Revival Reformation Classics: Can Change the World Again.

A Critical History of Philosophy.

By Asa Mahan

1883.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

SECTION I.

THE DESIGN AND PLAN OF THE WORK.

I PROPOSE, from a standpoint entirely new, in conformity with a plan, and for an end hitherto unattempted, to write a History of Philosophy. In the productions of this character which occupy places in the libraries of world-thinkers, we have, for the most part, a mere chronology of men and their systems, systems more or less distinctly exhibited. We are not, first of all, as we should be, put in full possession of the nature and character of Philosophy itself, of its appropriate and exclusive sphere in the empire of world-thought, and of the great problems of being and its laws, and of causes proximate and ultimate, which it is its province to solve, and which it must solve before its mission is ended. Nor are we informed of the principles and facts which must be laid down and adduced as the basis of all our deductions, and that as the immutable condition of a true solution of the problems under consideration. Last of all no consciously valid tests or criteria are given by which we may distinguish the true from the false methods of philosophizing, valid from invalid principles in science, or real from assumed facts which may be adduced, as the basis of scientific deduction.
On the other hand, we are informed, when any particular system is presented, that such an individual, in such an age, thought out that system. We are not rendered conscious of the real relations of the system to the true and proper system of Philosophy, what was the actual world-problem which the author attempted to solve, what was his actual method of philosophizing, what were the principles he laid down, and what were the facts which he adduced as the basis of his deductions, and wherein and why he succeeded or failed in accomplishing the end proposed.
Hence it is that, in the study of such productions, the reader finds, at length, a confused panorama of multitudinous contradictory systems passing before his mind, systems none of which he very clearly apprehends, until at last he comes to feel that 'chaos has come again.' He accordingly lays down the volume in which these systems are presented, with the consciousness that he has been rather confused than instructed by what he has read. In short, histories of philosophy have not, for the most part, to say the least, been what such productions should be, to wit, not mere chronologies of systems and men who have appeared and disappeared in the sphere of world-thought, but in the true and proper sense of the words, critiques of systems and men of the former ages especially, critiques which shall not only disclose to the thoughtful inquirer the mazes of 'science falsely so-called,' the deceptions of sophistry, the false assumptions and deductions of unbelief, and the hiding-places of error in all its assumed scientific forms, but shall open upon his vision the realm of truth itself; and 'the highway' of true science to that realm.

WHAT WE PURPOSE TO ACCOMPLISH, AND BY WHAT METHOD.

What we purpose to accomplish in the following treatise, together with the method by which we shall attempt to realize that purpose, has been indicated, though not fully developed, in what we have already stated. It is by no means certain that he who is able to point out the errors of others will succeed in remedying the evils of which he complains. Nor does the ability to show where and why others have deviated from the right path imply the possession of that higher wisdom by which the track of truth is revealed to universal mind. Our purpose is to attempt, at least, the accomplishment of both these results. We shall attempt, not only to expose the errors of 'science, falsely so-called,' but at the same time to render plain the track on which real science conducts to the domain of truth itself. Truth, when fully apprehended, not only demonstrates to the mind its own validity as truth, but at the same time makes equally manifest error as it is, error as constituted wholly of 'vain imaginings,' wild assumptions, and false deductions. Naked error is powerless to deceive, and borrows all its effectiveness from the fragments of truth with which it is associated. Error always starts upon the track of truth, and at particular points takes its departure from that path. Philosophy will never have completed its heaven-appointed mission until it shall have fully disclosed, not only the line on which truth leads, but shall have shown, with equal distinctness, where and why error, in all its forms, takes its departure from that line.
We shall, therefore, in this our introduction, stop for a while to disclose and determine 'the real nature and exclusive sphere of Philosophy itself; the great problems which it is its exclusive province to solve, the principles and facts which lie at the basis of valid deductions in this science, the criteria by which we may distinguish valid from invalid principles, and real from assumed or improperly adduced facts—the true and only true method of conducting our inquiries in this science—and this as distinguished from those which obtain in systems of error, the possible hypotheses of ontology and ultimate causation, and the tests by which we may distinguish among these the true from the false. We shall then be fully prepared, not only for a specification, but critical examination of the various systems which, in the present and past eras of the world's history, have been developed and commended to the regard of mankind.

SECTION II.

PHILOSOPHY—ITS NATURE AND TRUE AND PROPER SPHERE IN THE EMPIRE OF WORLD-THOUGHT.

SCIENCE has been rightfully defined as knowledge systematized. According to Webster, it is 'certain knowledge' or 'leading truths relating to any subject arranged in systematic order.' Pure science, such as the mathematics, is based exclusively upon self-evident principles and facts. The mixed sciences, such as physics and metaphysics, are built upon principles absolutely known as having universal and necessary validity, and facts of perception external or internal, facts known with equal certainty to be real. Knowledge pertaining to self-evident principles and facts is denominated knowledge À priori. Knowledge pertaining to facts of perception is called knowledge À posteriori. This distinction should be kept distinctly in mind, inasmuch as these two forms of knowledge will hereafter be frequently referred to under the above designations. Knowledge of the former kind is denominated necessary, and that of the latter contingent knowledge. Objects of the former class are apprehended as real, with the absolute impossibility of conceiving them as not existing, or as being in any respects different from, or opposite to, what we apprehended them to be. Objects of the latter class are conceived to be real, with the possibility of conceiving of their non-reality, or of their being different from what we apprehended them to be. While I know space, for example, to be a reality in itself, I find it to be an absolute impossibility for me even to conceive of its nonexistence, or as being, in any respect, different from what I apprehend it to be. The idea of space, therefore, is denominated a necessary idea. I know myself and body, on the other hand, as realities, and that with the same absoluteness that I know space to be a reality. Self and body, however, are conceived of as realities, with the possibility of conceiving that they do not exist, or that they might be, in themselves, other than they are. Our conceptions of self and body, therefore, are denominated contingent ideas. As far as absoluteness of validity is concerned, real knowledge in one form is just as valid for the reality and character of its object as in the other. Knowledge, in its necessary and contingent forms, differs merely and exclusively in regard to the nature of its objects and our modes of conceiving of the same, but not at all as far as validity is concerned. I know myself, for example, as a real self-conscious personality, with the same absoluteness that I know space as a reality. The difference pertains exclusively to my modes of conceiving of these realities. The same holds equally of real knowledge in all its forms, as far as absoluteness of validity is concerned.
Science, in constructing systems of truth, has to do with nothing but real knowledge; that is, with principles known to possess absolute and necessary validity, and with facts known, with equal certainty, to be real. Should any principle or fact whose validity or certainty is not thus known be taken up as a part of such system, the whole process would thereby be vitiated. In the sphere of human thought we meet, not only with forms of real knowledge, but with those of assumptions, beliefs, opinions, and conjectures. Systems based upon, or constructed out of the terms last noticed, are logical fictions, probabilities, or mere fancies, and not creations of science. To impose upon the public deductions based upon mere assumptions, conjectures, beliefs, or opinions, as truths of science, is sophistry. Real science never attempts to systematize or elucidate the unknowable, or the unknown. Realities discovered and brought within the sphere of actual knowledge, these are the exclusive objects of its authoritative teachings. Realities admitted to be located within the domain of the unknowable, or unknown, are thereby, in fact and form, wholly absent from the sphere of true science. Upon assumptions, nothing but logical fictions can be constructed. From mere beliefs, opinions, or conjectures, nothing but probabilities, possibilities, or guesses can be deduced.
Philosophy differs from science only as being less general and more specific and circumscribed in its sphere of inquiry and deduction. Science systematizes knowledge in all its forms. Philosophy, distinguished from science as a part from the whole, attempts 'an explanation of the reason of things,' or the causes of facts and events—ultimate causes especially. The grand problem of Philosophy pertains to the ultimate reason, the finally all-determining cause which reveals the reason why the facts of universal nature are as they are, and not otherwise. The problems of ontology, the inquiry what realities do exist, what are their nature and essence, qualities and attributes, what are the laws which govern them, and what is the ultimate reason or cause of the facts under consideration, these are problems with which Philosophy, in its true and proper sphere, concerns itself. In studying the history of Philosophy, we shall find that these are the main problems professedly solved in all the systems which we shall have occasion to investigate. Germany in former years claimed for itself the honour of being the home of Philosophy. Thinkers in other nations were occupied mainly in the sphere of psychology and kindred sciences, while German thought was devoted to the solution of the great problems pertaining to the conditions of valid knowledge, of ontology, of being, its nature and laws, and especially of ultimate causation. This claim was just as far as the true and proper idea of Philosophy itself, its real sphere in the empire of thought, and its great problems are concerned. Germany, as we shall see hereafter, erred fundamentally, as far as method is concerned, and, consequently, as utterly failed in the solution of the problems of world-thought.

WHAT DOES PHILOSOPHY IMPLY?

Philosophy is not a primary, but an ultimate form of thought. Science, as we have seen, is knowledge reduced to system. Philosophy is science in its ultimate form. Science as Philosophy, and in all other forms, implies the pre-existence of real knowledge. Knowledge must exist before it can be systematized or explained and elucidated. Neither science nor Philosophy can create knowledge. They can, we repeat, but systematize and elucidate the previously known. Real knowledge exists in the Intelligence in two forms, the systematized and elucidated, as in science and Philosophy, and in those primordial forms which precede science.

Relations of these two Forms of Knowledge to each other.

A very important inquiry here presents itself—to wit, what are the relations of these two forms of knowledge, the primordial and the systematized and elucidated, to each other? The former, we remark in general, must contain, in an unreflective and unsystematized form, all that is found in the reflective and systematized form. All systems of science and Philosophy are constituted wholly of principles and facts, the former organizing and elucidating the latter. These principles and facts must have been previously known, that is, in their primordial forms, or they could not have been employed in the construction of systems of knowledge. When we recur to the action of the Intelligence, and contemplate its states prior to all proper scientific movements, we shall discover two distinct forms of activity, the primal proper, or the purely intuitional, and what is denominated the practical, a state intermediate between intuition and science. By intuition all the elements which constitute systems of knowledge are given. In this primal action of the Intelligence, we have real knowledge with no intermixture of error. The reason is obvious. We have here the pure and exclusive action of the Intelligence uninfluenced by that of any of the other faculties. If the Intelligence should err here, it would be because it is its nature, or the necessary law of its activity, to err, and knowledge proper in any form would be impossible.
In the intermediate procedure of the Intelligence, the procedure denominated practical, we have, in their concrete and particular forms, all the principles and facts which constitute systems of knowledge. The child and the peasant, for example, when they perceive that two given objects are each equal to one and the same third object, know, with the same absoluteness that the philosopher does, that the two objects first designated are equal to one another. While all in common draw the same conclusions in view of the same facts, and all are guided in doing so by the same principles—to wit, things equal to the same things are equal to one another, the true philosopher only understands clearly the reason why he makes such deductions in view of the facts referred to. The reason is that he only knows this principle in its abstract and universal form, and in its light reflectively contemplates these facts. Knowledge, in its original, concrete, and particular forms, cannot be systematized. It is only when principles are evolved and presented in their necessary and universal forms, and facts are set in the clear light of such principles, that we have science or knowledge systematized, that is, truth in its scientific forms.
While in pure intuition we meet with nothing but the elements of real knowledge, in the practical forms of thought we find truth intermingled with error. The reason is that here, what does not occur in the primal intuitional state, we have the action of the Intelligence in connection with that of other faculties. As a consequence, we have forms of real knowledge intermingled with assumptions, opinions, beliefs, conjectures, and guesses, judgments, some of which are and some of which are not true, while others may or may not be true.

Criteria of True and False Systems of Science.

When systems are constructed exclusively from principles and facts which are the objects of intuitional knowledge, and from deductions necessarily implied by such principles and facts, we then, and only then, have true science. When, on the other hand, mere assumptions, opinions, beliefs, conjectures, or guesses, with deductions from the same, pass over and lie at the foundation, or enter as constituent elements into the structure of systems of affirmed knowledge, we then have 'science, falsely so-called.' We have here undeniably universal and infallible tests or criteria, by which, of affirmed systems of knowledge or science, we are to distinguish the valid from the invalid, the true from the false. Systems of the former classes are to be esteemed as rightfully having place in the sphere of true science. Those of the latter class are to be regarded as having place nowhere but within the circle of logical fiction. Deductions of the former class are to be regarded as truths of science; those of the latter, as the lawless sophisms or wild guesses of false science.

PRINCIPLES AND FACTS OF TRUE SCIENCE AS Distinguished FROM ASSUMPTIONS, OPINIONS, Conjectures, ETC.

A question of fundamental importance here arises—to wit, how shall we distinguish principles and facts of real science from mere assumptions, opinions, beliefs, conjectures, or guesses, which may be employed as principles or facts in the construction of systems of science? A ready answer can now be given to this inquiry, an answer the universal and absolute validity of which must be admitted as soon as the subject is understood. We begin with

Principles as distinguished from mere Assumptions.

Affirmed systems of science may, undeniably, be based either upon valid principles, or upon mere assumptions, that is, unauthorized judgments employed as principles in the construction of such systems. How shall we distinguish the former from the latter? Every judgment of the former class has, undeniably, and as all thinkers admit, these immutable and inseparable characteristics, absolute universality and necessity. In other words, it is absolutely impossible for the mind to conceive that they are not, and must not be, valid in themselves, and do not and must not hold true in respect to all objects and events to which they are applicable. Take as example such judgments as these: Things equal to the same things are equal to one another; A whole is greater than any of its Parts; Body implies space; Succession implies time; Events imply a cause; Phenomena imply substance; In every appearance some reality appears; The conditioned implies the unconditioned; and, It is impossible for the same thing at the same moment to exist and not exist. If we consider any one of these judgments, or all of them together, we shall perceive absolutely that they, one and all, have self-evident validity, and that universally; that they not only are true, but that they cannot be false, and cannot but hold true relatively to all objects and events to which they are applicable. Systems of knowledge resting upon such principles must have a strictly scientific basis. There are four, and only four, conditions on which any proposition or judgment can have self-evident validity. They are the following:

1. When the subject and predicate are identical, as in the judgment, A is A; these are mere tautological judgments, and, of course, are of no use in science.

2. When the predicate represents an essential element of our conception of the subject, as in the judgment, All bodies have extension; these are explicative judgments, and, as such, have important uses in science.

3. When the subject implies the predicate, as in the judgment, Body implies space; as in all such cases it is impossible to conceive of the reality of the object represented by the subject without affirming the same of that represented by the predicate, all such judgments do and must have universal and necessary validity. These are called implied or implicative judgments, and may be and are employed as principles in all the sciences.

4. When the subject sustains to the predicate the relation of absolute and intuitive incompatibility, and the judgment affirms that relation, as in the judgments, It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to exist and not to exist; and, A strait line cannot enclose a space. All the axioms and principles in all the sciences belong to one or the other of the two classes last named, the positive to the former, and the negative to the latter. No judgment can have universal and necessary validity, but upon one of the four conditions above specified, for the reason that it is utterly impossible for the mind even to conceive of any other condition on which any judgment can possess self-evident, universal, and necessary validity. We thus have an absolutely valid test by which we can infallibly determine the character and claims of any proposition or judgment which may be employed as a first principle in science. Any judgment not having any one of these characteristics is to be rejected, together with the system based upon it, as utterly void of validity.
What, as distinguished from valid principles in science, are assumptions? They are, we answer, judgments having no self-evident validity in themselves, which have not, if true, been verified as true, or which may be false in fact; judgments which are, nevertheless, employed as principles in the construction of systems of science. All systems resting upon assumptions instead of valid principles, whatever their characteristics in other respects, and whatever names they may represent, are nothing but logical fictions. When any system has been ascertained and shown to rest on such a basis, no further examination of its claim is required. It is to be esteemed and treated as an unsubstantial creation of false science.

Opinions, Beliefs, Conjectures, etc., as distinguished from Facts of real
Knowledge.

But how shall we distinguish real knowledge pertaining to realities and facts from mere opinions, beliefs, and conjectures pertaining to the same objects? Phenomena of the class last named, we answer, may be and often are changed, varied, or utterly and for ever displaced from human regard. We may hold one opinion or form of belief to-day, and its opposite to-morrow. Forms of belief which for ages, it may be, have had absolute authority in human regard, may, by increase of knowledge, be utterly displaced from human thought and regard. Real knowledge, on the other hand, has the character of absolute immutability. So far as we really and truly know an object, our convictions pertaining to it can never by any possibility be either changed or modified.
Mutability, then, is the fixed characteristic which reveals and distinguishes all mental apprehensions and judgments as mere opinions, beliefs, conjectures or guesses. Absolute immutability, on the other hand, as absolutely reveals, characterizes, and distinguishes from all other phenomena real knowledge in all its forms. When we have apprehensions and convictions relatively to any objects or facts, apprehensions and convictions which neither reasoning, nor sophistry, nor any increase of knowledge or forms of experience can displace, change, or modify, here we find ourselves in the presence of real knowledge, or knowledge in no form has place in human thought. Who will question the validity of the above distinctions and criteria? All systems of error, then, have their basis in assumptions, or are constituted in their superstructure of mere beliefs, opinions, conjectures, or guesses at truth. All systems of real science have for their basis universal and necessary principles, and in their superstructure are constituted exclusively of the forms and elements of real knowledge.

Intuitions and Forms of Belief which take rise from Intuitions.

We can now understand how it is that real intuitions are often confounded with forms of belief which are sometimes connected with and take rise from the former, and how it is that the validity of the former is called in question from the fact that the latter is found to be false. From the appearance of the earth as visible to the eye, the race once held that our globe is a vast plane, dotted with mountains, hills, valleys, lakes and oceans. The visible is the object of intuition. The judgment that the earth is a plane, and not a globe, is an unauthorized inference deduced from the intuition, an opinion which a wider induction of facts proved to be false. From the actual visibilities of the earth, as related to the sun, the moon, and the stars, men once inferred that all the heavenly bodies moved daily round the earth. What was actually seen is one thing; an inference deduced from visible facts is quite another. In what was really seen we have facts of actual intuitive knowledge. In what was inferred we have opinions, beliefs, conjectures, in all of which there is liability to error. The same holds true in all similar cases. In all appearances, even in what are called the optical illusions of mirage, some reality appears. In what actually appears we have facts of intuition, and here is real knowledge. In what is inferred from such facts, here, and only here, is the illusion. Such discriminations must be made everywhere; otherwise we shall confound truth with error.

CONDITION OF REAL KNOWLEDGE.

Science, as we have seen, is knowledge systematized. A question of fundamental importance here presents itself—to wit, What is the immutable condition of real knowledge? To this question but one answer can be given: Knowledge implies a subject possessed of the capacity or power to know, and an object so correlated to this faculty, that when the proper conditions are fulfilled, knowledge of said object necessarily arises, in consequence of that reciprocal relation. On no other condition is it possible for us even to conceive of the existence or possibility of knowledge. If knowledge exists at all, it must be, we repeat, because there exists a faculty which is, relatively to some object, a power of knowing, and an object which is, relatively to such power, an object of knowledge; and the power and object in such relations to each other, that real knowledge arises in consequence of this relation. Let anyone attempt to conceive of the fact or possibility of a knowledge of any object whatever on any other condition than the one before us, and he will find himself utterly unable to form such a conception. We have here, then, the one absolute condition of real knowledge—a condition which properly takes rank as a principle of science.

THE QUESTION, WHAT CAN WE KNOW?—HOW ANSWERED.

The question, What can we know? can be correctly answered but by a valid answer to another—to wit, What do we know, and what is implied by facts of actual knowledge? À priori, we cannot determine whether any or what faculties or objects of knowledge do, or do not, exist. The existence and nature of all powers and causes of every kind are revealed and determined, not à priori, but exclusively, by the known effects which they produce, and through what is implied by such effects. So of a power of knowledge. The existence and nature of said power can, by no possibility, be determined but through facts of actual knowledge. The question, What can we know? together with the other question, What are the extent and limits of valid knowledge? is determinable, we repeat, only through a valid determination of the facts and objects of actual knowledge, and what is implied by the same. We have in the answer now given to the question, What can we know? another immutable principle of universal science. Any other answer to this question conducts us, not in the direction of true, but of false science. The fundamental postulate of all the sciences, is the existence of the intelligence as a faculty with correlated objects of valid knowledge. Take away this one postulate, and we have undeniably no basis for scientific induction or deduction in any direction whatever. If no reality is known and recognizable as known, we have self-evidently nothing, not even knowledge itself, to systematize, explain, or elucidate. No principles are, or can be, of more fundamental importance and authority in science than those just defined, together with the criteria previously given—criteria by which we can infallibly distinguish, in respect to principles and facts of science, all forms of valid knowledge from assumptions, beliefs, opinions, and conjectures which enter, as constituent elements, into all systems of 'science falsely so-called.'

CONDITIONS, EXTENT, AND LIMITs OF VALid KNOWLEDGE AS AFFIRMED IN ALL SYSTEMS OF MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM.

The conditions, extent, and limits of valid knowledge as affirmed by the founders and advocates of Materialism on the one hand, and Idealism on the other, now claim a moment's attention. Materialism, as taught by all its advocates, affirms the absolute impossibility of valid knowledge, but upon one exclusive condition—that the object shall be external to the faculty of knowledge. In other words, we can have no real knowledge of any realities but such as are external to us. Idealism, on the other hand, denies absolutely the possibility of all knowledge of outward objects. In the different schools of idealism, the condition of valid knowledge is expressed in two forms: 1. That there must be a ' synthesis of being and knowing;' that is, that the subject and object of knowledge must be one and identical. This is the condition on which, as a principle, pantheism and subjective idealism are in fact and form based. 2. 'An absolute identity of being and knowledge;' that is, that knowledge itself and the object of knowledge must be one and identical. It is a question in dispute among German thinkers whether Schelling or Hegel first announced this condition as a principle in science.

Remarks on these Hypotheses.

On these hypotheses we have the following fundamental remarks to offer: 1. The condition of valid knowledge, in neither of the forms above announced, has even the appearance of self-evident certainty, and consequently has no claim whatever to the place in the sphere of thought assigned to said condition by its advocates—to wit, that of a principle in science—a principle which has universal and necessary validity. Knowledge not merely in one, but in three distinct forms, and the consequent existence of corresponding powers of knowledge, are equally conceivable, and, therefore, in themselves possible. We can conceive of an intelligence to which nothing but a knowledge of external objects is possible. Equally conceivable is an intelligence capacitated exclusively for subjective knowledge, or of one which shall know its own knowledge. Finally, we can with equal facility conceive of a power of intelligence to which knowledge in all these three forms shall be both possible and actual. All this is undeniable. How, then, can we determine under which of the above conceptions the human intelligence shall be classed? Not à priori, as is attempted in each of the schools under consideration. A penny is about to be thrown into the air. We should regard an individual as demented who should affirm himself possessed of the power to determine by à priori insight, and that with absolute certainty, which side will fall uppermost. Equally removed from such insight are the three cases under consideration. The possibility of knowledge in any one form designated is just as conceivable, and, therefore, as probable in any given case as in any of the others. À priori, it is just as possible and probable in itself that the human intelligence is capacitated for real knowledge in all these forms, as in any one of them.
The question before us, then, is to be determined wholly and exclusively à posteriori; that is, by reference to actual facts of consciousness. If we are actually conscious of knowledge, but in one exclusive form, the objective or subjective, or of actually knowing no other object but the mere act of knowing itself, such, we are to affirm, are the nature, extent, and limits of our faculty of knowledge. If, on the other hand, we are absolutely conscious of actual knowledge in all these forms, upon this adamantine fact we are to base our deductions in regard to the nature, extent, and limits of the human intelligence as a faculty of knowledge. The hypothesis of Materialism, and those of Idealism in all its forms, stand revealed as mere lawless assumptions, and nothing else.
2. While the hypothesis of Materialism on the one hand, and those of Idealism on the other, are utterly incompatible the one with the other, the evidence in favour of the claims of the former is absolutely equal to that in favour of the latter. The possibility of knowledge in its objective is just as conceivable as in its subjective forms. No à priori proof, evidence, or antecedent probability, can be adduced in favour of one as against the other. The evidence à posteriori, also, is balanced with equal absoluteness. We are as perfectly conscious of actual knowledge in one form as in the other. No possible argument can be adduced in favour of one hypothesis, an argument which does not bear with equal absoluteness in favour of the other.
3. In the clearest possible testimony of universal consciousness we have absolute disproof of both these hypotheses. If we are conscious of anything, we are conscious, and equally so, of actual knowledge, both in its subjective and objective forms. In every act of external perception, for example, we are just as absolutely conscious of knowing 'things without us,' as we are of knowing facts of internal experience. To deny this is, in the language of Sir William Hamilton, to affirm 'consciousness to be a liar from the beginning.'
4. Each of these hypotheses, by impeaching the validity of consciousness in one form, implies the absolute impossibility of real knowledge in any form. Each hypothesis denies absolutely the validity of consciousness in one of its known forms. If this faculty, as is affirmed, fundamentally deceives us in one form, it is to be trusted nowhere. Each of these hypotheses actually saps the foundation of knowledge in every sphere, actual and conceivable.
5. The hypothesis of Pure Idealism, that of 'absolute identity of being and knowing'—that is, that knowledge itself and the object of knowledge are always one and identical—is of utterly inconceivable and impossible validity. Thought without a thinker, ideas existing nowhere and in no time, and existing as the attributes of no real being, phenomena without substance, events without causes, and knowledge without a subject or object, except knowledge itself—can a greater absurdity have place in this or any other world? It was well said by a great German philosopher that the system of Hegel, which was based upon this hypothesis, was 'nothing in itself nor of itself; nor was its author in himself, but beside himself.' We can affirm with perfect safety that any professed system of science which has its basis in either of the above hypotheses must be void of all claims to truth, if that hypothesis is not and cannot be verified.

SECTION III.

FOUR, AND BUT FOUR, REALITIES ARE REPRESENTED, OR ARE REPRESENTABLE, IN HUMAN THOUGHT.

We now advance to a consideration of the hypothesis which lies at the foundation of this entire Treatise, the hypothesis about which all the inductions, deductions, expositions, and elucidations of said Treatise revolve. The hypothesis is this: Four, and but four, realities ever have been, or by any possibility can be, represented as realities in human thought. We refer, of course, to spirit and matter, time and space. Whatever is represented or representable as real, must of necessity be apprehended as one or the other of these realities, or as a property, attribute, state or effect of the same. The reason is obvious and undeniable. Nothing else is the object of perception external or internal, and no other reality is implied by what we perceive.

Body and its qualities, of which we become conscious through external, and mind with its operations, of which we become conscious in internal, perception, do imply the reality of time and space, and imply nothing else. Time and space by themselves do not imply the reality of either matter or spirit, much less, if possible, do they imply any other reality. Undeniably, no reality is or can be representable in human thought but objects of external and internal perception, and such as are implied by what we perceive. All must admit that no other realities are the conscious objects of perception, external or internal, but matter and spirit, with their phenomena, and that these imply no other realities but time and space. These realities are, undeniably, represented in human thought, and it is equally manifest that none others can be thus represented.

Let anyone attempt to form a positive conception of some reality which is neither matter, spirit, time, nor space, and he will find that he has attempted an utter impossibility. The reason is obvious. No elements of thought exist, elements out of which such a conception can by any possibility be constructed. All ideas in the mind, and all language also, take exclusive form from our apprehensions of these four realities, and of their apprehended attributes, properties or phenomena. Whatever is apprehended as not being one or the other of these realities, or their properties or phenomena, is, of necessity, apprehended as nothing—as no reality at all. Thoughts of such realities must be utterly objectless, and as wholly void of content in themselves; while the words representing such ideas must be totally void of meaning. Human thought is necessarily limited to these four realities, their nature, attributes, properties, phenomena, and mutual relations included.

NATURE, CHARACTER, AND MUTUAL RELATIONS OF THESE FOUR REALITIES.

Questions of fundamental importance here arise; namely, What are the essential characteristics, as represented in human thought, of these four realities? What are their mutual relationships, the one to each of the others? and what are their relations as objects of knowledge to the human intelligence? These questions, as we believe, admit of definite answers, and may be settled upon purely scientific grounds. Let us proceed to the accomplishment of these objects.

All these Realities are distinctly represented in Human Thought.

Our first position is this, all these realities are, in fact, distinctly represented in human thought. No individual, young or old, learned or unlearned—an individual of common understanding—misappre- hends us when we speak to him of matter or spirit, time or space. Nor does he ever confound any one of these realities with any other. In all languages, also, specific terms are employed to represent each of these realities. In all systems of Philosophy, too, the existence of all these realities, and the validity of our knowledge of the same, are affirmed or denied, and that in forms which imply the absolute universality and identity of human apprehension of all these existences. When philosophers, for example, deny the existence of any one of these realities, or impeach the validity of our knowledge of the same, no one misunderstands them. Such facts absolutely evince the existence in all minds of the apprehensions, clear and distinct, of all these four realities. Nor will real thinkers of any school deny the validity of these statements.

No other Reality is or can be represented in Human Thought.

Nor is any other reality represented in human thought; nor can we receive any such representation until some fifth entity, having none of the properties of any of these, is distinctly manifested to us. À priori, we cannot determine what realities do or do not exist in time and space. À posteriori, we perceive, and consequently know of none but material or mental entities, together with their attributes, properties, and relations. Nor of any effects ever perceived by us, are we able to affirm absolutely that they are not the phenomena of material or spiritual entities. No philosopher has ever witnessed a single phenomenon not connected with one or other of these substances. Pure idealists give us a system which has no material or spiritual substance in it. Every constituent element of that system, however, is taken, body and soul, from one of the known attributes of one of these substances—to wit, thought. Suppose that all of these realities, with all their attributes, properties, and mutual relations, were left out. Where would be our material for the construction of any system, or for the formation of any conception of any reality whatever? The fact that, in such circumstances, we can have no thought representations of any realities of any kind, evinces absolutely that the elements of all our conceptions and ideas are derived wholly from these four realities.

These Realities wholly unlike each other.

We remark, in the next place, that as represented in human thought, each of these realities is wholly unlike every other. There is not an essential property or attribute of any one of them that, in any form, resembles any property or attribute which, as represented in human thought, pertains to either of the others. When we have fully analyzed our apprehensions of space, for example, we cannot find in the idea a single element which can be found in our apprehension of either of the other realities. So in all other cases. When we compare our conceptions of matter and spirit, we find in these conceptions no common elements. What is there in thought, feeling, and acts of will, which include all the attributes of mind, that in any sense resembles extension and form, essential properties of matter—that is, whenever we compare these realities as actually represented in human thought? We sometimes, but never in the same sense, employ the same term to represent certain properties of each of these realities. We speak, for example, of body, space, and time, as having extension. But neither, as represented in thought, has extension in the same sense and form that either of the others has. The fact is undeniable that, as represented in our apprehensions, each of these realities is wholly unlike every other. We may, by assumption, resolve matter into spirit, and spirit into matter, and time and space into mere laws of thought. In our actual apprehensions, however, they are still the same distinct, separate, and dissimilar realities that they were before. We may assume that certain movements of matter eliminate thought and other mental acts and states, and that the content of all objects of external perception is sensation, a mere feeling of the mind. But we can no more conceive matter as exercising the functions of spirit, or as identical with any mental state, than we can conceive of the annihilation of time or space. We can as readily conceive of empty space as actually thinking, feeling, and willing, or as possessed of the properties of solidity and form, as in thought to affirm the former class of phenomena to be functions of matter, or the latter to be attributes of mind. Some scientists have assured us that in dissecting and analyzing a dead man's brains, they have discovered the identical process by which matter eliminates thought. With just as great a show of wisdom they might affirm that they had discovered and demonstrated that the powers of thought, feeling, and willing, together with that of gravitation, necessarily inhere as essential properties in a circle or square. Thought, with all the other functions of mind, is not at a greater remove from our apprehensions of a triangle than it is from that of matter. Of the validity of all these statements every mind must be absolutely conscious.

These Realities differ equally relatively to our Manner of Perceiving and Apprehending them.

If we contemplate these realities with reference to our manner of perceiving and apprehending them, we shall find them in forms equally fundamental, distinguished and peculiarized, the one from each of the others. Matter, we consciously perceive, in all its properties, as an exterior object distinct and separate from ourselves. Of mind, in all its functions and operations, we are conscious as the object of internal perception. As thus perceived, these realities are never in thought confounded, but for ever separated, the one from the other. Space we are conscious of apprehending as implied by body, which we perceive, and as the place of the same. Time we apprehend as implied by successive events of which we are conscious, and as the place of such events. As related to our manner of perceiving and apprehending them, each of these realities thus stands at an infinite remove from every other.

There are two peculiarities which separate time and space, with their properties, from spirit and matter, with their phenomena. The former we apprehend as existing, with the impossibility of conceiving of their non-existence, or as being in any respects different from our apprehensions of them. Matter and spirit we apprehend as realities, with the possibility of conceiving of their non-being. While we cannot conceive of space or time as not existing, we can conceive of them as unoccupied by substances and events. We therefore classify our ideas of the former realities as necessary, and those of matter and spirit as contingent, ideas. Time and space, also, are, though in different senses, apprehended as absolutely infinite and unlimited; the former in the past and future, and the latter in all directions. Matter and our own spirits, in senses equally special and peculiar, are apprehended as finite and limited; the former as existing in and occupying space, and the latter in the range of its faculties. Thus distinct and separated in human thought and apprehension is each of these realities from every other. In this light true science must and will recognize them.

These Realities sustain to each other fixed and definable relations.

While these realities, as universally represented in human thought, are thus unlike, distinct, and dissimilar, each from every other, they all sustain to each other fixed and definable relations. Some of these we have already specified. Space and time are apprehended as the places of substances and events, and as the necessary conditions of their existence and occurrence. We cannot conceive of substances and events without apprehending them as existing somewhere, that is, in space, and as occurring in definite periods of time. The ideas of space and time also render conceivable the possibility of the existence and occurrence of substances and events. If the former are not real, the latter cannot be.

While our ideas of space and time, that is, necessary ideas, are thus universally given as the logical antecedents of contingent ideas, those of matter and spirit, and in the order of origination in the mind, that is, contingent ideas, as universally precede necessary ones. Space and time are apprehended but as the places of substances and events, and as implied by the same. In no other forms can the former be defined. It is self-evident that a reality which is and can be apprehended, but as the place of, and as implied by, some other reality, cannot have been apprehended before the latter. Contingent ideas, then, must have been originated in the mind before necessary ones could have been. These relations, the logical and chronological order of these ideas, should be clearly apprehended and kept distinctly in mind, as they will hereafter be found to be of fundamental importance in the explanation of different systems of Philosophy.

Another relation of equal importance between our apprehensions of these realities here claims special attention. We refer to the relation of absolute compatibility. There is absolutely nothing in our ideas of any one of these realities in the remotest degree incompatible with our apprehensions of either of the others. The idea that space is a reality in itself is in no sense or form incompatible with the idea that time is also, and in the same sense, real. The idea that space and time are realities in themselves is equally compatible with the conception that matter and spirit are also realities in themselves. Nothing is or can be more self-evident than this, that an implied reality cannot be incompatible with the reality by which the former is implied, and that the latter cannot be incompatible with the former. The same relation of absolute compatibility exists between our apprehensions of matter and spirit. Matter is apprehended as relatively to spirit an object, and the latter as a faculty, of knowledge. The conception of the reality of one is in no sense or form incompatible with that of the other. Matter is apprehended as a substance existing in and occupying space, and, consequently, as possessed, among others, of the qualities of real extension and form. Mind is apprehended as an immaterial substance exercising the functions of thought, feeling, and willing. The idea that the object of the former apprehension exists as a reality in itself in no sense whatever contradicts the idea that the object of the latter exists as a similar reality. Nor can we find, on the most rigid scrutiny, in one of these apprehensions, a single element in the remotest degree contradictory to any element existing in the other. How, for example, can extension, form, colour and attraction, existing as qualities in one substance, be in the remotest degree incompatible with any form of thought, feeling, and willing, existing as attributes of another substance?

These Apprehensions not Self-contradictory.

Nor, we remark finally, can any self-contradictory elements be found in our apprehensions of any one of these realities, elements which prove such apprehension to be invalid for the reality and character of its object. As we here encounter the only formal argument ever adduced against the validity of our knowledge of the realities under consideration, very special attention is requested to what we have now to offer. Our apprehensions of each of these realities are, it is affirmed, self-contradictory, and, therefore, invalid. Let us see if any such contradictions do indeed exist in these apprehensions. Our ideas of space and time are undeniably absolutely simple ideas, and can, therefore, by no possibility, be either of them self-contradictory. The fundamental elements of contingent ideas are substance and attribute, the latter implying the former. Here, undeniably, is not the remotest appearance of self-contradiction. The implied, and that by which the former is implied, cannot be incompatible the one with the other. The same holds true of all the constituent elements relating to each other, elements of each of these apprehensions. There can be nothing, for example, in any form of thought that is incompatible with the existence of any feeling or act of will, facts which exist or occur in the mind. Nor is there the remotest appearance of incompatibility between any one of these classes of phenomena and any other. The idea of mind as possessed of threefold capacities, those of thought, feeling, and willing, is just as self-consistent as any idea can be. Analyze the facts of mind as carefully and fully as may be, and we shall find between every one and every other of them the fixed relation of absolute compatibility.

In respect to what is intrinsic in our apprehensions of matter, but one seeming contradiction is found, and this not in the idea as it actually exists in the mind, but in another substituted for this, and constituted for the occasion. The apprehension actually existing in the mind is this: all objects of external perception are apprehended as compound substances constituted of simple parts, the former being divisible, and the latter wholly incapable of being divided, the simple, also, being given not as perceived, but as implied by the compound which is an object of perception. Here, again, we have the perceived and the implied, between which there can by no possibility be any real nor even apparent contradiction. The seeming contradiction is thus rendered plausible. Take any material object we please. We apprehend it as a whole, made up of parts. Conceive this object divided, and then form a conception of either of the parts. The result will be that this new conception will be found to be like the first, constituted of the idea of a whole made up of parts. Repeat the operation as long and often as we please, and the same result will be obtained—the conception of a whole made up of parts. Hence the deduction that all our apprehensions of material objects are those of compounds constituted of compounds, which is self-contradictory. Our apprehensions of material objects being thus self-contradictory, the further inference is deduced that such apprehensions cannot be valid for the reality and character of their objects. The fallacy involved in such reasoning is obvious. A fiction is here substituted for a reality. The actually existing apprehension of material objects is, as we have seen, not that of a compound made up of parts which are themselves compounded, and capable of being divided, but of a compound constituted of absolute simples, simples which cannot be separated into parts. To prove the existence of contradictory elements in any conception, we must take that conception as actually given, and not as it is not given, in consciousness. The conception of material objects actually given is wholly void of real or apparent contradiction. The fiction substituted for what is real has in it incompatible elements. The manner in which this self -contradictory fiction is formed may be readily explained. When we form a conception of any material object, we employ a secondary intellectual faculty, the understanding, or notion-forming power of the mind. All such objects apprehended through this faculty must be conceived of as wholes constituted of parts. If we conceive an object to be divided, and then, through this secondary faculty, form a conception of either of the divided parts, we shall obtain the same result as before, the conception of a compound constituted of parts. Continue the process of division and of conception as long as we please, and the same result follows, the conception of a compound made up of parts. Now, it is not through such a process, or by means of this conceptive faculty, that we obtain our idea of the simple which cannot be divided. This idea, on the other hand, is furnished wholly through a primary faculty, the reason, the organ of implied knowledge, the faculty which gives us the necessary elements which enter into all our conceptions. We perceive body, succession and events. Reason, on occasion of such perceptions, apprehends space, time, substance, and cause, as necessarily implied by what we perceive. So, when we perceive the compound, reason apprehends the simple as implied by the perceived. The understanding blends the perceived and implied elements into the conception represented by the term body.

Between the perceived and implied elements constituting this conception, as in all other cases of perceived and implied knowledge, even the appearance of incompatibility or self- contradiction is impossible. It is thus demonstrably evident that our apprehensions of no one of the realities under consideration are in any sense or form incompatible with those of any other, and that our actual apprehension of each one of them is equally void of contradictory elements.

An argument against the validity of our knowledge of all material objects is also drawn from our affirmed apprehensions of the infinite divisibility of matter. On the one hand, it is affirmed that it is impossible for us to conceive of matter as real without conceiving of it as being infinitely divisible. On the other hand, infinite divisibility cannot be represented in thought. Hence the inference that our ideas of this substance cannot be valid. Such is the argument of Kant, and from him as given by Herbert Spencer. In our actual apprehension of this substance, as we have seen, it is not conceived at all as being, in itself, infinitely divisible, but the opposite. Suppose, now, that we can or cannot conceive of it as being thus divisible. From this fact we cannot infer that it does not exist in the form in which we actually conceive it to exist. Who doubts the actual existence in space of a straight line one inch long? Yet all that Kant and Spencer have said about the divisibility of matter apply in fact and form, as shown in 'The Science of Natural Theology,' pp. 272, 273, to our apprehensions of every such line. We should subject ourselves to the just charge of infinite stupidity if we should infer from such quibbling that no such lines do or can exist. So of the same identical argument against the validity of our idea of matter. Matter in any form, as conceived by the understanding, is divisible. Not so of its constituent elements as apprehended by the reason.

Necessary Deductions from the Principles and Facts just evinced as True.

1. Any systems of science or Philosophy, systems built upon the hypothesis that the relation of incompatibility exists between our apprehensions of any one and any other of the four realities under consideration, or that any of these apprehensions are, in themselves, self-contradictory—any such systems, we say, have place nowhere but in the sphere of 'science falsely so-called.' They can have no claims whatever to our regard as 'knowledge systematized.'

2. Equally void of all claims to our regard, as a principle in science, is the hypothesis that lies at the basis of Materialism on the one hand, and of Idealism on the other, to wit, that there exists but one substance or principle of all things. It is demonstrably evident that no form of proof, positive evidence, or even antecedent probability, can be adduced in favour of this hypothesis. No one will have the effrontery to claim for it the prerogative of a self-evident judgment. The predicate, in this case, is, undeniably, neither identical with, nor does it represent an essential element of, the subject, nor is it implied by the subject. In short, this hypothesis has not one of the immutable characteristics of a self-evident proposition or principle in science. À priori, we have just as much authority for the hypothesis that two substances exist, as we have, or can have, that but one exists. Nor can we find, in the whole range of human thought, a single principle or fact which renders it, in the remotest degree, certain, or even probable, that this hypothesis is true. On the other hand, we have the same evidence that two substances, matter and spirit, exist, that we have, or can have, that one or the other of them does exist. The deduction which lies at the basis of the two systems under consideration, the hypothesis which must be true, or each of them must be false, is nothing but a mere bald, naked, and lawless assumption, an assumption which has no more claims to our regards as a principle or fact in science than can be claimed for the greatest absurdity that was ever intruded into the sphere of human thought.

3. Our next deduction is this: no form nor degree of disproof, positive evidence, or antecedent probability can, by any possibility, be adduced against the validity of our apprehensions of any one, or all of the four realities under consideration. In itself, as we have seen, it is just as possible and probable that the objects of all these apprehensions exist together, as that any one of them exists alone. Nor can anything, as we have further seen, be shown to exist intrinsically in any one of these apprehensions, anything, in any form or degree, disproving or rendering improbable the validity of such apprehension for the reality and character of its object. Nowhere, in the wide range of human thought, can a solitary principle or fact be adduced, a principle or fact on the authority of which the absolute validity of our apprehension of any one of those realities can be justly impeached.

4. The validity of our last deduction is rendered self-evident by what has just been proven. The deduction may be thus stated: any form of positive proof or valid evidence in favour of the validity of any one or all of our apprehensions of matter, spirit, space, and time, for the reality and character of their objects, verifies for such apprehensions a place in the sphere of true science. Whenever two hypotheses are present, one of which must be true and the other false, the total absence of all evidence in favour of one, and positive evidence in favour of the other, vindicates for the latter a claim in our regard as a valid principle or real fact of science. The same holds true of a given hypothesis, against which no form or degree of disproof, positive evidence, or antecedent probability can be adduced, and in favour of which real proof or valid evidence does exist. Such, undeniably, are the real relations of science to each of the four apprehensions under consideration. Whether such forms of proof and valid evidence in their favour do exist, is hereafter to be shown. The bearing of such proof or evidence, when adduced, is undeniable. To render perfectly distinct the true state of the case, is the object of the present presentation.

THESE FOUR REALITIES ARE APPREHENDED BY UNIVERSAL MIND AS ACTUALLY KNOWN REALITIES, NOR CAN OUR APPREHENSIONS OF ANY ONE OF THEM BE CHANGED, MODIFIED, OR DISPLACED FROM HUMAN THOUGHT.

Our next position in regard to these four realities, space, time, matter, and spirit, and in regard to our apprehensions of the same, claims very special attention on account of its fundamental bearings upon our present and future inquiries. Our position is this: these four realities, all in common, are apprehended by universal mind as actually known realities, and our apprehensions of them, in all their essential characteristics, can, by no possibility, be changed or modified or displaced from human thought.

We think of space as the place of substances, of time as the place of events, and of space and time as the necessary condition of the possibility of the existence of substances and the occurrence of events. We then think of body as existing in and occupying space, and consequently, as possessed of real extension and form. We finally think of ourselves, our minds, as real, substantial personalities exercising the functions of thought, feeling, and willing. Not a shadow of doubt exists in our minds that all these objects of thought are realities in themselves, and that we actually apprehend them as they are. In other words, all these realities are consciously represented in universal thought as absolutely known realities. Our apprehensions of them do not lie under the eye of consciousness as mere assumptions, opinions, beliefs, imaginings, or guesses, which may or may not be true, but as forms of absolute knowledge. In the interior of his own mind, no one is ever conscious of himself as merely thinking, supposing, imagining, or guessing what he thinks, feels, and wills, but as absolutely knowing himself as the subject of all these operations. We are not conscious of matter as an object of doubtful belief, imagining, or of 'prudent guessing,' but as a directly perceived, and, therefore, known reality. The certainty of the self and the not-self, as given in universal consciousness, is equal and absolute. While we thus know mind and matter as realities in themselves, we do and must know with the same absoluteness that they do and must exist and act in time and space. Time and space, therefore, must be recognized in the consciousness, not only as actual, but as known realities. No one can honestly interpret the facts of his own consciousness and doubt the perfect validity of the above statements.

This leads us to remark, in the next place, that in all essential particulars, and in certain fundamental respects, our apprehensions of each and every one of these realities can, by no possibility, be displaced from human thought, nor can they, in any form, be changed or modified. As far as our apprehensions of space and time are concerned, we have already seen that it is absolutely impossible for us to conceive of the non-existence of these realities, or of their being, in any respects, different from what we apprehend them to be. In the absolute validity of these statements all thinkers of all schools agree. So far, then, the apprehensions under consideration must be admitted to have an immutably fixed place and character in human thought.

An equally immutable fixedness of place and character, in all essential particulars, is possessed, in universal thought, by our apprehensions of mind and matter. We are ever immutably conscious of ourselves, and cannot but be thus conscious, as real, substantial personalities possessing the powers and exercising the functions of thought, feeling, and willing. Nor can we possibly change or modify our apprehensions of ourselves as such personalities. We may assume and affirm matter to be the only reality, and that thought, feeling, and willing are nothing but phenomena of this one substance. Or we may assume and affirm that neither matter nor spirit exist as real substances, and resolve all realities into pure thought. In the very midst of all such assumptions and reasonings, and despite of all such deductions to the contrary, we are, and cannot but be, present to ourselves as the identical personalities above defined. While Messrs. Hill, Huxley, Spencer and Emerson, for example, stand out to themselves, in their systems, as demonstrated nonentities, they are, like all the rest of the race, ever present to themselves as real substantial personalities—yes, more than this, as real substantial thinkers of great eminence. They have never for a moment doubted, or can doubt, of themselves, or changed or modified their apprehensions of themselves in the particulars above stated. Conscious thinkers attempting to demonstrate to themselves, and to all mankind, that they themselves do not think at all? This is the scientific farce which such thinkers are perpetually acting and re-acting before themselves and before the world, and all this with the eye of their own consciousness ever fixed with direct, distinct, and clear vision upon their own substantial selves as stultifying themselves. We can no more, in the interior of our own minds, doubt the absolute validity of our knowledge of ourselves, or change or modify our apprehensions of ourselves, that is, in the fundamental particulars under consideration, than we can doubt the validity of our knowledge of a circle or square; or change or modify our apprehensions of these figures. In our interior apprehensions and convictions, we no more, and can no more, confound our conscious selves with material existences around us, our minds with our bodies, or our souls with our brains, than we do or can confound a circle with a triangle. In all minds in common, all reasonings and affirmed demonstrations to the contrary notwithstanding—in all minds in common, we say, spirit and matter are as distinctly separated and distinguished, the one from the other, as are the two figures above named from each other.

The same remarks are equally applicable to our apprehensions of matter. All men are distinctly and absolutely conscious of a direct and immediate perception of this substance as a reality exterior and objective to the mind, and as possessed, among others, of the essential qualities of extension and form. This apprehension which we have of this substance, together with our absolute conviction of its real existence as such a substance, can no more be displaced from human thought, or in any sense or form be changed or modified, than can our apprehensions and convictions in respect to any mathematical figures whatsoever. In the absolute validity of these statements, all men, philosophers among the rest, perfectly agree. Kant, for example, while he denies absolutely the validity of all our apprehensions of both matter and spirit, affirms, as absolutely, that it is impossible for reasoning or philosophy to displace these apprehensions from human thought, to change or modify the same, or to banish the conviction which is omnipresent in universal mind, that these apprehensions have absolute validity for the reality and character of their objects. The reason which he assigns for this undeniable fact, is this: 'We have to do with natural and unavoidable illusion, which reposes upon subjective principles.' This 'natural and unavoidable illusion,' he adds, 'is not one in which, for instance, a blockhead, from want of knowledge, involves himself, or which a trickster has artfully imagined in order to torment reasonable people, but one which irresistibly adheres to human reason, and even when we have discovered its delusion, still will not cease to play tricks upon reason and to push it continually into momentary errors, which always require to be corrected.' We have, undeniably, in all such cases, not reason through laws 'irresistibly inhering' in itself, imposing upon itself 'natural and unavoidable illusion,' and as necessarily 'playing tricks' upon itself. We have, on the other hand, reason itself, through its inherent and immutable laws, correcting the illusions and tricks which false science is endeavouring to impose, as truths of real science, upon the universal human intelligence. In accordance with the teaching of Kant, Coleridge affirms that our apprehension of external material substances, together with our absolute belief of the validity of such apprehension, is 'innate, indeed, and con-natural,' that it 'remains proof against all attempts to remove it by grounds or arguments,' and 'lays claim to IMMEDIATE certainty as a position at once indemonstrable and irresistible.' Yet he affirms this belief to be 'nothing but a prejudice, innate, indeed, and con-natural, but still a prejudice.' No philosopher of any age or school, a philosopher who denies the validity of our knowledge of the nature of matter especially, ever did deny, or will deny, the above statements of Kant and Coleridge. All agree that our apprehensions and beliefs in respect to the essential characteristics of spirit and matter are 'natural and unavoidable,' 'innate, indeed, and con-natural,' that they cannot be eradicated; changed, or modified, but 'remain proof against all attempts to remove them by grounds or argument,' and 'lay claim to immediate certainty as a position at once indemonstrable and irresistible.' 'This faith,' that is, this natural, unavoidable, irresistible, and immovable conviction, 'the philosopher,' that is, philosopher of his school, Mr. Coleridge tells us, 'compels himself to treat as nothing but a prejudice,' an 'illusion,' as Kant calls it. We fully confess that we regard an assumption forced upon the mind by an act of will, and that in opposition to a natural and immovable intellectual intuition,' which 'remains proof against all attempts to remove it by grounds or arguments'—we regard such a forced assumption, we say, 'as nothing but a prejudice, 'an illusion' of false science. On the other hand, we regard an intuitive conviction, which no system of philosophy can change, modify, or displace from human thought, as itself a truth of real science. The fact is undeniable, that all these realities are distinctly revealed in the universal consciousness as objects of valid knowledge, that in all essential particulars our apprehensions of these realities can, by no possibility, be changed, or modified, or displaced from human thought, and that the validity of these apprehensions can be impeached, not by any principle or fact given as valid, or real, by the intelligence, but by a mere assumption forced into the sphere of thought by a lawless act of will, an assumption in which we compel ourselves to 'treat as nothing but a prejudice,' an 'illusion,' apprehensions which the intelligence does and must regard as forms of absolute knowledge. We shall have occasion to speak, more at length, upon this great central fact hereafter.

OUR APPREHENSIONS OF THESE REALITIES HAVE ALL THE FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FORMS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE, CHARACTERISTICS WHICH TRUE SCIENCE MUST AND WILL ACKNOWLEDGE.

We now advance to our great central and final position in regard to these realities, and to our apprehensions of the same. These apprehensions, we remark, possess all actual and conceivable characteristics of real absolute knowledge, and hence, true science must, and will, accept of the objects of these apprehensions, as realities in themselves, and as being in themselves what we apprehend them to be. The validity of this position we argue from the following considerations:

I. The Validity of these Apprehensions Cannot be Disproved, or Rendered Doubtful.

We affirm, then, in the first place, that by no possibility can the validity of these apprehensions be disproved or rendered, in the remotest degree, doubtful. To accomplish such a result, we must find forms of knowledge of the validity of which we are, and must be, more certain than we are of that of these apprehensions, forms which if true, the latter must be false. The only conceivable conditions on which such incompatible forms of knowledge can be discovered and adduced are the following 1. An attempt may be made to show that such forms of knowledge are naturally impossible. 2. Or that facts exist outside of the sphere of these apprehensions, facts incompatible with the validity of said apprehensions. 3. Or such facts may be sought in the relations of these apprehensions to one another. 4. Or, finally, these facts may be sought in what is intrinsic in one or more of the apprehensions themselves. We propose to consider, in the order designated, these, the only conceivable forms of disproof that can be adduced.

1. Such Forms of Knowledge not Naturally Impossible.

Valid knowledge, in all these forms, cannot be shown to be impossible in itself. Nor is there any form or degree of antecedent probability against the actual existence of such knowledge. Knowledge in its exterior is just as conceivably possible as in its interior form. If we should, as philosophers of a certain school do, deny the possibility of knowledge in any one form, because we cannot show how such knowledge is possible, we should be compelled to deny its possibility in every form. Suppose the transcendental philosopher were required to show us how and why thought becomes its own object, and knows itself? He assures us, that in all acts of external perception, an exclusively mental state is made to appear to the mind, as the exclusive quality of an object exterior to, and separate from, the perceiving subject. He would find the how and the why quite as inexplicable in all such cases, and indeed in all cases, as in that of actual external perception. The real question for science to determine is not how and why we know in any case, but what we do know. No one can affirm à priori that God does not possess actual knowledge in all these forms, and that He cannot create an intelligence capacitated for such knowledge. We cannot, therefore, affirm à priori, that the human intelligence is not such a power. If such knowledge is not, and it undeniably is not, self-evidently impossible in itself, then there is, and can be, no antecedent probability against the actual existence of such a power; and the question whether the human intelligence is, or is not, such a power, is simply a question of fact, and is to be determined, like all other questions pertaining to mental facts, by an appeal to consciousness. The question for science is simply this: Are we, in fact, conscious of knowing our own mental states, and also 'things without us,' and also time and space as necessary existences, and as necessarily implied by what we perceive? If such is found to be the real state of our consciousness, science demands that we shall recognize the human intelligence as such a power.

2. Facts in Disproof cannot be found outside of the Sphere of these Apprehensions.

We may go wholly out of the spheres of all these apprehensions, and seek for real facts there, facts of the reality of which we are, and must be, more assured than we are of the existence of the realities under consideration, facts which absolutely imply the invalidity of said apprehensions. Now, outside of this sphere, undeniably no facts exist of which we can form the remotest apprehension. As far as human thought can reach, or divine, we are here in the region of absolute nonentity, in the midst of total vacancy, where nothing is revealed as the basis of any deductions whatever. In the midst of this 'palpable obscure,' nothing, surely, is, or can be revealed, to invalidate our knowledge of space, time, matter, or spirit.

3. Facts in Disproof cannot be found in the Relations of these Apprehensions to one another.

Or, we may seek for the form of knowledge after which we are inquiring, in the relations to one another of our apprehensions of the four realities under consideration, and may look for the object we seek in that direction. But here our researches will be found to be as vain and fruitless as before. Each of these apprehensions, as we have seen, sustains the relation of absolute compatibility with every other. There is the utter absence of all appearance of contradiction between our ideas of space and time, and between those and our apprehensions of matter and spirit. Nor is there a solitary element in our apprehensions of either of these substances, in the remotest degree, incompatible with, or contradictory to, any element existing in the other. No one professes to find here anything whatever to disprove or render improbable the validity of our knowledge of any one of these realities.

4. Such Facts cannot be found in what is Intrinsic in any of these Apprehensions.

Or, finally, we may look for the object we seek in the only remaining direction, in what is intrinsic in one or more of these apprehensions themselves. We have already anticipated nearly, or quite, all that can be found here bearing upon our inquiries. Ever since the days of Zeno, of the Italic School of Greece, philosophers of the same school have affirmed that none of our world-conceptions, or necessary ideas, can be valid for the reality and character of their objects, because all such apprehensions contain, within themselves, the elements of absolute self-contradictions. Here the following fundamental questions at once present themselves. Are we, or can we be, as absolutely assured, or more so, of the actual existence of such contradictions, than we are of the reality of time and space, on the one hand, and of our personal existence as exercising the functions of thought, feeling and willing, and of matter, as having real extension and form, on the other? Can I be so absolutely certain that these philosophers are right, as I am that I am now thinking upon the subject? Can I be so certain of the validity of their argument to prove the existence of these contradictions, as I am that I think, I feel, and I will, and that matter is immediately and directly before me, as possessed of the qualities of real extension and form? These philosophers themselves admit and affirm that in their own minds the conviction of the absolute validity of these conceptions and ideas 'remains proof against all their attempt to remove it, by the grounds and arguments' which they themselves adduce. Why, then, should we admit the validity of such grounds and arguments? We may ask, further, whether the same, or precisely similar, perplexities and seeming contradictions do not connect themselves with absolutely known truths? Something is real. This is undeniable, and will be admitted by the class of philosophers under consideration. Against the validity of this undeniable proposition, there exist, in all their force, all the difficulties, perplexities, and arguments, ever adduced against the validity of all our world-conceptions, and necessary ideas. If anything, be it spirit or matter, exists, it must exist somewhere and in some time, that is, in time and space. This implies the real existence, as realities in themselves, of time and space, and that in absolute accordance with our apprehensions of these realities. But time and space, these philosophers assure us, are not, and cannot be, the realities which we apprehend them to be, because such apprehensions have in them the elements of absolute contradiction. Now, reasoning which, if its validity be admitted, would prove absolutely that no form of being does, or can exist, can have validity in no sphere of human thought, much less against our world- conceptions and necessary ideas.

But we are fully able to see through and expose the sophistry and false deductions of these philosophers. All the contradictions which they adduce are, as we have already seen, undeniably found to exist exclusively, not in our world-conceptions, which actually exist in human thought, but in fictions manufactured for the occasion, and substituted for realities as they are. A compound constituted of compounds, and represented as such in thought, is self-contradictory, and cannot be real. Such, it is affirmed, are all our world-conceptions. On the other hand, the conception of a compound constituted of absolute simples is an idea void of all appearance even of self-contradiction. Such, as we have seen, are, without exception, all our world-conceptions, as they actually exist in human thought. Taken as they actually exist in the universal consciousness, no element can be found in any of these apprehensions—no element in the remotest degree incompatible with any other found in the same conception.

The argument of Mr. Spencer to prove that our ideas of space and time are self-contradictory, and that space and time cannot, therefore, be in themselves the realities which we apprehend them to be—his argument on this point, we say, is based wholly, in fact and form, upon the assumption that, if they exist at all, space and time both must exist as 'entities or the attributes of entities,' as 'things having or not having attributes,' facts utterly incompatible with our actual apprehensions of these realities. Here, again, we undeniably have a fiction substituted for a reality, and imposed upon the mind as that reality. Space and time are actually apprehended as the places of 'entities and their attributes,' and of 'things having attributes,' and not as entities, things, or attributes of entities; and nowhere but in the brain of a bewildered philosopher are our ideas of these realities confounded with our conceptions of 'entities' and 'things' and 'their attributes,' substances and attributes existing in time and space. If by the terms 'entity' and 'thing' Mr. Spencer means not substances, but realities, then his argument has no other characteristic than that of senseless tautology. It stands thus: If space and time are real substances in themselves—that is, realities—they must be realities or the attributes of realities.' If by these terms he means substances or their attributes, he has undeniably confounded the implied with that by which the former is implied, and stands openly convicted of a gross sophism. Neither substances nor their attributes are or can be time or space, but, as the immutable condition of the possibility of their existence, imply time and space. Time and space, as actually represented in human thought, therefore, are not substances or entities, but yet realities in themselves, and such realities as we apprehend them to be; and our apprehensions of them have not, as Mr. Spencer affirms, a 'purely relative,' but an absolute validity.

In his chapter on 'Ultimate Scientific Ideas,' Mr. Spencer has fully demonstrated the validity of our ideas of these realities. Against the monstrous absurdity of Kant, that space and time are nothing in themselves but 'à priori laws or conditions of the conscious mind,' Mr. Spencer urges the following demonstrative argument: 'If space and time, present to our minds, belong to the ego, then of necessity they do not belong to the non-ego. Now, it is absolutely impossible to think this' (that they do belong to the ego). Again, 'The direct testimony of consciousness is, that time and space are not within but without the mind, and so absolutely independent of it that they cannot be conceived to become nonexistent, even were the mind to become non-existent.' No reasonable man will or can question the demonstrative validity of this argument. If the 'direct testimony of consciousness' is to be admitted as of absolute validity in one, it must be in all cases. This is self-evident. 'Now, the direct testimony of consciousness is' not only that 'space and time cannot be conceived to become non-existent, even were the mind to become nonexistent,' but that, as realities, they cannot be conceived to be, in any respects whatever, different from what we apprehend them to be. The testimony of consciousness is just as absolute in one case as in the other. Our apprehensions of space and time, therefore, have in all respects absolute validity for the reality and character of their objects. From all that has been shown above, the deduction is absolute that the invalidity of our apprehensions of time and space, matter and spirit, cannot by any possibility be disproved or rendered in the remotest degree improbable.

II. Our Apprehensions of Space, Time, Matter, and Spirit are, in all their essential elements and characteristics, distinct, separate, and dissimilar from all Assumptions, Beliefs, and Opinions, which may or may not be true.

Our apprehensions of the four realities under consideration are, we remark in the next place, in all their essential elements and characteristics, most obviously distinguishable from and dissimilar to all forms of assumptions, opinions, beliefs, and conjectures, which may or may not be true. Phenomena of the latter class, all in common, as we have seen, have these fixed characteristics, that they are subject to change, modification, and displacement from human thought and regard. Our apprehensions of the realities under consideration, as we have also seen, have, all in common, characteristics of a distinct and opposite nature—characteristics equally and absolutely fixed and immutable—the utter impossibility of being changed, modified, or displaced from human thought and regard.

The elements also which enter into and constitute our fundamental apprehensions of space and time, matter and spirit, have all the characteristics of original intuition, while assumptions, beliefs, and opinions have all the characteristics of secondary operations— operations in which acts of the intellect are, to a greater or less degree, modified or determined by impulsions of the sensibility, or volitions of the will. How often do men think so-and-so because they desire or determine thus to think! Thus, consequently, we have assumptions, beliefs, opinions, conjectures, and guesses—that is, ever-changing phenomena, in which error and truth are lawlessly intermingled. In original intuition, which precedes such impulsions and determinations, we have pure intellection—the direct, immediate, and open vision of truth itself. Assumptions, beliefs, and opinions consequently come and go, appear and disappear, and take on an endless diversity of modifications. Original intuition, however, never changes. By every law and principle of correct classification our fundamental apprehensions of space and time, and spirit and matter, take rank, not among changeable and ever-changing assumptions, opinions, or belief's, but among the immutable facts of original intuition. In the universal consciousness the essential elements of all these apprehensions are distinctly recognized, not as belonging to the former class of phenomena, but as facts of original intuition. We regard ourselves as self-conscious personalities, exercising the functions of thought, feeling, and will, and matter as an exterior substance having extension and form, not because we desire or choose thus to regard ourselves or it, but because we are absolutely conscious of a direct and immediate intuition of ourselves as such personalities, and of it as such a substance. By conscious intuition similarly direct and immediate we recognize space and time as the places of substances and events, realities implied by what we perceive, and the conscious objects of necessary ideas. In all systems of true science, therefore, these essential apprehensions will be distinguished and separated from all the variable and ever-varying phenomena above designated, and ranked among the adamantine facts of original intuition.

III. These Apprehensions have all Possible Positive Characteristics of Real Absolute Knowledge.

Having shown incontrovertibly that the validity of these apprehensions can, by no possibility, be disproved, or, in any form or degree, rendered improbable, and having as incontestably proven that they are to be distinguished and separated from all forms of assumption, opinion, and belief, which may or may not be true, we now proceed to demonstrate, by the most rigid application of scientific criteria, that these apprehensions possess, in their most perfect forms, all conceivable characteristics of real knowledge. The facts already established evince this beyond all reasonable doubt, if they do not render it demonstrably evident. Apprehensions existing in all minds in common; apprehensions which can by no possibility be in the remotest degree changed, modified, or displaced from human thought and regard, and which, by fundamental characteristics, stand utterly distinguished and separated from all forms of assumptions, opinions, and beliefs which are continually subject to change and modification, and are often wholly displaced from human thought and regard—if such facts do not verify apprehensions as forms of actual knowledge, we can have no evidence that real knowledge, in any form, has a dwelling-place in the mind of man. Let us, however, enter at once upon a careful scrutiny of these apprehensions in the light of scientific tests, or criteria which absolutely verify, as such, all forms of real knowledge—knowledge which has place in systems of true science.

Necessary Ideas.

We commence with our necessary ideas of space and time. We have precisely the same evidence that these objects are realities in themselves, and, in all respects, such realities as we apprehend them to be, that we have of the truth of the axioms, Things equal to the same things are equal to one another, and It is impossible for the same thing, at the same time, to exist, and not to exist. Why do we, and all men, hold these propositions to be true? But one answer can be given. It is absolutely impossible for us even to conceive them not to be true. We, therefore, rightly affirm that we know absolutely that they are and must be true. The validity of such forms of knowledge cannot be doubted. For the same identical reasons for which we affirm that these axioms are and must be true, we affirm space and time to be realities in themselves, and in all respects such realities as we apprehend them to be. We can no more conceive that space and time are not realities in themselves, and the identical realities which we conceive them to be, than we can conceive that things equal to the same things are not equal to one another, and that it is possible for the same thing, at the same moment, to exist and not exist. That our apprehensions of space and time are, in the sense explained, necessary ideas, all thinkers of all schools admit and affirm. 'We can never,' says Kant, 'make to ourselves a representation of this, that there is no space, although we may very readily think' (conceive) that no objects therein are to be met with.' 'Time,' he says, 'is a necessary representation.' 'Space and time,' says Mr. Herbert Spencer, as already cited, 'cannot be conceived to become non-existent.' No thinker was ever known to deny the validity of the expositions here given. We must hold, then, that time and space are realities in themselves, or deny the validity of all the principles and axioms of all the sciences, the mathematics among the rest.

Contingent Ideas—Matter and Spirit.

Let us now turn our attention to contingent ideas, and consider the relations of said ideas to their objects, matter and spirit. These ideas, we affirm, as seen in the clearest light of all absolute scientific criteria applicable to such cases, have all the characteristics of real, valid knowledge. This we affirm from the following considerations:

1. There are no other forms of knowledge which have, or can have, in them the elements of more absolute certainty. We are just as distinctly and absolutely conscious of knowing these realities as they are, as we are of knowing time and space as they are in themselves. The conscious certainty of knowledge is just as absolute in one case as in the other. This certainty also admits of no degrees. Whenever we think of time and space, we are at one time just as certain that we know them, as we are at any other. With the same changeless certainty, we know ourselves as personalities exercising the functions of thought, feeling, and willing and matter as directly and immediately before us, and as possessed of extension and form; we thus know ourselves and matter, we say, whenever we think of ourselves and it. This omnipresent and changeless conscious certainty is one of the fixed and immutable tests of real knowledge. Some individuals do, indeed, deny the validity of our knowledge of these realities. The same individuals, however, all in common, deny the validity of knowledge, even in its necessary forms. On one condition only can the validity of our knowledge of either of these realities be denied, to wit, a universal and absolute impeachment of the intelligence itself, as a faculty of knowledge in every form.

2. Another infallible, scientific criterion of valid knowledge is the direct, immediate, and absolute testimony of the universal consciousness. If we apply this test with the utmost scrutiny, we shall be compelled to rank our fundamental apprehensions of matter and spirit among the most clearly marked forms of real knowledge. Of nothing can we be more distinctly and absolutely conscious than we are of our personal selves, as thinking, feeling, and willing, and absolutely perceiving, or knowing, matter as an exterior reality having real extension and form. If we think of the qualities of matter, we find most clearly and definitely marked forms of real knowledge. We need to refer here but to two classes of qualities, the primary and the secondary. The latter are, in universal mind, recognized as the unknown causes of known states of the sensibility, sensations, of which we are directly and absolutely conscious. The primary qualities, on the other hand, are as universally recognized as the equally known objects of known states of the intelligence, external perception, of which we are as directly and absolutely conscious. The secondary quality is given in consciousness as felt, and, therefore, inferred. The primary, on the other hand, is given as directly and immediately perceived, and, therefore, affirmed. We are conscious of a medium, sensation, between us and the unknown cause of the sensation. We are as absolutely conscious of direct and immediate knowledge in respect to the known object of perception. There is no more obvious and dangerous error in science than the hypothesis that all our knowledge of matter is indirect and mediate, through sensation. We must affirm, then, that our knowledge of mind, on the one hand, and of matter, on the other, is, in its fundamental characteristics, of absolute validity for the reality and character of its object, or, in the language of Sir William Hamilton, 'affirm consciousness to be a liar from the beginning.'

3. The fundamental elements which constitute our apprehensions of these substances have all the characteristics of original and direct intuition. We are absolutely conscious that our present fundamental perceptions, external and internal, are intuitional, and the apprehensions thus originated have all the characteristics of perfect immutability. This evinces, undeniably, that the elements constituting these apprehensions have, from the beginning, been of the same character. On no other hypothesis, also, can we account for the origin of these apprehensions. We apprehend ourselves as self-conscious personalities, exercising the functions of thought, feeling and willing. But one account can be given of the origin of such an apprehension—the consciousness of self as the subject of such phenomena. The immutable condition of the origination in the intelligence, of the apprehension of an exterior object, having extension and form, is the actual conscious perception of such object. There is nothing in mere sensation, an exclusively sensitive and subjective state—a state utterly void of extension, form, colour, solidity, or attraction, even to suggest an exterior object, much less one having these specific qualities. How could a mere subjective state, void of all these qualities, be consciously perceived as an exclusively exterior object having these specific qualities? How can different sensations, all absolutely agreeing in this, that they are exclusively subjective, and as such, all in common, utterly void of the element of extension—how, we ask, can such sensitive states be perceived, not only as exclusively exterior objects, but as such, all having this element in different degrees, one being, for example, ten or an hundred times as large as the other? Of two exclusively subjective states, how, we ask again, can one of these sensations be perceived in consciousness as wholly a subjective state, and thus originate the idea of a secondary quality of matter, and the other subjective state be perceived in the same consciousness as a quality of an object wholly exterior to and separate from the mind, and thus originate the idea of a primary quality of the same subject? Of two sensations both in common exclusively phenomena of the self, how can we be conscious of one as an exclusive quality of the self, and of the other as, with equal exclusiveness, a quality of the not-self? If the sensational hypothesis is true, we have, undeniably, an absolute refutation of the axiom, Things equal to the same things are equal to one another.

But one rational account can be given of the origin of our fundamental apprehensions of matter and spirit, viz., that those apprehensions must, from the beginning, have been constituted wholly of original intuition, and must, therefore, be regarded as forms of real knowledge. No deduction can have higher claims to absolute validity than this.

4. Immutability, as we have seen, is another all-authoritative criterion which characterizes and peculiarizes all forms of absolute knowledge. As we have also seen, we can no more change, modify, or displace our essential apprehensions of space and time, matter and spirit as realities in themselves, and the identical realities which we apprehend them to be, than we can change, modify, or displace our apprehensions of a circle or a square. Do what we will, reason upon the subject as we may, space and time, matter and spirit are before us as known realities, and by no possibility can we change, modify, or displace our apprehensions of them as such realities. Assumptions, opinions, beliefs, and conjectures may 'appear for a little while, and then vanish away.' While they remain they are subject to perpetual changes and modifications. But here are apprehensions which have absolute fixedness of form and place in human thought. Nothing but real knowledge can be even conceived to possess such immutably fixed characteristics. These apprehensions, then, do, and must, take rank as forms of real knowledge. Nothing but 'science, falsely so-called,' can place them under any other category.

5. The reasons, we remark again, for which philosophers of certain schools have impeached the validity of one or more of these apprehensions, vindicate most absolutely their claims to our regard as forms of real knowledge. These reasons take on two, and only two, forms: (1) that which we have already considered, the elements of contradiction said to be found in the apprehensions themselves. These contradictions we have already shown to be wholly imaginary, and that the deduction based upon them is void of validity. On this topic nothing more need be adduced. (2) The only remaining reason is based upon the difficulty which philosophers find in accounting for the possibility of knowledge, either in its subjective or objective form. One class cannot see how knowledge is possible but of 'things without us,' and the other but of mental states. The Idealist, as a consequence, in the language of Coleridge, 'compels himself to treat' what all admit to be the universal faith of mankind, that there exist things without us,' as 'nothing but a prejudice.' Suppose that we cannot account for the possibility of real knowledge in any form. Shall we, for such a reason, deny the facts of actual knowledge, the facts of the reality of which we are absolutely conscious? Did ever a greater absurdity have place in the brain even of a crazy philosophy? In the case before us, it should be borne in mind that we have nothing but a few self-styled philosophers against the world, philosophers themselves of all schools included. While the philosopher is 'compelling himself,' in the construction of his system, to treat 'as nothing but a prejudice' this universal faith, in his inward immovable convictions, as he himself acknowledges, he believes, as absolutely as do the rest of mankind, in space and time, matter and spirit, as knowable and actually known realities. No philosopher of any school will deny the perfect truthfulness of these statements. Apprehensions distinctly revealed in the universal consciousness as having undeniable validity for the reality and character of their objects, apprehensions, also, which can by no possibility be impeached but for the reason above stated, such apprehensions, we say, science must and will recognize as forms of absolute knowledge.

6. One reason more, and we close the present argument. The validity of our apprehension of no one of these realities can be impeached but for 'grounds and arguments' which, if admitted, would utterly annihilate the validity of the Intelligence itself, as a faculty of knowledge in every form whatever. If apprehensions, the validity of which cannot be disproved or rendered improbable, which, by fundamental characteristics, are distinguished and separated wholly from all assumptions and beliefs which may be true or false, which cannot be in the least degree changed, modified, or displaced from human thought, which co-exist in universal mind with an absolute certainty of their truthfulness, which are consciously constituted of the elements of original intuition, which the universal consciousness distinctly and positively recognizes as pertaining to their objects as directly and immediately perceived, or as necessarily implied by what is thus perceived, which can be 'treated as a prejudice,' but for reasons of which science has just cause to be ashamed, and which finally can be impeached but 'for grounds and arguments' which, if their validity be admitted, would imply the universal and utter falseness of the Intelligence itself as a faculty of knowledge, if such apprehensions are not verified as forms of absolute knowledge, knowledge, we repeat, in no form has or can have place in the human mind. We have, then, real valid knowledge of the four realities under consideration.

SECTION IV.

ORIGIN, GENESIS, AND CHARACTER, OF ALL ACTUAL AND CONCEIVABLE SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE DIVERSE SYSTEMS DEFINED.

WE are now fully prepared to explain distinctly the origin, genesis, and character, of all actual and conceivable systems of Philosophy, Systems which demand the investigation, elucidation, and criticism of the individual who writes a critical History of Philosophy. All such systems have their origin and genesis in, and take definite and fixed forms from, certain postulates pertaining to affirmed necessary relations of the human Intelligence, as a faculty of knowledge to these four realities. As the number of these relations is fixed and definite, but a certain fixed and definite number of systems of Philosophy ever have arisen, or can arise. They are the following: 1. It may be postulated that knowledge is possible but in its objective form, that is, relatively to 'things without us,' and that it is actual in this exclusive form. This postulate gives us Materialism, the system which affirms matter to be the only existing substance. 2. It may be assumed, on the other hand, that knowledge is possible but in its subjective form, that is, relatively to mind, or its operations, and is actual in this form. Hence Idealism, with its varied systems, Idealism which resolves all realities into mind, or its operations. 3. We may, in the next place, deny the validity of knowledge, both in its objective and subjective forms, affirming all our knowledge to be exclusively phenomenal, mere appearance in which no reality, as it is in itself, appears, and, in the language of Mr. Herbert Spencer, 'that the reality existing behind all appearance is, and ever must be, unknown.' This gives us the hypotheses Scepticism, which denies the possibility of any positive system of knowledge. Of all such systems, Scepticism affirms that each may, or may not, be true, and that by no possibility can we determine which is and which is not true. 4. We may, finally, affirm knowledge to be possible and actual in both forms, and hence include in our theory of existence spirit and matter, and space and time, as knowable and known realities. Here we have the hypotheses of Realism. As these four include all possible systems, and as each is perfectly incompatible with every other, one of these must be true, and all the rest false. The grand problem in philosophy is this, to determine absolutely which, of all these conflicting hypotheses, is true. How can this question be answered? We have the answer, we judge, in the preceding discussions, in which it has been incontestably proven that we have a valid knowledge of all the four realities under consideration, and, consequently, that the Intelligence is, in fact, a faculty of real knowledge, in its objective, subjective, and implied forms. In all these respects the verdict of the universal consciousness is perfectly clear, distinct, and absolute. The self, the not-self, and space and time, as implied by the self and not-self, of all these we are distinctly conscious as objects of real knowledge. Nor is there any distinction in the distinctness or absoluteness of the testimony of consciousness in respect to the existence or character of the self and not-self, or in respect to the reality of space and time as implied by the known facts of matter and spirit. The validity of consciousness is to be admitted or denied universally in respect of all these realities in common. Some special remarks, however, are required in respect to each of the hypotheses before us. We commence with

MATERIALISM.

Materialism, as we have said, affirms the possibility of knowledge in the objective form exclusively, and its actuality in this one exclusive form. As nothing but the known can have place in a system of science, matter as the only substance, and with it Atheism, is the necessary deduction from this hypothesis.

The doctrine of Materialism is set forth in two forms by its various advocates, each having a special hypothesis pertaining to the mode of our knowledge of matter: (1) Our knowledge of this substance is affirmed to be direct and immediate, and therefore of absolute validity; (2) our knowledge of this same substance is affirmed to be indirect and mediate—that is, through sensation. No other cause, however, it is assumed, but an external, material one can by any possibility account for the existence of sensation. On both hypotheses, therefore, our knowledge of this substance is to be regarded as having absolute validity. Matter being thus assumed to be the only existing substance, and the exclusive principle of all things, certain problems, nearly or quite definite in number and character, present themselves, and that with corresponding solutions of said problems. These problems and solutions, in nearly the same forms, will present themselves among all peoples, and be repeated over and over again in every age, among whom and in which the doctrine itself shall be avowed. The Materialism of the present century has, in no essential particulars, changed the forms, the problems, and the expositions and solutions of the same which, in the earliest eras of philosophy, presented themselves to the Oriental and Grecian mind. The present state of thought and inquiry, however, forces upon the advocates of this hypothesis certain special problems which must be solved, or the hypothesis itself must be abandoned. Let us consider some of these problems.

Necessary Problems which this Hypothesis involves.

1. The general assumption that lies at the basis of this hypothesis is this, that but one substance or principle of all things does or can exist. Unless this assumption can be proved to have absolute validity, Materialism must be regarded as nothing but a logical fiction. How can the Materialist verify this assumption as a truth of science? This is the first problem devolved upon him by the exigencies of his system. Has this assumption self-evident validity? No one will pretend that it has. How can its validity be demonstrated as a deductive verity? It is equally undeniable that no grounds or arguments can be adduced to verify it as such a truth. The whole system of Materialism has, undeniably, no other basis than a mere naked, lawless assumption, and can have no more claim to our regard than the empty assumption on which the system rests.

2. The special assumption that lies at the basis of Materialism in both its forms is this, that knowledge is possible but in its external form, and is actual in this form. One of the great problems devolved upon the advocates of this hypothesis is the verification of this assumption. It is, undeniably, not self-evidently true; nor can the remotest degree of antecedent probability be adduced in its favour. Real knowledge in its subjective form is just as conceivably possible, and therefore as antecedently probable, as in this. Equally impossible is it, by any process of logical deduction, to prove it true. Consciousness does, indeed, affirm knowledge to be actual in respect to 'things without us.' Its verdict, on the other hand, is equally absolute in respect to the fact of subjective knowledge. How, then, can this assumption be verified as a truth of science? The thing is undeniably impossible. Yet this assumption must be absolutely verified, or the system based upon it must be regarded as a logical fiction.

3. A third problem is this—to explain, in consistency with the principle of the system, the conscious facts of subjective knowledge just as they exist in universal mind. If knowledge is possible and actual but in respect to things without us—that is, in its objective form—then the words subject and object, I and thou, the me and the not-me, are words without meaning. If this assumption is valid, no philosopher can distinguish between himself and the beast on which he rides; nor could Mr. Compte, while living, have known himself to have been the author of 'The Positive Philosophy.' Here is the fatal rock that lies in the necessary course of Materialism. Upon that rock the system must fall, or be fallen upon by it. In the one case his system will 'be broken; in the other, it will' be ground to powder.

4. Another problem devolved upon the advocates of Materialism by the exigencies of their system is this—to demonstrate the fact that the fundamental elements of subjective and objective knowledge are perfectly identical in their nature. The fundamental characteristic of the object of subjective knowledge is the personal self exercising the functions of thought, feeling, and voluntary determination. The equally fundamental characteristic of the object of objective knowledge is an impersonal not-self possessed, among others, of the essential qualities of extension and form. Unless the Materialist can demonstrate that these two classes of conscious facts are absolutely identical in their nature, and necessarily imply a corresponding identity in the nature of the subject and object, and that nature an undeniably material one, the system itself stands revealed as a fiction of a crazy Philosophy.

Can the Materialist solve such a problem as this? We have but two scientific criteria by which to judge of the nature of substances through their fundamental phenomena. They are these: Phenomena in their essential characteristics alike are to be referred to the same substances; Phenomena in their equally essential characteristics unlike are to be referred to distinct and separate substances. These are the immutable and exclusive principles of all correct classification and deduction. Now when, and only when, the Materialist will demonstrate the fact that thought, feeling, and willing are identical in nature with extension and form, and that all these in common are and must be the exclusive phenomena of external material substances, then we will agree with him in affirming matter to be the only existing substance.

5. Another fundamental problem forced upon the Materialist by the exigencies of his system is, to verify the logical conne