DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.

BY REV. ASA MAHAN,
PRESIDENT OF THE OBERLIN COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE.

1845.

CHAPTER III.

LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

WE come now to consider the great and fundamental characteristic of the Will, that by which it is, in a special sense, distinguished from each of the other mental faculties, to wit: that of Liberty.

SEC. I. TERMS DEFINED.

Our first inquiry respects the meaning of the term Liberty as distinguished from that of Necessity. These terms do not differ, as expressing genus and species; that is, Liberty does not designate a species of which Necessity expresses the genus. On the other hand, they differ by way of opposition. All correct definitions of terms thus related, will possess these two characteristics. 1. They will mutually exclude each other; that is, what is affirmed of one, will, in reality, be denied of the other. 2. They will be so defined as to be universal in their application. The terms right and wrong, for example, thus differ from each other. In the light of all correct definitions of these terms, it will be seen with perfect distinctness, 1st, that to affirm of an action that it is right, is equivalent to an affirmation that it is not wrong; and to affirm that it is wrong, is to affirm that it is not right; 2nd, that all moral actions, actual and conceivable, must be either right or wrong. So of all other terms thus related.

The meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as distinguished the one from the other, may be designated by a reference to two relations perfectly distinct and opposite, which may be supposed to exist between an antecedent and its consequent.

1. The antecedent being given, one, and only one, consequent can possibly arise, and that consequent must arise. This relation we designate by the term Necessity. I place my finger, for example, constituted as my physical system now is, in the flame of a burning candle, and hold it there for a given time. The two substances in contact is the antecedent. The feeling of intense pain which succeeds is the consequent. Now such is universally believed to be the correlation between the nature of these substances, that under the circumstances supposed, but one consequent can possibly arise, and that consequent must arise; to wit—the feeling of pain referred to. The relation between such an antecedent and its consequent, therefore, we, in all instances designate by the term Necessity. When the relation of Necessity is pre-supposed, in the presence of a new consequent, we affirm absolutely that of a new antecedent.

2. The second relation is this. The antecedent being given, either of two or more consequents is equally possible, and therefore, when one consequent does arise, we affirm that either of the others might have arisen in its stead. When this relation is pre-supposed, from the appearance of a new consequent, we do not necessarily affirm the presence of a new antecedent. This relation we designate by the term Liberty.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ABOVE DEFINITIONS.

On the above definitions I remark:

1. That they mutually exclude each other. To predicate Liberty of any phenomenon is to affirm that it is not necessary. To predicate Necessity of it, is equivalent to an affirmation that it is not free.

2. They are strictly and absolutely universal in their application. All antecedents and consequents, whatever the nature of the subjects thus connected may be, must fall under one or the other of these relations. As the terms right and wrong, when correctly defined, will express the nature of all moral actions, actual and conceivable, so the terms Liberty and Necessity, as above defined, clearly indicate the nature of the relation between all antecedents and consequence, real and supposable. Take any antecedent and consequent we please, real or conceivable, and we know absolutely, that they must sustain to each other one or the other of these relations. Either in connection with this antecedent, but this of a consequent is possible, and this must arise, or in connection with the same antecedent, either this, or one or more different consequents are possible, and consequently equally so: for possibility has, in reality, no degrees.

3. All the phenomena of the Will, sustaining, as they do, the relation of consequents to motives considered as antecedents, must fall under one or the other of these relations. If we say, that the relation between motives and acts of Will is that of certainty, still this certainty must arise from a necessary relation between the antecedent and its consequent, or it must be of such a nature as consists with the relation of Liberty, in the sense of the term Liberty as above defined.

4. The above definitions have this great advantage in our present investigations. They at once free the subject from the obscurity and perplexity in which it is often involved by the definitions of philosophers. They are accustomed, in many instances, to speak of moral necessity and physical necessity, as if these are in reality different kinds of necessity: whereas the terms moral and physical, in such connections, express the nature of the subjects sustaining to each other the relations of antecedents and consequents, and not at all that of the relation existing between them. This is exclusively expressed by the term Necessity—a term which designates a relation which is always one and the same, whatever the nature of the subjects thus related may be. An individual in a treatise on natural science, might, if he should choose, in speaking of the relations of antecedents and consequents among solid, fluid, and aeriform substances, use the words, solid necessity, fluid necessity, and aeriform necessity. He might use many qualifying terms as there are different subjects sustaining to each other the relation under consideration. In all such instances no error will arise, if these qualifying terms are distinctly understood to designate, not the nature of the relation of antecedent and consequent in any given case (as if there were as many different kinds of necessity as there are qualifying terms used), but to designate the nature of the subjects sustaining the relation. If, on the other hand, the impression should be made, that each of these qualifying terms designates a necessity of a peculiar kind, and if, as a consequence, the belief should be induced, that there are in reality so many different kinds of necessity, errors of the gravest character would arise—errors no more important, however, than actually do arise from the impression often induced, that moral necessity differs in kind from physical necessity.

5. I mention another very decisive advantage which the above definitions have in our present investigations. In the light of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as above defined, the two great schools in philosophy and theology are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in difference between them, without the possibility on the part of either, of escaping under a fog of definitions about moral necessity, physical necessity, moral certainty, &c., and then claiming a victory over their opponents. These terms, as above defined, stand out with perfect clearness and distinctness to all reflecting minds. Every one must see, that the phenomena of the Will cannot but fall under the one or the other of the relations designated by these terms; inasmuch as no third relation differing in kind from either of these, is conceivable. The question therefore may be fairly put to every individual, without the possibility of misapprehension or evasion —Do you believe, whenever a man puts forth an act of Will, that in those circumstances, this one act only is possible, and that this act cannot but arise? In all prohibited acts, for example, do you believe that an individual, by the resistless providence of God, is placed in circumstances in which this one act only is possible, and this cannot but result, that in these identical circumstances, another and a different act is required of him, and that for not putting forth this last act, he is justly held as infinitely guilty in the sight of God, and of the moral universe? To these questions every one must give an affirmative or negative answer. If he gives the former, he holds the doctrine of Necessity, and must take that doctrine with all its consequences. If he gives the latter, he holds the doctrine of Liberty in the sense of the term as above defined. He must hold, that in the identical circumstances in which a given act of Will is put forth, another and different act might have been put forth; and that for this reason, in all prohibited acts, a moral agent is held justly responsible for different and opposite acts. Much is gained to the cause of truth, when, as in the present instance, the different schools are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in difference between them, and that without the possibility of misapprehension or evasion, in respect to the nature of that question.

MOTIVE DEFINED.

Having settled the meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as designating two distinct and opposite relations, the only relations conceivable between an antecedent and its consequent, one other term which may not unfrequently be used in the following treatise, remains to be defined; to wit—motive—a term which designates that which sustains to the phenomena of the Will, the relation of antecedent. Volition, choice, preference, intention, all the phenomena of the Will, are considered as the consequent. Whatever within the mind itself may be supposed to influence its determinations, whether called susceptibilities, biases, or anything else; and all influences acting upon it as incentives from without, are regarded as the antecedent. I use the term motive as synonymous with antecedent as above defined. It designates all circumstances and influences from within or without the mind, which operate upon it to produce any given act of Will.

The term antecedent in the case before us, in strictness of speech, has this difference of meaning from that of motive as above defined: The former includes all that is designated by the latter, together with, the Will itself. No difficulty or obscurity, however, will result from the use of these terms as synonymous, in the sense explained.

SEC. II. LIBERTY, AS OPPOSED TO NECESSITY, THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE WILL.

We are now prepared to meet the question, to which of the relations above defined shall we refer to the phenomena of the Will? If these phenomena are subject to the law of necessity, then, whenever a particular antecedent (motive) is given, but one consequent (act of Will) is possible, and that consequent must arise. It cannot possibly but take place. If, on the other hand, these phenomena fall under the relation of Liberty, whenever any particular motive is present, either of two or more acts of Will is equally possible; and when any particular consequent (act of Will) does arise, either of the other consequents might have arisen in its stead.

Before proceeding directly to argue the question before us, one consideration of a general nature demands a passing notice. It is this. The simple statement of the question, in the light of the above relations, settles it, and must settle it, in the judgment of all candid, uncommitted inquirers after the truth. Let any individual contemplate the action of his voluntary powers in the light of the relations of Liberty and Necessity as above defined, and he will spontaneously affirm the fact, that he is a free and not a necessary agent, and affirm it as absolutely as he affirms his own existence. Wherever he is, while he retains the consciousness of a rational being, this conviction will and must be to him an omnipresent reality. To escape it he must transcend the bounds of conscious existence.

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.

Such is the importance of the subject, however, that a more extended and particular consideration of it is demanded. In the further prosecution of the argument upon the subject, we will—

I. In the first place, contemplate the position, that the phenomena of the Will are subject to the law of Necessity. In taking this position we are at once met with the following palpable and insuperable difficulties.

1. The conviction above referred to—a conviction, which remains proof against all apparent demonstrations to the contrary. We may pile demonstration upon demonstration in favor of the doctrine of Necessity, still, as the mind falls back upon the spontaneous affirmations of its own Intelligence, it finds, in the depths of its inner being, a higher demonstration of the fact, that that doctrine is and must be false—that man is not the agent which that doctrine affirms him to be. In the passage already cited, and which I will take the occasion here to repeat, the writer has, with singular correctness, mapped out the unvarying experience of the readers of Edwards, on the Will. "Even the reader," he says, "who is scarcely at all familiar with abstruse science, will, if he follow our author attentively, be perpetually conscious of a vague dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion, that some fallacy has passed into the train of propositions, although the linking of syllogisms seems perfect. This suspicion will increase in strength as he proceeds, and will at length condense itself into the form of a protest against certain conclusions, notwithstanding their apparently necessary connection with the premises." What higher evidence can we have that that treatise gives a false interpretation of the facts of universal Conciousness pertaining to the Will, than is here presented? Any theory which gives a distinct and true explanation of the facts of Conciousness, will be met by the Intelligence with the response, "That's true; I have found it." Any theory apparently supported by adequate evidence, but which still gives a false interpretation of such facts, will induce the internal conflict above described—a conflict which, as the force of apparent demonstration increases, will in the very centre of the Intelligence, "condense itself into the form of a protest against the conclusions presented, notwithstanding their apparently necessary connection with the premises." The falsity of the doctrine of Necessity is a first truth of the universal Intelligence.

2. If this doctrine is true, it is demonstrably evident, that in no instance, real or supposeable, have men any power whatever to will or to act differently from what they do. The connection between the determinations of the Will, and their consequents, external and internal, is absolutely necessary. Constituted as I now am, if I will, for example, a particular motion of my hand or arm, no other movement, in these circumstances, was possible, and this movement could not but take place. The same holds true of all consequents, external and internal, of all acts of Will. Let us now suppose that these acts themselves are the necessary consequents of the circumstances in which they originate. In what conceivable sense have men, in the circumstances in which Providence places them, power either to will or to act differently from what they do? The doctrine of ability to will or to do differently from what we do is, in every sense, false, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. Men, when they transgress the moral law, always sin, without the possibility of doing right. From this position the Necessitarian cannot escape.

3. On this theory, God only is responsible for all human volitions together with their effects. The relation between all antecedents and their consequents was established by him. If that relation be in all instances a necessary one, his Will surely is, the sole responsible antecedent of all consequents.

4. The ideas of obligation, of merit and demerit, and of the consequent propriety of reward and punishment, are chimeras. To conceive of a being deserving praise or blame, for volitions or actions which occurred under circumstances in which none others were possible, and in which these could not possibly but happen, is an absolute impossibility. To conceive him under obligation to have given existence, under such circumstances, to different consequents, is equally impossible. It is to suppose, an agent under obligation to perform that to which omnipotence is inadequate. For Omnipotence cannot perform impossibilities. It cannot reverse the law of Necessity. Let any individual conceive of creatures placed by Diving Providence in circumstances in which but one act, or series of acts of Will, can arise, and these cannot but arise—let him, then, attempt to conceive of these creatures as under obligation, in these same circumstances, to give existence to different and opposite acts, and as deserving of punishment for not doing so. He will find it as impossible to pass such a judgment as to conceive of the annihilation of space, or of an event without a cause. To conceive of necessity and obligation as fundamental elements of the same act, is an absolute impossibility. The human Intelligence is incapable of affirming such contradictions.

5. As an additional consideration, to show the absolute incompatibility of the idea of moral obligation with the doctrine of Necessity, permit me to direct the attention of the reader to this striking fact. While no man, holding the doctrine of Liberty as above defined, was ever known to deny moral obligation, such denial has, without exception, in every age and nation, been avowedly based upon the assumption of the truth of the doctrine of Necessity. In every age and nation, in every solitary mind, in which the idea of obligation has been denied, this doctrine has been the great maelstrom in which this idea has been swallowed up and lost. How can the Necessitarian account for such facts in consistency with his theory?

6. The commands of God addressed to men as sinners and requiring them in all cases of transgression of the moral law, to choose and to act differently from what they do, are, if this doctrine is true, the perfection of tyranny. In all such cases men are required—

(1.) To perform absolute impossibilities; to reverse the law of Necessity.

(2.) To do that to which Omnipotence is inadequate. For Omnipotence, as we have seen, cannot reverse the law of Necessity. Not only so, but—

(3.) Men in all such instances are required, as a matter of fact, to resist and overcome Omnipotence. To require us to reverse the relation established by Omnipotence, between antecedents and consequents, is certainly to require us to resist and overcome Omnipotence, and that in the absence of all power even to attempt the accomplishment of that which we are required to accomplish.

7. If this doctrine is true, at the final Judgment the conscience and intelligence of the universe will and must be on the side of the condemned. Suppose that when the conduct of the wicked shall be revealed at that Day, another fact shall stand out with equal conspicuousness, to wit, that God himself had placed these beings where but one course of conduct was possible to them, and that course they could not but pursue; to wit, the course which they did pursue, and that for having pursued this course, the only one possible, they are now to be "punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of God and the glory of his power," must not the intelligence of the universe pronounce such a sentence unjust? All this must be true, or the doctrine of Necessity must be false. Who can believe, that the pillars of God's eternal government rest upon such a doctrine?

8. On this supposition, probation is an infinite absurdity. We might with the same propriety represent the specimens in the laboratory of the chemist, as on probation, as men, if their actions are the necessary result of the circumstances in which Omnipotence has placed them. What must intelligent beings think of probation for a state of eternal retribution, based on such a principle?

9. The doctrine of Necessity is, in all essential particulars, identical with Fatalism in its worst form. All that Fatalism ever has maintained, or now maintains, is, that men, by a power which they cannot control nor resist, are placed in circumstances in which they cannot but pursue the course of conduct which they actually are pursuing. This doctrine has never affirmed, that, in the Necessitarian sense, men cannot "do as they please." All that it maintains is, that they cannot but please to do as they do. Thus this doctrine differs not one "jot or tittle," from Necessity. No man can show the want of perfect identity between them. Fatalists and Necessitarians, may differ in regard to the ground of this Necessity. In regard to its nature, the only thing material, as far as present inquiries are concerned, they do not differ at all.

10. In maintaining the Necessity of all acts of the Will of man, we must maintain, that the Will of God is subject to the same law. This is universally admitted by Necessitarians themselves. Now in maintaining the necessity of all acts of the Divine Will, the following conclusions force themselves upon us:

(1) MOTIVES which necessitate the determinations of the Divine Will, are the sole originating and efficient causes in existence. God is not the first cause of anything.

(2.) To motives, which of course exist independently of the Divine Will, we must ascribe the origin of all created existences. The glory of originating "all things visible and invisible," belongs not to Him, but to motives.

(3) In all cases in which creatures are required to act differently from what they do, as in all acts of sin, they are in reality required not only to resist and overcome the omnipotent determinations of the Divine Will, but also the motives by which the action of God's Will is necessitated. We ask Necessitarians to look these consequences in the face, and then say, whether they are prepared to deny, or to meet them.

11. Finally, if the doctrine under consideration is true, in all instances of the transgression of the moral law; men are, in reality, required to produce an event which, when it does exist, shall exist without a cause. In circumstances where but one event is possible, and that cannot but arise, if a different event should arise, it would undeniably be an event without a cause. To require such an event under such circumstances, is to require an event without a cause, the most palpable contradiction conceivable. Now just such a requirement as this, is laid upon men, in all cases of disobedience of the moral law, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. In all such cases, according to this doctrine men are placed in circumstances in which but one act is possible, and that must arise, to wit, the act of disobedience which is put forth. If, in these circumstances, an act of obedience should be put forth, it would be an event without a cause, and in opposition also to the action of a necessary cause. In these identical circumstances, the act of obedience is required of creatures, which, if it should be put forth, would be an event without a cause. Has a God of truth and justice ever laid upon men such a requisition as that? How, I ask, can the doctrine of Necessity be extricated from such a difficulty?

DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY—DIRECT ARGUMENT.

II. We will now, as a second general argument consider the position, that the Will is subject in its determinations to the relation of Liberty, in opposition to that of Necessity. Here I would remark, that as the phenomena of the Will must fall under one or the other of these relations, and as it has been shown that they cannot fall under that of Necessity, but one supposition remains. They must fall under that of Liberty, as opposed to Necessity. The intrinsic absurdity of supposing that a being, all of whose actions are necessary, is still accountable for such actions, is sufficient to overthrow the doctrine of Necessity for ever. A few additional considerations are deemed requisite, in order to present the evidence in favor of the Liberty of the Will.

1. The first that I present is this. As soon as the doctrine of Liberty, as above defined, is distinctly apprehended, it is spontaneously recognized by every mind, as the true, and only true exposition of the facts of its own Consciousness pertaining to the phenomena of the Will. This doctrine is simply an announcement of the spontaneous affirmations of the universal Intelligence. This is the highest possible evidence of the truth of the doctrine.

2. The universal conviction of mankind, that their former course of conduct might have been different from what it was. I will venture to affirm, that there is not a person on earth who has not this conviction resting upon his mind in respect to his own past life. It is important to analyze this conviction, in order to mark distinctly its bearing upon our present inquiries. This conviction is not the belief, that if our circumstances had been different, we might have acted differently from what we did. A man, for example, says to himself—"At such a time, and in such circumstances, I determined upon a particular course of conduct. I might have determined upon a different and opposite course. Why did I not?" These affirmations are not based upon the conviction, that, in different circumstances, we might have done differently. In all such affirmations we take into account nothing but the particular circumstances in which our determinations were formed. It is in view of these circumstances exclusively, that we affirm that our determinations might have been different from what they were. Let the appeal be made to any individual whatever, whose mind is not at the time under the influence of any particular theory of the Will. "You say, that at such a time, and under such circumstances, you determined upon a particular course, that you might then have resolved upon a different and opposite course; and that you blame yourself for not having done so. Is not this your real meaning? If my circumstances had been different, I might have resolved upon a different course." "No," he would reply, "that is not my meaning. I was not thinking at all of a change of circumstances, when I made this affirmation. What I mean is, that in the circumstances, in which I was, I might have done differently from what I did. This is the reason why I blame myself, for not having done so." The same conviction, to wit: that without any change of circumstances our past course of life might have been different from what it was, rests upon every mind on earth in which the remembrance of the past dwells. Now his universal conviction is totally false, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The doctrine of the Liberty of the Will must be true, or the universal Intelligence is a perpetual falsehood.

3. In favor of the doctrine of Liberty, I next appeal to the direct, deliberate, and universal testimony of Consciousness. This, testimony is given in three ways.

(1.) In the general conviction above referred to; that without any change of circumstances, our course of conduct might have been the opposite of what it was. Nothing but a universal consciousness of the Liberty of the Will, can account for this conviction.

(2.) Whenever any object of choice is submitted to the mind, Consciousness affirms, directly and positively, that, under these identical circumstances, either of two or more act's of Will is equally possible. Every man in such circumstances is as conscious of such power as he is of his own existence. In confirmation of these affirmations, let any one make the appeal to his own Consciousness, when about to put forth any act of Will. He will be just as conscious that either of two or more different determinations is, in the same circumstances, equally possible, as he is of any mental sate whatever.

(3.) In reference to all deliberate determinations of Will in time past, the remembrance of them is attended with a consciousness the most positive, that, in the same identical circumstances, determinations precisely opposite might have been originated. Let anyone recall any such determination, and the consciousness of a power to have determined differently will be just as distinctly recalled as the act itself. He cannot be more sure that he acted at all, than he will be, that he might have acted [determined] differently. All these affirmations of Consciousness are false, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true.

4. A fundamental distinction which all mankind make between the phenomena of the Will, and those of the other faculties, the Sensibility for example, is a full confirmation of the doctrine of Liberty, as a truth of universal Consciousness. A man is taken out of a burning furnace, with his physical system greatly injured by the fire. As a consequence, he subsequently experiences much suffering and inconvenience. For the injury done him by the fire, and for the pain subsequently experienced, he never blames or reproaches himself. With self-reproach he never says, Why, instead of being thus injured, did I not come out of the furnace as the three worthies did from that of Nebuchadnezzar? Why do I not now experience pleasure instead of pain, as a consequence of that injury? Suppose, now, that his fall into the furnace was the result of a determination formed for the purpose of self-murder. For that determination, and for not having, in the same circumstances, determined differently, he will ever after reproach himself, as most guilty in the sight of God and man. How shall we account for the absence of self-reproach in the former instance, and for its presence in the latter? If the appeal should be made to the subject, his answer would be ready. In respect to the injury and pain, in the circumstances supposed, they could not but be experienced. Such phenomena, therefore, can never be the occasion of self-reproach. In the condition in which the determination referred to was formed, a different and opposite resolution might have been originated. That particular determination, therefore, is the occasion of self-reproach. How shall we account for this distinction, which all mankind agree in making, between the phenomena of the Sensibility on the one hand, and of the Will on the other? But one supposition accounts for this fact, the universal consciousness, that the former are necessary, and the latter free; that in the circumstances of their occurrence the former may not, and the latter may, be different from what they are.

5. On any other theory than that of Liberty, the words, obligation, merit and demerit, &c., are words without meaning. A man is, we will suppose, by Divine Providence, placed in circumstances in which he cannot possibly but pursue one given course, or, which is the same thing, put forth given determinations. When it is said that, in these identical circumstances, he ought to pursue a different and opposite course, or to put forth different and opposite determinations, what conceivable meaning can we attach to the word ought, here? There is nothing, in the circumstances supposed, which the word ought, or obligation, can represent. If we predicate merit or demerit of an individual thus circumstanced, we use words equally without meaning. Obligation and moral desert, in such a case, rest upon "airy nothing," without a "local habitation or a name."

On the other hand, if we suppose that the right and the wrong are at all times equally possible to an individual; that when he chooses the one, he might, in the same circumstances, choose the other; infinite meaning attaches to the words, ought, obligation, merit and demerit, when it is said that an individual, thus circumstanced, ought to do the right and avoid the wrong, and that he merits reward or punishment, when he does the one, and does not do the other. The ideas of obligation, merit and demerit, reward and punishment, and probation with reference to a state of moral retribution, are all chimeras, on any other supposition than that of the Liberty of the Will. With this doctrine, they all perfectly harmonize.

6. All moral government, all laws, human and Divine, have their basis in the doctrine of Liberty; and are the perfection of tyranny, on any other supposition. To place creatures in circumstances which necessitate a given course of conduct, and render every other course impossible, and then to require of them, under the heaviest sanctions, a different and opposite course—what can be tyranny if this is not?

OBJECTIONS IN BAR OF AN APPEAL TO CONSCIOUSNESS. OBJECTION AS URGED BY NECESSITARIANS.

An objection which is brought by Necessitarians, in perpetual bar of an appeal to Consciousness, to determine the fact whether the phenomena of the Will fall under the relation of Liberty or Necessity, here demands special attention. Consciousness, it is said, simply affirms, that, in given circumstances, we do, in fact, put forth certain acts of Will. But whether we can or cannot, in these circumstances, put forth other and opposite determinations, it does not and cannot make any affirmation at all. It does not, therefore, fall within the province of Consciousness to determine, whether the phenomena of the Will are subject to the relation of Liberty or Necessity; and it is unphilosophical to appeal to that faculty to decide such a question. This objection, if valid, renders null and void much of what has been said upon this subject and as it constitutes a stronghold of the Necessitarian, it becomes us to examine it with great care. In reply, I remark,

1. That if this objection holds in respect to the phenomena of the Will, it must hold equally in respect of those of the other faculties; the Intelligence; for example. We will, therefore, bring the objection to a test, by applying it to certain intellectual phenomena. We will take, as an example, the universal and necessary affirmation, that "it is impossible for the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be." Every one is conscious, in certain circumstances, of making this and other kindred affirmations. Now, if the objection under consideration is valid, all that we should be conscious of is the fact, that, under the circumstances supposed, we do, in reality, make particular affirmations; while, in reference to the question, whether, in the same circumstances, we can or cannot make different and opposite affirmations, we should have no consciousness at all. Now, I appeal to every man, whether, when he is conscious of making the affirmation, that it is impossible for the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be, he is not equally conscious of the fact, that it is impossible for him to make the opposite affirmation; whether, when he affirms that three and two make five, he is not conscious that it is impossible for him to affirm that three and two are six? In other words, when we are conscious of making certain intellectual affirmations, are we not equally conscious of an impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations? Every man is just as conscious of the fact, that the phenomena of his Intelligence fall under the relation of Necessity, as he is of making any affirmations at all. If this is not so, we cannot know but that it is possible for us to affirm and believe perceived contradictions. All that we could say is, that, as a matter of fact, we do not do it. But whether we can or cannot do it, we can never know. Do we not know, however, as absolutely as we know anything, that we cannot affirm perceived contradictions? In other words, we do and can know absolutely, that our Intelligence is subject to the law of Necessity. We do know by Consciousness, with absolute certainty, that the phenomena of the Intelligence, and I may add, of the Sensibility too, do fall under the relation of Necessity. Why may we not know, with equal certainty, whether the phenomena of the Will do or do not fall under the relation of Liberty? What then becomes of the objection under consideration?

2. But while we are conscious of the fact, that the Intellect is under the law of Necessity, we are equally conscious that Will is under that of Liberty. We make intellectual affirmations; such, for example, as the propositions, Things equal to the same things are equal to one another, There can be no event without a cause, &c., with a consciousness of an utter impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations. We put forth acts of Will with a consciousness equally distinct and absolute, of a possibility, in the same circumstances, of putting forth different and opposite determinations. Even Necessitarians admit and affirm the validity of the testimony of Consciousness in the former instance. Why should we doubt or deny it in the latter?

3. The question, whether Consciousness can or cannot give us not only mental phenomena, but also the fundamental characteristics of such phenomena, cannot be determined by any pre-formed theory, in respect to what Consciousness can or cannot affirm. If we wish to know to what a witness is able to testify, we must not first determine what he can or cannot say, and then refuse to hear anything from him, except in conformity to such decisions. We must first give him a full and attentive hearing, and then judge of his capabilities. So in respect to Consciousness. If we wish to know what it does or does not, what it can or cannot affirm, we must let it give its full testimony, untrammelled by any pre-formed theories. Now, when the appeal is thus made, we find, that, in the circumstances in which we do originate given determinations, it affirms distinctly and absolutely, that, in the same identical circumstances, we might originate different and opposite determinations. From what Consciousness does affirm, we ought surely to determine the sphere of its legitimate affirmations.

4. The universal solicitude of Necessitarians to take the question under consideration from the bar of Consciousness is, in fact, a most decisive acknowledgment on their part, that at that tribunal the cause will go against them. Let us suppose that all men were as conscious that their Will is subject to the law of Necessity, as they are that their Intelligence is. Can we conceive that Necessitarians would not be as solicitous to carry the question directly to the tribunal of Consciousness, as they now are to do it from that tribunal? When all men are as conscious that their Will is under the law of Liberty, as they are that their other faculties are under the relation of Necessity, no wonder that Necessitarians anticipate the ruin of their cause, when the question is to be submitted to the bar of Consciousness. No wonder that they so solemnly protest against an appeal to that tribunal. Let the reader remember, however, that the moment the validity of the affirmations of Consciousness, is denied; in respect to any question in mental science, it becomes infinite folly in us to reason at all on the subject; a folly just as great as it would be for a natural philosopher to reason about colors, after denying the validity of all affirmations of the eye, in respect to the phenomena about which he is to reason.

OBJECTION AS URGED BY SOME OF THE ADVOCATES OF THE
DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY.

An objection in another form against an appeal to Consciousness, such as has been made above, has been urged by an advocate of the doctrine of Liberty, in a review of the first edition of this Treatise. As the objection has weight with some individuals, it demands a passing notice. The form of the objection is this: No man has a Consciousness of the fact of his own free agency. All men, however, have an "instinctive belief," that they are free agents. Of this belief, and not of the fact that we are free agents, we are conscious. To this belief, therefore, and not to Conscious, the appeal should be made, in proof of the doctrine of Liberty.

In reply, I remark—

1. This objection involves a palpable contradiction and absurdity. I ask the objector, on what ground do you prove, or believe the fact, that you are a free agent? His reply is, "I believe this great truth on the ground that I instinctively believe it." In other words, your belief rests upon a belief and nothing else.

2. But let us examine a little more critically, this primary instinctive belief on which the secondary one rests. Upon what does this foundation belief itself rest? The answer is, upon nothing! It has no foundation whatever! The Intelligence looks into blank midnight. No object in the heavens above, nor in the earth beneath, nor in the waters under the earth, appears. Still, without any perception external or internal of any object or phenomenon, an "instinctive belief" arises. Upon this belief, which, by acknowledgment, is perfectly foundationless, and without any object or phenomenon, perceived externally or internally as the ground of its existence, upon this belief, the objector rests the great doctrine of Liberty, and claims, that he has found for it a most stable and permanent foundation—a foundation however, not unlike that assigned by the Indian philosopher, to the earth, in order to account for its stability, to wit, placing it upon the back of a huge elephant, and that upon the back of a great tortoise, and that upon—he could not tell what.

3. But a sound and correct philosophy would convince the objector, that no such beliefs as that under consideration, do or can exist in the human Intelligence. All real, fundamental beliefs pertain either to objects or phenomena, of external or internal perception, to wit, to the qualities of external material substances perceived by the faculty of external perception, and to the operations of our own minds perceived by Consciousness, or to the logical antecedent of phenomena thus perceived and affirmed, to wit, the ideas of space, time, substance, cause, &c. There are no foundationless beliefs in the universal Intelligence. All real beliefs pertain to phenomena directly perceived, or to the necessary logical antecedents of such phenomena. The truth of this assertion, philosophy has perfectly demonstrated. I was somewhat surprised to find the reviewer ignorant of this important fact.

4. But the objection under consideration, entirely reverses and contradicts the principle universally admitted by philosophers, as the basis of all correct and legitimate affirmations pertaining to substances of every kind. The principle is this. All substances are known and revealed to us, only through their phenomena. All substances, powers and agents, are to us as their respective phenomena. No legitimate affirmations, therefore, can be made, in respect to such substances, powers, or agents, which do not rest upon phenomena which they exhibit. If the element of Liberty or Necessity does not appear in the phenomena of the Will revealed by Consciousness, we cannot legitimately affirm, that we are either free or necessary agents. Consciousness then, is the great authoritative bar of appeal to decide this great question.

5. Finally, the fallacy of this objection has already been perfectly demonstrated. We have already seen, that we are conscious, that the Intelligence, for example, is subject to the law of Necessity, that is, we are conscious of making particular affirmations, with a consciousness equally distinct of an absolute impossibility of making opposite affirmations. If then, we can know by Consciousness, that the Intelligence is under the law of Necessity, why may we not determine by the same witness whether the Will is under that of Liberty?

DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY ARGUED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE IDEA OF LIBERTY IN ALL MINDS.

III. I will present a third general argument in favor of the doctrine of Liberty; an argument which, to my mind, is perfectly conclusive, but which differs somewhat from either of the forms of argumentation above presented. I argue the Liberty of the Will from the existence of the idea of Liberty in the human mind, in the form in which it is there found.

If the Will is not free, the idea of Liberty is wholly inapplicable to any phenomena in existence whatever. Yet this idea is in the mind. The action of the Will in conformity to it is just as conceivable as its action in conformity to the idea of Necessity. It remains with the Necessitarian to account for the existence of this idea in the human mind, in consistency with his own theory. Here the following considerations present themselves demanding special attention.

1. The idea of Liberty, like that of Necessity, is a simple, and not a complex idea. This all will admit.

2. It could not have come into the mind from observation or reflection; because all phenomena, external and internal, all the objects of observation and reflection, are, according to the doctrine of Necessity, not free, but necessary.

3. It could not have originated, as necessary ideas do, as the logical antecedents of the truths given by observation, and reflection. For example, the idea of space, time, substance, and cause, are given in the Intelligence, as the logical antecedents of the ideas of body, succession, phenomena, and events, all of which are truths derived from observation or reflection. Now the idea of Liberty, if the doctrine of Necessity is true, cannot have arisen in this way; because all the objects of observation and reflection are, according to this doctrine, necessary, and therefore their logical antecedents must be. How shall we account, in consistency with this theory, for the existence of this idea in the mind? It came not from perception, external, or internal, nor as the logical antecedent or consequent of any truth thus perceived. Now if we admit the doctrine of Liberty as a truth universal Consciousness, we can give a philosophical account of the existence of the idea of Liberty in all minds. If we deny this doctrine, and consequently affirm that of Necessity, we may safely challenge any theologian or philosopher to give such an account of the existence of that idea in the mind. For all ideas, in the mind, do and must come from observation or reflection, or as the logical antecedents or consequents of ideas thus obtained. We have here an event without a cause, if the doctrine of Necessity is true.

4. All simple ideas, with the exception of that of Liberty, have realities within or around us, corresponding to them. If the doctrine of Necessity is true, we have one solitary idea of this character, that of Liberty, to which no reality corresponds. Whence this solitary intruder in the human mind?

The existence of this idea in the mind is proof demonstrative, that a reality corresponding to it does and must exist, and as this reality is found nowhere but in the Will, there it must be found. Almost all Necessitarians are, in philosophy, the disciples of Locke. With him, they maintain, that all ideas of the mind come from observation and reflection. Yet they maintain that there is in the mind one idea, that of Liberty, which never could thus have originated; because, according to their theory, no objects corresponding do or can exist, either as realities, or as the objects of observation or reflection. We have again an event without a cause, if doctrine of Liberty is not true.

5. The relation of the ideas of Liberty and Necessity to those of obligation, merit and demerit, &c., next demand our attention. If the doctrine of Necessity is true, the idea of Liberty is, as we have seen, a chimera. With it the idea of obligation can have no connection or alliance; but must rest exclusively upon that of Necessity. Now, how happens it, that no man holding the doctrine of Liberty was ever known to deny that of obligation, and of merit and demerit? How happens it, that the validity of neither of these ideas has ever, in any age or nation, been denied, except on the avowed authority of the doctrine of Necessity? Sceptics of the class who deny moral obligation, are universally avowed Necessitarians. We may safely challenge the world to produce a single exception to this statement. We may challenge the world to produce an individual in ancient or modern times who holds the doctrine of Liberty, and denies moral obligation, or an individual who denies moral obligation on any other ground than that of Necessity. Now, how can this fact be accounted for, that the ideas of obligation, merit and demerit, &c., universally attach themselves to a chimera, the idea of Liberty, and stand in such irreconcilable hostility to the only idea by which, as Necessitarians will have it, their validity is affirmed?

6. Finally, if the doctrine of Necessity is true, the phenomena of the Intelligence, Sensibility, and the Will, are given in Consciousness as alike necessary. The idea of Liberty, then, if it does exist in the mind, would not be likely to attach itself to either of these classes of phenomena; and if to either, it would be just as likely to attach itself to one class as to another. Now, how shall we account for the fact, that this idea always attaches itself to one of these classes of phenomena, those of the Will, and never to either of the others? How is it that all men agree in holding, that, in the circumstances of their occurrence, the phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility cannot but be what they are, while those of the Will may be otherwise than they are? Why, if this chimera, the idea of Liberty, attaches itself to either of these classes, does it not sometimes attach itself to the phenomena of the Intelligence or Sensibility, as well as to those of the Will? Here, once again, we have an event without a cause, a distinction without a difference, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The facts before us can be accounted for only on the supposition, that the phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility are given in Consciousness as necessary, while those of the Will are given as free.

THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY, THE DOCTRINE OF THE BIBLE.

IV. We will now, in the fourth place, raise the inquiry, an inquiry very appropriate in its place, and having an important bearing upon our present investigations, whether the doctrine of the Will, above established, is the, doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible? The following considerations will enable us to give a decisive answer to this inquiry.

1. If the doctrine of the Will here maintained is not, and consequently that of Necessity is, the doctrine pre-supposed in the Scriptures, then we have two revelations from God, the external and internal, in palpable contradiction to each other. As the works of God (see Rom. 1: 19, 20) are as real as a revelation from him as the Bible, so are the necessary affirmations of our Intelligence. Now, in our inner being, in the depths of our Intelligence, the fact is perpetually revealed and affirmed—a fact which we cannot disbelieve, if we would—that we are not necessary but free agents. Suppose that, in the external revelation, the Scriptures, the fact is revealed and affirmed that we are not free but necessary agents. Has not God himself affirmed in one revelation what he has denied in another? Of what use can the internal revelation be, but to render us necessarily sceptical in respect to the eternal? Has the Most High given two such revelations as this?

2. In the Scriptures, man is presented as the subject, and, of course, as possessing those powers which render him the proper subject of command and prohibition, of obligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and punishment. Let us suppose that God has imparted to a being a certain constitution, and then placed him in a condition in which, in consequence of the necessary correlation between his constitution and circumstances, but one series of determinations are possible to him, and that series cannot but result. Can we conceive it proper in the Most High to prohibit that creature from pursuing the course which God himself has rendered it impossible for him not to pursue, and require him, under the heaviest sanctions, to pursue, under these identical circumstances, a different and opposite course—a course which the Creator has rendered it impossible for him to pursue? Is this the philosophy pre-supposed in the Bible? Does the Bible imply a systerm of mental philosophy which renders the terms, obligation, merit and demerit, void of all conceivable meaning, and which lays no other foundation for moral retributions but injustice and tyranny?

3. Let us now contemplate the doings of the Great Day revealed in the Scriptures, in the light of these two opposite theories. Let us suppose that, as the righteous and the wicked stand in distinct and separate masses before the Eternal One, the Most High says to the one class, "You, I myself placed in circumstances in which nothing but obedience was possible, and that you could not but render; and you, I placed in a condition in which nothing but disobedience was possible to you, and that you could not but perpetrate. In consequence of these distinct and opposite courses, each of which I myself rendered unavoidable, you deserve and shall receive my eternal smiles; and you as richly deserve and shall therefore endure my eternal frowns." What would be the response of an assembled universe to a decision based upon such a principle? Is this the principle on which the decisions of that Day are based? It must be so, if the doctrine of Liberty is not, and that of Necessity is, the doctrine of the Bible?

4. We will now contemplate another class of passages which have a bearing equally, decisive upon our present inquiries. I refer to that class in which God expresses the deepest regret at the course which transgressors have pursued, and are still pursuing, and the most decisive unwillingness that they should pursue that course and perish. He takes a solemn oath that he is not willing that they should take the course of disobedience and death, but that they should pursue a different and opposite course. God expresses no regret that they are in the circumstances in which they are, but that in those circumstances they should take the path of disobedience, and not that of obedience. Now, can we suppose, what must be true, if the doctrine of Necessity is the doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible, that God places his creatures in circumstances, in which obedience is to them an impossibility, and in which they cannot but disobey, and then takes a solemn oath that he is not willing that they should disobey and perish, "but that they should turn from their evil way and live?" What is the meaning of the exclamation, "O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandment," if God himself had so conditioned the sinner as to render obedience an impossibility to him? Is this the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible? On the other hand, how perfectly in place are all this passages under consideration the supposition that the doctrine of Liberty is the doctrine therein pre-supposed, and that consequently the obedience which God affirms Himself desirous that sinners should render, and his regret that they do not render, is always possible to them! One of the seven pillars of the Gospel is this very doctrine. Take it from the Bible, and we have "another Gospel."

5. One other class of passages claims special attention here. In the Scriptures, the Most High expresses the greatest astonishment that men should sin under the influences to which he has subjected them. He calls upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the conduct of men under those influences. "Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth," he exclaims, "for the Lord hath spoken; I have nourished and brought up children, and they have rebelled against me." Now, let us suppose, as the doctrine of Necessity affirms, that God has placed sinners under influences under which they cannot but sin. What must we think of his conduct in calling upon the universe to unite with him in astonishment, that under these influences they should sin—that is, take the only course possible to them, the course which they cannot but take? With the same propriety, he might place a mass of water on an inclined plane, and then, call upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the downward flow of the fluid. Is this the philosophy pre-supposed in the Bible?

BELIEF OF THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH.

6. My sixth argument in favor of the position, that the doctrine of Necessity is not, and that that of Liberty is, the doctrine of the Bible, is an argument strong and decisive, though a collateral one. The latter doctrine, as opposed to the former, was the universal doctrine of the primitive church for the first four or five centuries after the Bible was written, the church which received the "lively oracles" directly from the hands of some of those by whom they were written, to wit: the writers of the New Testament. It should be borne in mind here, that at the time the sacred canon was completed, the doctrine of Necessity was held by the leading sects in the Jewish Church. It was also a fundamental article of the creed of all the sects in philosophy throughout the world, as well as of all the forms of heathenism then extant. If the doctrine of Necessity, as its advocates maintain, is the doctrine taught the church by inspired apostles and the writers of the New Testament, we should not fail to find, under such circumstances, the churches planted by them, rooted and grounded in this doctrine. The opposite supposition is hardly conceivable. If, on the other hand, we find the entire primitive church, for centuries, arrayed in unbroken columns against the opinions of the world on this one point, if we find, her openly and unanimously opposing the doctrine of Necessity and affirming that of Liberty, the conclusion forces itself upon us, that the latter and not the former, is the doctrine taught the church by inspired apostles, and is consequently the doctrine of the Bible. That this was the unbroken belief of the primitive church during the centuries referred to, I argue from the following considerations:

(1.) The advocates of the doctrine of Necessity who have most carefully examined the subject, have been unable to find that doctrine in the church, during the period above specified. We may safely challenge them to disprove this assertion.

(2.) The unvarying testimony of learned men, who have aquainted themselves with the subject, is, that during the period under consideration, the church universally held the doctrine of Liberty, and opposed that of Necessity. "Every one," says Mosheim, "knows that the peculiar doctrines" (among which the doctrine of Necessity was one of the most prominent,) "to which the victory was assigned by the Synod [of Dort,] was absolutely unknown in the first ages of the church." Had not this assertion been strictly true, the Calvinistic translators of Mosheim, Maclane and Murdock would, in their notes, have contradicited it. Neander, than whom, none is of greater authority in church history, speaking of the first three centuries of the Christian era, says that "the church teachers agreed unanimously, in maintaining the free will of man as a necessary condition of the existence of morality." Bredschneider declares, that "the earliest Christian fathers unanimously ascribe to man freedom of will, according to which he can choose either the good or the bad." Knapp also affirms, that the "ancient fathers held to to autexousion, understanding by this, or the term liberum arbitrium, the power of man to choose the good or evil freely without compulsion." "They," [the fathers] says Dr. Whitby, "unanimously declare that God hath left it in the power of man to turn to virtue or vice." ALL the fathers," says the learned Wiggers, "differed from Augustine and agreed with the Pelagians in attributing free will to man" To the same purpose is the testimony of Calvin himself. "The Greek fathers," he says, "above others, and among them especially Chrysostom, have exceeded bounds in extolling the power of the human will." In another place, speaking with special reference to Jerome, a Latin father, he says, "they [these fathers] attributed to man too much power to become virtuous." Again, " The Latin fathers have always retained the word free will, as if man stood upright." In this last phrase, he does those fathers great wrong; for they hold to Liberty not as uprightness itself, but as the condition of moral obligation. "As for the Greek fathers," he adds, "they have not been ashamed to make use of a more arrogant expression: calling man autexousion, [free agent or self-manager] just as if man had power to govern himself." I might multiply authorities to almost any extent. But these are abundantly sufficient on this point.

(3.) But the testimony of the early Christian fathers themselves, leaves no doubt upon this point. I will cite the declarations of a few of them. "If it happen by fate," (or necessity) says Justin Martyr, who lived in the second century, "that men are either good or wicked; the good were not good, nor should the wicked be wicked." In another place, he says, "Every created being is so constituted as to be capable of vice and virtue. For he can do nothing praiseworthy, if he had not the power of turning either way." Again, he says, "unless we suppose man has the power to choose the good and refuse the evil, no one can be accountable for any action whatever." Once more "God has not made man, like trees and brutes, without the power of election." "No reward," says Turtullian, who flourished in the same century, "can justly be bestowed, no punishment can justly be inflicted, upon him who is good or bad by necessity, and not by his own choice." Again he says, that "man being appointed for God's judgment, it was necessary to the justice of God's sentence that man should be judged; according to the deserts of his free will."

Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons, and of the same century, says, "man, a reasonable being, and in that respect like God, is made free in his will, and having power over himself, is the cause that sometimes he becomes wheat and sometimes chaff." Again, "They who do good shall obtain honor and glory, because they have done good when they could forbear doing it. And they who do it not shall receive just judgment of our God; because they have not done good when they could have done it."

"What is forced," says Basil, one of the most distinguished of the ancient fathers, "is not pleasing to God, but what comes from a truly virtuous motive, and virtue comes from the Will not from Necessity." Again, "the Will depends on what is within us, and within us is free Will."

"Forasmuch as God has put good and evil in our power," says Chrysostom, "he has given us a free power to choose the one or the other; and as he does not retain us against our will, so he embraces us when we are willing." Again," After a wicked man, if he will, is changed into a good man; and a good man, through sloth, falls away and becomes wicked; because God hath endowed us with free agency; nor does he make us to do things necessarily, but he places proper remedies before us, and suffers all to be done according to the will of the patient."

"God," says Jerome, "hath endowed us with free will. We are not necessarily drawn either to virtue or vice. For when Necessity rules, there is no room left either for damnation or the crown." Again, "Even to those who shall be wicked God gives power to repent and turn to him.'' In another place he says, "our Will is kept free to turn either way, that God may dispense his rewards and punishments, not according to his own pre-judgment, but according to the merits of everyone." Once more, "Let the man who condemns it [free Will] be himself condemned."

"It would be more just," says Epiphanius, "to punish the stars, which make a wicked action necessary" (this was said in reference to the heathen notion that the stars determined destiny,) "than to punish the poor man, who does that wicked action by Necessity."

"The soul," says Origen, "does not incline to either part out of Necessity, for then neither vice nor virtue could be ascribed to it; nor would its choice of virtue deserve reward; nor its declination to vice punishment." Again, "How could God require that of man which he [man] had not power to offer him?"

"Ten thousand things," says Theodorite, "may be found both in the gospels and authorities of the apostles, clearly manifesting the liberty and self election of man." Again, "For how can he [God] punish a nature [with endless torments] which had no power to do good, but was bound in the hands of wickedness."

Neither promises nor reprehensions, rewards, nor punishments are just, says Clemens of Alexandria, "if the soul has not the power of choosing or abstaining; but evil is involuntary," that is necessary. Eusebius of the fourth century, declares, that "this opinion," the doctrine of fate or necessity, "absolves sinners, as doing nothing of their own accord, which was evil; and would cast all the blame of all wickedness committed in the world, upon God, and upon his providence."

Didymus, also of the fourth century, after asserting the doctrine of Liberty, says, "and this is not only ours, but the opinion of all who speak orthodoxly, [according to the opinion of the universal church,] of rational being."

Even Augustine, the first Necessitarian, I believe, known in the church, is often constrained by the force of the universal opinion of the church, in his own and the preceding ages, to assert, though in strange inconsistency with himself, the doctrine of Liberty. "They that came to Christ," he says, "ought not to impute it to themselves, because they came, being called: and they that would not come, ought not to impute it to another, but only to themselves, because, when they are called, it was in the power of their free will to come."

I have adduced the above testimony, almost at random; from the mass that lies before me. It should be borne in mind, that the sentiment avowed by the witnesses above adduced, is not a sentiment affirmed by some, and denied by others, of the same era in the church, but the undivided opinion of the universal orthodox church, during the first four or five centuries of her existence. It remains with the Necessitarian, to account for this one fact, the universal belief of the doctrine of Liberty in the church, during the period above named, when, as he will have it, the primitive church, under the teachings of inspired apostles, and writers of the New Testament, was, at first, rooted and grounded in the opposite belief. Could the entire church have so totally misunderstood their teachers and writers on a point so plain, so universally familiar to men of all classes of that era, and so fundamental to a right understanding of the entire system of Christian doctrine? The doctrine of Necessity is a dark innovation upon the universal faith, as published by inspired apostles and prophets, and as received and proclaimed by the universal church, founded by such men, during the first five centuries of her existence, an innovation introduced by the great enemy, (I refer not to the character of the great and good men by whom this doctrine has been held,) introduced by the great enemy, for no other purpose than the corruption of that faith, by sapping the foundation of morality and moral government both.

REMARKS ON THE ABOVE TESTIMONY.

A few remarks suggested by the testimony above adduced, demand a passing notice here.

1. The doctrine of Liberty, as maintained by the primitive church, is not a particular form of that doctrine, such as is admitted by Necessitarians, but the identical form defined and defended in this treatise, to wit, that in the circumstances in which men choose, determine, or act in one given direction, they may do so in a different and opposite direction. "Now," says Clemens, "any thing is in our power, when we are equally masters of that and of its opposite; as to philosophize, or not, and to believe, or to disbelieve." Of the same character are all the quotations above given.

The necessity, too, which the primitive church universally opposed, was the identical form of the doctrine defined and reprobated in this Treatise. This doctrine, they designated indifferently by the terms fate and Necessity, and by both terms, they meant the same thing, to wit, that, under the circumstances in which men do act in a given direction, they have no power to act in a different and opposite direction.

2. The reason why the leading fathers of the primitive church defended the doctrines of Liberty, and denounced and reprobated that of Necessity, with such earnestness and force, was not, (as some might object, to get rid of the force of the above argument,) on account of any division of sentiment in the church, at the time upon the subject. On these points, all was harmony and peace within the circle of the church. It was, as opposed to the sentiments of the world, and to "philosophy, falsely so called," then prevalent, and in hostile array against the peculiar doctrines of christianity, that those fathers so strongly defended the former doctrine and denounced the latter.

3. The injustice of Necessitarians, in holding up the doctrine of Liberty, as a Pelagian heresy, now appears perfectly manifest. Pelagius, to be sure, held the doctrine of Liberty, as he also did that of the existence of God, and of a future retribution. But he held neither, any more than the others as peculiar to himself, and the one, just as well as either of the others, may be charged upon those who hold it, as a Pelagian heresy. Strange indeed, to charge that as a Pelagian heresy, which was the universal doctrine of the church centuries before Pelagius existed.

4. We are now fully prepared for the last resort of the Necessitarians, to break the force of the argument under consideration. It is this. Grant, your position in respect to the sentiments of the primitive church, he says, and it weighs nothing in favor of your doctrine; for the obvious reason, that that church held other opinions now universally admitted to be erroneous. As she misunderstood the apostles on those points, she may also have done it on these under consideration. While it is cheerfully admitted, I reply, that on some points, the church did almost, if not quite universally, misunderstand her inspired teachers, there are others, as all admit, on which she did not, and could not have thus misunderstood them. Among the latter class of subjects, the doctrines of Liberty and Necessity must be placed. With these doctrines, the world was then familiar, and in reference to them it was strongly committed. In respect to them, therefore, the apostles could not have avoided a most decisive expression of opinion, and from the circumstances of the case, their opinion upon these subjects, could not have been misunderstood. The fact, therefore, that the primitive church came out from under their hands, in open and undivided array, in favor of the doctrine of Liberty, and in opposition to that of Necessity, can be rationally accounted for on one supposition only, to wit, that such were the views which she received from her inspired teachers, and that such, therefore, are the teachings of the Bible.

SEC. III—VIEWS OF NECESSITARIANS.

We are now prepared for a consideration of certain miscellaneous questions which have an important bearing upon our present inquiries.

NECESSITY AS HELD BY NECESSITARIANS.

I. The first inquiry that presents itself is this: Do Necessitarians hold the doctrine of Necessity as defined in this chapter? Do they really hold, in respect to every act of will, that, in the circumstances of its occurrence, that one act only is possible, and that cannot but arise? Is this, for example, the doctrine of Edwards? Is it the doctrine really held by those who professedly agree with him? I argue that it is:

1. Because they unanimously repudiate the doctrine of Liberty as here defined. They must therefore, hold that of Necessity; inasmuch as no third relation is even conceivable or possible. If they deny that the phenomena of the Will fall under either of these relations, and still call themselves Necessitarians, they must hold to an inconceivable something, which themselves even do not understand and cannot define, and which has and can have no real existence.

2. Edwards has confounded the phenomena of the Will with those of the Sensibility which are necessary in the sense here defined. He must, therefore, hold that the characteristics of the latter class belong to those of the former.

3. Edwards represents the relation between motives and acts of Will, as being the same in kind as that which exists between causes and effects among external material substances. The former relation he designates by the words moral necessity; the latter, by that of natural, or philosophical, or physical necessity. Yet he says himself, that the difference expressed by these words "does not lie so much in the nature of the connection as in the two terms connected." The qualifying terms used, then, designate merely the nature of the antecedents and consequents, while the nature of the connection between them is, in all instances, the same, that of naked necessity.

4. Edwards himself represents moral necessity as just as absolute as physical, or natural necessity, "Moral necessity may be," he says, "as absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause."

5. Necessitarians represent the relation between motives and acts of Will as that of cause and effect; and for this reason necessary. "If," says Edwards, "every act of Will is excited by some motive, then that motive is the cause of that act of Will." "And if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, then they are necessarily connected with their motives." Now, as the relation of cause and effect is necessary, in the sense of the term Necessity as above defined, Edwards must hold, and design to teach, that all acts of Will are necessary in this sense.

6. Necessitarians represent the connection between motives and acts of Will as being, in all instances, the same in kind as that which exists between volition and external actions. "As external actions," says President Day, "are directed by the Will, so the Will itself is directed by influence." Now all admit, that the connection between volitions and external actions is necessary in this sense, that when we will such action it cannot but take place. No other act is, in the circumstances, possible. In the same sense according to Necessitarians is every act of Will necessarily connected with, influence, or motives. We do Necessitarians no wrong, therefore, when we impute to them the doctrine of Necessity as here defined. In all cases of sin, they hold, that an individual is in circumstances in which none but sinful acts of Will are possible, and these he cannot but put forth; and that in these identical circumstances the sinner is under obligation infinite to put forth different and opposite acts.

7. Finally, the definitions and assertions of professed Necessitarians pertaining to this subject, show, that they held the doctrine of Necessity as above defined. "Man is a necessary agent," says Collins, a celebrated Necessitarian, "if all his actions are so determined by the causes which precede each action, that not one past action could possibly not have come to pass, or have been otherwise than it hath been; nor one future action can possibly not come to pass, or be otherwise than it shall be. He is a free agent, if he is able, at any time, under the circumstances and causes he then is, to, do different things; or, in other words, if he is not unavoidably determined in every point of time by the circumstances he is in, and causes he is under, to do that one thing he does, and not possibly to do any other." The reader will perceive, at once, the perfect identity of the above definitions of Liberty and Necessity with those given in the preceding part of this treatise.

Equally explicit is Dr. Woods on this point, in his controversy with Dr. Ware. The point at issue between him [Dr. Ware,] and the Calvinists, he says, "is not whether two men, who are alike in some respects, and are acted upon by many similar motives can choose differently, but whether they can choose differently when they are alike in all respects, that is, when all the proper antecedents of a choice, are the same; in other words, when all the external and internal motives to volitions are the same. A difference in the prevailing affections of the mind, whatever is alike, will always cause a difference of volitions. But suppose every thing which has the nature of a motive is the same in both; then what can be the cause of a difference of volitions? This is the question. We say there never was any difference in such circumstances, that there never can be, and that, to assert, it is to assert that an effect exists without a cause." Here the dogma is unequivocally and directly asserted, that in the presence of the same motive, but one act of Will is possible, and that cannot but arise. This is the doctrine of Necessity, as defined in this Treatise. In the presence of the identical motives, under the influence of which, men, in all cases, do disobey God, they are as Dr. W. himself maintains, required upon pain of Gods eternal displeasure, to put forth acts of obedience. In other words, sinners are sent to eternal perdition, for not, in the presence of motives, under the influence of which but one act is possible and that cannot but arise, putting forth another and a different act. That is, men are to endure eternal punishment for not producing an effect, which when produced shall be an effect without a cause. Such is the doctrine of Dr. W., as avowed by himself, the doctrine too of all who agree with him in theology. I do not say that they state their sentiments in these words. But such are their real views when correctly expressed.

Mr. Payne, in his Elements of Mental and Moral Science, declares, that every act of Will is "a state of mind, which must as infallibly arise, in the circumstances adapted to produce it, as the feeling of fragrance, when the odoriferous particles of the rose are brought in contact with the organ."

Equally clear and definite is Dr. Chalmers in his statement of the doctrine under, consideration.

"The first point then, which we have already labored to impress, is, that there is no such thing as chance or contingency in any department of nature—that this principle so readily admitted in regard to the world of matter, should also be extended to the world of mind—that if the one have its laws of motion, and its regular successions, and its unvarying processes, the other has its laws of thought and of feeling; and, in virtue of these, has all its processes alike regular and alike, unvarying—that in neither is there aught so monstrous as an event uncaused, or coming forth of the womb of nonentity without having a progenitor in some event that went before it; and if not uncaused then necessary, having the same certain and precise dependence on something preceding itself which the posterior has on the prior term of any sequence—So that the phenomena of thinking and feeling and willing and doing in the spiritual department of Nature, do as surely result from the previous constitution which has been given to it, as any of the varied phenomena in the material department result from its constitution. According to this view, the history of our species may be regarded as one vast progression, carried forward by definite footsteps; and with the state of each individual as surely fixed at every moment of time by the laws of mental nature, as is the situation of any planet above, or of any particle of dust below by the physical laws which are established in the material world. This is that doctrine of philosophical necessity, whose ablest advocate is President Edwards of America."

Here the principle is distinctly affirmed, that the sinner who is moving in the line of disobedience to God, can no more, under the circumstances and influences under which he does and must act, take the course of obedience, which he is required to take, or avoid holding on in the course of disobedience, which he is required to abandon, than the planets, under the influences which impel them forward in their present course, can take a different and opposite course, or avoid moving in this one particular course.

The same principle, he maintains, holds true of all the actions of all beings. The course which they do pursue, under the influences to which they are, and must be subject, they cannot possibly but pursue. Dr. Chalmers, therefore, will not regard himself as slandered, when the belief of the doctrine of Necessity, as defined in this Treatise, is imputed to him.

I make but one quotation more. "The prescience and omnipotence of God being granted," says Luther, "the consequence naturally and necessarily follows, that we cannot, by ourselves, become anything, that we cannot live, nor do anything but by His omnipotence. But since he foreknew what we should be, and now moves and governs, and causes us to be what we are, why, I ask, should it be feigned, what in us is free, that any thing might occur one way or the other, but as he foreknew, and now brings to pass? The foreknowledge and omnipotence of God are diametrically at war with our free Will." Necessitarians may differ in respect to the grounds of Necessity in us, some ascribing it to the fixed laws of our constitution, with Chalmers, and others with Luther, to the direct action of Omnipotence, causing things to be what they are and rendering it impossible that they should be otherwise. In respect to the nature of this necessity, they all agree, to wit, that under the circumstances and influences under which we act in a given direction, it is absolutely impossible for us to act differently, or not, to act in that one direction. This is the doctrine of Necessity, as defined in this Treatise.

THE TERM, CERTAINTY, AS USED BY NECESSITARIANS.

11. We are prepared for another important inquiry, to wit: whether the words, certainty, moral certainty, &c., as used by Necessitarians, are identical in their meaning with that of Necessity as above defined? The doctrine of Necessity would never be received by the public at all, but for the language in which it is clothed, language which prevents its being seen as it is. At one time it is called Moral, in distinction from Natural Necessity. At another, it is said to be nothing but Certainty, or Moral Certainty, &c. Now the question arises, what is this Certainty? Is it or is it not, real Necessity, and nothing else? That it is, I argue,

1. From the fact, as shown above, that there can possibly be no Certainty, which does not fall either under the relation of Liberty or Necessity as above defined. The Certainty of Necessitarians does not according to their own showing fall under the former relations, it must, therefore, fall under the latter. It must be naked Necessity and nothing else.

2. While they have defined the term Necessity, and have not that of Certainty, they use the latter term as avowedly synonymous with the former. The latter, therefore, must be explained by the former, and not the former by the latter.

3. The Certainty which they hold is a certainty which avowedly excludes the possibility of different and opposite acts of Will under the influences, or motives, under which particular acts are put forth. The Certainty under consideration, therefore, is not necessity of a particular kind, a necessity consistent with liberty and moral obligation. It is the Necessity above defined, in all its naked deformity.

4. Necessitarians unanimously agree in representing the ground or reason of the Certainty, that when a particular motive is given, one and only one consequent, or act of Will, will arise, as being, in all instances, perfectly identical with that which exists between all other antecedents and consequents. Now all admit, Necessitarians, as well as others, that in all instances of the class last named, the ground of the certainty, that when a certain antecedent is given, but one particular consequent will arise, is, that such is the corellation between the nature of the one and the other, that in connection with, such antecedent, one consequent only is possible, and that must arise, that is, the ground of the certainty is Necessity, and nothing else. Now as the ground of the Certainty, that when a certain motive is given, one particular act of Will will arise, is, according to Necessitarians themselves, identical with that in the instances above named, certainty with them is, and can be nothing else, but naked necessity.

DOCTRINE OF ABILITY ACCORDING TO THE NECESSITARIAN SCHEME.

III. We are now prepared for a distinct statement of the doctrine of Ability, according to the Necessitarian scheme. Even the Necessitarians, with very few exceptions, admit, that in the absence of all power to do right or wrong, we can be under no obligation to do the one or avoid the other. "A man," says Pres. Day, "is not responsible for remaining in his place if he has no power to move. He is not culpable for omitting to walk, if he has no strength to walk. He is not under obligation to do anything for which he has not what Edwards calls natural power." It is very important for us to understand the nature of this ability, which lies at the foundation of moral obligation; to understand, I repeat, what this Ability is, according to the theory under consideration. This Ability according to the doctrine of Liberty, has been well stated by Cousin, to wit: "The moment we take the resolution to do an action, we take it with the consciousness of being able to take a contrary resolution;" and by Dr. Dwight, who says of a man's sin, that it is chosen by him "unnecessarily, while possessed of a power to choose otherwise." The nature of this Ability, according to the Necessitarian scheme, has been stated with equal distinctness in the Christian Spectator. "If we take this term [Ability or Power] in the absolute sense, as including all the antecedents to a given volition, there is plainly no such thing as power to the contrary; for in this sense of the term, as President Day states, "a man never has power to do anything but what he actually performs." In this comprehensive, though rather unusual sense of the word," says President Day, "a man has not power to do anything which he does not do." The meaning of the above extracts cannot be mistaken. Nor can any one deny that they contain a true exposition of the doctrine of Necessity, to wit: that under the influences under which men do will, and consequently act, it is absolutely impossible for them to will and act differently from what they do. In what sense, then, have they power to will and act differently according to this doctrine? To this question President Day has given a correct and definite answer. "The man who wills in a particular way, under the influence of particular feelings, might will differently under a different influence."

Now, what is the doctrine of Ability, according to this scheme? A man, for example, commits an act of sin. He ought, in the stead of that act, to have put forth an act of obedience. Without the power to render this obedience, as President Day admits, there can be no obligation to do it. When the Necessitarian says, that the creature, when he, sins, has power to obey, he means, not that under the influence under which the act of sin is committed, the creature has power to obey; but that under a different influence he might obey. But mark, it is under the identical influence under which a man does sin, and under which according to the doctrine of Necessity, he cannot but sin, that he is required not to sin. Now how can a man's ability, and obligation not to sin under a given influence, grow out of the fact, that, under a different influence, an influence, under which he cannot but do right, he might not sin? This is all the ability and ground of obligation as far as Ability, Natural Ability as it is called, is concerned, which the doctrine of Necessity admits. A man is, by a power absolutely irresistible, placed in circumstances in which he cannot possibly but sin. In these circumstances, it is said that he has natural ability not to sin, and consequently ought not to do it. Why? Because, to his acting differently, no change in his nature or powers is required. These are "perfect and entire, wanting nothing." All that is required is, that his circumstances be changed, and then he might not sin. "In what sense," asks President Day, "is it true, that a man has power to will the contrary of what he actually wills? He has such power that, with a sufficient inducement, he will make an opposite choice." Is not this the strangest idea of Natural Ability as constituting the foundation of obligation, of which the human mind ever tried to conceive? In illustration, let us suppose that a man, placed in the city of New York, cannot but sin; placed in that of Boston he cannot but be holy, and that the fact whether he is in the one or the other city depends upon the irresistible providence of God. He is placed in New York where he cannot but sin. He is told that he ought not to do it, and that he is highly guilty for not being perfectly holy. It is also asserted that he has all the powers of moral agency, all the ability requisite to lay the foundation for the highest conceivable obligation to be holy. What is the evidence? he asks. Is it possible for me, in my present circumstances, to avoid sin? and in my present circumstances, you know, I cannot but be. I acknowledge, the Necessitarian says, that under present influences, you cannot but sin, and that you cannot but be subject to these influences. Still, I affirm, that you have all the powers of moral agency, all the natural ability requisite to obedience, and to the highest conceivable obligation to obedience. Because, in the first place, even in New York, you could obey if you chose. You have, therefore, natural, though not moral, power to obey. But stop, friend, right here. When you say that I might obey, if I chose, I would ask, if choosing, as in the command, "choose life," is not the very thing required of me? When, therefore, you affirm that I might obey, if I chose, does it not mean, in reality, that I might chose, if I should choose? Is not your Natural Ability this, that I might obey if I did obey?¹⁵ I cannot deny, the Necessitarian replies, that you have correctly stated this doctrine. Permit me to proceed in my argument, however. In the next place, all that you need in order to be holy as required, is a change not of your powers, but of the influences which control the action of those powers. With no change in your constitution or powers you need only to be placed in Boston instead of New York, and then you cannot but be holy. Is it not as clear as light, therefore, that you have now all the powers of moral agency, all the ability requisite to the highest conceivable obligation to be holy instead of sinful?

I fully understand you, the sinner replies. But remember, that it is not in Boston, where, as you acknowledge, I cannot be, that I am required not to sin; but here in New York, where I cannot but be, and cannot possibly but sin. It is here and not somewhere else, that I am required not to sin. How can the fact, that if I were in Boston, where I could not but be holy, I might not sin, prove, that here in New York, I have any ability, either natural or moral—am under any obligation whatever—not to sin? These are the difficulties which press upon me. How do you remove them according to your theory?

I can give no other answer, the Necessitarian replies, than that already given. If that does not silence for ever every excuse for sin in your mind, it is wholly owing to the perverseness of your heart, to its bitter hostility to the truth. I may safely appeal to the Necessitarian himself, whether I have not here given an uncaricatured expose of his theory.

SINFUL INCLINATIONS.

IV. When pressed with such appalling difficulties as these, the Necessitarian falls back, in self-justification, upon the reason why the sinner cannot be holy. The only reason, it is said, why the sinner does not do as he ought is, not the want of power, but the strength of his sinful inclinations. Shall he plead these in excuse for sin? By no means? They constitute the very essence of the sinner's guilt. Let it be borne in mind, that, according to the doctrine of Necessity, such is the connection between the nature, or constitution of the sinner's mind—a nature which God has given him, and the influences under which he is placed by Divine Providence—that none but these very inclinations are possible to him, and these cannot but exist. From these inclinations, sinful acts of Will cannot but arise. How is the matter helped, as far as ability and obligation, on the part of the sinner, are concerned, by throwing the guilt back from acts of Will upon inclinations equally necessary?

NECESSARIAN DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY.

V. The real liberty of the Will, according to the Necessitarian scheme, next demands our attention. All admit that Liberty is an essential condition of moral obligation. In what sense, then, is, or is not, man free, according to the doctrine of Necessity?

"The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty," says President Edwards, "is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases. Or in other words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any respect as he wills. And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we please to call that by, is a person's being hindered, or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise." "The only idea, indeed, that we can form of free- agency, or of freedom of Will," says Abercrombie, "is, that it consists in a man's being able to do what he wills, or to abstain from doing what he will not. Necessary agency, on the other hand, would consist in a man's being compelled, by a force from without, to do what he will not, or prevented from doing what he wills."

With these definitions all Necessitarians agree. This is all the Liberty known, or conceivable, according to their theory. Liberty does not consist in the power to choose in one or the other of two or more different and opposite directions, under the same influence. It is found wholly and exclusively in the connection between the act of Will, considered as the antecedent, and the effect, external or internal considered as the consequent. On this definition I remark,

l. That it presents the idea of Liberty as distinguished from Servitude, rather than Liberty as distinguished from Necessity. A man is free, in the first sense of the term, when no external restraints hinder the carrying out of the choice within. This, however, has nothing to do with Liberty, as distinguished from Necessity.

2. If this is the only sense in which a man is free, then, in the language of a very distinguished philosopher, "if you cut off a man's little finger, you thereby annihilate so much of his free agency;" because in that case, you abridge so much of his power to do as he chooses. Is this Liberty, the only liberty of man, a liberty which may be destroyed by chains, bolts, and bars? Is this Liberty as distinguished from Necessity—the Liberty which lays the foundation of moral obligation?

3. If this is the only sense in which man is free then dire Necessity reigns throughout the entire domain of human agency. If all acts of Will are the necessary consequents of the influences to which the mind is at the time subjected, much more must a like necessity exist between all acts of Will and their consequents, external and internal. This has been already shown. The mind, then, with all its acts and states, exists in a chain of antecedents and consequents, causes and effects, linked together in every part and department by a dire necessity. This is all the liberty that this doctrine knows or allows us: a Liberty to choose as influences necessitate us to choose, and to have such acts of Will followed by certain necessary consequents, external and internal. In this scheme the idea of Liberty, which all admit must have a location somewhere, or obligation is a chimera; this, idea I say, after, "wandering through dry places, seeking rest and finding none" at length is driven to a location where it finds its grave, and not a living habitation.

4. It is to me a very strange thing, that Liberty, as the foundation of moral obligation, should be located here. Because the acts of Will are followed by certain corresponding necessary consequents external and internal, therefore we are bound to put forth given acts of Will, whatever the influences acting upon us may be, and however impossible it may be to put forth those acts under those influences! Did ever a greater absurdity dance in the brain of a philosopher or theologian?

5. The public are entirely deceived by this definition, and because they are deceived as to the theory intended by it, do they admit it as true? Suppose any man in the common walks of life were asked what he means, when he says, he can do as he pleases, act as he chooses, &c. Does this express your meaning? When you will to walk, rather than sit, for example, no other volition is at the time possible, and this you must put forth, and that when you have put forth this volition, you cannot but walk. Is this your idea, when you say, you can do as you please? No, he would say. This is not my idea. If that is true, man is not a free agent at all. What men in general really mean when they say they can do as they please, and are therefore free, is, that when they put forth a given act of Will, and for this reason conduct in a given manner, they may in the same circumstances put forth different and opposite determina- tions, and consequently act in a different and opposite manner from what they do.

ARGUMENT OF NECESSITARIANS IN RESPECT TO THE PRACTICAL TENDENCY OF THEIR DOCTRINE.

VI. The argument of Necessitarians in respect to the practical tendencies of their doctrine demands a passing notice. All acts of the Will, they say, are indeed necessary under the circumstances in which they occur; but then we should learn the practical, lesson not to place ourselves in the circumstances where we shall be liable to act wrong. To this I reply:

l. That on the hypothesis before us, our being in the circumstances which originate a given choice, is as necessary as the choice itself. For I am in those circumstances either by an overruling Providence over which I have no control, or by previous acts of the Will rendered necessary by such Providence. Hence the difficulty remains in all its force.

2. The solution assumes the very principle denied, that is, that our being in circumstances which originate particular acts of choice is not necessary. Else why tell an individual he is to blame for being in such circumstances and not to place himself there again?

GROUND WHICH NECESSITARIANS ARE BOUND TO TAKE IN RESPECT TO THE DOCTRINE OF ABILITY.

VII. We are now fully prepared to state the ground which Necessitarians of every school are bound to take in respect to the doctrine of Ability. It is to deny that doctrine wholly, to take the open and broad ground, that, according to any appropriate signification of the words, it is absolutely impossible for men to will, and consequently to act, differently from what they do; that when they do wrong they always do it, with the absolute impossibility of doing right; and that when they do right, there is always an equal impossibility of their doing wrong. If men have not power to will differently from what they do, it is undeniably evident that they have no power whatever to act differently: because there is an absolutely necessary connection between volitions and their consequents, external actions. The doctrine of Necessity takes away wholly all ability from the creature to will differently from what he does. It therefore totally annihilates his ability to act differently. What, then, according to the theory of Necessity, becomes of the doctrine of Ability? It is annihilated. It is impossible for us to find for it a "local habitation or a name." As honest men, Necessitarians are bound to proclaim the fact. They are bound to proclaim the doctrine, that, in requiring men to be holy, under influences under which they do sin, and cannot but sin, (as it is true of all sinful acts according to their theory), God requires of them absolute impossibilities, and then dooms them to perdition for not performing such impossibilities.

The subterfuge to which Necessitarians resort here, will not avail them at all, to wit: that men are to blame for not doing right, because they might do it if they chose. To will right is the thing, and the only thing really required of them. The above maxim therefore amounts, as we have already seen, to this: Men are bound to do, that is, to will, what is right, because if they should will what is right, they would will what is right.

DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, AS REGARDED BY NECESSITARIANS OF DIFFERENT SCHOOLS.

VIII. Two schools divide the advocates of Necessity. According to one class, God produces in men all their volitions and acts, both sinful and holy, by the direct exertion of his own omnipotence. Without the Divine agency, men, they hold, are wholly incapable of all volitions and actions of every kind. With it, none but those which God produces can arise, and these cannot but arise. This is the scheme of Divine efficiency, as advocated by Dr. Emmons and others.

According to the other school, God does not, in all instances, produce volitions and actions by his own direct agency, but by creating in creatures a certain nature or constitution, and then subjecting them to influences from which none but the particular volitions and acts which they do put forth can result, and these must result. According to a large portion of this school, God either by his own direct agency, or by sustaining the laws of natural generation, produces in men the peculiar nature which they do possess, and then imputes to them infinite guilt, not only for this nature, but for its necessary results, sinful feelings, volitions, and actions.

Such are these two schemes. In the two following particulars, they perfectly harmonize. 1. All acts of Will, together with their effects, external and internal, in the circumstances of their occurrence, cannot but be what they are. 2. The ground of this necessity is the agency of God, in the one instance producing these effects directly and immediately, and in the other producing the same results, immediately, by giving existence to a constitution and influences from which such results cannot but arise. They differ only in respect to the immediate ground of this necessity, the power of God, according to the former, producing the effects directly, and according to the latter, indirectly. According to both, all our actions sustain the same essential relation to the Divine Will, that of Necessity.

Now while these two theories so perfectly harmonize, in all essential particulars, strange to tell, the advocates of one regard the other as involving the most monstrous absurdities conceivable. For God to produce, through the energies of his own omnipotence, human volitions, and then to impute infinite guilt to men for what he himself has produced in them, what a horrid sentiment that is, exclaims the advocate of constitutional depravity. For God to create in men a sinful nature, and then impute to them infinite guilt for what he has himself created, together with its unavoidable results, what horrid tyranny such a sentiment imputes to the Most High, exclaims the advocate of Divine efficiency, in his turn.

The impartial, uncommitted spectator, on the other hand, perceives most distinctly the same identical absurdities in both these theories. He knows perfectly, that it can make no essential difference, whether God produces a result directly, or by giving existence to a constitution and influences from which it cannot but arise. If one theory involves injustice and tyranny, the other must involve the same. Let me here add, that the reprobation with which each of the classes above named regards the sediments of the other, is a sentence of reprobation passed (uncon- sciously to be sure) upon the doctrine of Necessity itself which is common to both. For if this one element is taken out of either theory, there is nothing left to render it abhorrent to any mind. It is thus that Necessitarians themselves, without exception, pass sentence of condemnation upon their own theory, by condemning it, in every system in which they meet with it except their own. There is not a man on earth, that has not in some form or other passed sentence of reprobation upon this system. Let any man, whatever, contemplate any theory but the one he has himself adopted, any theory that involves this element, and he will instantly fasten upon this one feature as the characteristic which vitiates the whole theory, and renders it deserving of universal reprobation. It is thus that unsophisticated Nature expresses her universal horror at a system which

"Binding nature fast in fate.