Duties arising from the constitution of the sexes. Science of Moral Philosophy. By Asa Mahan

PRESIDENT OF THE OBERLIN COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE.
AUTHOR OF "A SYSTEM OF INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY;" "DOCTRINE OF THE WILL," &C.

CHAPTER XIII.

DUTIES ARISING FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SEXES.

Duties of the unmarried--Duties of the married--Law of Chastity--Law of Divorce.

IN the remarks which I design to make upon this subject, I shall assume the following propositions as first truths:

1. Marriage is agreeable to the will of God, being not only permitted, but presented as divinely constituted in the scriptures, and being manifestly demanded by the human constitution.

As contracts for marriage are also commonly entered into, at longer or shorter periods, before the union of the parties is consummated, I shall consider the duties of individuals in the following relations:

I. Duties of individuals in single life, towards those in respect to whom no such relation is anticipated.

1. As the marriage relation is to be confined, in all instances, to two individuals, one of each sex, every person is under the highest obligation not to will or desire the existence of that affection, on which the relation in question is founded, excepting in respect to one individual—the one individual with whom that union is desired.

2. The existence of such affection in other individuals should be regarded as a positive evil, inasmuch as the unhappiness arising from disappointed hope, or ungratified desire, will always be in proportion to the strength of the affection excited. Hence,

3. Every means, and every influence, adapted to excite such affection, and such expectation, should not only be avoided, but regarded as in the highest degree criminal. The pride of conquest, and the love of power in such a relation, is one of the most purely selfish and bad passions ever indulged in by man or woman. The individual who is not perfectly satisfied with the affection and esteem of one individual of the other sex—that affection and esteem peculiar to the married relation, deserves the affection and esteem of no person on earth.

II. We will now consider the duties of individuals in contracting marriage, and while the union is not consummated. Here I would remark,

(2.) The mutual usefulness and happiness of the parties concerned, in some particular sphere in life. Hence,

(3.) Such relations should not be sought when the demands of benevolence can be better met by remaining in single life; as is no doubt not unfrequently the case, Nor,

(4.) Should they be sought by individuals whose relations in life, habits, education, &c., disqualify them for being mutual aids to each other, in the particular spheres in which they are expecting to move.

2. The following are among the duties devolved upon individuals on entering into this relation.

(1.) Each should frankly disclose to the other all the facts in respect to personal feelings, desires, expectations, &c., which may properly be demanded, in order to render such an alliance a matter of judgment, and not the mere impulse of feeling.

(2.) Any secret personal defects, &c., which would, on becoming known, tend to influence unfavorably the feelings of the other party, should also be frankly disclosed.

(3.) The mutual advice of parents and friends should, in all ordinary circumstances, be sought.

3. We will now consider the duties of the parties to each other and to the public, after such an engagement had been consummated.

(1.) All attempts at secrecy, in respect to the fact of such engagement, should, under all ordinary circumstances, be avoided. The public have a right to know the relation of the parties, in order that they may know how to treat them. A denial of such engagement, when it really exists, is lying, inasmuch as it is withholding the truth when it ought to be known.

(2.) The engagement once formed should be regarded by each of the parties as sacred. Each is now in a state of voluntary divorcement from all desire, or intention of forming such contracts with any other individuals, and should regard even the voluntarily cherished entertainment of the thought of doing it as highly criminal. If in any relation, next to that of marriage itself, parties ought to regard mutual pledges as inviolably sacred, it is in such a relation as this.

(3.) Any proposals from others to violate such engagements, should be reprobated and repelled at once, as solicitations to perpetrate a most immoral act.

(4.) The entertaining of any affection, such as that designed to constitute the basis of the marriage union, towards any other individuals, or any attempts to excite such affections in them towards either of the parties, on the part of the same, should be regarded as an aggravated crime.

(5.) The parties are now morally bound to use all diligence to qualify themselves for the occupancy of the particular spheres of action in which they are expecting to move, when their union is consummated. The period intervening between the engagement and its consummation, should be mutually regarded as the season of mutual diligent preparation for the discharge of the ensuing responsibilities.

4. One additional inquiry in this connection, remains to be answered, to wit, under what circumstances may either party refuse to fulfill a marriage contract? I believe, that there is but one reason, that can justify such an act. It is this. A refusal or criminal neglect on the part of the other, to fulfill the conditions on which the contract was based. The discovery of intentional deception in the original contract, of any acts of licentiousness, or gross immorality, of any unfaithfulness in the affections, or any inexcusable failure to fulfill any conditions mutually agreed upon, wholly frees the party offended against, from obligation to fulfill the marriage contract. The party sinning, on the other hand, cannot; without guilt, make his or her own crime, such as subjective alienated affection, any reason for such refusal, or any just ground for any proposals to the other for a mutual dissolution of the contract. In no transaction whatever, much less in one of this nature, can an offending party avail himself of his own wrong, as a basis of seeking to be freed from obligations to fulfill a solemn engagement.

Among the duties imposed by this relation, the following may be specified as among the most important:

1. Each is under the most sacred obligation to preserve inviolate towards the other, that cordial and exclusive affection and esteem, that conjugal fidelity and chastity, pledged in the marriage vow. "Love itself," says Coleridge, "in its highest earthly bearing as the ground of the marriage union, becomes love by an inward fiat of the will, by a completing and sealing act of moral election, and lays claim to permanence, only under the form of duty." By such a fiat of their mutual wills, the parties have imposed upon themselves mutual and exclusive affection, as a sacred duty. The absence of such affection, and especially its bestowment upon any foreign object; is, and is to be regarded by them, as a heinous crime.

2. The marriage relation imposes upon the parties the duty of preserving that personal purity and propriety, of cultivating such manners and habits, and of making such improvements in knowledge and virtue, that each shall ever appear to the other, worthy of that affection and esteem, the exercise and preservation of which they have imposed upon themselves as a duty. To love in the absence of perceived worth, and especially where its presence was expected, is a hard task, truly. Such a task, no one individual can impose upon another without crime.

3. The marriage relation imposes upon the parties the duty of mutual assistance. It is the special duty of the husband to make provision for the maintenance of the family; and of the wife to take charge of the domestic affairs. Now each is bound, in the first instance, to make every proper effort to manage the concerns of his or her particular department in such a manner as to meet all the reasonable expectations of the other. In the second instance, by every appropriate exertion they are bound to assist each other in their several departments.

4. The marriage relation imposes upon each of the parties, the duty of studiously accommodating him or herself to the natural temperament and habits of the other, and of mutual forbearance on the part of each, in respect to the frailties of the other. Without such a course of conduct on the part of each of the parties concerned, domestic bliss will be a stranger to their habitation.

5. The marriage relation devolves upon each of the parties concerned, the special duty of meeting with cheerfulness the dispensations of Providence in respect to their common lot, and especially when those dispensations fall within the particular sphere of one of the parties.

6. The marriage relation constitutes the husband the head of the family, and devolves upon him the right and the duty of control, and upon the wife the duty of obedience. This is evident from the following considerations:

(1.) The order of creation. "The man was first formed, then the woman." "The man was not created for the woman; but the woman for the man."

(2.) The positive teachings and requirements of inspiration. "The head of every man is Christ; and the head of every woman is the man." "Likewise wives, be in subjection to your own husbands."

(3.) As the weaker vessel the wife sustains to the husband the relation of dependence. He is her natural guardian and protector.

(4.) The position of the parties in society is naturally determined by the relations of the husband to community, and not by those of the wife. Her position, therefore, in respect to the husband, is that of subornation, and both parties are most happy, when she acknowledges it. In all such relations, subjection, on the one hand, and kind control on the other is demanded by the mutual happiness of each. The husband should of course consider the wife as his companion and associate. Her counsel should be sought in all instances, when it can be usefully employed, and especially when their mutual interests are concerned. Authority should always be exercised, on the part of the husband with the spirit of forbearance and affection, and as cheerfully and affectionately submitted to by the wife.

7. The marriage relation devolves upon the parties the duty of mutual confidence, and of course the duty of exhibiting such a character that each shall always be, and appear to the other to be, worthy of the confidence demanded by the relation existing between them.

If we consult the teachings of reason and revelation both, we shall not fail to be deeply impressed with the conviction that there is no forms, of duty relative to finite moral agents, to which greater sacredness and importance attaches, than to the laws of chastity, and, that no form of crime is more heinous in itself, nor of more destructive tendency, then the violation of this law. What is woman, when she has surrendered herself to this form of crime? In her body, she is a mass of contagious rottenness. One might with as much safety lie down with the dead, in their corruptions, as to approach her. In her mind, all is of a corresponding darkness and desolation. Not a solitary principle or sentiment remains there turning in any other direction, than to death and corruption. From all domestic ties, domestic bliss, and domestic hopes, she is in a state of total dissociation. From society she has nothing to hope, but its neglect and contempt. She can now, by no possibility, perpetrate any crime by which she can be disgraced. In what she has done, and in what she is, she has sunk far below the possibility of additional infamy. All of ignominy that she can receive, has already received its full consummation in her character. What has she to do with anything that improves humanity, or kindles human hope? What additional infamy has she to fear, from any crime she may choose to perpetrate? Life presents to her but one office, to receive in herself, and do to society, all the evil she can, and in thus receiving and doing, to make her descent as speedily as possible down to death. As she looks forward to the future, nothing awaits her there but eternally to rot in the charnel-house of the universe.

Such is woman, when she has surrendered herself to this of crime. And what is man, when, for a momentary gratification, he will deliberately reduce woman to such a state?

A licentious man, though not as wholly lost to hope, (such being the unjust moral state of public sentiment) is, nevertheless, as utterly destitute of any internal respect for moral principle, in any form, as a dissolute woman. He may in his visible conduct before the world, manifest more respect for the external decencies of society; but all within him is hardened and petrified into as total recklessness of any form of real virtue, excepting when restrained by influences from without, as in her. He that will prey upon the virtue of, and sacrifice all that is valuable to one half of the human race, that portion especially given to men to cherish and protect, and all this for a momentary gratification of his own lust, can surely have no internal respect for any of the rights of humanity.

Such being the importance of this law, the question, what are the principles or the forms of duty which it imposes upon us, demand special attention. To this inquiry I answer,

1. The law of chastity imposes upon us the sacred duty of divorcing our minds wholly from all, even momentarily cherished, desires, purposes, or intentions for sexual gratification, excepting strictly within the married relation. The crime is actually committed morally, when for a single moment, such desire or intentions is, even approvingly or pleasingly, entertained, or not held in utter reprobation, in the secret recesses of the soul.

2. It requires an equally sacred divorcement of the mind from all causes which naturally lead to an actual violation of this law—such, for example, as indulging a wanton imagination in respect to such scenes, licentious reading or conversation. In all such indulgence, the fountain of moral purity within is wholly corrupted.

3. It requires a similar avoidance of all scenes of external temptation, such as visiting places where such crimes are perpetrated, or conversing with licentious persons, out of curiosity. Such conduct is wholly incompatible with internal purity.

4. It requires also an equally sacred avoidance of all familiarities with individuals of the other sex, familiarities not sanctioned by the strictest principles of purity and propriety. Let woman repel, with instant reprobation, the very first approach over the line of strict propriety, on the part of any individual of the other sex, and let man entertain the sentiment, as the fixed law of his activity, that all such approaches are crimes of most aggravated character, and then we may hope that society may be preserved pure, as far as the law of chastity is concerned.

5. The law of chastity binds every individual to use his influence to generate a public sentiment which will render licentiousness as dishonorable in man as in woman. Never will this crime be held in reprobation for what it is in itself, till this sentiment is generated and confirmed. Nothing is more immoral and unjust than that form of public sentiment, which casts off, as hopelessly lost, the seduced, and then cherishes the seducer, under the avowed fear of otherwise rendering him desperate.

6. Finally, this law binds all to exert their influence to render the crime of licentiousness the subject of such governmental penalties as its intrinsic criminality demands.

In respect to this department of our subject, the following specifications are all that need to be said. The law of chastity is violated,

1. By any external acts of sexual intercourse in any form, excepting between individuals honestly regarding each other, as sacredly united as husband and wife.

2. When the internal purpose is formed, or the desire is secretly cherished, to put forth such acts, in any form, out of that sacred relation, then also this law is, morally speaking, violated.

3. This law is also morally violated, when the minds of adult persons are in any other state than that of utter reprobation of the crime of licentiousness, as crime. It is one thing to avoid the external act. It is quite another voluntarily to entertain proper sentiments in respect to its criminality. In no other state is the mind in real harmony with the laws of chastity.

4. Finally, this law is violated, when any thoughts or feelings are internally entertained, tending in the direction of licentiousness, or any scenes of external temptation to the commission of the crime are visited for purposes of curiosity, or when the mind allows itself to be subject to any influences naturally leading in that direction.

There seems to be a quite common impression among Christians, that but for one reason only is an act of divorce now permitted in the scriptures, to wit, the crime of licentiousness in one of the parties. The passage in which this law is supposed to be announced, is found in Matt. 19: 9: "And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away, doth commit adultery." There are two mistakes, as it appears to me, in the explanations commonly given of the instructions of our Savior in this chapter, mistakes which need to be corrected. The first pertains to his declaration, that "Moses, for the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives." The common supposition is, that Moses, as an inspired legislator, knowing that husbands, whether permitted or not, would, from time to time, put away their wives, in accommodation to the hardness of their hearts, permitted them to do the thing; but to protect wives from injury, required them, should they put them away, to give a writing of divorcement. Now any one who will carefully consult Dent. 24: 1, will perceive that this is wholly a mistake. "When a man hath taken a wife, and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favor in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her: then let him write her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house." The ordinance of Moses was given, not in accommodation to the hardness of the husband's heart, but for the express purpose of guarding him against imposition in the marriage contract, an imposition to which, owing to the existing moral state of the nation, and the relations of females to the public, he was liable. If the husband, after marriage, should find "uncleanness" upon the wife that rendered her an object of disgust to him, then he was permitted to put her away, because he had been imposed upon in the marriage contract.

The other mistake is this, the supposition that our Savior here designs to announce the reasons for divorce, for acts committed after marriage; when his object is to assign those acts committed prior to marriage, which may be made a reason for divorce subsequently to its consummation. That reason is licentiousness. The question agitated among the Jews was, not for what causes occurring after marriage is divorce justifiable, but for what reasons existing prior, but discovered subsequently to marriage, may a man put away his wife. It was with the last inquiry, only, that they came to Christ, and to this therefore is his answer directly applicable.

Now it by no means follows, as a necessary consequence, that because but one form of crime committed before marriage, justifies the party offended against, in seeking a divorce, that but that one form perpetrated after its consummation, justifies the same thing. As far as the past is concerned, but one thing fundamental to the relation is really pledged in the marriage contract, to wit, chastity. A breach of the law of chastity prior to marriage, and discovered subsequently to that event, is therefore the only form of crime which can properly, in the present state of society, and as it was at the time when our Savior spake, be a ground of divorce, as far as any acts prior to marriage are concerned.

In respect to the future, the virtue of chastity not only is pledged, but a faithful discharge of the various duties involved in the married relation. The laws of Ohio make a gross breach of the marriage covenant, in either of these particulars, a ground of divorce. Is this in accordance with reason and scripture both?

The principle involved in the law of divorce, as announced by our Savior, decides the case, as far as a breach of the law of chastity is concerned. If licentiousness committed prior to marriage, and subsequently to that event discovered is a ground of divorce, the same crime in a worse form perpetrated after marriage must be of course.

But what are the teachings of inspiration in respect to a breach of the marriage covenant in the other particular? To this question, inspiration, as it appears to me, has given a direct and positive answer. 1 Cor. 7: 15. "But if the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases." The term "cases" is not in the original. The passage may be thus rendered, "But if the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or sister is not under bonds in respect to such individuals" But what are the bonds to which the apostle refers in this case? The marriage bonds surely. These are the only bonds of which he is speaking in the context. In the verses preceding, he affirms that the believer is bound by the marriage covenant even to the unbeliever, when the latter chooses to remain with the former. In verse 15, he affirms that when the unbeliever abandons the party remaining faithful to the marriage vow, the latter is freed from the bonds which would otherwise bind him or her to the other, that is, from the marriage bonds. So Calvin, Grotius, and Rosenmuller understand the passage, and so do the laws of interpretation compel us to understand it, the express object of the apostle being to affirm when the marriage bonds do or do not, in the circumstances supposed, bind the Christian.

The principle involved in the passage is this; when one party willfully, without any just cause, abandons the other, or wholly refuses to fulfill the duties involved in the marriage covenant, the party sinned against is freed from those bonds, and of course may properly seek a legal recognition of the fact. There are two, and I may add only two revealed reasons for divorce--licentiousness--and a willful refusal to fulfill the duties involved in the marriage relation. With these causes reason fully accords. It is a universal principle in respect to all law human or divine, that when an individual wantonly tramples upon a given law, he forfeits all claim to the protection of that law, and to the interests which it was designed to promote. No reasons can be assigned why the law of marriage should be an exception to this principle. In the act of licentiousness, and in all wanton refusals, on the part of one party, to live with the other, as the marriage relation requires, this law is thus trampled upon, and the party sinned against is not morally, and ought not to be legally held bound to the other, in such cases.

To understand fully the law of divorce, as announced by our Savior, it should be borne in mind, that individuals transgressing, in the sense above explained, and for such reasons, separated from the married relation, are separated finally and forever. No person can live with them in this relation, without incurring the guilt of adultery. "Whosoever marrieth her that is put away, committeth adultery" This applies, of course, to all persons divorced for crime.

Duties arising from the constitution of the sexes. Science of Moral Philosophy By Asa Mahan