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SCIENCE
OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY;
BY REV. ASA MAHAN, A. M.,
PRESIDENT OF THE OBERLIN COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE.
AUTHOR OF "A SYSTEM OF INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY;" "DOCTRINE OF THE WILL," &C.
WITH A RESPONSE BY CHARLES G. FINNEY
TO THE OBJECTIONS TO HIS THEORY.
OBERLIN:
JAMES M. FITCH.
1848.
REPUBLISHED BY THE EDITOR.
RICHARD FRIEDRICH OF
ALETHEA IN HEART MINISTRIES,
8071 Main St. Fenwick, MI 48834
http://truthinheart.com
(989) 637-4179
2004.
ISBN 0-932370-37-4
First Alethea In Heart edition published in 2004.
Republished from the edition of 1848, Oberlin, without altering anything but format and page numbers.
Copyright © 2004
Richard M. Friedrich
All Rights Reserved.
SCIENCE
OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY;
BY REV. ASA MAHAN,
PRESIDENT OF THE OBERLIN COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE:
AUTHOR OF "A SYSTEM OF INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY;"
"DOCTRINE OF THE WILL," &C.
_____
OBERLIN:
JAMES M. FITCH.
____
1848.
Entered according to act of Congress in the year 1848 by
ASA MAHAN,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of Ohio.
FORWARD BY THE EDITOR.
Asa Mahan must be considered one of the greatest philosophers of all time. He spent a lifetime carefully researching the various departments of philosophy and left us authoritative works in the most important areas. Each volume shows a mastery of the subject, with both a wonderful sense of manly independence of thought and a humility in giving due recognition to worthy thinkers gone before. But his greatness is not limited to realistic accuracy of thought and skill of communication and development, but equally so in a life lived consistently with the principles he discovered and related. Of the great minds in history, few have offered such a volume of their lives as this author. He was well known not just as the first President of Oberlin College, Cleveland University, and Adrian College, but also as a successful pastor, evangelist, professor and reformer. As such he suffered many years under the oppression of popular opinion while he maintained the principles developed in this volume. Eventually popular opinion caught up in some points, and discovered the truth of what he previously taught in the same. None of these being so obvious than the evils of slavery.
The details of his life may be more fully noticed in the previous works we have reproduced: Autobiography, and Out of Darkness Into Light. The common sense realism in his philosophical works is also equally wonderful in his spiritual works on holiness. Philosophy and spirituality should not be so antagonistic to each other, as is the case in the minds of most people. The two subjects are often thought of as opposite or antagonistic to each other. The author shows not only in his many works in both areas, but in his own life, that they intimately relate to each other. 'As a man thinks, so will he live.' And as a man wills and worships, so will his mind be thus focused. If a man thinks incorrectly, he will generally live accordingly. If a man lives unspiritually, he will generally be greatly mistaken in his understanding of our nature and relations in this grand universe. But with our author we can hardly recommend a more worthy example of both wisdom and virtue.
All this being said, we will add that this particular branch of philosophy is the most difficult to conclude in, even as the author shares in his Preface below. And we feel, as seems to be indicated in the same, that the liability to err is all the greater in this volume than in every other work produced by this author. Where almost every other volume published will command the near entire agreement of most candid readers, this volume may not come as close. Part of that is owing to the fact that every person is necessitated to focus on different ethical issues than other persons. And thus different issues are mastered or neglected in different proportions by different people. And such leads to a variety of opinions on moral subjects. Added to this is the fact that while people may be agreed about a general conclusion on a issue, with more and more insight into the matter itself, and as it relates to other issues, some people gain further developments about that truth, which others who have not traveled so far in may not yet see and agree with. Such facts of experience will no doubt be some reason for disagreement with some of the conclusions of this volume, which perhaps a later perusal after more mature investigations may clear up.
We wish the reader to consider the tremendous difficulty of the task of writing such a book of this nature; and distinctly remember the humble admissions of the author in his Preface while reading every part. We wish to ensure the reader that even if the author may be thought to be wrong in a number of places, the exercise of carefully studying his perspective and methods with a candid heart and mind will most definitely advance any reader. One of the most important principles our author promoted was manly independence of thought that can learn from any circumstance.
Our friend James Hamilton, the biographer of Mahan, has shared his agreement with our stated perspective of the author and this volume in particular. That is, due to the above mentioned limitations in the study of this subject, it is with difficulty that one can decide who is more correct in the matters where the author differed from his close associate Charles G. Finney; who shared so much resemblance in philosophy, theology, spirituality, and morals. In all their writings and history there can be found very little differences between these men. In fact, during the time this book was being worked on they were both professors at Oberlin College, and both editors of the theological Oberlin Quarterly Review.
The difference above mentioned was pertaining to defining the process involved in what object or objects impose the duty or basis for all of our choices in life. How should we define the process of what is the ultimate reason(s) for every morally binding choice we make? What are the objects that are the highest or deepest reasons for why we act? Not so much why should we act the way we do, but deeper: What are the objects that are the only real reason for action? Finney answered simply that all beings capable of happiness were objects of value in themselves, and that the collective value of each individual in the universe imposed the duty to choose such individual and collective values as the foundation of all our motivation. We love and obey God because it is seen as an irresistible good to Him and to all rational beings capable of happiness. Also because it is the highest good we can accomplish to all such beings. The idea is therefore simple even though it is profound.
Mahan on the other hand, supposed that some of what Finney called conditions in that process, were also grounds, or fundamental reasons for our deepest motivations. Such, for example, would be not only that a person's value compelled us to action, but that their good character called for fundamental obligation or responses.
James Hamilton wrote his thesis on the difference of theories between these great reformers on the subject of the foundation of moral obligation. The editor also found it difficult to decide who was more correct in the matter. He finally concluded that there was in fact more resemblance than Mahan supposed; and that Finney displayed the clearest, most consistent, and accurate position. Finney responded to this detailed critique of his first edition of his Systematic Theology in the second and final London 1851 edition (which we have also reproduced for the first time since its publication). We have added the response in the Appendix of this volume. We are not aware of a published response by Mahan to that work besides a few statements in his Logic text of 1855. Thus it is advisable that the reader not conclude in his understanding of Finney's theology before he reads the response (found in the first 200 or so pages of that book). We observe that much of the difference was owing to differing categorizations, definitions, or as mentioned, inconsistency of definition. Notice what Mahan admits in this respect:
"I am happy also to be able to show, as I have shown above, that Professor Finney is with me in this doctrine, though in palpable inconsistency with his theory. 'It is a demand,' he says, 'of the intelligence of every moral being, that we should esteem and treat as worthy of confidence those whose character entitles them to this confidence.'"
Finney likewise returned the compliment many more times in his response. Thus it is evident that they had great respect for each other as spiritual persons and philosophers. And if such minds differed in form while remaining the same in spirit, it is a worthy example for lesser minds to consider while they differ with others in the finer points of theology. With such before his mind, the author exclaimed: "How difficult it is, even for the wisest, to be consistent in error!" Yet in this case it seems that it was true of himself. And as the editor sees it, he did hold the correct theory, but added to it by confounding certain conditions as grounds. If this is true it is a category mistake which is often made in both philosophy and theology as he so often pointed out in other matters. It was also a difference of defining the whole process of ultimate intentions. One side carefully defines the differences between the conditions and grounds for the deepest virtuous motivations of the Will or heart, while the other calls some of those conditions grounds or reasons as well. Both sides acknowledged the stated elements in the other position as part of the real process, and as creating the same results: a duty to choose a valuable object. But they differed in how they defined that process. Both claimed that the other was inconsistent. It remains for the reader to see who really was, and to realize that communication is not always perfect in this life.
We will attempt to add footnotes to show where page numbers were given of the quotes found in the original publications, so that the reader can find them in our new publication of these works, which regretfully have different numbering due to the fact that both volumes contained major page numbering errors.
Once again, we wish to commend the careful study of this work after studying the more foundational philosophical works of the author. Such books as Mental Philosophy, Intellectual Philosophy, and Doctrine of the Will will prepare the reader to better understand this book, and to appreciate his mature perspective. It will also help the reader to be more careful in their research and to be more candid in their judgments. The volume on Logic, though fairly advanced, would also be very worthy to study before this work. The remainder of the philosophical works would be recommended to follow these; and the spiritual works alongside any of the philosophical works.
The master copy used for this volume was photocopied from the microfilm copy at Calvin College in Grand Rapids. As with all of our reproductions, it is completely true to the original in spelling, italics, and nothing is added or removed from the text. Nothing is changed but a few typos.
PREFACE.
EVERY one is fully aware of the fact, that of all subjects which it concerns man to investigate, that involved in these two questions is of paramount importance, namely, What ought I to be? and, How ought I to act? The scientific solution and elucidation of these questions, constitutes the peculiar sphere of the science of Moral Philosophy, a science which will never attain to a full development, till it has done all for the solution, and elucidation of these questions which any particular science can do for the subject to which it pertains.
The proper development of any science is, of necessity, conditioned, in the first instance, upon the proper definition and elucidation of its fundamental principles, and in the next upon an exemplification of the true method of applying such principles to all practical questions which fall within the appropriate sphere of that science. The full conviction that such an end yet needs to be attained in respect to the science of Moral Philosophy, notwithstanding all that has hitherto been written upon the subject, has given rise to the following treatise. How far the author has realized so desirable an end, it now remains with the public to decide. One thing he will freely confess, and that is, that he has not yet fully realized his own ideal of what such a treatise might be in the hands of individuals of higher wisdom than he possesses. He has, however, made as near an approach to that ideal, as, after years of patient investigation, and under the circumstances in which he was necessitated to think and write, it was possible for him to make; and he entertains the internal assurance, that whoever will give the work a careful perusal, will find, that as a consequence, he better understands the law of right and duty, than he might have done before.
PREFACE.
A treatise on Moral Philosophy that does justice to its subject, will, of course, tax to the utmost the powers of the hardest student who attempts fully to fathom the depths, and ascend the heights of thought to which it attains; and at the same time, it will so elucidate that subject, that the ordinary reader who will devote adequate time and attention to its perusal, will study it with much interest and profit. Such it has been the fixed aim of the author to render the following treatise. He designed to render it a book for the student, and at the same time, a book for the people. Let not the common reader, then, be startled at the intricate questions which open upon him, as he proceeds. If he masters the subjects discussed, he will never regret the loss of his labor, and let him remember, that he can master them, if he will.
This treatise was not prepared for the thoughtless, who take up such a work, glance, it may be, at its contents, and then lay it aside, as too deep for them, individuals whose minds float at random upon the surface of things, without looking seriously into the depths beneath, or to the heights above for the purpose of understanding the great realities within and around them, realities among which they are to have their eternal dwelling place, and who especially never ponder the questions, What am I? Where am I? and Whither am I bound? What ought I to be? What ought I to do? and What will be my destiny, as the consequence of being and doing what I ought, or ought not? It was prepared, on the other hand, for thinkers, into whose hearts wisdom has entered, and unto whose souls knowledge is pleasant. To such it is now commended, with the earnest hope, that they may find the same interest and profit in its study, that the author has found in its preparation.
MISTAKES.
In consequence of the absence of the author, at the time, the second section of Chapter XVI, Part I, was not inserted. Its omission, however, is not material, as section 1, contains a discussion of the subject sufficiently full. For the same reason, chapters XVII and XVIII were wrongly located. Chapter XVIII was designed to be placed before chapter XVII. The printing had proceeded too far to make the corrections when these mistakes were discovered.
CONTENTS.
____
PART FIRST.
CHAPTER I.
THE SCIENCE DEFINED.
CHAPTER IV.
IDEA OF UNIVERSAL MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.
Ideas dependent upon those of Right and Wrong—The Peculiar Sentiment which always attends the Affirmations of Conscience accounts for the Fact that Conscience has so often been regarded as the Spirit of God in the Soul—Universal Moral Harmony, Attraction, Repellency—Boldness of Virtue, Timidity of Vice—Future Functions of the Pure in Heart—Ground of the Universal Fear with which Conscious Guilt enters upon a Disembodied State,
CHAPTER V.
MORAL ACTION.
Terms defined—Intentions alone are Moral Actions—Position verified—Conclusions from the Positions above established—Ultimate Intentions defined—Defective Definition,
CHAPTER. VI.
UNIVERSAL TEST OF THE MORAL CHARACTER OF ULTIMATE INTENTIONS.
When an Intention is right—Meaning of the Term Love—Meaning of the Term Selfishness—The Manifest Error of many in their Efforts at Self-Justification,
CHAPTER VII.
A MORAL AGENT.
Moral Agent defined—Necessary Characteristics of such Agent—Moral Law must sustain to him an objective and subjective relation—He must possess a Will whose Determinations are free—Appropriate and Exclusive Sphere of Moral Law—Ability always commensurate with Obligation—Common Error—Obligation can not transcend the Possible Reach of the Subject—Standard by which the Demerit of Wrong Actions is to be estimated,
CHAPTER VIII.
NECESSARY AND CONTINGENT PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY.
A Fact for Elucidation—The Distinctions made of Universal Application—Reasons for the Unsatisfactoriness of Common Treatises on Moral Philosophy—The True Standard of Judgment in respect to Moral Character—A Prevalent Mistake—Moral Principles and Prudential Maxims —Remarks,
CHAPTER IX.
FOUNDATION OF OBLIGATION.
Question defined—Only Two Answers to this Question possible—The Question which is the True Theory, how answered—The Convictions of the Race—The Direct Testimony of Consciousness—The Doctrine of Utility contrary to Consciousness—When impossible for us to act or intend morally—Obligation to will, how affirmed a priori—A Fact of Experience—Last Resort of the Utilitarian—Real Foundation distinctly stated—Conclusions necessarily resulting from these Positions—The Selfish System—The Will of God—Doctrine of General Consequenees,
CHAPTER X.
NEW THEORY PERTAINING TO THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
Theory as held by Prof. Finney—The Opposite Theory stated—Prof. Finney's Theory in its Logical Consequences tends to the Doctrine of Utility—In consistency with this Theory we can not account for certain distinctions which he himself Makes—Prof. Finney contradicts his own Theory—Prof. Finney's Argument based upon a Psychological Error—Universal Consciousness opposed to Prof. Finney's Theory—There are Forms of Real Good, obligations to confer which rest exclusively upon Moral Character—Unanswerable Argument against this Theory in the Relations of the Universal Intelligence to the Moral Government of God Theory cannot be so explained as to involve all the Duties we are conscious of owing to God—Another Fundamental Objection to Prof. Finney's Theory—The Scriptures as well as Universal Intelligence opposed to Prof. Finney's Theory—General Remarks,
CHAPTER XI.
MORAL ACTION NEVER OF A MIXED CHARACTER.
Can Contradictory and Opposite Elements enter into one and the same Intention?—Actions Right in themselves can not be faulty on the score of Intensity—Intentions in themselves Pure can not co-exist in the Mind with Executive Volitions of an opposite character—The Will can not be in a Right State and the Subject be guilty for Necessary and Unavoidable States of the Sensibility—Conclusions necessarily resulting from the Doctrine above established,
CHAPTER XII.
MORAL RELATIONS--NATURE OF VIRTUE--CHARACTER.
Character—Relations—Nature of Virtue as defined by Dr. Paley—According to this Definition, Moral Character depends upon the spring from which it arises—In what Sense character may and may not be mixed,
CHAPTER XIII.
ERRORS ARISING FROM THE APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PRUDENTIAL MAXIMS AND MORAL PRINCIPLES IN THEIR ABSTRACT AND UNIVERSAL FORMS.
Do right for the sake of the Right—Whatever is Expedient is Right—The End sanctifies the Means—Acting Conscientiously—Acting from Love,
CHAPTER XIV.
IDEA OF RETRIBUTION.
Import of the Idea of Retribution—Doctrine of Natural Consequences—Doctrine that Punishment should be inflicted only as a Means of Reformation—True Theory—What it is that distinguishes the Idea of Moral Law from all other Ideas—Doctrine of Eternal Retributions—Important Fact—Idea of Retribution in Harmony with the Laws of Rational Existence,
CHAPTER XV.
EXTERNAL ACTIONS.
What Actions are to be regarded as forbidden—What External Actions are required by the Moral Law as the Necessary Cousequents or Appropriate Indexes of those Determinations of the Will which are confined to the Law—Rules of Judgment in respect to Moral Character from External Conduct—Application of Principles,
CHAPTER XVI.
THE SCRIPTURES AS A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
The Moral Law as revealed in the Scriptures—Prescription of Formal Rules for any Question of Duty—Method in which those Universal Principles are expressed which include and imply All Particular and Specific Precepts of Moral Obligation—A Method combining all that is comprehended in the Second and to some extent in the First above mentioned—Diligent Study of the System of Duty revealed in the Scriptures imposed upon us—The Light in which the Great Mass of the Precepts of the Bible should be regarded—An Error to which Honest Minds are liable—A Large Portion of the Particular Precepts of the Bible not to be regarded as Formal Rule—Are none of the Precepts of the Moral Law as given in the Bible, to be regarded as Rules of Action, demanding Formal Obedience?—Manner in which Dishonest Minds free themselves from Forms of Duty which they are determined not to discharge—Meaning of Certain Declaration One Great Object of the Most High in revealing the Law of Duty in a Certain Manner—Another Important Principle—Meaning of the Savior in Certain Declarations—Grounds of charging a Want of Circumspection in inquiring after Duty, as a Crime—Real Distinction between Formalism and Spiritual Religion,
CHAPTER XVII.
GOVERNMENT—ITS GROUNDS.
Foundation of Government—The Will of God—Family Government—Civil Government--Divine Government—Real Foundation stated—Government is a Necessity—Under what circumstances Government ought to exist—In what Sense has Civil Government its Foundation in the Social Compact—In what Sense under Civil Governments the Majority ought to rule—A Common Mistake—Bearing of the Existence of Government upon Human Society—An Important Error—The appropriate Characteristics of Tyranny—Slavery not a Government—Civil Government a Demand of Human Nature,
CHAPTER XVIII.
OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION ASIDE FROM THE SCRIPTURES IN RESPECT TO THE LAW OF DUTY.
A knowledge of the Law of our Mental and Physical Constitution—A Careful Study of our Relations in Life—A Careful Analysis of our own Moral Judgments—A Careful and Judicious Observation of Public Opinion—The Counsel and Works of Individuals whom God has specially gifted,
CHAPTER XIX.
IDEA OF RIGHTS.
Terms defined—Foundation of Rights—Relation of Right and Duty—Remarks,
PART SECOND.
PRACTICAL ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
PIETY, OR OUR DUTIES TO GOD.
Duties included in these Words when understood in their most Extensive Sense—Piety in its more Restricted Sense,
CHAPTER II.
PRAYER.
Term defined—Mental Exercises included in Prayer—Characteristics of Acceptable Prayer—Prayer Reasonable—Importance attached to Prayer in the Scriptures—Common Objections to Prayer—Times and Seasons when Prayer is required—Remarks,
CHAPTER III.
THE LORD'S DAY, OR TILE CHRISTIAN SABBATH.
General Considerations—Objections—Argument summarily stated—Manner in which the Sabbath should be kept,
CHAPTER IV.
SUBJECTIVE DUTIES, OR THE DUTIES WE OWE TO OURSELVES.
To stand approved at the Bar of Conscience—Self-Control—Mental Independence—Harmonious Development of all our Powers—Esteem of others—Self-Knowledge—Correction of Evil Habits,
CHAPTER V.
SUBJECTIVE DUTIES—CONTINUED.
Humility and Pride—Ambition—Contentment—Covetousness—Envy—Moral Courage and Fortitude—Internal Rectitude—Moral Purity and Impurity pertaining to the Government of the Thoughts and Feelings,
CHAPTER VI.
SUBJECTIVE DUTIES—CONTINUED.
Government of Appetites—Remarks—Moral Principles pertaining to Dress—Compliance with Custom,
CHAPTER VII.
DUTIES WHICH WE OWE TO MAN AS MAN.
General Relations—Duties resulting from such Relations —Duties growing out of Moral Character—Remarks,
CHAPTER VIII.
LIBERTY AND SERVITUDE.
Terms defined—Incorrect Definitions—Fundamental Necessities to which the Idea of Liberty pertains—Forms in which Liberty may be invaded—Subjective Servitude —Tyranny of Public Opinion—Tyranny of Party Organization—Government Oppressions—Slavery—Bible Argument—Laws of Moses—Bearing of the New Testament upon this subject—Conclusions necessarily arising from the facts above adduced—Remarks,
CHAPTER IX.
THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY, AND THE DUTIES THENCE RESULTING.
Terms defined—Objects which may sustain the Relation of Property—Extent and Limits of this Right—Means by which Property may be lawfully acquired—States of Mind Right or Wrong relative to Property—Forms of Duty binding us relatively to the Property of others—Modes in which the Right of Property may be violated,
CHAPTER X.
DUTY AS IT RESPECTS CHARACTER.
Idea of Perfection—Character defined—Our Duty in respect to Character—Guilt of violating these Duties—Remarks,
CHAPTER XI.
DUTY IN RESPECT TO REPUTATION.
Term defined—Guilt of unjustly depriving one of a good Reputation—Law which binds us in respect to Character—Remarks—Forms in which Duty in respect to Reputation is violated in judging of Character—Manner in which we are bound to judge others relatively to Character or Reputation—Law of Duty respecting the Disclosure of Facts bearing upon the Reputation of others—Circumstances under which the Law of Duty pertaining to the Disclosure of facts bearing upon Reputation is violated Remarks,
CHAPTER XII.
LAW AND DUTY OF VERACITY.
Terms defined—Form in which the law of veracity binds us—Veracity in the statement of facts—Law of veracity when violated—Is all intentional deception lying?—Promises and Contracts—Promises, when not binding--Of Oaths—Nature of an Oath—Lawfulness of Oaths—podiency of the Oath—Obligations imposed by the Oath,
CHAPTER XIII.
DUTIES ARISING FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SEXES.
Duties of the unmarried—Duties of the married—Law of Chastity—Law of Divorce,
CHAPTER XIV.
FORMS OF DUTY ARISING FROM THE PARENTAL AND FILIAL RELATIONS.
Duties of Parents to children—Violations of Parental Obligation—Duties of Children to their Parents—Remarks—Use of the Rod in Family Government—Duties in respect to individuals incidentally connected with Families as Domestics, &c.—Duties of Domestics—Duties of Employers,
CHAPTER XV.
PATRIOTISM AND PHILANTHROPY.
Philanthropy and Patriotism defined—Forms of Duty imposed by the law of Patriotism—Our Duty as Patriots when violated,
CHAPTER XVI.
DUTIES ARISING FROM THE CONTINGENT RELATIONS OF LIFE.
Law of Self-Defence—Anger, Wrath, Malice, and a Righteous Indignation at Wrong-Doing—Duty of Meekness –Gratitude,
MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
CHAPTER I.
THE SCIENCE DEFINED.
THE common definition of Ethics or Moral Philosophy is this. It is the science of the Moral Law. Few persons, however, obtain any definite conception of the subject from such a definition, for the obvious reason, that the idea designated by the term science is not distinctly developed in their minds. This idea, therefore, must be elucidated before any particular definition of any specific science can be appreciated.
In the volume on Intellectual Philosophy, the idea of science is defined as "knowledge reduced to fundamental ideas and principles; or the properties and relations of objects systematically evolved in the light of such ideas and principles." The following perhaps would be a definition still more distinct and definite. Science is the presentation and elucidation of universal rules and formulas, in the light of which particular facts and problems may be explained and solved.
The above definitions present the idea in a strictly universal form. A particular science would accordingly be the presentation and elucidation, of those universal rules and formulas in the light of which all particular facts and problems falling within the appropriate sphere of such science may he explained and solved. Any particular scientific Treatise realizing the above idea, will not itself explain and solve such facts and questions: but will furnish the rules and principles in the light of which they may be solved, and will so familiarize the mind of the student with the application of the formulas given, that he, in their light, will be able to answer such questions for himself. An individual who has fully mastered a scientific Treatise on common Arithmetic, for example, will find himself in possession of a specific answer to no one question falling within the sphere of such science, that he meets with in the ordinary transactions of life. He will find himself familiarized with the nature and application of universal formulas, or rules and principles, however, in the light of which he can readily solve such questions for himself. The same holds true of all particular scientific Treatises developed according to the true idea of science.
Application of the above to the science of Moral Philosophy.
The application of the idea above elucidated to the subject of the present Treatise will be readily apprehended. The idea of duty is to the Intelligence under all circumstances of conscious existence, an omnipresent reality. It is the only idea, in any intelligence, human or divine, which has authority; and every where that authority is absolute. Though in itself, as we shall see hereafter, perfectly simple, its applications are illimitable and endlessly diversified, and present, in the varied circumstances and relations of rational existence, an endless diversity of questions, involving moral obligation, that need to be solved. The object of a Treatise on Moral Philosophy scientifically developed, will be to present and elucidate all those universal principles and formulas, in the light of which all such questions may be solved, and so to familiarize the student with the application of such principles, that he will be able to solve them for himself. Such Treatise will not be to the student relatively to such particular questions, what a Table of Interest is to the merchant relatively to his pecuniary transactions, that is, it will not present a particular specific solution of all or perhaps any particular questions of moral obligation which he may meet with, in the course of his existence. It will, if it accomplishes its object, however, familiarize him with the nature and application of those principles in the light of which he may solve all such questions for himself. Such, as I suppose, is the true idea of Moral Philosophy, an idea in conformity to which the science will be intentionally developed in the present Treatise.
REMARKS.
With two general remarks, the present chapter will be closed.
1. If the view of the subject presented above be admitted as correct, certain defects in the common Treatises on the subject will be manifest. We find, for example, that after the discussion of certain fundamental questions, they are mainly occupied in direct arguments to prove that such and such particular states of mind, or courses of conduct are right or wrong, instead of giving and elucidating by appropriate examples, as in all other scientific Treatises, those universal principles in the light of which it will be clearly seen that such actions cannot but be right or wrong. This is obviously owing to the want of well developed ideas of what the Science of Moral Philosophy really is.
Another defect equally noticeable is the general absence of definitions scientifically definite and accurate. If Moral Philosophy is considered as mainly designed to specify a system of moral duties, this would not be regarded as an important defect. If, on the other hand, it is contemplated as chiefly designed to define and elucidate fundamental principles in the light of which specific duties stand revealed to the mind as such, then very much depends, as in all other scientific Treatises upon the precision and accuracy of definitions.
2. We now have an obvious explanation of the uncertainty which commonly attends disquisitions in Moral Philosophy. It is owing, as it appears to me, to the reason stated above—the want of well settled ideas of the true end and aim of such science. Let it once be understood, that its sphere is, not to specify in a formal manner, the varied duties of man, not to decide whether such and such particular courses of conduct are right or wrong, but to furnish and elucidate universal formulas or principles, in the light of which all such questions may be answered by the student for himself, and then Moral Philosophy will take its place, not among the uncertain, but certain sciences.
CHAPTER II.
POSTULATES AND AXIOMS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
EACH particular science has a sphere peculiar to itself. It has its basis, therefore, in axioms, deriving their special form from the nature of the science to which they pertain, and in postulates which pertain to no other science. The student who will turn to the work on Intellectual Philosophy, pp. 190—1, will find the above principles clearly elucidated. No one attempts to prove the truth of any axioms and postulates which he assumes as the basis of the science which he is attempting to elucidate. He assumes them as universally admitted truths, and proceeds to construct his treatise upon them. The object of the present chapter is to state some of the facts and principles which the Moral Philosopher assumes as the basis of his peculiar science.
1. It is no part of the business of the moral philosopher to prove the existence of God, or that of moral accountable agents of any kind. These are assumed as postulates or first truths. His single inquiry on the other hand is, what are the duties of such beings, supposing them to exist? It is a part of his inquiry, what are the elements necessary to moral agency? It belongs to an intellectual, and not to a moral philosopher, however, to determine whether these elements exist in man, or any other being or class of beings. Hence I remark,
2. That the moral philosopher does not prove, but assumes the existence of man, and the existence in him of the essential elements of moral agency. His inquiries are, what are the particular duties, and the ground of moral obligation in respect to these duties, arising from the existence of these elements in man.
3. It is no part of the business of the moral philosopher to prove the existence of those relations, the apprehension of which give rise to moral obligation. For example: he spends no time in proving the existence of beings sustaining to each other the relations of creator and creature, parent and child, ruler and subject. These he assumes as the basis of his inquiries, which exclusively relate to the duties arising out of these relations, and the reasons of our obligation to comply with them.
4. It is no part of the moral philosopher's business to prove the validity of conscience, any more than it is the business of the natural philosopher to prove the validity of the eye in determining colors. The moral philosopher assumes the validity of this faculty in two respects:
(I.) The capability of the intellectual faculties to determine the relations actually existing among creatures, and that of the conscience to affirm the duties arising out of these relations when determined; and,
(2.) That what the conscience necessarily affirms to be right or wrong, is so in fact.
5. The moral philosopher assumes the identity of the moral faculty in all moral agents in this sense, that when the same conditions are fulfilled, the affirmations of conscience in all moral agents will be identical. This is what is assumed in every science in respect to the human intelligence. If any one is disposed to question the principle, and ask with the sceptic: How do I know that the reason of all men is identical? how do I know that all mean the same thing by the terms right and wrong? I can only reply that for one, I shall not stop to "bray such a man with a pestle in a mortar among wheat," for sure I am, that by this or any other means, his "folly will not depart from him."
6. When a particular relation is before the mind in view of which the moral faculty affirms a particular obligation, it is no part of the business of the moral philosopher to show why the reason makes that affirmation, or why that relation gives rise to that particular duty. The necessary affirmation of the moral faculty is assumed as the reason of that obligation. When the particular relation in view of which a particular duty is affirmed, is pointed out, all the reason that can be assigned has been given, why that duty is binding upon us. We have then discovered the foundation, and the only foundation of moral obligation.
7. It is not the business of the moral philosopher to prove that the Bible is a revelation from God. This he assumes as the basis of his inquiries. He assumes the divine existence and attributes, the existance of man as a moral agent, &c., and then inquires what are the duties arising out of the various relations which man sustains to himself and to intellignces around him?
CHAPTER III.
IDEA OF MORAL LAW.
Terms defined.
MORAL PHILOSOPHY has been defined as the science of the Moral Law. We are now prepared for a consideration of the question, What is Moral Law?
Law, in its most general signification, is a rule of action. Physical law is the rule in conformity with which the physical powers of the universe act. The law of attraction, for example, is not the fact that bodies attract each other, not the power in them which attracts; but the rule in conformity with which this power acts. Newton discovered this rule, not the fact, nor the power in bodies indicated by the fact. These had been known ages before he existed.
Moral Law is the rule in conformity with which moral agents are required to act. It is not the rule in conformity with which they, in all instances do act; for some refuse such conformity. But it is the rule in conformity to which, I repeat, they are required to act.
Physical law then is a rule of action, Moral Law, a rule for action.
Dr. Wayland's Definitions.
Law, as defined by Dr. Wayland, is "a mode of existence, or order of sequence." Moral Law he defines as "an order of sequence established between the moral quality of actions and their results." This definition of Moral Law is fundamentally defective, inasmuch as it makes the existence of moral action antecedent to that of Moral Law, without which, as its chronological and logical antecedent both, no such action is possible. It is a dictate of reason and revelation, that "where there is no law there is no transgression," or obedience either, and consequently no moral qualities in actions of any kind.
The "connection also between Moral Actions and their results," is rather the sanction of Moral Law, than the law itself. In the definition under consideration, the antecedent is put for the consequent.
Law objectively and subjectively considered.
Law, as shown in the volume on Intellectual Philosophy, may be contemplated in two points of light, to wit, objectively and subjectively. Viewed in the relation first-named, it may be defined as the action of particular substances or powers in conformity to certain rules: in the latter as an idea in some intelligent mind. A person listens to a choir of singers whose entire performance is in conformity with certain rules. Why does the question spontaneously arise in his mind, Who taught this choir? a question not put as a mere conjecture that some person may or may not have conformed the action of these powers to a given arrangement; but with the absolute affirmation of the Reason that somebody must have done it. The answer is obvious. It is impossible to conceive of the action of powers in conformity with a given rule, without the affirmation that that rule exists as an idea or law of the Reason in some intelligent mind. This is true of all laws, physical and moral. The physical powers of the universe are the objects of laws existing subjectively as ideas in the mind of God. In other words: God has so constituted these powers, and placed them in such relations to each other that their mutual action and re-action shall be in conformity with a rule existing as an idea in his own mind. The law exists objectively in the powers, but subjectively in the supreme Intelligence.
Law exists objectively in the brute, but subjectively and objectively both, in man.
As with the physical powers of the universe, so with all sentient beings, excepting rational moral agents. The former, that is, the brute creation, always act in conformity with laws. These laws, however, exist in them only objectively. All their actions are necessary, and necessarily conformed to laws, of the existence of which they have no knowledge, laws which they obey in the absence of all consciousness of the fact, and which exist subjectively in the Intelligence of the universal Law Giver.
Now in man, (and here lies as I suppose, one great and fundamental difference between man and the brute) law exists, not only objectively but subjectively. All his actions are necessarily in conformity to laws of some kind, laws ultimately referable to the eternal reason, but originating immediately in his own Reason. Man is his own law-giver, or in the language of inspiration, he is a "law unto himself." This fact, the existence of law subjectively in man, as I shall in subsequent chapters endeavor to show, is an essential element of moral agency. My object now is to establish the fact, the existence of law not only objectively but subjectively in man.
Observe a company of children together who are a about to engage in sport. Before their play is begun, what is always done? Some rule or law is adopted in conformity with which their sports shall be conducted. Whenever rational beings act in concert this fact will be found true. It holds also, not only in respect to communities, but in respect to individuals. No man can enter upon any kind of business, without proposing to himself, and adopting, either consciously or unconsciously, some rules in conformity with which that business shall be conducted.
The fact under consideration is especially true of rules, or laws of moral obligation. In all the varied circumstances and relations of conscious existence, certain ideas or rules of action necessarily suggest themselves, rules to which we cannot but affirm ourselves bound to conform. Our course of conduct must have a continual reference to such ideas, in the relation to them of conformity, or non-conformity. On this account, the scriptures affirm of man, as remarked above, that he is "a law [law giver] unto himself." In other words, in the varied relations of his existence, he necessarily imposes upon himself laws or rules of action.
THE IDEAS OF RIGHT AND WRONG.
As Moral Law, subjectively considered, is an idea of Reason, it has hence been denominated the idea of right and wrong. The sentiment of obligation relatively to it is expressed by the words ought and ought not.
Characteristics of these ideas.
We will now notice some of the fundamental characteristics of the above-mentioned ideas.
1. They are perfectly simple ideas—simple as opposed to complex. The laws, considered as rules of action, which represent these ideas are of course simple. So must be the ideas; else the laws would not represent them. The idea of right and wrong, like those of space, time, cause and effect, cannot be resolved into other elements or ideas more simple.
2. They are primitive. Before they are developed, certain conditions must be fulfilled, certain relations must be apprehended. Then these ideas, and all others dependent upon them, are necessarily developed in the primitive spontaneity of the Reason. No man can contemplate moral excellence without the judgment that it ought to be loved. Nor can any man date the origin of these ideas in his own mind, any more than he can date that of the idea of his own existence.
3. These ideas are identical with that of fitness when applied to moral relations. This last is more extensive in its application, but becomes identical with them, when applied to the relations above referred to.
4. The ideas of right and wrong, of obligation, and all others depending upon them, are necessary. From those relations out of which particular forms of duty are seen to arise, we cannot but know that they must arise, and that from them duties of an opposite nature cannot, by any possibility, arise. Actions affirmed to be right or wrong we can no more conceive that they are not what we affirm them to be, or conceive of them as possessed of the opposite characteristics, than we can conceive of the annihilation of space. We conceive, for example, of an individual, as actually conforming to the great command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Can we conceive such conformity to be otherwise than right? Do we not as necessarily affirm the opposite state to be wrong? Do we not make these affirmations with a consciousness of the impossibility of attributing to one of these states the characteristics of the others? Certainly we do. These ideas are necessary and absolute in the same sense, and for the same reasons that those of time and space are.
4. They are also universal. Universality must be affirmed of them in three important respects.
(I.) They exist alike in all intelligent minds. "There is no tribe so rude," says Sir James Mackintosh, "as to be without a faint perception of a difference between right and wrong. There is no subject on which men of all ages and nations coincide in so many points as in the general rules of conduct, and in the qualities of the human character which deserve esteem." This is strikingly illustrated by the manner in which heathen nations justify criminal actions. This they do by referring them to principles right in themselves and more general; as in the cases where infanticide is justified by the plea that the child is thereby freed from the evils of life. All such references clearly evince, not only the existence of such ideas in all minds, but their existence there in the same essential forms. Men differ, not in their ideas of what is right and wrong, but in their application of these ideas to specific acts and courses of conduct.
(2.) In another sense the ideas of right and wrong are universal. Moral law knows of no exceptions. It is very commonly said that there are exceptions to all general rules. A law, however, admitting of exceptions is not a law. Facts presenting apparent exceptions to a given law, come under another principle. Though in appearance like those included under such a law, they are, in their essential elements, totally unlike such facts. Every moral law supposes the existence of certain relations, and results from those relations. While those relations exist, the law remains of course and admits of no exceptions. Apparent exceptions belong to other relations, and of course fall under different principles. For example: a parent is bound to provide for his child while he has the ability to do it, and the child remains dependent upon him. If such parent is freed from such obligation, it must be in consequence of his ceasing to be able to make provision for the child, or of the child's ceasing to be dependent upon him. A change of relations produces a corresponding change of responsibilities, and the apparent exception to the rule above referred to comes under another and a different rule.
3. Whenever we conceive of an action as right in itself, we cannot but erect the motive or intention which prompted the act into a law for all intelligent beings. An act of disinterested benevolence, for example, perform from a corresponding intention, stands revealed to our minds. The intention which prompted the act we cannot but affirm, ought to govern ourselves and all other intelligents in all moral acts whatever. So also when we contemplate a wrong act, we cannot but affirm, that the motive which prompted the act is prohibited to all moral agents, to all circumstances actual and conceivable. In this important sense then, the ideas of right and wrong are also strictly universal.
Conclusions from the above.
1. As the ideas of right and wrong exist in all rational minds, as in all minds they have the same characteristics, those of absolute universality and necessity, and as each moral agent cannot but affirm that the same law, which binds himself, does and must bind all other intelligents, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that the same law not only does bind all intelligents, but stands revealed as law to all intelligents. What evidence can we have that the same idea does and must exist in all minds? This and this only, the consciousness that in the presence of given facts, that idea does and must arise in our minds, as the necessary law of our intelligence. In this consciousness the necessary law of the universal intelligence stands revealed with perfect distinctness, and we may know with absolute certainty, that in all Minds to whom the facts referred to are known, the same idea, in the same essential form, is developed. We may take in illustration, the principle of causality. How do we know that in all rational minds the idea, that every event has a cause, is developed in the same essential form in which it exists in our own? We are conscious of the fact, that in the presence of an event, we do and cannot but conceive of and affirm a cause, as the necessary condition of the occurrence of the event. In this consciousness we cannot but know, that to all Intelligents who have had any perceptions of events at all, this principle, in the same essential form in which it exists in our own minds, is and must be known.
'When, therefore, in the presence of certain facts and relations, we find that we do and cannot but conceive of and affirm a law which, as we know absolutely, does and must bind not only ourselves, but all other moral agents, we cannot but know, that as these facts and relations are known to all such agents, the same law, in the same essential forms, must not only bind such agents, but must be known to them as law. I know of no truth more demonstrably evident than this.
2. On the assumption that the scriptures are a revelation from God, what we now assume to be true, it will follow as a necessary consequence of the truths above established, that the Moral Law revealed in the Sacred Word is perfectly identical with the ideas of right and wrong as they actually exist in the human mind. Were this not so, two revelations proceeding from the same source would stand in palpable contradiction to each other. He who revealed the law, created the human Intelligence. The necessary affirmations of that Intelligence are His productions as much so as the Intelligence itself, or the results of any other of his works, and are consequently a revelation from Him as well as the scriptures themselves. To deny this we must assume that a necessary intended result of what God has produced, is not a revelation of God Himself. This identity also is verified by the fact, that the Moral Law revealed to any man or race of men on earth will commend itself to their consciences as perfectly right and just. This could not be true on an other supposition than that under consideration. When a heathen, on hearing the Law for the first time, pronounces it right and just, as he will not, and in his own conscience, cannot fail to do, he does and must compare that law with an idea pre-existing in his own mind, and it is on the perceived identity of the two, that this judgment is based. This renders undeniably evident the perfect identity of which I am speaking.
This same identity also is every where assumed and asserted in the scriptures. When the ancient patriarch put the question "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" God expressed no disapprobation of the judgment thus passed upon what would be right in Him. Yet this judgment had its basis exclusively in the idea of right previously existing in the patriarch's mind. How often also does the Most High bring the fundamental principles of his own government to the bar of the human conscience, thus testifying to the perfect identity between the ideas of right and wrong developed in that conscience and the fundamental principles of his own eternal moral government.
The same truth also is affirmed in all the declarations we meet with in the scriptures pertaining to the perfection and rectitude of the Divine Law. All such judgments imply the conscious correspondence between the idea of right and perfection in the interior of the mind itself and the revelation without. The whole argument for the truth of the scriptures based upon internal evidence, rests upon this one principle, and is wholly void of force on any other principle, to wit, the perfect correspondence between the fundamental truths and principles of inspiration, and the ideas of fundamental truth and morality pre-existing in the mind itself. I might also refer to passages in which the truth which I am endeavoring to establish is directly asserted. But sufficient has already been said for the purpose I now have in view.
I would simply add in this place, that the objection urged against this position, that it renders a revelation of moral duty unnecessary, is evidently without weight. Though the ideas of right and wrong do exist in all minds, they yet need a distinctness of development which an external revelation alone can impart to them. There are many specific applications of these ideas also which need to be specified, applications which the unaided intellect of man would never discover. A revelation, finally, imparts a solemn and impressive interest to the idea of duty which it could not otherwise possess. They certainly take a very unwise course, who would magnify the importance of a revelation by denying the possibility of men's knowing their duty without it. They thus present the highest possible justification of the depravity of the heathen. For what better excuse can exist for any course of conduct, than the fact, that he who pursued it could not possibly know it to be wrong. Such, by no means, is the teaching of inspiration on this point. It affirms, that while the heathen perpetrate the crimes charged upon them, and take pleasure in those who do the same, they know well that they "who do such things are guilty [deserving] of death." It is not unavoidable ignorance, but a love of error instead of truth, that renders a revelation of the great principles of moral obligation necessary.
CHAPTER IV.
IDEA OF UNIVERSAL MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.
Ideas dependent upon those of right and wrong.
BEFORE proceeding directly to an elucidation of the subject of the present chapter, it may be important to notice certain fundamental moral ideas which have their ultimate basis in those of right and wrong. I refer to such as those of obligation, merit and demerit, and of retributions, or of moral order as it is expressed by some. We are all aware that in the presence of the ideas of right and wrong, a conviction of obligation, expressed, as I have before said, by the words ought and ought not, arises. The conception of obligation complied, or not complied with, suggests other ideas, those of merit and demerit, or the desert of reward and punishment. These last ideas suggest that of moral retributions, or a state of moral order. This, then, is the order of these ideas relatively to each other. The ideas of right and wrong are the foundation of that of obligation: this again, of that of moral desert, or reward and punishment, and these finally of that of moral retributions, or of a state of moral order. Each of these classes of ideas is, relatively to its appropriate sphere, strictly universal and necessary.
Idea of Universal Moral Responsibility.
The idea of universal moral responsibility now claims our attention. The words used hardly convey my meaning. It will be fully understood, however, as we proceed. In the preceding chapter, it has been shown, that in all moral judgments, the mind legislates, that is, affirms obligation, not for itself merely, but for all intelligents. The motives or intentions which it prescribes or prohibits for itself, it of necessity, prescribes or prohibits for all moral agents in existence. When it is conscious to itself, of having really obeyed or disobeyed the law of right, it knows absolutely, that it will and must be the object of the corresponding approbation or disapprobation of the conscience of every moral agent in existence, to whom its conduct may be known. The reason is, that each moral agent cannot but be aware, that his own moral judgments are but the echo of the conscience of the moral universe.
Now as the conscience of each moral agent thus legislates not merely for himself, but for all intelligents, and he cannot but be aware that such is the character of the conscience of every other such agent, we have in this great fact, an explanation of the universal conviction and sentiment of moral accountability on the part of each moral agent, not only at the bar of his own conscience, but that of every other such agent in existence. Every man knows, and cannot but recognize himself as accountable not only at the bar of his own conscience, but of that of every other intelligent, for his moral conduct. Every where he recognizes the right in every other Intelligent to inquire into his moral character and conduct, and to esteem and treat him accordingly. Thus every moral agent is to every other, in very important respects, a moral legislator, a judge, and an executer of Moral Law. The principle of moral accountability universally obtains, on the part of each moral agent relatively to all others.
As God is recognized by the universal Intelligence, not only as the Creator of all things, but as possessed in a degree absolutely infinite, of all possible perfections, as having, consequently, an acquaintance absolutely perfect with the character and deserts of all Intelligents, He is accordingly recognized by universal mind, as the supreme lawgiver, governor, and "judge of all." Yet moral agents are not accountable to God alone; but each is, in the sense above explained, accountable to all, and all to each. Nor does even God Himself claim an exemption from an adjudication at the bar of the universal conscience. To be sure, He will not pass, like creatures, a formal trial there. In this sense, "He gives none account of any of his matters." Yet He has so constituted all moral agents that they cannot but judge of the rectitude of his laws and principles of administration, and judge of them by a standard which He has Himself erected in the interior of their minds, to wit, the ideas of right and wrong, of which we have been speaking. This is what is meant by the Idea of universal moral accountability expressed at the head of this chapter.
REMARKS.
1. We are now prepared to explain the peculiar sentiment which universally attends the affirmations of conscience. As conscience, in its absolute mandates, legislates, not for the particular subject, but for all Intelligents, it really issues its mandates as from the conscience of the moral universe. It is on this principle, that in receiving the mandates of his own conscience, each moral agent feels himself accountable to all for his obedience or disobedience.
2. We now readily account for the fact, that conscience has so often been recognized, as the Spirit of God in the soul of man. Thus says Marcus Antonius, "He that is well disposed will do every thing dictated by the Divinity, a particle or portion of Himself, which God has given to each of us, as a guide and a leader." "The mind of man," says Aristotle, "has a near affinity to God. There is a divine ruler in him." "There is," says Seneca, "a holy spirit in us." Hieron says that "the universal light shining in the conscience is a domestic God, a God within the hearts and souls of men." "God," says Epictetus, "has assigned to each man a director, his own genius, a guardian whose vigilance no slumbers interrupt, and whom no false reasonings can deceive. So that when you have shut your door, say not that you are alone, for your God is within." I might also, to almost any extent, quote sentiments not unlike the above from Christian authors. The above, however, is sufficient for my purpose. Why do men thus regard conscience as the Spirit of God in the interior of their minds? The reason is, that the conscience of each moral agent really, as above shown, utters its mandates as from the throne of the universal conscience, and especially from that of God. Its voice is, and cannot but be recognized as the voice of God in the soul.
Because God has thus placed conscience within us as his Umpire, and its mandates can not but be recognized as the voice of God within us, hence the impression under consideration.
3. The thought above illustrated discloses to us the principle of universal moral harmony and attraction, together with that of repellency among all moral agents, one toward another. All such agents who conform to the law of righteousness, cannot but approve and delight in their own character. At the same time they cannot but know in themselves, that their characters must, when revealed, be fully approved at the bar of universal conscience, and also be the object of the approbation and delight of all the truly virtuous. Hence each individual of such a character prefers to have that character stand in the clearest light of his own, and of the universal conscience. Here too is the universal bond of brotherhood between all the really pure in existence.
On the other hand, all who disobey this law fear the adjudication of their own and of the universal conscience. They cannot but have a continued consciousness that they have a solemn account to render at the bar of their own and of the conscience of all other Intelligents, which they are by no means prepared to meet. Hence between all such agents and all others, there is the universal principle of repellency, and especially between those who are truly virtuous and those who are not. Among those who live in violation of the law of duty, there may for a time, on account of the strong action of other principles of their nature, be an apparent heart unanimity. Yet at the basis of such union there can not but be the elements of perpetual discord and repellency. What is said above is but an explanation of the declaration of our Savior. John iii. 20-21. "For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved. But he that doethtruth, cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God."
4. The truth above elucidated presents alone an explanation of the natural boldness and consequent strength of virtue, and timidity and weakness of vice. He certainly can have little to fear from any being, who is conscious of standing approved at the bar of the universal conscience. He certainly cannot but know that he has all to fear, who recognizes himself as accountable to all, and is at the same time aware that when he shall be known as he is, he must be condemned at that tribunal. There is not a moral agent in existence of whom such a person does not stand in fear, and in whose presence he would not tremble at the thought of a full disclosure of his character.
5. In the light of the great truth under consideration, the real meaning of certain important declarations of scripture pertaining to the future functions of the pure in heart becomes manifest. We read of the righteous that they shall not only judge the world, but even the angels of God. If such declarations be understood as indicating that such individuals shall be seated upon thrones of judgment before which the moral universe shall formally pass for adjudication, the whole cannot but appear to a reflecting mind as a meaningless farce. But if they be understood as they were designed to be, to reveal the fact, that eternal retributions will rest not merely upon the adjudication of God the judge of all, but also upon that of the universal Conscience, they then shadow forth a great truth, one of the greatest of which the human mind can conceive. This, as I said, is the idea which the sacred writer designed to express. He is reproving Christians, for adjudicating their civil causes before wicked men, instead of among themselves. He informs them that they have always a standard of judgment erected in their own minds, a standard of judgment, in the light of which they would hereafter pass judgment upon the character and deserts of men and angels too. Why then should they regard themselves as disqualified to adjudicate cases in difference among themselves, pertaining to the affairs of this life?
6. The ground of the universal fear with which conscious guilt contemplates an entrance upon a future disembodied state, admits in the light of the great truth before us, of a ready explanation. Human character is here consciously to a great extent, under a mask. When men think of dropping this "mortal coil" and standing disembodied spirits in the unveiled presence of the Eternal one, they cannot but suppose that in the dropping of this coil, the mask from character will also fall off, and that that unveiled vision of God, will be the time for moral scrutiny and adjudication. The natural and necessary fear of that adjudication in the mind of the guilty has its origin in the immutable principles and fundamental laws of universal mind, and points with absolute certainty to a solemn reality lying before us in the future, to wit, Retributions. This idea rightly apprehended, based as it is, upon that of universal accountability above elucidated, is the foundation of all that is pure and great, and noble in character. Without it, man is either a moral negation, or a moral monster.
CHAPTER V.
MORAL ACTIONS.
Terms defined.
ACTION is the putting forth or exertion of power. The nature of the action is of course as the nature of the power exerted, and must be compared with a corresponding law. Physical action is the exertion of physical power, and can be compared only with a physical law. A moral action being the exertion of moral power, is an action which can be compared with the moral law, or with the ideas of right and wrong. It is an action of which the Reason affirms that it ought or ought not to be done, and in the doing of which, merit or demerit is necessarily attributed to the agent. This definition is not only distinct in itself, but distinguishes its object from all other actions real and conceivable. This definition is equally applicable to complex actions, and the elements which constitute them. Of complex actions, that element, and that only, has a moral quality which is capable of being compared with the moral law, and of which we affirm directly that it ought or ought not to be. A deliberate action is always more or less complex.
Intentions alone are moral actions.
An important question here arises, to wit, what kind of actions, and what element of complex actions, are capable of being compared with the Moral Law, or with the fundamental ideas of right and wrong? In other words, to what principle or power of our nature does the Moral Law directly address its precepts and its sanctions? An individual, we will suppose, has put forth some moral act. We consequently affirm that he ought or ought not to have performed it, and that for having done so, he merits approbation or disapprobation. The act we will suppose to have been a complex one, as the putting of money or food into the hands of another. There is an element in this act to which, in the judgment of all men, its praise or blameworthiness attaches, and attaches exclusively. The question is, what is this element? The united spontaneous answer of all Intelligents whose minds have not been warped by false philosophy, (and such will be theirs also, when they forget for a moment their theories,) the united and spontaneous answer of the moral universe, I say, would be, the motive or intention of the agent in performing the act. We may refer to the act as useful or hurtful, as wise or unwise, and our judgments of it will vary according to the different points of view from which we contemplate it. But when we refer to that element in view of which we do and can not but assert it to be morally right or wrong, we do and can take but one consideration into the account, the intention of the agent in the act. That this is the correct view of the subject is evident from the following considerations:
Position Verified.
1. All mankind agree in this, in justifying or condemning themselves or others, in all moral actions, by a reference to their intentions in the performance of such acts. If they wish to know the character of any such act, their only inquiry is, what was the motive or intention of the agent in its performance. This one fact being fully and certainly known, all men unite in pronouncing judgment upon the act irrespective of all other considerations, and that with the absolute assurance, that in such judgment they cannot be wrong. If a man would justify himself in any act, he always does it by a reference to his intentions. So when men would condemn individuals in any moral act, they always do it by impeaching their motives or intentions. There is no one point in which all intelligents, Christian and heathen, civilized and savage, more absolutely agree, than in this. Such an agreement undeniably evinces that in the spontaneous and reflective judgment of the universal intelligence, the moral quality of all actions is found in the intention alone; in other words, that intentions alone are in reality moral acts,
2. Our judgments of the moral character of all particular acts, necessarily vary with our knowledge of the real intentions of the agent in their performance, and while our judgments of the intentions of the agent remain fixed, our affirmations pertaining to the character of the acts proceeding from them, cannot undergo the least "variableness or shadow of turning." As our knowledge of this one quality varies, so will our judgment of the moral character of the agent. If, for example, we admit that the intentions of a surgeon, in a given operation, were in all respects what they ought to be, we cannot but acquit him of moral guilt, whatever the results may be. If on the other hand, we assume that he intended to destroy the life of the subject in the operation, we cannot but attribute to him the guilt of murder, even though we learn that the course actually taken, was the only one by which the life of the patient could be preserved. Since then the relations between our judgments of intentions and moral character are and must be fixed, it follows, as a necessary conclusion, that the moral character of all acts and states of mind is found in intentions alone, in other words, that intentions alone are moral acts.
3. It is in respect to intentions alone, that virtuous and vicious agents in many instances really differ. Their external actions, their judgments, their volitions, and their feelings, excepting so far as they depend upon their intentions, may be alike. It is only in respect to intentions, and feelings and judgments necessarily resulting from them, that they differ.
4. It is absolutely impossible for us to impute guilt to an agent, when we judge his intentions to be in all respects right; or to impute virtue to him, whatever he may be in other respects, when we judge his intentions to he wrong. The truth of the above propositions is fully attested by universal consciousness. In the truth of this assertion, I am pleased to find myself sustained most fully by such authority as Edwards. "As to such motions of body, or exercises and alterations of mind, which do not consist in the imminent acts or states of the will itself, but are supposed to be required as effects of the will; I say, in such supposed effects of the will, in cases wherein there is no want of a capacity of understanding, that inability, and that only excuses, which consists in want of connection between them and the will. If the will fully complies, and the proposed effect does not prove, according to the laws of nature, to be connected with his volition, the man is perfectly excused; he has a natural inability to do the thing required. For the will itself, as has been observed, is all that can be directly and immediately required by command; and other things only indirectly, as connected with the will. If, therefore, there be full compliance of the will, the person has done his duty; and if other things do not prove to be connected with his volition, that is not owing to him."
"When the will consents to the performance of an action," says President Wayland, "though the act be not done, the Omniscient Deity justly considers us as either virtuous or vicious."
"The moral quality does not belong to the external act, nor to the resolution to carry that conception into effect. It must then reside in the intention."
"And universally," says Prof. Tappan, "the merit and demerit of an agent is as his actual choice or intention. His volition depends upon his choice, and hence all the sequents of his volition, as far as he can be responsible for them, depend upon his choice. However he may be judged by beings who have no other way of estimating the principles by which he regulates himself, than the sequents which appear in connexion with his volitions; in the court of his own conscience, and in the court of all-seeing truth and justice, he shall be judged according to his choices or intentions—according to that which he determined and aimed to do."
The following from Edwards is equally to the point:
"The will only itself, and not those actions which are the effects of the will, is the proper object of precept or command."
"The motions or state of the body are matters of command, only as they are subject to the soul, and connected with its acts. But now the soul has no other faculty whereby it can, in the most direct and proper sense, consent, yield to, or comply with any command, but the faculty of the will; and it is by this faculty only, that the soul can directly disobey or refuse compliance: for the very notions of consenting, yielding, accepting, complying, refusing, rejecting, &c., are, according to the meaning of the terms, nothing but certain acts of the will. Obedience, in the primary nature of it, is the submitting and yielding of the will of one to the will of another. Disobedience is the not consenting, not complying of the will of the commanded to the manifested will of the commander. Other acts that are not the acts of the will, as certain Motions of the body and alterations in the soul, are obedience or disobedience only indirectly, as they are connected with the state or actions of the will, according to an established law of nature. So that it is manifest, the will itself may be required: and the being of a good will is the most proper, direct and immediate subject of command; and if this cannot be prescribed or required by command or precept, nothing can; for other things can be no otherwise than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of a good will."
"Corol. 1. If there be several acts of the will, or a series of acts, one following another, and one the effect of another, the first and determining act is properly the subject of command, and not only the consequent acts which are dependent upon it. Yea, it is this more especially, which is that which command or precept has respect to: because it is this act that determines the whole affair; in this act the obedience or disobedience lies, in a peculiar manner; the consequent acts being all subject to it, and governed and determined by it. This determining, governing act, must be the proper object of precept, or none."
"Coral. 2. It also follows, from what has been observed, that if there be any sort of act, or exertion of the soul, prior to all free acts of the will or acts of choice in the case, directing and determining what that act of the will shall be; that act or exertion of the soul cannot properly be subject to any command or precept, in any respect whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely. Such acts can not be subject to commands directly, because they are no acts of the will; being by the supposition prior to all acts of the will, determining and giving rise to all its acts: they not being acts of the will, there can be in them no consent to, or compliance with any command. Neither can they be subject to any command indirectly or remotely; for they are not so much as the effects or consequences of the will, being prior to all its acts. So that if there be any obedience in that original act of the soul determining all volitions, it is an act of obedience wherein the will has no concern at all; it preceding every act of the will. And therefore, if the soul either obeys or disobeys in this act, it is wholly involuntarily; there is no willing obedience or rebellion, no compliance or opposition of the will in the affair: and what sort of obedience or rebellion is this?"
That Edwards, in the above extracts, designed to assert the doctrine that moral obligation, and consequently, moral character, pertains to intentions only, is evident from two considerations.
(1.) He denies moral character wholly of all mental and physical states but those of the will.
(2.) He distinguishes between all ultimate acts of will, and dependent executive volitions proceeding from them, and attributes all moral qualities that do exist to such ultimate acts or intentions alone.
"There are," says Kant, the founder of the modern Transcendental school in philosophy, "qualities which greatly aid and strengthen a good will; but they have not any inward worth of their own, and will be found always to presuppose a good will, which limits the praise they deservedly carry.
"A good will is esteemed to be so, not by the effects which it produces, nor by its fitness for accomplishing any given end, but by its mere good volition, that is, it is good in itself; and is therefore to be prized incomparably higher for its own sake, than any thing whatsoever which can be produced at the call of appetite or inclination. Even if it should happen, that, owing to an unhappy conjuncture of events, this good will were deprived of power to execute its benign intent, still this good will, (by which is not meant a wish) would, like a diamond, shine in itself, and by virtue of its native lustre. Utility or uselessness could neither enhance nor prejudice this internal splendor: they resemble the setting of a gem, whereby the brilliant is more easily taken in the hand, and offered to the attention of those not otherwise judges, but which would not be required by any skilled lapidary, to enable him to form his opinion of its worth."
"It is thus without all question, that we are to understand those passages of scripture, where it is ordained that we love our neighbor, even our enemy; for, as an affection, love cannot be commanded or enforced; but to act kindly from a principle of duty can, not only where there is no natural desire, but also where aversion irresistibly thrusts itself upon the mind; and this would be a practical, not a pathological liking, and would consist in the original volition, and not in any emotion of the sensory." "The consequences of an action," says Cousin, "whatever they may be, do not render it either morally good or bad; the intention is every thing. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a moral action; nothing but moral intentions."
I forbear further quotations which might be multiplied to almost any extent.
6. Equally explicit, on the point, are the teachings of Inspiration. Take a single example in illustration. The guilt of the king of Assyria, in his bloody wars, is affirmed to depend not on his external acts, but exclusively upon his motives or intentions in performing them. "Nevertheless, he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think [intend] so." In conformity to this principle, it is affirmed, that "As a man thinketh, [intendeth] in his heart, so is he." God also in judging of moral character is represented, as looking not at the outward acts, but at the heart, the motives or intentions by which such acts are put forth.
7. As a final reason for the truth of the doctrine under consideration, I remark that it is only in reference to intentions, that moral agents are free, and not subject wholly to the law of necessity. An act or state of mind is free, when, at the time and in the circumstances of its existence, it may be different from what it is. It is necessary when, at the time and in the circumstances of its occurrence, it can not but be in all respects what it is, nor by any possibility be, in any respect, different from what it is. To say that an agent, all of whose acts and states are subject to the law of necessity, ought in any given circumstances, to be or to do in any respect different from what he is or does, and can not but be and do in those circumstances, is equivalent to the affirmation, that an event ought to exist for which there is no cause. Can the intelligence affirm, that any such thing ought to be? What meaning can attach to the word ought when it is asserted that an event without a cause ought to exist? We venture to affirm, that no man, in the possession of reason, would have the effrontery to look the proposition directly in the face, and then affirm that in any conceivable circumstances, an event ought to occur, and that the subject is guilty for its non-occurrence, when its occurrence in those circumstances, would be an event without a cause. Obligation cannot be affirmed of any agent, or of any department of his nature, when its affirmation would involve such a contradiction as that. Now, it is universally admitted by philosophers of all schools, that in respect to all states and acts of the physical system, and also in respect to all mental states, intentions excepted, in respect to all states of the sensibility and intelligence, for example, man is wholly subject to the law of necessity. In respect to intention only is he free. As moral obligation consists only with freedom, and as man is free only in respect to his intentions, intentions are the only acts or mental states of which obligation can be directly affirmed. The sense in which it may be affirmed of other acts and states, will be considered hereafter. Intentions, then, and moral actions are synonymous terms.
Conclusions from the propositions above established.
1. Intentions are exclusively phenomena of the will. They, pertain neither to the intelligence, nor Sensibility. This all will admit.
2. No motion of the physical organization, no state of the intelligence or sensibility does or can, in itself, possess any moral character. The truth of this proposition has been already established beyond controversy. A few additional considerations, designed to render its truth if possible still more evident, demand a passing consideration.
(1.) In respect to all phenomena of these faculties, excepting so far forth as their character depends upon the action of the will, individuals of moral character, in all respects the direct opposites, may perfectly resemble each other. All the external acts performed by the purest men that ever lived, might, as far as mere physical motion is concerned, be performed by fallen spirits, their character remaining unchanged, if they were to be become incarnate. The same holds equally true of all states of the intelligence. The same thoughts and convictions are common to the worst and best of creatures. Moral character surely can, in no sense, consist in any such phenomena as these. Equally manifest is the applicability of the same principle to all the states of the sensibility not dependent upon the action of the will, such sensations, emotions and desires are common to creatures of the worst and the best of moral characters. How can moral character in any form, depend upon such phenomena?
(3.) No idea of God is more absurd in itself, or more dishonorable to the divine character, than the supposition, that He has legislated morally in respect to such phenomena. Suppose that God has hung out before the moral universe, a law in which thoughts, feelings, or physical acts or states, are required of or prohibited to his creatures, phenomena, the existence of which, by no efforts of their wills they can either produce or prevent or modify in themselves. How must He stand before the universe, as a moral legislator? This is the precise light in which all present the moral law and God its administrator, who predicate moral character of such phenomena.
(4.) The dogma that moral agents are directly morally responsible for the existence or non-existence of such phenomena, implies, as we have seen, that events without causes are required of creatures. All such phenomena are exclusively subject to the law of necessity. In the circumstances of their existence, they cannot but exist as they are. To suppose that the law requires them to be different from what they are, is to suppose that it requires events without a cause. That which in the circumstances of its existence, cannot but be what it is, and by no possibility be otherwise, (which is the case of all phenomena subject to the law of necessity,) cannot in those circumstances, be in any respects other than it is, unless there is an event without a cause. Those then, who maintain, that the law requires of creatures the existence of thoughts, feelings, or physical phenomena, which, by no efforts of theirs they can produce in themselves, or to prevent the existence of such phenomena the occurrence of which no efforts of theirs can, in any degree avail to prevent, all such persons, I say, maintain, that the divine law requires of creatures, events without causes, and dooms them to death for not producing results which when produced shall be results not produced at all. How utterly incapable must a person, who can maintain such a dogma, be to reason profoundly upon any question of fundamental morality.
3. It follows as a necessary consequence from what has been established above, that moral agents are responsible for physical acts or states, as also for the phenomena of the intelligence and sensibility, so far forth only as their existence and character depend either directly or indirectly on their wills, or Intentions. So far they may with all propriety, and in every system of righteous moral legislation, will be held responsible for such phenomena. Beyond these limits moral responsibility wholly ceases.
4. Equally manifest is it that moral agents are responsible directly and immediately for those acts of will only denominated ultimate intentions. Whenever there is a series of acts all depending for their existence and entire character upon some one causative, pre-determining, and controlling act, it is self-evident, that moral obligation must directly pertain to this one act alone. "This determining, governing act," as Edwards well observes, "must be the proper object of precept or none." Now, this is the precise relation which ultimate intention sustains to all subordinate executive volitions. To it they sustain the relation exclusively of effects to cause. The intention being given, the subordinate volitions cannot but be, with all existing characteristics. Moral law has to do with such phenomena therefore, only as dependent for their existence and entire characteristics upon ultimate intentions. These last are the only phenomena over which it directly legislates. Much is done for the science of Moral Philosophy, when its appropriate and primary objects of investigation are thus rendered clear and distinct.
Ultimate Intentions Defined.
As ultimate intentions are the only phenomena over which moral law directly legislates, and as all obligation and moral desert finally terminate in these, the correct scientific definition of such phenomena becomes an object of fundamental importance. What then are ultimate intentions? They are, of course, ultimate determinations, or acts of will, that is, acts which are caused by, subordinated to, and determined in their characteristics by, none others. Ultimate intentions, therefore, may be thus defined. Whenever the will acts, and the reasons for such action are found in some object and in nothing extraneous to it, those acts which refer directly to such object, and determine the character of the series of acts ultimately referring to it, are ultimate. This is what we mean by ultimate intentions. Whenever we ash for the motives or ultimate intentions of an individual, we always inquire for the object relatively to which that final act is put forth, the act which gives existence to and determines the character of the whole series of subordinate acts under consideration.
Defective Definition.
Ultimate Intentions have been sometimes defined as the choice of an end. "The choice of an ultimate end," says my respected associate, Professor Finney, "is an ultimate intention." This definition is to my mind, defective, for the following reasons.
1. It is by no means intuitively certain, (the fundamental characteristic of all correct definitions,) that it includes all ultimate acts of will. It admits, at least of a doubt, whether there may not be such acts which cannot properly be denominated the choice of an end.
2. There are ultimate acts of will which cannot, properly, be denominated the choice of an end. To choose any thing as an end, implies, according to the proper signification of the words, that we choose it, as something which we are to promote by appropriate executive acts. There are objects which present ultimate reasons for acts of will which we cannot, in the sense above explained, will as an end. God, for example, we can, by no acts of our wills, render better or more happy than He is, his holiness and happiness both being revealed to us, as absolute infinite quantities wholly incapable consequently of increase or diminution from any finite cause. We therefore cannot will either of them as ultimate ends, that is, as ends to he secured by appropriate executive acts. But the revelation of the divine existence and perfections, does present ultimate reasons for many ultimate acts of will. The definition under consideration therefore is defective.
1. We notice the meaning of the term love when used to express all forms of virtue; as when it is said that "love is the fulfilling of the law." Love as moral virtue, in distinction from mere feeling, is action from respect to the intrinsic character and relative worth of all objects of moral action, as apprehended by the intelligence. When the will is actually in this state in respect to all objects involving moral obligation, all that moral law does or can require is fully discharged.
2. We notice also the meaning of the term selfishness when used to express all forms of sin or wrong doing. It does not then mean merely and exclusively preferring our own to the interest of another, but voluntary conformity to impulse or feeling irrespective of the idea of duty. All such action, whatever its form or direction, and whatever the feeling in which it has its spring, is selfishness. No other actions do or can exist between actions or intentions right and wrong than those now under consideration.
1. They have their basis in ideas and principles of our nature totally distinct. Prudential maxims have their basis in self-love, or utility, or the idea of the useful. Moral principles, in the ideas of right and wrong, or duty.
2. Motives for obedience to prudential maxims and moral principles as such, are in their nature distinct and unlike. The motives for obedience to the former are drawn from a consideration of the consequences of the action, and of the consequences to ourselves, especially. Motives to obedience to the other class, are drawn exclusively from a consideration of the nature or moral character of the action itself.
3. Transgression of a prudential maxim as such is a crime when the principle is understood: while obedience to it merely as a prudential maxim, is in no sense virtuous, or meritorious. To take arsenic, knowing its qualities, is sin. To abstain from taking arsenic, however, through fear of consequences, is no virtue. On the other hand, disobedience to moral principles is not only sinful, but obedience is meritorious.
4. Moral principles when presented as prudential maxims, lose their nature as moral principles, and obedience to them if it were possible, would not be meritorious. The same is true of prudential maxims, when considered as moral principles. They lose their character as prudential principles, and disobedience to them, not only becomes sinful, but obedience becomes meritorious.
5. When we have obeyed a moral principle as such, it is absolutely impossible not to erect the immediate motive for the act into a principle or law of universal obligation. It is not so in respect to maxims of prudence. We pity, but do not blame persons who do no know and do not adhere to these principles. The man who strictly adheres to the prudential maxims, either in respect to his temporal or eternal interest, we praise merely as "one who doeth well unto himself." The many that conforms his conduct to the principles of the moral law, simply because he ought to do it, him, and him alone, we admire as virtuous.
1. Systems of prudential maxims and moral principles, are in their nature, object, and influence, wholly unlike.
1. The object of the moral philosopher is, to develop and arrange the principles of morals as such, and to urge obedience to them as duties. His object is, to render his hearers and readers not prudent merely, but virtuous, and prudent only so far as prudence is a necessary consequent of real virtue.
2. A person may be very prudent, in the common acceptation of the term, while destitute of all real virtue; but he can not become virtuous, without in the same measure becoming really prudent, and that in the highest sense of the term. "I wisdom dwell with prudence." "He that saveth his life shall lose it."
"Now, in what, you will ask, does the difference consist? inasmuch, as, according to our account of the matter, both in the one case and the other, in acts of duty as well as acts of prudence, we consider solely what we ourselves shall gain or lose by the act.
The difference, and the only difference, is this:
That in the one case, we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world; in the other case, we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come."
The Will of God.
2. The second theory that I notice resolves all obligation, or rather the measure and ground of it, into the will of God. The command of God, according to this theory, does not reveal to us what is right and wrong, but constitutes it. We are bound, for example, to love excellence, to be grateful to a benefactor, and to will the good of being, not on account of any thing intrinsic in the objects themselves, nor on account of our relations to them; but simply, and exclusively because God requires it. The question now to be decided is, not whether the known will of God is absolute law to us, but why it is. In regard to the theory under consideration, I remark:
1. That if admitted to be true, we have no means at all of judging of the divine conduct or law. To say of God, that He is a "God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is He," to ask the question, "shall not the Judge of all the earth do right," or to say of the divine law, "it is perfect," is to use words without meaning. If God's will is the standard of right, how can we judge of the intrinsic rectitude of the divine will itself? But such judgment all men do and must pass, a fact showing clearly that the will of God reveals what is right in itself, but does not constitute the right.
2. God himself appeals to the reason of his creatures as proof the rectitude of his administration. If the will of God is the standard of right and the foundation of obligation, this of course would be the only standard to which God could appeal in such cases. Such appeals then show that in the mind of God and all rational creatures, there is a common standard of right and wrong, that standard to which all alike do and must appeal, as the ground of moral obligation.
3. If the above theory is correct, without a direct revelation, men would be free from all obligation, and without any standard of right and wrong. They have, on that supposition, no other standard by which they can determine what is right or wrong, or agreeable to the will of God, than the nature, or intrinsic character of the things themselves. But this is not the standard of right and wrong, and consequently no indication of conformity to the will of God according to this theory. Such persons are of necessity without law of any kind.
4. If we could make the absurd supposition that God does not exist, still, we should recognize the distinction between virtue and vice, right and wrong, and should recognize our obligation to avoid the latter and practice the former. In the absence also of all expectation of reward or punishment in a future state, we should recognize our obligation to live in such a manner as to promote the peace and tranquility of ourselves and others.
5. Free will is universally the subject, and not itself the source or foundation of law. Law originates with intelligence and not with mere will. Virtue in God consists in the absolute subjection of his will to the dictates of his own intelligence. In creatures, it consists in voluntary harmony with the divine will, as thus subject to the dictates of the divine intelligence. Implicit obedience to the divine will for such a reason, certainly indicates deeper and more becoming reverence for the Divinity, than similar subjection to mere arbitrary will as such. Such obedience can neither be intelligent, nor virtuous.
6. If the divine will were divorced from its present subjection to the divine intelligence, the commands of God would not be law to moral agents, as they now are. This shows demonstratively that the foundation of obligation does not lie in the mere will of God; but that the reason why the will of God binds all intelligents as law, is the fact universally recognized of the absolute subjection of the divine will to the dictates of infinite knowledge and wisdom.
7. In conformity with the above representation. the intelligences in heaven are represented as praising God, for the perceived conformity of his administration to what is intrinsically wise, right and just. Rev. 16: 5; 19: 2.
3. The third theory that demands consideration, is that which bases obligation upon a consideration of the consequences of the action if generally permitted.
According to this theory, we are not to look at the intentions and relations of the agent, in any particular act, to determine the merit or demerit of the act. That question is to be determined by conceiving the act indefinitely multiplied, and contemplating its effects on that supposition. See Paley's works, Vol. 2, p.59:
"The general consequence of any action may be estimated, by asking what would be the consequence if the same sort of actions were generally permitted. But suppose they were, and a thousand such actions perpetrated under this permission; is it just to charge a single action with the collected guilt and mischief of the whole thousand? I answer, that the reason for prohibiting and punishing an action, (and this reason may be called the guilt of the action, if you please,) will always be in proportion to the whole mischief that would arise from the general impunity and toleration of actions of the same sort.
'Whatever is expedient, is right.' But then it must be expedient on the whole, at the long run, in all its effects, collateral and remote, as well as in those which are immediate and direct; as it is obvious, that in computing consequences, it makes no difference in what way or at what distance they ensue."
In reference to this theory it is enough to say, that if an action be not an evil in itself, its indefinite multiplication would not be an evil. If it is an evil, or a good of an indefinite value, its indefinite multiplication cannot give us a definite result; since it is the multiplication of an unknown quantity. If it has a definite value in itself, the conception of its indefinite enlargement can give us no clearer insight into its real character. The doctrine of general consequences, gives us purely an indefinite and imaginary standard by which to determine the value of unknown quantities. The unknown quantity is also compared with consequences which are never likely to occur, and which under the government of God will never occur. In view of this standard also, we should judge it much more criminal to break the laws of a bad than of a good government, because that under the former, such consequences are much more likely to occur. Now, obligation to obey the laws of any government is proportioned to the rectitude and efficiency of the government which sustains them.
CHAPTER X.
NEW THEORY PERTAINING TO THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
I HAVE reserved for a separate chapter, the consideration of a new theory pertaining to the foundation of moral obligation, a theory broached some years since by my much respected associate, Prof. Finney, and argued at great length in his second volume on Systematic Theology. After long and mature consideration, I am constrained to differ from the principles on the subject set forth in this work. As my object is truth, and as the interests of truth are, in my judgment, not a little concerned in a full and correct understanding of this subject, I shall, notwithstanding my great reluctance to appear before the public in opposition to any of the principles advocated in that excellent treatise, proceed to state my objections to the theory therein set forth on the subject under consideration.
Theory stated.
To attain the object in view, the first thing to be done is to ascertain clearly what this theory is, as distinguished from that maintained in this treatise. Prof. Finney fully agrees with myself in rejecting the doctrine of utility. "The teachings of a consistent utilitarian," he says, "must of necessity abound with pernicious error." Again, "consistent utilitarianism inculcates fundamentally false ideas of the nature of virtue." Of course, he will agree with me in the statement made in the last chapter, that any theory (his own not excepted,) that, in its logical consequences necessarily lands us in this doctrine, must be false. What then is this theory?
1. He maintains that the only ultimate reason in view of which obligation is ever affirmed, is happiness as a good in itself. "It is then the intrinsic and infinite value," he says, "of the highest good of God and of the universe, that constitutes the true foundation of moral obligation."
2. He maintains that obligation in no form or degree is ever affirmed in view of what is perceived to be intrinsic in moral character, holiness or sin, virtue or vice, merit or demerit. None of these contain any ultimate reason for any acts of will whatever. "The highest well-being of God and of the universe of sentient creatures is the end on which preference, choice, intention, ought to terminate."
3. Holiness or sin, moral character, &c., are esteemed by the mind for no other reason than as a condition or a means of happiness:
"Obedience must be a means or condition, and that which law and obedience are intended to secure, is and must be the ultimate end of obedience. The law or the lawgiver aims to promote the highest good or blessedness of the universe. This must be the end of moral law and moral government. Law and obedience must be the means or conditions of this end. It is absurd to deny this."
Again, speaking of virtue, moral worth, &c., he says,
"Were it not for the fact that it meets a demand of the intelligence and thus produces satisfaction, it could not so much as be thought of as a good in itself, any more than any thing else that is a pure conception of the reason, such, for instance, as a mathematical line."
Further on, he adds,
"The willing and the worthiness of willing are valuable only as the end willed is valuable. Were it not that the end is intrinsically valuable, the willing would not be so much as relatively valuable. It would have no value whatever."
4. The intelligence does not require ultimate intentions, in other words, does not affirm obligation in respect to them, as a condition or a means of happiness; but simply and exclusively because happiness is a good in itself. This sentiment is often repeated in the work before us. A single quotation, however, is all that is necessary to show that I have rightly expounded the view therein set forth on this point.
"Ultimate intention is right or wrong in itself, and no questions of utility, expediency or tendency have any thing to do with the obligation to put forth ultimate intention, there being only one reason for this, namely, the intrinsic value of the end to be intended. It is true that whatever is expedient is right, not for that reason, but only upon that condition. The inquiry then, is it expedient? in respect to outward action, is always proper; for upon this condition does obligation to outward action turn. But in respect to ultimate intention or the choice of an ultimate end, an inquiry into the expediency of this choice or intention is never proper, the obligation being founded alone upon the perceived and intrinsic value of the end, and the obligation being without any condition whatever, except the possession of the powers of moral agency, with the perception of the end upon which intention ought to terminate, namely the good of universal being."
5. While obligation to put forth ultimate intentions is in no sense conditioned upon their perceived tendency to promote happiness, the necessary condition of obligation to put forth executive volitions and outward actions is their perceived tendency to promote happiness.
" I said in a former lecture, that the obligation to put forth volitions or outward actions to secure an end must be conditionated upon the perceived tendency of such volitions and actions to secure that end; but while this tendency is the condition of the obligation to executive volition, or outward action, the obligation is founded upon the intrinsic value of the end, to secure which such volitions tend."
The Opposite Theory stated.
Such is the doctrine set forth in the treatise on Systematic Theology. Let us now attend to a statement of the opposite theory.
1. The advocates of this theory agree with Professor Finney in the doctrine, that the good of being is an ultimate reason for ultimate intentions of a certain class, to wit, all intentions included in the words, willing the good of being.
2. On the other hand, they affirm, that there are other objects, such as virtue and sin, moral character, moral desert, &c., which contain ultimate reasons for certain acts of will or ultimate intentions, besides happiness as a good in itself. Here and here only, is there a difference of opinion. The doctrine maintained by this class of philosophers may be thus stated. Whenever an object is present to the mind, which on account of what is intrinsic in the object itself, necessitates the will to act, two or more distinct and opposite acts are always possible relatively to such object. The intelligence can never be indifferent in respect to the acts or intentions put forth under such circumstances. In its judgment that act and that act only can be right, which corresponds with the apprehended intrinsic character of the object. All other acts must be wrong. The sphere of moral obligation must be as extensive as the objects the apprehension of which intrinsically necessitate acts of will of some kind, and relatively to which distinct and opposite acts are possible. According to Professor Finney, there is but one object in existence the apprehension of which intrinsically necessitates acts of will, to wit, the good of being. According to this class of philosophers, there are other objects aside from this, the apprehension of which also necessitates acts of will, and relatively to which therefore obligation does and must pertain. We are now prepared for a distinct statement of the arguments which lie against the theory of Professor Finney, and in favor of the opposite theory.
Further, Professor Finney has himself assumed the truth of the doctrine of Utility as the ground and the only ground of explanation of certain forms of moral obligation. A palpable instance of this kind is found on page 63:
"An example is brought forward of moral obligation to do that which does not imply the choice of the highest good of being. It is said we are under obligation to esteem and treat as worthy of confidence those whose known veracity entitles them to our confidence. This, let it be observed, is an example or an instance in which it is said that we are under obligation where no reference is had to the good of being. Now, let it be remembered, that the theory to overthrow which this example is brought forward is, that the satisfaction of the mind arising from the fact that every demand of his being is met is that in which the ultimate good of being consists. Now it is a demand of the intelligence of every moral being that we should esteem and treat as worthy of confidence those whose character entitles them to this confidence. Thus, then, to esteem and treat all that are truthful, is one of the demands of the universal intelligence of moral agents. Unless this demand be met by a being he cannot be satisfied with himself. His intelligence and conscience are not satisfied.
2. In consistency with the fundamental principles of this theory, we can never account for the difference which he himself makes and must make between ultimate intentions and subordinate executive volition. Both alike, as we have seen above, are, according to his theory, esteemed and regarded by the intelligence for no other reasons, than as a condition or a means of happiness. Yet he asserts that the obligation to put forth ultimate intentions is affirmed without any reference whatever to their being apprehended as a condition or a means of happiness; while the affirmation of obligation to put forth executive acts is conditioned wholly upon their being perceived to be such a condition or means. Now how can the intelligence make any such difference between objects esteemed and regarded, as far as anything intrinsic in the objects themselves is concerned, as absolutely alike. Is not this an event without a cause, an intellectual discrimination without a difference? How can that which in the mind's estimation is, for its own sake, of no account whatever, and which is regarded only as a condition or a means, be nevertheless required or prohibited wholly on its own account, that is, "as right or wrong in itself," and not at all as a condition or means; while another thing occupying precisely the same place in the mind's estimation, is regarded or prohibited not at all as "right or wrong in itself," but wholly on condition, that it is perceived to be a condition or a means? Is not here not only a discrimination without a difference, but a direct acknowledgment that there is something besides happiness which the mind regards for its own sake, and which may therefore itself be an ultimate ground of certain forms of moral obligation? For myself, I have no conception that this theory can, by any possibility, be rescued from such difficulties.
3. Professor Finney has himself directly and palpably contradicted his own theory. Take an example found on page 94:
"The intelligence of every moral agent, from its nature and laws affirms, that the ultimate good and blessedness of moral beings is, and ought to be conditionated upon their holiness and good desert. This being a demand of reason, reason can never affirm moral obligation to will the actual blessedness of moral agents, but upon condition of their virtue and consequent good desert, or merit. The intelligence affirms, that it is fit, suitable, proper, that virtue, good desert, merit, holiness, should be rewarded with blessedness."
Again, on page 47, he says of virtue, "It is intrinsically meritorious or deserving of good, but not identical with the ultimate good."
The fundamental principle of his theory is, that oughtness is never affirmed in view of what is intrinsic in any thing but happiness. Yet here we are told, in the first instance, that the "intelligence of every moral agent, from its nature and laws affirms" oughtness in view of something else, to wit, that upon which "good or blessedness is and ought to be conditionated." In the second instance, we are told that virtue "is intrinsically deserving of good." Now desert and obligation are correlative terms. That it which intrinsically deserves good, must, for what it is in itself devolve upon all who have the power to confer the good, the obligation to cofer it. Words have no meaning, if this is not the case. To deny the statement that virtue is intrinsically deserving of good, is to deny a universal intuition of the intelligence. To admit the fact that it intrinsically deserves good, and yet to affirm that for nothing intrinsic in itself, it involves moral obligation, is to deny a necessary logical consequent of that intuition.
4. The entire argument of Professor Finney, is based upon a manifest psychological error. I refer to the use made throughout the argument of the term satisfaction, which he has substituted for that of happiness, good, and well-being. According to his use of the term, man has in fact three sensibilities, the general sensibility, that of the intelligence, and also that of the will. "By the term satisfaction," he says, "I mean more than is generally understood by the term happiness. This term is generally used to express merely the satisfaction of the sensibility. There is, however, such a thing as intellectual satisfaction, the satisfaction of conscience. In other words, there is a natural, and if I may so speak, a moral satisfaction. The demands of the intelligence and of the heart and of the sensibility are all fully met. This results in a state of universal and entire mental satisfaction. It is a state perhaps well and fully expressed by the term BLESSEDNESS. Every power and susceptibility is full, is satisfied. The mind can say, it is enough,—I have no want. This state must be the ultimate and the absolute good."
The psychological error involved in the above passage will appear manifest at once, if we substitute for the term satisfaction, that of happiness. What if we should speak of the happiness of the sensibility, the happiness of the intellect, and of the will, or heart? To say that satisfaction in the sense above explained, is the end on which all intentions should terminate, is a very different thing from saying that happiness, or the satisfaction of the sensibility is that thing.
Now it is by availing himself of this use of the term satisfaction, that Professor Finney rids himself of the most important objections urged against his theory. Take in illustration one or two examples:
"It is objected, 'That if this be the sole foundation of moral obligation, it follows that if all the good now in existence were connected with sin, and all the misery connected with holiness, we should be just as well satisfied as we now are.'
To this I answer, We are satisfied only when the demands of our being are met. One demand of our being is, that all moral agents should be holy, and that they should be actually and perfectly happy only on the condition that they are holy. Now if our constitution only demanded their happiness irrespective of their holiness, then were they perfectly happy, we should be satisfied whether they were holy or not. But our constitution being what it is, we should not be and can not be satisfied with their happiness unless they are holy: for their holiness, as a condition of their actual blessedness, is an unalterable demand of our intelligence. Now, therefore, although we are to regard their universal satisfaction as the ultimate good, yet we also know, and cannot but affirm that their universal satisfaction or blessedness is naturally impossible, and that it ought to be, except on condition of their perfect holiness. Therefore the supposition is impossible and inadmissible."
Why does not our constitution demand happiness irrespective of holiness, and why is "holiness as a condition of actual blessedness, an unalterable demand of our, intelligence?" Why can neither be satisfied with mere happiness irrespective of the conditions on which it exists, as far as moral agents are concerned? Simply and exclusively, because both alike regard something else for its own sake besides happiness. In other words, because the theory of Professor Finney does not accord with the facts of human nature and consciousness.
In answering the argument based upon the principle, that it is an intuition of the universal intelligence that there is as much virtue in esteeming and treating an individual as worthy of confidence, on the ground of ascertained character for veracity, as there is in willing his happiness, on the ground of perceived capacities for good, we have another resort to the same expedient:
"It is not only a demand of my being that I should treat one who is worthy of confidence as worthy, but it also is a demand of his being and intelligence that I should thus treat him. If I would aim, therefore, at his highest good, or at meeting the demands of his being for the sake of promoting his entire and perfect satisfaction, I must treat him as worthy of confidence. So that his highest good and my highest good, and the highest good of all beings, demand that I should thus treat him. For the intelligence of God and of every intelligent being in the universe, demands that I should treat a being with confidence who is worthy of confidence. So that I do not really meet the demands of my own being, nor of the intelligence of any being unless I do thus treat him. Therefore, thus esteeming and treating him is indispensable to the highest good of being. And if I am under an obligation to choose the highest satisfaction or good of universal being as an end, I must be under an obligation to treat every being so as to meet the demands of my own intelligence, and the intelligence of the universe. This I can not do, without esteeming the holy as holy, the truthful as truthful, &c."
Now why is it, that in order to "meet the demands of my own intelligence and the intelligence of the universe," I must "esteem the holy as holy, the truthful as truthful, &c.?" Simply and exclusively, I answer again, because the universal intelligence does and must regard for its own sake, something besides happiness; in other words, because there are other objects than happiness upon which some ultimate intentions or acts of will must terminate. I ask no more than what Professor Finney has himself written upon the subject, to demonstrate the falsity of his own theory.
5. I now adduce against the theory of Professor Finney, and in favor of the opposite theory, the direct and positive testimony of universal consciousness. Let us suppose, for example, that the character of God as possessed of absolute omniscience, and veracity, is before the mind, on the one hand, and his capacity for infinite happiness, on the other. I put it to the consciousness of every intelligent being, whether God's character for knowledge and veracity does not present reasons just as ultimate for esteeming and treating Him as worthy, instead of unworthy of confidence, as his susceptibilities for happiness do for willing his blessedness, instead of putting forth contradictory acts? We no more go beyond the object presented for the one class of affirmations than for the other. We can not affirm obligation to esteem and treat Him as worthy, instead of unworthy of confidence, in view of his capacities for happiness, any more than we can affirm obligation to will his good in view of his character, irrespective of his capacities.
Further, God's known character for veracity and for what is intrinsic in that character itself, necessitates the will to assume relatively to it, the attitude of trust or practical distrust, just as much as his known susceptibilities do to assume that of willing his good, or some opposite state. In the presence of the former truth, and for no other reasons, than what is presented in the truth itself, the will, from its nature and laws, is as much necessitated to act in some direction, as it is in the presence of the latter. Nor can the intelligence any more avoid the affirmation that of the classes of acts the one or the other of which the will must put forth in the presence of the former of these truths, that the one is morally right and the other wrong, any more than it can, in respect to those one or the other of which it must put forth in view of the latter truth. Of this, every one must be as conscious, as he is of any other mental state whatever, and whatever his theory may be, he will, as soon as he begins to reason about moral obligation, assume the principle under consideration as true. This fact shows clearly, that the doctrine which I now maintain is a first truth of the universal intelligence.
I am happy also to be able to show, as I have shown above, that Professor Finney is with me in this doctrine, though in palpable inconsistency with his theory. "It is a demand," he says, "of the intelligence of every moral being, that we should esteem and treat as worthy of confidence those whose character entitles them to this confidence." If, in the judgment of the universal intelligence, as is here asserted, character for veracity entitles to confidence, such character does and must present an ultimate reason why such confidence should be rendered.
6. There are forms of real good to moral agents, obligations to confer which rest exclusively upon moral character. That I should, for example, be regarded and treated by moral agents around me as worthy of confidence, is one of the fundamental necessities of my nature. On what condition or grounds can I require them to render me this good? Not on the ground that it is a good in itself to me. Such fact makes no appeal whatever to the conscience relatively to the good of which I am speaking. There is one and only one consideration that can, by any possibility, reach the conscience on this subject, to wit, revealed trust-worthiness. No claim to confidence can be sustained on any other ground whatever.
Here the nature of the good which our constitution claims, under such circumstances, demands special attention. It is not that we should will the happiness of an individual, and then treat him as worthy of confidence, simply as a means to this end, but that we should render confidence from regard to what is intrinsic in his character for trustworthiness. Suppose one should say to an individual, "I do not regard your character for veracity as any reason in itself why I should repose confidence in you. I will your happiness, on the other hand, and as a means to this end, esteem and treat you as trust-worthy." The prompt and indignant reply would be, "You have not at all met my real wants. In view of my capacities for good, my nature requires you to will my good, and in view of my revealed character for veracity, and that exclusively, it requires you to esteem and treat me as worthy of confidence. If you would meet all the demands of my nature, you must regard my character for what is intrinsic in itself, as well as my capacities for good." I certainly have interpreted the demands of my own nature very imperfectly, if the above is not a true interpretation of the fundamental wants of universal humanity. Nor can I meet the fundamental demands of my own nature upon any other conditions. If I do not repose confidence exclusively from respect to what is intrinsic in revealed trustworthiness, I do not, and can not meet the demands of my own conscience, and the fundamental wants of my own being.
7. I find an unanswerable argument against this theory, also, in the relations of the universal intelligence to the moral government of God. All men do, as a matter of fact, reason from the connection between holiness and happiness, and sin and misery, under that government, to the moral character of God. In the scriptures also, the same principle is continually appealed to. These statements no one will call in question, and from them, the following conclusions necessarily arise:
(1.) The connection above referred to, so far forth as it is taken by reason and inspiration as proof that the moral rectitude of the divine administration, is contingent and not necessary, that is, it depends wholly upon the will of God. If the connection was a necessary one, and not dependent upon the divine will, it would present no more evidence of the divine rectitude, than the principle that every event has a cause, and all that is said in the scriptures about God's establishing this connection, would be false.
(2.) Virtue and vice are in their own nature absolute, and would be what they now are, did not the connection under consideration exist. If they were in their own nature variable, and wholly depending for their character upon their relations to something else, in its own nature absolute, to wit, happiness, the mere connection established between that which has no worthiness in itself, and that which alone has such worth, could afford no evidence whatever of the moral character of God. The truth of this principle is self-evident. Before we can affirm merit of God, for connecting any two things together, we must perceive that they ought to be connected. But this is impossible, except on one condition, to wit, that each object has in itself a character alike absolute.
8. The theory under 'consideration can not be so explained as to involve all the duties which we are conscious of owing to God. If we suppose the moral character of God to be in all respects the opposite of what it now is, we should still be under obligation, in view of his infinite capacities for good, to will his happiness with all the conditions and means thereof. Now this is, and must be ALL that we do or can owe to Him, as far as willing his good is concerned, his known character being what it is. As all the duties which we do or can owe to God, according to this theory, consist simply and exclusively in willing his good with all the conditions and means therof, then we really and truly owe no more to Him now, than we should were his moral character in all respects the reverse of what it is. No one can possibly escape this conclusion, who holds the theory under consideration. Now every one can not but know, that any theory that necessarily involves such consequences, must be false. All mankind do and must agree in referring to the moral character of God as the ultimate reason or ground, not for all, but a majority of the duties which they are conscious of owing to God. This they do with a consciousness, that but for his moral perfections, such duties would not bind them in any form. In his attempt to answer the above argument, Professor Finney does not meet it at all. The character of God being what it is, we are bound, he says, to "will his infinite happiness as a fact." Were it the opposite of what it is, we should be bound to "will the same thing as a possible good, but not as a fact." Neither of these phrases, nor both together mean any thing more nor less than willing his infinite happiness with all the conditions and means therof, which, he will admit, we are bound to do, God's moral character being what it may. So the argument is not met at all. Besides, if the phrases willing "happiness as a possible good," and "as fact," do not differ fundamentally from each other in their meaning, then they have nothing to do with the question. If they do fundamentally differ, the ultimate ground of this difference is found in moral character alone, which is thus shown to be an ultimate reason for particular forms of moral obligation, and the theory to sustain which this difference is adduced, falls to the ground. The reply of Professor Finney, however, does not meet the argument above stated, for this reason. Neither the words "willing God's happiness as a possible result," nor "as a fact," by any means express all the duties we are conscious of owing to Him, duties which we should not owe, were his character the opposite of what it is, and which consequently must have their ultimate foundation in moral character. Were any person to affirm that our duties to God, would not in their fundamental form be different from what they are, were his known character in all respects the opposite of what it is, he would contradict the necessary intuitions of the universal intelligence. Any theory, which, like the one under consideration, compels us, in its adoption, to make such an affirmation, must be false, or universal intuitions are no criterions of truth.
10. The scriptures are no less palpably against this theory than the dictates of the universal intelligence. For example, "Praise God, for He is good." The inquiry which presents itself here, is not what praise is, but what is the fundamental reason here assigned why it should be rendered? This reason is found wholly in the moral character of God. The question put by Abraham also, "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" has exclusive reference, not to happiness or misery as a good or evil in itself, but wholly to the connection which the patriarch affirms, God ought to establish between holiness and good, and sin and misery. The doing right refers to the establishment of this connection exclusively, and the obligation to form it is affirmed to have its ultimate basis in the relative and intrinsic fitness between moral desert and happiness or misery.
1. The first consideration perhaps that will strike the mind of the reader, in the perusal of what he has written upon the subject, is, that he has conducted the argument with almost no reference whatever to the only proper tribunal in such a case, to wit, human consciousness. The question what is the foundation of obligation, must be almost exclusively a psychological question. In the presence of certain relations, we do, in fact, affirm obligation. How can the question, in view of what considerations are such affirmations made, be answered, excepting by an appeal to consciousness? A priori we can not tell in view of what such affirmations are made. Suppose we demonstrate the fact, that happiness is the only good, which is in fact nothing more than proving the truth of an identical proposition. It by no means follows from this, that good, that is, happiness, is the only thing which the mind regards for its own sake, much less, that it is the only consideration in view of which obligation is in any case affirmed. How can such a question be properly answered? It is purely a psychological question, and can properly be answered only by an appeal to consciousness. The reader of Professor Finney's work will search almost, if not quite in vain, for an appeal to consciousness throughout his entire argument. This I can not but regard as an important mistake.
In view of this fact, we readily account for the attitude of mind in which the reflective student, who has been convinced by Professor Finney's argument, finds himself. He experiences an almost continued conflict between the principles of his theory, and the testimony of his consciousness, between the logical and spontaneous convictions of his own mind. If he follows his spontaneous convictions, he can not but recognize the fact, that there is as much virtue in esteeming and treating a being as worthy of confidence, on the ground of ascertained character for veracity, as there is in willing happiness in view of perceived susceptibilities for good. His theory, however, leads to precisely opposite conclusions. According to the same convictions also, the relations of a benefactor, in themselves involve obligations to gratitude, as sacredly, as revealed susceptibilities for good do to will happiness. Precisely opposite, however, are his logical conclusions.
In assigning ultimate reasons for certain forms of obligation too, he as spontaneously assigns moral character as involving them, as he does susceptibilities for good, as the ground of obligation to will good. Yet his theory condemns all such reasoning as false. The reason for this internal conflict is, that he has been led to settle a question purely psychological, by abstract reasoning. The result is just what might have been anticipated. His theoretical and psychological convictions are in palpable contradiction to each other. If he had investigated the subject as he should have done, psychologically, no such conflict would have occurred.
2. Another prominent error of Prof. Finney is this, throughout the discussion, he has confounded the question, what we are required to will, with the question, why are we bound to will it? When, for example, he meets with the argument, that the relation of a benefactor, is and must be an ultimate reason for the particular form of duty denominated gratitude, his reply is this. Gratitude when a duty, must imply the obligation to will something to the benefactor. But what can we be bound to will to him but happiness? Happiness therefore, is the only foundation of moral obligation. Now who does not see, that this is a manifest, though wholly undesigned evasion of the real question at issue? The question with which we started was, not what we are bound to will to a benefactor, but why is gratitude a duty? To the latter question, the only question under consideration, but one answer can be given. It is this. The only consideration which does or can involve obligation to exercise the form of duty denominated gratitude, is not mere susceptibilities for good, but the relation of a benefactor. The same principle holds true in many other instances. Now it is, by confounding these two entirely distinct questions, to wit, what we are bound to will, and why we are bound to will it, that Prof. Finney fails, in instances not a few, to meet the real question presented.
3. The reader is now fully prepared to apprehend the fallacy involved in the form of the appeal which Professor Finney often makes to the scriptures. His argument may be thus stated. All duty is, in the Bible, expressed by one word—love: All forms of duty therefore, must consist in willing one and the same thin g. Now there is a most manifest want of connection between the premise and conclusion in this instance. All that can be inferred from the admitted fact under consideration, is this: There must be some one formula, by which all forms of duty whatever may be expressed. This is readily granted. It by no means, follows from this however, that willing happiness or any one thing is that formula. According to the theory maintained in this treatise, we have a formula also absolutely universal in its application, to wit, all acts of will are right or wrong, as they are conformed, or not conformed to the apprehended intrinsic character of their objects. Now I cannot but regard this, as having a more proper claim to be considered a universal formula, than the one above named. That love, then, which is the fulfilling of the law, may be synonymous with the former formula, instead of the latter. But the former, by no means implies that all right willing consists in willing some one thing for its own sake. If the will, at various times, should act ultimately with reference to ten thousand things, and such action should always be conformed to the apprehended character of its objects, its acts would fall under the formula before us, and would all be consequently properly expressed by one word, love. Professor Finney's theory, therefore, by no means follows from the admitted fact, that all duty is expressed in the scriptures, by one word. The love, there referred to, may include more forms of willing, than willing happiness for its own sake.
4. The argument of Professor Finney, that virtue can not itself be an ultimate reason, or foundation for any form of obligation, next claims our attention. Virtue, he rightly argues, consists in right ultimate intention. To say that virtue is itself a foundation of obligation in any form is to affirm, he says, that it ought to be chosen for its own sake. But this is saying that we ought to choose to choose, to intend to intend, &c. "To do duty is to form and cherish an ultimate intention. To intend to do duty is merely to intend to intend." This, it is argued, is absurd. For myself, I can not see the absurdity here, that Professor Finney imagines that he himself perceives. The idea, or a conception of a character supremely selfish and wicked, on the one hand, and supremely benevolent and pure on the other, is before the mind. Is it irrational for the mind to choose to possess the one and not the other? Here the election is between holiness and sin, or different classes of intentions. All who choose the former, and reject the latter, the Son of God pronounced blessed. "Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness."—Righteousness itself also He positively commands us to seek. "Seek first the kingdom of God, and its righteousness."
Nor are choices which thus terminate on righteousness and unrighteousness, less ultimate than those which terminate on happiness. When the mind says let me be pure instead of impure, righteous, instead of wicked, it thinks only of what is intrinsic in the objects, just as it does in other instances, when its choices terminate on happiness. I can place no confidence whatever, in the testimony of my consciousness in respect to any mental states, if the above is not true in my own experience, however the case may be with others.
True conversion from sin to holiness, in my judgment, uniformly takes place, not in a mere choice of happiness for its own sake, but in a choice which, in the sense above explained, terminates on choice. The will, in all such instances, does in reality elect the law of its own future activity. The language of the heart is, let all my activity be in harmony with the law of right, and benevolence, instead of that of selfishness. This, in the language of Kant, is, the will's making the moral law its maxim. In all deliberate, rational action, the mind elects the law of its own activity. This is specially true of all actions morally right. Such action commences in a choice between conformity or non-conformity to the moral law, as the law of all voluntary activity. There is therefore no absurdity in a moral agent's intending to intend, and choosing to choose, when the subject is rightly understood. Indeed there is, and can be no real virtue without it.
5. My next remark is, that the argument of Professor Finney to establish his theory consists wholly in deducing a universal from a particular, when the former is in no sense necessarily contained in the latter. I will give his entire argument, in his own words. Under the division of his subject in which he proposes to "show from nature and revelation what must be the foundation of moral obligation," he lays down the following proposition, and sustains it with the argument annexed:
"The highest well-being of God and the universe of sentient existences is the end on which ultimate preference, choice, intention ought to terminate. In other words, the well-being of God and the universe, is the absolute and ultimate good, and therefore it should be chosen by every moral agent.
It is certain that the highest well-being of God and of the universe of sentient existences must be intrinsically and infinitely valuable in itself. It is a first truth of reason that whatever is intrinsically valuable should be chosen for that reason, or as an end. It is and must be a first truth of reason, that whatever is intrinsically and infinitely valuable ought be chosen as the ultimate end of existence by every moral agent. To say that a thing is intrinsically and infinitely valuable, is the same as to say that it is intrinsically and infinitely worthy or deserving of being chosen for what it is in and of itself. Therefore to admit or affirm that a thing is intrinsically and infinitely valuable, is the same as to affirm that every moral agent who has the knowledge of this intrinsically and infinitely valuable thing is under an obligation of infinite weight to choose it for the reason that it is intrinsically and infinitely valuable, or in other words to choose it as an ultimate end. It is then the intrinsic and infinite value of the highest good or well-being of God and of the universe that constitutes the true foundation of moral obligation. The moral law then, must require moral agents to will good or that which is intrinsically valuable to God and the universe of sentient existences for its own sake or as an ultimate end. Be it remembered, that moral obligation respects, strictly speaking, the ultimate intention only. It must follow that the highest well-being of God and of the universe, is the intrinsically valuable end on which ultimate choice ought to terminate."
What follows under this head consists simply in explanation of terms. The only professed proof of his proposition is contained in the above extract. The scriptures are not either directly or indirectly appealed to. Now who does not see that in the above argument, from an admitted particular fact, a conclusion absolutely universal is deduced, when the fact presented does not either necessarily or logically involve that conclusion? It is admitted by all, that the highest well-being of God and of the sentient universe is a good infinitely valuable in itself, and that it ought to be chosen by all moral agents for its own sake. But from this universally admitted fact, it by no means follows, that this is the only object worthy of regard for its own sake, and which therefore, may in itself involve ultimate reasons for certain forms of moral obligation. Yet this is the argument of Professor Finney, the only argument which he adduces, to sustain his theory. His premise utterly fails to sustain his conclusion.
9. With one additional remark I close this extended chapter. Professor Finney very properly distinguishes between a condition and ground of obligation. He makes however an erroneous use of this distinction, for the establishment of his own theory. When constrained to admit that other considerations than those of happiness as a good in itself, are in fact taken into the account in the affirmation of certain forms of obligation, his reply is, that such considerations are referred to by the intelligence as conditions merely, and not as the ground of such affirmations. In this way he disposes of many of the most important objections to his theory. Now before we can know with certainty whether he has rightly applied this distinction in any or in all instances in which he has applied it, we must have some sure test which we may apply in each given instance, to determine whether the intelligence refers to the consideration in question, as a condition or ground of obligation. As Professor Finney has not even attempted to give us such a test, I will endeavor to do it myself. Existence and the possession of the powers of moral agency, for example, are, as all admit, the condition, but not the ground of our obligation to will good, to one who is capable of enjoying it. Perceived susceptibility for the good is the ground of this form of obligation. Now, why do we refer to the former facts as the condition, and to that last named as the ground of this form of obligation? But one answer can be given. That which the universal intelligence concurs in assigning as a reason for a particular form of obligation, when it would assign such reason, is the real reason or ground of the form of obligation referred to. That, on the other hand, which must be admitted as true, or obligation in no form or degree can exist at all, but which the intelligence does not refer to, as the reason for any particular form of obligation whatever, is a condition, but not a ground of obligation. It is for these very reasons that we affirm existence and the possession of the powers of moral agency to be the conditions merely, while perceived susceptibilities for good are the ground of our obligation to will the good of the subject of such susceptibilities. This test will be admitted as of universal application.
Let us now apply this test to a few obvious forms of moral obligation. What does the universal intelligence agree in assigning as the reason of the obligation of gratitude when such obligation is perceived to, exist? This and this alone, the relation of a benefactor. Such relation, then, is not, as Professor Finney affirms, a mere condition, but, in opposition to his theory, it is the ground of such form of obligation. For the same reason, we affirm, that perceived trust-worthiness is not a mere condition, but the ground of obligation to the exercise of confidence. The moral perfections of God are not a mere condition but the ground of our obligation to esteem, venerate and praise Him. When Professor Finney therefore assigns as the mere condition, what the universal intelligence, in its spontaneous affirmations, assigns, not as the mere condition but as the ground of such forms of obligation his error is manifest, as soon as we have a sure test by which to determine its character. Now as his whole theory, in reality, rests upon the misapplication of the distinction under consideration, it must, of course fall to the ground.
CHAPTER XI.
MORAL ACTION NEVER OF A MIXED CHARACTER.
WE are now prepared to enter upon an investigation of a question, a right understanding of which is of fundamental importance to a proper elucidation of the science of Moral Philosophy. I refer to the question whether all the moral acts of a moral agent are, or are not, from the necessity of the case, of a purely unmixed character, that is, wholly right, or wholly wrong. To an investigation of this question special attention is now invited.
In the preceding chapters the two following principles have been fully established. 1. Moral obligation, merit, demerit, &c., pertain immediately to acts of will, or voluntary states of mind only. No state of the physical organization, nor of the intelligence, or sensibility can, with any truth or propriety, be denominated a moral action. 2. Of acts of will, ultimate intentions only possess a moral character, or can properly be denominated moral actions. The question before us then is legitimately reduced to this one single inquiry, namely, can any one given ultimate intention be of a mixed moral character; in other words, can such distinct, contradictory, and opposite elements as sin and holiness, selfishness and benevolence, voluntary obedience and disobedience to known duty, enter into one and the same ultimate act of will, or intention? Instead of taking up the question in this simple form, I propose to argue it in connection with the following considerations, on account of which the doctrine of mixed moral action is held by its advocates. By the different classes of advocates of this doctrine its truth has been argued from the following considerations, and these are the only grounds on which its truth has been, or can be urged.
I. Contradictory and opposite elements may enter into one and the same ultimate intention.
II. An intention perfectly pure in itself, may be faulty on the score of intensity, and thereby be properly regarded as of a mixed moral character.
III. In connection with an ultimate intention perfectly right, an executive act or volition of an opposite nature may be put forth, and thus the whole moral act be of a mixed character.
IV. In connection with ultimate intentions and executive acts perfectly right, states of the intelligence or sensibility morally wrong may exist, and thus the whole moral state be of a mixed moral character. If, as said above, a mixed moral action is possible, it must be for one or the other of these reasons. I ask, then,
I. Can contradictory and opposite elements enter into one and the same ultimate intention? To this question I answer, no, for the following reasons:
1. The dogma of mixed moral action, in the sense now under consideration, is in palpable contradiction to all our fundamental conceptions of an ultimate intention. Such intention implies not only the election of its object for its own sake, but a corresponding rejection of everything of an opposite nature. Suppose the question is before my mind, shall I go to this place or that? I can by no possibility go to but one of the places named, and to one or the other I must go. Now a determination to go to one place implies of necessity a determination not to go to the other. The same does and must hold true in respect to all ultimate intentions. The question before the mind is, shall I, for example, serve God, or mammon? A determination to serve one, implies and necessarily involves a corresponding determination not to serve the other; the demands of each being directly opposite and contradictory to the other. An ultimate intention then embracing the contradictory and opposite elements of voluntary obedience and disobedience, would imply, in one and the same act, a determination to serve and not to serve God, and a determination not to serve and actually to serve mammon. This is a palpable absurdity, as great as the supposition that the same body may move in opposite directions at one and the same time. So Edwards himself affirms. "It is absurd," he says, "to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself in its present act: or the present choice to be opposite to and resisting present choice; as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time." According to Kant it would imply a universal with a particular opposed to it; that is, it would imply a determination to obey the moral law universally, and at the same time not to obey it in certain particulars. No absurdity greater than this ever was or can be conceived of. Yet it is the very absurdity embraced by all who maintain the doctrine of mixed moral action in the form now under consideration.
2. The presence of two such elements as voluntary obedience and disobedience to known duty, in one and the same intention, would of necessity imply another ultimate intention from which these contradictory elements proceed. In other words, the determination containing such elements would not be an ultimate intention, but an executive subordinate volition. A man may form a determination, for example, as many do, to serve God and mammon, or to obey God in certain particulars and to disobey Him in others. Such determination, however, must be put forth as a means to an end previously elected, to wit, a determination to secure, at one and the same time, the rewards of obedience and disobedience. This last then and not the other would be ultimate, and would be characterized by the purest selfishness conceivable. Any intention then embodying a purpose to yield to the call of duty in certain particulars, and to refuse to yield in others, would not be an ultimate, but a subordinate intention, an intention originating in another which is ultimate and characterized by the most unmingled depravity. For what form of selfishness can by any possibility be more supreme and aggravated than that which aims to secure the rewards of obedience and disobedience at one and the same time?
3. An intention, to be ultimate, must be supreme, that is, it must involve the supreme preference of the mind. The supposition of two distinct and ultimate intentions in the mind at one and the same time, or of one involving the contradictory elements under consideration, which would in fact be equivalent to two, implies of necessity that neither is supreme, that is, that neither or both together are in reality an ultimate intention. The idea of two such intentions, then, or of two contradictory elements in one and the same intention, implies a palpable contradiction and impossibility.
4. If two such intentions may co-exist in the mind, or if two such contradictory elements may enter into one and the same intention, a thousand may, all, and consequently none, supreme, and all contradictory to each other. What can be more absurd than a principle involving such consequences?
5. The general if not universal agreement of theologians and metaphysicians of note in respect to the absolute impossibility of the co-existence of two contradictory ultimate intentions in the mind, or of contradictory elements in the same intention, which, as I have sad, amounts to the same thing, deserves notice as an important corroborative argument in favor of the doctrine which I am endeavoring to establish. I have already alluded to the sentiments of Edwards and Kant on the subject. I will here adduce one or two additional quotations from the former as deserving special regard. "The strength of the will," he says, " let it be never so great, does not at all enable it to act one way and the contrary way both at the same time. It gives it no such sovereignty and command, as to cause itself to prefer and not to prefer at the same time, or to choose contrary to its own present choice." Again, "Will and endeavor against, or diverse from present acts of the will, are in no case supposable, whether those acts be occasional or habitual; for that would be to suppose the will, at present, to be otherwise than at present it is."
2. All external actions are prohibited by the moral law, which, in the judgment of the agent, are of a doubtful character. Such doubt may respect,
6. All actions are prohibited by the moral law which justly subjects the agent to the imputation of wrong intentions, or the absence of right ones. Every moral agent is, as we have seen, under obligation to will the good of others. A simple revelation of such a state of mind often has the highest influence to secure the result willed; while the inference that the opposite is willed, or that good is not willed, has a powerful tendency to a different result. We are bound then, not only to will the good of others, but to avoid all actions from which the inference may be properly drawn, that the good required is not willed or that the opposite is willed. Example: all actions in the ordinary intercourse of life which are the proper indexes of unkindness, or of the absence of good will are of this class.
5. The question has no doubt risen in the minds of not a few of my readers, are none of the precepts of the moral law, as given in the Bible, to be regarded as rules of action demanding formal obedience in strict and literal conformity to such precepts interpreted according to the obvious import of the language in which they are expressed? I answer, there are many such precepts recorded in the scriptures. Among these I notice as examples, the numerous class of prohibitions. Such precepts generally mark out and limit certain spheres of action, all access to which is designed to be barred. Strict literal conformity to them is therefore demanded of us. So when the observance of special ordinances is required, such as baptism and the Lord's supper, literal conformity to such precepts, as far as conformity is specified, is of course required. Similar conformity also to the spirit of all inspired precepts of every kind, together with all forms of duty seen to be such in the light of such precepts, all honest minds will regard as sacredly binding upon the conscience. Whether, and how far any particular precept is to be regarded as an external rule to which formal obedience is required, or a principle in the light of which the particular forms of duty demanded in particular relations and circumstances are revealed, the mind, under the influence of heart-integrity will seldom be at a loss to determine.
6. It may not be unimportant, nor uninstructive, to notice here the manner in which dishonest minds, who still acknowledge themselves bound to yield obedience to what God requires of them in the scriptures, free themselves from the pressure of conviction in respect to forms of duty which they are determined not to discharge. They shelter themselves at once behind the Bible, and demand a specific command naming the particular act, and requiring it of all men as a duty. It is perfectly vain to show them that the spirit of every precept of the moral law demands it of them. No, they say, show us the particular precept, naming this identical thing as duty, and we are ready to perform it. In connection with such demand, they will very likely profess great reverence for the Bible, and a hearty willingness to do all that it requires. This they refuse to perform, for the exclusive reason that it is no where required of them in the sacred volume. Now what such persons need to convince them of duty, and as a consequence, to induce them to perform it, is not the revelation of a specific command, but the possession of an honest heart. In their present state, if such precept should be presented, they would then show as reckless a disregard for the letter, as they now do for the spirit of the divine law. The world presents no other exhibitions of more manifest, deep-seated and heartless depravity, than is visible in such examples as these. The demand of a specific precept, as the condition of obedience, is the common shield for the conscience, on the part of all apostates from the law of duty.
8. Another very important thought, as it appears to me, here presents itself, to wit: one great object of the Most High, in revealing the law of duty in such a manner that it should become to the mind who rightly apprehends it, an indwelling light, in the sense above explained. It is to render the subject wise to discern what is in itself fit and proper, in other words, duty, in the varied circumstances and relations in which himself and other intelligent beings may be placed, or in the language of inspiration, to render the children of God every where, "a wise and understanding people," and that in reference to the highest form of wisdom possible to intelligent beings. Had the law been given in the form of mere rules, no light would be shed from it, upon what is in itself "just, lovely, and of good report." But now its hallowed influence upon the mind is chiefly visible in rendering it of "quick understanding," to discern, in any given circumstances and relations, what is intrinsically demanded therein by equity, justice, truth and benevolence.
9. Hence I notice another principle of equal importance to that above suggested. It is the direction which questions of duty should take in the varied circumstances and relations in which from time to time we find ourselves. The solution of such questions is, as I have already remarked, commonly sought, if reference is had to the Bible at all, by referring to the scriptures for some particular precept giving us specific directions in each particular case. Now this, as it appears to me is a great mistake. God designs that intelligent beings shalt act from a sacred regard to what is in itself fit, proper, just, and benevolent in given circumstances and relations. He has given his law, as we have seen, as an internal light to render the mind quick to discern what, in such circumstances, and relations is demanded by "righteousness, and judgment, and equity." The direction, then, which all ordinary questions of duty should take is this. What, in the circumstances and relations supposed, is intrinsically demanded by righteousness, judgment, and equity?" Reference should be had to the Bible, not for specific precepts formally prescribing what is duty in the particular case, but for light on this one great question. Every question of duty thus solved will, ever after, be to the mind, an additional light in the solution of other, and similar, or even different questions. "To understand righteousness, and judgment, and equity," it should be remembered, is not to know merely what is commanded, but what is in itself right, just, and equitable. To be righteous ourselves, implies action from respect to what is in itself right, just and equitable. In the solution of all ordinary questions of duty, therefore, it should be our fundamental aim to understand what in the circumstances, is demanded by the great law of rectitude, as in itself right and just.
Foundation of Government.
An important question here arises: What are the relations, which, when apprehended by the reason, demand the existence of government, reasons which confer the right of control on the one hand, and impose the duty of obedience on the other? Various theories have been started upon this subject, some of which demand a passing consideration, before presenting what I regard as the true theory.
The Will of God.
1. Subordinate authorities have been resolved into the will of God. Civil government for example, has, a right to exist, it is said, as a divine institution simply. That civil, as well as family government, is sanctioned by divine authority, and that such sanction binds all subjects to obey, is readily admitted. It may be questioned, however, whether any government has its foundation in mere arbitrary will. Every government which exists as a divine institution, is demanded by the relations of the ruler and subject, as apprehended by the divine intelligence. A revelation of these relations, and not a reference to the mere will of God, justifies the divine conduct in requiring the institution itself.
If the duty of obedience in these cases rests upon the revealed will of God merely, till it is known that such institutions are required by the divine will, the duty of obedience can not be recognized. It is recognized however, as in the case of the child, long before the fact is known.
2. Family government has been resolved into the relation of parent and child. Parental relations determine in general to what particular persons the right of control belongs. They do not, however, create the right itself. If so, till the relation is recognized by the child, his obligation to obey would not and could not be recognized. Nor would the right of control on the part of the parent, nor the duty of obedience on the part of the child, ever cease, while the relations continue. The child on the other hand, does recognize the right of the parent to control, and his duty to obey, long before his relations as a child are known; and when he has arrived at a certain age, the right and duty under consideration cease altogether. Reason necessarily affirms their unfitness. Those rights and duties, then, have some other foundation than the mere relation of parent and child.
Civil Government.
1. Civil government has, by many, been resolved into what is called the "social compact," the consent of individuals, not merely that the government shall exist, but determining the form which shall exist. From this theory the following consequences necessarily result:
(2.) All governments may, whatever their character or influence, be dissolved by mere popular will, and that without guilt. Whatever exists as the result of mere will, may be dissolved by the same power when it chooses.
(3.) Before a person has consented to submit to government, obedience is not binding upon him, and consequently government has no right to punish him for any crime whatever.
(4.) If a community of one hundred existed, and fifty-one should choose not to have a government, and forty-nine to have one, universal anarchy must be permitted, notwithstanding the power and the will on the part of the minority to institute such a government as the public good demands. Now universal reason affirms that the minority under such circumstances ought to compel the majority to submit to such regulations as the public good demands.
Divine Government.
4. The right of God to control his creatures, has been commonly explained by a reference to his relations to them as their Creator, and to his perfect wisdom, goodness and power. Let us suppose that their wisdom, power and goodness are as perfect as his. Would the relation of Creator and creature, together with the perfections above mentioned, confer on Him the right of control? Why, it might be asked, should infinite wisdom control infinite wisdom? Why then should parental authority cease when an equality exists between the parent and child? That moral character merely, does not give the right of control, is evident from the fact that the obligation of the child does not depend upon the moral character of the parent, but upon the intrinsic rectitude of parental requirements. So God's right to command his creatures does not depend upon his moral character; but upon the rectitude of the commands themselves, and certain natural relations hereafter to be specified. Moral character, in many instances, determines what particular commands government has a right to impose. But it does not confer the right of commanding what is in itself proper.
Real Foundation stated.
We now come to the inquiry, what are the relations, in view of which reason affirms the right of control on the one hand, and the duty of obedience on the other. These relations are and must be in all instances one and identical; because the same things are always affirmed, to wit: right on the one hand and duty on the other. Government of every kind, it should be borne in mind, is in all instances a means to an end. The moral rectitude and well-being of the subject is the end; government is the means to that end. Whenever and wherever government is seen to be a necessary means to the end above specified, its existence is demanded by the reason, and the obligation rests upon those who have the power to do it to give existence to government. Government then, has in all instances, its foundation in one relation, and in that one exclusively. What is that relation? I answer: The relation of dependence. Whenever one being sustains such a relation to another, (no matter how the relation came to exist,) that without controlling him, he can not do him the good which benevolence demands, the right and duty of control exists on the part of the former, and the duty of obedience on the part of the latter. These rights and duties are necessarily affirmed by the reason of the ruler and subject, whenever these relations are apprehended. This I infer from the following considerations:
1. Every person is bound to will his own highest well-being, and the means necessary to that end. Of course he must, when authority is seen to be that means, affirm the duty of those who have the power to use it, and his own duty to submit.
2. Whenever and wherever this relation is apprehended, the rights and duties under consideration are, as a matter of fact, affirmed. The child for example, when it has apprehended merely this one relation, recognizes in the parent, the right of control, and in itself the duty of obedience.
3. Wherever these relations are perceived, these rights and duties are affirmed, not only in the perceived absence of moral goodness, but in connection with the worst moral character. Whatever the moral character of the parent may be, the child recognizes its obligation to respect his authority as a parent, and to render obedience as such, whenever it is perceived to be consistent with what is in itself morally right.
4. These rights and duties vary as this one relation varies. The child remains subject to parental authority, while this relation continues, and ceases to be thus subject when this relation ceases. Should the parent become dependent, so that his highest good requires that the child should exercise control, the right of control would, according to the dictates of the universal conscience, rest in the child. Such facts undeniably evince, that, in this one relation all government has its foundation.
6. I may add, that whenever this relation is not supposed, these rights and duties are never affirmed, whatever other relations may exist. However wise and good and powerful any being may be, no reason can be adduced from these perfections why beings equally wise and good and powerful, should be subjected to his authority.
REMARKS.
Some reflections arising from the principles thus illustrated, here demand our attention.
1. My first remark is that such is the constitution of human nature, that government is a necessity. It is necessary in two respects.
(I.) It is impossible for rational beings to act in concert without instituting government of some kind. In one instance it may be formally instituted with the relations of ruler and subject definitely marked out. In other instances the spontaneous and concurrent dictates of the general reason are the rule, and a controlling public sentiment, the sanction. In all instances, however, government of some kind is the necessary result of concurrent action.
(2.) Government is necessary as a means to an end: the moral rectitude and well being of mankind. It is only under such circumstances that virtue flourishes, and general and individual tranquillity is felt. A man would feel as safe when herded with wolves and tigers, as in a community without laws, and a government to force subjection.
2. We see under what circumstances, and to what extent, and in what form, government ought to exist. Wherever the relation of dependence in any form exists, there is a demand for government in some form. The nature, form, and limits of the government are to be determined by the nature and extent of the relation. Here we have the meaning and application of the command, "Yea, all of you, be subject one to another, and be clothed with humility."
3. In what sense has civil government its foundation in the "social compact?" In the first place, no government actually existing, had its origin entirely in such a compact. Nor does the right of government to exist depend upon the popular will. Nor is the right to institute any particular form of government, with reference to the end of government, based upon the same will. God however, has thrown upon human beings the responsibility of instituting governments, and moulding them with a view to the end required, holding them at the same time accountable to Him for the manner in which this responsibility is discharged. In this sense only, is government based upon the social compact.
4. We see in what sense, under civil governments, the majority ought to rule. It is only when the end of government can be best advanced by this means. Suppose the majority should will the existence of universal anarchy, or the existence of a government which would defeat, in its legitimate action, the end of all government. The minority in that case would have the right, and supposing them to possess the power, it would be their duty to compel the majority to submit to such regulations and to such a government as the public good demands. Misrule has no right to exist as law because the greater number will it.
5. We notice a common mistake, to wit: that the command of government is the foundation of obligation. The command of God, it is said, is not the index of what is right in itself, or of what is demanded by the relations of creatures. It creates the right. That this position is wholly wrong I argue,
(1.) From the fact that on this supposition we have no standard by which to determine the propriety of any command but the command itself. With what propriety could the affirmation be made, "The law of the Lord is perfect?" If the mere will of God not only makes the law, but makes it right, such an affirmation is without meaning.
(2.) When we suppose any authority to command what we judge, and necessarily judge to be wrong, disobedience becomes a duty in the judgment of all rational beings.
(4.) God submits his own laws to this test.
6. We see when it is that the commands of any lawful authority are binding upon us.
(1.) When it requires what is right in itself.
(2.) When it requires that which it is not wrong for us to do, and the evil of obedience is less than that of resistance. Example: Christ paying taxes.
8. We notice the common error that in the institution of governments, some rights are given up for the purpose of securing others more important. Thy object of all lawful government is to protect rights of every kind, not to annihilate any. No right can be named which is not secured by a government instituted upon proper principles.
9. The appropriate characteristics of tyranny. A government which exists not for the good of the governed but of the ruler, is tyranny. Subjects cease to be subjects. They become things.
10. Slavery for example, is not a government. It has no rulers nor subjects. It has simply owners and things. It is therefore the perfection of tyranny. There are no redeeming qualities in it.
11. Civil government is a demand of human nature, sanctioned by the universal intelligence. This I have intimated in a remark made above. Some additional remarks may be demanded on this point, however, on account of certain existing tendencies of the human mind.
(1.) It is as natural to man, as a social being, to organize civil government, as it is to form marriage alliances. It would, therefore, be just as manifest a war upon the changeless laws and principles of human nature, to oppose the former, as it would be to oppose the latter. We have just as much evidence that one is agreeable to the will of God, as we have that the other is.
(2.) The relation of ruler and subject, whenever, and to whatever extent the relation of dependence exists, is sanctioned by the demands of universal reason. I am sick, and in a state of total ignorance in respect to the nature of my disease and the appropriate remedy. A friend is by, who understands both. What relation does reason affirm ought to exist between us under such circumstances? Certainly this: ignorance ought to be controlled by wisdom. The more perfect the subjection, the more perfect the conformity to the demands of the reason. So also of the well-being of the subject. Inasmuch, as not only health will be sacrificed, but peace of mind, by the opposition of the will to the reason. The above illustration is equally applicable to every case coming under the relation of dependence, actual and conceivable.
(3.) In all governments founded upon the above relations, and conformed in their action to its demands, there is the highest security given to all the rights and interests of the subject. Hence the universal tranquillity which results under such institutions. The annihilation of government is the destruction of this tranquillity.
(4.) The existence of such government secures the public peace, by securing the universal love of, and respect for justice and order itself. When justice is unprotected, it is always confounded with the opposite of justice; or rather, all distinction between right and wrong seems to be annihilated. But when government throws its broad aegis around justice and purity, then, and then only it is, that justice and purity become visible and distinct to all minds, and are loved for their own sake.
(5.) The perfect adaptation of government founded upon this principle, to meet the necessary demands of the reason, is strikingly seen in this fact, that the more perfect the control and subjection, the more strong the mutual affection and esteem between the ruler and subject, and that the strongest attachment and esteem ever engendered, are induced under such circumstances. The love between parents and children is always in proportion to the control of the parent and the subjection of the child—control exercised in the spirit of subjection and for the ends which benevolence demands. Now mutual affection never results from a relation unsanctioned by reason. What stronger evidence can we have that government is a demand of the reason?
12. My last remark is, that the use of whatever means is requisite to the existence and most healthy exercise of government, must not only be sanctioned by the universal conscience, but must be agreeable to the will of God. This is a necessary consequence of the admission of the right of government to exist at all.
CHAPTER XVIII.
OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION ASIDE FROM THE SCRIPTURES IN RESPECT TO THE LAW OF DUTY.
THE idea of duty is to man, as a rational being, an omnipresent reality. All objects, all events, when apprehended by the mind, reveal and impose it upon us. Hence all inquiries with man culminate in this, What ought I to be, and what ought I to do? As all particular and specific forms of duty grow out of our relations to various beings and objects around us, as they become to us objects of knowledge, an important inquiry arises, Whence are the sources of information to which we should especially resort, aside from the Holy Scriptures, to obtain an answer to the great inquiry before us? Among such sources, the following may be specified as of special importance.
1. The first that I notice is a knowledge of the laws of our mental and physical constitution. All our powers, mental and physical, were intrusted to us as sacred treasures, to be employed by us, in harmony with the laws which control their action, to meet the ends of benevolence. How can we wisely employ these powers, unless we study the laws of their most perfect development and activity? This then should be one of the prime studies of man as a rational being.
2. Another source of information to which we should resort, is a careful study of our relations in life, as parents and children, instructors and pupils, members of particular churches and communities, of some one particular nation, and of the family of man. Man was made to know himself in his peculiar relations to existences around him, and in the possession of this knowledge, to answer the great questions, what ought I to be, and what ought I to do? He that distinctly contemplates himself in these various relations, for the purpose of obtaining distinct answers to these various questions, will uniformly possess full distinctness of vision in respect to such questions.
3. A careful analysis of our own moral judgments is another important source of knowledge on this subject.
We often find ourselves too, passing judgments upon others, when perfectly impartial spectators of their conduct. By carefully and distinctly marking the judgments we then pass, we shall obtain principles which will guide us in cases where feeling or interest would otherwise be likely to induce false assumptions.
When other persons also come into certain relations to us, we are continually, in our own minds, imposing certain courses of conduct upon them as duties. By carefully marking such judgments, we may obtain answers to questions of personal duty, when we come into similar relations to others.
4. A careful and judicious observation of public opinion also may often be to us an important source of information relatively to the subject under consideration.
In this department of inquiry, the first thing to be done is to distinguish carefully between the decisions of the public conscience and of the public will. We often notice men who oppose important measures, prefacing their opposition with affirmations of love and respect for the principle on which the measures are based. In the opposition referred to, is the expression of the popular will. In the affirmation of respect and esteem, we find the decision of the public conscience, and there for us, almost universally, lies the path of duty.
When men also are impartial spectators of the conduct of others, they generally agree in their judgment of such conduct. By marking carefully their judgments under such circumstances, together with their reasons for the same, we may commonly obtain important principles for the solution of cases of conscience ourselves.
When men also are in certain relations to others, they uniformly impose upon them certain courses of conduct. relatively to themselves, as duties. If an individual is in affliction, for example, he holds all who are aware of the fact, as bound in duty, to sympathize with him, and if necessity requires it, to extend the hand of relief. Now by marking the duties thus universally imposed, we may find for ourselves, important principles of moral conduct.
5. The counsel and works of individuals whom God had specially gifted, as instructors of mankind, in respect to the law of duty, should also be sought as a source of knowledge on the subject under consideration. Then our special inquiry should be, not merely what duty is, but why is one course of conduct right and another wrong. Here and here alone, we obtain important principles for moral judgments.
6. Finally, all questions of duty should be solved under a sense of accountability to God, and with supplication for divine teaching. The former preserves the mind from improper biases, and the latter secures the promised divine illumination which to all minds is the chief source of wisdom and knowledge.
IDEA OF RIGHTS.
Terms Defined.
WE are all familiar with the expressions that individuals and communities have rights, that such rights are invaded or trampled upon, and that rights ought to be respected, and guarded from invasion. The question is, what is the meaning of the term rights when thus used? I answer, When an individual comes to sustain such a relation to any object or interest that it can not be withheld, or taken from him without guilt on the part of the perpetrator, such individual has a right to such object or interest. This is what we mean by the term rights.
Foundation of Rights.
The foundation of such rights next demands consideration. All things in the universe around us exist as a means to an end, the good of sentient existences. The simple fact of the existence, in any creature of any want or susceptibility to good, entitles him to the possession, and enjoyment of the object or objects adapted to meet that demand of his nature, unless higher interests in himself or others extinguish that right. Life, for example, is to man a good. This fact entitles him to the means of existence in the universe around him, and to such means in the best possible forms consistent with higher interests.
Relation of Right and Duty.
The existence of a right in any individual creates an obligation on the part of other beings, not only to refrain from its violation, but to use all proper means to put the subject in possession of the good to which he is entitled. Right and duty are correlative terms, and mutually imply each other. That which we are in duty bound to render to others, they may claim of us as a right. That to which by right we are entitled from others, they owe to us as duties.
REMARKS.
1. We are now prepared for a distinct statement of the object of government, in all its legitimate forms. I use the term in its universal sense, as including all legitimate forms of government, human and divine. The end of government is to enforce duty, guard and protect rights, and advance the individual and public weal, by all lawful and practicable means. Each special form of government has a sphere peculiar to itself. The end, in all its forms is one and the same. Government, in none of its legitimate forms, extinguishes any one right of any one individual, but guards and protects all alike.
2. The true idea of tyranny and oppression next claims our attention. Any form or measure of government which deprives the subject of any form or degree of good, to which, by right, he is entitled, is tyranny and oppression. Government, in all such instances, is not only perverted from its true ends and aims, but has placed itself in the relation of direct antagonism to them. It is then one of the most terrible curses that can possibly be inflicted upon humanity.
PART II.
MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
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PRACTICAL ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
PIETY, OR OUR DUTIES TO GOD.
ALL forms of duty, as we have seen, rest upon one and the same principle, to wit, that every object known to a moral agent shall be esteemed and treated by him according to their apprehended intrinsic and relative worth. All particular duties are only specific applications of this one universal principle. What makes any specific act right or wrong is its manifest conformity or non-conformity to this principle. One important object of the preceding investigations has been to prepare the way for our present inquiries, in the department of practical ethics. Of all the principles of moral obligation, those which first demand our attention are such as are included under the term piety, or our duties to God.
Duties included under these words when understood
in their mot extensive sense.
According to the most extensive signification of the word, the term piety would include all duties of every kind. The conscience of each individual, as we have seen, utters all its mandates in all their varied forms, in the name of the universal intelligence. Each specific duty is required of us, as demanded by the Most High, and by the universal conscience. He who is truly virtuous, therefore, will regard each duty, to whomsoever and to whatsoever it directly pertains, as thus commanded, and will perform it as a subject of divine legislation, and in obedience to the divine authority. To such a person, every duty will, in reality, be an act of piety. In all departments of moral obligation, divine legislation will be specifically acknowledged, and submitted to as such. The idea of solemn accountability to the divine tribunal, will be the great idea in the light of which all particular "cases of conscience will be solved." The individual whose piety is not thus universal has no proper claims certainly to real piety or virtue either. Morality and religion, when rightly understood, are not, as far as duty is concerned, different departments of action, but one and the same. All duty, when rightly performed, has its spring and source in the spirit of allegiance to God. All sin, all wrong-doing, in every form, is direct and open disloyalty to his authority.
The idea of a truly pious man, then, in other words, of a true worshipper of God, may be thus announced. He is one, the supreme law of whose existence and activity is, the law of duty; who elevates all duty in every form directly into the light of divine legislation, and performs it as a matter of allegiance to God, the Universal Lawgiver. "He endured as seeing Him who is invisible."
Piety in its more restricted sense.
There are forms of duty, however, which pertain immediately and directly to God, those included more particularly under the first and great commandment of the moral law. The term piety is often used to express this class of duties. It is in this sense that the subject will now be contemplated.
In the human intelligence God stands revealed as the Author of all other existences, as the unconditioned and absolute cause of all that conditionally exists, and as possessed of every possible attribute involved in the idea of infinity and perfection. The idea of the infinity and perfection of God is always associated in the human mind with a consciousness of personal finiteness and consequent imperfection. In the relations of infinity and perfection on the one hand, and finiteness and imperfection on the other, God and humanity are revealed in the universal consciousness.
As man also is in his nature and constitution, a religious being, the conception of God in some form, as it ever has been, so it ever will be, the great leading idea of his existence, the idea under the influence of which his character will be chiefly moulded. Such is his nature, that should he even deny the divine existence, still the idea will be almost equally present to his mind, and will exert hardly less influence in the formation of his character, an influence in that case altogether disastrous, but for that reason none the less powerful. Humanity without religion is as much out of its natural native sphere of thought and activity, as is the caged eagle or lion—humanity, that was created to rise to an intimate and endearing inter-communion with Infinity and Perfection, and through such intercommunion to form and develop its character.
In respect to this infinite and Eternal Being, also, man finds himself in the relation of profound and universal dependence. To Him we are indebted for our existence; and the continuance of that existence, with all the good or ill which may attend it, depends entirely upon his will.
There is another relation still more solemn which we are continuously conscious of sustaining to God. I refer to that of moral accountability. To our minds He stands revealed, as through our own consciences, and under the most impressive sanctions, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong. Conscience also, in its inward heaven illumined revelations, continually directs the mind to the divine tribunal, with the certain and all impressive indication, that there appropriate retributions await us for all acts of obedience or disobedience to its sacred behests. God, the Moral Legislator, and "God the Judge of all," is the revealed divinity of the universal conscience.
While God stands thus revealed to the human mind, man continually carries in the depths of his own consciousness, the solemn conviction, that in consequence of having transgressed the law of God, he is amenable at the divine tribunal, as a violator of the claims of infinite and eternal weight. The conviction of personal sinfulness and ill-desert, and of consequent exposure to the penalty of the divine law, lies upon the conscience of universal humanity.
In the sacred scriptures God has revealed Himself in full and special adaptation to the necessities of man as a sinner, as having provided a remedial system through which the impure may be recovered to rectitude, the guilty pardoned, and the lost restored to hope, and blessedness.
Such are the relations recognized by man, as existing between himself and his Maker.
We will now contemplate some of the duties involved in these relations, as constituting essential elements of the idea of piety in the form in which we are now contemplating the term.
1. The first that I notice is this. As creatures, we should ever carefully cherish, in the depths of our own minds, a deep and pervading sentiment of our own finiteness and imperfection, as contrasted with the divine Infinity and Perfection. This we should do as a sacred duty to God, to ourselves, and the world around us. Without this sentiment we can make no proper approaches to God, or render any becoming and acceptable services to Him. Nor can we duly understand or appreciate the duties which we owe to ourselves or the world around us. He that contemplates himself in his own finiteness, as ever acting in the presence and under the immediate legislation of Infinity and Perfection, will contemplate his own nature and destiny, together with his responsibilities to himself and other beings, in a very different light from what he otherwise would.
We shall also be to ourselves, and all other objects will be to us, very much as the ideas with which we compare them. If we habitually compare ourselves with others, we shall naturally think of ourselves or of them more highly than we ought to think. If, on the other hand, ourselves and all other things are contemplated, in the light of our common relations to Infinity and Perfection, all things will naturally assume their appropriate place in our estimation. The profoundest wisdom to which the finite can attain is found in the depths of voluntary self-humiliation. To this we attain, only as we habitually place our own finiteness and consequent natural imperfection, in the light of the divine Infinity and Perfection.
2. One of the chief aims of our existence should be to develop and perfect in our own minds, our conceptions of the being and perfections of Deity. The idea of God must be in the finite intelligence, an endlessly growing idea. To develop and perfect it, will be the lesson of eternity. One of the first and most sacred duties devolved upon us by our own consciences is to perfect, in the use of all appropriate means, our knowledge of that Eternal Being to whom we owe our existence, and upon whom that existence, with all its infinite interests, depends. No individual can have a proper respect for the idea of duty in any form, who does not meet the demands of his conscience in respect to the acquirement of the fullest possible knowledge of the character of God, and the principles of his government.
3. The supreme law of our existence should be the ascertained will of God, in whatever manner it may be communicated to us. While we do and must recognize ourselves as finite, imperfect and dependent, and the Author of our being as in all respects infinite, perfect, and independent, we necessarily recognize in Him the right of unlimited control, and in ourselves, the duty of universal and implicit obedience. It is a first truth of the universal intelligence, that the finite should voluntarily surrender itself to the control of the infinite, the imperfect to that of the perfect, and the dependent to that on which it does and must depend. The will of God, standing before us as it does, in revealed absolute harmony with the dictates of infinite wisdom, knowledge, rectitude, and benevolence, the first duty which conscience devolves upon the creature is a distinct and unlimited surrendry of his own to the control of the will of his Creator. As the actual providences of God are a continual revelation of his will to us, the submission of our will to his always includes a cordial acquiescence in the divine dispensations, as on the whole, wisest and best, whatever their present aspect may be.
5. He that would meet the demands of his conscience relatively to the special duties of piety towards God, will carefully cherish in his own mind, a sentiment of profound and universal dependence on the one hand, and also a tenderly affectionate remembrance of God's relations to him as an infinite and boundless benefactor, on the other. The chief relations which beings morally pure will ever sustain to God, will be that of dependent recipients to an independent infinite benefactor. The exercise of gratitude, therefore, with its appropriate manifestations, will always be the form of duty mainly devolved upon them relatively to the Author of' their existence. To be a constant recipient of good, without recognizing the fact, to exercise and manifest ingratitude to an infinite benefactor, is one of the darkest forms which crime ever puts on.
6. The next form of duty that claims our attention, is that of unlimited trust or confidence in God, as a God of absolute wisdom, knowledge and veracity, and at the same time able and willing to meet all our necessities, as we appreciate his trustworthiness, and confide in Him accordingly. To us He has revealed Himself, not only as possessed of infinite excellence, as the universal moral legislator, and "the judge of all," but also as a Father entertaining and cherishing towards us a more than paternal tenderness. Such manifestations certainly ought to meet a most grateful response on our part. The duty of faith unlimited and absolute is a first truth of universal reason.
7. The exercise of filial confidence in God on our part, should ever be mingled with sentiments of cherished fear, reverence and awe, which his revealed Infinity demand. "Reverence and godly fear," are sentiments surely with which the finite should approach the Infinite, and creatures should mention the name of their Creator.
8. The sentiments above referred to, internally cherished and manifested by appropriate external action, constitutes worship, the duty of rendering which is recognized by the universal conscience. Wherever a human being exists, we find him entertaining conceptions of God in some form, and those conceptions also prompting him to some forms of worship. The idea of worship and the corresponding instinct is absolutely universal. By all then, it should be recognized as a sacred duty.
9. I come now to speak of those special duties devolved upon us, in consequence of our relations to God, as sinners, and of his to us through the revealed remedial system. The conviction of personal sinfulness and consequent ill-desert, lies, as we have seen, upon the universal consciousness of humanity. Every where also we find the conviction, in some form, that God has placed man, not under a dispensation of strict retributive justice, but of mercy, in other words, under a remedial system. The question that now arises is, What are the duties which such convictions must sacredly impose upon us?
(1.) The first that I notice is a distinct voluntary recognition of the fact of our sinfulness and ill-desert, on the one hand, and of God's relations to us, through the remedial system, on the other. To have the conviction lie upon the consciousness, that we are sinners, and voluntarily to meet that fact with all the fearful consequences which hang upon it, is quite another. This is the form of duty which the conscience devolves upon every man.
(2.) An act of deep voluntary self-humiliation in the presence of offended infinite justice and goodness, is another form of duty, which the conviction under consideration devolves upon us. The individual upon whose consciousness the conviction of guilt before and against God has long lain, and who has never been induced thereby, in deep humiliation, to bow the knee to the Father of mercies, in confession of guilt, and as a suppliant for pardon, will vainly claim respect for the idea of duty, or moral virtue in any form whatever.
(3.) A most cordial and humble reliance upon the grace proffered to us through the remedial system, for our recovery from the power of sin, for its unlimited pardon, and our restoration to the favor of God. To man, whatever his human eminence may be, there is no royal road to life eternal. Here universal humanity meets upon a common level, and walks in the same "highway of holiness," a way which human pride contemns to its own destruction. No individual, however, meets the solemn behests of conscience, relatively to himself as a sinner, and God as the Author of the remedial system, who does not thus accept of the grace of God. To escape the power and consequences of sin is the first and great duty of the transgressor. No individual does or can attain this end, in any other way than an act of self-humiliation and dependence upon divine grace such as we are now contemplating.
(4.) The last form of duty devolved upon us by the convictions under consideration, is a life of gratitude, humility, faith and obedience, corresponding to the grace of which we have been the recipients. To possess ourselves, and put the race of man in possession of this infinite grace in all its fullness, should be the great end of our existence.
"Greatly instructed I shall hence depart;
Greatly in peace of thought, and have my fill
Of knowledge, what this vessel can contain;
Beyond which was my folly to aspire.
Henceforth I learn, that to obey is best,
And love with fear the only God; to walk
As in his presence; ever to observe
His providence; and on Him sole depend,
Merciful over all his works, with good
Still overcoming evil, and by small
Accomplishing great things, by things deemed weak
Subverting worldly strong, and worldly wise
By simply meek: that suffering for truth's sake
Is fortitude to highest victory,
And, to the faithful, death the gate of life;
Taught this by his example, whom I now
Acknowledge my Redeemer ever blest."
"To whom time also the angel last replied.
'This having learned, thou hast attained the sum
Of wisdom; hope no higher, though all the stars
Thou knewest by name, and all the ethereal powers.
All secrets of the deep, all Nature's works,
Or works of God in heaven, air, earth; or sea,
And all the riches of the world enjoyedst,
And all the rule, one empire; only add
Deeds to thy knowledge answerable; add faith,
Add virtue, patience, temperance; add love,
By name to come called charity, the soul
If all the rest; then wilt thou not be loath
To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess
A Paradise within thee, happier far."'
CHAPTER II.
PRAYER.
Term defined.
ONE of the essential elements of the idea of piety, I have reserved for a separate chapter, to wit, prayer. In treating upon this subject, the first thing which claims our attention is a definition of the duty itself. That which distinguishes prayer in all its forms from every other exercise is this. Prayer is a direct expression, either verbal or mental, of our thoughts, feelings, desires, or purposes, to God. Desire in itself is not prayer. Desire expressed to God is.
Mental Exercises included in prayer.
Four distinct classes of mental exercises are included in prayer, when the term is taken in its widest acceptation, to wit,
1. Adoration and praise, of which the following may serve as an example: "O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth."
2. Thanksgiving for mercies received, "Bless the Lord, O my soul, and forget not all his benefits."
3. Confession. "I acknowledge my sin, and my transgression is ever before me."
Characteristics of Acceptable Prayer.
Prayer, as presented in the scriptures, to be acceptable and prevalent with God, especially in the form of petition, must be attended with the following characteristics:
1. A sense of need, and a consciousness of utter helplessness in ourselves.
2. Confidence, filial and affectionate, in God, as a hearer of prayer. "He that cometh unto God, must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him."
3. A belief that the blessing asked, will be granted, if it is known to be agreeable to the will of God. "This is the confidence that we have in Him, that if we ask any thing according to his will, he heareth us: and if we know that He hear us, whatsoever we ask, we know that we have the petitions that we desired of Him."
4. Cordial submission to the divine will, when this is not known.
5. Faith in Christ, as the only medium through which our petitions can come up with acceptance before God.
6. The motive in asking, must be in accordance with the divine will. "Ye ask, and receive not, because ye ask amiss, that ye may consume it upon your lusts."
7. Urgent importunity, till our petitions are granted, or it is known that the blessing asked is not agreeable to the divine will.—"Men ought always to pray, and not to faint."
9. Such a temper of mind towards our fellow men, as we desire God to cherish towards us. " When ye stand praying, forgive, if ye have aught against any."
Prayer reasonable.
Such are the nature and characteristics of acceptable prayer, as presented in the scriptures of truth. The following considerations will fully establish the fact, that prayer is no less a dictate of the intelligence than of revelation.
1. Wherever the belief of God exists, some form of address to him has been invariably adopted. This shows clearly, that the duty is universally intuitively affirmed, wherever the relation of Creator and creature is apprehended.
2. Under sudden and unexpected calamities, there is universally a spontaneous appeal to God for counsel or aid, a fact undeniably indicating that prayer is a necessary instinct of universal humanity.
3. All acts of prayer, performed in the spirit above described, commend themselves to every man's reason. Under such circumstances, our reason necessarily affirms such acts to be fit and proper.
4. The importance of the duty of prayer necessarily arises from the contemplation of the parental relations of God to us. That a child should express, to its parent, its love and gratitude, confess its faults, and make known its wants, and present its requests, is a necessary affirmation of the reason, in view of the parental and filial relations. When we contemplate ourselves as the offspring of God, and Him, as the Father of our spirits, how plain is the duty and fitness of prayer to Him.
5. Prayer is the appropriate expression and almost necessary result of those affections of filial love, and obedience, which our reason affirms that we ought to cherish towards God. Let those affirmations exist, and prayer can not be restrained without an effort, and such an effort as would powerfully tend to suppress the affections themselves.
6. Prayer devoutly performed tends most powerfully to induce and perpetuate the strong exercise of all right affections and sentiments. To give expression to any affection or sentiment, as all are aware, tends to strengthen the principle upon which it depends. The same must, in a pre-eminent degree, be true of prayer devoutly and reverentially performed.
Importance attached to Prayer in the scriptures.
The light in which God regards the duty of prayer, as manifested in the scriptures, will be seen in the following considerations:
1. Few duties are so frequently and peremptorily commanded. "Pray without ceasing." "Men ought always to pray." "In all things, by prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, let your requests be made known to God."
2. To no duty are more precious promises attached. "Ask, and it shall be given you." "Every one that asketh receiveth."
3. The scriptures abound with examples of the power of prayer.
4. Prayer is always presented as one of the most distinguishing characteristics of holy men, whose histories are recorded in the Bible, and especially of the Lord Jesus Christ.
5. Prayer is presented as one of the fundamental characteristics which distinguish the righteous from the wicked. One of the appellations which distinguish Christians from others, is this: "those that call upon the name of the Lord." Of the hypocrite it is asked: "will he always call upon the Lord?" "The wicked, it is said, through the pride of his countenance, will not seek after God."
6. In the vision which the inspired evangelist had of heaven, the prayers of the saints are represented as sweet incense which comes up before God.—"And when he had taken the book, the four beasts, and four and twenty elders fell down before the Lamb, having every one of them harps, and golden vials full of odours, which are the prayers of saints. And another angel came and stood at the altar, having a golden censer; and there was given unto him much incense, that he should offer it with the prayers of all saints upon the golden altar which was before the throne. And the smoke of the incense, which came with the prayers of the saints, ascended up before God out of the angel's hand."
The above considerations render it quite evident, that to no form of duty is greater importance attached in the scriptures, than to that of prayer. It is equally evident also, that prayer is a medium though which blessings both temporal and spiritual descend to men, blessings which would not be received, but for the acceptable performance of this duty. To such an idea of prayer, the following objections have been urged—objections deserving a passing notice.
1. The absolute omniscience and benevolence of God. He knows perfectly all our necessities, and needs no information from us pertaining to them. His benevolence also is such, that no importunities on the part of creatures are requisite to excite his compassion, or to persuade Him to grant them all real good. It is an impeachment of the divine knowledge and goodness both to suppose that He needs any importunities on our part to render Him propitious to us. To this objection I reply,
(1.) If it has any weight at all, it lies equally against the supposition, that the bestowment of any blessing whatever is conditionated on the performance of any duty of any kind on the part of the creature. Notwithstanding the possession of these perfections, God does not bestow the blessing of pardon without the repentance of the transgressor. God knows perfectly the transgressor's need of pardon, and is so inclined to bestow it, that no relentings in the creature are requisite to excite his compassion. Yet infinite knowledge and goodness do not induce God to pardon the transgressor without repentance. Why then should these perfections induce Him to bestow other blessings, without prayer on the part of the recipient?
(2.) Prayer is a duty as manifestly growing out of the relations of a creature, as a dependent recipient of good, as repentance is, on account of his relations as a sinner. The one, therefore, may as properly be made a condition of the bestowment of special good as the other. Those who object to prayer overlook the fact, that it is the condition of the reception of special favors, in the same sense, and for the same reasons that other duties are, duties necessarily resulting from our varied relations.
(3.) The great want of man is not merely to know that God exists, not merely to attain a true knowledge of his being and perfections; but with this acquaintance, to be rendered distinctly sensible of the fact, that we are the direct and immediate objects of his special regard. What means could He adopt so well adapted to secure this result, as the bestowment of special blessings in answer to special requests on our part. In asking, and receiving, as I ask, I become sensible, as I otherwise could not be, of the direct personal relations which I sustain to the Author of my existence. His being and perfections also, as they otherwise could not be, become distinct and omnipresent realities to my mind. Prayer then, has its basis in other reasons than those supposed in the objection under consideration.
2. Another objection urged is the eternity and immutability of the divine purposes. All that God will
ever do, it is urged, is eternally and immutably preordained. It is folly and impiety in us to expect to change these purposes by prayer. The purposes of God, it should be borne in mind, are conformed to facts eternally foreseen, and are in full and perfect harmony with these facts. If special prayer exists, it exists, as a fact thus foreseen, and with God's purposes eternally and immutably in conformity to them. It stands revealed, as a fixed and immutable purpose of God, that "every one that asketh shall receive." The descent of special blessing, therefore, in answer to special prayer is implied in the immutability of God's purposes, instead of being inconsistent with them. The objection under consideration really assumes that the purposes of God are formed with no reference to facts as they occur, and consequently that prevalent prayer implies a change of such purposes.
(l.) That it manifestly can have no weight against the idea of special spiritual blessings being obtained in answer to prayer. As these comprise the great mass of human necessities, all things working together for our good when these are supplied, and as these are granted only through the special influences of the Spirit and grace of God, the objection under consideration, even if it be admitted to hold in respect to physical blessings, can have no weight at all against prayer, as far as its main objects are concerned.
(2.) As far as temporal, physical blessings are concerned, this objection rests upon nothing else than an assumption which has no other basis than sheer ignorance. Whether God does or does not, by special interpositions, so change the order of providence as to meet the physical necessities, and especially the fervent prayers of the righteous, who can tell? That he does not, I feel quite safe in asserting is neither an ascertained truth of revelation, reason, philosophy, or common sense.
(3.) This objection also assumes, that the unvarying direction of a necessary instinct of universal humanity is towards the unreal, than which no assumption is more contrary to reason and sound philosophy. In all sudden and special exigencies, it is a universal instinct of humanity, to appeal to God for a special interposition for deliverance. No law of nature is more fixed and universal than this. To suppose, as this objection does, that the fixed direction of a necessary and universal law existing in that for which all other laws of the universe were established, to wit, mind, is towards the unreal, is surely a most unreasonable and unphilosophical assumption.
(4.) Even if we suppose, that the laws of nature are fixed and immutable, the objection under consideration is without weight. It may still be true, that even temporal blessings will descend to us if we pray, which would not otherwise descend. The entire providence of God, is undeniably arranged with a changeless reference to the good of mind, at the various stages of its existence. All the facts pertaining to the conduct of creatures, and prayer not among the least, were taken into account in that arrangement. All things are so ordered as to meet such exigencies and especially the requests of the pure in heart. Whether the laws of providence are fixed and immutable or not, whether God interposes to change them, or not, it still remains true, that special blessings may descend to the morally pure, in consequence of fervent prayer on their part blessings which would not otherwise descend to them.
In the scriptures, as we have seen, prayer is required: but no particular form, posture or seasons when the duty is to be performed, are prescribed. These we are to infer from the known relations existing between us and God, and from the examples recorded for our instruction and imitation. A contemplation of these relations, with a sincere desire to know the will of God, renders our duty in these respects as plain, and as sacredly binding, as if enjoined by a special revelation. For example:
1. Individual or private prayer. Who can contemplate his peculiar relations to God, without recognizing the propriety of the command, "when thou prayest, enter into thy closet?"
2. Domestic prayer. If God is to be acknowledged at all, in any relations of life, how manifest is it, that He should be acknowledged in the domestic circle, and by the appointed head and guardian of that circle.
3. Social or public prayer. The same reasons that sanction the duty of prayer in the private and domestic relations, sanction it in all the social relations, especially in those relations existing between the members of the "body of Christ," the Church.
If God had done no more than reveal Himself to us as a hearer of prayer, and had enjoined the duty upon us, no revelation would be necessary to designate the above as among the seasons when this duty ought to be performed.
Prayer at any particular time should have a special relation to the existing state of the individual or circle, domestic or social, engaging in this employment.
REMARKS.
1. The moral state of the individual who leads a prayerless life, becomes quite obvious in the light of the principles above elucidated. He must surely be wholly destitute of proper sentiments in respect to his own weakness, dependence and necessities, as a creature, and equally so of any proper respect for the duties growing out of his relations to his Creator.
2. The excuse so often urged by individuals who neglect this duty, that "they pray in heart," demands a passing notice. It is a changeless law of our existence, that strong affection of every kind will manifest itself in appropriate words and actions. The existence of a true spirit of prayer in the heart is no exception to this law.
3. Any system of religion which overlooks or undervalues the duty, the utility, and power of prayer, is alike opposed to reason and revelation both.
THE LORD'S DAY, OR THE CHRISTIAN SABBATH.
THE question in respect to the keeping of a Sabbath is one of special revelation. It is only, as such, that its observance can be regarded as morally binding. It is in this light therefore, that I shall regard and treat the subject in the present chapter.
"The Sabbath," says our Savior, "was made for man;" that is, it was instituted to meet the demands of our nature. As it was originally given, not to any one particular people or age, but to the race, we are bound to conclude that the keeping of the day in accordance with the divine requisitions respecting it, is demanded by the fundamental laws of our being. The same principle applies to all particular precepts respecting the day. If any particular duties are enjoined, or any particular employments forbidden, we are bound to conclude that such precepts are, based upon the fundamental demands of our physical or moral constitution, or both united.
General Considerations.
In the further consideration of this subject, I will first direct attention to certain general considerations bearing upon the institution, and designed especially to establish the fact of its being perpetually binding upon us, as the recipients of divine revelation. On this point I remark,
1. That the Sabbath was originally given, not to one people, but to the race. In the scriptures, the account of its establishment is connected with that of the creation, and of the first origin of the race. "Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them. And on the seventh day, God ended his work which He had made: and He rested on the seventh day from all the work which He had made. And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it; because that in it He had rested from all his work which God created and made.—Gen. 2:1—3. The term blessed, as here used, can mean nothing less than this, that God ordained the institution of the Sabbath as a day of special blessings to all who would duly observe it. To sanctify the day, means to set it apart from secular to religious uses. This is the fixed and exclusive meaning of the term sanctify, when connected with any common object. The fact that the account of the origin of the institution is connected with that of the creation itself, is sufficient evidence, that its origin is coeval with that of the race, and of the fact, that it was designed not for any one people alone, but for the entire race of man. How strange this account appears, when placed in the light of the idea entertained by some, that the Sabbath was designed only for one people, and merely as an institution of temporary obligation relatively to them. To connect the account of the origin of such an Institution with that of the creation itself, without any intimation whatever of its real subsequent date, would be absurd even in an author uninspired. Then the reason assigned for the institution marks it as designed for the race. What if the Most High had said, I finished the work of creation in six days, and rested on the seventh. For this reason, I now, thousands of years after the creation, sanctify this day, as an institution of temporary obligation for one, the least almost of all the branches of the human race! No man, having any proper respect for the scriptures, can put such a construction upon such a passage. Yet the idea under consideration compels us to do it.
The day also was introduced by Moses to the children of Israel, not as a new, but as an institution already existing. "And it came to pass, that on the sixth day they gathered twice as much bread, two omers for one man; and all the rulers of the congregation came and told Moses. And he said unto them This is that which the Lord hath said, To-morrow is the rest of the holy Sabbath unto the Lord."—Exodus 16: 22, 28. This was a considerable period before the arrival of the Israelites at Sinai, where the Sabbath was formally prescribed to the people. Yet it was presented to them, as a day, the observance of which had previously been commanded by the Most High. It certainly had not been commanded to the Jews, as a people. It must have been given to the race, and to them only as a part of it. We might then, with the some propriety argue, that any of the other of the ten commandments was given to the Jews alone, and given as precepts of temporary obligation even unto them, as to affirm that the Sabbath was thus given.
The almost universal division of time into weeks of seven days among the ancients, and the equally extensive observance of the seventh as a sacred day, clearly evinces also, that the Sabbath, with the division of time which it implies, was not originally given to one people, but to the race. "Sacred" says Hesiod, "in the first place, is the day of the New Moon. Sacred also are the fourth and the seventh days." "Again came the seventh day, the illustrious light of the sun." "The seventh day then arrived," says Homer, "a sacred day." Again he says," The seventh [day] is among good things. The seventh is the birth [day.] The seventh is among the chief things. The seventh is perfect." Hesiod and Homer, as the reader is well aware, are among the most ancient of the Greek writers. Philo, the Jew who was cotemporary with our Savior, says of the Sabbath, "For it is a holy day, not of one city, or place only, but of all the world, a holy day which alone can be described as universal, the birth-day of the world." "Neither is there any city of the Greeks or among foreigners," says Josephus, "not even one nation in the which the custom of observing the seventh day, on which we rest, has not found its way." I might adduce many other testimonies equally to the purpose. But this is sufficient. Such coincidences must have had a common origin, the giving of the Sabbath originally, not to any one people, but to the race.
2. The reason originally assigned for the Institution requires to be specially notice "And God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it; because that in it He rested from all his works which God had created and made." The reason here assigned, as well as that assigned by our Savior, designates the institution, as of changeless obligation. As long as creation should stand before the creatures of God, as his grand work, the reason for observing the institution on the seventh, instead of any other day, would remain unchanged. If, on the other hand, the time should come when, God should perform a work infinitely more important than the creation, such an occurrence would demand, not a destruction of the institution but a change from the seventh to the day on which this last and crowning work of God was completed. Such an occurrence as the above however, instead of being a reason for the abrogation of the Sabbath itself, would be an additional reason of infinite weight for its continued observance, on a different day.
3. Another fact presented in the scriptures designates the institution as of perpetual obligation. It is presented as an emblem of that rest which remains for the people of God in a future state. See Heb. chapters 3 and 4. If this is a reason why one nation in one age should observe the institution, it is a reason equally strong why every nation in every age, should observe it.
4. Another consideration of considerable weight to my mind is this, the fact that the precept requiring the observance of the institution, is placed among nine other precepts of changeless obligation, and which are separate from all other laws, precepts, and institutions, given at the time, as of fundamental importance. The particular phraseology in which the command is given, is adapted with perfect propriety to the institution as then existing, just as the first commandment is conformed in its phraseology to the existing tendencies of the nation and world. Those facts however do not at all diminish the weight of the consideration above stated, in respect to the relation not of the particular day, but of the institution to the changeless laws of our being.
5. The institution of a Sabbath is a manifest demand of our spiritual, religious and social nature. As a spiritual, religious, and social being, worship, individual and social, is a universal instinctive necessity of that nature with which man is endowed. Social worship requires stated days for its performance. As Christianity is designed to be the religion of universal humanity, and as social worship is one of its fundamental elements, a Sabbath is required to perfect its adaptation, as a universal religion, to meet the ends for which it wits given to man. The idea of a Sabbath, that is, of stated days for social worship, is not only a revealed truth, but a necessary demand of the human intelligence. To say, that there should be no Sabbath, is equivalent to the affirmation, that there should be no universal religion an essential element of which is social worship. This is equivalent to the affirmation, that the great want of man growing out of his spiritual, religious and social nature, shall never be met.
More General Considerations.
Such are some of the reasons, intrinsic in the institution itself, in favor of its perpetuity. Some other considerations of a more general nature now require a passing notice.
l. All the commands of the Old and New Testaments requiring public worship demand such a day. Public worship cannot be maintained without some stated day on which it is observed. Had God required his people not to "forget the assembling of themselves together," and not appointed seasons for this purpose, a blank would have been left in the divine institutions, which the necessities of the church must and would have supplied even without the divine sanction. Can we suppose that God appointed and threw such awful sanctions around an institution in one dispensation, and then dropped it in the other, when the same commands of his, and necessities of our nature which demanded it in the former, demand it in the latter?
2. No reasons can be assigned for the institution before Christ, which do not demand it with increasing weight after his ascension.
3. God has invariably set the seal of his approbation to the strict observance of the day. No community can be named, the purity, virtue, intelligence, and general prosperity of which do not bear an almost exact correspondence to the strictness with which the Sabbath is kept. The opposite is true of all Sabbath-breaking communities. Has God thus set his seal to the observance of a day which He has Himself abrogated? If God's providences and Spirit give us any indication of his voice, both distinctly point to the command, "Remember the Sabbath-day to keep it holy," as of universal and of perpetual obligation.
4. The most extensive observation and experience demonstrate, as far as induction can do it, that such a day is demanded by the physical as well as the moral constitution of man.
5. The main objections brought against the Sabbath are based upon a supposed cessation of the relations noticed above, which so obviously demand a Sabbath. Example: the supposition that saints have entered into their rest in such a manner that they have nothing more to do for God, but simply to enjoy peace, that public and private worship are not demanded, and the necessity of receiving mutual instruction and admonition, has been superseded by the light and teachings of the Spirit. As these are all total misapprehensions of the condition and relation of the Christian, the conclusions based upon them fall of course.
The conclusion which forces itself upon every mind is this: either the seventh day is the Sabbath for us, or some other day has been substituted in its place. The last is the position which I shall now endeavor to establish. If the day has been changed, such change may have been made known to us in one of two ways, either of which would equally indicate the divine will to us:
1. By a direct command.
2. By the example of those directly inspired by the Holy Spirit.
To the church to whom they ministered, they would indicate the change by precept and example both. To us however, may be left simply the example of these inspired men, as recorded in the Bible, and of the church under their guidance as recorded in her memorials.
We will now consider the amount of evidence left us in the New Testament, in favor of an existing Sabbath under the new dispensation, and of the fact that the day now observed by Christians is that Sabbath. In remarking upon this day, I remark,
1. That the seventh day, as the day on which the institution is to be observed, has been abolished, by the direct authority of inspiration. In proof of this assertion I adduce a single passage bearing directly upon the subject: "Let no man therefore judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of a holy-day, or of the new moon, or of the Sabbath-days.—Col. 2: 16. The obvious meaning of this passage may be thus expressed. Never admit that you are under obligation to observe any of the institutions or days referred to, so that men may condemn you as guilty of sin for their non-observance. As these institutions and days were instituted directly by divine authority, they can cease to be binding only by the same authority. That they are all alike thus abolished, is in this passage directly asserted. Now if the term "Sabbath," here employed, refers to the seventh day, or to the Jewish sabbath, the keeping of that day as the Sabbath has been superseded by the direct authority of God. That this is the meaning of the term I argue,
(1.) From the fact, that all the other sacred days instituted under the old dispensation were included under the words, "holy day" and "new moon."
(2.) If the term sabbath does include more days than the seventh, no reason can be assigned, why it should not be understood to include this day also, but the strongest reasons to the contrary. The apostle evidently intended to include every thing understood at the time, as included under this term. That the seventh day was included by universal usage no one can doubt. It is a violation of all the laws of interpretation, therefore, to suppose that this day was not included under the term in the passage before us.
(3.) The term sabbath is never, in a solitary instance, used by any of the writers of the New Testament, to designate any of the Jewish sacred days excepting the seventh day. We have then the highest evidence we possibly can have, that this is the day referred to in the passage, and consequently, that the observance of the institution on that day has been formally discontinued by divine authority.
The objection urged by some, that the Jewish feast days must be referred to in this place, from the fact, that in the original, the plural form of the word is used, is without any weight whatever, from the obvious fact, that this is the form most commonly used in the New Testament, to distinguish the seventh day.
2. We have direct and positive evidence, that the observance of the first day of the week was instituted by divine authority as the Christian Sabbath.
In establishing this proposition I will, in the first place, direct attention to Rev. 1: 10. "I was in the spirit on the Lord's day." From this passage I affirm, that there is under the present dispensation, a sabbath, and that the one now regarded by Christians generally, as such, is that day.
The term "Lord's" has a fixed and definite meaning in the scriptures. When applied to any of the common objects of life, it designates some thing set apart from a secular to a sacred use. Thus, the "Lord's Supper," 1 Cor. 11: 20, designates a meal distinguished from common meals, by being observed, as a memorial of the death of Christ, or in honor of Him. So the expression "the Sabbath of the Lord thy God," designates a day separated from all secular pursuits, and devoted to religious worship. What then does the apostle mean by the phrase, "the Lord's day," but a day thus separated, and thus consecrated? There is then such a day under the present dispensation, a day established and recognized as such by inspiration. Else an apostle would not have been inspired of God thus to speak of it.
This could not have been the seventh day of the week, or the Jewish sabbath. This is evident from the fact that that day is always designated by the term sabbath, and was also previously declared by inspiration itself, as we have seen, Col. 2: 16, to have been abolished.
The phrase "the Lord's day," on the other hand, was understood by the entire church at the time, in the very sense attributed to it, to wit, to designate it a day sacred in the sense explained, and the first day of the week as that day. The manner in which the apostle uses the phrase, shows clearly, that it had a fixed and definite meaning, as universally understood at the time in the churches, and that he intended to be understood as using it according to its universal acceptation. What then was the meaning universally attached to the phrase at the time in the churches?
The testimony of Christian writers cotemporary with the apostle, and immediately succeeding him, is perfectly conclusive on that point. Says Barnabas, the companion of Paul, "we keep the eighth as a joyful day, on which day also, Jesus rose from the dead." Ignatius, a cotemporary with the apostle, contrasts the practice of sabbatizing, "with living according to the Lord's day, the day on which our life arose, the day consecrated to the resurrection, and the queen and prince of all days." Again he says "Let every friend of Christ celebrate the Lord's day." Pliny the younger, says of Christians in his letter as governor, to the Emperor Trajan: "That they are accustomed, on a stated day, to meet before day-light, and to repeat among themselves, a hymn to Christ, as to God." This was A. D. 107. That this was the Christian Sabbath, is evident from what has been said above, as well as from the fact that one of the standing questions put to martyrs by Roman persecutors, was, "Have you kept the Lord's day?" The answer usually returned in substance was, "I am a Christian, I can not omit it." To be a Christian, and to observe as the sabbath of the Lord our God, the "Lord's day," that is, the first day of the week, was by them considered as synonymous.
From the time of the apostles onward, the phrase was employed in this same sense, by the church universal. They not only observed the day as a Sabbath, but designated it by the same words. They sometimes used other forms of expression to distinguish the same thing. This, however, was the common designation of the day, and the meaning universally attached to it. To show this I will here present the following extract from the excellent work of "Gurney on the Sabbath."
"An unquestionable evidence on this point is afforded us by Justin Martyr, who in his Apology addressed to the Emperor Antonius (A. D. 147,) gives a lively account of the Christian day of worship. 'On the day called Sunday,' he says, 'there is a meeting in one place of all the Christians who live either in the towns or in the country, and the Memoirs of the Apostles (supposed to mean the four Gospels) or the writings of the prophets, are read to them as long as is suitable. When the reader stops, the president announces the admonition, and exhorts to the imitation of these noble examples; after which we all arise and begin to pray.' Justin then describes the eucharistical meal, and the collection made for the poor, and concludes by explaining why this day of the week was chosen for their public worship. 'We all meet together on the Sunday because it is the first day—on which God turned the darkness [into light,] gave shape to the chaos, and made the world; and on the same day Jesus Christ our Savior rose from the dead.'
Dionysius, Bishop of Corinth (A. D. 170,) when writing to the Romans, informs them that the epistle of Clement their late bishop, had been read in the church at Corinth, while they were keeping the Lord's holy day; an incidental allusion, which proves that the practice of observing that day was familiar both to the writer, and to those persons whom he was addressing.
After the destruction of Jerusalem, and with it of the whole Jewish polity, and during the first two or three centuries of the Christian era, it is probable that the Lord's day was universally recognized as the only Christian sabbath. Ignatius, as we have already remarked, contrasts this day with the old sabbath of the Jews; and while abundant evidence is afforded by the other authors whom we have now cited, that the first day of the week was kept as a solemn day of worship, no mention is made by any of them of the seventh day, as claiming any peculiar honors from Christians. Accordingly Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, (A. D. 167,) expressly asserts that the Lord's day was their sabbath. "On the Lord's day every one of us Christians keeps the sabbath, meditating on the law, and rejoicing in the works of God." So also Turtullian (A. D. 192,) while he makes frequent mention of the keeping of the Lord's day, speaks of the Jewish sabbath as foreign to believers in Jesus. Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, (A. D. 250,) takes no notice of the old sabbath, but repeatedly alludes to the Lord's day, as that which was kept holy among Christians."
I have adduced the above extracts, as full demonstration of the sense in which inspiration itself employs the phrase, "the Lord's day," in the passage under consideration. Inspiration then directly recognizes the day as thus sacred, and as nothing but inspiration could have rendered it such, the keeping of the day as the sabbath of God, was by divine authority introduced into the Christian church, and is consequently binding upon us as such. As a believer in the inspiration of the scriptures, I know not how to get rid of the above argument.
Special attention is now invited to the following passages of scripture: "And we sailed away from Phillippi, after the days of unleavened bread, and came unto them to Troas in five days; where we abode seven days. And upon the first day of the week, when the disciples came together to break bread, Paul preached unto them, (ready to depart on the morrow) and continued his speech until midnight."—Acts 20: 6, 7. "Now concerning the collection for the saints, as I have given order to the churches of Galatia so do ye. Upon the first day of the week let every one of you lay by him in store, as God hath prospered him, that there be no gatherings when I come.—1 Cor. 16: 1, 2. It is quite evident from the manner in which these facts are here recorded, that the custom referred to, the custom of assembling for worship on the "Lord's day," or the first day of the week, was established and universal, at least in the churches at Corinth and Troas. Equally evident is the fact, that this custom was introduced by the apostles themselves, in other words, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. This is rendered certain from two considerations.
(1.) The direct testimony of inspiration. "Now I praise you, brethren, that ye remember me in all things, and keep the ordinances, as I delivered them to you."—1 Cor. 11: 2. Here the apostle affirms, that the church at Corinth were keeping "the ordinances as he delivered them unto them." In a subsequent chapter he refers, as seen above, to the observance of the "Lord's day" as a day of stated worship, as an ordinance established and observed by that church. What is this but a direct affirmation, that he himself had delivered this ordinance unto them? No other conclusion can be legitimately drawn from this palpable fact. We have then the positive testimony of inspiration, that the keeping of the Lord's day was introduced into the churches by divine authority.
(2.) The universal observance of this day in all the churches, as a day sacred in the sense under consideration, and that under the immediate supervision of the apostles, renders it demonstrably evident, that the ordinance must have been introduced by them, that is, by the inspiration of the Spirit of God, through them. A custom absolutely universal in all parts of the world, must have had a common cause for its existence. A custom that did obtain thus universally among churches established by the apostles, and acting under their immediate supervision and control, could have originated from no other cause, than their direction and authoritative dictation. That this was the case among the churches sustaining such a relation to the inspired apostles of Christ in respect to the keeping of the Lord's day, has already been rendered undeniably evident. Additional evidence to any required extent might be adduced, did my limits permit. We can hardly conceive of a case more clearly made out, than is the fact, that the observance of this day as the Christian sabbath, was introduced by the authority of inspiration itself. With those who deny the fact, that the apostles did teach and write under the inspiration of God, in other words, that the New Testament, as well as the Old, is of divine authority, the above argument has nothing to do. As Christians, among whom it is my joy and highest glory to number myself, I see not how to avoid the force of the evidence adduced in favor of the keeping of this day.
As an argument confirmatory of that already adduced from scripture, I now direct attention to the manner in which the first day of the week is referred to by the apostles. Let us suppose that they were inspired by the Holy Spirit to establish this day as the Christian sabbath. The manner in which it is referred to by them, readily falls in with this supposition, and with no other. Why are they so particular in recording the most signal manifestations of divine grace, as having occurred on that particular day? It is needless to adduce examples on this point. The reader, who is familiar with his Bible, is already sufficiently informed on the subject.
To conclude the argument from the direct testimony of scripture, I adduce the fact that the change of the ordinance from the seventh to the first day of the week, is positively foretold by an inspired prophet. "Seven days shall they purge the altar and purify it; and they shall consecrate themselves. And when these days are expired, it shall be, that upon the eighth day, and so forward, the priests shall make your burnt-offerings upon the altar, and you peace-offerings: and I will accept you, saith the Lord God."—Eze. 43: 26, 27.
Under the image of a mystical temple, and of a corresponding arrangement of the church, the prophet shadows forth the glories of the new dispensation. In this passage he affirms that from the time when the work of completing the temple and purifying the altar was consummated, an event to occur on the eighth day, that is on the day after the Jewish sabbath, or the first day of the week, the usual services performed on the seventh day should be performed on the eighth. The meaning of the prophecy can be nothing else than this, that from the time in which the work of redemption was consummated, the eighth, that is the first day of the week, instead of the seventh, should be the day on which public worship should be observed. The change of the sabbath, therefore, from the seventh to the first day of the week is a subject of direct prophecy.
3. As a third and last argument in favor of a change of the Sabbath from the seventh to the first day of the week, I notice the intrinsic reasonableness of such a change. The new dispensation is represented as so far surpassing, as a manifestation of the divine glory, all that God had previously done, that such works, in the comparison, should cease to be "remembered, or to come into mind." Surely the Sabbath should now represent the consummation of "the new heavens and of the new earth," and not that of the old. The change of the day is in itself so reasonable, so accordant with the usual dispensations of Providence, that all who fully enter into the spirit of inspiration would naturally expect it.
OBJECTIONS.
Some objections often adduced against the arguments above presented in favor of an existing Sabbath, as well as against those adduced to prove a change of the day, demand a passing notice in this place.
1. We have no direct and positive command for keeping the Christian Sabbath. I have two remarks to make in reply to this objection:
(1.) It assumes that the will of God is never indicated to us in any other way than by positive command, an hypothesis manifestly false.
(2.) It also assumes that the declaration of an inspired apostle, that a church keeps the ordinances as he delivered them to that church, and a reference to the keeping of the Christian Sabbath, as one of the established customs or ordinances of that and other churches, does not amount to a command. Such an assumption surely is not only without foundation, but untrue.
2. All the ordinances ceased at the destruction of Jerusalem. To this objection I reply,
(1.) This is assumed without a shadow of proof.
(2.) The supposition that the Sabbath was instituted for a period of about thirty or forty years, is intrinsically absurd.
(3.) For such an abrogation, we may at least ask a "thus saith the Lord" or, apostolic example.
(4.) The apostle John probably wrote the Revelation, and certainly lived long after that event. Yet the practice continued in the churches under his immediate inspection, and that without the least interruption.
3. In Rom. 14: 5, and Gal. 2: 16, the apostle does away with the keeping of the Sabbath altogether. Answer:
(1) Such language is to be construed consistently with the ordinances established by the apostle himself, of which the keeping of the Christian Sabbath, we have seen, is one.
(2.) The apostle is evidently speaking of Jewish customs, and consequently of the Jewish Sabbath, and not of Christian ordinances, or of the Christian Sabbath.
4. The Sabbath is a part of the Mosaic ritual.
(1.) This we have seen to be false.
(2.) If so, the Lord's day is none the less binding upon us.
5. The Jewish Sabbath is a type of the rest under the new dispensation. This does not touch "the Lord's day."
6. All days are equally holy to the Christian. True, but not in the same sense. All kinds of employments may not therefore be equally lawful on every day.
7. The divine command, requiring the observance of the seventh day as the Sabbath, has never been repealed. Till repealed, it is binding upon us. The conclusion is admitted; but the principle on which it rests is positively denied. The ground of this denial has been fully shown in the remarks made above on Col. 2: 16.
Argument summarily stated.
The entire argument in favor of the Christian Sabbath, stands before us in this light:
1. That there is, under the present dispensation, a Sabbath, is incontrovertible.
2. That the seventh day, as such a Sabbath, has been repealed by divine authority expressed and implied, is equally certain.
3. The first day of the week is that day, as is evident,
(1.) From express declarations of scripture, as understood by the whole primitive church.
(2.) By the example of the church directly under the control of inspired apostles.
(3.) By the declaration of such an apostle, that the ordinances were kept by at least one of these churches, as he delivered them to that church.
(4.) From the fact that such is the nature of the ordinance of the Sabbath, that the directions of the apostles respecting it could not have been misapprehended.
(5.) The action of the church under the direction of the apostles, together with the facts and declarations recorded in the Bible, can not be accounted for, only on the supposition that the keeping of the first day of the week, as the Christian Sabbath, was an ordinance delivered by them to the churches.
Manner in which the Sabbath should be kept.
One inquiry remains to be answered, to wit, the manner in which the Sabbath should be kept, in order to realize the benefits designed to be conferred upon the race by the institution. In accomplishing this object, we will
1. Inquire into the obligations imposed upon men by the law, respecting the original Sabbath. To understand this subject, we must
(1.) Distinguish between the institution as given to the race, and the same institution as adapted to a particular people, located in one particular part of the world.
(2.) We must distinguish between the particular precepts, respecting the institution as given to that people, and that one precept which presents it as a part of the moral law.
(3.) We must keep in view the two-fold design of the institution: the spiritual interest of man by appropriate religious observances, and the health of his physical system, by an entire suspension of secular labor.
(4.) As the main object of the institution was the advancement of the spiritual interest of man, the apprehension of any means, whether prescribed or not, adapted to that end, will enable us to determine the meaning of the precept, "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy."
(5) To understand the duties appropriate to this day, we must not only determine what is positively required, but what is prohibited. The prohibition is thus expressed: "In it thou shalt not do any work." Every thing properly called work, is positively prohibited. What then, are the kinds of employment which come under this term "work?" I answer,
[I.] Nothing is called work, which is necessary to securing the end of the Sabbath—spiritual good, and physical rest; and securing these objects in the best possible manner.
[2.] Nothing is called work, which is a necessary manifestation of the spirit which we are required to cherish, and which the Sabbath is designed to secure. "It is lawful to do good on the Sabbath day."
[3.] Every thing, not included under either of the above particulars, is comprehended under the head work, and is of course forbidden.
(6.) But as the keeping of the Sabbath has a primary reference to the state of mind, our thoughts, reading and conversation should of course be employed on things sacred and divine. They should also be dissociated from things about which our hands are forbidden to be employed. Such would be the original Sabbath, if its revealed law as given to the race, was binding upon us.
2. The inquiry which now arises is this. Should the Christian Sabbath be kept by us in conformity with the above principles? To this inquiry I answer,
(I.) The Sabbath was made for man. All the above precepts are demanded by his moral and physical constitution.
(2.) Here we have God's judgment respecting the manner in which the Sabbath should be kept. Such a revelation surely is law to us.
(3.) No reason can be assigned why the present should be kept less sacred. On the other hand, all the reasons lie on the opposite side.
(4.) All the indications of providence favor this supposition. The virtue, order, intelligence, and prosperity of every community is, as its observance of the Sabbath.
(5.) No reason can be assigned why a Sabbath, if kept at all, should not be kept in accordance with the principles above elucidated.
CHAPTER IV.
SUBJECTIVE DUTIES, OR THE DUTIES WHICH WE OWE TO OURSELVES.
"MAN" says Kant, "as a part of the physical system (homo phenomenon, animal rationale,) is an animal of very little moment, and has but a common value with beasts, and the other products of the soil. Even that he is superior to those by force of his understanding, gives him only a higher external value in exchange, when brought to the market along with other cattle, and sold as wares.
"But man considered as a person, that is, as the subject of ethico-active reason, is exalted beyond all price: for as such (homo noumenon,) he can not be taken for a bare means, conducive either to his own or to other persons' ends, but must be esteemed an end in himself; that is to say, he is invested with an internal dignity (an absolute worth,) in name of which, he extorts reverence for his person, from every other finite intelligent throughout the universe, and is entitled to compare himself with all such, and to deem himself their equal."
The great idea presented in the above passage is this: man, as an intelligent being, is not a means, but an end. In this light each individual of the race is to be contemplated.
That which distinguishes a rational being from all others is, that he may, and should be to himself an end, in the same sense that any other, and every other such being is. Man, for example, may make his own character, his own nature, and his own well-being an end, in the same sense that he can that of any other being; in other words, he may elect, and use means to secure the perfecting of his own character, his own confirmation in virtue, and his own well-being, in the same sense, and in the same manner, that he can those of intelligent beings around him. Hence it is that all duty, with a moral agent, does not pertain to other beings. There are, on the other hand, duties peculiar and specific, which he owes to himself, duties which would devolve upon him, did no other being than himself exist. There are duties also which he owes to himself consequent on his existence, as an inhabitant of a realm of ends. To a consideration of such duties, the present chapter will be devoted.
1. I remark, then, in the first place, that every moral agent should propose to himself as an end, relatively to himself, to stand fully approved, in regard to all acts and mental states of a moral character, and that in respect to himself, and all other beings, at the bar of his own, and consequently at that of the universal conscience. "And herein do I exercise myself, to have always a conscience void of offence toward God and toward men." Never was a greater or better thought, or rather intention announced by a rational being. The idea which overshadows all others, in the human intelligence, is the idea of duty. Hence to stand fully approved, at the bar of conscience, is the great want of all rational existences. To stand thus approved, relatively to himself, every man should propose to himself, as the law of his existence and entire activity.
2. To establish and confirm in ourselves the principle and habit of self-control, is another end which every individual should propose to himself as an end of his existence relatively to himself. Each department of our mental constitution has its appropriate sphere relatively to every other. The intellect presents those ends towards which all mental activity should be directed. The appropriate sphere of the will is to hold all departments of our nature in subordination to those ends, while it devotes the entire energies of our being to their realization. In the varied states of the sensibility, all good or ill, happiness or misery consists. The various states of the sensibility, are excited spontaneously in, the presence of their appropriate objects, and impel the will to seek present gratification irrespective of all consequences, natural or moral. When the ends which the intelligence affirms we ought to pursue are present to the mind, it often finds itself strongly impelled in the opposite direction, by the impulses of the sensibility demanding immediate and present gratification. Self-control implies the continued subjection of all such impulses to the ends under consideration. He that most fully realizes this idea attains to the highest elevation to which humanity does or can reach. "He that ruleth his own spirit is greater than he that taketh a city." To attain this high prerogative should be one of the first and great ends of our existence.
3.Another subjective end which every rational being should propose to himself, is the full realization in his own character of the idea of mental independence.
4. The harmonious development of all our powers, mental and physical, as a means of accomplishing the purposes of our existence, is another end which every one should propose relatively to himself. Each intelligent was created for a particular sphere of activity. To the appropriate occupancy of that sphere, a continued and harmonious development of all our powers, mental and physical, is demanded. Through the intelligence, mind was made to converse with universal truth. Through the sensibility it may become a blissful partaker of the blessedness which the knowledge of the truth was designed to impart. Through the will it may direct its immortal energies for the realization of those high ends, in the accomplishment of which it realizes its destiny. The physical organization was designed to be the basis of all these operations. No department of our nature answers its end, but upon one condition, that it receives its appropriate development. Self-cultivation then should be an end which every one should propose to himself, as one of the great ends of his existence.
5. Another object which every one should propose to himself as an end, is to render himself in all respects, to himself, and consequently to others, worthy of esteem. To make it an object to acquire esteem is one thing. To aim to render ourselves truly deserving of it, and that as a sacred duty which, as rational beings, we owe to ourselves, to God, and to the world, is quite another. The attainment of this end will be an object which every wise man will propose to himself, as one of the essential aims of his existence.
7. Self-knowledge should also be one of the fixed subjective ends of every intelligent being. To know what we are, what we have been, and what we ought to be, to understand distinctly to what our powers are adapted, and to what they are adequate, are indispensable to the appropriate occupancy of the spheres of existence and activity to which Providence has assigned, or may assign us. Thus to know ourselves will be our steady aim, if we follow the dictates of true wisdom.
8. The correction of all habits and tendencies in ourselves which incline us to the evil and from the good, together with the development and confirmation of others of an opposite character, should command our special regard, in all our subjective ends and aims. In all, strong tendencies to evil do exist, and happy is he whose will has not generated, and to a great extent confirmed the habit of subjection to such tendencies. Self-correction and emendation, consequently, become one of the first duties which we owe to ourselves. Then to develop and confirm in ourselves all tendencies and habits of an opposite nature, should command an equal regard.
9. Finally, in all our personal ends and aims, we should contemplate ourselves as the sons and daughters, not merely of time, but eternity, and educate ourselves accordingly. This indeed should be the supreme subjective end of life.
CHAPTER V.
SUBJECTIVE DUTIES CONTINUED. PARTICULAR FORMS OF SUBJECTIVE DUTIES, TOGETHER WITH THE VICES TO WHICH THEY STAND OPPOSED.
THE application" of the principles and subjective ends stated and elucidated in the last chapter are many and important. To some of these, attention will now be directed, in the present and succeeding chapter. The forms of subjective duties, together with the vices to which they stand opposed, claiming our attention, present themselves to our consideration under two classes—those which pertain directly and exclusively to the mind—and those which stand related more especially to external actions. The former will be the subject of elucidation in the present chapter. Among these we will consider in the first place,
HUMILITY AND PRIDE.
God has so constituted us that we not only derive happiness from the conscious possession of mental and moral worth, but also from the esteem which the possession of such characteristics excites in the minds of spectators. Such esteem is in itself a good, and as such, it should be reckoned among the rewards which a beneficent and righteous Providence has added to well-doing. On the other hand, the universal disesteem which a want of moral rectitude excites, is one among the many retributions which God has annexed to evil-doing. There are three reasons, then, why a person of moral worth would desire to know himself, and would be willing to be known to the world—a love of truth—a wish to correct whatever in himself might be wrong—the happiness arising from a conscious possession of a virtuous character, and the consequent esteem of others. His love of truth, his moral rectitude, would induce in him a willingness to be subject to all the disesteem justly due to evil-doing, when he is conscious of having erred from the path of rectitude.
For opposite reasons a vicious person chooses to be unknown to himself and others, as far as moral character is concerned. He rather chooses to be esteemed the opposite of what he is.
We are now prepared to define humility, and pride its opposite, and to show the merit of the former, and the demerit of the latter.
Humility.
This virtue does not consist in any intellectual convictions relative to ourselves, nor in any mere involuntary emotions necessarily consequent on such convictions. Such phenomena are common to all rationals, whether virtuous or not. Humility, on the other hand, as moral virtue, pertains exclusively to the will. The term expresses a certain attitude of the will relative to ourselves. As a moral virtue, it consists in a cordial consent and choice of the will, to know ourselves and be known by others as we are, to esteem ourselves, and be esteemed by others in perfect accordance with our real intrinsic and relative physical, mental and moral worth. It implies also a similar state relative to all other beings. Hence an individual endued with this spirit is not displeased or offended at the thought that other beings possess higher worth, and consequently deserve, and may command more esteem than himself. He is fully satisfied with the measure of esteem which his real worth ought to command, and which, in the arrangements of Providence, it does, or will command. Such is the virtue of humility. Its full possession is necessary to a consciousness of internal worth, as well as a conscious claim to the esteem of others. The moment a moral agent becomes unwilling to be to himself, to God, and the universe, what he really is, he can not but be conscious to himself of a forfeiture of a right to the esteem of any being. The revelation of this virtue, on the other hand, to the eye of consciousness, or to public recogni