Revival Reformation Classics: Can Change the World Again.

SCIENCE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY;

BY REV. ASA MAHAN, A. M.,

Terms Defined.

INTEGRITY, as we have seen, consists in an honest choice and intention to know all objects and events which it concerns us to know as they are, and to esteem and trust them accordingly. The term veracity expresses the relations of such internal integrity to other moral agents in all the varied communications of the subject with them. It consists in the pure intention to be to others all that truth demands; and nothing else, to communicate to all in respect to whom the law of veracity binds us, nothing but our honest convictions in respect to what is truth, and to announce, whether by word or deed, or both united, those convictions just as they lie in the interior of our, own minds. In this relation to our neighbor, we meet fully all our duty to him, as far as the law of veracity is concerned, and that whether what is communicated accords with facts or not, and whether he rightly or wrongly apprehends our real intentions. We can not beheld responsible for any unavoidable results of the necessary limitations of our faculties. Integrity requires proper carefulness and perfect, candor in the formation of our convictions, and similar care in communicating them to others. When these conditions, in honest sincerity, are fulfilled, we have perfectly met the demands of the law of veracity, in our communications with our neighbor. The law of veracity, which our own conscience thus imposes upon us, we of course do, and by a law of our intelligence must impose upon others relatively to ourselves. The law and the only law which binds them in their communications with us, we should ever bear in mind, is the law of integrity and veracity. In all such communications, there is a liability to mistakes and errors of greater or less importance. Whether we have been mistaken or not, and whatever consequences may arise to us, they have a sacred claim upon our esteem and commendation, when, from maternal respect to truth, they have fully obeyed the law of integrity and veracity. On the other hand, we should quietly submit to and acquiesce in any evils which may thus accrue to us. How much unrighteous heart-burning and bitter recrimination would be prevented in this world, by a strict adherence to the above self-evident principles.

FORMS IN WHICH THE LAW OF VERACITY BINDS US.

There are various forms in which the law of integrity and veracity binds us, forms demanding special attention in such a treatise as this, as, for example—veracity in the statement of our knowledge of facts—and veracity in respect to promises, contracts, and oaths. To a consideration of these, special attention is now invited.

Veracity in the Statement of Facts.

Knowledge with us pertains to particular facts lying within and around us, and to general principles in the light of which such facts may be explained. In our communications with others in respect to such subjects, what we really profess to communicate, is the actual relations of our intelligence to those subjects. What we entertain as confident belief, or what we hold as more conjecture or opinion, this, and this only, we profess to communicate. The law which binds us morally under such circumstances is this: honestly intend, in all communications with all individuals in respect to whom the law of veracity binds you, to communicate the real relations of your intelligence, just as they are, to the objects to which such communications pertain. On the other hand, let it never be your intention to deceive or mislead such individuals in such communications, in the relations supposed.

It is not our duty, always, in speaking upon a given subject, even to intend to communicate all that we know, this often being impracticable; but all that, in the circumstances, is demanded by the law of duty. The opposite principle would require us to be, at all times, wholly silent upon every subject, in respect to which we can not, when we speak at all, tell all that we know about it. Such a principle, surely, is dictated neither by scripture nor reason. In making, as we are often, and always almost, to a greater or less degree, necessitated to do, partial communications, there is always an incidental liability to the communication of error, of greater or less importance, errors arising, 1. From a misunderstanding of our real meaning. 2. From erroneous inferences in respect to what we have not communicated. 3. Wrong uses made of the truth actually communicated, on account of erroneous principles in the hearer's mind. When Christ, for example, proclaimed the gospel, he did it with a certain knowledge that errors from all these sources were actually incidental to its communication. Yet He uttered the truth, notwithstanding those incidental evils. The question here arises, When would, it be our duty to utter truth, when we are aware that such evils will attend its communication? I answer,

1. It must be our intention to communicate only what is true.

2. It must be our honest intention to guard, by the best means in our power, against all such incidental evils.

3. In our honest judgment, the good resulting must far overbalance the evils. In such circumstances, we are justified, in speaking, though the evils referred to, in any amount should arises. In other circumstances, when the incidental evils would, in our judgment, overbalance the good direct and indirect, duty demands our silence.

Law of Veracity—when violated.

Such is the law of veracity. The question which now arises is, When is this law violated? The various forms of violation, may all perhaps be comprehended under one term, lying. What then is lying defined as moral evil? It is this, the intentional deception of an individual, under circumstances where the law of veracity binds us, in other words, where, we are bound to intend to communicate the truth and nothing else. The deception must be intentional; or it falls under some other law than that of veracity. It must also be in circumstances where we are bound to intend to communicate the truth and that only; else, as no obligations are violated; no moral wrong is committed, that is, the act is not a lie. Concealment is one thing; lying is quite another. It may be, and often is a duty to conceal what we know; but never to deceive any one to whom we are bound by the law of veracity. When language is used, as we often have occasion to use it, equally consistent with knowledge or ignorance of the subject to which the discourse pertains, in such cases we do not even deceive the hearer. We simply conceal from him the relations of our intelligence to the object referred to. The question put by our Savior to the two young men, on the way to Emmaus, is of this character. The question simply concealed, without affirming any thing, in respect to Christ's real knowledge on the subject. His object in putting the question was well understood, to wit, to draw from them a full statement of the case. All beyond this was simply concealed. All such forms of speech, therefore, make no approach whatever, to deceiving or lying either.

When individuals have a variety of particular objects to accomplish in a given transaction, and they disclose a part of these, without affirming or denying any thing in respect to what remains, these last are simply concealed. Deception in no form is practised upon the hearer. To constitute the communication a lie, the speaker must have communicated a part, professing at the same time to have communicated the whole. The appearing of Samuel at Bethlehem, as divinely directed, at the time when David was anointed king, is a case of this kind.

Individuals having also some ulterior design demanded by the law of benevolence, are necessitated to put forth subordinate acts which occasion mementary misconceptions of their real intentions, and that as a means to the end referred to. A painter, for example, had nearly completed a painting in the cupola of a church, some hundred feet or more from the ground. While surveying his work, his attention became so absorbed, that he had unconsciously stepped backward, till another step would have precipitated him from the scaffolding on which he was standing. His associate, perceiving that to warn his friend of the peril would only render his death certain, as the only means of saving him, seized a brush and made towards the painting, with an apparent design to mar it. The painter leaped forward to prevent the catastrophe, and thus his life was saved. No one would regard the occasioning a momentary misconception such as that, a lie. The confidence of no one in the integrity of him who occasioned it, would be weakened by a knowledge of such a fact. That which weakens the confidence of no one in the veracity of the subject, is not a lie.

Lying, on the other hand, is the intentional inducing of false judgments in others, when and where we are bound to intend to induce none but what are true.

The following may be specified as the most important forms in which this vice appears.

1. Making statements as true which are known or supposed to be false.

2. Making statements as true which are not known or sincerely supposed to be true. Whether such statements turn out to be true or false, makes no difference whatever with the character of him who makes them. When we state things as true, we are bound to know whereof we affirm.

3. Stating a part of the facts as they are, and withholding others, with the intention of inducing a false judgment; or magnifying some and extenuating others, and that as a means to the same end.

4. Individuals may also so arrange real facts, as naturally to induce false impressions upon the hearer, and that with the design of producing such results. This is also lying. Any thing, in short, said or done, in the relations supposed, with the intention of inducing false judgments, is lying.

Is all intentional deception lying?

The definition above given would seem to imply, that it is not at least an ascertained truth, that intentional deception, in every form, is morally wrong, that is, lying. We are now prepared to answer the inquiry which naturally arises in this connection on this subject. If there is any form of such deception, the knowledge of which does not, in the least degree weaken our confidence in the veracity of an individual in those relations which he recognizes as imposing the law of veracity upon him, such forms of deception, all must admit, are not lying, the peculiar characteristic of which is, that the knowledge of it destroys confidence, of necessity, in the veracity of the subject. Does, or can such a case exist? Take a single fact in reply. It is a well known fact of history, that General Washington, as a means of capturing Lord Cornwallis, intentionally deceived Sir Henry Clinton, in respect to his, General Washington's ulterior designs. This he did by means of letters sent with a design that they should be intercepted, and thereby produce that result. The world has been familiar with that fact ever since it occurred, and yet it has not, in the least degree, weakened confidence in the absolute veracity of General Washington in all the relations in which it is acknowledged that the law of veracity binds moral agents. That form of intentional deception therefore, is not lying.

There are relations then in which intentional deception is not lying. What are those relations? A man, we will suppose, is pursued by a beast of prey. By an act of intentional deception upon the animal, the man escapes with his life. Was that act a moral wrong, a lie? No, is the reply. The creature deceived is a brute. But suppose that the creature pursuing was not a brute, but a man, a man pursuing with the known and single purpose of taking the life of the pursued. By the identical act, by which the brute was, the man is deceived, and the pursued escapes accordingly. Did the law of veracity bind the individual any more relatively to the man, the human assassin, than the brute? If so, why? My honest convictions are that this law binds an individual, under such circumstances, no more relatively to one than the other. The principle which I lay down as law universal on the subject is this. When individuals voluntarily outlaw themselves from all the ties which bind man to man in social and civil life, when the choose to sustain to society no other relations than beasts of prey, such as pirates, assassins, and robbers, such individuals, by their own acts have outlawed themselves from those relations where the law of veracity binds man to man. When they are deceived as a means of self-defence and protection, no rights are violated, and consequently, no moral is committed. For this reason deception like that affected by Washington, between belligerent powers, is not considered as lying, each party being in a state of outlawry relatively to the other. On the other hand, in cases of treaties, flags of truce, &c., the law of veracity binds; because the parties then are replaced under the control of that law. In accordance with this principle, God required Joshua to deceive the inhabitants of Ai, and required the Israelites to observe the treaty made with the inhabitants of Gibeon.

With the exception of those who are outlawed in the sense, explained, all men are within the circle where the law of veracity binds us. Intentional deception of them is lying. There are many things which it may be and is our duty to conceal from, or not to reveal them; but what we can not conceal without deception, ought not to be concealed at all. Without the most sacred respect for truth, virtue has no place in human character. Such is the law of veracity. We will now contemplate the applications of this law to

Promises and Contracts.

Promises and contracts differ only in this: the latter is a mutual promise based upon conditions agreed upon, between different individuals. As the same principles apply to each, they will be treated in the same connection. In a promise, certain expectations have been voluntarily excited by the promiser in the promisee, expectations which the former pledges himself to meet. The form in which a promise binds the promiser is plain. It is this, as shown by Dr. Paley. The expectations which he intentionally excited and supposed the promisee to understand him to pledge himself to meet, he is bound, under the conditions hereafter to be specified, to meet.

The importance of observing most strictly the law of veracity in respect to promises, is as great as subjective integrity, on the one hand, and the preservation of all the bonds of social, domestic, and civil life, on the other.

Promises when not binding.

The only question which demands special attention on this subject is this. When is a promise not binding upon the promiser? A promise is not binding,

1. When the performance is impossible. "The moral character of such a promise however, will," is the language of Dr. Wayland, "vary with the circumstances under which the promise was made. If I knew nothing of the impossibility, and honestly expressed an intention which I designed to fulfill, I am at "bar of conscience, acquitted." The fulfillment of promises may be, from the nature of the case, impossible, or providential occurrences may render them so, or they may have been rendered so, by the voluntary act of the promiser. In the latter instance the promiser is guilty, and punishable for his misdeed. But in all the instances above specified, he is alike freed from obligation to fulfill his promise.

2. When the promise pledges the promiser to do what in itself is unlawful. No being can bring himself under obligation to sin, or break a command of God. For this, in the language of Dr. Wayland, would be to "suppose a man guilty for not being guilty."

3. When the promise was based upon a condition known to both parties at the time, which condition is subsequently found not to exist. I promise, for example, to give money to one soliciting alms as a beggar. I subsequently, before fulfilling the promise, discover that he is an impostor. This discovery releases me, for the reasons stated, from all obligation to fulfill the promise

4. When the promisee fails to fulfill the conditions upon the fulfillment of which the promise was suspended. This principle has a special reference to contracts.

5. The promiser may, in certain instances, be released from obligation, by the consent of the promisee. If that release, however, has been obtained by the guilt of the promiser, the latter will have a solemn account to render to the Judge of all the earth.

These are the only instances that I have been able to find, in which the fulfillment of a promise is not binding. I would here remark that instances often occur, in which a promise can be in part fulfilled. The promiser is of course bound to the full extent of his ability. Also the promiser, in many instances, is not able to fulfill his promise at the time specified. Whenever he becomes able, such fulfillment is of course binding upon him. This is the rule which should bind insolvent debtors.

With the consequences resulting from the fulfillment of promises, we have nothing to do. These must always be submitted to, with cheerful resignation, as dispensations of providence.

Of Oaths.

The topics which claim our attention in discussing this department of our subject are the following—the nature of oaths—their lawfulness—their expediency—and the obligations they really impose upon the individual who takes them.

Nature of an Oath.

The design of the oath is to secure, in the individual upon whom it is imposed, a strict adherence to the law of veracity, in respect to the subject pertaining to which he is to speak or act, and to secure this result, by inducing, in him, a distinct recognition of his accountability to God, and of a special amenability, at the bar of his country, for a faithful discharge of the obligation imposed, on the one hand, and assumed, on the other. The individual taking an oath, simply pledges himself to discharge the responsibilities assumed, and gives this pledge with a distinct and avowed recognition of amenability in the transaction, amenability in the sense above explained. This, as I understand it, is the true and real nature of the oath. Oaths are properly imposed in those cases only, in which interests solemn and important are concerned, such as the administration of justice, and the filling of stations of great trust and responsibility.

Lawfulness of Oaths.

The lawfulness of oaths, under circumstances like those above named, may be argued from the following considerations:

1. The universal intelligence has sanctioned their use, in the circumstances named. In all ages and nations, oaths, for the attainment of certain ends, have been imposed. This would seem to intimate most clearly their conformity to the natural reason of man.

2. God Himself has sanctioned its use, by imposing it upon Himself. "Because He could swear by no greater, He sware by Himself." God surely would not sanction a practice wrong in itself.

3. "Oaths for confirmation" were directly required, under the ancient dispensation. With this fact all are familiar.

4. Christ Himself, the author of the new dispensation, received the oath and answered under it. "And the high priest answered and said, I adjure Thee by the living God," that is, I put Thee upon Thy oath, as in the presence of the living God. Till then Christ had refused to answer questions put to Him. But now being put under oath, He gave answer, as a witness, to the truth. If He had deemed the oath a thing unlawful and wrong, He certainly would not have answered under it.

5. The use of the oath has the direct sanction of inspired apostolic example. How often does the apostle Paul, for example, speak, under the express solemnity of an oath. "I call God to record on my soul." "God is my witness." "Behold, before God I lie not," &c.

6. In Rev. 10: 6, an angel of God is represented, as affirming truth, under the express solemnity of an oath. Inspiration then, under both dispensations alike, as well as the common intelligence of all nations in all ages, sanctions the use of the oath, on occasions of special solemnity.

7. Those passages of scripture which are supposed by some to prohibit oaths, have no reference whatever to judicial oaths. When we read, for example, the commands of our Savior, "swear not at all," we should remember, that the word rendered swear has two entirely distinct meanings, one referring to the oath judicially taken, and the other to a profane use of it, in ordinary conversation. The circumstances in which the prohibition was given, evince most clearly, that the latter is the sense, and the only sense in which it is used, in the prohibition under consideration. In our social "communications" we are not to use any form of oath. This is the form of the oath also prohibited through the Apostle James.

Expediency of the Oath.

The considerations presented above, render sufficiently evident the lawfulness of the oath. The question which next arises is, whether its use, though in itself proper, is ever expedient. Two considerations only need to he adduced, to render the expediency of the ordinance sufficiently evident. 1. There are circumstances of marked solemnity and interest, such as the administration of justice, in which men upon whose evidence the scales of justice must turn, should act with a distinct and special recognition of their accountability to God, and to the tribunals of their country. Oaths are, in a special manner, adapted to secure this result. They may therefore, very properly be resorted to on such occasions. 2. The sacredness which the public attaches to the oath renders its use, on the occasions referred to, obviously expedient. This sacredness is clearly evinced in the atrociousness of the crime of perjury in public estimation. This shows the adaptation of the oath to secure the objects for which it was instituted, to wit, the ends of justice.

Obligations imposed by the Oath.

The obligations imposed by the oath are simply those, that the mind be wholly abstracted from all considerations but one, to wit, the solemn honest intention to speak or act, as the case may be, in strict conformity to truth. The witness under oath, for example, has nothing to do with the consequences which may result from his testimony, nor with his relations to the individuals to whom it relates. His simple and exclusive office is to relate the facts of which he has a personal knowledge, bearing upon the case. The obligation imposed upon him by the oath, is the honest intention to tell all that he knows upon the subject, and no more nor less.

Such is the law of veracity in its varied applications. Happy is he who carries in his inner being the consciousness, that that law is the fixed and changeless law of his voluntary activity.

CHAPTER III.
THE LORD'S DAY; OR CHRISTIAN SABBATH.
CHAPTER IV.
SUBJECTIVE DUTIES, OR THE DUTIES WE OWE TO OURSELVES.
Oppression Through Ignorance.
CHPATER XIII.
DUTIES ARISING FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SEXES.

TLaw and Duty of Veracity.. Science of Moral Philosophy By Asa Mahan