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SCIENCE
OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY;
BY REV. ASA MAHAN, A. M.,
PRESIDENT OF THE OBERLIN COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE.
AUTHOR OF "A SYSTEM OF INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY;" "DOCTRINE OF THE WILL," &C.
WITH A RESPONSE BY CHARLES G. FINNEY
TO THE OBJECTIONS TO HIS THEORY.
OBERLIN:
JAMES M. FITCH.
1848.
REPUBLISHED BY THE EDITOR.
RICHARD FRIEDRICH OF
ALETHEA IN HEART MINISTRIES,
8071 Main St. Fenwick, MI 48834
http://truthinheart.com
(989) 637-4179
2004.
ISBN 0-932370-37-4
First Alethea In Heart edition published in 2004.
Republished from the edition of 1848, Oberlin, without altering anything but format and page numbers.
Copyright © 2004
Richard M. Friedrich
All Rights Reserved.
SCIENCE
OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY;
BY REV. ASA MAHAN,
PRESIDENT OF THE OBERLIN COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE:
AUTHOR OF "A SYSTEM OF INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY;"
"DOCTRINE OF THE WILL," &C.
_____
OBERLIN:
JAMES M. FITCH.
____
1848.
Entered according to act of Congress in the year 1848 by
ASA MAHAN,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of Ohio.
FORWARD BY THE EDITOR.
Asa Mahan must be considered one of the greatest philosophers of all time. He spent a lifetime carefully researching the various departments of philosophy and left us authoritative works in the most important areas. Each volume shows a mastery of the subject, with both a wonderful sense of manly independence of thought and a humility in giving due recognition to worthy thinkers gone before. But his greatness is not limited to realistic accuracy of thought and skill of communication and development, but equally so in a life lived consistently with the principles he discovered and related. Of the great minds in history, few have offered such a volume of their lives as this author. He was well known not just as the first President of Oberlin College, Cleveland University, and Adrian College, but also as a successful pastor, evangelist, professor and reformer. As such he suffered many years under the oppression of popular opinion while he maintained the principles developed in this volume. Eventually popular opinion caught up in some points, and discovered the truth of what he previously taught in the same. None of these being so obvious than the evils of slavery.
The details of his life may be more fully noticed in the previous works we have reproduced: Autobiography, and Out of Darkness Into Light. The common sense realism in his philosophical works is also equally wonderful in his spiritual works on holiness. Philosophy and spirituality should not be so antagonistic to each other, as is the case in the minds of most people. The two subjects are often thought of as opposite or antagonistic to each other. The author shows not only in his many works in both areas, but in his own life, that they intimately relate to each other. 'As a man thinks, so will he live.' And as a man wills and worships, so will his mind be thus focused. If a man thinks incorrectly, he will generally live accordingly. If a man lives unspiritually, he will generally be greatly mistaken in his understanding of our nature and relations in this grand universe. But with our author we can hardly recommend a more worthy example of both wisdom and virtue.
All this being said, we will add that this particular branch of philosophy is the most difficult to conclude in, even as the author shares in his Preface below. And we feel, as seems to be indicated in the same, that the liability to err is all the greater in this volume than in every other work produced by this author. Where almost every other volume published will command the near entire agreement of most candid readers, this volume may not come as close. Part of that is owing to the fact that every person is necessitated to focus on different ethical issues than other persons. And thus different issues are mastered or neglected in different proportions by different people. And such leads to a variety of opinions on moral subjects. Added to this is the fact that while people may be agreed about a general conclusion on a issue, with more and more insight into the matter itself, and as it relates to other issues, some people gain further developments about that truth, which others who have not traveled so far in may not yet see and agree with. Such facts of experience will no doubt be some reason for disagreement with some of the conclusions of this volume, which perhaps a later perusal after more mature investigations may clear up.
We wish the reader to consider the tremendous difficulty of the task of writing such a book of this nature; and distinctly remember the humble admissions of the author in his Preface while reading every part. We wish to ensure the reader that even if the author may be thought to be wrong in a number of places, the exercise of carefully studying his perspective and methods with a candid heart and mind will most definitely advance any reader. One of the most important principles our author promoted was manly independence of thought that can learn from any circumstance.
Our friend James Hamilton, the biographer of Mahan, has shared his agreement with our stated perspective of the author and this volume in particular. That is, due to the above mentioned limitations in the study of this subject, it is with difficulty that one can decide who is more correct in the matters where the author differed from his close associate Charles G. Finney; who shared so much resemblance in philosophy, theology, spirituality, and morals. In all their writings and history there can be found very little differences between these men. In fact, during the time this book was being worked on they were both professors at Oberlin College, and both editors of the theological Oberlin Quarterly Review.
The difference above mentioned was pertaining to defining the process involved in what object or objects impose the duty or basis for all of our choices in life. How should we define the process of what is the ultimate reason(s) for every morally binding choice we make? What are the objects that are the highest or deepest reasons for why we act? Not so much why should we act the way we do, but deeper: What are the objects that are the only real reason for action? Finney answered simply that all beings capable of happiness were objects of value in themselves, and that the collective value of each individual in the universe imposed the duty to choose such individual and collective values as the foundation of all our motivation. We love and obey God because it is seen as an irresistible good to Him and to all rational beings capable of happiness. Also because it is the highest good we can accomplish to all such beings. The idea is therefore simple even though it is profound.
Mahan on the other hand, supposed that some of what Finney called conditions in that process, were also grounds, or fundamental reasons for our deepest motivations. Such, for example, would be not only that a person's value compelled us to action, but that their good character called for fundamental obligation or responses.
James Hamilton wrote his thesis on the difference of theories between these great reformers on the subject of the foundation of moral obligation. The editor also found it difficult to decide who was more correct in the matter. He finally concluded that there was in fact more resemblance than Mahan supposed; and that Finney displayed the clearest, most consistent, and accurate position. Finney responded to this detailed critique of his first edition of his Systematic Theology in the second and final London 1851 edition (which we have also reproduced for the first time since its publication). We have added the response in the Appendix of this volume. We are not aware of a published response by Mahan to that work besides a few statements in his Logic text of 1855. Thus it is advisable that the reader not conclude in his understanding of Finney's theology before he reads the response (found in the first 200 or so pages of that book). We observe that much of the difference was owing to differing categorizations, definitions, or as mentioned, inconsistency of definition. Notice what Mahan admits in this respect:
"I am happy also to be able to show, as I have shown above, that Professor Finney is with me in this doctrine, though in palpable inconsistency with his theory. 'It is a demand,' he says, 'of the intelligence of every moral being, that we should esteem and treat as worthy of confidence those whose character entitles them to this confidence.'"
Finney likewise returned the compliment many more times in his response. Thus it is evident that they had great respect for each other as spiritual persons and philosophers. And if such minds differed in form while remaining the same in spirit, it is a worthy example for lesser minds to consider while they differ with others in the finer points of theology. With such before his mind, the author exclaimed: "How difficult it is, even for the wisest, to be consistent in error!" Yet in this case it seems that it was true of himself. And as the editor sees it, he did hold the correct theory, but added to it by confounding certain conditions as grounds. If this is true it is a category mistake which is often made in both philosophy and theology as he so often pointed out in other matters. It was also a difference of defining the whole process of ultimate intentions. One side carefully defines the differences between the conditions and grounds for the deepest virtuous motivations of the Will or heart, while the other calls some of those conditions grounds or reasons as well. Both sides acknowledged the stated elements in the other position as part of the real process, and as creating the same results: a duty to choose a valuable object. But they differed in how they defined that process. Both claimed that the other was inconsistent. It remains for the reader to see who really was, and to realize that communication is not always perfect in this life.
We will attempt to add footnotes to show where page numbers were given of the quotes found in the original publications, so that the reader can find them in our new publication of these works, which regretfully have different numbering due to the fact that both volumes contained major page numbering errors.
Once again, we wish to commend the careful study of this work after studying the more foundational philosophical works of the author. Such books as Mental Philosophy, Intellectual Philosophy, and Doctrine of the Will will prepare the reader to better understand this book, and to appreciate his mature perspective. It will also help the reader to be more careful in their research and to be more candid in their judgments. The volume on Logic, though fairly advanced, would also be very worthy to study before this work. The remainder of the philosophical works would be recommended to follow these; and the spiritual works alongside any of the philosophical works.
The master copy used for this volume was photocopied from the microfilm copy at Calvin College in Grand Rapids. As with all of our reproductions, it is completely true to the original in spelling, italics, and nothing is added or removed from the text. Nothing is changed but a few typos.
PREFACE.
EVERY one is fully aware of the fact, that of all subjects which it concerns man to investigate, that involved in these two questions is of paramount importance, namely, What ought I to be? and, How ought I to act? The scientific solution and elucidation of these questions, constitutes the peculiar sphere of the science of Moral Philosophy, a science which will never attain to a full development, till it has done all for the solution, and elucidation of these questions which any particular science can do for the subject to which it pertains.
The proper development of any science is, of necessity, conditioned, in the first instance, upon the proper definition and elucidation of its fundamental principles, and in the next upon an exemplification of the true method of applying such principles to all practical questions which fall within the appropriate sphere of that science. The full conviction that such an end yet needs to be attained in respect to the science of Moral Philosophy, notwithstanding all that has hitherto been written upon the subject, has given rise to the following treatise. How far the author has realized so desirable an end, it now remains with the public to decide. One thing he will freely confess, and that is, that he has not yet fully realized his own ideal of what such a treatise might be in the hands of individuals of higher wisdom than he possesses. He has, however, made as near an approach to that ideal, as, after years of patient investigation, and under the circumstances in which he was necessitated to think and write, it was possible for him to make; and he entertains the internal assurance, that whoever will give the work a careful perusal, will find, that as a consequence, he better understands the law of right and duty, than he might have done before.
PREFACE.
A treatise on Moral Philosophy that does justice to its subject, will, of course, tax to the utmost the powers of the hardest student who attempts fully to fathom the depths, and ascend the heights of thought to which it attains; and at the same time, it will so elucidate that subject, that the ordinary reader who will devote adequate time and attention to its perusal, will study it with much interest and profit. Such it has been the fixed aim of the author to render the following treatise. He designed to render it a book for the student, and at the same time, a book for the people. Let not the common reader, then, be startled at the intricate questions which open upon him, as he proceeds. If he masters the subjects discussed, he will never regret the loss of his labor, and let him remember, that he can master them, if he will.
This treatise was not prepared for the thoughtless, who take up such a work, glance, it may be, at its contents, and then lay it aside, as too deep for them, individuals whose minds float at random upon the surface of things, without looking seriously into the depths beneath, or to the heights above for the purpose of understanding the great realities within and around them, realities among which they are to have their eternal dwelling place, and who especially never ponder the questions, What am I? Where am I? and Whither am I bound? What ought I to be? What ought I to do? and What will be my destiny, as the consequence of being and doing what I ought, or ought not? It was prepared, on the other hand, for thinkers, into whose hearts wisdom has entered, and unto whose souls knowledge is pleasant. To such it is now commended, with the earnest hope, that they may find the same interest and profit in its study, that the author has found in its preparation.
MISTAKES.
In consequence of the absence of the author, at the time, the second section of Chapter XVI, Part I, was not inserted. Its omission, however, is not material, as section 1, contains a discussion of the subject sufficiently full. For the same reason, chapters XVII and XVIII were wrongly located. Chapter XVIII was designed to be placed before chapter XVII. The printing had proceeded too far to make the corrections when these mistakes were discovered.
CONTENTS.
____
PART FIRST.
CHAPTER I.
THE SCIENCE DEFINED.
CHAPTER IV.
IDEA OF UNIVERSAL MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.
Ideas dependent upon those of Right and Wrong—The Peculiar Sentiment which always attends the Affirmations of Conscience accounts for the Fact that Conscience has so often been regarded as the Spirit of God in the Soul—Universal Moral Harmony, Attraction, Repellency—Boldness of Virtue, Timidity of Vice—Future Functions of the Pure in Heart—Ground of the Universal Fear with which Conscious Guilt enters upon a Disembodied State,
CHAPTER V.
MORAL ACTION.
Terms defined—Intentions alone are Moral Actions—Position verified—Conclusions from the Positions above established—Ultimate Intentions defined—Defective Definition,
CHAPTER. VI.
UNIVERSAL TEST OF THE MORAL CHARACTER OF ULTIMATE INTENTIONS.
When an Intention is right—Meaning of the Term Love—Meaning of the Term Selfishness—The Manifest Error of many in their Efforts at Self-Justification,
CHAPTER VII.
A MORAL AGENT.
Moral Agent defined—Necessary Characteristics of such Agent—Moral Law must sustain to him an objective and subjective relation—He must possess a Will whose Determinations are free—Appropriate and Exclusive Sphere of Moral Law—Ability always commensurate with Obligation—Common Error—Obligation can not transcend the Possible Reach of the Subject—Standard by which the Demerit of Wrong Actions is to be estimated,
CHAPTER VIII.
NECESSARY AND CONTINGENT PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY.
A Fact for Elucidation—The Distinctions made of Universal Application—Reasons for the Unsatisfactoriness of Common Treatises on Moral Philosophy—The True Standard of Judgment in respect to Moral Character—A Prevalent Mistake—Moral Principles and Prudential Maxims —Remarks,
CHAPTER IX.
FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION.
Question defined—Only Two Answers to this Question possible—The Question which is the True Theory, how answered—The Convictions of the Race—The Direct Testimony of Consciousness—The Doctrine of Utility contrary to Consciousness—When impossible for us to act or intend morally—Obligation to will, how affirmed a priori—A Fact of Experience—Last Resort of the Utilitarian—Real Foundation distinctly stated—Conclusions necessarily resulting from these Positions—The Selfish System—The Will of God—Doctrine of General Consequenees,
CHAPTER X.
NEW THEORY PERTAINING TO THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
Theory as held by Prof. Finney—The Opposite Theory stated—Prof. Finney's Theory in its Logical Consequences tends to the Doctrine of Utility—In consistency with this Theory we can not account for certain distinctions which he himself Makes—Prof. Finney contradicts his own Theory—Prof. Finney's Argument based upon a Psychological Error—Universal Consciousness opposed to Prof. Finney's Theory—There are Forms of Real Good, obligations to confer which rest exclusively upon Moral Character—Unanswerable Argument against this Theory in the Relations of the Universal Intelligence to the Moral Government of God Theory cannot be so explained as to involve all the Duties we are conscious of owing to God—Another Fundamental Objection to Prof. Finney's Theory—The Scriptures as well as Universal Intelligence opposed to Prof. Finney's Theory—General Remarks,
CHAPTER XI.
MORAL ACTION NEVER OF A MIXED CHARACTER.
Can Contradictory and Opposite Elements enter into one and the same Intention?—Actions Right in themselves can not be faulty on the score of Intensity—Intentions in themselves Pure can not co-exist in the Mind with Executive Volitions of an opposite character—The Will can not be in a Right State and the Subject be guilty for Necessary and Unavoidable States of the Sensibility—Conclusions necessarily resulting from the Doctrine above established,
CHAPTER XII.
MORAL RELATIONS--NATURE OF VIRTUE--CHARACTER.
Character—Relations—Nature of Virtue as defined by Dr. Paley—According to this Definition, Moral Character depends upon the spring from which it arises—In what Sense character may and may not be mixed,
CHAPTER XIII.
ERRORS ARISING FROM THE APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PRUDENTIAL MAXIMS AND MORAL PRINCIPLES IN THEIR ABSTRACT AND UNIVERSAL FORMS.
Do right for the sake of the Right—Whatever is Expedient is Right—The End sanctifies the Means—Acting Conscientiously—Acting from Love,
CHAPTER XIV.
IDEA OF RETRIBUTION.
Import of the Idea of Retribution—Doctrine of Natural Consequences—Doctrine that Punishment should be inflicted only as a Means of Reformation—True Theory—What it is that distinguishes the Idea of Moral Law from all other Ideas—Doctrine of Eternal Retributions—Important Fact—Idea of Retribution in Harmony with the Laws of Rational Existence,
CHAPTER XV.
EXTERNAL ACTIONS.
What Actions are to be regarded as forbidden—What External Actions are required by the Moral Law as the Necessary Cousequents or Appropriate Indexes of those Determinations of the Will which are confined to the Law—Rules of Judgment in respect to Moral Character from External Conduct—Application of Principles,
CHAPTER XVI.
THE SCRIPTURES AS A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
The Moral Law as revealed in the Scriptures—Prescription of Formal Rules for any Question of Duty—Method in which those Universal Principles are expressed which include and imply All Particular and Specific Precepts of Moral Obligation—A Method combining all that is comprehended in the Second and to some extent in the First above mentioned—Diligent Study of the System of Duty revealed in the Scriptures imposed upon us—The Light in which the Great Mass of the Precepts of the Bible should be regarded—An Error to which Honest Minds are liable—A Large Portion of the Particular Precepts of the Bible not to be regarded as Formal Rule—Are none of the Precepts of the Moral Law as given in the Bible, to be regarded as Rules of Action, demanding Formal Obedience?—Manner in which Dishonest Minds free themselves from Forms of Duty which they are determined not to discharge—Meaning of Certain Declaration One Great Object of the Most High in revealing the Law of Duty in a Certain Manner—Another Important Principle—Meaning of the Savior in Certain Declarations—Grounds of charging a Want of Circumspection in inquiring after Duty, as a Crime—Real Distinction between Formalism and Spiritual Religion,
CHAPTER XVII.
GOVERNMENT—ITS GROUNDS.
Foundation of Government—The Will of God—Family Government—Civil Government--Divine Government—Real Foundation stated—Government is a Necessity—Under what circumstances Government ought to exist—In what Sense has Civil Government its Foundation in the Social Compact—In what Sense under Civil Governments the Majority ought to rule—A Common Mistake—Bearing of the Existence of Government upon Human Society—An Important Error—The appropriate Characteristics of Tyranny—Slavery not a Government—Civil Government a Demand of Human Nature,
CHAPTER XVIII.
OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION ASIDE FROM THE SCRIPTURES IN RESPECT TO THE LAW OF DUTY.
A knowledge of the Law of our Mental and Physical Constitution—A Careful Study of our Relations in Life—A Careful Analysis of our own Moral Judgments—A Careful and Judicious Observation of Public Opinion—The Counsel and Works of Individuals whom God has specially gifted,
CHAPTER XIX.
IDEA OF RIGHTS.
Terms defined—Foundation of Rights—Relation of Right and Duty—Remarks,
PART SECOND.
PRACTICAL ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
PIETY, OR OUR DUTIES TO GOD.
Duties included in these Words when understood in their most Extensive Sense—Piety in its more Restricted Sense,
CHAPTER II.
PRAYER.
Term defined—Mental Exercises included in Prayer—Characteristics of Acceptable Prayer—Prayer Reasonable—Importance attached to Prayer in the Scriptures—Common Objections to Prayer—Times and Seasons when Prayer is required—Remarks,
CHAPTER III.
THE LORD'S DAY, OR TILE CHRISTIAN SABBATH.
General Considerations—Objections—Argument summarily stated—Manner in which the Sabbath should be kept,
CHAPTER IV.
SUBJECTIVE DUTIES, OR THE DUTIES WE OWE TO OURSELVES.
To stand approved at the Bar of Conscience—Self-Control—Mental Independence—Harmonious Development of all our Powers—Esteem of others—Self-Knowledge—Correction of Evil Habits,
CHAPTER V.
SUBJECTIVE DUTIES—CONTINUED.
Humility and Pride—Ambition—Contentment—Covetousness—Envy—Moral Courage and Fortitude—Internal Rectitude—Moral Purity and Impurity pertaining to the Government of the Thoughts and Feelings,
CHAPTER VI.
SUBJECTIVE DUTIES—CONTINUED.
Government of Appetites—Remarks—Moral Principles pertaining to Dress—Compliance with Custom,
CHAPTER VII.
DUTIES WHICH WE OWE TO MAN AS MAN.
General Relations—Duties resulting from such Relations —Duties growing out of Moral Character—Remarks,
CHAPTER VIII.
LIBERTY AND SERVITUDE.
Terms defined—Incorrect Definitions—Fundamental Necessities to which the Idea of Liberty pertains—Forms in which Liberty may be invaded—Subjective Servitude —Tyranny of Public Opinion—Tyranny of Party Organization—Government Oppressions—Slavery—Bible Argument—Laws of Moses—Bearing of the New Testament upon this subject—Conclusions necessarily arising from the facts above adduced—Remarks,
CHAPTER IX.
THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY, AND THE DUTIES THENCE RESULTING.
Terms defined—Objects which may sustain the Relation of Property—Extent and Limits of this Right—Means by which Property may be lawfully acquired—States of Mind Right or Wrong relative to Property—Forms of Duty binding us relatively to the Property of others—Modes in which the Right of Property may be violated,
CHAPTER X.
DUTY AS IT RESPECTS CHARACTER.
Idea of Perfection—Character defined—Our Duty in respect to Character—Guilt of violating these Duties—Remarks,
CHAPTER XI.
DUTY IN RESPECT TO REPUTATION.
Term defined—Guilt of unjustly depriving one of a good Reputation—Law which binds us in respect to Character—Remarks—Forms in which Duty in respect to Reputation is violated in judging of Character—Manner in which we are bound to judge others relatively to Character or Reputation—Law of Duty respecting the Disclosure of Facts bearing upon the Reputation of others—Circumstances under which the Law of Duty pertaining to the Disclosure of facts bearing upon Reputation is violated Remarks,
CHAPTER XII.
LAW AND DUTY OF VERACITY.
Terms defined—Form in which the law of veracity binds us—Veracity in the statement of facts—Law of veracity when violated—Is all intentional deception lying?—Promises and Contracts—Promises, when not binding--Of Oaths—Nature of an Oath—Lawfulness of Oaths—podiency of the Oath—Obligations imposed by the Oath,
CHAPTER XIII.
DUTIES ARISING FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SEXES.
Duties of the unmarried—Duties of the married—Law of Chastity—Law of Divorce,
CHAPTER XIV.
FORMS OF DUTY ARISING FROM THE PARENTAL AND FILIAL RELATIONS.
Duties of Parents to children—Violations of Parental Obligation—Duties of Children to their Parents—Remarks—Use of the Rod in Family Government—Duties in respect to individuals incidentally connected with Families as Domestics, &c.—Duties of Domestics—Duties of Employers,
CHAPTER XV.
PATRIOTISM AND PHILANTHROPY.
Philanthropy and Patriotism defined—Forms of Duty imposed by the law of Patriotism—Our Duty as Patriots when violated,
CHAPTER XVI.
DUTIES ARISING FROM THE CONTINGENT RELATIONS OF LIFE.
Law of Self-Defence—Anger, Wrath, Malice, and a Righteous Indignation at Wrong-Doing—Duty of Meekness –Gratitude,
MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
CHAPTER I.
THE SCIENCE DEFINED.
THE common definition of Ethics or Moral Philosophy is this. It is the science of the Moral Law. Few persons, however, obtain any definite conception of the subject from such a definition, for the obvious reason, that the idea designated by the term science is not distinctly developed in their minds. This idea, therefore, must be elucidated before any particular definition of any specific science can be appreciated.
In the volume on Intellectual Philosophy, the idea of science is defined as "knowledge reduced to fundamental ideas and principles; or the properties and relations of objects systematically evolved in the light of such ideas and principles." The following perhaps would be a definition still more distinct and definite. Science is the presentation and elucidation of universal rules and formulas, in the light of which particular facts and problems may be explained and solved.
The above definitions present the idea in a strictly universal form. A particular science would accordingly be the presentation and elucidation, of those universal rules and formulas in the light of which all particular facts and problems falling within the appropriate sphere of such science may he explained and solved. Any particular scientific Treatise realizing the above idea, will not itself explain and solve such facts and questions: but will furnish the rules and principles in the light of which they may be solved, and will so familiarize the mind of the student with the application of the formulas given, that he, in their light, will be able to answer such questions for himself. An individual who has fully mastered a scientific Treatise on common Arithmetic, for example, will find himself in possession of a specific answer to no one question falling within the sphere of such science, that he meets with in the ordinary transactions of life. He will find himself familiarized with the nature and application of universal formulas, or rules and principles, however, in the light of which he can readily solve such questions for himself. The same holds true of all particular scientific Treatises developed according to the true idea of science.
Application of the above to the science of Moral Philosophy.
The application of the idea above elucidated to the subject of the present Treatise will be readily apprehended. The idea of duty is to the Intelligence under all circumstances of conscious existence, an omnipresent reality. It is the only idea, in any intelligence, human or divine, which has authority; and every where that authority is absolute. Though in itself, as we shall see hereafter, perfectly simple, its applications are illimitable and endlessly diversified, and present, in the varied circumstances and relations of rational existence, an endless diversity of questions, involving moral obligation, that need to be solved. The object of a Treatise on Moral Philosophy scientifically developed, will be to present and elucidate all those universal principles and formulas, in the light of which all such questions may be solved, and so to familiarize the student with the application of such principles, that he will be able to solve them for himself. Such Treatise will not be to the student relatively to such particular questions, what a Table of Interest is to the merchant relatively to his pecuniary transactions, that is, it will not present a particular specific solution of all or perhaps any particular questions of moral obligation which he may meet with, in the course of his existence. It will, if it accomplishes its object, however, familiarize him with the nature and application of those principles in the light of which he may solve all such questions for himself. Such, as I suppose, is the true idea of Moral Philosophy, an idea in conformity to which the science will be intentionally developed in the present Treatise.
REMARKS.
With two general remarks, the present chapter will be closed.
1. If the view of the subject presented above be admitted as correct, certain defects in the common Treatises on the subject will be manifest. We find, for example, that after the discussion of certain fundamental questions, they are mainly occupied in direct arguments to prove that such and such particular states of mind, or courses of conduct are right or wrong, instead of giving and elucidating by appropriate examples, as in all other scientific Treatises, those universal principles in the light of which it will be clearly seen that such actions cannot but be right or wrong. This is obviously owing to the want of well developed ideas of what the Science of Moral Philosophy really is.
Another defect equally noticeable is the general absence of definitions scientifically definite and accurate. If Moral Philosophy is considered as mainly designed to specify a system of moral duties, this would not be regarded as an important defect. If, on the other hand, it is contemplated as chiefly designed to define and elucidate fundamental principles in the light of which specific duties stand revealed to the mind as such, then very much depends, as in all other scientific Treatises upon the precision and accuracy of definitions.
2. We now have an obvious explanation of the uncertainty which commonly attends disquisitions in Moral Philosophy. It is owing, as it appears to me, to the reason stated above—the want of well settled ideas of the true end and aim of such science. Let it once be understood, that its sphere is, not to specify in a formal manner, the varied duties of man, not to decide whether such and such particular courses of conduct are right or wrong, but to furnish and elucidate universal formulas or principles, in the light of which all such questions may be answered by the student for himself, and then Moral Philosophy will take its place, not among the uncertain, but certain sciences.
CHAPTER II.
POSTULATES AND AXIOMS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
EACH particular science has a sphere peculiar to itself. It has its basis, therefore, in axioms, deriving their special form from the nature of the science to which they pertain, and in postulates which pertain to no other science. The student who will turn to the work on Intellectual Philosophy, pp. 190—1, will find the above principles clearly elucidated. No one attempts to prove the truth of any axioms and postulates which he assumes as the basis of the science which he is attempting to elucidate. He assumes them as universally admitted truths, and proceeds to construct his treatise upon them. The object of the present chapter is to state some of the facts and principles which the Moral Philosopher assumes as the basis of his peculiar science.
1. It is no part of the business of the moral philosopher to prove the existence of God, or that of moral accountable agents of any kind. These are assumed as postulates or first truths. His single inquiry on the other hand is, what are the duties of such beings, supposing them to exist? It is a part of his inquiry, what are the elements necessary to moral agency? It belongs to an intellectual, and not to a moral philosopher, however, to determine whether these elements exist in man, or any other being or class of beings. Hence I remark,
2. That the moral philosopher does not prove, but assumes the existence of man, and the existence in him of the essential elements of moral agency. His inquiries are, what are the particular duties, and the ground of moral obligation in respect to these duties, arising from the existence of these elements in man.
3. It is no part of the business of the moral philosopher to prove the existence of those relations, the apprehension of which give rise to moral obligation. For example: he spends no time in proving the existence of beings sustaining to each other the relations of creator and creature, parent and child, ruler and subject. These he assumes as the basis of his inquiries, which exclusively relate to the duties arising out of these relations, and the reasons of our obligation to comply with them.
4. It is no part of the moral philosopher's business to prove the validity of conscience, any more than it is the business of the natural philosopher to prove the validity of the eye in determining colors. The moral philosopher assumes the validity of this faculty in two respects:
(I.) The capability of the intellectual faculties to determine the relations actually existing among creatures, and that of the conscience to affirm the duties arising out of these relations when determined; and,
(2.) That what the conscience necessarily affirms to be right or wrong, is so in fact.
5. The moral philosopher assumes the identity of the moral faculty in all moral agents in this sense, that when the same conditions are fulfilled, the affirmations of conscience in all moral agents will be identical. This is what is assumed in every science in respect to the human intelligence. If any one is disposed to question the principle, and ask with the sceptic: How do I know that the reason of all men is identical? how do I know that all mean the same thing by the terms right and wrong? I can only reply that for one, I shall not stop to "bray such a man with a pestle in a mortar among wheat," for sure I am, that by this or any other means, his "folly will not depart from him."
6. When a particular relation is before the mind in view of which the moral faculty affirms a particular obligation, it is no part of the business of the moral philosopher to show why the reason makes that affirmation, or why that relation gives rise to that particular duty. The necessary affirmation of the moral faculty is assumed as the reason of that obligation. When the particular relation in view of which a particular duty is affirmed, is pointed out, all the reason that can be assigned has been given, why that duty is binding upon us. We have then discovered the foundation, and the only foundation of moral obligation.
7. It is not the business of the moral philosopher to prove that the Bible is a revelation from God. This he assumes as the basis of his inquiries. He assumes the divine existence and attributes, the existance of man as a moral agent, &c., and then inquires what are the duties arising out of the various relations which man sustains to himself and to intellignces around him?
CHAPTER III.
IDEA OF MORAL LAW.
Terms defined.
MORAL PHILOSOPHY has been defined as the science of the Moral Law. We are now prepared for a consideration of the question, What is Moral Law?
Law, in its most general signification, is a rule of action. Physical law is the rule in conformity with which the physical powers of the universe act. The law of attraction, for example, is not the fact that bodies attract each other, not the power in them which attracts; but the rule in conformity with which this power acts. Newton discovered this rule, not the fact, nor the power in bodies indicated by the fact. These had been known ages before he existed.
Moral Law is the rule in conformity with which moral agents are required to act. It is not the rule in conformity with which they, in all instances do act; for some refuse such conformity. But it is the rule in conformity to which, I repeat, they are required to act.
Physical law then is a rule of action, Moral Law, a rule for action.
Dr. Wayland's Definitions.
Law, as defined by Dr. Wayland, is "a mode of existence, or order of sequence." Moral Law he defines as "an order of sequence established between the moral quality of actions and their results." This definition of Moral Law is fundamentally defective, inasmuch as it makes the existence of moral action antecedent to that of Moral Law, without which, as its chronological and logical antecedent both, no such action is possible. It is a dictate of reason and revelation, that "where there is no law there is no transgression," or obedience either, and consequently no moral qualities in actions of any kind.
The "connection also between Moral Actions and their results," is rather the sanction of Moral Law, than the law itself. In the definition under consideration, the antecedent is put for the consequent.
Law objectively and subjectively considered.
Law, as shown in the volume on Intellectual Philosophy, may be contemplated in two points of light, to wit, objectively and subjectively. Viewed in the relation first-named, it may be defined as the action of particular substances or powers in conformity to certain rules: in the latter as an idea in some intelligent mind. A person listens to a choir of singers whose entire performance is in conformity with certain rules. Why does the question spontaneously arise in his mind, Who taught this choir? a question not put as a mere conjecture that some person may or may not have conformed the action of these powers to a given arrangement; but with the absolute affirmation of the Reason that somebody must have done it. The answer is obvious. It is impossible to conceive of the action of powers in conformity with a given rule, without the affirmation that that rule exists as an idea or law of the Reason in some intelligent mind. This is true of all laws, physical and moral. The physical powers of the universe are the objects of laws existing subjectively as ideas in the mind of God. In other words: God has so constituted these powers, and placed them in such relations to each other that their mutual action and re-action shall be in conformity with a rule existing as an idea in his own mind. The law exists objectively in the powers, but subjectively in the supreme Intelligence.
Law exists objectively in the brute, but subjectively and objectively both, in man.
As with the physical powers of the universe, so with all sentient beings, excepting rational moral agents. The former, that is, the brute creation, always act in conformity with laws. These laws, however, exist in them only objectively. All their actions are necessary, and necessarily conformed to laws, of the existence of which they have no knowledge, laws which they obey in the absence of all consciousness of the fact, and which exist subjectively in the Intelligence of the universal Law Giver.
Now in man, (and here lies as I suppose, one great and fundamental difference between man and the brute) law exists, not only objectively but subjectively. All his actions are necessarily in conformity to laws of some kind, laws ultimately referable to the eternal reason, but originating immediately in his own Reason. Man is his own law-giver, or in the language of inspiration, he is a "law unto himself." This fact, the existence of law subjectively in man, as I shall in subsequent chapters endeavor to show, is an essential element of moral agency. My object now is to establish the fact, the existence of law not only objectively but subjectively in man.
Observe a company of children together who are a about to engage in sport. Before their play is begun, what is always done? Some rule or law is adopted in conformity with which their sports shall be conducted. Whenever rational beings act in concert this fact will be found true. It holds also, not only in respect to communities, but in respect to individuals. No man can enter upon any kind of business, without proposing to himself, and adopting, either consciously or unconsciously, some rules in conformity with which that business shall be conducted.
The fact under consideration is especially true of rules, or laws of moral obligation. In all the varied circumstances and relations of conscious existence, certain ideas or rules of action necessarily suggest themselves, rules to which we cannot but affirm ourselves bound to conform. Our course of conduct must have a continual reference to such ideas, in the relation to them of conformity, or non-conformity. On this account, the scriptures affirm of man, as remarked above, that he is "a law [law giver] unto himself." In other words, in the varied relations of his existence, he necessarily imposes upon himself laws or rules of action.
THE IDEAS OF RIGHT AND WRONG.
As Moral Law, subjectively considered, is an idea of Reason, it has hence been denominated the idea of right and wrong. The sentiment of obligation relatively to it is expressed by the words ought and ought not.
Characteristics of these ideas.
We will now notice some of the fundamental characteristics of the above-mentioned ideas.
1. They are perfectly simple ideas—simple as opposed to complex. The laws, considered as rules of action, which represent these ideas are of course simple. So must be the ideas; else the laws would not represent them. The idea of right and wrong, like those of space, time, cause and effect, cannot be resolved into other elements or ideas more simple.
2. They are primitive. Before they are developed, certain conditions must be fulfilled, certain relations must be apprehended. Then these ideas, and all others dependent upon them, are necessarily developed in the primitive spontaneity of the Reason. No man can contemplate moral excellence without the judgment that it ought to be loved. Nor can any man date the origin of these ideas in his own mind, any more than he can date that of the idea of his own existence.
3. These ideas are identical with that of fitness when applied to moral relations. This last is more extensive in its application, but becomes identical with them, when applied to the relations above referred to.
4. The ideas of right and wrong, of obligation, and all others depending upon them, are necessary. From those relations out of which particular forms of duty are seen to arise, we cannot but know that they must arise, and that from them duties of an opposite nature cannot, by any possibility, arise. Actions affirmed to be right or wrong we can no more conceive that they are not what we affirm them to be, or conceive of them as possessed of the opposite characteristics, than we can conceive of the annihilation of space. We conceive, for example, of an individual, as actually conforming to the great command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Can we conceive such conformity to be otherwise than right? Do we not as necessarily affirm the opposite state to be wrong? Do we not make these affirmations with a consciousness of the impossibility of attributing to one of these states the characteristics of the others? Certainly we do. These ideas are necessary and absolute in the same sense, and for the same reasons that those of time and space are.
4. They are also universal. Universality must be affirmed of them in three important respects.
(I.) They exist alike in all intelligent minds. "There is no tribe so rude," says Sir James Mackintosh, "as to be without a faint perception of a difference between right and wrong. There is no subject on which men of all ages and nations coincide in so many points as in the general rules of conduct, and in the qualities of the human character which deserve esteem." This is strikingly illustrated by the manner in which heathen nations justify criminal actions. This they do by referring them to principles right in themselves and more general; as in the cases where infanticide is justified by the plea that the child is thereby freed from the evils of life. All such references clearly evince, not only the existence of such ideas in all minds, but their existence there in the same essential forms. Men differ, not in their ideas of what is right and wrong, but in their application of these ideas to specific acts and courses of conduct.
(2.) In another sense the ideas of right and wrong are universal. Moral law knows of no exceptions. It is very commonly said that there are exceptions to all general rules. A law, however, admitting of exceptions is not a law. Facts presenting apparent exceptions to a given law, come under another principle. Though in appearance like those included under such a law, they are, in their essential elements, totally unlike such facts. Every moral law supposes the existence of certain relations, and results from those relations. While those relations exist, the law remains of course and admits of no exceptions. Apparent exceptions belong to other relations, and of course fall under different principles. For example: a parent is bound to provide for his child while he has the ability to do it, and the child remains dependent upon him. If such parent is freed from such obligation, it must be in consequence of his ceasing to be able to make provision for the child, or of the child's ceasing to be dependent upon him. A change of relations produces a corresponding change of responsibilities, and the apparent exception to the rule above referred to comes under another and a different rule.
3. Whenever we conceive of an action as right in itself, we cannot but erect the motive or intention which prompted the act into a law for all intelligent beings. An act of disinterested benevolence, for example, perform from a corresponding intention, stands revealed to our minds. The intention which prompted the act we cannot but affirm, ought to govern ourselves and all other intelligents in all moral acts whatever. So also when we contemplate a wrong act, we cannot but affirm, that the motive which prompted the act is prohibited to all moral agents, to all circumstances actual and conceivable. In this important sense then, the ideas of right and wrong are also strictly universal.
Conclusions from the above.
1. As the ideas of right and wrong exist in all rational minds, as in all minds they have the same characteristics, those of absolute universality and necessity, and as each moral agent cannot but affirm that the same law, which binds himself, does and must bind all other intelligents, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that the same law not only does bind all intelligents, but stands revealed as law to all intelligents. What evidence can we have that the same idea does and must exist in all minds? This and this only, the consciousness that in the presence of given facts, that idea does and must arise in our minds, as the necessary law of our intelligence. In this consciousness the necessary law of the universal intelligence stands revealed with perfect distinctness, and we may know with absolute certainty, that in all Minds to whom the facts referred to are known, the same idea, in the same essential form, is developed. We may take in illustration, the principle of causality. How do we know that in all rational minds the idea, that every event has a cause, is developed in the same essential form in which it exists in our own? We are conscious of the fact, that in the presence of an event, we do and cannot but conceive of and affirm a cause, as the necessary condition of the occurrence of the event. In this consciousness we cannot but know, that to all Intelligents who have had any perceptions of events at all, this principle, in the same essential form in which it exists in our own minds, is and must be known.
'When, therefore, in the presence of certain facts and relations, we find that we do and cannot but conceive of and affirm a law which, as we know absolutely, does and must bind not only ourselves, but all other moral agents, we cannot but know, that as these facts and relations are known to all such agents, the same law, in the same essential forms, must not only bind such agents, but must be known to them as law. I know of no truth more demonstrably evident than this.
2. On the assumption that the scriptures are a revelation from God, what we now assume to be true, it will follow as a necessary consequence of the truths above established, that the Moral Law revealed in the Sacred Word is perfectly identical with the ideas of right and wrong as they actually exist in the human mind. Were this not so, two revelations proceeding from the same source would stand in palpable contradiction to each other. He who revealed the law, created the human Intelligence. The necessary affirmations of that Intelligence are His productions as much so as the Intelligence itself, or the results of any other of his works, and are consequently a revelation from Him as well as the scriptures themselves. To deny this we must assume that a necessary intended result of what God has produced, is not a revelation of God Himself. This identity also is verified by the fact, that the Moral Law revealed to any man or race of men on earth will commend itself to their consciences as perfectly right and just. This could not be true on an other supposition than that under consideration. When a heathen, on hearing the Law for the first time, pronounces it right and just, as he will not, and in his own conscience, cannot fail to do, he does and must compare that law with an idea pre-existing in his own mind, and it is on the perceived identity of the two, that this judgment is based. This renders undeniably evident the perfect identity of which I am speaking.
This same identity also is every where assumed and asserted in the scriptures. When the ancient patriarch put the question "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" God expressed no disapprobation of the judgment thus passed upon what would be right in Him. Yet this judgment had its basis exclusively in the idea of right previously existing in the patriarch's mind. How often also does the Most High bring the fundamental principles of his own government to the bar of the human conscience, thus testifying to the perfect identity between the ideas of right and wrong developed in that conscience and the fundamental principles of his own eternal moral government.
The same truth also is affirmed in all the declarations we meet with in the scriptures pertaining to the perfection and rectitude of the Divine Law. All such judgments imply the conscious correspondence between the idea of right and perfection in the interior of the mind itself and the revelation without. The whole argument for the truth of the scriptures based upon internal evidence, rests upon this one principle, and is wholly void of force on any other principle, to wit, the perfect correspondence between the fundamental truths and principles of inspiration, and the ideas of fundamental truth and morality pre-existing in the mind itself. I might also refer to passages in which the truth which I am endeavoring to establish is directly asserted. But sufficient has already been said for the purpose I now have in view.
I would simply add in this place, that the objection urged against this position, that it renders a revelation of moral duty unnecessary, is evidently without weight. Though the ideas of right and wrong do exist in all minds, they yet need a distinctness of development which an external revelation alone can impart to them. There are many specific applications of these ideas also which need to be specified, applications which the unaided intellect of man would never discover. A revelation, finally, imparts a solemn and impressive interest to the idea of duty which it could not otherwise possess. They certainly take a very unwise course, who would magnify the importance of a revelation by denying the possibility of men's knowing their duty without it. They thus present the highest possible justification of the depravity of the heathen. For what better excuse can exist for any course of conduct, than the fact, that he who pursued it could not possibly know it to be wrong. Such, by no means, is the teaching of inspiration on this point. It affirms, that while the heathen perpetrate the crimes charged upon them, and take pleasure in those who do the same, they know well that they "who do such things are guilty [deserving] of death." It is not unavoidable ignorance, but a love of error instead of truth, that renders a revelation of the great principles of moral obligation necessary.
CHAPTER IV.
IDEA OF UNIVERSAL MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.
Ideas dependent upon those of right and wrong.
BEFORE proceeding directly to an elucidation of the subject of the present chapter, it may be important to notice certain fundamental moral ideas which have their ultimate basis in those of right and wrong. I refer to such as those of obligation, merit and demerit, and of retributions, or of moral order as it is expressed by some. We are all aware that in the presence of the ideas of right and wrong, a conviction of obligation, expressed, as I have before said, by the words ought and ought not, arises. The conception of obligation complied, or not complied with, suggests other ideas, those of merit and demerit, or the desert of reward and punishment. These last ideas suggest that of moral retributions, or a state of moral order. This, then, is the order of these ideas relatively to each other. The ideas of right and wrong are the foundation of that of obligation: this again, of that of moral desert, or reward and punishment, and these finally of that of moral retributions, or of a state of moral order. Each of these classes of ideas is, relatively to its appropriate sphere, strictly universal and necessary.
Idea of Universal Moral Responsibility.
The idea of universal moral responsibility now claims our attention. The words used hardly convey my meaning. It will be fully understood, however, as we proceed. In the preceding chapter, it has been shown, that in all moral judgments, the mind legislates, that is, affirms obligation, not for itself merely, but for all intelligents. The motives or intentions which it prescribes or prohibits for itself, it of necessity, prescribes or prohibits for all moral agents in existence. When it is conscious to itself, of having really obeyed or disobeyed the law of right, it knows absolutely, that it will and must be the object of the corresponding approbation or disapprobation of the conscience of every moral agent in existence, to whom its conduct may be known. The reason is, that each moral agent cannot but be aware, that his own moral judgments are but the echo of the conscience of the moral universe.
Now as the conscience of each moral agent thus legislates not merely for himself, but for all intelligents, and he cannot but be aware that such is the character of the conscience of every other such agent, we have in this great fact, an explanation of the universal conviction and sentiment of moral accountability on the part of each moral agent, not only at the bar of his own conscience, but that of every other such agent in existence. Every man knows, and cannot but recognize himself as accountable not only at the bar of his own conscience, but of that of every other intelligent, for his moral conduct. Every where he recognizes the right in every other Intelligent to inquire into his moral character and conduct, and to esteem and treat him accordingly. Thus every moral agent is to every other, in very important respects, a moral legislator, a judge, and an executer of Moral Law. The principle of moral accountability universally obtains, on the part of each moral agent relatively to all others.
As God is recognized by the universal Intelligence, not only as the Creator of all things, but as possessed in a degree absolutely infinite, of all possible perfections, as having, consequently, an acquaintance absolutely perfect with the character and deserts of all Intelligents, He is accordingly recognized by universal mind, as the supreme lawgiver, governor, and "judge of all." Yet moral agents are not accountable to God alone; but each is, in the sense above explained, accountable to all, and all to each. Nor does even God Himself claim an exemption from an adjudication at the bar of the universal conscience. To be sure, He will not pass, like creatures, a formal trial there. In this sense, "He gives none account of any of his matters." Yet He has so constituted all moral agents that they cannot but judge of the rectitude of his laws and principles of administration, and judge of them by a standard which He has Himself erected in the interior of their minds, to wit, the ideas of right and wrong, of which we have been speaking. This is what is meant by the Idea of universal moral accountability expressed at the head of this chapter.
REMARKS.
1. We are now prepared to explain the peculiar sentiment which universally attends the affirmations of conscience. As conscience, in its absolute mandates, legislates, not for the particular subject, but for all Intelligents, it really issues its mandates as from the conscience of the moral universe. It is on this principle, that in receiving the mandates of his own conscience, each moral agent feels himself accountable to all for his obedience or disobedience.
2. We now readily account for the fact, that conscience has so often been recognized, as the Spirit of God in the soul of man. Thus says Marcus Antonius, "He that is well disposed will do every thing dictated by the Divinity, a particle or portion of Himself, which God has given to each of us, as a guide and a leader." "The mind of man," says Aristotle, "has a near affinity to God. There is a divine ruler in him." "There is," says Seneca, "a holy spirit in us." Hieron says that "the universal light shining in the conscience is a domestic God, a God within the hearts and souls of men." "God," says Epictetus, "has assigned to each man a director, his own genius, a guardian whose vigilance no slumbers interrupt, and whom no false reasonings can deceive. So that when you have shut your door, say not that you are alone, for your God is within." I might also, to almost any extent, quote sentiments not unlike the above from Christian authors. The above, however, is sufficient for my purpose. Why do men thus regard conscience as the Spirit of God in the interior of their minds? The reason is, that the conscience of each moral agent really, as above shown, utters its mandates as from the throne of the universal conscience, and especially from that of God. Its voice is, and cannot but be recognized as the voice of God in the soul.
Because God has thus placed conscience within us as his Umpire, and its mandates can not but be recognized as the voice of God within us, hence the impression under consideration.
3. The thought above illustrated discloses to us the principle of universal moral harmony and attraction, together with that of repellency among all moral agents, one toward another. All such agents who conform to the law of righteousness, cannot but approve and delight in their own character. At the same time they cannot but know in themselves, that their characters must, when revealed, be fully approved at the bar of universal conscience, and also be the object of the approbation and delight of all the truly virtuous. Hence each individual of such a character prefers to have that character stand in the clearest light of his own, and of the universal conscience. Here too is the universal bond of brotherhood between all the really pure in existence.
On the other hand, all who disobey this law fear the adjudication of their own and of the universal conscience. They cannot but have a continued consciousness that they have a solemn account to render at the bar of their own and of the conscience of all other Intelligents, which they are by no means prepared to meet. Hence between all such agents and all others, there is the universal principle of repellency, and especially between those who are truly virtuous and those who are not. Among those who live in violation of the law of duty, there may for a time, on account of the strong action of other principles of their nature, be an apparent heart unanimity. Yet at the basis of such union there can not but be the elements of perpetual discord and repellency. What is said above is but an explanation of the declaration of our Savior. John iii. 20-21. "For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved. But he that doethtruth, cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God."
4. The truth above elucidated presents alone an explanation of the natural boldness and consequent strength of virtue, and timidity and weakness of vice. He certainly can have little to fear from any being, who is conscious of standing approved at the bar of the universal conscience. He certainly cannot but know that he has all to fear, who recognizes himself as accountable to all, and is at the same time aware that when he shall be known as he is, he must be condemned at that tribunal. There is not a moral agent in existence of whom such a person does not stand in fear, and in whose presence he would not tremble at the thought of a full disclosure of his character.
5. In the light of the great truth under consideration, the real meaning of certain important declarations of scripture pertaining to the future functions of the pure in heart becomes manifest. We read of the righteous that they shall not only judge the world, but even the angels of God. If such declarations be understood as indicating that such individuals shall be seated upon thrones of judgment before which the moral universe shall formally pass for adjudication, the whole cannot but appear to a reflecting mind as a meaningless farce. But if they be understood as they were designed to be, to reveal the fact, that eternal retributions will rest not merely upon the adjudication of God the judge of all, but also upon that of the universal Conscience, they then shadow forth a great truth, one of the greatest of which the human mind can conceive. This, as I said, is the idea which the sacred writer designed to express. He is reproving Christians, for adjudicating their civil causes before wicked men, instead of among themselves. He informs them that they have always a standard of judgment erected in their own minds, a standard of judgment, in the light of which they would hereafter pass judgment upon the character and deserts of men and angels too. Why then should they regard themselves as disqualified to adjudicate cases in difference among themselves, pertaining to the affairs of this life?
6. The ground of the universal fear with which conscious guilt contemplates an entrance upon a future disembodied state, admits in the light of the great truth before us, of a ready explanation. Human character is here consciously to a great extent, under a mask. When men think of dropping this "mortal coil" and standing disembodied spirits in the unveiled presence of the Eternal one, they cannot but suppose that in the dropping of this coil, the mask from character will also fall off, and that that unveiled vision of God, will be the time for moral scrutiny and adjudication. The natural and necessary fear of that adjudication in the mind of the guilty has its origin in the immutable principles and fundamental laws of universal mind, and points with absolute certainty to a solemn reality lying before us in the future, to wit, Retributions. This idea rightly apprehended, based as it is, upon that of universal accountability above elucidated, is the foundation of all that is pure and great, and noble in character. Without it, man is either a moral negation, or a moral monster.
CHAPTER V.
MORAL ACTIONS.
Terms defined.
ACTION is the putting forth or exertion of power. The nature of the action is of course as the nature of the power exerted, and must be compared with a corresponding law. Physical action is the exertion of physical power, and can be compared only with a physical law. A moral action being the exertion of moral power, is an action which can be compared with the moral law, or with the ideas of right and wrong. It is an action of which the Reason affirms that it ought or ought not to be done, and in the doing of which, merit or demerit is necessarily attributed to the agent. This definition is not only distinct in itself, but distinguishes its object from all other actions real and conceivable. This definition is equally applicable to complex actions, and the elements which constitute them. Of complex actions, that element, and that only, has a moral quality which is capable of being compared with the moral law, and of which we affirm directly that it ought or ought not to be. A deliberate action is always more or less complex.
Intentions alone are moral actions.
An important question here arises, to wit, what kind of actions, and what element of complex actions, are capable of being compared with the Moral Law, or with the fundamental ideas of right and wrong? In other words, to what principle or power of our nature does the Moral Law directly address its precepts and its sanctions? An individual, we will suppose, has put forth some moral act. We consequently affirm that he ought or ought not to have performed it, and that for having done so, he merits approbation or disapprobation. The act we will suppose to have been a complex one, as the putting of money or food into the hands of another. There is an element in this act to which, in the judgment of all men, its praise or blameworthiness attaches, and attaches exclusively. The question is, what is this element? The united spontaneous answer of all Intelligents whose minds have not been warped by false philosophy, (and such will be theirs also, when they forget for a moment their theories,) the united and spontaneous answer of the moral universe, I say, would be, the motive or intention of the agent in performing the act. We may refer to the act as useful or hurtful, as wise or unwise, and our judgments of it will vary according to the different points of view from which we contemplate it. But when we refer to that element in view of which we do and can not but assert it to be morally right or wrong, we do and can take but one consideration into the account, the intention of the agent in the act. That this is the correct view of the subject is evident from the following considerations:
Position Verified.
1. All mankind agree in this, in justifying or condemning themselves or others, in all moral actions, by a reference to their intentions in the performance of such acts. If they wish to know the character of any such act, their only inquiry is, what was the motive or intention of the agent in its performance. This one fact being fully and certainly known, all men unite in pronouncing judgment upon the act irrespective of all other considerations, and that with the absolute assurance, that in such judgment they cannot be wrong. If a man would justify himself in any act, he always does it by a reference to his intentions. So when men would condemn individuals in any moral act, they always do it by impeaching their motives or intentions. There is no one point in which all intelligents, Christian and heathen, civilized and savage, more absolutely agree, than in this. Such an agreement undeniably evinces that in the spontaneous and reflective judgment of the universal intelligence, the moral quality of all actions is found in the intention alone; in other words, that intentions alone are in reality moral acts,
2. Our judgments of the moral character of all particular acts, necessarily vary with our knowledge of the real intentions of the agent in their performance, and while our judgments of the intentions of the agent remain fixed, our affirmations pertaining to the character of the acts proceeding from them, cannot undergo the least "variableness or shadow of turning." As our knowledge of this one quality varies, so will our judgment of the moral character of the agent. If, for example, we admit that the intentions of a surgeon, in a given operation, were in all respects what they ought to be, we cannot but acquit him of moral guilt, whatever the results may be. If on the other hand, we assume that he intended to destroy the life of the subject in the operation, we cannot but attribute to him the guilt of murder, even though we learn that the course actually taken, was the only one by which the life of the patient could be preserved. Since then the relations between our judgments of intentions and moral character are and must be fixed, it follows, as a necessary conclusion, that the moral character of all acts and states of mind is found in intentions alone, in other words, that intentions alone are moral acts.
3. It is in respect to intentions alone, that virtuous and vicious agents in many instances really differ. Their external actions, their judgments, their volitions, and their feelings, excepting so far as they depend upon their intentions, may be alike. It is only in respect to intentions, and feelings and judgments necessarily resulting from them, that they differ.
4. It is absolutely impossible for us to impute guilt to an agent, when we judge his intentions to be in all respects right; or to impute virtue to him, whatever he may be in other respects, when we judge his intentions to he wrong. The truth of the above propositions is fully attested by universal consciousness. In the truth of this assertion, I am pleased to find myself sustained most fully by such authority as Edwards. "As to such motions of body, or exercises and alterations of mind, which do not consist in the imminent acts or states of the will itself, but are supposed to be required as effects of the will; I say, in such supposed effects of the will, in cases wherein there is no want of a capacity of understanding, that inability, and that only excuses, which consists in want of connection between them and the will. If the will fully complies, and the proposed effect does not prove, according to the laws of nature, to be connected with his volition, the man is perfectly excused; he has a natural inability to do the thing required. For the will itself, as has been observed, is all that can be directly and immediately required by command; and other things only indirectly, as connected with the will. If, therefore, there be full compliance of the will, the person has done his duty; and if other things do not prove to be connected with his volition, that is not owing to him."
"When the will consents to the performance of an action," says President Wayland, "though the act be not done, the Omniscient Deity justly considers us as either virtuous or vicious."
"The moral quality does not belong to the external act, nor to the resolution to carry that conception into effect. It must then reside in the intention."
"And universally," says Prof. Tappan, "the merit and demerit of an agent is as his actual choice or intention. His volition depends upon his choice, and hence all the sequents of his volition, as far as he can be responsible for them, depend upon his choice. However he may be judged by beings who have no other way of estimating the principles by which he regulates himself, than the sequents which appear in connexion with his volitions; in the court of his own conscience, and in the court of all-seeing truth and justice, he shall be judged according to his choices or intentions—according to that which he determined and aimed to do."
The following from Edwards is equally to the point:
"The will only itself, and not those actions which are the effects of the will, is the proper object of precept or command."
"The motions or state of the body are matters of command, only as they are subject to the soul, and connected with its acts. But now the soul has no other faculty whereby it can, in the most direct and proper sense, consent, yield to, or comply with any command, but the faculty of the will; and it is by this faculty only, that the soul can directly disobey or refuse compliance: for the very notions of consenting, yielding, accepting, complying, refusing, rejecting, &c., are, according to the meaning of the terms, nothing but certain acts of the will. Obedience, in the primary nature of it, is the submitting and yielding of the will of one to the will of another. Disobedience is the not consenting, not complying of the will of the commanded to the manifested will of the commander. Other acts that are not the acts of the will, as certain Motions of the body and alterations in the soul, are obedience or disobedience only indirectly, as they are connected with the state or actions of the will, according to an established law of nature. So that it is manifest, the will itself may be required: and the being of a good will is the most proper, direct and immediate subject of command; and if this cannot be prescribed or required by command or precept, nothing can; for other things can be no otherwise than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of a good will."
"Corol. 1. If there be several acts of the will, or a series of acts, one following another, and one the effect of another, the first and determining act is properly the subject of command, and not only the consequent acts which are dependent upon it. Yea, it is this more especially, which is that which command or precept has respect to: because it is this act that determines the whole affair; in this act the obedience or disobedience lies, in a peculiar manner; the consequent acts being all subject to it, and governed and determined by it. This determining, governing act, must be the proper object of precept, or none."
"Coral. 2. It also follows, from what has been observed, that if there be any sort of act, or exertion of the soul, prior to all free acts of the will or acts of choice in the case, directing and determining what that act of the will shall be; that act or exertion of the soul cannot properly be subject to any command or precept, in any respect whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely. Such acts can not be subject to commands directly, because they are no acts of the will; being by the supposition prior to all acts of the will, determining and giving rise to all its acts: they not being acts of the will, there can be in them no consent to, or compliance with any command. Neither can they be subject to any command indirectly or remotely; for they are not so much as the effects or consequences of the will, being prior to all its acts. So that if there be any obedience in that original act of the soul determining all volitions, it is an act of obedience wherein the will has no concern at all; it preceding every act of the will. And therefore, if the soul either obeys or disobeys in this act, it is wholly involuntarily; there is no willing obedience or rebellion, no compliance or opposition of the will in the affair: and what sort of obedience or rebellion is this?"
That Edwards, in the above extracts, designed to assert the doctrine that moral obligation, and consequently, moral character, pertains to intentions only, is evident from two considerations.
(1.) He denies moral character wholly of all mental and physical states but those of the will.
(2.) He distinguishes between all ultimate acts of will, and dependent executive volitions proceeding from them, and attributes all moral qualities that do exist to such ultimate acts or intentions alone.
"There are," says Kant, the founder of the modern Transcendental school in philosophy, "qualities which greatly aid and strengthen a good will; but they have not any inward worth of their own, and will be found always to presuppose a good will, which limits the praise they deservedly carry.
"A good will is esteemed to be so, not by the effects which it produces, nor by its fitness for accomplishing any given end, but by its mere good volition, that is, it is good in itself; and is therefore to be prized incomparably higher for its own sake, than any thing whatsoever which can be produced at the call of appetite or inclination. Even if it should happen, that, owing to an unhappy conjuncture of events, this good will were deprived of power to execute its benign intent, still this good will, (by which is not meant a wish) would, like a diamond, shine in itself, and by virtue of its native lustre. Utility or uselessness could neither enhance nor prejudice this internal splendor: they resemble the setting of a gem, whereby the brilliant is more easily taken in the hand, and offered to the attention of those not otherwise judges, but which would not be required by any skilled lapidary, to enable him to form his opinion of its worth."
"It is thus without all question, that we are to understand those passages of scripture, where it is ordained that we love our neighbor, even our enemy; for, as an affection, love cannot be commanded or enforced; but to act kindly from a principle of duty can, not only where there is no natural desire, but also where aversion irresistibly thrusts itself upon the mind; and this would be a practical, not a pathological liking, and would consist in the original volition, and not in any emotion of the sensory." "The consequences of an action," says Cousin, "whatever they may be, do not render it either morally good or bad; the intention is every thing. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a moral action; nothing but moral intentions."
I forbear further quotations which might be multiplied to almost any extent.
6. Equally explicit, on the point, are the teachings of Inspiration. Take a single example in illustration. The guilt of the king of Assyria, in his bloody wars, is affirmed to depend not on his external acts, but exclusively upon his motives or intentions in performing them. "Nevertheless, he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think [intend] so." In conformity to this principle, it is affirmed, that "As a man thinketh, [intendeth] in his heart, so is he." God also in judging of moral character is represented, as looking not at the outward acts, but at the heart, the motives or intentions by which such acts are put forth.
7. As a final reason for the truth of the doctrine under consideration, I remark that it is only in reference to intentions, that moral agents are free, and not subject wholly to the law of necessity. An act or state of mind is free, when, at the time and in the circumstances of its existence, it may be different from what it is. It is necessary when, at the time and in the circumstances of its occurrence, it can not but be in all respects what it is, nor by any possibility be, in any respect, different from what it is. To say that an agent, all of whose acts and states are subject to the law of necessity, ought in any given circumstances, to be or to do in any respect different from what he is or does, and can not but be and do in those circumstances, is equivalent to the affirmation, that an event ought to exist for which there is no cause. Can the intelligence affirm, that any such thing ought to be? What meaning can attach to the word ought when it is asserted that an event without a cause ought to exist? We venture to affirm, that no man, in the possession of reason, would have the effrontery to look the proposition directly in the face, and then affirm that in any conceivable circumstances, an event ought to occur, and that the subject is guilty for its non-occurrence, when its occurrence in those circumstances, would be an event without a cause. Obligation cannot be affirmed of any agent, or of any department of his nature, when its affirmation would involve such a contradiction as that. Now, it is universally admitted by philosophers of all schools, that in respect to all states and acts of the physical system, and also in respect to all mental states, intentions excepted, in respect to all states of the sensibility and intelligence, for example, man is wholly subject to the law of necessity. In respect to intention only is he free. As moral obligation consists only with freedom, and as man is free only in respect to his intentions, intentions are the only acts or mental states of which obligation can be directly affirmed. The sense in which it may be affirmed of other acts and states, will be considered hereafter. Intentions, then, and moral actions are synonymous terms.
Conclusions from the propositions above established.
1. Intentions are exclusively phenomena of the will. They, pertain neither to the intelligence, nor Sensibility. This all will admit.
2. No motion of the physical organization, no state of the intelligence or sensibility does or can, in itself, possess any moral character. The truth of this proposition has been already established beyond controversy. A few additional considerations, designed to render its truth if possible still more evident, demand a passing consideration.
(1.) In respect to all phenomena of these faculties, excepting so far forth as their character depends upon the action of the will, individuals of moral character, in all respects the direct opposites, may perfectly resemble each other. All the external acts performed by the purest men that ever lived, might, as far as mere physical motion is concerned, be performed by fallen spirits, their character remaining unchanged, if they were to be become incarnate. The same holds equally true of all states of the intelligence. The same thoughts and convictions are common to the worst and best of creatures. Moral character surely can, in no sense, consist in any such phenomena as these. Equally manifest is the applicability of the same principle to all the states of the sensibility not dependent upon the action of the will, such sensations, emotions and desires are common to creatures of the worst and the best of moral characters. How can moral character in any form, depend upon such phenomena?
(3.) No idea of God is more absurd in itself, or more dishonorable to the divine character, than the supposition, that He has legislated morally in respect to such phenomena. Suppose that God has hung out before the moral universe, a law in which thoughts, feelings, or physical acts or states, are required of or prohibited to his creatures, phenomena, the existence of which, by no efforts of their wills they can either produce or prevent or modify in themselves. How must He stand before the universe, as a moral legislator? This is the precise light in which all present the moral law and God its administrator, who predicate moral character of such phenomena.
(4.) The dogma that moral agents are directly morally responsible for the existence or non-existence of such phenomena, implies, as we have seen, that events without causes are required of creatures. All such phenomena are exclusively subject to the law of necessity. In the circumstances of their existence, they cannot but exist as they are. To suppose that the law requires them to be different from what they are, is to suppose that it requires events without a cause. That which in the circumstances of its existence, cannot but be what it is, and by no possibility be otherwise, (which is the case of all phenomena subject to the law of necessity,) cannot in those circumstances, be in any respects other than it is, unless there is an event without a cause. Those then, who maintain, that the law requires of creatures the existence of thoughts, feelings, or physical phenomena, which, by no efforts of theirs they can produce in themselves, or to prevent the existence of such phenomena the occurrence of which no efforts of theirs can, in any degree avail to prevent, all such persons, I say, maintain, that the divine law requires of creatures, events without causes, and dooms them to death for not producing results which when produced shall be results not produced at all. How utterly incapable must a person, who can maintain such a dogma, be to reason profoundly upon any question of fundamental morality.
3. It follows as a necessary consequence from what has been established above, that moral agents are responsible for physical acts or states, as also for the phenomena of the intelligence and sensibility, so far forth only as their existence and character depend either directly or indirectly on their wills, or Intentions. So far they may with all propriety, and in every system of righteous moral legislation, will be held responsible for such phenomena. Beyond these limits moral responsibility wholly ceases.
4. Equally manifest is it that moral agents are responsible directly and immediately for those acts of will only denominated ultimate intentions. Whenever there is a series of acts all depending for their existence and entire character upon some one causative, pre-determining, and controlling act, it is self-evident, that moral obligation must directly pertain to this one act alone. "This determining, governing act," as Edwards well observes, "must be the proper object of precept or none." Now, this is the precise relation which ultimate intention sustains to all subordinate executive volitions. To it they sustain the relation exclusively of effects to cause. The intention being given, the subordinate volitions cannot but be, with all existing characteristics. Moral law has to do with such phenomena therefore, only as dependent for their existence and entire characteristics upon ultimate intentions. These last are the only phenomena over which it directly legislates. Much is done for the science of Moral Philosophy, when its appropriate and primary objects of investigation are thus rendered clear and distinct.
Ultimate Intentions Defined.
As ultimate intentions are the only phenomena over which moral law directly legislates, and as all obligation and moral desert finally terminate in these, the correct scientific definition of such phenomena becomes an object of fundamental importance. What then are ultimate intentions? They are, of course, ultimate determinations, or acts of will, that is, acts which are caused by, subordinated to, and determined in their characteristics by, none others. Ultimate intentions, therefore, may be thus defined. Whenever the will acts, and the reasons for such action are found in some object and in nothing extraneous to it, those acts which refer directly to such object, and determine the character of the series of acts ultimately referring to it, are ultimate. This is what we mean by ultimate intentions. Whenever we ash for the motives or ultimate intentions of an individual, we always inquire for the object relatively to which that final act is put forth, the act which gives existence to and determines the character of the whole series of subordinate acts under consideration.
Defective Definition.
Ultimate Intentions have been sometimes defined as the choice of an end. "The choice of an ultimate end," says my respected associate, Professor Finney, "is an ultimate intention." This definition is to my mind, defective, for the following reasons.
1. It is by no means intuitively certain, (the fundamental characteristic of all correct definitions,) that it includes all ultimate acts of will. It admits, at least of a doubt, whether there may not be such acts which cannot properly be denominated the choice of an end.
2. There are ultimate acts of will which cannot, properly, be denominated the choice of an end. To choose any thing as an end, implies, according to the proper signification of the words, that we choose it, as something which we are to promote by appropriate executive acts. There are objects which present ultimate reasons for acts of will which we cannot, in the sense above explained, will as an end. God, for example, we can, by no acts of our wills, render better or more happy than He is, his holiness and happiness both being revealed to us, as absolute infinite quantities wholly incapable consequently of increase or diminution from any finite cause. We therefore cannot will either of them as ultimate ends, that is, as ends to he secured by appropriate executive acts. But the revelation of the divine existence and perfections, does present ultimate reasons for many ultimate acts of will. The definition under consideration therefore is defective.