THE WORKS OF
JAMES ARMINIUS
VOL. 3
A FRIENDLY DISCUSSION
BETWEEN
JAMES ARMINIUS & FRANCIS JUNIUS,
CONCERNING PREDESTINATION,
CONDUCTED BY MEANS OF LETTERS
The origin of this discussion is thus stated by the elder
Brandt: "On the subject of Predestination, he [Junius]
endeavoured to defend the opinion of Calvin, by rendering it
a little more palatable. For he did not maintain that the
divine predestination had respect to mankind either
ANTECEDENT TO THE DECREE OF THEIR CREATION, or SUBSEQUENT TO
THEIR CREATION, ON A FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THEIR FALL, but that it
had respect only to MAN ALREADY CREATED, so far as BEING
ENDOWED BY GOD WITH NATURAL GIFTS, HE WAS CALLED TO A
SUPERNATURAL GOOD. On that account James Arminius, then one
of the ministers of the church at Amsterdam, entered into an
epistolary conference with him, and tried to prove that the
opinion of Junius, as well as that of Calvin, inferred the
NECESSITY OF SIN, and that he must therefore, have recourse
to a third opinion, which supposed man, not only AS CREATED
but AS FALLEN, to have been the object of predestination.
Junius answered his first letter with that good temper, which
was peculiar to him, but seemed to fabricate out of the
various opinions concerning predestination one of his own,
which, Arminius thought contradicted all those which it was
his endeavour to defend. Arminius was induced to compose a
rejoinder to the answer of Junius, which he transmitted to
the Professor, who retained it full six years, to the time of
his death, without attempting to reply."
The letter of Arminius was divided by Junius into twenty-
seven propositions in answering it, and each of them is here
presented, with the answer of Junius, and the reply of
Arminius, corresponding to it.
TO THE
MOST DISTINGUISHED MAN,
FRANCIS JUNIUS, D.D.,
A BROTHER IN CHRIST, WORTHY OF MY MOST PROFOUND REGARD, JAMES
ARMINIUS WISHES YOU HEALTH.
MOST DISTINGUISHED AND VENERATED SIR:
They who do not give their assent to the sentiments of
others, seem to themselves, and wish to seem to others, to
be, in this, under the influence of sound judgment; but
sometimes, ignorance of the sentiments of others is the cause
of this, which, nevertheless, they by no means acknowledge. I
have not hitherto been able to agree, in the full persuasion
of my mind, with the views of some learned men, both of our
own and of former ages, concerning the decrees of
predestination and of reprobation.
Consciousness of my own lack of talents does not permit me to
ascribe the cause of this disagreement to sound judgment:
that I should ascribe it to ignorance is hardly allowed by my
own opinion, which seems to me to be based on an adequate
knowledge of their sentiments. On this account I have been
till this time in doubt; fearing to assent to an opinion of
another, without a full persuasion in my own mind; and not
daring to affirm that which I consider more true, but not in
accordance with the sentiments of most learned men. I have,
therefore, thought it necessary for the tranquillity of my
mind, to confer with learned men concerning that decree, that
I might try whether their erudite labours might be able to
remove my doubt and ignorance, and produce in my mind
knowledge and certainty. I have already done this with some
of my brethren; and with others, whose opinions have
authority, but thus far, (to confess the truth,) with a
result useless, or even injurious to me. I thought that I
must have recourse to you, who, partly from your published
works, and partly from the statements of others, I know to be
a person such that I may, without fear, be permitted to hope
from you some certain result.
REPLY OF FRANCIS JUNIUS TO THE MOST LEARNED MAN, AND MY VERY
DEAR BROTHER, JAMES ARMINIUS GREETING:
TERTULLIAN, On whose works, as you know, I have now been long
engaged, has been the cause of my long silence, respected
brother. In the mean time, I placed your letter on a shelf
plainly in my view, that I might be reminded of my obligation
to you, and might attend, at the earliest possible
opportunity, to your request. You desire from me an
explication of a question of a truly grave character, in
which the truth is fully known to God: that which is
sufficient He had expressed in His written word, which we
both consult with the divine help. You may set forth openly
what you think and do not think. You desire that I should
present my views, that from this mutual interchange and
communication of sentiments, we may illustrate the truth of
divine grace. I will do what I can according to the measure,
which the Lord has admeasured to me; and whatever I may
perceive of this most august mystery, I will indicate it,
whether I regard it as truth or as a merely speculative
opinion, that you with me may hold that which belongs to the
Deity. Whatever pertains to my opinion, if you have a more
correct sentiment, you may, in a kind and brotherly manner,
unfold it, and by a salutary admonition recall me into the
way of truth. I will here say nothing by way of introduction,
because I prefer to pass at once to the subject itself, which
may rather be "good to the use of edifying," as the apostle
teaches. I judge that all desire the truth in righteousness:
but all do not therefore see the truth in righteousness. "We
know in part, and we prophesy in part," (1 Cor. xiii, 9,) and
"when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you
into all truth." (John xvi, 13.) We perceive a part of the
truth: and present a part; the rest will be given in his own
time, by the Spirit of truth to those who seek. May he
therefore grant to both of us that we may receive and may
present the truth.
That we may both realize greater advantage from this
brotherly discussion, and that nothing may carelessly fall
from me, I will follow the path marked out in your letters,
writing word for word, and distinguishing the topics of your
discussion into propositions; and will subjoin to them, in
the same order, my own opinion concerning each point, that in
reference to all things you may be able to see clearly, and
according to the Divine will, determine from the mode of my
answer, what I think and what I do not think. The following
is your first proposition, in which you may recognize
yourself as speaking.
FIRST PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I see, then, most renowned sir, that there are three views in
reference to that subject, [predestination] which have their
defenders among the doctors of our church. The first is that
of Calvin to Beza; the second that of Thomas Aquinas and his
followers; the third that of Augustine and those who agree
with him. They all agree in this, that they alike hold that
God, by an eternal and immutable decree, determined to bestow
upon certain men, the rest being passed by, supernatural and
eternal life, and those means which are the necessary and
efficacious preparation for the attainment of that life.
THE REPLY OF FRANCIS JUNIUS TO THE FIRST PROPOSITION OF
ARMINIUS
If one should wish to accumulate a variety of opinions, he
would in appearance have a large number of them; but let
these be the views of men to whom will readily be assigned
the first place in relation to this doctrine. But in
reference to the points of agreement among them all, of which
you speak, there are, unless I am deceived, two things most
worthy of explanation and notice. First, that what you say is
indeed true, that "God, by an eternal and immutable decree,
determined to give eternal, supernatural life to certain
men;" but that eternal life is not here primarily, or per se
the work of that divine predestination, but rather in a
secondary manner, and dependent, by consequence, on adoption
th~v uiJoqesiav The apostle demonstrates this in Ephes. i, 5.
"Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by
Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of
his will." And in verse 11, "which He hath purposed in
Himself; that in the dispensation of the fullness of time, He
might gather together in one all things in Christ," &c.
Also, Romans viii, 17, "if children, then heirs; heirs of
God, and joint-heirs with Christ," &c. We must not, however,
forget that if an effect is substituted for the
distinguishing part of the essence the definition of the
thing is defective. Predestination, if we regard its peculiar
and distinguishing quality, is, according to the testimony of
the Scripture, to filiation, (so to speak,) or the adoption
of children, the effect and sequence of which is eternal
life. It is thus true that we are predestinated to life, but,
accurately speaking, we are predestinated to adoption by the
special grace of our heavenly Father. He who proposes one,
supposes the other; but it is necessary that the former
should be always set forth distinctly in the general
discussion. Hence it seems that the arrangement of this whole
argument will be less encumbered, if we consider that saving
decree of the divine predestination in this order; that God
has predestinated us to the adoption of children of God in
Christ "to himself," and that he has pre-arranged by his own
eternal decree the way and the end of that adoption; the way
of that grace, leading us in the discharge of duty, by our
vocation and justification, but its end, that of life, which
we shall obtain when our glorification is perfected, (Rom.
8,) which are the effects of that grace, and the most certain
consequences of our adoption. The statement that God has
predestinated certain persons to life, is a general one; but
it is not sufficiently clear or convenient for the purpose of
instruction, unless gratuitous adoption in Christ is
supposed, prior to justification and life and glory.
There is still another statement, made by you, which seems to
me to need consideration, that "God has bestowed on certain
men those means which are the necessary and efficacious
preparation for the attainment of that life." For though that
assertion is true, yet it must be received with cautious
discrimination and religious scrupulousness. Our filiation is
(so to speak) the work of the divine predestination, because
God is our father, and by His grace unites us to himself as
sons. But whatever God has ordained for the consummation of
this adoption in us, it is, in respect to that adoption, not
a means but a necessary adjunct or consectary. That eternal
life, bestowed on us, is a consectary of our adoption "to
himself." But in respect to the adjuncts and consequence,
they may be called mutually, the means one of another; as
calling is said to be the means of justification, and
justification of glorification, (Rom. 8.) Yet though they are
means, most of them are necessary and efficacious in certain
respects, not per se and absolutely. For if they were, per se
and absolutely necessary and efficacious, they would be
equally necessary and efficacious in all the pious and elect.
Yet most of them are not of this character; since even
infants and they who come in their last hours, being called
by the Lord, will obtain eternal life without those means.
These things have been said, the opportunity being presented.
We agree generally in reference to the other matters.
THE REPLY OF JAMES ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF FRANCIS JUNIUS
To that most distinguished person, Doctor Francis Junius, and
my brother in Christ, to be regarded with due veneration.
REVEREND SIR:
I have read and reviewed your reply, and used all the
diligence of which I was capable, considering it according to
the measure of my strength, that I might be able to judge
with greater certainty concerning the truth of the matter
which is under discussion between us. But while I consider
everything in the light of my judgment, it seems to me that
most of my propositions and arguments are not answered in
your reply. I venture, therefore, to take my pen and to make
some comments in order to show wherein I perceive a
deficiency in your answer, and to defend my own arguments. I
am fully persuaded that you will receive it with as much
kindness as you received the liberty used in my former
letter, and if any thing shall seem to need correction and to
be worthy of refutation, you will indicate it to me with the
same charity; that, by your faithful assistance, may be able
to understand the truth which I seek with simplicity of
heart, and explain it to others to the glory of God and their
salvation, as occasion shall demand. May that Spirit of truth
be present with me, and so direct my mind and hand, that it
may in no respect err from the truth. If however any thing
should fall from me not in harmony with its meaning, I shall
wish that it had been unsaid, unwritten.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO HIS FIRST PROPOSITION
In my former letter I laid down three views held by our
doctors in reference to the decree of Predestination and
Reprobation, diverse, not contrary. Others might perhaps have
been adduced, but not equally diverse among themselves or
from others. For each of these are distinguished by marks
which are manifest and have reference to the essence and
nature of the subject itself, which is under discussion.
First, they give the object of the decree (man) a different
mode or form, since the first presents him to the Deity as an
object to be created, the second as created, the third as
fallen.
Secondly, they adapt to that decree attributes of the Deity,
either different or considered in a different relation. For
the first presents mercy and justice as preparing an object
for themselves; the third introduces the same attributes as
finding their object prepared; the second places grace, which
holds the relation of genus to mercy, over predestination;
and liberty of grace over non-election or the preparation of
preterition, and justice over punishment.
Thirdly, they differ in certain acts. The first view
attributes the act of creation to that decree, and makes the
fall of man subordinate to the same decree; the second and
the third premises creation; the third also supposes the fall
of man to be antecedent in the order of nature to the decree,
regarding the decree of election which flows from mercy and
that of reprobation which is administered by justice, as
having no possible place except in reference to man
considered as a sinner, and on that account meriting misery.
It is hence apparent that I have not improperly separated
those views which are themselves separated and discriminated
by some marked distinction. But you will perhaps persuade me
that our doctors differ only in their mode of presenting the
same truth, more easily than you will persuade them or their
adherents. For Beza in many places sharply contends that God,
when predestinating and reprobating man, considers him, not
as created, not as fallen, but as to be created, and he
claims that this is indicated by the term "lump," used in
Rom. ix, 21, and he charges great absurdities on those who
hold different views. For example, he says that they "who
present man as created to God decreeing, consider the Deity
as imprudent, creating man before he had his own mind
arranged any thing in reference to his final condition. He
accuses those who present man as fallen, of denying, divine
providence, without the decree or arrangement of which sin
entered into the world, according to their view. But I can
readily endure, indeed I can praise any one who may desire to
harmonize the views of the doctors, rather than to separate
them more widely, only let this be done by a suitable
explanation of views, apparently diverse, not by change in
statement, or by any addition, differing from the views
themselves. He, who acts otherwise, does not obtain the
desired fruit of reconciliation, and he gains the emolument
of an erroneously stated sentiment, the displeasure of its
authors.
As to those two respects in which you think that my
explanation of the agreement of those views needs
animadversion, in the former I agree, in the latter I do not
much disagree with you. For Predestination is, immediately,
to adoption, and, through it, to life; but when I propose the
sentiments of others, I do not think that they should be
corrected by me. Yet I cheerfully receive the correction;
though I consider that it has little or nothing to do with
this controversy. Indeed I think that it tends to confirm my
view. For adoption in Christ not only requires the
supposition of sin as a condition requisite in the object,
but of a certain other thing also, of which I did not in my
former letter think it best to treat. That thing is faith in
Jesus Christ, without which adoption is in fact bestowed on
no man, and, apart from the consideration of which, adoption
is prepared for no one by the divine predestination. (John i,
12.) For they who believe are adopted, not they who are
adopted receive the gift of faith: adoption is prepared for
those who shall believe, not faith is prepared for those who
are to be adopted, just as justification is prepared for
believers, not faith is prepared for the justified. The
Scripture demonstrates that this is the order in innumerable
passages. But I do not fully understand in what sense you
style vocation and justification the way of adoption. That
may be called the way of adoption which will lead to
adoption, and that also by which adoption tends to its own
end. You seem to me to understand the term way in the latter
sense, from the fact that you make justification subsequent
to adoption, and you speak of the way of grace leading us in
the discharge of duty, by our vocation and justification.
Here are two things not unworthy of notice. The first is that
you connect vocation with adoption as antecedent to it, which
I think can scarcely be said of vocation as a whole. For the
vocation of sinners and unbelievers is to faith in Christ;
the vocation of believers is to conformity to Christ and to
communion with him. The Scripture makes the former antecedent
to adoption. The latter is to adoption itself, which is
included in conformity and communion with Christ. The second
is that you made adoption prior to justification; both of
which I regard as bestowed on believers at the same time,
while in the order of nature, justification is prior to
adoption. For the justified person is adopted, not the
adopted person is justified. This is proved by the order both
of the attainment of those blessings made by Christ, and that
of the imputation of the same blessings made by God in
Christ. For Christ obtained the remission of sins, before he
obtained adoption, before in the order of nature: and
righteousness is imputed before sonship. For "when we were
enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son,"
(Rev. v, 10,) but being reconciled, we are adopted as sons.
Let us consider also what are opposed to these, namely,
imputation of sins and non-adoption. From these it is clearly
seen that such is the order. Sin is the cause of exclusion
from filiation by the mode of demerit. Imputation of sin is
the cause of the same exclusion by the mode of justice,
punishing sin according to its demerit. In reference to your
remarks concerning means, I observe that this term is applied
by the authors to whose sentiments I refer, to those things
which God makes subordinate to the decree of Predestination,
but antecedent to the execution of that decree, not those by
which or in respect to which Predestination itself is made,
whether to adoption or to life. But I think it may be most
useful to consider whether these, either as adjuncts, or
consectaries, or means, or by whatever other name they may be
called, are only effective to consummate the adoption already
ordained for certain individuals, or whether they were
considered by the Deity in the very act of predestination to
sonship, as necessary adjuncts of those to be predestinated.
SECOND PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
They differ in this, that the first presents men as not yet
created, but to be created, to God, electing and
predestinating, also passing by and reprobating, (though, in
the latter case, it does not so clearly make the
distinction): the second presents them created, but
considered in a natural state, to God electing and
predestinating, "to be raised from that natural state above
it; it presents them to Him in the act of preterition, as
considered in the same natural state, and to Him in that of
reprobation, as involved in sin by their own fault: the third
presents them to Him both electing and predestinating, and
passing by and reprobating as fallen in Adam, and as lying in
the mass of corruption and perdition.
THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SECOND PROPOSITION
That, in this statement of views (which are apparently, not
really, contradictory) you have, in some manner, fallen into
error, we shall, in its own place, demonstrate. I could wish
that in this case an ambiguity, in the verb reprobate, and
the verbal reprobation, had been avoided. This word is used
in three ways; one general, two particular. The general use
is when non-election, or preterition and damnation, is
comprehended in the word, in which way Calvin and Beza
frequently understood it, yet so as to make some distinction.
A particular mode or signification is when it is opposed to
election, and designates non-election or preterition (a Latin
phrase derived from forensic use) in which sense the fathers
used it according to the common use of the Latins. There is
also a particular use of the word, when reprobation is taken
for damnation, as I perceive that it is used by you in this
whole letter. The first mode is synecdochical, the second
common, the third metonymical; I add that the third might
properly be called catachrestic if we attend to the just
distinction of these members. I wholly approve the second
meaning and shall adhere to it in this whole discussion.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SECOND PROPOSITION
I have made a difference, not a contrariety between those
views, and have already explained that difference according
to my judgment. I do not, however, wish to be tedious in the
proof of this point. For, in this matter, it is my aim that
of a number of positions, any one being established, others,
perhaps before unsettled, may be demonstrated.
The word reprobation may be sometimes used ambiguously, but
it was not so used by me: and, if it had been, blame for that
thing ought not to be laid on me, who have used that word in
the sense and according to the use of those, whose views I
presented, but especially according to the sense in which it
has been used by yourself, with whom I have begun this
discussion. For I had examined various passages in your
writings, and in them I found that the word was used by you
in the last sense, which you here call catachrestic. I will
adduce some of those passages, from which you will see that I
have used the word in accordance with your perpetual usage.
In your Notes on Jude, (fol 27-6,) "The proper cause of
reprobation is man himself; of his own sin, dying in sins."
So in your Sacred Axioms concerning Nature and Grace,
prefaced to the Refutation of the Pamphlet of Puccius, Axioms
xliv, xlv, xlvi, xlvii, xlviii, and especially xlix and l,
the words of which I here quote. Axiom xlix, "Nor is
preterition indeed the cause of reprobation or damnation, but
only its antecedent. But the peculiar and internal efficient
cause of this is the sin of the creature, while the
accidental and external cause is the justice of God." Axiom
i, "Therefore Reprobation (that we may clearly distinguish
the matter) is understood either in a wider sense, or in one
which is more narrow and peculiar to itself. In a wider
sense, if you consider the whole subject of the divine
counsel from preterition, as the antecedent and commencement,
to damnation, as the end and consequent, with the
intervention of the peculiar cause of damnation, namely, sin;
in a more narrow and appropriate sense, if you consider only
the effects of sin." We might add, also, what is said in the
51st axiom. Of the theses concerning Predestination,
discussed by Coddaeus under you, the 14th has this remark:
"Preterition is the opposite of preparation of grace and
reprobation or preparation of punishment is the opposite of
preparation of glory. But preparation of punishment is the
act in which God determines to punish his creatures, &c." In
theses 17 and 18, "reprobate on account of sins, from the
necessity of justice." Here you seem to have wished to use
those words properly: which you also signify more plainly in
the Theses concerning election discussed by the younger
Trelcatius under your direction. Thesis xii, "But if
reprobation is made the opposite of election, (as it really
is,) it is a figurative expression, that is either by
synecdoche, or by catachresis. By synecdoche, if it refers to
the whole series of acts opposed to Predestination; by
catachresis, if it refers to non-election. For non-election
is the first limit of the divine purpose, dependent on his
will alone. Reprobation is the ultimate limit, next to the
execution, dependent on the supposition of antecedent
causes." Hence it is apparent that I have used that word in
the sense which you have styled "appropriate." I will state,
in a few words, what I think in reference to the same word,
and its use. I am wholly of the opinion that the word
reprobation, according to the use of the Latin language,
properly signifies non-election, if election does not consist
without reprobation. But I think that it is never used in the
Scripture for an act which is merely negative, and never for
an act which has reference to those who are not sinners. If
at any time Augustine and others of the fathers use it for
preterition, non-election, or any negative act, they consider
it as having reference to a reelection in sin, and in the
mass of corruption, or for a purpose to withhold mercy, the
latter term being used for a deliverance from sin and actual
misery. Calvin and Beza use it in almost every case, for the
mere preparation of punishment, or for both acts.
THIRD PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The first theory is this, that God determined from eternity
to illustrate his own glory by mercy and justice: and as
these could be exercised in fact only in reference to
sinners, that he decreed to make man holy and innocent, that
is, after his own images yet, good in such a sense as to be
liable to a change in this condition, and able to fall and to
commit sin: that he ordained also that man should fall and
become depraved, that He might thus prepare the way for the
fulfillment of his own eternal counsels, that he might be
able mercifully to save some and justly to condemn others,
according to his own eternal purpose, to the declaration of
his mercy in the former, and of his justice in the latter.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE THIRD PROPOSITION
This view seems to have been stated not with sufficient
fullness; for Calvin in his Institutes, (lib. 3,) eloquently
refers to the words of Paul in Ephes. i, "He predestinated
us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself,
&c.," and explains them, preserving the order which we
noticed under Proposition I. God therefore from eternity
determined to illustrate most wisely his own glory by the
adoption of these and the preterition or non-adoption of
those with the introduction also of mercy and justice. This
being settled, that statement may be very well conceded, that
"God determined to illustrate his own glory by mercy and
justice, if it is rightly understood. But this will be
hereafter explained in a summary manner. But it cannot be
conceded, nor can I think that Calvin or Beza would have said
simply that "mercy and justice cannot in fact be exercised
except in reference to sinners. For in the first place (that
we may sooner or later explain these things), sinners are
such in act, in habit, or in capability. We are sinners in
act when the depravity of our nature has carried out its own
operations; we were sinners in habit in the womb and from the
womb, before we wrought the works of the flesh. Adam was such
in capability in some sense before the fall, when he had the
power to lay aside his holy habits of life, and make himself
the bond-slave of sin. So also they are miserable, in act, in
habit, or in capability, who now endure miseries or have put
on the habit of them, are capable of falling into them. The
latter, however, are sinners and miserable, not absolutely
but relatively; not fully but in a certain sense (kata ti)
and only in a comparative mode of speaking as Job iv, 18,
"Behold He put no trust in his servants; and his angels he
charged with folly." Augustine refers to this (Lib. contra.
Priscill et Origen, cap 10) concluding his remarks with this
most elegant sentence: "for by participation in whom they are
righteous, by comparison with Him they are unrighteous."
But in the second place it is not true that "mercy cannot be
exercised except in reference to sinners," for all creatures,
even the angels from heaven, when compared, according to
their own nature, with the Deity, are wretched, since in
comparison with Him they are not righteous, and because, by
their own nature, they can sink into misery, (which is
certainly the capability of misery; as, on the contrary, not
to be capable of misery, is the highest happiness), they are
miserable by capability. Therefore, He who has freed them
from possible misery by His own election, has bestowed mercy
on them; in reference to which they are called "elect angels"
by Paul. (1 Tim. v, 21.) We may here merely refer to the fact
that the word mercy (the Latin term misericordia being used
in a more contracted sense) does not necessarily suppose
misery, as will be seen by a reference to the original
languages, the Hebrew and Greek, in which the men of God
wrote. The Hebrews expressed that idea by two words dsj and
symjr neither of which had reference properly and necessarily
to misery e]leov of the Greeks does not necessarily suppose
misery, if we regard the common usage of the Scriptures; for
parents exercise it towards their children, though happy and
free from misery. In the third place, it is by no means more
true that "he can exercise justice only in reference to
sinners." For he who renders to each his due, exercises
justice: but God would clearly not be just if he did not
render their due to the righteous as well as to the
unrighteous. For even towards Adam, if he had remained
righteous, God would have exercised justice both by the
bestowment of his own reward upon him, analogous to his
righteousness, and by that supernatural gift, analogous to
his own power and grace, which He adumbrated to man by the
symbol of the tree of life. It was possible that God should
exercise justice in reference even to those who were not
sinners. But concerning judgment to death, the case is
different. From what has already been said, we readily
conclude in reference to the rest. In reference to the word
ordain, we shall speak under the sixth proposition.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO HIS THIRD PROPOSITION
I might show that the sentiments of Calvin and Beza were well
and fully set forth by me in those words, by many passages
selected from their writings. For though sometimes, when they
make mention of adoption, and non-adoption, which is its
contrary by logical division and opposition, yet they do not
set forth their views, as it was explained by you in answer
to my first proposition, and as you have just explained it in
these words: "God, therefore, from eternity, determined to
illustrate most wisely his own glory by the adoption of
these, and the preterition or non-adoption of those, with the
introduction of mercy and justice." For in two respects there
is a departure in those words from their sentiment.
In the first place, because they do not consider that the
illustration of the glory of God is effected immediately by
the adoption of these and the non-adoption or preterition of
those, but by a declaration of mercy and justice, which are
unfolded in the acts of adoption or election, and of non-
adoption or reprobation. It seems proper, according to the
rule of demonstration, that this order should be preserved;
the glory of God consists in the declaration of the
attributes of God; the attributes of God are illustrated by
acts suitable to those attributes.
Secondly, mercy and justice are not said by them to be
introduced into the decree of predestination and reprobation.
For those words signify that God, according to other
attributes of his nature, decreed the adoption of these and
the non-adoption of those, to the illustration of his own
glory, in which deed he used also mercy and justice for the
execution of that decree, and indeed with the condition of a
change in the object. But this was not their view, but it was
as I have already set it forth, namely, "God determined from
eternity to illustrate his own glory by mercy and justice:
since the glory of God can be neither acknowledged nor
celebrated, unless it be declared by his mercy and his
justice. But they consider mercy the appropriate cause of
adoption, but justice the cause of non-adoption or
reprobation, and they regard his purpose of illustrating both
as the whole cause of predestination, that is, of election
and reprobation; for they divide predestination into these
parts or species. Therefore in my statement less was ascribed
to mercy and justice in that decree than those authors think
ought to be ascribed to those attributes, and than they do
ascribe to them in the explanation of their entire view. Nor
is it with justice denied that it is a part of their
sentiment that mercy and justice can only be exercised in
fact in reference to actual sinners. For they assert this
most clearly, not indeed restricting the word justice to
punitive justice, which, indeed, is my view, as is evident
from my sixth proposition, and I think that this can be
understood from them. I will adduce a few passages from many.
Beza (adversus calumnias Nebulonis, ad art. 2) "God, having
in view the creation of man, to declare the glory both of his
mercy and of his justice, as the result showed, made Adam in
his own image, that is, holy and innocent; since as he is
good, nothing depraved can be created by him. But they must
be depraved on whom he determines to have mercy, and they
also whom he justly determines to condemn." From this passage
I quoted the words in which I stated this view. The same Beza
again says (lib. 1, quest. et reap. fol. 126, in 8,) "Since
God had decreed from eternity, as can be learned from events,
to manifest in the highest degree his own glory in the human
race, which manifestation might consist partly in the
exercise of mercy, partly in the demonstration of hatred
against sin, he made a man inwardly and outwardly pure, and
endowed with right understanding and will, but susceptible of
change. He, as supremely good, could not and would not indeed
create any evil thing, and yet unless evil had entered into
the world, there would have been no place for mercy or
judgment." He expresses himself, in the plainest manner
possible, in his conference with Mombelgartes; "Let us," says
Beza "lay down these principles. God, an infinitely wise
architect, and whose wisdom is unlimited, when He determined
to create the world, and especially the human race had a
certain proposed end, &c. For the eternal and immutable
purpose of God was antecedent to all causes, because He
decreed in Himself from eternity to create all men for His
own glory. But the glory of God is neither acknowledged nor
celebrated, unless his mercy and justice is declared.
Therefore, He made an eternal and immutable decree by which
He destined some particular individuals, of mere grace, to
eternal life, and some, by an act of judgment, to eternal
damnation, that He might declare His mercy in the former, but
His justice in the latter. Since God had proposed this end to
Himself in the creation of men, it was necessary that He
should also devise the way and the means by which He could
attain that end, that His mercy and His justice might be
equally manifested. For since mercy presupposes misery, it
can neither have place nor be declared where misery does not
exist, it was then necessary that man should be created, that
in him there might be a place for the mercy of God. This
could not be found without preceding misery. So also, since
justice presupposes crime, without which justice cannot be
exercised, (for where there is no crime, there justice has no
place,) it was necessary that man should be so created that,
without the destruction of his nature, he might be a fit
subject, that in him God might declare His own justice. For
He could not declare His own justice in man unless He should
have destined him to eternal damnation. Therefore, God
proposed, &c." These things were published by James Andreas,
but acknowledged by Beza, for in his answer to that
discussion he does not say that views, not his own, are
attributed to him. You see, therefore, that I have adapted
the proper object to those attributes according to their
opinion, which sentiment they without doubt think that they
have derived from the Scripture; in which this is fixed that
God cannot justly punish one who is not a sinner; in which
also the same author will deny that the word mercy is so used
that, when attributed to God, it may signify salvation from
possible misery; since, in their view, it every where
designates salvation from the misery which the sinner has
merited, and which either has been or can be justly inflicted
by the Deity. But I shall not wish to contend strenuously
that it is not possible that mercy should be exercised
towards those not actually miserable, and I can easily assent
to those things which you have said concerning that subject,
if they may have the meaning which I will give in my own
words, namely, that all creatures, even angels and men, when
compared with God, are miserable, misery being here taken for
non felicity, not for that which is opposed to felicity in a
privative sense, but for that which is opposed to it in a
contradictory sense; as nothing more is proved by the reason
from analogy. In comparison with God they are not just,
therefore, in comparison with him they are not happy. For
there are three antecedents, each of which has its
consequent; just, unjust, not just; happy, unhappy or
miserable, not happy. From justice results happiness, from
injustice misery, from non-justice non-felicity.
But creatures as such can be compared with God, both in
relation of the limit whence they proceed, and in relation to
the limit to which they advanced by the Deity. In relation to
the latter, angels and men exist, are just, are happy; in
relation to the former, they do not exist, are not just, are
not happy, since they come from nothing and can therefore be
returned to nothing. But in this relation they cannot be
called unjust or unhappy, since the limit, from which they
were brought forward, is opposed, by contradiction, not by
privation, to the limit to which they are borne by the divine
goodness, or more briefly, since they are brought from
possibility to actuality, which possibility and actuality are
contradictory not privative, one of the other. Now, since
they consist of possibility and actuality, it is not possible
that they, if deserted by divine support, should return to
nothing, but it is necessary that they, if thus deserted,
should return to nothing. It is moreover possible that,
continuing to exist by the divine power, yet being left to
themselves and having power to decide their own course, they
should, in their second action, not live according to the
dictates of justice, by which they were governed in their
first action, but do something contrary to it, and by this
act become unrighteous and sinners, and, having become such,
should put on the habit of unrighteousness, the habit of
righteousness having been removed, either as an effect or on
the ground of demerit, so that they would become miserable
first by desert, next by act, and finally by habit. But if
God should hinder them from deserving that misery that is
from sinning and becoming actually miserable, I do not see
why that act may not be ascribed to mercy since it originates
in the desire to prevent misery, which desire pertains to
mercy. I concede, indeed, that this is so, and that it is not
therefore absolutely true that mercy can only be exercised
towards actual sinners. But I wish that it should be observed
that mercy is not used, in that sense, by Calvin and Beza,
and indeed if mercy, thus understood, should be substituted
for the same affection, as it is used by Calvin and Beza, the
whole relation and description of the decree would be
changed. I remark also that mercy, understood as you present
it, does not come under consideration when the subject
treated of is the predestination of men: for it is not
exercised by God towards man, as one who has not been saved
from possible misery by the divine predestination. Finally,
it should also be considered that the relation between mercy
understood in the latter, and mercy understood in the former
sense is such that both cannot concur to the salvation of a
man. For if there be occasion for the mercy, which saves from
possible misery, there can be no place for that which
delivers from actual misery, as the opportunity for the
exercise of its peculiar functions is taken away, or, rather,
precluded by the former; if on the contrary the mercy, which
frees from actual misery, is necessary, the other does not
act, and so the former excludes the latter in the relation of
both cause and effect, and the latter consequently excludes
the former, not succeeding after the fulfillment of its
office, but existing by the necessity of its own action, as
the man has failed of the former.
We remark in reference to justice that it is indeed very true
that it can have place, and can be exercised towards those
who are not sinners. For it is the rewarder not only of
sinful, but of righteous conduct. But why may it not be
deduced from these things, so considered by you, that the
necessary existence of sin cannot be inferred even from the
necessary declaration of the mercy and justice of God, since
both, considered in a certain light, can be exercised towards
those who are not sinners. In this way the order of
predestination established by Calvin and Beza is wholly
overthrown. But as mercy, saving from possible misery, and
justice, rewarding virtue do not need the pre-existence of
actual misery and sin, yet it is certain that mercy, freeing
from actual misery and justice, punishing sin, can only be
exercised towards the actually miserable and sinful. But
Calvin and Beza every where use the terms, mercy and justice,
in this sense, when they discuss the decree of predestination
and probation. Since, also, mercy and justice, understood in
the former sense, have no place in the predestination and
reprobation of men, but only as they are received in the
former signification, mercy, saving from possible misery and
justice, rewarding good deeds, might be properly omitted in
the discussion of the predestination and reprobation of men,
though I do not deny that such a consideration may have its
appropriate and by no means small advantages. Since we have
entered on the consideration of mercy and justice, we may, if
you have leisure and are so disposed, continue it for a short
time, comparing each with the other, for the illustration of
the subject which we now discuss, in reference first to the
object of both, then to the order in which each acts on its
own object.
Mercy and justice, the former saving from possible misery,
the latter rewarding good conduct can be exercised towards
one and the same object, as is manifest in the case of the
elect angels, who are saved from possible misery, and have
obtained from the divine goodness the reward of right
conduct. But that same mercy cannot be exercised in reference
to the same object with punitive justice. For whatever is
worthy of the act of punitive justice is not saved from
possible misery. The mercy, also which saves from actual
misery is in this respect similar to the other kind of mercy,
that it cannot concur in respect to the same object with
punitive justice; but it is to be considered whether and how,
like the other mercy, it can be exercised at the same time
with the justice which rewards goodness. We, indeed see, that
in the Scriptures the reward of a good deed is promised to
those who have obtained mercy in Christ, and is in fact
bestowed upon them, but the reward, though it may be of
justice, is yet not of justice, understood in that sense in
which justice is regarded, when rewarding a good deed,
according to the promise of the law, and of debt; for the
former remuneration is the grace of God in Jesus Christ, who
is made unto us of God, righteousness, (justice) and
sanctification. Justice, in one case bestowing a remuneration
of debt, may be called legal, but, in the other, of grace,
may not inappropriately be called evangelical, the union of
which with the mercy saving from actual misery has been
effected in a wonderful manner by God in Jesus Christ, our
High Priest, and expiatory sacrifice. The object, then, of
punitive justice is essentially and materially different from
the object of mercy considered in either light, and of
justice remunerating right conduct.
But the object of mercy, saving from possible misery, is
different in its formal relation from the object of mercy,
saving from actual misery, for the former is a creature,
righteous and considered in his state as it was by creation,
but the latter is a sinful creature, and fallen from his
original state into misery by transgression. Of those two
classes both of mercy and justice, the former in each case is
to be excluded from the decree of the predestination and
reprobation of men, namely, mercy-saving from possible misery
and justice, rewarding goodness from a legal promise, but the
latter, preside over that decree, namely, mercy-saving from
actual misery, over predestination, and punitive justice over
reprobation. Now let us examine the order, according to which
each, compared by themselves and among themselves, tends to
its own object. Mercy preventing misery and justice rewarding
goodness according to law, tending towards one subject, take
this order, that mercy should first perform its office, and
then justice discharge its functions. For the prevention of
sin, and therefore of misery, precedes any good deed, and
therefore precedes the reward of that good deed, therefore,
also, the misery which saves from actual misery precedes the
justice which rewards a good deed, of grace. For that mercy
not only takes away the guilt and dominion of sin, but
creates in the believer a habit of righteousness, by which a
good deed is produced, to be compensated of grace by the
reward. But concerning mercy-saving from actual misery, which
is the administration of predestination, and punitive justice
which is the cause of reprobation, what judgment shall we
form? We will say that both tend, at the same moment, to
their own object, but we will [make] consider the former as
an antecedent in the order of nature. For though he, who
elects, in the very fact that he elects, reprobates also the
non-elect, yet the act of election is antecedent in the order
of nature, just as an affirmative is in the order of nature
prior to negation. From which we infer (of this we will speak
hereafter) that the decree to leave man to the decision of
his own destiny, and to permit the fall, does not belong to
the decree of reprobation, since it is prior to and more
ancient than the decree of predestination.
I wish that this order may be considered with somewhat more
diligence and at greater length, for it will open before us a
way of knowing some other things, different from and yet by
no means wholly foreign to the subject now under discussion.
If the mercy, which bestows grace and life, holds the prior
relation to this decree, and the justice, which denies grace
and inflicts death, the posterior relation in the order of
nature, though not of time, then it is still more to be
considered, whether the object of this decree is adequately
and with sufficient accuracy described by the term sinner; or
whether something else ought not also to be added, which may
so limit the object, that it may be made adequate to the
decree which originated in such mercy and justice, and may be
in harmony with it, namely the nature of the object thus made
adequate, and, in its own capability, tending to its own
peculiar and appropriate object. If any one thinks that the
functions of justice towards sin and the sinner are prior to
those of mercy and that the rendering of it's due punishment
to sin is prior by nature to the remission of the same to the
sinner, I wish he would attend diligently to two points.
First, that a two-fold action is attributed, by those who
discuss this matter, to justice, so far as it premises over
the decree of reprobation, or preterition and predamnation,
and this in harmony with the nature of the subject; the
former is negative, the latter affirmative, and in this order
that the negative precedes the affirmative. From this it
follows that if that negative act is posterior, in the order
of nature, to the affirmative act of predestination, as is
the case, then the functions of mercy must be prior; for from
mercy originates the affirmative act of predestination, which
is antecedent to the negative act of reprobation. SECONDLY,
that the punishment, due to sin, is by this decree destined
for no one, unless so as it is not removed by mercy; and in
this respect, though justice may in its own right claim the
punishment of the sinner, yet it exacts that punishment,
according to the decree of predomination which is made by
justice, in view not of the fact that it is due to the
sinner, but of the fact that it has not been remitted to him
of mercy; else all men universally would be predamned, since
they all have deserved punishment. Hence, this ought also to
be considered whether the justice, which is the
administratrix of the decree of reprobation or predamnation
is revealed according to the Law or the Gospel, of legal
rigor or softened by some mercy and forbearance. If mercy,
the administratrix of predestination is revealed according to
the Gospel, as is true, it seems from what has already been
said, that justice the opposite of mercy, which is prior to
it, in the order of nature, should be also revealed according
to the Gospel. If any one thinks that these views are vain
and useless, let him consider that what is said in the
Scripture concerning legal righteousness is not useless --
"The man which doeth those things shall live by them," (Rom.
x, 5,) and "cursed is every one that continueth not in all
things which are written in the book of the law to do them."
(Gal. iii, 10.)
Let him also consider what is said concerning Evangelical
righteousness, "He that believeth in the Son hath everlasting
life, (John iii, 36,) and "He that believeth not is
condemned. (John iii, 18.) I wish that these things may be
considered thoroughly by the thoughtful, and I ask a
suspension of their decision until they have accurately
weighed the matter.
FOURTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The second theory is this -- God, from eternity, considering
men in their original native condition determined to raise
some to supernatural felicity and ordained for the same
persons supernatural means which are necessary, sufficient
and efficacious to secure that felicity to them, to the
praise of his glorious grace; and to pass by others, and to
have them in their natural state, and not to bestow on them
those supernatural and efficacious means, to declare the
liberty of his own goodness; and that he reprobated the same
individuals, so passed by, whom he foresaw as not continuing
in their original condition, but falling from it of their own
fault, that is, he prepared punishment for them to the
declaration of his own justice.
THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FOURTH PROPOSITION
This theory is stated, in these words, not more nearly in
accordance with the sentiment of its authors than the
preceding. For in the first place, I do not remember that I
have read these words in Thomas Aquinas, or others: in the
second place, if any have used this phraseology, they have
not used it in that sense, as shall be proved under the sixth
proposition. But in the phrase supernatural felicity,
understand th<n uiJoqesian, the adoption of the sons of God
with all its adjuncts and consectaries. After the words
"declare the liberty of his own goodness," add, if you
please, "and the perfection of his manifold wisdom." The word
reprobation is to be taken catachrestically, as we have
before observed. I should prefer that words should be
variously distinguished in referring to matters which are
distinct.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE FOURTH PROPOSITION
If I have stated this second theory as nearly in accordance
with the sentiments of its authors as in the preceding case,
it is well; but I fear on this point since I do not, with
equal confidence claim a knowledge of the second. Yet I think
that I have derived the explanation of this from the Theses
discussed under your direction in which I recognize your
style and mode of discussion. Thus in Thesis 10 of those
which were discussed, Coddaeus being the respondent, is this
statement. "Human beings" (that is, one part of the material
of predestination, as is stated in Thesis 7, of the same
disputation concerning predestination) "are creatures in a
condition of nature (which can effect nothing natural,
nothing divine) to be exalted above nature, and to be
transmitted to a participation of divine things by the
supernatural energy of the Deity." The same assertion is
found in the Thesis 4 of your tenth theological disputation,
in which the subject of the predestination of human beings
alone is discussed, as is the case with the first Thesis,
that no one may think that things, said in common concerning
the predestination of angels and of men, ought to be
expressed in general terms. which might afterwards be
attributed specially to each of these classes, according to
their different condition to the elect angels, an exaltation
from that nature, in which they were created by the Deity,
but to elect human beings on elevation from their corrupt
nature into which they fell, of their own fault. If, however,
this matter is thus understood, there is now no discrepancy
between us in this respect.
But I think that it is evident from those words of your
Theses that human beings, considered in their original
condition are the material of predestination, or its adequate
object. Human beings I say in their original condition, both
in the fact that nothing supernatural or divine has been
bestowed upon them, and that they have not yet fallen into
sin.
Considered in their original condition, I say again, in view
of the fact that even if they have either supernatural and
divine gifts or sin, they are not considered with reference
to these by Him who determined to perform any certain act
concerning them, which is equivalent to an assertion that
neither supernatural or divine gifts, nor sin, held, in the
mind of Him who considered them the position of a formal
cause in the object, From these words I deduce this
conclusion:
Human beings, considered in their natural state which can
admit nothing supernatural or divine, are the object or
material of predestination;-But human beings, considered in
their natural condition, are here as beings considered in
that natural state, which can do nothing supernatural or
divine, or rather they are the same in definition;-
Therefore, human beings in their natural state are the object
and material of predestination, that is, according to the
views embraced in your Theses. The Major Proposition is
contained in the Thesis. For if the will or decree of God in
reference to the exaltation of men from such a state of
nature to a state above nature is predestination, then men,
considered in that natural state, are the true material of
predestination; since the acts of God, both the internal,
which is the decree concerning the exaltation of certain
human beings, and the external, which is the exaltation
itself, (as it ought to be, if we wish to consider the mere
object) leave to us man in his mere natural state which can
do nothing supernatural or divine.
If it is said that, in these words, the condition of sin is
not excluded, since even sinners may be raised from their
corrupt nature, I reply, in the first place, that this cannot
be the meaning of those words, both because it is not
necessary that it should be said of such a nature that can do
nothing supernatural or divine, for this is understood from
the qualifying term, when it is spoken of as "corrupt," and
because, in the definition of preterition, Thesis 15, that
act, by which the pure nature of some creatures is not
confirmed, is attributed to preterition, which preterition is
the leaving of some created beings in their natural
condition. I reply, in the second place, that there is here
an equivocation in the definition, and that the decree is
equivocal and only true on the condition of its division, of
which I will say more hereafter. The Minor is true, for this
is evident from the reciprocal and equivalent relation of the
antecedent and consequent to each other. But what pertains to
predestination is enunciated in these words, "to be exalted
above nature, and to be transferred to a participation of
divine things by the supernatural energy of the Deity, which
divine things pertain to grace and glory," as in your Thesis
9. It is not doubtful that my words, in which I have
described the second theory, are in harmony with these
statements, but if any one thinks that there is a discrepancy
because, in your Theses, grace and glory are united, and that
it can be understood from my words that I designed to
indicate that glory first, and grace afterwards, are prepared
for men in predestination, I would inform him that I did not
wish to indicate such an idea, but that I wished to set
forth, in those words, what the predestinate obtain from
predestination.
I come now to the second part, which refers to preterition,
and in reference to this, your Theses make this statement
"Preterition is the act of the divine will, by which God,
from eternity, determined to leave some of his creatures in
their natural state, and not to communicate to them that
supernatural grace by which their nature might be preserved
uncorrupt, or, having become corrupt, might be restored to
the declaration of the freedom of his own goodness." Also in
your theological axioms Concerning Nature and Grace, axiom
44. "To this purpose of election in Christ is opposed the
eternal purpose of non-election or preterition, according to
which some are passed by as to be left in their own natural
state." These are my words: "but he determined to pass by
some and to leave them in their natural state, and not to
impart to them those supernatural and especially those
efficacious means, to declare the freedom of his own
goodness." He, who compares our statements, will see that one
and the same sentiment is expressed in different words. For
"supernatural grace" and "supernatural means" signify the
same thing, "the grace by which nature, when uncorrupt, might
be strengthened, and when corrupt, might be restored," is
what I have described in the phrase "efficacious means." For
"efficacious means" either confirm nature when uncorrupt or
restore it when corrupt; as sufficient means are those which
have the power to confirm or restore. Moreover the end, which
I have proposed, is expressed in your second Thesis, "to the
praise of his glorious grace," and again, in the second
Thesis of the tenth disputation, "to the praise of his most
glorious grace," and in Thesis 15 of the disputation
concerning predestination, in which Coddaeus is the
respondent, you have stated the end of preterition to be "the
declaration of the freedom of the divine goodness, with no
additional remark; yet I do not object to what you wish to
add in this place, "the perfection of his manifold wisdom."
However, the freedom of goodness and the perfection of wisdom
cannot be at the same moment engaged in the acts of
predestination and preterition. For the office of wisdom
takes precedence, in pointing out all possible methods of
illustrating the glory of God, and that which may especially
conduce to the glory of God. But the freedom of his goodness
is subsequent in its operation, in making choice of the mode
of illustration, and in carrying it out into the action, in
the exercise (so to speak) of power. In reference to the
third part, I make the same remark, namely, concerning
reprobation, or the preparation of punishment, that I have
also explained it correctly according to your view, for thus
is reprobation or the preparation for punishment defined in
Thesis seventeen. "It is the act of the divine pleasure, by
which God from eternity determined for the declaration of his
own justice to punish his creatures, who should not continue
in their original state, but should depart from God, the
author of their origin, by their own deed and depravity. But
I have used the same words with only this addition, "the same
individuals, so passed by," by which addition I have only
done that which was made requisite by the arrangement and
distinction in character which I have adopted; for those, for
whom punishment is prepared, are not different from those who
are passed by, though punishment was prepared for them, not
because they are included in the latter class, the passed by,
but because they were foreseen as those who would be sinners.
I cannot, therefore, yet persuade myself that this sentiment
has been incorrectly set forth by me. If I shall see it
hereafter, I will freely acknowledge it, though this may not
be of so much importance.
This indeed I desire, that whether the first view, or the
second, or any other view whatever be presented, it may be
clearly and strongly proved from the Scriptures, and be
defended, with accuracy, from all objections. In reference to
the word "reprobate," I have spoken before in reply to your
second answer, and I am prepared to use it hereafter
according to your later explanation, as you have given it in
your last answer. I should perhaps have so used it, in my
former letter, if I had found it so used by yourself in your
own writings, for I know that equivocal meaning has always
been the mother of error, and that it ought to be carefully
avoided in all serious discussions.
FIFTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The third theory is that God determined of his grace to free
some of the human race, fallen, and lying in the "lump" (Rom.
ix, 21 ) of perdition and corruption, to the declaration of
his Mercy; but to leave in the same "lump," or at least to
damn, on account of final impenitence, others, to the
illustration both of the freedom of his gratuitous grace
towards the vessels of glory and mercy, and of his justice
towards the vessels of dishonour and wrath. I do not state
these views, that I may instruct you in reference to them,
but that you may see whether I have correctly understood
them, and may direct and guide me, if I am, in any respect,
in error.
THE REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE FIFTH PROPOSITION
This theory agrees with the first and second in all respects,
if you make this one exception, that, in the latter case, the
election and reprobation of men is said to have been made
after the condition of the fall and of our sin, in the former
case without reference to the fall, and to our sin. But
neither of them seems properly and absolutely to pertain
altogether to the relation of election and reprobation since
all admit that the cause of election and reprobation is
placed in the consent only of the Being, who alone
predestinates. For, whether it is affirmed that election and
reprobation are made from among human beings in their
original state, or from those, who are fallen and sinful,
there was not any cause in them, who, in either state, were
equal in all respects, according to nature, but only in the
will and liberty of God electing, who separated these from
those, and adopted them unto himself "of his own will"
boulhqeiv as James says (ch. 1, vers. 18,) or according to
the counsel of his will. But yet this circumstance is worthy
of notice, and we will, hereafter in its own place, give our
opinion concerning it, according to the Scriptures, as there
will be an appropriate place for speaking of this subject.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE FIFTH PROPOSITION
The circumstance of sin and of the fall is of very great
importance in this whole subject, not indeed as a cause but
as a quality, requisite in the object, without a
consideration of which I do not think that election or
reprobation was or could have been made by the Deity, which
matter we will hereafter more fully discuss. There are also
many men learned, and not unversed in the sacred Scriptures,
who say that God could not be defended from the charge of
sin, if he had not in that decree, considered, man as a
sinful being. But I cannot, for a two-fold reason, assent to
your denial that the formal cause of the object properly
pertains to the subject of that decree, because all fully
agree in admitting that the cause of the decree is placed in
Him, who predestinates. First, because the formal cause of
the object, and not the cause of the act only, is necessarily
required for the definition of that act. Secondly, because it
is possible that the cause of the act may be of such a
nature, that, in its own act, it cannot exert influence on
the object which is presented to it, unless it be furnished
with that formal relation, which I think is the fact in this
case, and will prove it. Nor is there any reason why it
should be said that the freedom of God, in the act of
predestination, is limited though the circumstance of sin may
be stated to be of necessity presupposed to that decree.
But since frequent mention has been made, in this whole
discussion of divine freedom, it will not be out of place to
refer to it at somewhat greater length, and to affix to it
its limits from the Scripture, according to the declaration
of God himself. The subject of freedom is the will, its
object is an act. In respect to the former, it is an
affection of the will, according to which it freely tends
towards its one object; in respect to the latter, it is the
power and authority over its own act. This freedom is, in the
first place and chiefly, in God, and it is in rational
creatures by a communication made by God. But freedom is
limited, or, which is the same thing, it is effected that any
act should not be in the power of the agent in three ways, by
natural and internal necessity, by external force and
coaction, and by the interposition of law. God can be
compelled by no one to an act, he can be hindered by no one
in an act, hence, this freedom is not limited by that kind of
restriction. Law also cannot be imposed on God, as He is the
highest, the Supreme Lawgiver. But He can limit Himself, by
His own act. There are, then, but two causes which effect
that any act should not be in the power of God; the former is
the nature of God, and whatever is repugnant to it is
absolutely impossible; the latter is any previous act of God,
to which another act is opposed. Examples of the former are
such as these; God cannot lie, because He is, by nature,
true. He cannot sin or commit injustice, because he is
justice itself. Examples of the latter are these; God cannot
effect that what has previously occurred may not have
occurred, for, by an antecedent act, he has effected that it
should be; if now can effect that it may not have been, He
will destroy his own power and will. God could not but grant
to David that his seed should sit on his throne, for this was
promised to David, and confirmed by an oath. He cannot forget
the labour of love, performed by the saints, so as not to
bestow upon it a reward, for He has promised that reward. If,
then, any one wishes to inquire whether any act belongs to
the free will and the power of God, he must see whether the
nature of God may restrict that act, and if it is not so
restricted, whether the freedom of God is limited by any
antecedent act, if he shall find that the act is not
restricted in either mode, then he may conclude that the act
pertains to the divine power; but it is not to be immediately
inferred that it has been or will be performed by God, since
any act which depends on His free will, can be suspended by
Him, so as not to be performed. It is also to be observed
here that many things are possible for God, in respect to
this absolute power, which are not possible in respect to
justice. It is possible in respect to His power that He
should punish one who has not sinned, for who could resist
Him, but it is not possible, in respect to justice, for it
would be at variance with the Divine justice. God can do
whatever He wills with His own, but He cannot will to do with
His own that which he cannot do of right. For His will is
restricted by the limits of justice. Nor is the creature, in
such a sense, in the power of God, the Creator, that he can
do, of right, in reference to it, whatever he might do of His
absolute power, for the power of God over the creature
depends, not on the infinity of the Divine essence, but on
that communication by which he has communicated to us our
limited essence. This permits that God should deprive us of
that being which he has given us without merit on our part,
but does not permit that He should inflict misery upon us
without our demerit. For to be miserable is worse than not to
be, as happiness is better than mere existence. And,
therefore, there is not the same liberty to inflict misery on
the creature without demerit, as to take away being without
previous sin. God takes away that which He gave, and He can
do as He wills, with His own, but He cannot inflict misery,
because the creature does not so far belong to God. The
potter cannot, from the unformed lump, make a man to
dishonour and condemnation, unless the man has previously
made himself worthy of punishment and dishonour by his own
transgression.
SIXTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I am not pleased with the first theory because God could not,
in his purpose of illustrating his glory by mercy and
punitive justice, have reference to man as not yet made, nor
indeed to man as made, and considered in his natural
condition. In which sentiment I think that I have yourself as
my precedent, for, in discussing predestination, you no where
make mention of mercy, but every where of grace, which
transcends mercy, as exercised towards creatures, continuing
in their original, natural state, while it coincides with
mercy in being occupied with the sinner, but when you treat
of the passed by and the reprobate, you mention justice, and
only in the case of such. Besides, according to that opinion,
God is, by necessary consequence, made the author of the fall
of Adam and of sin, from which imputation he is not freed by
the distinctions of the act and the evil in the act, of
necessity and coaction, of the decree and its execution, of
efficacious and permissive decree, as the latter is explained
by the authors of this view, in harmony with it, nor a
different relation of the divine decree and of human nature,
nor by the addition of the proposed end, namely that the
whole might redound to the divine glory, &c.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SIXTH PROPOSITION
There are three things to be laid down in order, before I
come to the argumentation itself. First, in reference to the
meaning of the first view; secondly, in reference to its
agreement with the second and third; thirdly, in reference to
a few fundamental principles necessary to the clearness of
this question. In the first place, then, if that view be
fully examined, we shall perceive with certainty that its
authors did not regard man absolutely and only before his
creation, &c., but in a general view and with a universal
reference to that and to all times. For though they make the
act of election and predestination, (as one which exists in
the Deity,) as from eternity, in reference to the creation of
man, yet they teach that its object, namely mankind, was
predestinated without discrimination, and in common, and that
God, in the act of predestination, considered the whole human
race as various parts inwrought by the eternal decree into
its execution. Thus Beza, very clearly on Ephes. i, 4, says,
"Christ is presented to us as mediator. Therefore, the fall
must, in the order of causes, necessarily precede in the
purpose of God, but previous to the fall there must be a
creation in righteousness and holiness." So afterwards, on
ch. iv, 24, "As God has made for Himself a way both for
saving, by his mercy, those whom He had elected in Christ,
and for justly punishing those who, having been conceived in
sin, should remain in their depravity," &c.
This view he also learnedly presents in a note on verses 4
and 5. Thus those authors embrace the first, and, at the same
time, the second and third theories.
But this first theory has an agreement with the second and
also with the third, indeed it is altogether the stone,
though in appearance it seems otherwise, if you attend to the
various objects of these theories. For while the authors of
the first regard man universally, in the argument of
predestination, election and reprobation, the authors of the
second have made a restriction to the case of man before
transgression only, and this with the design to show that, in
predestination, the cause of election and of reprobation was
only in the being predestinating, which is very true. When
they assert, therefore, that the election of man was made
before his fall, they do not exclude the idea of the eternity
of that decree, but consider this to be sufficient if they
may establish the fact that eternal predestination, that is,
election and reprobation, was made by God, without reference
to sin, which the apostle has demonstrated in the example, by
no means obscure, of Jacob and Esau. (Rom. 9) The first,
therefore, differs from the second less in substance than in
the manner of speaking. But those, who adhere to the third
theory, have looked, properly speaking, not so much to the
cause of election and reprobation, as to the order of causes,
of which damnation is the consequence; which damnation, many
in former times, confounding with reprobation, that is, non-
election or predestination, exclaimed that the doctrine of
predestination was impious, and accused the servants of God,
as is most clearly evident from the writings of Augustine and
Fulgentius. The little book of Augustine, which he wrote in
answer to the twelve articles falsely charged against him,
most opportunely explains the matter. Neither those who
favour the second theory, therefore, nor those who favour the
third, have attacked the first, but have rather presented in
a different mode, parts of the same argument, distinct in
certain respects. It seems then that, as to the sum of the
whole matter, they do not differ so much as some suppose, but
have attributed to parts of its execution, (to all of which
the decree has reference,) certain circumstances, not indeed
ineptly in respect to the decree.
Let us now come to certain fundamental principles necessary
to this doctrine, by the application of which its truth may
be confirmed, and those things which seem to operate against
it, may be removed. These seem to me capable of being
included under four heads, the essence of God, His knowledge,
His actions, and their causes, to each of which we will here
briefly refer. We quote first from Mal. iii, 6, "I am the
Lord, I change not;" also from James i, 17, "with whom is no
variableness, neither shadow of turning," and many similar
passages. The truth of this fundamental principle is very
certain; from it is deduced the inevitable necessity of this
conclusion, that in the Deity nothing is added, nothing is
taken away, nothing is changed in fact or relation; for such
have philosophers themselves decided to be the nature of
eternity; but God is eternal. Also that God is destitute of
all movement in His essence, because He is immortal; in His
power because He is pure and simple action; and in intellect,
because "all things are naked and opened unto His eyes," and
He sees all and each of them eternally, by a single glance;
in His will and purpose, for He "is not a man that he should
lie, neither the son of a man that He should repent," (Num.
xxiii, 19,) but He is always the same; and lastly in
operation, for the things which vary are created, while the
Lord remains without Variation, and has in Himself the form
of immutable conception of all those things which exist and
are done mutably in time. The second fundamental principle is
that the knowledge of the eternal, immutable and infinite
mind is eternal, immutable and infinite and knows things to
be known as such, and those to be done as such, (gwstw~v)
eternally, immutably and infinitely. God has a knowledge
practically (praktikw~v) of all evil as a matter of mere
knowledge and finally of all things of all classes, (which
consist of things the highest, the intermediate, and the
lowest of things good and evil,) energetically
(ejnerghtikw~v) according to his own divine mode. There is a
three-fold relation in all science, if comparison is made
with the thing known according to the measure of the being
who knows or takes cognizance of it; inferior, equal, and
superior, or supereminent, which may be made clear by an
illustration from sight. I see the sun, but the light of my
vision is inferior to its light; I take cognizance of natural
objects, but as owls do of the light of the sun, as Aristotle
says. Here is the inferior mode of knowledge, which never
exists in God. In him alone exists equal knowledge, and that
knowledge which is supereminent after the divine mode, for He
has equal knowledge of Himself; He is that which He knows
Himself to be, and he knows adequately what He is. All other
things He knows in the supereminent mode, and has them
present to himself from eternity; if not, there would be two
very grievous absurdities, not to mention others; one, that
something might be added to the Deity, but that nothing can
be added to eternity; the other, that knowledge could not
belong to God univocally as the source of all knowledge. But
nature herself teaches that in every class of objects there
is some one thing which they call univocal, from which are
other things in an equivocal sense; as, for example, things
which are hot, are made so by fire. Here the fire is hot
univocally, other things equivocally. God has knowledge
univocally, other beings equivocally; unless perhaps some may
be so foolish as to place a possessor of knowledge above the
Deity, which would be blasphemy. The third point is that the
actions of God in Himself are eternal, whether they pertain
to His knowledge or His essence, to His intellect, will or
power, and whatever else there may be of this nature; but
from Himself they flow, as it were, out of himself according
to His own mode, or according to that of the creature
according to his eternal decree, yet in an order which is his
own, but adapted to time. According to the mode of the Deity,
action is three-fold; that of creation, that of providence,
so far as it is immediate, and that of saving grace.
For many things proceed from the Deity without the work of
the creature, but they are things which He condescends to
accomplish mediately in nature and in grace. He does, as a
universal principle according to the mode of the creature,
and, as Augustine says, (lib. 7, de. civit. Dei. cap. 30) "He
so administers all things which He has created, as to permit
them also to exercise and to perform their own motions." But
"their own motions" pertain, some of them to nature and to
natural instinct and are directed invariably to one certain
and destined end, and others to the will in the rational
nature, which are directed to various objects either good or
evil, to those which are good, by the influence of the Deity,
to those which are evil by His influence only so far as they
are natural, and by his permission so far as they are
voluntary. From which it can be established in the best and
most sacred manner that all effects and defects in nature and
in the will of all kinds, depend on the providence of God;
yet in such a manner that, as Plato says, the creature is in
fault as the proximate cause, and "God is wholly without
blame."
The fourth point is that the first and supreme cause is so
far universal, that nothing else can be supposed or devised
to be its cause, since if it should depend on any other
cause, it could be neither the first nor the supreme cause,
but there must be another, either prior or superior, or equal
to it, so that neither would be absolutely first or supreme.
In the next place, all causes exist, either as principles or
derived from a principle; "as principles" nature and the will
exist; "from a principle" are mediate causes, from nature,
natural causes, and from the will voluntary causes. The mode
of the latter has been made two-fold by the Deity, necessary
and contingent. The necessary mode is that which cannot be
otherwise, and this is always good, in that it is necessary;
but the contingent is that which is as it happens to be,
whether good or bad. But here a three-fold caution is to be
carefully observed; first, that we hold these modes of the
causes to be from the things themselves and in themselves,
according to the relation of the principles from which they
proceed, for we speak now not of the immediate actions of
God, which are above these principles, as we have before
noticed, the natural causes, naturally, and the voluntary
causes, voluntarily; secondly, that we make both these modes
to be from God, but not in God; for mode in God is only
divine, that is, it surpasses the necessary and contingent in
all their modes; since there can occur to the Deity neither
necessity from any source, nor any contingency, but all
things in the Deity are essential, and in a divine mode;
thirdly, that we should consider those modes as flowing from
God to created things, in such a manner that none of them
should be reciprocated, and, as it were, flow back to God.
For God is the universal principle; and if any of these
should flow back to Him, He would from that fact cease to be
the principle. The reason, indeed, of this is manifest from a
comparison of natural examples, since this whole thing
proceeds not from natural power simply, in so far as it is
natural, but from the rational power of God. For it is a
condition of natural power, that it always produces one and
the same thing in its own kind, and that if it should produce
any thing, out of itself, it must produce something like
itself from the necessity of nature, or something unlike from
contingency. A pear tree produces a pear tree, a bull begets
one of its own species, and a human being begets a human
being; that is, in accordance with the distinct form which
exists in the nature of each thing.
But the operation of rational power, which is capable of all
forms, is of all kinds; to which three things must concur in
the agent, knowledge, power, and will. But the mode of those
things, which rational power effects, is not constituted
according to the mode of knowledge or power, but to the mode
of the will which actually forms the works, which virtually
are formed in the knowledge and power, as in a root; and this
from the freedom of the will and not from the necessity of
nature. If we would illustrate this by an example in divine
things, let it be this: the person of the Father begat the
person of the Son by nature, not by the will; God begat his
creatures by the will, not by nature. Therefore, the Son is
one with the Father, but created things are diverse from the
Deity, and are of all classes, degrees, and conditions, made
by His rational power voluntarily to demonstrate His manifold
wisdom. It is indeed nothing new that those things which are
of nature should be reciprocated and refluent, since many of
them are adequate, while many indeed are essential. But it is
a new idea that those things which are of the will should be
either reciprocated or made adequate. But if this is true in
nature, as it surely is, how much more must it be believed in
reference to God, if He be compared with created things. It
was necessary that these should be laid down by me, my
brother, rather copiously, that the sequence might be more
easily determined by certain limits.
You say that the first opinion does not please you, because
you think that God cannot, in his purpose to illustrate his
glory by mercy and punitive justice, have had reference to
the human race, considered as not yet made. You add, in
amplifying the idea, that God did not have reference even to
the human race, considered as created, and in his natural
condition. That we may each understand the other, I remark
that I understand by your phrase, "have reference to the
human race," to have man as the object or instead of the
object of action. But let us consider, if you please, or
rather, because it does please you and you request it, how
far your view is correct. Indeed, from the first fundamental
principle, which I have before laid down, (from which I trust
that you do not dissent,) I consider man as not yet created,
as created, as fallen, and, in fine, man in general, in
whatever light he may be viewed, to be the object of the
power, knowledge, will, mercy and justice of God; for if this
is granted, it will then be a complete sequence that there is
something, aside from common providence and the special
predestination of the sons of God, not an object of the
action of the Deity. Then there can be some addition to God,
if something can be added to His power, knowledge, will, &c.,
since the power, knowledge, will, &c., of God, is either God,
or a divine, that is, an infinite act. Whatever eternity
looks upon, if it does not look upon it eternally, it ceases
to be eternity; it loses the nature of eternity. If infinity
does not look on infinite things, in an infinite manner, if
it is limited by parts, it ceases to be infinity. To God and
His eternity, it is not is, was or shall be, but permanent
and enduring being, all at once, and without bounds. The
creature exists indeed in time, but is present to God, in a
peculiar, that is, a divine mode, which is above all
consideration of time, and from eternity to eternity; and
this is true not only of the creature itself, but of all its
feelings, whatever may be their origin. You will perhaps say
that this principle is acknowledged in the abstract, but that
here, as it is considered in the concrete, it has a different
relation, in that it has reference to mercy and punishment,
which can really be supposed only in view of antecedent
misery and sin. But these also, my brother, are present with
God as really as those; I do not say in the mode of nature,
which is fleeting, but in that of the Deity, which is
eternal, and in all respects surpasses nature. They, who
think differently, are in danger of denying the most absolute
and eternal essence of the Deity itself. We said also, under
proposition three, that in created things misery and sin may
be considered in relation to the act, the habit, or the
capability also in an absolute and in a relative sense. But
in God, (whom also Aristotle acknowledges to be "energy in
its most simple form," mercy and judgment exist by an eternal
act, and not by a temporal one; and contemplates the misery
and sin of man in all their modes, previous to all time, and
does not merely take cognizance of them as they occur in
time.
Lastly, that we may disclose the fountain of the matter, this
whole idea originates in the fact that the third fundamental
principle which, we before laid down, has not been
sufficiently regarded by those who so think. For since all
action is either internal or external, or both united
together. The internal is in God, as the maker: the external
is in the creature in its own time and place, and in the
thing made just as the house is formed in the mind of the
builder, before it is built materially (as it is said). But
when both acts are united and from them is produced a work,
numerically a unit, which they style a result, then the
internal act is the formal cause; the external act is the
material cause. Nothing in God is temporary; action in God is
alone eternal, for it is internal, it is therefore not
temporary; so, on the contrary, all things out of God are
temporary, therefore the external act is temporary, for it is
out of God. "What, then, do you prove?" you will ask. "That
God in his mercy and punitive justice acts with reference to
man as not yet created, or indeed as created, but considered
in his natural condition?" I indeed admit that whatever it
may be, which can be predicated of man, it can sacredly and
in truth be predicated of him. Yet I see that two statements
may be made of a milder character, and in harmony with the
words of Christ and the apostles, which are clearly
intimated, if not fully expressed by them; the former, that,
in this question, we must consider, not only the mode and the
consequent event (which some call, catechrestically, the
end), namely, mercy and punitive justice, also life and
eternal death, but the fountain and the genus from which
these result, and to which they hold the relation of species,
namely, grace and non-grace, adoption or filiation, and non-
adoption, which is reprobation, as we have said above (Prop.
2), the latter, that, in the argument of election, we must
propose not any particular relation of the human race, but
the common or universal relation so that we may consider him
as not yet created, as created, as fallen &c., yet present in
all respects in the conception of God, so that in this
election, grace towards mankind in the abstract, and mercy
towards man as fallen and sinful, which is of grace, concur,
but in reprobation, the absence of the grace of adoption and
the absence of mercy concur. If these statements are correct,
I do not see in what respect a pious mind can be offended.
For Christ says that they are blessed of God, the Father who
"inherit the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of
the world." (Matt. xxv, 34.)
And Paul says that God "hath blessed us with all spiritual
blessings in heavenly places in Christ, according as he hath
chosen us in him, before the foundation of the world, that we
should be holy and without blame before him in love, having
predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus
Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure, to the
praise, &c." (Ephes. i, 3-6.) "What then? is there no special
reference?" I answer that properly in the argument of
election and reprobation (for the matter of damnation is a
different one) there is no particular reference to men as a
cause, but our separation from the reprobate is wholly of the
mere will of God: in that God has separated and made a
distinction among men, whether not yet created, created or
fallen, and indeed among all things, present alike to Him,
yet equal in all respects by nature and condition, by
electing and predestinating some to the adoption of the sons
of God, and by leaving others to themselves and to their own
nature, not calling them to the adoption of the sons of God,
which is gratuitous and can be ascribed only to grace. This
grace, also, unique in itself only, may be two-fold in the
elect, for either it is grace simply, if you look even from
eternity on man without reference to the fall, which grace is
communicated to the elect, both angels and men, or it is
grace joined to mercy, or gracious mercy, when you come down
to the special matter of the fall and of sin. God dealt with
the angels according to His grace, with us according to His
grace and mercy, if you do not also have reference to
possible misery (of which we spoke, Prop. 3, and misery.) For
in this sense mercy is, and can, with propriety, be called a
divine work of grace. But what is there here which can be
reprehended in God? What is there, which can be denied by us?
God has bestowed human nature on all; it is a good gift; on
certain individuals he has bestowed mercy and the grace of
adoption; this is a better gift. He was not under obligation
to bestow either; He bestowed both, the former on all, the
latter on some men. But it may perhaps be said that
reprobation is one thing, and punitive justice and damnation,
which is under discussion, is another. Let that be conceded;
then there is agreement between us in reference to
reprobation, let us then consider punitive justice and
damnation. It is certain that, as the vessels of mercy which
God has prepared for His glory that He might demonstrate the
riches of His glory, are from eternity fully present to Him
in a divine and incomprehensible manner, without any motion
or change in Himself, so also "the vessels of wrath fitted to
destruction" that he might "show His wrath and make His power
known," (Rom. ix, 22,) are eternally presented to his eyes,
according to the mode of Deity. As vessels, therefore, they
are of God, for He is the maker of all things: as vessels of
wrath, they are of themselves and of their own sin, into
which they rush of their own will, for we all are by this
nature the children of wrath, (Ephes. ii, 3,) but not in our
original constitution. Moses affirms in Gen. i, 31, that "God
saw every thing that He had made, and, behold, it was very
good."
God, who is good, does not hate that which is good. All
things, at their creation, were good, therefore at their
creation, God did not hate any one of all created things: He
hates that which is alien from Himself, but not that which is
His own: He is angry with our fall and sin, not with His own
creation. By creation they are vessels; by the fall, they are
vessels of wrath, and fitted to destruction, as the most just
consequence of the fall and of depravity: for "neither shall
evil dwell with God." (Psalm v, 4.) As in the knowledge of
God is the good of the elect, with whom he deals in mercy, so
in the knowledge of God, as Isaiah says, chapter xlviii, 4
and 8, is the evil of others: the latter He hated and damned
from the period of His knowledge of it. But He knew and
foreknew from eternity; therefore, He hates and damns, and
even pre-damns from eternity.
As this is the relation of the former proposition, the
relation of the other also, added by way of amplification,
"nor indeed to man as made and considered in his original
condition," is also the same. For the consequence is plainly
deduced in the same mode, in reference to the latter as in
reference to the former; and you are not ignorant that
universal affirmations follow by fair deduction from that
which is general to that which is particular. God has
reference from eternity in election and reprobation to
mankind in general; therefore He had reference to man as not
created, created and fallen, and if there is any other term,
by which we can express our ideas. In the case of election,
and of reprobation, I say, He regarded man abstractly, with
whatever relation you may invest him. In the case of
damnation, He regarded the sinner, whom He had not given to
Christ in the election of grace, and whom He from eternity
saw as a sinner. Those holy men, therefore rightly stated
that the election and reprobation of man was made from
eternity: some considered them as having reference to man,
not yet created, others to man as not yet fallen, and yet
others to man as fallen: since in whatever condition you
regard him, a man is elected or reprobated without
consideration of his good or evil deeds. Nor indeed can it be
proved that they are at variance in this matter, unless a
denial of other conditions is shown in plain terms. For such
is the common statement by universal consent. In which, if
any one affirms that the supposition of one involves the
disavowal of the other he opposes the truth of natural logic
and common usage. But if such is the relation of election and
reprobation in a general sense, it is a complete sequence
that they who say that men, as not created, were elected,
speak very truly, since God elected them by the internal act,
before He did by the external act; and that they who affirm
that the election was of man, as created, have reference to
the principle of the external act; and so with the rest. But
all these things are not in reference to His act per se, but
in reference to the condition of the act, which does not
affect its substance. You say that in this opinion you have
me as a precedent since, in the discussion of predestination,
I "no where make mention of mercy, but every where of grace,
which transcends mercy." Indeed, my brother, I have never
thought that I should seem to exclude the other parts when I
might use the term grace, nor do I see how that inference can
be made from the phrase itself. Grace is the genus; it does
not exclude mercy, the species. Grace includes, so to speak,
the path for all times; therefore it includes that of mercy.
Nor do they, who mention mercy, in presenting the species,
exclude the genus, nor, in presenting a part, do they exclude
all which remains. And we, in presenting the genus, do not
deny the species, nor in presenting the whole, do we disavow
a part. Both are found in the Scriptures, which speak of
grace in respect to the whole and its single parts, and in a
certain respect, of mercy: but they take away neither by the
affirmation of the other. I would demonstrate this by
quotations, did I not think that you with me, according to
your skill and intelligence would acknowledge this.
Predestination is of grace: the same grace, which has
effected the predestination of the saints, also includes
mercy: this I sufficiently declared a little while since. I
mentioned grace simply, in the case of simple predestination,
that is, predestination expressed in simple and universal
terms. I speak of mercy, also, in relation to a man who is
miserable, spoken of absolutely, or relatively. You add that
when I treat of the passed by and the reprobate, I mention
justice, and only in the case of such. Let us, if you please,
remove the homonymy; then we shall expedite the matter in a
few words. We exposed the homonymy in the second proposition;
we speak of the reprobate either generally or particularly.
If you understand it generally, the mention of justice is
correctly made, as we shall soon show. If particularly,
either reprobates and those passed by refer to the same,
which is the appropriate signification, or the term reprobate
is applied to the damned, which is catachrestic. I do not
think that you understand it in the former sense, if you
understand it in the latter (as you do), what you say is
certainly very true, that I spoke of justice only when
treating of the damned. However, I do not approve that you
write copulatively of the passed by and the reprobate, that
is, the damned. For although they are the same in subject,
and all the passed by are damned, and all the damned are
passed by, yet their relation as passed by or reprobate is
one thing, and their relation as damned is another.
Preterition or reprobation is not without justice, but it is
not of justice, as its cause: damnation is with justice and
of justice. Election and reprobation or preterition are the
work of free will according to the wisdom of God; but
damnation is the work of necessary will according to the
justice of God; for God "cannot deny Himself" (2 Tim. ii,
13.) As a just judge, it is necessary that He should punish
unrighteousness, and execute judgment. This, I say, is the
work of the manifold wisdom of God, which in those creatures,
in whom he has implanted the principle of their own ways,
namely, a free will, He might exhibit its two-fold use, good
and bad, and the consequent result of its use in both
directions. Hence he has, in His own wisdom, ordained, both
in angels and in men, the way of both modes of its use,
without any fault or sin on His own part. But it is a work of
justice to damn the unrighteous. Therefore also it is said
truly that the passed by are damned by the Deity, but because
they were to be damned, not because they were passed by or
reprobated.
Now I come to your argumentation, in which you affirm that,
"according to that theory, God is, by necessary consequence,
made the author of the fall of Adam, and of sin &c." I do
not, indeed, perceive the argument from which this conclusion
is necessarily deduced, if you correctly understand that
theory. Though I do not doubt that you had reference to your
own words, used in stating the first theory, "that he
ordained also that man should fall and become depraved, that
he might thus prepare the way for the fulfillment of his own
eternal counsels, that he might be able mercifully to save
some, &c." This, then, if I am not mistaken, is your
reasoning. He, who has ordained that man should fall and
become depraved, is the author of the fall and of sin; God
ordained that man should fall and become depraved; therefore,
God is the author of sin. But the Major of this syllogism is
denied, because it is ambiguous; for the word ordain is
commonly, though in a catachrestical sense, used to mean
simply and absolutely to decree, the will determining and
approving an act; which catachresis is very frequent in
forensic use. But to us, who are bound to observe
religiously, in this argument, the propriety of terms, to
ordain is nothing else than to arrange the order in acts, and
in each thing according to its mode. It is one thing to
decree acts absolutely, and another to decree the order of
acts, in each thing, according to its mode. The former is
immediate, the latter, from the beginning to the end, regards
the means, which in all things, pertain to the order of
events. In the former signification, the Minor is denied; for
it is entirely at variance with the truth, since God is never
the author of evil (that is, of evil involving guilt). In the
latter signification the Major is denied, for it is not
according to the truth, nor is it necessary in any respect
that the same person who disposes the order of actions and,
in each thing, according to its mode: should be the author of
those actions. The actor is one thing, the action is
another,-and the arranger of the action is yet another. He
who performs an evil deed is the author of evil. He, who
disposes the order in the doer and in the evil deed, is not
the author of evil, but the disposer of an evil act to a good
end. But that this may be understood, let us use the fourth
fundamental principle, which we have previously stated,
according to this, we shall circumscribe this whole case
within this limit; every fault must always be ascribed to the
proximate, not to the remote or to the highest cause. In a
chain, the link, which breaks, is in fault; in a machine, the
wheel, which deviates from its proper course, is in fault,
not any superior or inferior one. But as all causes are
either principles, or from principles, (in this case,
however, principles are like wheels, by which the causes,
originating from the principles, are moved), God is the
universal principle of all good, nature is the principle of
natural things, and the rational will, turning freely to good
or evil, is the principle of moral actions. These three
principles, in their own appropriate movement, perform their
own actions, and produce mediate causes, act in their own
relations, and dispose them; God in a divine mode, nature in
a natural mode, and the will in an elective mode. God, in a
divine mode, originates nature; nature, in its own mode,
produces man; the will, in its own appropriate mode, produces
its own moral and voluntary actions. If, now, the will
produces a moral action, whether good or evil, it produces
it, of its own energy, and this cannot be attributed to
nature itself as a cause, though nature may implant the will
in man, since the will, (though from nature) is the peculiar
and special principle of moral actions, instituted by the
Deity in nature. But if the blame of this cannot be
attributed to nature as a cause, by what right, I pray, can
it be attributed to God, who, by the mode and medium of
nature, has placed the will in man? I answer then, with
Augustine, in his book against articles falsely imputed to
him, artic. 10.
"The predestination of God neither excited, nor persuaded,
nor impelled, the fall of those who fell, or the iniquity of
the wicked, or the evil passions of sinners, but it clearly
predestinated His own judgment, by which He should recompense
each one according to his deeds, whether good or bad, which
judgment would not be inflicted, if men should sin by the
will of God." He proceeds to the same purpose in art. 11,
remarking, "If it should be charged against the devil, that
he was the author of certain sins, and the inciter to them, I
think he would be able to exonerate himself from that odium
in some way, and that he would convict the perpetrators of
such sins from their own will, since, although he might have
been delighted in the madness of those sinners, yet he could
prove that he did not force them to crime. With what folly,
what madness, then, is that referred to the counsel of God,
which cannot at all be ascribed to the devil, since he, in
the sins of wicked men, aids by enticements, but is not to be
considered the director of their wills. Therefore God
predestinated none of these things that they should take
place, nor did He prepare that soul, which was about to live
basely and in sin, that it should live in such a manner; but
He was not ignorant that such would be its character, and He
foreknew that He should judge justly concerning a soul of
such character."
But if this could be imputed neither to nature, nor to the
devil, how much less to God, the most holy and wise Creator?
God, (as St. Augustine says again, book 6) "does not
predestinate all which he foreknows. For He only foreknows
evil. He does not predestinate it, but He both foreknows and
predestinates good." But it is a good, derived from God,
that, in His own ordination, He disposes the order in things
good and evil; if not, the providence of God would be, for
the most part, indifferent (may that be far from our
thoughts). God does not will evil, but He wills, and
preserves a certain order even in evil. Evil comes from the
will of man; from God is the general and special arrangement
of His own providence, disposing and most wisely keeping in
order even those things which are, in the highest degree,
evil.
Here a two-fold question will perhaps be urged upon me:
first, how can these be said, in reference to the will, to be
its own motions, when we acknowledge that the will itself,
that is, the fountain of voluntary motions, is from nature,
and nature is from God? Secondly, why did God place in human
beings this will, constituted in the image of liberty? I will
reply to both in a few words. To the first; the will is
certainly from nature, and nature is from God, but the will
is not, on that account, the less to be called the principle
of those motions, than nature is called the principle of
natural motions. Each is the principle of its own action,
though both are from the supreme principle, God. It is one
thing to describe the essence of a thing, another to refer to
its source. What is essential to nature and the will? That
the former should be the principle of natural motions, the
latter, of spontaneous motions. What is their source? God is
the only and universal source of all things. Nor is it absurd
that a principle should be derived from another principle:
for although a principle, which originates in another, should
not be called a principle in the relation of origin or
source, yet, in the relation of the act it does not on that
account, cease to be an essential principle. God is, per se,
a principle. Nature and our wills are principles derived from
a principle. Yet each of them has its own appropriate
motions. Nor is there any reason, indeed, why any should
think that these are philosophical niceties: they are natural
distinctions, and that, which is of nature, is from God. But
if we are unwilling to hear nature, let us listen to the
truth of God, to Christ speaking of the devil (John viii,
44), "when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he
is a liar and the father of it." Here he is called "the
father of a lie," and is said "to speak of his own."
According to Christ's words, then, we have the origin and the
act of sin in the devil. For the act has a resemblance to
himself, for he speaks of his own. What, I pray, can be more
conclusive than these words? Hence Augustine, in the answer
already quoted, very properly deduces this conclusion. "As
God did not, in the angels who fell, induce that will, by
which they did not continue in the truth; so he did not
produce in men that inclination by which they imitate the
devil. For he speaketh a lie of his own; and he will not be
free from that charge, unless the truth shall free him." He
indeed gave free will, namely, that essential power to Adam:
but its motion is, in reference to Adam, his own, and, in
reference to all of us, our own. In what sense is it our own,
when it is given to us by God? Whatever is bestowed on us by
God, is either by the law of common right, or of personal and
private property. He gave the will to angels and men by the
law of personal possession. It is therefore, one's own and
its motion belong to the individual. "This," says Augustine,
(lib. de Genes. ad litt. in perf. cap. 5,) "He both makes and
disposes species and natures themselves, but the privations
of species and the defects of natures he does not make, He
only ordains." Therefore God is always righteous, but we are
unrighteous.
To the second question, namely, why did God create in us this
will, and with such a character? I reply; -- it was the work
of the highest goodness and wisdom in the universe. Why
should we, with our ungrateful minds, who have already made
an ill use of those minds, obstruct the fountain of goodness
and wisdom? It was the work of goodness to impress his own
image on both natures, in the superior, on that of angels,
and in the inferior, on that of men: since, while other
things in nature are moved by instinct, or feeling, as with a
dim trace of the Deity, these alone, in the freedom of their
own will, have the principle of their own ways in their own
power by the mere goodness of God. It was the work of wisdom
to make these very species, endued with His own image,
together with so many other objects, and above the others, as
the most perfect mirror of His own glory, so far as is
possible in created things. But why did he make them of such
a character, with mutable freedom? He made His own image, not
himself.
The only essential image of God, the Father, is the Lord
Jesus Christ, one God, eternal and immutable, with the Father
and the Holy Spirit. Whoever thou mayest be, who makest
objections to this, thou hearest the serpent whispering to
thee, as he whispered once to Eve, to the ruin of our race.
Let it suffice thee that thou wast made in the image of God,
not possessing the divine perfection. Immutability is
peculiar to the divine perfection. This pertains by nature to
God. The creature had in himself His image, communicated by
God, and placed in his will: but he, whether angel or man,
who fell, rejected it of his own will. Not to say more, this
whole question was presented by Marcion, and Tertullian, with
the utmost fluency and vigour, discussed it in its whole
extent, in a considerable part of his second book against
Marcion, the perusal of which will, I trust, be satisfactory
to you.
You remark, finally, that they are not freed from the
necessity of that conclusion "by the distinctions of the act,
and the evil in the act, of necessity and creation, of the
decree and its execution, &c." Indeed, my brother, I think
that, from those things, which have just been said, you will
sufficiently perceive in what respects your reasoning is
fallacious. For God does not make, but ordains the sinner, as
I say, with Augustine, that is, He ordains the iniquity of
the sinner not by commanding or decreeing particularly and
absolutely that he should commit sin, but by most wisely
vindicating His own order, and the right of His infinite
providence, even in evil which is peculiar to the creature.
For it was necessary that the wisdom of God should triumph in
this manner, when He exhibited His own order in the peculiar
and voluntary disorder of His own creature. This disorder and
alienation from good the creature prepared for himself by the
appropriate motion of free-will, not by the impulse of the
Deity. But that freedom of the will, says Tertullian against
Marcion (lib. 2, cap. 9) "does not fix the blame on Him by
whom it was bestowed, but on him by whom it was not directed,
as it ought to have been." Since this is so, it is not at all
necessary that I should speak of those particular
distinctions, which, in their proper place, may perhaps be
valid; they do not seem to me to pertain properly to this
argument, unless other arguments are introduced, which I
cannot find in your writings. Besides all those distinctions
pertain generally to the subject of providence, not
particularly to this topic. I am not pleased that the
discussion should extend beyond its appropriate range. But
here some may perhaps say; "Therefore, the judgments of God
depend on contingencies, and are based on contingencies, if
they have respect to man as a sinner, and to his sin." That
consequence is denied: for, on the contrary, those very
things which are contingencies to us, depend on the
ordination of God, according to their origin and action. To
their origin, for God has established the contingency equally
with the necessity: To their action, for He acts in the case
of that which is good, fails to act in that which is evil, in
that it is evil, not in that it is ordained by His special
providence. They are not, therefore, contingencies to the
Deity, whatever they may be to us; just as those things,
which are contingent to an inferior cause, can by no means be
justly ascribed to a superior cause. But I have already
stated this matter with sufficient clearness, in the
discussion of the fourth fundamental principle. Let us,
therefore, pass to other matters.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SIXTH PROPOSITION
The meaning of the first theory is that which I have set
forth in the third proposition. But it is of little
importance to me, whether the object, generally and without
distinction, or with a certain distinction, and invested with
certain circumstances, is presented to God, when
predestinating and reprobating, for that is not, now, the
point before me. If, however, it may be proper to discuss
this also in a few words, I should say that it cannot seem to
one who weighs this matter with accuracy, that the object is
considered in general and without any distinction by God, in
the act of decreeing, according to the sentiment of the
authors of the first theory. For the object was considered by
God, in the act of decreeing, in the relation which it had at
the time. when it had, as yet, been affected by no external
act of God, executing that decree; for this, in a pure and
abstract sense, is an object, free from every other
consideration, which can pertain to an object, through the
action of a cause operating in reference to it. But since,
according to the authors of the first theory, the act of
creation pertains to the execution of the decree, of which we
now treat, it is, therefore, most certainly evident, that
man, in that he was to be made, was the object of
predestination and reprobation. If any one considers the
various and manifold sets of that decree, it is not doubtful
that some of these must be accommodated and applied to this
and others to that condition of man, and in this sense, I
would admit the common and general consideration of the
object. But all those acts, according to the authors of that
first theory, depend on one primary act, namely, that in
which God determined to declare, in one part of that unformed
"lump," from which the human race was to be made, the glory
of his mercy, and, in another part, the glory of his justice,
and it is this very thing which I stated to be displeasing to
me in that first theory; nor can I yet persuade myself that
there exists, in the whole Scripture, any decree, by which
God has determined to illustrate his own glory, in the
salvation of these and in the condemnation of those, apart
from foresight of the fall.
The passage which you quote from Beza, on Ephes. i, 4,
plainly proves that I have done no injustice to those authors
in explaining their doctrine. He says, in that passage, that
God, by the creation and corruption of man, opened a way for
himself to the execution of that which he had before
decreed."
In reference to the harmony of those theories, I grant that
all agree in this, that this decree of God was made from
eternity, before any actual existence of the object, whatever
might be its character, and however it might be considered.
For "known unto God are all his works from the beginning of
the world." (Acts xv, 18.)
It is necessary also that all the internal acts of God should
universally be eternal, unless we wish to make God mutable;
yet in such a sense that some are antecedent to others in
order and nature. I admit also that they agree in this, that
there exists, in the predestinate or the reprobate, no cause
why the former should be predestinated, the latter
reprobated; and that the cause exists only in the mere will
of God. But I affirm that some ascend to a greater height
than others, and extend the act of decree farther. For the
advocates of the third theory deny that God, in any act of
predestination and reprobation, has reference to man,
considered as not yet fallen, and those of the second theory
say that God, in the act of that decree, did not have
reference to man as not yet created. The advocates of the
first, however, openly assert and contend that God, in the
first act of the decree, had reference to man, not as
created, but as to be created. I, therefore, distinguished
those theories according to their objects, as each one
presented man to God, at the first moment of the act of
predestination and reprobation, as free from any divine act
predestinating and reprobating, either internal, by which he
might decree something concerning man, or external, by which
He might effect something in man; this may be called pure
object, having as yet received no relation from the act of
God, decreeing from eternity, and no form from the external
act. But when it has received any relation or form from any
act of God, it is no longer pure object, but an object having
some action of God concerning it, or in it, by which it is
prepared for receiving some further action, as was also a
short time since affirmed. We will hereafter examine your
idea that they substantiate their theory by the example of
Jacob and Esau in Romans 9.
I may be permitted to make some observations or inquiries
concerning what you lay down as fundamental principles of
this doctrine, and of your reply to my arguments. In
reference to the first, concerning the essence of the Deity,
God is in such a sense immutable in essence, power,
intellect, will, counsel and work, that, nevertheless, if the
creature is changed, he becomes to that creature in will, the
application of power, and in work, another than that which he
was to the same creature continuing in his primitive state;
bestowing upon a cause that which is due to it, but without
any change in Himself. Again if God is immutable, He has, for
that very reason, not circumscribed or determined to one
direction, by any decree, the motion of free-will, the
enjoyment and use of which He has once freely bestowed on
man, so that it should incline, of necessity, to one
direction, and should not be able, in fact, to incline to
another direction, while that decree remains. Thirdly, God
has the form and an eternal and immutable conception of all
those things which are done mutably by men, but following, in
the order of nature, many other conceptions, which God has
concerning those things which He wills both to do Himself,
and to permit to men.
In reference to the second, concerning the knowledge of God;
I am most fully persuaded that the knowledge of God is
eternal, immutable and infinite, and that it extends to all
things, both necessary and contingent, to all things which He
does of Himself, either mediately or immediately, and which
He permits to be done by others. But I do not understand the
mode in which He knows future contingencies, and especially
those which belong to the free-will of creature, and which He
has decreed to permit, but not to do of Himself, not, indeed,
in that measure, in which I think that it is understood by
others more learned than myself. I know that there are those
who say that all things are, from eternity, presented to God,
and that the mode, in which God certainly and infallibly
knows future contingencies, is this, that those contingent
events coexist with God in the Now of eternity, and therefore
they are in Him indivisibly, and in the infinite Now of
eternity, which embraces all time. If this is so, it is not
difficult to understand how God may certainly and infallibly
know future contingent events. For contingencies are not
opposed to certainty of knowledge, except as they are future,
but not as they are present. That reasoning, however, does
not exhaust all the difficulties which may arise in the
consideration of these matters. For God knows, also, those
things which may happen, but never do happen, and
consequently do not co-exist with God in the Now of eternity,
which would be events unless they should be hindered, as is
evident from 1 Samuel xxiii, 12, in reference to the citizens
of Keilah, who would have delivered David into the hands of
Saul, which event, nevertheless, did not happen. The
knowledge, also, of future events, which depend on contingent
causes, seems to be certain, if those causes may be complete
and not hindered in their operation. But how shall the causes
of those events, which depend on the freedom of the will, be
complete, among which, even at that very moment in which it
chose one, it was free not to choose it, or to choose another
in preference to it? If indeed at any time your leisure may
permit, I could wish that you would accurately discuss, in
your own manner, these things and whatever else may pertain
to that question. I know that this would be agreeable and
acceptable to many, and that the labour would not be useless.
The knowledge of God is called eternal, but not equally so in
reference to all objects of knowledge. For that knowledge of
God is absolutely eternal, by which God knows Himself, and in
Himself all possible things. That, by which He knows beings
which will exist, is eternal indeed as to duration, but, in
nature, subsequent to some act of the divine will concerning
them, and, in some cases, even subsequent to some foreseen
act of the human will. In general, the following seems to me
to be the order of the divine knowledge, in reference to its
various objects. God knows
1. Himself what He, of Himself is able to do.
2. All things possible what can be done by those beings which
He can make.
3. All things which shall exist by the act of creation.
4. All things which shall exist by the act of creatures and
especially of rational creatures. Whether moved by those
actions of His creatures and
5. What He Himself especially of His rational shall do.
creatures; Or at least receiving occasion from them.
From this, it is apparent that the eternity of the knowledge
of God is not denied by those, who propose, as a foundation
for that knowledge, something dependent on the human will, as
foreseen.
But I do not understand in what way it can be true that, in
every genus, there must be one thing univocal, and from this,
other things in an equivocal sense. I have hitherto supposed
that those things which are under the same genus are univocal
or at least analogous; but, that things equivocal are not
comprehended with those which are univocal, under the same
genus, either in logic, or metaphysics, and still less in
physics. Then I have not thought that the univocal could be
the cause of the equivocal. For there is no similarity
between them. But if there exists a similarity as between
cause and effect, they are no longer equivocal. Thus those
things, which are heated by the fire as I should say, are
heated neither univocally, nor equivocally, but analogically.
God exists univocally, we, analogically. This they admit, who
state that certain attributes of the divine nature are
communicable to us according to analogy, among which they
also mention knowledge.
In reference to the third, concerning the actions of the
Deity; the actions of God are, in Himself, indeed eternal,
but they preserve a certain order; some are prior to others
by nature, and indeed necessarily precede them, whether in
the same order, in which they proceed from Him, I could not
easily say; but I know that there are those who have thus
stated, among whom some mention George Sohnius. Some also of
the internal actions in God, are subsequent in nature to the
foresight of some act dependent on the will of the creature.
Thus the decree concerning the mission of His Son for the
redemption of the human race is subsequent to the foresight
of the fall of man. For although God might have arranged to
prevent the fall, if he had not known that He could use an
easy remedy to effect a restoration, (as some think,) yet the
sure decree for the introduction of a remedy for the fall by
the mission of His Son, was not effected by God except on the
foresight of the disease, namely, the fall.
The mode in which God, as the universal principle, is said to
flow into His creatures, and especially his rational
creatures, and concurs with their nature and will, in
reference to an action, has my approbation, whatever it may
be, if it does not bring in a determination of the will of
the creature to one or two things which are contrary, or
contradictory. If any mode introduces such a determination, I
do not see how it can be consistent with the declaration of
Augustine, quoted by yourself, that God so governs all things
which He has created as also "to permit them to exercise and
put forth their own motions," or with the saying of Plato, in
which God is declared to be free from all blame.
I could wish that it might be plainly and decisively
explained how all effects and defects in nature, and the
will, of all kinds universally, are of the providence of God,
and yet God is free from fault, the whole fault, (if any
exists,) residing in the proximate cause. If any one thinks
that God is exempted from fault because He is the remote
cause, but that the creature, as the proximate cause, is
culpable, (if there is any sin,) he does not seem to me to
present a correct reason why any cause may be in fault, or
free from fault, but, concerning this also, I will hereafter
speak at greater length. In reference to the fourth,
concerning the causes of the actions of God; the universal
cause has no cause above itself, and the first and supreme
cause does not depend on any other cause, for the very terms
include that idea; but it is possible that there may be
afforded to the universal, first and supreme cause, by
another cause, an occasion for the production of some certain
effect, which, without that occasion, the first cause would
neither propose to be produced in itself, nor in fact produce
out of itself, and indeed could neither produce nor propose
or decree to be produced. Such is the decree to damn certain
persons, and their damnation according to that decree.
I readily assent to what you have said in reference to the
modes of necessary and contingent causes, as also those
things which you have remarked in reference to the
distinction between natural and rational power. I am,
however, certain that nothing can be deduced from them
against my opinion, or against those things, which have been
presented by me for the refutation of the first theory.
Having made these remarks, I come to the consideration of
your answer to my arguments. In my former argument, I denied
that man, considered as not yet created, is the object of
mercy rescuing from sin and misery, and of punitive justice,
and I persist in that sentiment; for I do not see that any
thing has been presented, which overthrows it, or drives me
from that position. For man is not, by that consideration,
removed from under the common providence or the special
predestination of God, but providence must, in this case, be
considered as according to mercy and justice thus
administered, and predestination, as decreed according to
them. But the reasoning from the relative to the absolute is
not valid; and the removal, in this case, is from under the
providence of God, considered relatively, not absolutely; so
also with predestination. You foresaw that I would make this
reply, and consequently you have presented a three-fold
answer; but, in no respect, injurious to my reasoning. For as
to the first, I admit that sin and misery were, in the most
complete sense, present with God from eternity, and, as they
were present, so also there was, in reference to them, a
place for mercy and justice. But the theory, which I oppose,
does not make them, (as foreseen,) present to mercy and
justice, but, according to the decree for illustrating mercy
and justice, it presents a necessity for the existence of sin
and misery, as, in their actual existence, there could be in
fact, a place, for the decree, made according to mercy and
justice. As to the second, I grant also that there could be,
in one who was in fact neither a sinner, nor miserable, a
place for mercy saving from sin and possible misery, but we
are not here treating of mercy so considered: and it is
certain that mercy and judgment exist in the Deity, by an
eternal act, but it is in the first action of those
attributes. In a second act, God cannot exercise those
attributes, understood according to the mind of the authors
of that theory, except in reference to a sinful and actually
miserable being. Lastly, what you say concerning the
internal, and external action of the Deity, and these
conjoined, does not disturb, in any greater degree, my
argument. For neither the internal action, which is the
decree of God in reference to the illustration of his glory,
by mercy and punitive justice, nor the external action, which
is the actual declaration of that same glory through mercy
and justice, nor both conjoined can have any place in
reference to a man who is neither sinful, nor miserable. I
know, indeed, that, to those who advocate this theory, there
is so much difference between internal and external action,
that is, as they say, between the decree and its execution,
that God may decree salvation according to mercy and death
according to justice to a person who is not a sinner, but may
not really save, according to mercy, any one, unless, He is a
sinner, or damn, according to justice, any except sinners.
But I deny that distinction; indeed I say that God, can
neither will nor decree, by internal act, that which He
cannot do, by external act, and thus the object of internal
and external action is the same, and invested with the same
circumstances: whether it be present to God, in respect to
his eternal intelligence and be the object of His decree, or
be, in fact, in its actual existence, present to Him and the
object of the execution of the decree. Hence, I cannot yet
decide otherwise concerning that theory, than that it cannot
be approved by those, who think and desire to speak according
to the Scriptures.
The "two statements" which you think "may be made, of a
milder character, and in harmony with the words of Christ and
the apostles," do not serve to explain that first theory, but
are additions, by which it is very much changed, and which
its advocates would by no means acknowledge, as, in my
opinion, was made sufficiently manifest in my statement of
the same theory in reply to your third answer, and may be, at
this time, again demonstrated in a single word. For those
very things, which you make the mode and the consequent event
of predestination and reprobation, are styled, by the authors
of that first theory, the cause, and the principle of that
same decree, and also the end, though not the final one,
which, they affirm, is his glory, to be declared by mercy and
justice. Again they acknowledge no grace in predestination
which is not mercy, and correctly so, for the grace, which is
towards man considered absolutely, is not of election: also
they do not acknowledge any non-grace, or non-mercy, which is
not comprehended in punitive justice. Here I do not argue
against that theory thus explained, not because I approve it
in all respects, but because I have, this time, undertaken to
examine what I affirm to be the view of Calvin and Beza;
other matters will be hereafter considered. I will notice
separately what things are here brought forward, agreeing
with that view, thus explained. The passages of Scripture
quoted from Matthew 25, and Ephesians 1, in which it is
taught that "God, from all eternity, of the good pleasure of
his will, elected some to adoption, sanctification, and a
participation of his kingdom," so far fail to prove the
common view that on the contrary there may be inferred from
them a reference to sin, as a condition requisite in the
object of benediction and election. In the former passage,
the blessed are called to a participation of the kingdom,
which God has prepared for them from eternity; but in whom
and by whom? Is it not in Christ and by Christ? Certainly;
then it was prepared for sinners, not for men considered in
general, and apart from any respect to sin. For "thou shall
call his name Jesus; for he shall save his people from their
sins." (Matt. i, 2.)
The passage from Ephesians 1, much more plainly affirms the
same thing, as will be hereafter proved in a more extended
manner, when I shall use that passage, avowedly to sustain
the theory which makes sin a condition requisite in the
object. I did not present a particular reference to men, as a
cause, which I wished to have kept in mind, but according to
a condition, requisite in the object, namely, misery and sin.
This I still require. The distinction, which you make between
grace and mercy, is according to fact and the signification
of terms, but in this place is unnecessary. For no grace,
bestowed upon man, originates in predestination, as there is
no grace, previous to predestination, not joined with mercy.
God deals with angels according to grace, not according to
mercy saving from sin and misery. He deals with us according
to mercy, not according to grace in contradistinction to
mercy. I speak here of predestination. According to that
mercy, also, is our adoption; it is not, then, of men,
considered in their original state, but of sinners. This is
also apparent from the phraseology of the apostle, who calls
the elect and the reprobate "vessels," not of grace and non-
grace but of "mercy" and "wrath." The relation of "vessels"
they have equally and in common from their divine creation,
sustainment, and government. That they are vessels worthy of
wrath, deserving it, and the "children of wrath," (Ephes. ii,
3), in this also there is no distinction among them. But that
some are "vessels of wrath," that is, destined to wrath, of
their own merit, indeed, but also of the righteous judgment
of God, which determines to bring wrath upon them; while
others are "vessels" not "of wrath" but "of mercy" according
to the grace of God, which determines to pardon their sin,
and to spare them, though worthy of wrath, this is of the
will of God, making a distinction between the two classes;
which discrimination has its beginning after the act of sin,
whether we consider the internal or the external act of God.
From this it is apparent that they are not on this account
vessels of wrath because they have become depraved, the just
consequence of which is wrath, if the will of God did not
intervene, which determines that this, which would be a just
consequence in respect to all the depraved, should be a
necessary consequence in respect to those, whom alone He
refuses to pardon, as He can justly punish all and had
decreed to pardon some. That which is "added by way of
amplification" is confirmed by the same arguments. For there
is no place for punitive justice except in reference to the
sinner; there can be no act of that mercy, of which we treat,
except towards the miserable. But man, considered in his
natural condition is neither sinful nor miserable, therefore
that justice and mercy have no place in reference to him.
Hence, you, my brother, will see that the object of
predestination, made according to those attributes and so
understood, cannot be man, considered in general, since it
requires, in its object, the circumstance of sin and misery,
by which circumstance man is restricted to a determinate
condition, and is separated from a general consideration. I
know, indeed, that, if the general consideration is admitted,
no one of those particular considerations is excluded, but
you also know that if any particular relation is precisely
laid down, that universal relation is excluded. I do not
think that it is to be altogether conceded that, in the case
of election and reprobation, there is no consideration of
well-doing or of sin. There is no consideration of well-
doing, it is true, for there is none to be considered; there
is no consideration of sin as a cause why one, and not
another, should be reprobated, but there is a consideration
of sin as a meritorious cause of the possibility of the
reprobation of any individual, and as a condition requisite
in the object, as I have often remarked, and shall,
hereafter, often remark, as occasion may require. In what
respects, those theories differ was briefly noticed in reply
to your first answer. When God is said to have elected
persons, as not created, as created but not fallen, or as
fallen, all know that it is understood, not that they are in
fact such, but that they are considered as such, for all
admit that God elected human beings from eternity, before
they were created, that is, by the internal act; but no one
says, that man was elected by the external act before he was
created; therefore a reconciliation of those theories was
unnecessary, since the object of both acts is one and the
same, and considered in the same manner. Besides the
questions, when the election was made, and in what sense it
was considered, are different. I wished to confirm my words
by the authority of your consent; whether ignorantly, will be
proved from these statements. You make man, considered as a
sinner, the subject of the preparation of punishment
according to justice, which I, agreeably to your Theses, have
called reprobation, and you, according to your opinion,
presuppose sin in him; but, in the first theory, they make
sin subordinate to that same decree. The preterition, which
the same theory attributes to punitive justice, you attribute
to the freedom of the divine goodness, and you exclude
punitive justice from it, when you make man, not yet a
sinner, the subject of preterition. Predestination, which the
first theory ascribes to mercy, in contra-distinction to
grace, your Theses, already cited (answers 2 and 4) assign to
grace, spoken of absolutely, since they consider man in the
state of nature in which he was created; but you make man, as
a sinner, the subject of grace, as conjoined with mercy, and
you presuppose sin. That first theory, on the other hand,
makes sin subordinate to that predestination, both of which
cannot, at the same time, be true, therefore, in this you
seem to agree with me, as you ascribe election to mercy, only
so far as man is considered miserable, and preparation of
punishment to justice, only so far as man is considered
sinful. You reply, that, when grace is presented, as the
genus, mercy, as the species, is not excluded, and mercy
being presented, as the species, grace, as the genus, is not
excluded. I grant it, but affirm, first, that grace cannot be
supposed here as the genus, for grace, spoken of generally,
cannot be supposed to be the cause of any act, that is, any
special act, such as predestination. Again, the relation of
grace and mercy in this case, is different from that of genus
and species: for they are spoken of, in an opposite manner,
as two different species of grace, the term grace, having the
same appellation with that of the genus, referring to that
grace which regards man as created, the term mercy, receiving
its appellation from its object, referring to that grace
which regards man as sinful and miserable. If man is said to
be predestinated according to the former, the latter can have
no place; if according to the latter, then it is certain that
the former can have no place, otherwise the latter would be
unnecessary. Predestination cannot be said to have been made
conjointly according to both. My conclusion was, therefore,
correct, when I excluded one species by the supposition of
the other. If man is to be exalted to supernatural glory from
a natural state, this work belongs to grace, simply
considered, and in contra-distinction to mercy; if from a
corrupt state, it belongs to grace conjoined with mercy, that
is, it is the appropriate work of mercy. Grace, simply
considered and opposed to mercy, cannot effect the latter,
mercy is not necessary for the former. But predestination is
of such grace as is both able and necessary to effect that
which is proposed in predestination.
What I wrote copulatively, in reference to the passed by and
the reprobate, was written thus, because they are one
subject. But that they are not the same in relation, is
admitted: and I expressed this when I remarked that you
referred to justice only in the case of the latter, namely,
the reprobate, that is, the damned. In my second proposition,
however, I signified that, according to the view of those to
whom I ascribed the second theory, the relation of
preterition was different from that of predamnation, which I
there called reprobation. The homonymy of the term
reprobation is explained in my second answer, and all fault
is removed from me, who have used that word every where
according to your own idea. But it is very apparent, from
what follows, that you dissent from the authors of the first
theory. For you assert that "predestination is of justice,"
but that preterition or reprobation is according to justice,
but not "of justice;" while the authors of the first theory
ascribe to justice the cause of reprobation, however
understood, whether synecdochically, or properly, or
catachrestically, that is, they affirm that both preterition
and predamnation are of justice.
But how are election and preterition "the work of flee-will
according to the wisdom of God and damnation, the work of
necessary will according to the justice of God? I have
hitherto thought, with our theologians, that this whole
decree was instituted by God, in the exercise of most
complete freedom of will, and I yet think that the same idea
is true, according to the declaration, "I will have mercy on
whom I will have mercy," and "He hath mercy on whom He will
have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth." (Rom. ix, 15 &
18.)
In each of these acts God exercises equal freedom. For, if
God necessarily wills in any case to punish sin, how is it
that He does not punish it in all sinners? If he punishes it
in some, but not in others, how is that the act of necessary
will? Who, indeed, does not ascribe the distinction which is
made among persons, equally meriting the punishment, to the
freewill of God? Justice may demand punishment on account of
sin, but it demands it equally in reference to all sinners
without distinction; and, if there is any discrimination, it
is of free-will, demanding punishment as to these, but
remitting sin to those. But it was necessary that punishment
should be at least inflicted on some. If I should deny that
this was so after the satisfaction made by Christ, how will
it be proved? I know that Aquinas, and other of the School-
men, affirm that the relation of the divine goodness and
providence demands that some should be elected to life, and
that others should be permitted to fall into sin and then to
suffer the punishment of eternal death, and that God was free
to decree to whom life, and to whom death should appertain,
according to his will, but their arguments seem to me
susceptible of refutation from their own statements,
elsewhere made concerning the price of our redemption paid by
Christ. For they say the price was sufficient for the sins of
all, but if the necessity of divine justice demands that some
sinners should be damned, then the price was not sufficient
for all. For if justice, in him who receives that price,
necessarily demands that some should be destitute of
redemption, then it must have been offered by the redeemer
with the condition that there must always remain to the
necessity of justice, some satisfaction, to be sought
elsewhere and to be rendered by others. Let no one think that
the last affirmation of the school-men (that concerning the
sufficiency of the price), which, however, they borrowed from
the fathers, is to be rejected, for it could be proved, if
necessary, by plain and express testimonies from the
Scripture.
Let us now come to my second argument, which was this. A
theory, by which God is necessarily made the author of sin,
is to be repudiated by all Christians, and indeed by all men;
for no man thinks that the being, whom he considers divine,
is evil; -- But according to the theory of Calvin and Beza
God is necessarily made the author of sin; -- Therefore it is
to be repudiated. The proof of the Minor, is evident from
these words, in which they say that "God ordained that man
should fall and become corrupt, that in this way he might
open a way for His eternal counsels." For he, who ordains
that man should fall and sin, is the author of sin This, my
argument, is firm, nor is it weakened by your answer. The
word ordain is indeed ambiguous, for it properly signifies to
arrange the order of events or deeds, and in each thing
according to its own mode, in which sense it is almost always
used by the school-men. But it is also applied to a simple
and absolute decree of the will determining an action. What
then? Does it follow, because I have used a word, which is
ambiguous and susceptible of various meanings that I am
chargeable with ambiguity? I think not; unless it is proved
that, in my argument, I have used that word in different
senses. Otherwise sound reasoning would be exceedingly rare,
since, on account of the multitude of things and the paucity
of words, we are very frequently compelled to use words,
which have a variety of meanings. Ambiguity may be charged
when a word is used in different senses in the same argument.
But I used that word, in the same sense in the Major and in
the Minor, and so my argument is free from ambiguity. I
affirm that this is evident from the argument itself. For the
added phrase "that man should fall" signifies that the word
ordain, in both propositions, is to be applied to the simple
decree in reference to an action, or rather to a simple
decree that something should be done. It cannot, on account
of that phrase, be referred to a decree disposing the order
of actions.
Let us now state the syllogism in a few words, that we may be
able to compare your answer with the argument.
He who ordained that man should fall and become depraved, is
the author of the fall and of sin; God ordained that man
should fall and become depraved; Therefore, God is the author
of sin.
You deny the Major, if the word ordain is understood to mean
the disposal of the order of actions. You deny the Minor if
the same word is used to mean a simple decree as to actions,
or things to be done. This is true, and, in it, I agree with
you. But what if the same word in the Minor signifies a
simple decree, &c.? Then, indeed, even by your own admission,
the Major will be true. Else your distinction in the word is
uselessly made, if the Major is false, however the word may
be understood. But that the word is used in the Major in this
sense, is proved by the phraseology, "He who ordained that
man should fall." Then you say that the Minor is false if the
word is used in the same sense in which we have shown that it
is used in the Major, and so the conclusion does not follow.
I reply, that the question between us is not whether that
Minor is true or false, the word ordain being used for the
decreeing of things to be done, but whether they affirm it,
to whom the first theory is attributed. If, then, they affirm
this, and the Major is true, then it follows (and in this you
agree with me,) that God is the author of sin. For you admit
that he is the author of sin, who, by the simple decree and
determination of the will, ordains that sin shall be
committed. Calvin and Beza assert this in plain and most
manifest declarations, needing no explanation, and by no
means admitting that explanation of the word ordain, which,
as you say and I acknowledge, is proper. I wish also that it
might be shown in what way the necessity of the commission of
sin, can depend on the ordination and decree of God otherwise
than by the mode of cause, either efficient or deficient,
which deficiency is reduced to efficiency, when the
efficiency of that which is deficient is necessary to the
avoidance of sin. Beza himself concedes that it is
incomprehensible how God can be free from and man be
obnoxious to guilt, if man fell by the ordination of God, and
of necessity.
This, then, was to be done: their theory was to be freed from
the consequence of that absurdity, which, in my argument, I
ascribe to it. It was not, however, necessary to show how God
ordained sin, and that He is not indeed the author of sin. I
agree with you, both in the explanation of that ordination,
and in the assertion that God is not the author of sin.
Calvin himself, and Beza also, openly deny that God is the
author of sin, although they define ordination as we have
seen, but they do not show how these two things can be
reconciled. I wish, then, that it might be shown plainly, and
with perspicuity, that God is not made the author of sin by
that decree, or that the theory might be changed, since it is
a stumbling block to many, indeed to some a cause of
separating from us, and to very many a cause of not uniting
with us. But I am altogether persuaded that you also perceive
that consequence, but prefer to free the theory of those men
from an absurd and blasphemous consequence, by a fit
explanation, than to charge that consequence to it. This is
certainly the part of candour and good will, but used to no
good purpose, since the gloss, as they say, is contrary to
the text, which is manifest to any one who examines and
compares the text with the gloss. Those two questions, which
you present to yourself, do not affect my argument, when the
matter is thus explained.
Yet I am delighted with your beautiful and elegant discussion
of those questions. But I would ask, in opposition to the
theory of Calvin and Beza, "How can these movements of the
will be called its own and free, when the act of the will is
determined to one direction by the decree of God?" Then, "Why
did God place the will in man, if He was unwilling that he
should enjoy the liberty of its use?" For these questions are
necessarily to be answered by those authors, if they do not
wish to leave their theory without defense. It is therefore,
apparent from these things that my argument does not fail,
but remains firm and unmoved, since all things which you have
adduced, are aside from that argument, which did not seek to
conclude, as my own views, that God is the author of sin (far
from me be even the thought of that abominable blasphemy),
but to prove that this is a necessary consequence of the
theory of Calvin and Beza: which (I confidently say) has not
been confuted by you: nor can it be at all confuted, since
you use the word ordain in a sense different from that in
which they use it, and from that sense, according to which if
God should be said to have ordained sin, nothing less could
be inferred than that He is the author of sin.
I said, moreover, that the theory of Calvin and Beza, in
which they state that God ordained that man should fall and
become depraved, could not be explained so that God should
not be made by it the author of sin, by the distinctions of
the act, and the evil in the act, of necessity and coaction,
of the decree and its execution, of efficacious and
permissive decree, as the latter is explained by the authors
of that theory agreeably to it, nor by the different relation
of the divine decree and of human nature or of man, nor by
the addition of the end, namely, that the whole ordination
was designed for the illustration of the glory of God. You
seem to me, reverend sir, not to have perceived for what
purpose I presented these things, for I did not wish to
present any new course of reasoning against that first
theory, but to confirm my previous objection by a refutation
of those answers, which are usually presented by the
defenders of that theory, to the objection which I made,
that, by it, God is made the author of sin. For they, in
order to repel the charge from their theory, never make the
reply which has been presented by you, for, should they do
this, they would necessarily depart from their own theory,
which is wholly changed, if the word ordain, which they use,
signifies not to decree that sin should be committed, but to
arrange the order of its commission, as you explain that
word. But to show that it does not follow from their theory,
that God is the author of sin, they adduce the distinctions
to which I have referred, and have diligently gathered from
their various writings; which ought to be done before that
accusation should be made against their theory. For, if I
could find any explanation of that theory, any distinction,
by which it could be relieved of that charge, it would have
pertained to my conscience, not to place upon it the load of
such a consequence. Your distinction in the word ordain
indeed removes the difficulty, but, in such a way, that, by
one and the same effort, it removes the theory from which I
proved that the difficulty followed. Prove that the authors
of that theory assert that God ordained sin in no other sense
than that, in which you have shown that the word is properly
used, and I shall obtain that which I wish, and I will
concede that those distinctions were unnecessary for the
defense of that theory. For the word ordain used in your
sense, presupposes the perpetration of sin; in their sense,
it precedes and proposes its perpetration, for "God ordained
that man should fall and become depraved," not that from a
being, fallen and depraved, He should make whatever the order
of the divine wisdom, goodness, and justice might demand.
There is here, then, no wandering beyond the appropriate
range of the discussion. You say that all those distinctions
pertain in common to the question of providence, and
therefore the ordination of sin pertains in common to the
question of providence. If, however, the authors of the first
theory have ascribed the ordination of sin to the divine
predestination, why should it cause surprise, that those
distinctions should also be referred to the same
predestination? There is, in this case, then, no blame to be
attached to me, that I have mentioned these distinctions. On
the contrary, I should have been in fault, if, omitting
reference to those distinctions, I should have made an
accusation against their theory, which they are accustomed to
defend against this accusation by means of those
distinctions. But since you do not, by your explanation,
relieve their theory from that objection, and I have said
that those distinctions do not avail for its relief and
defense, it will not be useless that I should prove my
assertion, not for your sake, but for the sake of those, who
hold that opinion, since they think that it can be suitably
defended by these distinctions.
They use the first distinction thus: "In sin there are two
things, the act and its sinfulness." God, by his own
ordination, is the author of the act, not of the sinfulness
in the act. I will first consider the distinction, then the
answer which they deduce from it. This distinction is very
commonly made, and seems to have some truth, but to one
examining, with diligence, its falsity, in most respects,
will be apparent. For it is not, in general or universally,
applicable to all sin. All sins, especially, which are
committed against prohibitory laws, styled sins of
commission, reject this distinction. For the acts themselves
are forbidden by the law, and therefore, if perpetrated, they
are sins. This is the formal relation of sin, that it is
something done contrary to law. It is true that the act in
that it is such, would not be sin, if the law had not been
enacted, but then it is not an act, having evil or
sinfulness. Let the law be absent, the act is naturally good:
introduce the law, and the act itself is evil, as forbidden,
not that there is any thing in the act which can be called
unlawfulness or sin. I will make the matter clear by an
example. The eating of the forbidden fruit, if it had been
permitted to the human will as right, would, in no way, be
sin, nor any part of sin, it would not contain any element of
sin; but the same act, forbidden by law, could not be
otherwise than sinful, if perpetrated; I refer to the act
itself, and not to any thing in the act to which the term
evil can be applied. For that act was simply made illicit by
the enactment of the law. I shall have attained my object
here in a single word, by simply asking that the sinfulness
in that act may be shown separately from the act itself. That
distinction, however, had a place in acts which are performed
according to a perceptive law, but not according to a due
mode, order, or motive. Thus he, who gives alms, that he may
be praised does a good act badly, and there is, in that deed
both the act and the evil of the act according to which it is
called sin. But the sin which man perpetrated at the
beginning, of the ordination of God, was a sin of commission;
it therefore affords no place for that distinction. This
fundamental principle having been established, the answer,
deduced from that distinction, is at once refuted. Yet let us
look at it. "God," they say, "is, by ordination, the author
of the act, not of the evil in the act." I affirm, on the
contrary, that God ordained that act, not as an act, but as
it is an evil act. He ordained that the glory of His mercy
and justice should be illustrated, of his pardoning mercy,
and His punitive justice; but that glory is illustrated not
by the act as such, but as it is sinful, and as an evil act.
For the act needs remission, not as such, but as evil; it
deserves punishment, not as such, but as evil. The
declaration, then, of His glory by mercy and justice, is by
the act as it is evil, not as it is an act; therefore that
ordination which had its end, the illustration of that glory,
was not of the act as such, but as evil, and of sin, as sin
and transgression. That distinction, therefore, is useless in
repelling the objection, which I have urged against that
theory. I add, for the elucidation of the subject, that if
God efficaciously determines the will to the material of sin,
or to depraved objects, though it may be affirmed that He
does not determine the will to an evil decision, in respect
to the evil, He is still made the author of sin, since man
himself does not will the evil in respect to the evil and the
devil does not solicit to evil in respect to the evil, but in
respect to that which is delectable, and yet he is said to
induce persons to sin.
The second distinction is that of necessity and coaction.
They use it in this way. If the decree of God, in which he
ordained that man should fall, compelled him to sin, then
would God, by that decree, become the author of sin, and man
would be free from guilt: but that decree did not compel man.
It only imposed a necessity upon him so that he could not but
sin; which necessity does not take away his liberty.
Therefore, man, since he sins freely, the decree being in
force, is the cause of his own fall, and God is free from the
responsibility. Let us now consider this distinction, and the
use made of it.
Necessity and coaction differ as genus and species. For
necessity comprehends coaction in itself. Necessity also is
twofold, one from an internal, the other from an external
cause; the one, natural, the other, violent. Necessity, from
an external cause and violent, is also called coaction,
whether it be used contrary to nature, or against the will,
as when a stone is projected upwards, and a strong man makes
use of the hand of a weaker person to strike a third person.
The former has the name of the genus, necessity, but is
referred to a specific idea, by a contraction of the mental
conception. There is, then, between these two species, some
agreement, as they belong to the same genus, and some
discrepancy, since each has its own form. But it is now to be
considered whether they so differ that coaction alone, and
not that other species of necessity, is contrary to freedom;
and whether he who compels to sin is the cause of sin, and
not he who necessitates without compulsion. They indeed
affirm this, who use this distinction. First, in reference to
freedom; it is opposed directly to necessity, considered in
general, whether natural or compulsive, for each of these
species causes the inevitability of the act. For a cause acts
freely when it has the power to suspend its action. Some say
that freedom is fully consistent with natural necessity, and
refer to the example of the Deity, who is, by nature and
freely, good. But is God freely good? Such an affirmation is
not very far from blasphemy. His own goodness exists in God,
naturally and most intimately; it does not then exist in Him
freely. I know that a kind of freedom of complacency is
spoken of by the School-men, but contrary to the very nature
and definition of freedom. We say, in reference to sin, that
he is the cause of sin, who necessitates to the commission of
sin, by any act whatever of necessitation, whether internal
or external, whether by internal suasion, motion, or leading,
which the will necessarily obeys, or by an application of
external violence, which the will is not able, though it may
desire, to resist; though, in that case, the act would not be
voluntary. He, indeed sins more grievously, who uses the
former act, than he, who uses the latter. For the former has
this effect, that the will may consent to the sin, but the
latter has no such effect, though that consent is not
according to the mode of free-will, but according to that of
nature, in which mode only, God can so move the will, that it
may be moved necessarily, that is, that it cannot but be
moved. And in this relation, the will, as it consents by
nature to sin, is free from guilt; for sin, as such, is of
free-will, and tend towards its object, according to the mode
of its own freedom. The law is enacted not for nature but for
the will, for the will as it acts not according to the mode
of nature, but according to the mode of freedom. That
distinction is, therefore, vain, and does not relieve the
first theory from the objection made against it. If any one
wishes, with greater pertinacity, still to defend the idea,
that one and the same act can be performed freely and
necessarily, in different respects, necessarily in respect to
the first cause, which ordains it, but freely and
contingently in respect to the second cause, let him consider
that contingency and necessity differ not in certain
respects, but in their entire essence, and that they divide
the whole extent of being, and cannot, therefore, be
coincident. That is necessary which cannot fail to be done;
that is contingent which can fail to be done. These are
contradictions which can in no way be attributed to the same
act. The will tends freely to its own object, when it is not
determined, to a single direction, by a superior power; but,
when that determination is made by any decree of God, it can
no longer be said to tend freely to its own object; for it is
no longer a principle, having dominion and power over its own
acts. Did it not pertain to the nature of the bones of
Christ, (which they present as an example,) to be broken? Yet
they could not be broken on account of the decree of God. I
reply, that the divine determination being removed, they
could be broken; but, that determination, being presented by
the decree of God, they could not at all be broken, that is,
it was necessary, not contingent, that they should remain
unbroken. Did God, therefore, change the nature of the bones?
That was not necessary. He only prevented the act of breaking
the bones, which were liable by their nature to be broken,
which act could have been performed, and would have been, if
God had not anticipated it by His decree, and by an act
according to that decree. For our Lord gave up the ghost when
the soldiers were approaching the cross to break his bones,
and were about to use the breaking of his legs to accelerate
his death. That I may not be tedious, I will not refute all
the objections; but I am persuaded, from what has been
presented, that they are all susceptible of refutation. The
third distinction is that of the decree and its execution.
They use it thus; though God may have decreed from eternity
to devote certain persons to death, and, that this may be
possible, may have ordained that they should fall into sin,
yet he does not execute that decree, by their actual
condemnation, until after the persons themselves have become
sinful by their own act, and, therefore, He is free from
responsibility. I answer that the fact that the execution of
the decree is subsequent to the act of sin, does not free
from responsibility him, who, by his own decree, has ordained
that sin should occur, that he might afterwards punish it;
indeed he, who has ordained and decreed that sin should be
committed, cannot justly punish sin after its commission; he
cannot justly punish a deed, the doing of which he has
ordained; he cannot be the ordainer of the punishment, who
was the ordainer of the crime. Augustine rightly says, "God
can ordain the punishment of crimes, not the crimes
themselves," that is, He can ordain that they should take
place. I have already demonstrated that man does not become
depraved of his own fault, if God has ordained that he should
fall and become depraved.
The fourth distinction is that of efficacious and permissive
decree: which distinction, rightly explained, removes the
whole difficulty, but it removes also the theory, by which
God is affirmed to have ordained that sin should take place.
The authors, however, of the first theory endeavour to
sustain that theory by reference to permissive decree. They
affirm that God does not effect, but decrees and ordains sin,
and that this is done not by an efficacious, but by a
permissive decree; and they so explain a permissive decree,
that it coincides with one, which is efficacious. For they
explain permission to be an act of the divine will, by which
God does not bestow, on a rational creature, that grace,
which is necessary for the avoidance of sin. This action,
joined with the enactment of a law, embraces in itself the
whole cause of sin. For he, who imposes a law which cannot be
observed without grace, and denies grace to him, on whom the
law is imposed, is the cause of sin by the removal of the
necessary hindrance. But more on this point hereafter.
On the contrary, if permissive decree be rightly explained,
it is certain that he, who has decreed to permit sin, is by
no means the cause of sin; for the action of his will has
reference to its own permission, not to sin. Nor are these
two things, God, in the exercise of His will, permits sin,
and, God wills sin, equivalent. For, the object of the will
is, in the former case, permission, in the latter, sin. On
the contrary rather, the conclusion, God permits, therefore,
He does not will, a sinful act, is valid, for he who wills
any thing does not permit the same thing. Permission is a
sign of want of action in the will. That distinction, then,
does not relieve the first theory. The fifth distinction is
that of the divine decree and human nature, which they use
thus: -- sin, if you consider the divine decree, is
necessary; but if you have reference to human nature, which
is equally free and flexible in every direction, it is freely
and contingently committed; and, therefore, the whole
responsibility is to be placed on human nature, as the
proximate cause. We have discussed this, previously, in
reference to the second distinction, and have sufficiently
refuted it. They make another use of the same distinction, by
a diverse respect of the ends, which God has proposed to
Himself in His decree, and which are proposed to man in the
commission of sin. "For," they say, "God intends, in His
decree, to illustrate His own glory, but man intends to
gratify his own desire; and though man does the very thing,
which is divinely decreed, he does not do it because it is
decreed, but because his will so inclines him. I reply,
first; a good end does not approve, or make good, an action
which is unlawful in itself; for "we are not to do evil that
good may come;" but it is evil to ordain that sin shall be
committed. Secondly, that man, to satisfy his own desire,
should do that which God has forbidden, also results from the
decree of God, and, therefore, man is relieved from
responsibility. Thirdly, though the fulfillment of the divine
decree is not the end which moves man to the commission of
sin, yet that same thing is the cause which, by a gentle,
silent, and imperceptible, yet efficacious, movement effects
that man should sin, or, rather, commit that act which God
had decreed should be committed, which, then, in respect to
man, cannot be called sin. Finally, the last defense consists
in a reference to the end, of which they make this use: "We
are accustomed to state the decree of God, not in these
terms, that 'God has determined to adjudge some men to
eternal death and condemnation,' but we add, ' that His
justice may be illustrated to the glory of his name.'"
I answer, that the addition does not deny the previous
statement, (for this is confirmed by the rendering of the
cause,) and the addition, even of the best end, does not
justify an action which is not in itself formally good, as
has before been stated. From these things, then, it is
apparent, that these grounds of defense are insufficient, and
avail nothing for the defense of that theory which states
that God ordained that men should fall and become depraved,
in order to open to Himself, in that manner, a way for the
execution of the decree which He had, from eternity,
determined and proposed to Himself, for the illustration of
His own glory by mercy and justice. If any one may think that
any other distinction or explanation can be presented, by
which that theory may be defended and vindicated, I shall be,
in the highest degree, pleased, if this is done. But let him
be cautious not to change the theory or add to it any thing
inconsistent with it. You mention, at the end of your sixth
answer, an objection to your view; -- "Then the judgments of
God depend on contingency, and are based on things
contingent, if they have reference to man as a sinner, and to
his sin." I must examine this with diligence, since it also
lies against my view, in that I think that sin must be
presupposed in the object of the divine decree. It is most
manifest, from the Scriptures, that many of the judgments of
God are based on sin, which, yet, cannot be said, to depend
on sin. It is one thing to make sin the object and occasion
of the divine judgments, and another to make it the cause of
the same. The judgment, which God pronounces in reference to
sin, He pronounces freely, nor does this depend on sin, for
He can suspend it, or substitute another in its place; yet it
is based on sin, because, apart from sin, He could not thus
judge. But sin is contingent, or contingently committed.
Therefore, the judgments of God are based on things
contingent. I deny the consequence. The judgments of God are
based on sin, not as it is committed contingently, but as it
is certainly and infallibly foreseen by God. Therefore, the
sight of God intervenes between sin and judgment, and thus,
judgment is based on the certain and infallible vision of
God. Then that which exists, so far as it exists, is
necessary. But the judgments of God are based on sin, already
committed and in existence. In your answer, however, I could
wish that it might be explained to me how those things, which
are contingent, depend on the ordination of God, whether
according to the source or the act, the word ordination
having reference to a decree that certain things shall be
done, not to the disposal of the order in which they shall be
done, for so the word is to be understood in this place. For,
though God has appointed the mode of contingency in nature,
yet it does not follow from this that contingencies have
their source in the ordination of God. For a cause, which is
free and governs its own action, can suspend or carry forward
a contingent act, according to its own will; so also in
reference to the act. I do not, therefore, understand in what
way contingencies, which are such in themselves, are not
contingencies to God, from the fact that He has established
the mode of contingency in nature. Sin is not, in any mode
and in respect to anything, necessary. Therefore, sin is also
contingent to God, that is, it is considered by God as done
contingently, though in His certain and infallible sight, on
account of the infinity of the divine knowledge. Nor is it
the same idea, that a thing should be really contingent to
the supreme cause, and that a thing, truly contingent in
itself, should be considered as contingent by that supreme
cause. For it is understood that nothing can be accidental or
contingent to God, for He is immutable, He is entirely
uncompounded, and, as Being and Essence, belongs to Himself
alone. But the knowledge of God considers things as they are,
though with vision far exceeding the nature of all things.
SEVENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I will not now adduce other reasons why that theory is not
satisfactory to me, since I perceive that you treat it in a
mode and respect different from mine. I come then to the
theory of Thomas Aquinas, to which, I think, you also gave
your assent, and presented proofs from the Scriptures, and I
will openly state that, of which I complain. I would pray you
not to be displeased with the liberty, which I take, if your
good will towards me was not most manifest.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SEVENTH PROPOSITION
I should prefer that those "other reasons," whatever they
might be, had been presented, that I might dispose of the
whole matter, (if possible,) at the same time, for I desire
that my opinion should be known to you without any
dissimulation, and that your expectation should be satisfied.
Nevertheless, I hope, that, in your wisdom, you will
perceive, from what I have already said, and shall yet say,
either what my opinion is concerning those reasons, or what
there may be, according to my view, in which your mind may
rest, (which may the Lord grant). The theory of Thomas
Aquinas I unite with the other, I do not follow it. But I
will, briefly and in a few words, explain what I shall state
in this argument, and in what mode, from the word of God, and
what does not please me in that theory, noticing the words of
your writing in the same order.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SEVENTH PROPOSITION
If I thought, indeed, that you considered that first theory,
as it is explained by its authors, to be in accordance with
the Scriptures, I would, in every way, attempt to divest you
of that idea, but I see that you so explain it, as greatly to
change it; on which account I am persuaded that you judge
that, unless it be explained according to your
interpretation, it is, by no means, in accordance with the
Scriptures. You will also allow me, my brother, to repeat,
that, in your entire answer, you have not relieved that
theory from any objection. For it remains valid, that "God is
made the author of sin, if He is said to have ordained that
man should fall and become depraved that He might open to
Himself a way for the declaration of His own glory, in the
way in which He had already determined by eternal decree."
Yet, that no one may think that my promise was vain, I will
attempt by other arguments also the refutation of that
theory, which presents, as an object to God, in the act of
predestination, man not yet created or to be created. I used
two arguments, one a priore, the other, a posteriore or by
absurdity of consequence. The argument a priore was as
follows; -- Predestination is the will of God in reference to
the illustration of His glory by mercy and justice; but that
will has no opportunity for exercise in a being not yet
created. The argument a posteriore was as follows; If God
ordained that man should fall and become depraved, that He
might open to Himself a way for the execution of that purpose
of His will (predestination,) then it follows that He is the
author of sin by that ordination. These arguments have been
already dwelt upon at sufficient length.
I adduce my third argument. Predestination is a part of
providence, administering and governing the human race;
therefore, it was subsequent to the act of creation or to the
purpose of creating man. If it is subsequent to the act of
creation, or to the purpose of creating man, then man,
considered as not yet created, is not the object of
predestination. I will add a fourth. Predestination is a
preparation of supernatural benefits, it is, therefore,
preceded by the communication of natural gifts, and,
therefore, by creation, in nature, or act, or in the decree
of God. Also a fifth. The illustration of the wisdom of God
in creation, is prior to that illustration of the wisdom of
God, which is the business of predestination. (1 Cor. i, 21.)
Therefore, creation is prior to predestination, in the
purpose of God. If creation is prior, man is considered by
God, in the act of predestination, as existing, not as to be
created.
So also in reference to goodness and mercy, the former of
which, in the act of creation, was illustrated in reference
to Nothing, the latter, in the act of predestination,
concerning that which was subsequent to Nothing. To the same
purpose can all the arguments be used, by which it was proved
that "sin is a condition requisite in the object of
predestination."
EIGHTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I shall, therefore, consider three things in that theory.
1. Did God elect from eternity, of human beings, considered
in their natural condition, some to supernatural felicity and
glory, and non-elect or pass by others?
2. Did God prepare for those whom He elected, that is, for
human beings to be raised from a natural to a supernatural
state, and to be translated to a participation of divine
things, according to the purpose of election, those means
which are necessary, sufficient, and efficacious to the
attainment of that supernatural felicity, but passed by
others, that is, determine not to communicate those means to
them, but to leave them in their natural state?
3. Did God, foreseeing that those persons, thus passed by,
would fall into sin, reprobate them, that is, decree to
subject them to eternal punishment?
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE EIGHTH PROPOSITION
Let this be the rule which shall guide us in our future
discussion. If any use the term, "in their natural
condition," they do not exclude supernatural endowments,
which God communicated to Adam, but use it in opposition to
sin, (which afterwards supervened,) and to native depravity.
They, who use these words otherwise, seem to me to be
deceived by a diversity of relation. The word reprobation is
here used, (as we have before observed,) in its third
signification, which we have called catachrestic; but
sufficient on that point. We will come to those three points
in their order.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE EIGHTH PROPOSITION
Natural condition I have opposed both to supernatural
endowments, and to sin and native depravity, for I have
supposed the former term to be used, to the exclusion of the
latter; -- not incorrectly, whether we consider the force of
the terms themselves, or their use by the school-men. Natural
condition has a relation to supernatural endowments, which
they exclude as transcending it, and to sin and depravity
which they, in like manner, exclude, as corrupting it. Though
I have used the term reprobation in the sense in which it is
used in your Theses and other writings, yet I shall desist
from it hereafter, (if I can keep this in my mind,) and use,
in its place, the words preterition and non-election, except
when I wish to include both acts, by Synecdoche, in one word.
For the term reprobation, as it is used by me, I will
substitute preparation of punishment or predamnation.
NINTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
In the first question, I do not present as a matter of doubt,
the fact that God has elected some to salvation, and not
elected or passed by others for I think that this is certain
from the plain words of Scripture; but I place the emphasis
on the subject of election and non election; -- Did God, in
electing and not electing, have reference to men, considered
in their natural condition. I have not been able hitherto to
receive this as truth.
THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE NINTH PROPOSITION
We remarked, in the sixth proposition, that, though the mode
of regarding man can and ought to be distinguished by certain
respects or relations, yet the authors of the first theory
have stated that mankind was considered in common by the
Deity in the case of election and reprobation; but the
authors of the second have not excluded that common relation
of the human race, which they have referred to a special
relation; but they have only desired that the contemplation
of supervenient sin should not affect the case of election
and reprobation, according to the declaration of the apostle,
"neither having done any good or evil," (Rom. ix, 11,) and
according to those words "natural condition," mean only the
exclusion of any reference to supervenient sin from the case
of election. If this observation is correct, the latter state
of the question, properly considered, will not be at variance
with the former. For he, who states that man, as not yet
created, as not yet fallen, and as fallen, was considered by
the Deity in the case of election and reprobation, he
certainly affirms the latter, and both the former. The
question, therefore, is, properly, not whether God, in
electing and in passing by or reprobating, had reference to
men in their natural condition, that is, apart from the
contemplation of sin, as sin, but the question should be,
whether God had reference, in this case, to man, apart from
any contemplation of sin as a cause. We deny this, on time
authority of the word of God. Nor did Augustine, to whom the
third theory is ascribed, mean any thing else, as he has most
abundantly set forth (lib. 1, quaes. ad Simplicianum), for
what he asserts concerning Jacob and Esau is either to be
understood, in the same manner, in the ease of Adam and Eve,
or the rule of election and reprobation will be different in
different cases, which is certainly absurd. Before, then,
Adam and Eve were made, or had any thing good or evil, the
Divine election, as we have plainly stated in the same
argument, was already made according to the purpose of grace,
which election preceded both persons, and all causes
originating from, or situated in, persons. The truth of this
is proved from authority, reason, and example. From
authority, in Romans 9, Ephesians 1, and elsewhere. From
reason; for, in the first place, election is made in Christ,
not in the creatures, or in any condition in them; secondly,
it is admitted by all, (which you afterwards acknowledge in
part, though in a different sense,) that predestination and
reprobation suppose nothing in the predestinate or the
reprobate, but only in Him who predestinates, as the apostle
affirms "not of works, but of Him that calleth." (Rom. ix,
11.) Augustine presents a most luminous exposition of that
passage, showing, from the reasoning of the apostle, that
neither works, nor faith, nor will, was foreseen in the case.
The procreation of the child depends, in nature, on the
parent only; much more does the adoption of His children
originate in God alone (to whom it peculiarly pertains to be
the cause and principle of all good), not in any
consideration of them. Finally the example of angels
demonstrates the same thing, of whom some are called elect,
others are non-elect. Of the angels, the elect were such
apart from any consideration of their works, and those, who
are non-elect, passed-by; or reprobate, are non-elect, apart
from the consideration of their works. For, as Augustine
conclusively argues in reference to men, "if, because God
foresaw that the works of Esau would be evil, He, therefore,
predestinated him to serve the younger, and, because God
foresaw that the works of Jacob would be good, He, therefore,
predestinated him to have rule over the elder, that which is
affirmed by the apostle, would be false, 'not of works,'" &c.
The state of the case is the same in reference to angels. For
God provided against the possible misery of these, by the
blessing of election; He did not provide against the possible
misery of those, in the work of reprobation and preterition.
But how? by predestinating the elect angels, to the adoption
of sons, who are so styled in Job 1, 2 & 38, and not
predestinating the others. God begat them as sons, not by
nature, but by will, which will is eternal, and preceded from
eternity their existence, which belongs to time. What does
the child contribute towards his procreation? He does not
indeed exist. What does an angel contribute towards his
sonship? If nothing, what does man contribute? In reply to
both these, Augustine, in the place already cited, surely
with equal justice, thunders forth that inquiry of St. Paul,
"who maketh thee to differ from another? and what hast thou
that thou didst not receive?" &c. (1 Cor. iv, 7.)
God, therefore, regards man in general; He does not find any
cause in man; for the cause of that adoption or filiation is
from His sole will and grace. But if any one should say that
sin is the cause of reprobation or preterition, He will not
establish that point. For, in the first place, the reasoning
of Augustine, which we have just adduced, remains unshaken,
based on a comparison of works foreknown; in the second
place, since we are, by nature, equally sinners before God,
one of these three things must be true; -- either all are
rejected on account of sin, as a common reason, or it is
remitted to all, or a cause must be found elsewhere than in
sin, as we have found it. Lastly, "who makes us to differ,"
if it be not God, according to the purpose of His own
election? Therefore, the affirmation stands, that God, in the
case of election and reprobation made from eternity,
considered man in general, so that He has in Himself, not in
man, the cause of both acts. Yet let us accurately weigh the
arguments, which are advanced here, though, properly, they
are not opposed to this theory.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE NINTH PROPOSITION
I think it is sufficiently evident how the authors of the
first theory considered man, from what was said in reply to
your answer to Prop. 6. But that the authors of the second
theory, by the addition of that special relation, did not
exclude the universal relation, seems hardly probable to me.
For he, who says that sin supervened to election and
preterition originating in their own causes, excluding sin
not only from the cause of election and preterition, but from
the subject and the condition requisite in it, he denies that
man, universally, considered as fallen, is presented to him
who elects and passes by, and if he denies this, he denies
also that man is considered in general, by God, in the act of
decree. In other respects I assent to what you affirm. Sin is
not the cause of election and preterition, yet this statement
must be rightly understood, as I think that it is here
understood, namely, that sin is not the cause that God should
elect some, and pass by others: let it be only stated that
sin is the cause that God may be able to pass by some
individuals of the human race made in His own image. In the
former statement there is agreement between us, in the latter
we disagree, if at all. It is not, then, the question, "Did
God have reference, in His own decree, to men apart from any
consideration of sin, as a cause, that is, as a cause that He
should elect these, and pass by those." For this is admitted
even by Augustine, who, nevertheless, presupposes to that
decree sin, as a requisite condition in its object. But the
question is this; "Is sin a condition requisite in the
object, which God has reference in the acts of election and
preterition, or not?" This is apparent by the arguments
presented by myself, which prove, not that sin is a cause of
that decree, but a condition, requisite in the object.
Augustine affirms this, and I agree with him. Let us look at
some passages from his works. In Book 1, to Simplicianus, he
excludes sin as a cause that God should elect or reprobate,
but includes it as a cause that He might have the power to
pass by or reprobate, or as a condition requisite in the
object of election and reprobation. The latter, I prove by
his own words, (there is no necessity of proof as to the
former, for in reference to that, there is agreement between
us). "God did not hate Esau, the man, but He did hate Esau,
the sinner," and again, "Was not Jacob, therefore, a sinner,
because God loved him? He loved in him not sin, of which he
was guilty, but the grace which Himself had bestowed, &c.,
and again, "God hates iniquity, therefore He punishes it in
some by damnation, and removes it from others by
justification." Again, "The whole race from Adam is one mass
of sinful and wicked being, among whom both Jews and
Gentiles, apart from the grace of God, belong to one lump."
If you say that Augustine was here discussing, not
preterition, but predamnation, I reply that Augustine knew no
preterition which was not predamnation, for he prefixes to
preterition hatred as its cause, as he prefixes love to
election. Then, I conclude, according to the theory of
Augustine, that what is affirmed in the case of Esau and
Jacob, is not to be understood in that of Adam and Eve, and
it does not, hence, follow that there would be a diverse mode
of election and reprobation, unless it be first proved that
God, in election, had reference to Adam and Eve, considered
in their primitive state, which, throughout this discussion,
I wholly deny. But there is a manifest difference between
Esau and Jacob, and Adam and Eve. For the former, though not
yet born, could be considered as sinners, for both had been
already conceived in sin; if they had not been created, they
could not be considered as such, for they were such in no
possible sense; not even when they had been created by God,
and remained yet in their original integrity. It cannot be
inferred from this, that "persons, and all causes originating
from, or situated in persons" preceded the act of election.
For sin, in which Jacob and Esau were then already conceived,
did not precede. Yet I admit that sin was not the cause that
God should love one and hate the other, should elect one and
reprobate the other, but it was a condition requisite in the
object of that decree. Those arguments, however, which you
present, do not injure my case. For they do not exclude sin
from the object of that decree as a requisite condition, nor
as a cause without which that decree could not be made, but
only as a cause, on account of which one is reprobated,
another elected.
This is apparent from Romans 9. For Esau had been conceived
in sin when those words were addressed by God to Rebecca. In
the same chapter also, the elect and the reprobate are said
to be "vessels of mercy" and "of wrath," which terms could
not be applied to them apart from a consideration of sin. I
will not now affirm, as I might do with truth, that Jacob and
Esau are to be considered, not in themselves, but as types,
the former being the type of the children of the promise, who
seek the righteousness which is of faith in Christ, the
latter, the type of the children of the flesh, who followed
after the righteousness of the law, which subject requires a
more extended explanation, but here not so necessary. The
first chapter to the Ephesians clearly affirms the same
thing, as it asserts that the election is made in Christ,
because it is of the grace, by which we have redemption in
the blood of Christ, &c.
Your arguments "from reason" do not militate against the
position, which I have assumed, they rather strengthen it.
For in the first place, "the election is made in Christ,"
therefore, it is of sinners, as will be hereafter proved at
greater length. Secondly, "predestination and reprobation
suppose nothing in their subject." Therefore, whatever
character the subject may have, which receives grace, for
such a character, and considered in the same relation, is the
grace prepared. But the sinner receives, and he only, the
grace prepared in predestination. Therefore, also for the
sinner alone, is grace prepared in predestination, but of
this, also, more largely hereafter. Thirdly, men are the sons
of God, not by generation, but by regeneration; the latter,
presupposes sin, therefore, adoption is made from sinners.
The example of angels in this case proves nothing. Their
election and reprobation and those of men are unlike, as you
in many places acknowledge, for their salvation is secured by
the grace of preservation and confirmation, that of men by
the grace of restoration. He begat angels, as sons to
Himself, according to the former grace; He regenerated men as
sons to Himself by the latter grace. Therefore, God regarded
man not in general, but as sinful, in reference to which
point is this question between us, though he might find in
man no cause that He should adopt one and pass by another, in
reference to which we have no controversy. The question then
remains between us, did God, in His decree of predestination
and reprobation, have reference to man considered in his
natural purity, or to man considered as in his sins? I assert
the latter, and deny the former, and I have presented many
arguments in support of my opinion; but I will now consider,
in their order, those things, which you have presented
against it.
TENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS.
First, in general. 1. Since no man was ever created by God in
a merely natural state; whence also no man could ever be
considered in the decree of God, since that, which exists in
the mind, is the material of action and exists in the
relation of capability of action, but takes its form from the
will and decree by which God determined actually to exert His
power, at any time, in reference to man. Hence, whatever
distinction may be made, in the mind, between nature, and a
supernatural gift, bestowed on man at the creation, that is
not to be considered in this place. For the creation of the
first man, and, in him, of all men, was in the image of God,
which image of God in man is not nature, but supernatural
grace, having reference not to natural felicity, but to
supernatural life. It is evident, from the description of the
image of God, that supernatural grace in man is that divine
image. For, according to the Scripture, it is "knowledge
after the image of Him that created him," (Col. iii, 10,) and
"righteousness and true holiness" pertaining to the new man
which is created after" (according to) "God." (Ephes. iv,
24.) In addition to this, all the fathers, seem, without
exception, to be of the sentiment that man was created in a
gracious state. So, also, our Catechism, ques. 62. Since
there is found, in the Scriptures, no reference to the love
of God according to election, no divine volition and no act
of God concerning men, referring to them in different
respects, until after the entrance of sin into the world, or
after it was considered as having entered.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TENTH PROPOSITION
Before I refer to arguments, an ambiguity must be removed,
which is introduced here, and which will be frequently
introduced whenever reference is made to a "merely natural
state." Things are called natural from the term "nature." But
nature is two-fold, therefore, natural things are also two-
fold. I affirm that nature is two-fold, as it is considered,
first in relation to this physical world, situated nearer and
lower in elementary and material things, which is described
by Philosophers in the science of Physics, secondly, in
relation to that spiritual world, namely, that which is more
remote and higher, consisting in spiritual and immaterial
things, which is treated of in Metaphysics, rightly so
called. From the former nature we have our bodies, and by it
we are animals; from the latter, we have our spirits, and by
it we are rational beings, which is also observed by
Aristotle (lib. 2, de gener. animalium cap. 3) in his
statement that the mind alone "enters from without" into the
natural body, and is alone divine; for there is no communion
between its action and that of the body. Hence, it is, that
natural things must, in general, be considered in three
modes; physically, in relation to the body according to its
essence, capability, actions and passions; metaphysically, in
relation to the intelligent mind, according to its essence
and being; and conjointly in relation to that personal union,
which exists in man, as a being composed of both natures. But
particularly, a distinction must be made in these same
natural things, in respect to nature as pure and as corrupt.
Therefore, all those things, which pertain to the nature of
man in these different modes, are said to belong to the mere
natural state of man, sin being excluded.
Now, I come to the particular members of your Proposition.
First, you affirm, "that no man was ever created in a merely
natural state." If you mean that he was created without
supernatural endowments, I do not see how this can be proved,
(though many make this assertion). The Scripture does not any
where make this statement. But you are not ignorant that it
is said in the schools, that a negative argument from
authority, as, "it is not written, therefore, it is not true"
is not valid. Again, the order of creation, in a certain
respect, proves the contrary, since the body was first made
from the dust, and afterwards the soul was breathed into it.
Which, then, is more probable, that the soul was, at the
moment of its creation, endowed with supernatural gifts, or
that they were superadded after its creation? I would rather
affirm that, as the soul was added to the body, so the
supernatural endowments were added to the soul. If God did
this in relation to nature, why may He not have done it, in
the case of grace, which is more peculiar. Lastly, I do not
think that it follows, if man was not made in a merely
natural state, but with supernatural endowments, that grace,
therefore, pertains to creation, and also that supernatural
gifts would therefore, pertain, in common, to the whole race.
That this consequence is false, is proved by the definition
of nature, and the relation of supernatural things. For what
else is nature than the principle of motion and rest,
ordained by God? If, then, supernatural things are ordained
on this principle, they cease to be supernatural and become
natural. Besides the relation of supernatural things is such
that they are not natural, as they are not common; for those
things which are common to all men belong to nature, but
supernatural things are personal, and do not pass to heirs. I
acknowledge that Adam and Eve received supernatural gifts,
but for themselves not for their heirs; nor could they
transmit them to their heirs, except by a general arrangement
or special grace. If this be so, then man is without
supernatural endowments, though, as you claim, the first man
may not have been made without them; and he is justly
considered by us as not possessing them, and much more would
he have been so considered by the Deity. Indeed, my brother,
God contemplated man, in a merely natural state, and
determined in His own decree to bestow upon him supernatural
endowments. He could then be so considered in the decree of
God. He contemplated nature, on which He would bestow grace;
the natural man, on whom He would bestow, by His own decree,
supernatural gifts. Was it not, indeed, a special act of the
will, to create man, and another special act of the will to
endow Him with supernatural gifts? Which acts, even though
they might have occurred at the same time (which does not
seem to me necessary, for the reasons which have been just
advanced) cannot be together in the order of nature, since
one may be styled natural, and the other supernatural. I know
that you afterwards speak of the image of God, but we shall
soon see that this has no bearing, (as you think), on this
case. Meanwhile, I wish that you would always keep in view
the fact, that, though all these things should be true, yet
they are not opposed to that doctrine which asserts that in
this decree, God considered man in general.
I will leave without discussion those subsequent remarks on
the material and the formal relation of the decree of God,
since the force of the argument does not depend on them, and
pass to the proof. "The creation of the first man," you
affirm, "and, in him, of all men, was in the image of God,"
(I concede and believe it,) "which image of God in man is not
nature but supernatural grace, having reference not to
natural felicity but to supernatural life." What is this,
your statement, my brother? Origen formerly affirmed the same
thing, and on this account received the reprehension of the
ancient church in its constant testimony and harmonious
declarations, as is attested by Epiphanius, Jerome and other
witnesses. I do not, however, believe that you agree in
sentiment with Origen, in opposition to the united and wise
declaration of that church, but some ambiguity, which you
have not observed, has led you into this mistake. Let us then
expose and free from its obscurity this subject, by the light
of truth.
The first ambiguity is in the word nature, the second in the
term supernatural. We have just spoken in reference to the
former, affirming that this term may refer to the lower
nature of elementary bodies, or to that higher nature of
spiritual beings, or finally to our human nature, composed of
both natures in one compound subject; and that this latter
nature is itself two-fold, pure and depraved.
The latter ambiguity consists in the fact, that the term
supernatural is applied, at one time, to those things which
are above this inferior nature, and pertain to the superior,
spiritual, or metaphysical nature; at another, to those
things which are above even that higher and metaphysical
nature, that is, to those which are properly and immediately
divine; and at another, to those things which are above the
condition of this our corrupt nature, as they are bestowed
upon us only of supernatural grace, though they might have
pertained to that pure nature. The body, for example, is of
this lower nature, and in comparison with it, the soul is
supernatural. Again, our souls are of the higher nature,
which pertains to angels. In reference to both the soul and
the body, all divine things are supernatural as they are
superior to all corporeal and mental nature. How you say that
"the image of God in man is not nature but supernatural
grace;" that is, as I think, it is not of nature, but of
grace, or not from nature, but from grace. Here consider, my
brother, the former ambiguity. "The image of God is not of
nature," if the lower or corporeal nature is referred to, is
a true statement, but if the higher nature is referred to, it
is not a true statement. For what is nature? It is the
principle, ordained of God, of motion and rest in its own
natural subject, according to its own mode. Place before your
mind the kinds of motion, which occur in the lower nature,
generation, corruption, increase, diminution, alteration,
local transition, which they style fora &c. You will find
this difference, that the subjects of this lower nature
experience these motions according to their own essence and
all other matters, that is, according to their material,
form, and accidents, but the subjects of that higher nature
are moved by no means according to their essence, but only
according to their being; but that divine things surpass both
natures, in an infinite and divine mode, because they are, in
all respects, destitute of all motion. The body is mortal;
whence, if not from this inferior nature? The soul is
immortal; whence, if not from that superior nature? But both
natures are ordained of God, and so perform their work,
immediately, that God performs, by both mediately, all things
which pertain to nature. But the image of God is from that
superior nature, by which God performs mediately in the
children of Adam, as He instituted our common nature in Adam,
our first parent. It is indeed true, that it was supernatural
grace by which God impressed His own image on Adam; just as
he also performed the work of creation by the same grace. God
bestowed its principle not on nature, of nature, but of
Himself; but when nature has received its existence, that
which existed by nature, was produced by nature in the
species and individuals. Though, in its first origin, it is
of grace, yet it is now, in its own essence, of nature, and
is to be called natural. But the image of God is produced, in
the species and in the individuals, by nature. Therefore, it
must be called natural We shall hereafter consider its
definition, for it is necessary first to elucidate the
statement that "the image of God has reference, not to
felicity, but to supernatural life." Let us remove the
ambiguity, as we shall thus speak more correctly of these
matters. Natural felicity pertains either to the nature from
which we have the body, or to that from which we have the
spirit, or to both natures united in a compound being. To
this latter felicity the image of God has, naturally, its
reference; to that of the body as its essential and
intimately associated instrument; to that of the spirit, as
its essential subject; to that of the man, as the entire
personal subject. If you deny this, what is there, I pray
you, in all nature, which does not seek its own good? But, to
every thing, its own good is its felicity. If, in this lower
nature, a stone, the herds, an animal, and, in that higher
nature, spirits and intelligent forms do this, surely it
cannot be justly denied to man, and to the image of God in
man. You add that "it has reference to supernatural life."
This, however, is a life dependent on grace, as all the
adjuncts show. If you understand that it has reference to
that life only, we deny such exclusive reference. If to this
(natural) life, and to that life conjointly, we indeed affirm
this, and assent to your assertion that the image of God in
man has respect to both kinds of felicity, both natural and
supernatural; by means of nature, in a natural mode, and of
grace, in a supernatural mode.
I would now explain this, in a more extended manner, if it
was not necessary that a statement should first be made of
the subject under discussion. Perceiving this very clearly,
you pass to a definition of that image, in proof of your
sentiment. "It is evident," you say, "from the description of
the image of God, that supernatural grace, in man, is that
divine image." You will permit me to deny this, since you ask
not my opinion. You add, "According to the Scripture, it is
'knowledge after the image of Him that created him,' (Col.
iii, 10,) and righteousness and true holiness pertaining 'to
the new man which is created after God.' (Ephes. v, 25)". I
acknowledge that these are the words of the apostle, and I
believe them, but I fear my brother, that you wander from his
words and sentiment.
In the former passage, he does not assert that the image of
God is "knowledge after the image etc," but that the "new man
is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created
him." The subject of the proposition is man, one in
substance, but once "old," now "new." In this subject there
was old knowledge, there is new knowledge. According to the
subject, the knowledge is one, but it differs in mode; for
the old man and the new man understand with the same
intellect, in the previous case as the old, afterwards as the
new man. What, therefore, is the mode of that knowledge!
"After the image of God." This is the mode of our knowledge
and intelligence. The former (that which is old) according to
the image of the first Adam who "begat a son in his own
likeness;" (Gen. v, 3;) the latter according to the image of
the second Adam, Christ and God, our Creator. The image of
God is not said to be knowledge, but knowledge is said to be
renewed in us after the image of God. What, then, is
knowledge? An act of the image of God. What is the image of
God? The fountain and principle of action, fashioning in a
formal manner, the action, or the habit of that image. The
mode, in which this may be understood, is a matter of no
interest to me. Consider, I pray you, and I appeal to
yourself as a judge, whether this can be justly called a
suitable description; -- "The image of God is knowledge
according to the image of God." This description, indeed,
denies that the image of God is either one thing or another;
either knowledge or the image of God, if, indeed, knowledge
is according to the image of God. You will, however,
understand these things better, from your own skill, than
they can be stated by me in writing. I now consider the other
passage. "The image of God is ' righteousness and true
holiness' pertaining 'to the new man, which is created after
God."' Here you affirm something more than in the previous
case, yet without sufficient truth. That knowledge, of which
you had previously spoken, is a part of truth, for it is the
truth, as it exists in our minds. Here you state that it is
truth, and righteousness and holiness. But let us examine the
words of the apostle. He asserts, indeed, that the new man is
one "which after God is created in righteousness and true
holiness." I will not plead the fact that many explain the
phrase "after God," as though the apostle would say "by the
power of God working in us." I assent to your opinion that
the words kata< Qeon mean simply the same as would be implied
in the phrase "to the image," or "according to the image of
God." Yet do you not perceive that the same order, which we
have just indicated, is preserved by Paul; and that the
subject, the principle, and the acts or habits, thereby
inwrought, are most suitably distinguished? The subject is
man, who is the same person, whether as the old; or the new
man. The principle is the image of God, which is the same,
whether old or new, and purified from corruption. The acts or
habits, inwrought by that principle, are righteousness,
holiness, and truth. Righteousness, holiness, and truth are
not the image, but pertain to the image. Let us return, if
you please, to that principle, which the Fathers laid down
"natural things are corrupt, supernatural things are
removed." You may certainly, hence, deduce with ease this
conclusion; -- righteousness, holiness and truth are not
removed, therefore, they are not supernatural. Again, they
have become corrupt, therefore, they are natural. If they had
been removed, none of their elementary principles would exist
in us by nature. But they do exist; therefore, they are by
nature, and are themselves corrupt, and, with them, whatever
originates in them. The same is the fact with the image of
God. The image of God is not removed; it is not, therefore,
supernatural; and, on the other hand, it has become corrupt;
it is, therefore, natural. For it is nowhere, in the
Scriptures, said to be bestowed, but only to be renewed. I
shall offer proof, on this point, from the Scriptures, when I
have made a single remark. Righteousness, holiness, truth,
exist only in the image of God; there is, in man, some
righteousness, holiness and truth; therefore, there is in man
somewhat of the image of God. Moses, in Genesis 1, certainly
relates nothing else than the first constitution of nature,
as made in reference to every subject and species. But he
relates that man was made in the image of God. This, then,
was the constitution of human nature. But, if it is of
nature, then the image of God pertains universally to the
human race, since natural things differ from personal things
in this, that they are common. The same is evident from Gen.
v, 3. Adam begat Seth "in his own likeness," in his own
image; but Adam was made in the image of God; therefore he
begat Seth in the image of God. It may be said, however, that
the image of God, and the image of Adam differ, and that a
distinction is made between them by Moses. They indeed
differ, but in mode, not in their essence; for the image of
God in Adam was uncorrupted, in Seth it was corrupted through
Adam; yet in both cases it was the image. In the same
respect, this image, in the rest of the human race, is called
according to its corruption, the image of the earthy,
according to its renewal, the image of the heavenly. But
since the image of God is diverse in mode only, and not in
essence, it is said to be renewed, and restored, and not to
be implanted or created, as we have before observed, as that
which differs not in essence, but in mode or degree. The same
thing is taught in Gen. ix, 6. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood,
by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made
he man." If the image of God did not exist in the descendants
of Adam, who are slain, the argument of Moses would be
impertinent and absurd. But the argument, either of Moses or
of God, is just and conclusive; for if you say, -- "The
slayer of him, whom God has made in His own image, ought to
be slain by man; God made the man who is slain in his own
image; therefore, let the murderer be slain by man." the
argument is valid. For since man was made in the image of
God, it is just that his murderer should be slain, and indeed
that he should be slain by man. But if you explain the
passage "for in the image of God made He man," so that "He"
shall refer to man, my interpretation of the argument will be
even more confirmed. I do not, however, remember that it is
affirmed any where in the Scriptures that man made man, nor
can it be proved to me. These things, I think will be
sufficient that you may see, my brother, that the image of
God is naturally in man.
What, then, is the image of God? For it is now time that we
pass from destructive to constructive reasoning. I will state
it, in the words of the orthodox Fathers. Let Tertullian, of
the Latins, first speak (lib. 2 advers. Marcion, cap. 9.)
"The distinction is especially to be noticed, which the Greek
Scriptures make, when they speak of the afflatus, not of the
Spirit, (pnohn non pneu~ma) for some, translating from the
Greek, not considering the difference or regarding the proper
use of words, substitute Spirit for afflatus, and afford
heretics an occasion of charging fault on the Spirit of God,
that is, on God Himself; and it is even now a vexed question.
Observe, then, that the afflatus is inferior to the Spirit,
though it comes from the Spirit, as its breath, yet it is not
the Spirit. For the breeze is lighter than the wind, and if
the breeze is of the wind, the wind is not therefore, of the
breeze. It is usual also, to call the afflatus the image of
the Spirit; for thus also, man is the image of God, that is
of the Spirit, for God is Spirit, therefore, the image of the
Spirit is the afflatus. Moreover the image will never in all
respects equal the reality; for to be according to the truth
is one thing, to be the truth itself is another. Thus, also,
the afflatus cannot, in such a sense, be equal to the Spirit,
that, because the truth -- that is the Spirit, or God -- is
without sin, therefore the image, of truth also, must be
without sin. In this respect the image will be inferior to
the truth, and the afflatus will be inferior to the Spirit,
having some lineaments of the Deity, in the fact that the
soul is immortal, free, capable of choice, prescient to a
considerable degree, rational, and capable of understanding
and knowledge. Yet, in these particulars, it is only an
image, and does not extend to the full power of divinity, and
so, likewise, it does not extend to sinless integrity, since
this belongs alone to God, that is to truth, and can not
pertain to the mere image; for as the image, while it
expresses all the lineaments and outlines of the truth, yet
is destitute of force, not having motion, so the soul, the
image of the Spirit, is not able to exhibit its full power,
that is, the felicity of freedom from sin, otherwise it would
be not the soul, but the Spirit, not man, endowed with mind,
but God, &c." Ambrose (hexaemeri lib. 6, cap. 7), after many
arguments, concludes in this way; "for 'what will a man give
in exchange for his soul?' in which there is, not merely a
small portion of himself, but the substance of the entire
human race. It is this by which thou hast dominion over other
living creatures, whether beasts or birds. This is the image
of God, but the body is in the likeness of beasts; in one
there is the sacred mark of divine resemblance, in the other
the vile fellowship with the herds and wild beasts, &c."
Also, in Psalm 118, sermon 10, "Likeness to the image of God
consists, not in the body, or in the material parts of our
nature, but in the rational soul; in respect to which man was
made after the likeness and image of God, and in which the
form of righteousness, wisdom, and every virtue is found."
To the same purpose are the words of Augustine, in his first
Book "De Genes. contra Manich," chap. 17th, and in many other
places. I mention also Jerome, because he evidently has the
same view, and, in writing against Origen, he uses the same
argument with that of Epiphanius and the Greek Fathers. I
would refer to Basil, if you did not know that Ambrose quotes
from him. Why should I speak of Chrysostom, the two
Gregories, Cyril, Theodouret? Damascenus, an epitomist of all
those writers, presents this subject, with the greatest
accuracy, in the book which he has inscribed "Concerning the
respect in which we were made in the image of God." Also, in
another, which has reference to "The two wills in Christ," in
which he uses the following words, "as to the rational, and
intellectual, and voluntary powers, they belong to the mind
at birth, and the Spirit is superadded, as having princely
prerogative, and in these respects both angels and men are
after the image of God, and this is abundantly true of men,
&c.," in which passage he has, with the utmost diligence,
introduced those things which are essential and those which
are adjunct.
I conclude with a single argument from Augustine against the
Manichees. "Those men," he says, "do not know that it is not
possible that nature should use any action, or produce any
effect, the faculty for which has not been received according
to nature. For example, no bird can fly, unless it has
received the faculty of flying, according to nature, and no
beast of the earth can walk, unless it has received the
faculty of walking, according to nature. So, likewise, man
cannot act or will, unless he has received, according to
nature, that faculty, which is called the "voluntary," and
the "energetic;" and he cannot understand if he has not
received from nature the intellectual faculty, and he cannot
see, or perform any other action, and, therefore, in every
kind of nature, natural actions find place, and they exist at
once and together, but those which depend on the will and
activity, do not exist together." From which reasoning he
infers that man understands, reasons, wills, and, above other
creatures, does many things which savour of divinity;
therefore, many faculties exist in man, in respect to which
he is said, in the Scriptures, to have been made in the image
and likeness of God.
Here then is that image of God, in our soul; its essential
parts not only show, of themselves, some resemblance, by
nature, to divinity, but are, by nature and grace together,
adapted to the perception of supernatural grace, as we shall
soon show. You add that "all the fathers, seem, without
exception, to be of the sentiment that man was created in a
gracious state. So also our Catechism, ques. 6." I have,
indeed, known no one among orthodox divines, who holds any
different opinion; nor is there any other correct explanation
of our catechism.
But you seem to fall into an error from a statement, which is
susceptible of a two-fold interpretation, and to unite things
really distinct. For it is not meant that the first man was
created with grace, that is, that he received, in the act of
creation, nature and supernatural grace; but this is their
meaning: the man who was first created, received grace, that
is, supernatural grace, as an additional gift -- which idea
we have before presented in this answer. What then? Did he
not have supernatural grace in creation? If you understand,
by grace, the good will of God, he had grace; if you
understand supernatural gifts, bestowed upon him, then he did
not have those things, which are supernatural, from creation,
or by the force of creation, since creation is the principle
of nature, or its first term, but supernatural things
entirely differ from it; but he had them in creation, that
is, in that first state of creation in which Adam was until
he fell into sin. That you may more easily understand the
subject, let us use the illustration of the sun and moon, to
explain the divine image. The moon has an essential image,
and one which is relative and accidental. As its image is
essential, it has its own light in some degree; yet it would
be darkened, unless it should look towards the sun; as its
image is relative, it has light borrowed from the sun, while
it is looked upon by it, and looks to it. So, there was, in
man, a two-fold relation of the image of God, even from the
creation. For man had his own essential light fixed in the
soul, which shines as the image of God among created things;
he had also a relative light, as he was looked upon by God,
and looked back to God. The essential image is natural; the
relative image was, so to speak, supernatural, for it looked
to God, through nature joined to grace, by a peculiar and
free motion of the will; God looked upon it, of grace, (for,
what action of God towards us is natural?) We have that
essential light, corrupted by sin; it is plain that we have
not lost it. We have lost the relative light; but Christ
restores this, that we may be renewed, after God, in his own
image, and that the essential light may be purified, since
natural things are corrupted, the supernatural are lost, as
we have previously said.
Your second argument is stated thus: "Since there is found,
in the Scriptures, no reference to the love of God according
to election, no divine volition, and no act of God,
concerning men, referring to them in different respects,
until after the entrance of sin into the world, or after it
was considered as having entered." If I should concede this,
yet the sentiment of those, who say that man is considered,
in general, by the Deity, would not, therefore, be confuted,
as we have before shown. But I may, perhaps, be able to
disprove this assertion by authority, by reason, and by
example. You have authority in Romans ix, 11-13. "For the
children being not yet born, neither having done any good or
evil, that the purpose of God, according to election, might
stand, not of works, but of Him that calleth; it was said
unto her, The elder shall serve the younger; as it is
written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated." What do
those three phrases indicate "the children being not yet
born;" again, "neither having done any good or evil;" and
"according to election, not of works, but of Him that
calleth." You will say, "these expressions are according to
truth; but they have reference to fallen and sinful nature."
But they exclude, with the utmost care, all reference to sin
and refer all blessing to the sole vocation of God, who
calleth, as even yourself, my brother, if you are willing to
observe it, (and you certainly are thus willing,) may easily
deduce from that proposition. To this authority you will
certainly submit every semblance of reasoning. (Ephes. i, 4,
5,) "He hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of the
world, having predestinated us unto the adoption of children,
by Jesus Christ to Himself."
Election originates in special love; and when He is said to
have chosen us in Christ, all reference to ourselves is
excluded; predestination also precedes both persons and cases
relating to them. Indeed this is indicated by the words
"foreknow" and "predestinate," (Rom. 8). Christ himself
attributes to the blessing of the Father only that they were
made possessors of the kingdom, "from the foundation of the
world," (Matt. 30). In sin, or previous to sin? In view of
sin, or without reference to it? Why should the former be
true, I ask, rather than the latter? Why indeed, should not
the latter rather, since all things are said to depend on
God, who calleth? To these, let the following considerations
be added:
1. Whatever absurdity may be connected with this subject, you
will perceive, (if you examine it closely,) that it pertains
as much to the former interpretation, and rather more to it
than to the latter. This absurdity is not to be passed by,
but rather to be religiously and suitably removed.
2. I deny that a reference to sin belongs to the matter of
filial adoption. I call nature as a witness: Does not a
father beget sons, before he investigates or observes what
shall be their condition? But this generation, (namely that
of the children of God), is of will and not of nature. True:
yet it is attributed to the will of God alone, not to any
condition in us. Every condition in us is excluded, even that
of sin; the will of God, alone, His purpose, alone, is
considered in the matter. God distinguishes by His mere will
among those equal in nature, equal in sin; whom, considered
in their natural condition simply, not in that of sin, but
generally in Christ, He adopts as His children. As in nature,
children are begotten without reference to their future
condition, so God, of His own will, adopted from eternity His
own children.
3. Whatever is more consistent with the wisdom and grace of
God, would be performed by the Deity, and is to be believed
by us, rather than that which is less consistent. But it is
more consistent with His wisdom and grace that He should
adopt unto Himself children without any consideration of
character, than that He should do so on the supposition of
such consideration; otherwise nature would act more perfectly
than God, as according to nature, fathers beget children,
without such consideration. Therefore, the former view is
more consistent with the character of God, and rather to be
received with faith by us.
As an example, for the confirmation of this matter, we will
take, if you please, that of the Angels. Whoever are the sons
of God, are sons by election. Angels are the sons of God,
(Job 1, 2, & 37,) therefore, they are such by election, as
Paul affirms (1 Tim. v, 21,) when he calls them "the elect."
But they are elect without consideration of their sins, as
they did not sin, but remained in their original condition.
Therefore, the love of God is with election, without
reference to sin, or consideration of it, which you seem to
deny in your assertion. Perhaps you will say that your
assertion had reference only to men. But I reply, that love
and election are spoken of in relation both to angels and
men, and in the same manner, since God placed, in both, his
own image, in reference to which election is made. The most
decisive proof of this is found in the principle that, if any
act which apparently exists in reference to two things, which
have the same relation, does not really exist in reference to
one, it does not exist in reference to the other. In the
election of Angels, there is no reference to their condition
or their works; therefore, in the election of men there is no
such reference. If the condition of Angels and of men is, in
some respects, different, it does not follow that the mode of
their election is different; especially when the relation of
that thing, in reference to which they are chosen, is the
same in both cases. This is the image of God, which,
preserved or restored according to His own will, he has
called and united to Himself, which will remain immutably in
Christ, "gathering together in one all things," (Ephes. i,
10,) and which he had placed on the common basis of his own
nature, from which, those, who were to be damned according to
His judgment, fell of their own will.
It is not possible to adduce any other example; because all
other things are created in a different relation. For they
are destitute of the image of God, in which consists, with
suitable limitations, the object of election. Therefore, the
nature of the divine election, made concerning men, can be
illustrated by the example of angels, and by no other
example. But the divine election was such, not that it
separated, at first, the Angels who sinned from those who did
not sin, but that, of His own will and grace, he
distinguished those who were not about to sin, as previously
elected and predestinated to adoption, from others who were
about to sin of their own free will. What reason, then, is
there that we should think that another mode of the divine
election must be devised in reference to men?
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TENTH PROPOSITION
I apply the term natural to whatever pertains to the
substance and existence of man, without which man cannot
exist. Such are the soul and the body, and the whole system
compounded of them, with all natural attributes, affections,
passions, &c. I apply the term supernatural to whatever God
has bestowed on man above and in addition to those natural
characteristics, which indeed pertain to the perfection of
man, not in respect to his animal nature, but in respect to
his spiritual nature, to the acquisition not of natural, but
of supernatural good. I apply the phrase "merely natural," in
this place, to that which has nothing supernatural added to
it. The sense then of my words is that man is not made in a
merely natural state, without supernatural endowments.
I do not here contend, with much strenuousness, whether he
has those supernatural endowments from the act of creation or
from another act of superinfusion, but leave this without
decision, as neither useful or injurious to my cause. But I
decidedly state and affirm, that God decreed to make man such
by nature, as he in fact did make him; but such, that He
might add to him some supernatural endowments, as He not only
wished that he might be such as he was by nature, but He
wished also to advance him further to a happier state,
namely, to a participation of Himself, to which he could not
attain, unless endowed with supernatural gifts. But when I
deny that man was made in a merely natural state, and,
therefore, was created with supernatural gifts, I wish not to
indicate that the act, by which supernatural endowments are
communicated, was creation, (for in my 26th proposition I
have called that act superinfused Grace,) but that God was
unwilling to cease from the act of communicating His blessing
to that part of primitive matter or Nothing from which He
created man, and that of His own decree, until he should also
have bestowed those supernatural gifts upon him. I thought
that I ought to observe the mode of expression, used in the
Scripture, which declares that man was created "in the image
and likeness of God," which image and likeness of God
comprehends in itself also supernatural gifts. If this is
true, as I contend, then man was created with supernatural
endowments. For he was made in the image of God, and the word
"made" is attributed, without distinction, to all parts of
the image, without separating that, in the image, which is
natural from that which is supernatural to man. I am glad to
quote here the words of Jerome Zanchius, who, in his first
book concerning the creation of man, chapter 1, speaks
concerning this same matter in these terms;" I am pleased
with the sentiment of those, who say that with the
inbreathing of life, there was also inbreathed and infused by
the Deity whatever Adam possessed of celestial light, wisdom,
rectitude, and other heavenly gifts; in which he reflects the
Deity, as His true image. For he was created such as the
Scripture teaches, affirming that he was made in the image of
God, and Solomon in Eccl. vii, 29, "God made man upright."
But he was not such when his body only was formed. When, with
a soul placed in him, he became a living soul, that is a
living man, that he was made upright, just, &c., and thus, at
the same time with his soul, rays also of divine wisdom,
righteousness, and goodness were infused." Thus Zanchius, who
clearly decides what I left without decision in either
direction, and this for a twofold reason; I knew that it was
a matter of dispute among the learned, and I perceived that
nothing could be deduced from it either of advantage or
disadvantage to my cause.
Those supernatural gifts, which were bestowed on man, he
received for transmission to posterity, on the terms, on
which he received them, namely, of grace, not as this word
denotes the principle of natural endowments, for from grace,
understood in its widest sense, we have received even our
nature, as that to which we had no claim, but as it is used
in contra-distinction to nature, and as it is the principle
of supernatural gifts. I can then concede that God had
reference to man in nature, as the subject of grace, the
natural man as the subject of supernatural gifts; but that He
had reference to him, contemplated in the administrative
decree of creation, not in the decree of predestination,
which we have now under discussion; as the subject of grace
sufficient for supernatural felicity, not of effectual grace,
of which we now dispute; as the subject of supernatural
gifts, to be transmitted to his posterity, without exception,
according to the arrangement of grace, and without any
condition, not of such gifts as are peculiar to those, who
are predestinated, and to be bestowed, with certainty and
infallibly, upon them, in reference to which is the
controversy between us.
Hence, these things are not opposed to my sentiment, for in
them the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi is committed. I wish,
however, that you would always remember that I speak
constantly concerning the grace, prepared in the decree of
predestination, and in no other decree. But I have proved
that man was not made in a merely natural state, in the
sense, as I have already stated, of a destitution of
supernatural endowments, whether he is said to have them by
the act of creation, or by the act of superinfusion; and I
have proved it by an argument, deduced from the image and
likeness of God in which man was created. Which argument is
valid, whether the image of God signifies only supernatural
gifts, bestowed on man by the Deity, as our Catechism and
Confession, and some of our theologians affirm in reference
to the image of God, or nature itself, together with those
supernatural gifts, which is my opinion; according to which I
wish that my affirmation, that "the image of God in man is
not nature, but supernatural grace," should be understood,
that is, that it is not nature alone, apart from supernatural
endowments, which is sufficient for any argument. For the
question is not concerning natural qualities, and therefore,
the decision of the point whether they belong to the image of
God, according to my opinion, or not, does not affect the
subject of inquiry. Let supernatural qualities be embraced in
the definition of the image of God, in which man was made,
and I have obtained what I desire.
I also wish that my subsequent remarks should be understood
in the same manner, namely, that the image of God, has
respect, not to natural felicity only, but to supernatural,
and if that is true, as you seem to concede, I have attained
my object. I did not wish to define with accuracy the image
of God in which man was made, since this was not necessary to
my purpose: it was sufficient to have shown that "knowledge,
righteousness, and holiness" pertained also to the image of
God, whether that image consisted wholly or only in part in
them. For either of these statements would be equally
available for my purpose, as I had undertaken to prove that
man was not created without supernatural endowments, and
therefore that he could not have been considered, in the
decree of predestination, as created in a merely natural
state, without supernatural endowments. But, before I come to
the defense of my argument on this point, I must speak, at
somewhat greater length, of three things, in considering
which, a considerable part of your answer is occupied. First.
I will explain more fully than I have before done, what I
call natural, and what, supernatural qualities. Secondly. I
will speak of the image of God, and what things, whether
natural or supernatural, are embraced in it, and in its
definition. Thirdly, by what action of the Deity, man has
both the former, and the latter qualities.
First; I call those qualities natural which pertain to the
nature of man, without which man cannot be man, and which
have their source in the principles of nature, and are
prepared, by their own nature, for natural felicity, as their
end and limit: such are the body, the soul, the union of
both, and that which is made up of both, and their natural
attributes, affections, functions, and passions; under which
I also comprehend moral feelings, which are sometimes spoken
of in contradistinction to those which are natural. I call
those qualities supernatural which are not a part of man, and
do not originate in natural principles, but are superadded to
natural principles, for the increase and perfection of
nature, designed for supernatural felicity, and for a
supernatural communion with God, our Creator, in which that
felicity consists.
Between these, exists a natural relation of this character,
that natural qualities may receive the addition of
supernatural, by the arrangement of God, and that
supernatural qualities are adapted for adding to, adorning
and perfecting nature, and are therefore ordained for
exalting it above itself. Hence, without ambiguity, under the
term natural, I have comprehended nature both corporeal and
spiritual, and that which is composed of both. It is,
however, to be carefully observed -- that ambiguities of
words are to be noticed and explained, in a discussion, when,
if taken in one sense, they favour any view, and, if in the
other, they do not, when, according to one sense, a statement
is true, and, according to the other, is false. But when the
statement is true, and pertinent to the subject, in whatever
sense a word is taken, there is no need of an explanation of
the ambiguity. Thus, in this case, you observe that I
understand, by natural qualities, both those which pertain to
the inferior nature, that is, to the body, and those which
pertain to the superior nature, that is, to the soul, and in
whatever mode you take it, my argument is equally strong and
valid. We shall hereafter notice examples of equally
unnecessary reference to ambiguity.
Secondly; two things must be considered in reference to the
image of God in man, in what things does it consist, and
which of them may be called material, and which supernatural?
I affirm that the image of God in man embraces all those
things which represent in man any thing of the divine nature,
which are partly essential: yet God did not wish that the
images of all of them should be essential to man, whom He
wished to create, in such a condition, not only that he might
be that which he was, but that he might have the capability
of becoming that which he was not, and of failing to be that
which he was. I call essential the soul, and in it the
intellect, and will, and the freedom of the will, and other
affections, actions, and passions, which necessarily result
from them. I call accidental both the moral virtues, and the
knowledge of God, righteousness and true holiness, and
whatever other attributes of the Deity exist, to be
considered in Him as essential to his own nature, but in man
as an express image, of which under the term "divine nature,"
Peter says, that believers are "partakers." 2. I do not think
that all these things can be comprehended under the term
natural, but I think that "knowledge, righteousness and true
holiness," are supernatural, and are to be called by that
name. I am in doubt whether I have your assent to this
affirmation. For in one part of your answer, you say that
those are natural qualities, and present arguments in support
of that view, and in another place, in the same answer, you
acknowledge that Adam had supernatural gifts though not from
the act of creation: by which supernatural qualities, I know
not what you can understand, except those things which are
mentioned by the apostle in Colossians 3, and Ephesians
4. Yet you seem to set forth under the term reflexive image,
those very things which you acknowledge to be supernatural.
But, whether I rightly understand your sentiment or not, I
will speak of those things which, I think, tend to confirm my
sentiment, and to refute your view, as I understand it.
I prove, then, that those qualities are supernatural. First,
from Colossians 3, and Ephesians 4. Whatever things we have,
from regeneration, by the spirit of Christ, are supernatural.
But we have, from regeneration, by the Spirit of Christ, "the
knowledge of God, righteousness and true holiness."
Therefore, they are supernatural. If any one says that we do
not have them, in substance, from regeneration, but only a
renewal of the same qualities, which had previously been made
corrupt, I do not see how that assertion can be proved. For
the phrases of the apostle teach another doctrine. For he who
must "put on the new man," is not clothed with the "new man,"
or with any part of him. But to the new man, pertain
"righteousness and true holiness." Then, in the case of him,
who must be "renewed in knowledge," it is not his knowledge
which has become corrupt and must be renewed, but his
intelligence, which must be enlightened with new knowledge,
which has been utterly expelled by the darkness of the old
man. I designed this, only, in my argument, and not to define
the image of God in man. But I cannot see that I differ from
the view of the apostle in my explanation. For the knowledge
of God, in the passage quoted by me, is the "image of God"
itself, and "after the image of God." Nor are these
expressions at variance with each other, nor are they so
absurd as you wish them to appear. You say "the image of God
is knowledge, according to the image of God, therefore, the
image of God is denied to be either knowledge or image." I
deny this sequence if the definition is rightly understood,
namely, in the following manner. The image of God, renewed in
us by the regenerating Spirit, is the knowledge of God,
according to the image of God, in which, at the beginning, we
were created. This image has a two-fold relation, in that it
is created anew in us by the Spirit of Christ, and that it
was formerly created in us by the Spirit of God. That
knowledge differs not only in mode, but in its whole nature,
from the knowledge of the old man: nor is it said to be
renewed, but the man is said to be renewed in it. But I
confess that I cannot understand how knowledge is an act of
the image of God, and how that image is the fountain or
principle of that act, that is of knowledge. For I have
hitherto thought that man was said to be created in or to the
image of God, that is, because, in mind, will, knowledge of
God, righteousness and finally holiness, he refers to God
Himself, as the archetype. In the other passage from
Ephesians 4, I do not find the three characteristics, "truth,
righteousness and holiness," but only two, righteousness and
holiness, to which is ascribed truth, that is, sincerity,
purity, simplicity. Knowledge, also, is not a member or
portion of that truth, but a gift, created in the intellect
or mind of man, as righteousness and holiness are ingenerated
in the will, or rather the affections of man.
Secondly, I prove that the same qualities are supernatural in
this way. Those things, according to which we are, and are
said to be, partakers of the divine nature, and the children
of God, are supernatural: but we are, and are said to be
partakers of the divine nature, and children of God,
according to knowledge, righteousness and holiness;
therefore, these are supernatural. The Major does not need
proof. The Minor is evident from a comparison of the first,
second, third, and fourth verses of 2 Peter 1. Thirdly, those
things which have their limit in supernatural felicity, are
supernatural; but the knowledge of God, righteousness and
holiness are such; therefore, they are supernatural.
Fourthly, the immediate causes of supernatural acts are
supernatural. But the knowledge of God, righteousness and
holiness, are the immediate causes of supernatural acts:
therefore they are supernatural. I now come to your
arguments, in which you attempt to show that the image of God
in man is natural, and that those qualities, knowledge,
righteousness and holiness, are natural, not supernatural.
Your first argument is this: Supernatural qualities were
removed, natural qualities were corrupted. But truth,
righteousness, holiness, were not removed, they were
corrupted; therefore, they are not supernatural, but natural.
Your first argument is this: Supernatural qualities were
removed, natural qualities were corrupted. But truth,
righteousness, holiness, were not removed, they were
corrupted; therefore, they are not supernatural, but natural.
Your Minor is defended thus. The principles of these
qualities are in us by nature; they would not be, if they had
been removed. I reply -- that I admit the Major; but the
Minor does not seem at all probable to me, not even by the
addition of that reason. For, I affirm that the knowledge
which is according to piety, the righteousness and the
holiness, of which the apostle speaks, were not corrupted,
but removed, and that none of the principles of those
qualities remain in us after the fall. I acknowledge that the
principles and seeds of the moral virtues, which have some
analogy and resemblance to those spiritual virtues, and that,
even those moral virtues themselves, though corrupted by sin,
remained in us after the fall. It is possible that this
resemblance may mislead him who does not accurately
discriminate between these moral and those spiritual virtues.
In support of this sentiment, in which I state that those
gifts were taken away, I have the declaration of the
Catechism, in the answer to question nine, in these words:
"Man deprived himself and all his posterity, of those divine
gifts." But an explanation of the nature of those divine
gifts is given in the sixth question, namely, "righteousness
and holiness." I know not but that I have the support of your
own declaration on this point. For in the eighteenth of your
Theses, Concerning Original Sin, discussed in 1594, are these
words: "For, as in Adam the form of human integrity was
original righteousness, in which he was made by God, so the
form of corruption, or rather of deformity, was a deprivation
of that righteousness."
In the nineteenth Thesis, "The Scripture calls the form,
first mentioned, the image and likeness of God." In the
twentieth Thesis, "The Scripture calls the latter form, the
image and likeness of Adam." If I rightly understand these
expressions, I think that it plainly follows from them that
original righteousness was removed, and that it is,
therefore, supernatural, according to the rule "supernatural
qualities were removed; natural qualities were corrupted." I
have also, in my favour, most, perhaps all, of the Fathers.
Ambrose, in reference to Elijah and his fasting, chap. 4th,
says, "Adam was clothed with a vesture of virtues before his
transgression, but, as if denuded by sin, he saw himself
naked, because the clothing, which he previously had, was
lost," and again in the seventh book of his commentary on the
10th chapter of that gospel, marking, more clearly, the
distinction between the loss of supernatural qualities and
the corruption of natural ones, he speaks thus: "Who are
thieves if not the angels of night and of darkness? They
first despoil us of the garments of spiritual grace, and then
inflict on us wounds." Augustine, (De Trinitate, lib. 14,
cap. 16,) says, "Man, by sinning, lost righteousness and true
holiness, on which account, this image became deformed and
discoloured; he receives them again when he is reformed and
renewed." Again, (De civit. Dei, lib. 14, cap. 11) he affirms
that "free-will was lost." To conclude this part of the
discussion, I ask what were those spiritual qualities, which
were renewed or lost, if not the knowledge of God,
righteousness and holiness.
Another argument, adduced by you, is this: "Whatever belongs
to the species is natural; But the image of God belongs to
the species; Therefore it is natural." I answer, the Major is
not, in every case, true. For a quality may pertain to the
species either by a communication through nature or natural
principles, or by an arrangement of grace. That, which, in
the former, not in the latter, pertains to the species, is
natural. In reference to the Minor, I affirm that the image
of God pertains to the species, partly through nature, partly
of grace; therefore the image of God in man is partly through
nature, partly of grace; therefore, the image of God in man
is partly natural, partly supernatural. If you make any other
inference, you deduce a general conclusion from a particular
proposition, which is not valid. If an addition be made to
your Major, so that, in its full form, it should stand thus:
"Whatever is produced in the species, and its individuals, by
nature, is natural," I will admit it as a whole. But in that
case, the Minor would not be wholly true. For the image of
God is not promised in us wholly by nature, for that part of
it which is in truth and righteousness, and holiness, is
produced in us by nature, but is communicated by an act of
grace, according to the arrangement of grace. But it is
objected that the image cannot be common, if it is not
natural. For natural qualities differ, in that they are
common, from those which are personal, (the question refers
not to supernatural qualities). I answer a thing is common in
a two-fold sense, either absolutely, according to nature, or
conditionally, according to the arrangement of grace. The
image of God is common in part according to nature and
absolutely, in those things which belong to man according to
his essence, and which cannot be separated from his nature,
and in part conditionally, according to the arrangement of
grace, in those things which pertain not to the essence but
to the supernatural perfection of man. The former are
produced in all men absolutely, the latter conditionally,
namely that he should preserve those principles, which are
universal to the species, and particular to the individual,
uncorrupted. Therefore, the whole image is common, but partly
by nature, and partly of the arrangement of grace; by nature,
that part, which is called natural; according to the
arrangement of grace, that part which I call supernatural.
This, also, is according to the declaration of the Scripture
that Seth was begotten in the image and likeness of Adam, not
in the image of God. He was indeed begotten in the image of
God, not as God communicated it, in its integrity, to Adam,
but as Adam maintained it for himself. But Adam maintained it
for himself not in its integrity, therefore, he communicated
it in that condition. But that, which is in its integrity,
and that, which is not in its integrity, differ, not only in
mode and degree, but also in some of the essential parts of
that image, which are possessed by the image, in its
integrity, and are wanting to the image, not in its
integrity, which Adam had originally, by a complete
communication from God, and of which Seth was destitute on
account of the defective communication from Adam.
Your third argument is this: "The image of God is not said to
be produced or created in us, but to be renewed or restored,
therefore, it was not lost or removed, but corrupted."
I answer -- Neither part of your assumption is, in a strict
sense, true; with suitable explanation, both parts are true,
but neither of them is against my sentiment. I will prove the
former assertion, namely, that neither part of the assertion
is true. We are said to be "new creatures in Christ" and "to
be created to good works." David prayed that God would
"create" within him "a clean heart." The image of God is
nowhere said to be restored and renewed within us, but as we
are said to be "renewed in knowledge after the image of God,"
"to be renewed in the spirit of our mind," and "to be
transformed by the renewing of our mind." Yet, with suitable
explanation, both parts of the assumption are true, but they
are very favourable to my sentiment, as I will show. There
are in us, in respect to ourselves, two parts of the image of
God, one essential, the other accidental to us. The essential
part is the soul, endowed with mind, affection and will. The
accidental is the knowledge of God, righteousness, true
holiness, and similar gifts of spiritual grace. The former
are not said to be produced or created in us, because it was
deformed and corrupt. The latter is not said to be restored
or renewed in us, because, from a defect in the subject, it
has no place in us and not because it was not corrupt and
deformed, but it is said to be produced and created in us,
(for we are called, on its access, new creatures,) because it
resembles a mold, by the use of which, that essential part is
restored and renewed. The words of the apostle plainly set
forth this idea, in which it is affirmed not that the
knowledge, referred to, is renewed, but that we, as partakers
of the image of God so far as it is essential to us, are said
to be renewed in knowledge, as in a new mold, according to
the image of God, so far as it is accidental to us. Both
parts, then, of the antecedent are true. For the image of God
is restored and renewed in us, namely, our mind and will, and
the affections of the soul; and the image of God is produced
and created in us, namely, the knowledge of God,
righteousness, and true holiness. The former is the subject
of the latter; the latter is the form, divinely given to the
former. Therefore, also, the argument of Moses in commanding
the murderer to be slain, is valid. For in man, even after
transgression, the image of God remained, so far as it was
essential to him, or that part remained, which pertained to
the essence of man, though the part, which was accidental, is
removed through sin.
We now discuss the action of the Deity, by which we have both
the natural and the supernatural part of the image of God. I
have not made any distinction in the act, both because I
wished to use the phraseology of Scripture, according to
which the word creation signifies the act by which man has in
himself, the image and likeness of God, for it speaks thus:
"Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," and "so
God created man in his own image," and because both parts
equally well answered my purpose. But, if the subject is
considered with accuracy, I think that a distinction is to be
made in those acts, and that one is rightly termed creation,
by which man received natural qualities, the other,
superinfusion, by which he received the supernatural. For
life in man is two-fold, animal and spiritual; animal, by
which he lives according to man, spiritual, by which he lives
according to God. Of the former, the principle is the soul in
man, endowed with intellect and will; of the latter, the
principle is the Spirit of God, communicating to the soul
those excellent gifts of knowledge, righteousness, and
holiness. It is probable that the principles of these kinds
of life, each so diverse from the other, were bestowed on
man, not by the same, but by a different act. But it is not
important to my sentiment to decide in what mode, whether by
a two-fold or a single act of God, man had these qualities,
only let it be understood that he had both the former and the
latter, before God was employed concerning him in the act of
predestination; that is, he had them in respect to the divine
consideration. I make the statement in general terms, because
those things, both natural and supernatural, were conferred
on the whole species, the former absolutely, the latter on
the condition that the species should preserve to itself that
principle. Hence, I conclude, if it was conferred on the
species, then it was conferred by a decree of providence, in
contra-distinction to predestination; if it was conferred
conditionally, it was not conferred by a decree of
predestination, by which no gift is conditionally conferred.
It is now evident from this that my argument is valid. For if
man was created by God, under this condition, that he should
have, not only natural, but also supernatural gifts, either
by the same act of creation, or by the additional act of
superinfusion, (in reference to which I have never
contended,) it follows, then, that God, in the acts of
predestination and reprobation, which separate men, could not
have reference to men, as considered in a merely natural
state. You also seem, afterwards, to concede this, that man
had supernatural endowments, even in his primitive state, but
as an increment to nature, and not from the act of creation,
which is the principle of nature. This I concede, and from it
make this inference, since those things, which the first man
had, were possessed by all his posterity in him, (for all
which he was, we also were in him, according to the 40th
Thesis of your disputation concerning Original Sin,
previously cited,) the former, of nature, the latter, of the
arrangement of grace, it follows that God could not, in the
decree under discussion, have reference to man, considered in
a merely natural state, nor indeed, to man, considered with
supernatural endowments, for a being of such character could
not be passed by, or at least was not passed by, except from
the fact that it was foreseen that he would lose those
supernatural endowments by transgression and sin.
Your assertion that these statements, however true they may
be, are not opposed to that sentiment, which considers man in
general, is valid, if it is proved that man was, or could be
considered universally by God in the act of decree. But I
think that my arguments are valid, also, against that
sentiment. For if God could not consider man in a merely
natural state, if not with supernatural endowments, if not
without sin, regarding him as the object of the acts of
predestination and reprobation, then also he could not
consider the same being in a general sense. For a general
consideration is excluded by the necessary consideration of
any particular circumstance, which becomes the formal
relation (ratio) of the object, apart from which formal
relation God could not consider man, when He was acting in
reference to man in that decree. Besides, how can the general
consideration yet have place, when a circumstance, which that
general consideration comprehends within itself, is excluded.
If what you say concerning "the essential and the relative
image" has this meaning, that the essential image comprehends
truth and righteousness, and holiness, and yet is entirely
natural to man, as may be deduced from some things alleged by
you, then I affirm distinctly, that I cannot oppose it;
indeed, I think that I can prove the contrary. But if you
apply the phrase "essential image" to all which man has,
essential to himself, according to the image of God, I admit
it. Then the "respective" image will embrace what I call
supernatural and accidental. But, as these things, with the
premises which I have laid down, do not tend to refute my
sentiment, I proceed to the remainder of my argument.
My second argument is this, that no love of God according to
election, or divine volition regarding human beings
variously, or divine actions varying in reference to them, is
found after sin entered into the world, or after it was
considered as having entered. But if this argument is valid,
it also refutes the sentiment, which states that man was
considered "in general." For if there is no divine election
and reprobation of men except after the entrance of sin into
the world, then man is considered, not "in general," but
particularly, in reference to the circumstance of sin. But
you plead "authority, reason, and example." You plead
"authority" from three passages of Scripture, Romans 9,
Ephesians 1, and Matthew 25. Neither of these is opposed to
my view, since I do not deny that election and reprobation
were made from eternity, and do not say that sin was the
cause of the decree, but a condition requisite in its object.
The passage in Romans 9, is not adverse to me; first, because
Jacob and Esau had been already conceived in sin, when those
words were addressed to Rebecca, as is evident from the text.
The affirmative, that they had done neither good nor evil, is
to be understood in reference to the distinction which might
be made between them, as is explained by Augustine in many
places. The apostle then denies all reference to sin, namely,
to that by which any distinction might be made between them,
not to that, of which they were both equally guilty.
Secondly, because he attributes all things to the vocation of
God, who calleth, which is of mercy, and has reference only
to sinners. Thirdly, because the "purpose of God, according
to election" which states, "not of works," is a gracious
purpose in Christ, to the promise of which reference is made
in Romans iv, 16 "it is of fruit, that it might be by grace,
to the end the promise might be sure to all the seed," that
is, of faith of, or in Christ, which pertains only to
sinners, for he, who has not sinned, does not need faith in
Christ, since he obtains righteousness, and thereby life, by
the laws. Let this, then, be the answer in reference to this
passage, if it is to be understood of Esau and Jacob in their
own persons, without any typical meaning. But the meaning of
that passage is far different, as could be proved, if it were
necessary.
I come, now, to the passage cited from Ephesians 1. That
passage is so far from being opposed to my sentiment that I
shall hereafter use it as a strong argument in my favour.
Election is here said to be "from eternity;" I grant it. It
is said to have been made "in Christ;" I acknowledge it. It
is said to be "unto the adoption of children by Jesus
Christ;" I consent to it. I do not, however, see that either
of these statements is opposed to the idea, that sin is a
condition, requisite in the object of election and
reprobation. It is true that any reference to ourselves, as a
cause of our own election, is denied. Predestination precedes
persons, in respect to their actual existence, not as they
are considered by the Deity. It refers to causes, before they
actually exist, but not before they are foreseen by God from
eternity, though, in the foresight of God, they exist, not as
the causes of predestination, but as a condition requisite in
the object. In Matthew 25, the blessed of the Father, who
shall possess the kingdom prepared for them of the mere
benediction of God, are spoken of. But that benediction is in
Christ, by which the malediction is removed, which even the
blessed themselves had deserved according to the prescience
of God, before they were blessed in Christ; and the kingdom,
which was prepared for them, by the blood of Christ, is a
kingdom, to which they are raised from the ignominy and
slavery of sin. If you had thoroughly considered that, which
is really in controversy, you would not have thought that
those passages could be used effectually against me.
The reasons, adduced by you, are not more adverse to my
opinion, for they oppose the sentiment which makes sin the
cause of the decree, not that which makes it a condition,
requisite in the object. I will examine them. To the first, I
answer that my sentiment, either as antecedent or consequent,
is not absurd, until it is proved to be so. Your second and
third reasons change the state of the question. For they
exclude from that decree sin, as a cause, on account of which
God adopted children unto Himself, or in view of which He
made the decree; in reference to which there is no question.
To the second, I say, that the subject of discussion, here,
is the adoption made in Christ, which pertains to no one
except by faith in Christ, to which we are not begotten but
begotten again by God. From this it is proved, that the
adoption is of sinners, and of sinners equally involved in
sin, not of men equal in nature. To the third, I answer; --
In the first place, we must judge from the word of God, what
may be more, and what may be less in accordance with the
wisdom and grace of God. In the second place, I affirm that
it is equally in accordance with the wisdom and grace of God,
that He should adopt unto Himself sons from those who are not
sinners as from those who are sinners, and vice versa, if
such should be His choice. What you say in reference to "the
supposition of such consideration" is aside from the subject.
In the third place, the wisdom and grace, according to which
God adopted children unto Himself from among men in that
"hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world unto our
glory, which none of the princes of this world knew," which
wisdom is "Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling-
block," -- and that grace, is that which is joined with
mercy, bestowed on the sinner, and is in Christ. The latter
tends far more illustriously to the glory of God than grace,
as used in contradistinction to mercy, and so much the more,
as he, who has deserved evil, is more unworthy than he, who
has deserved nothing, either good or evil. It has been shown
before, that the example of angels is not analogous, but the
reverse. For God determined to secure the salvation of men
and of angels in different modes. The relations, therefore,
of predestination, in the former, and in the latter case, are
diverse. God stamped His own image on both, but with a
different condition, namely, that it should be preserved in
none, but restored in some, among men. God so tempered, as
Augustine says, the natures of angels and of men, that He
might first show, in them, what their own freewill could
effect, then what should be the beneficial influence of His
grace, preserving in the case of angels, and restoring, in
the case of men. He showed in the case of angels, namely,
grace in contradistinction to mercy. He showed in men, the
power of the latter grace, namely, grace joined to mercy, and
both of his own eternal purpose. Since, then, He did, in men,
what He did not in angels, and, in angels, what He did not in
men, and this from the decree of predestination, I conclude
that there is one relation of divine predestination in the
case of angels, and another in the case of men. Therefore,
there is no love of God towards men, according to election,
without the consideration of sin. There was no discussion
between us in reference to angels, and, in my argument,
express mention was made of men; whatever, then, is proved
concerning angels, has no weight in the refutation of my
argument.
ELEVENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Secondly, of Election.
1. Election is said to have been made in Christ, who was
ordained as mediator for sinners, and was called Jesus,
because He should save, not certain individuals, considered
merely in their nature, but "His people from their sins." He
is said to have been foreordained, and we in Him, and He, in
the order of nature and causes, before us. He was ordained as
saviour, we, as those to be saved. But in Christ, having such
a character, and being considered such as the Scripture
describes him to us, man could not be considered in a merely
natural state. Much less, therefore, could he be elected in
Him.
2. Election is said to have been made of grace, which is
distinguished from nature in a two fold manner, both as the
latter is pure and considered abstractly, and as it is guilty
and corrupt. In the former sense, it signifies the progress
of goodness towards supernatural good, to be imparted to a
creature naturally capable of it; in the latter sense, it
signifies the ulterior progress towards supernatural good to
be communicated to man, as corrupt and guilty, which is also,
in the Scriptures, called mercy. In my judgment, the term
grace is used, in the latter sense, in the writings of the
apostles, especially when the subject of discussion is
election, justification, sanctification, &c. If this is true,
then election of grace was made of men considered, not in a
"merely natural state, but in sin."
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE ELEVENTH PROPOSITION
It is true, that election is made by God the Father in Christ
the Mediator; but that the Mediator was ordained, only for
sinners, is not absolutely true. Therefore, the inference is
not valid. Indeed, should its truth be conceded, yet it has
no weight against those, who state that, in election,
reference was to man in general. But that the Mediator was
ordained, not for sinners alone -- to say nothing of that
Mediation, which is attributed to Christ in creation and
nature, "all things were made by Him; and without him was not
any thing made that was made. In Him was life; and the life
was the light of men." (John i, 3, 4,) "by whom also He made
the worlds." (Heb. i, 2, &c.) -- I demonstrate most
completely by a single argument.
Christ is Mediator for those, to whom He was, from eternity,
given as Head by the Father; -- He was given as Head by the
Father to Angels and men; therefore, he is the Mediator for
both the latter and the former. But angels did not sin; he
was not, then, ordained Mediator for sinners only. Let us
discuss each point, if you please, separately, that we may
more fully understand the subject.
When we speak of the Head, we consider three things,
according to the analogy of nature; its position, by which,
in fact, dignity, and authority, it holds the first place in
the whole body; its perfection, by which it contains all the
inward and outward senses, in itself, as their fountain and
the principle of motion; finally its power, by which all
power, feeling, motion and government is accustomed to flow
from it to the other members.
According to this idea, Christ is indeed the Head, in common,
of all created things; the Head, I say, of superior nature,
and of interior nature, and of all those things which are in
nature. We transcend this universal relation, when we
contemplate the Head, as appointed from eternity. Angels and
men are, after God, capable of eternity; and to both Christ
was given eternally, by the Father, as the Head, not only
that they should exist forever, (which is the attribute of
spiritual nature) but also, and this is specially of grace,
that they should be forever heirs of eternal glory, as sons
of God, heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ. The latter
were ordained of God, by the adoption of grace in Christ
Jesus, all to one end, namely, to the sight, the enjoyment,
and announcement of the glory of God, and of them was
constituted the mystical body of Christ, the celestial
church. Finally, as in all this life, that is the head of a
living creature, from which power, feeling and motion flow
into the members of the body, so in all that eternal life,
the body grows by the influence of Christ, its Head, and each
of the members obtain immutability of life, that is, eternity
from this fact, that they subsist in Christ, their Head,
apart from whom they would be dissolved. But Christ, is the
Mediator by the relation in which he is the Head of angels
and men, for, as Head, he' joins them to Himself; as
Mediator, he joins them to the Father. That Christ is Head
and Mediator, is in fact, one and the same thing, only that
the divinity intervenes in the relation, since He is called
the Head, as to our relation to Himself; and Mediator as to
our relation to the Father. "But," it may be said, "he did
not redeem the angels as he redeemed us. This indeed is true;
but Mediator and Redeemer differ from each other, as genus
and species. To angels, Christ is Mediator of preservation
and confirmation; but to us, he is Mediator, also, of
redemption and of preservation from that from which we have
been redeemed. So he is styled Mediator for both, though in a
different mode. The Major, then, of my syllogism is true,
that "Christ is the Mediator of those to whom he was
appointed from eternity as their Head." But that He was
appointed, both to angels and men, as their Head, and
therefore, as Mediator, is taught by the apostle in
Colossians 1, when he affirms of Christ that he "is the image
of the invisible God," that is, He represents God the Father,
in his word and work, chiefly to those whom the Father has
given to him, as their Head and Mediator; "the first born of
every creature," namely, every one whom God has, of His
grace, predestinated to adoption, and begotten then, that
they might be His children; for there is a comparison of
things which are homogeneous, and so the passage is to be
understood. Then, explaining both those attributes, he
subjoins, first, in general terms, "For by Him were all
things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth
visible, and invisible," (but he explains these things, to
take away the plea of the angel worshipers, whom he assails
in this epistle,) "whether thrones or dominions, or
principalities, or powers; all things were created by Him and
for Him, and He is before all things, and by Him all things
consist;" and then, with particular reference to the glorious
body of which He is precisely the Head and Mediator, "and He
is the Head of the body, the church," who, in the
confirmation of grace is "the beginning," but in redemption,
is "the first-born from the dead," the common end of all,
which is "that in all things he might have the pre-eminence."
The cause, is the decree of the Father, predestinating His
Son for the adoption of His children, "for it pleased the
Father that, in Him, should all fullness dwell, and having
made peace through the blood of His cross to reconcile all
things to Himself;" &c. He sets forth this idea still more
clearly, when, warning them from the worship of angels under
the pretense of philosophy, he says, "for in Him dwelleth all
the fullness of the Godhead bodily. And ye are complete in
Him, which is the Head of all principality and power," that
is, of angels to the worship of whom, they were solicited.
For, of every one soliciting them to the worshipping of
angels, he afterwards affirms that they do not hold the
"Head, from which all the body, by joints and bands having
nourishment ministered and knit together, increaseth with the
increase of God." To the same purpose is Ephesians 1.
It is then to be stated, generally, that he was ordained to
be Mediator for sinners, but not for them only, since he is
also Mediator for the angels, who have maintained their
original purity, but he is ordained as Redeemer for sinners
only. We may be able to express this very idea in another
mode, if we say that he was ordained Mediator, both for
those, who could sin, that they might not sin, and for those,
who had sinned, that they might be saved from their sins.
Both modes of interpretation tend to the same result. The
same is the case with the name Jesus. But what need is there
of many words? We say that he was ordained as Mediator both
for those who stood and for those who fell, as Redeemer only
for those who fell; for those who stood, that they might
remain, standing, and for those who fell, that they might
rise again, and remain standing. From which it follows, a
mode of argumentation, plainly the same, being preserved,
that when election is said to have been made in Christ, God
had reference to man, considered generally, as not yet
created as created in a natural state, as standing and as
having fallen, but this is the same thing as being considered
in a merely natural state, which you deny. The same argument
applies to what follows.
I come to your second argument. You say "Election is said to
have been made of grace," and further, that "grace is spoken
of in a two-fold sense, when it is used in opposition to
nature, and that it is to be taken, in the latter sense, in
this argument," and you conclude that, "the election of grace
was made of men, considered not in a natural state, &c." Do
you not see, my brother, that your conclusion is unsound,
involving the fallacy of division, and that it is also
equivocal? For, in the Major, grace is used collectively or
generally, but in the Minor distributively; in the former, it
is used simply, as to its essence, in the latter, an accident
is taken into account, namely, the different modes of the
object, which do not affect the essence of grace. Why shall
we not rather argue in this manner? Election is of grace; --
grace has reference to those, whom it establishes in good,
and to those whom, saved from evil, it restores to good;
election, then, has reference to the same. That, which is
stated in general terms, should be applied in general terms,
for this, both nature and reason demand, unless there is a
positive restriction in the necessity of the subject, or
there be some limitation by an adjunct. That election is used
in a general sense, is most clearly evident from a comparison
of angels and men. You say, that grace is used, in the latter
signification, in the writings of the Apostles in this and
similar arguments. This may be correct, but this is not
affected by a restriction of the term grace, which in God and
of God, embraces all things, but by a restriction of the
object kata ti the restriction is in the object, that is, in
man, not in that which is added or granted to him. What, if a
farmer should command his servant to cultivate a field, which
field needed first to be cleared, then plowed, and lastly to
be sowed, &c., would you, then, restrict the word cultivate
to one of these processes? That, which is general or common,
remains general or common, and its generality may not be
narrowed down by any particular relations of the object.
Therefore, as you see, this consequence, deduced from faulty
reasoning, is not valid, nor is that, which is stated in
general terms, to be restricted to particular circumstances.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF THE ELEVENTH PROPOSITION
The two arguments advanced by me, as they are most
conclusive, so they remain unaffected by your answers. I
prove this, in reference to the first. Its strength and force
consists in this, that the election of men is said to have
been made in Christ, as the Mediator between God and sinful
men, that is as Reconciler and Redeemer, from which I argued
thus: Whoever are elect in Christ, as Mediator between God
and sinful men, that is, as Reconciler and Redeemer, they are
considered by God, electing them, as sinners; -- But all men,
who are elect in Christ, are elect in Christ, as Mediator
between God and sinful men, that is, as Reconciler and
Redeemer; Therefore, all men, who are elect in Christ, are
considered by God, electing them, as sinners.
The Major is plain. For, in the first place, they, who are
not sinners, do not need a Reconciler and Redeemer. But
election is an act, altogether necessary to those who are
elected. In the second place, Christ himself is not
considered by God as Mediator of Redemption, unless in view
of the fact, that he is ordained as such for those who have
sinned. For the divine foresight of sin preceded, in the
order of nature, the decree by which its ordained that His
Son should be the Mediator, appointed to offer in the
presence of God, in behalf of men, a sacrifice for sins. In
the third place, the election of men by God is made only in
the Mediator, as having obtained, by his own blood, eternal
redemption.
The Minor is evident. For since Christ is the Mediator
between men and God, only as Reconciler, Redeemer, and the
advocate of sinners; Mediator, I say, who, by the act of His
Mediation, affords salvation to those, for whom he is
Mediator. (1 Tim. ii, 5 & 6; Heb. viii, 6 &c.; ix, 15; xii,
24.) Hence follows the conclusion, since the premises are
true, and consist of three terms, and are arranged in a
legitimate form.
Let us now examine your arguments in opposition to what I
have adduced. You affirm that Christ is not ordained as
Mediator for sinners only, and therefore, my conclusion is
not valid. Let it be conceded that your antecedent is true,
yet it does not follow that my conclusion is not valid. For,
in my premises, I did not assert that Christ was ordained
Mediator only for sinners, nor are the questions discussed
between us, -- of what beings is Christ the Mediator -- when
spoken of universally -- and in what modes. But I spoke of
Christ, as ordained a Mediator for men in particular, and
affirmed that he was ordained Mediator for them, only as
sinners; for he was ordained Mediator to take away the sins
of the world. The subject of discussion, then, in the mode in
which he is the Mediator for men. Here, you commit two
fallacies, that of Irrelevant conclusion [ignoratio elenchi],
and that of reasoning from a particular case to a general
conclusion, [a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter]. I
speak of Christ's Mediation as pertaining to a particular
case, namely, as undertaken for man, you treat of his
Mediation, as simply and generally considered. But you
rightly separate the consideration of the mediation, which is
attributed to Christ, in creation and nature, for the latter
is, entirely, of another kind and mode. According to this, he
is the Mediator of God to creatures; according to that, of
creatures to God. The one, refers to all creatures, the
other, only to those, made in the image of God. The one tends
to the communication of all natural and created good to all
creatures, the other, to the bestowment, on rational
creatures, of a participation in infinite and supernatural
good. You, indeed, prove that he was ordained Mediator, not
for sinners only, but without any necessity. For this is not
the question between us. The point to be proved by you, was
that he is the Mediator of men, not of sinners, which I know
that you would not wish to attempt, as a different doctrine
is taught in the Scriptures. Yet, let us examine the
argument. He was ordained as Mediator also for the angels; --
But the angels did not sin; -- Therefore, he was not
constituted Mediator only for sinners. I may concede all
this, for it weighs nothing against my argument, since I have
not said in general terms, that Christ was ordained only for
sinners. I restricted his Mediation to men, to the work of
their salvation, to the mode in which salvation was obtained
for them. Hence, if this be true, I conclude that my argument
remains firm and unmoved, in which I proved that, in Christ
as the Mediator of men before God, only sinners were elected.
I wish that we might always remember that there is no
controversy between us concerning the election of angels or
the mediation, by which they are saved, and that we are
treating only of the election and reprobation of men, and of
the mode of mediation by which they obtain salvation, for it
will be perceived that statements, which, taken generally,
are not true, may be, in the highest degree, true, when
applied to the particular case of mankind. There is, then, no
need of considering those things, which are said concerning
Christ as the Mediator of angels. If, however, I may be
permitted to discuss even this point, I may ask for the proof
of your Major, in which you affirm that "Christ is Mediator
for those to whom he was given, as Head, by the Father." I
think that I have good reason for denying your postulate.
For, in Philemon 2, Christ is said to have received "a name
which is above every name, that, at the name of Jesus, every
knee should bow, of things in heaven, because he, "being in
the form of God, humbled himself and became obedient unto
death, even the death of the cross." Here we see that the
reason of his being constituted the Head, even of heavenly
things, was this, that, by his own blood and death, he might
perform the functions of Mediator for men before God. If he
was the Mediator for angels, then this fact, and not the
former reason, should have been alleged, in this passage, for
his appointment as Head, even of angels.
These two terms, Head and Mediator, seem to me to have an
order and relation, such that the appellation of Mediator
pertains to Christ in a prior relation, and that of had in a
posterior relation, and the latter, indeed, on account of the
former. For, by the act of Mediation, he acquires for himself
the right of dominion, the possession of which the Father
delivers to him, when He bestows the title of Head upon him.
This is implied, also, in the distinction used in schools of
Divinity, Christ is Mediator by merit and by efficacy. By
merit first, then by efficacy. For by his merit, he prepares
for himself a people, the blessings necessary for their
happiness, and the right and power of imparting those
blessings to his own people; from which are derived the
titles Head, saviour, Leader, Prince, and Lord; in accordance
with which titles, there flows, of his own efficacy, to his
own people, an actual communication of those blessings, which
he obtained by the merit of his death. For in Hebrews ii, 16,
it is said that Christ: "took not on him the nature of
angels; but he took on him the seed of Abraham." Now, if the
statement, made by our divines, is true -- that this
assumption of nature was made that he might be able to
perform the functions of Mediator for those whose nature he
assumed, you perceive that the conclusion is valid, that
since "he took not on him the nature of angels," he did not
perform the functions of Mediator for them. To this add, that
it is very frequently said, by our Theologians that Christ is
Mediator only as he stands between God and men, which
assertion they refer to his human nature, taken into a
personal union by the Word, that he might, in this way, stand
between both, partaking, with the Father, of the Divine
nature, and with us, of human nature. Hence, also, he is
called Emmanuel in a twofold sense, first, because he is God
and man in the unity of his person, and secondly, because,
being such, he has united God and men in the office of
Mediation. But he does not stand between God and angels.
Consider, also, the declaration of Heb. v, 1, "every high
priest taken from among men is ordained for men in things
pertaining to God." But Christ was not taken from among
angels, therefore, he was not ordained for angels in things
pertaining to God. Indeed, I affirm, with confidence, that
there was nothing to be done, by the way of any mediation
for, or in behalf of angels before God. I add, also, that a
Mediator should not be inferior in nature to those for whom
he acts in that capacity. But Christ, in his human nature,
was made "a little lower than the angels, for the suffering
of death. (Heb. ii, 9.) Therefore, he is not Mediator for
angels. Finally, I remark, angels are "ministering Spirits
sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of
salvation." (Heb. i, 14.) "Unto the angels hath He not put in
subjection the world to come," but unto Christ Jesus
primarily, and unto all his brethren, secondarily, whose
nature he sanctified in himself, and exalted with himself to
that dignity. Therefore, Christ is not the Mediator of
angels. But the inquiry may be made, Cannot Christ, then, be
said in any manner to be Mediator for angels? I answer; --
The term mediator may be applied in a two fold manner, either
in behalf of creatures to the Deity, or of the Deity to
creatures. I deny that Christ is Mediator in behalf of the
angels before God, but I do not deny he is Mediator for God
to angels. For this coincides with the appellation of Head,
which I confess belong to Christ, in respect to angels,
though in a relation different from that, by which he is the
Head of believers. For the union, which exists between Christ
and believers of the human race, is more strict and close,
than that which exists between him and angels, on account of
the consubstantiality of his human nature with that of men,
from which angels are alien. But enough on these points.
Whether they are, as I have stated them, or not, it affects,
neither favourably nor unfavourably, my argument, but you
entirely agree with me when you say that he was ordained as
Redeemer only for the fallen. From this, also, I infer the
truth of my sentiment. Men are elected in the Redeemer, only
as fallen; for they are not elected that they should remain
standing, but that they should rise again, and then remain
standing, as you have rightly observed. But how can you
infer, that, since election is made in Christ, the election,
I say, of men, in Christ, the Redeemer, (for those words are
to be supplied), it follows that God had respect to men, in
general, considered generally as not yet created, as created
in their natural state, as yet standing and as fallen. I
think that the contrary can, and must be inferred. Therefore,
God, in election, had reference to man, only as fallen. For,
in election, He regarded man in the Redeemer, and the
Redeemer is such only of the fallen.
As to the latter argument, the form of the answer is the
same. I do not use the word grace equivocally; I do not use
it at the same time collectively and distributively. I admit
that it is used in a two-fold sense, for the grace of
preservation and restoration; I admit that it is used
collectively, and absolutely, particularly and concretely,
that is, the grace of preservation and restoration. But, what
then? If I use a word, which has a general and equivocal
sense, is equivocation, therefore, at once, to be laid to my
charge? But I have used that word, at all times in this
discussion, in the same way, namely, as referring to the
grace by which some men are elected. It is that grace by
which restoration and its means are prepared, not that by
which preservation and its means are appointed. For the
latter grace was not bestowed on human beings.
From the former grace alone, all they, who are saved, obtain
their salvation. In the Major of my syllogism, grace is
spoken of in a particular relation, and in the Minor, it is
used in the same way, and, neither in the former nor in the
latter, is it used in a general sense, as the following
syllogism will show. They who are elected according to the
grace of restoration, which is joined with mercy, having
place only in reference to sinners, are considered by Him,
who elects, as sinners; But all men, who are elected, are
elected according to the grace of restoration, which is
joined to mercy, having place only in reference to sinners; -
- Therefore, all men, who are elected, are considered by Him,
who elects, as sinners. Grace is spoken of, throughout,
particularly and relatively in respect to men, and in no
case, is it used generally or absolutely. Indeed, it cannot
be used generally or absolutely when it has reference
relatively and particularly to election, whether of angels or
of men. For neither these nor those are elected or saved by
grace, taken absolutely, but both by grace used relatively,
angels by the grace of preservation, men by the grace of
restoration.
When, however, we treat of election universally and
abstractly, we must discuss the subject of grace, as its
cause, universally, absolutely and abstractly; for, to a
genus, general attributes are to be ascribed, which may be
afterwards applied to the species after their several modes.
Your argumentation, then, is aside from our controversy.
Election is of grace; grace respects those, whom it
establishes, and those whom, saved from evil, it restores to
good. Therefore, election has reference to the same persons.
For we do not now discuss election in general, and
absolutely, if so, the word grace, according to correct
usage, must be understood in a general sense. But we discuss
the election of men; therefore, the general term grace must
be restricted to that grace, according to which men are
elected. It is not, therefore, proper to say that "grace has
reference to those whom it establishes in good," for the
grace, of which we here treat, does not refer to those whom
it establishes in good, for grace established no one of the
human race, it only restored those, to whom it had reference.
But you say that the grace, which establishes in good, and
that, which restores, are one in essence, and only
distinguished and restricted in relation to the object. What
if I should concede this? My conclusion will still be valid.
The question between us has reference to the object and its
formal relations by which relation you say that grace is
distinguished and restricted. But that restriction of the
object has only this force, that the grace, which, according
to your assertion, is one in essence, must unfold itself and
be applied to a sinner, and to one not a sinner, in a
different mode; and indeed must use acts of a different
character in the two cases. There is, then, a restriction in
"that which is added or granted," but it is a necessary
consequence of the restriction of the object. This
distinction, then, is sufficient for the conclusion which I
desire.
The question is not concerning objects of election,
essentially different from each other, but concerning
different modes of considering an object, which is one and
the same in essence, and concerning a different formal
relation. I will illustrate it by a simile. Justice in God is
one in essence, namely, giving to each one that which is due
to him; to him who is obedient, what pertains to him,
according to the divine promise, and to the sinner that which
pertains to him, according to the divine threatening. But
from the fact that justice renders the retribution of
punishment an object, it is necessarily inferred that the
object is worthy of punishment, and was, therefore, liable to
sin; so likewise with grace. Grace then is one in essence,
but varies in its mode; one in principle and end, but varied
in its progress, steps and means: one, when taken absolutely
and in general, but two-fold, when taken relatively and
particularly, at least in respect to opposite and distinct
matters. But in the whole of this course of reasoning, I have
used the term grace, in a particular relation, as it is
varied in mode, progress, steps and means, and as it is taken
relatively and distributively. No equivocation, then, has
been used in this; there is no reasoning from general to
particular, from the abstract to the concrete.
But, though, all these statements be true, they avail
nothing, you affirm, against those who state that mankind in
general were regarded in election. These arguments, indeed,
prove that mankind in general could not have been regarded in
election, or at least that such was not the case. For if man
was considered in general, then he was elected by grace,
taken in a general sense. For a general effect requires a
general cause. But man was elected, not by grace considered
generally, but by grace considered particularly, relatively,
and distributively, with reference to the circumstance of
sin. If man was considered in general, then he was elected in
the Mediator not considered generally, but considered
particularly as Redeemer. Therefore, in election, man was not
considered in general, but with restriction to the
circumstance of sin, which was to be proved. The illustration
of the field to be cultivated, is not against this view,
indeed it is in its favour. For if a farmer should command
his son to cultivate a field, which was overrun with briars,
and, therefore, required culture joined with clearing, then
the word cultivate, though, when taken in a general sense, it
is not restricted to clearing, yet, when applied to that
particular field, it necessarily includes that act. Hence we
infer, that, if a field cannot be cultivated without the act
of clearing, it is, therefore, overrun with briars and weeds,
and, by analogy, if a man can not be saved without the act of
restoration, he is, therefore, a sinner; for a sinner only is
capable of restoration, and restoring grace is adapted only
to his case.
TWELFTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Thirdly, of Non-Election or Preterition. Non-election or
preterition is an act of the divine pleasure, by which God
from eternity determined not to communicate to some men
supernatural happiness, but to bestow on them only natural or
animal happiness, if they should live agreeably to nature; --
But, in an act of this kind, God has not to do with men
considered in a merely natural state; -- Therefore, God does
not pass by certain men, considered in a merely natural
state. The truth of the Minor is proved; --
1. Because there is no natural happiness of this kind, which
is the end of man, and his ultimate neither in fact, for
there has not been, and there is not a man happy in this
sense, nor in possibility, derived from the decree of God
considered, either absolutely, for no man will ever be thus
happy naturally, or conditionally, for God did not design
happiness of this kind for any man on a condition, as the
condition must be that of obedience, which God remunerates by
supernatural happiness.
2. Because sin is the meritorious cause of that act of the
divine pleasure, by which He determined to deny, to some,
spiritual or supernatural happiness, resulting from union
with Himself and from His dwelling in man. "Your iniquities
have separated between you and your God." (Isa. lix, 2.) Nor
can that denial of happiness to man be considered otherwise
than as punishment, which is necessarily preceded by the act
of sin, and its appointment by the foresight of future sin.
These arguments may be useful also in the discussion of other
questions.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWELFTH PROPOSITION
Your definition of non-election or preterition, (which
Augustine calls also reelection,) is by no means just, -- and
this in three respects.
1. Since that, which is made a difference, is not merely an
accident. For if the difference of the things defined is only
an accident, the definition is not a good one. The essential
difference between election and reprobation consists in
adoption by Jesus Christ unto God the Father, the accidental
consectary of which is supernatural happiness. Ephesians 1,
and Romans 8.
2. Because the thing defined is referred, not to its primary
end, but to one which is secondary, which is erroneous. The
primary end of election is union with God by adoption, but a
secondary, and, as we have said, accidental end, is
happiness.
3. Because the definition is redundant; for an addition is
made of something positive, when you insert, in parentheses,
"but to be bestowed," &c., while the definition itself is
purely negative. There is also a fault, and even an error in
that which is added. For non-election or preterition does not
bestow natural happiness, but rather supposes it; God does
not, in that act, bestow a gift on those on whom it already
has been bestowed. This we remark concerning the Major.
The Minor is denied. God, in this act, has reference to man
in general, therefore also, in this mode, He has respect to
the same general reference. Thus you perceive that your whole
reasoning is false. To sustain your Minor you use two
arguments. The first is designed to confirm that part of the
definition, which does not, as we have asserted, belong to
definition; therefore, I need not notice it. Yet since you
afford the occasion, I shall be permitted to make certain
suggestions. The argument denies that there is any "natural
happiness of this kind, which is the end of man, and his
ultimate." If you speak here of the depraved nature of man, I
admit it; for "an evil tree does not bring forth good fruit,"
much less does it acquire any goodness of itself. If you
speak of nature, in its purity, as it was, originally, in
Adam, I deny it. For, to undepraved nature, pertained its own
future natural happiness, though it was afterwards, so to
speak, to be absorbed, by the grace of God, in supernatural
happiness. This happiness was the natural design of man and
his natural end. Do not all things in nature seek their own
good? But since nature seeks not any thing which may not
exist, (it is foolish to seek that, which does not exist,
even in possibility, and nature, the work of an infinitely
wise Architect, is not foolish,) it follows that the good of
each thing exists by nature, in possibility, if the thing
does not attain to it, and in fact, if the thing does attain
to it. But if the condition of natural things is such,
consider, I pray you, my brother, how it can be truly said of
man that he is deprived of natural felicity, and his natural
end, when all things, in nature, are in a different
situation. Surely, nature could not be blind, in her most
excellent work, and see so clearly in all her other works.
But you say that this fact never existed. I admit it, for
Adam fell out by the way; but it was to exist in the future.
You say that it did not exist "in possibility." This is an
error, for God designed it for Adam, on the condition of his
remaining in the right way. I prove this from the words of
God himself; "in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt
surely die." (Gen. ii, 17.) What is death? Is it not
privation? What is privation? Is it not of some natural
attribute or habit? Adam, then, was deprived of natural life,
and of that happy constitution of life, which he obtained in
Eden, otherwise he would have remained happy in it, if he had
continued in the discharge of duty, until God had fulfilled
in him the promise of supernatural life, which was adumbrated
to him by the tree of life in the garden of Eden. For, on the
contrary, it follows that, if he had not eaten the forbidden
fruit, he would not have become mortal, but, with life and
sight, he would have been prepared for translation to a
higher life.
You affirm that God "remunerates obedience by supernatural
happiness." He indeed remunerates obedience in that way, but
not in that way alone. Conjunctively, it is true;
exclusively, it is false. He remunerates obedience in both
ways. For even at the present time, when we are very far
removed from the natural condition of Adam, godliness has the
"promise of the life that now is and of that which is to
come." (1 Tim. iv, 8.) I judge that a two-fold idea, namely,
of the end and of the mode, has led you into error. You have
thought that the only end of man is that which is
supernatural. It is very true, that things subordinate are
not at variance. There is a natural end. As nature is
subordinate to God, so natural ends are subordinate to those
which are supernatural and divine. The end of our nature, so
far as it is natural, is this, that it should approach very
near to the Divine; so far as it is supernatural, it is that
man may be united to God. To the former, Adam could attain by
nature; to the latter, he could be exalted from the former,
by grace. You indeed judged that there could be no mode, in
which both kinds of happiness should concur. But two things
must be observed in this case, one, that natural happiness is
a previous preparation, the other that it is a foundation to
the supernatural. It is prepared for and previous to it.
Unless he had been already happy in nature, even it he had
remained without falling, he would not have attained the
other happiness, there must have been in him that natural
happiness by which he could approach the supernatural. But
when he should have in fact, entered into that supernatural
felicity, then natural happiness would be the foundation and
upon it the consummation would be in supernatural happiness.
If perfection is added to perfection, the less is not
destroyed, but the increase is made upon the less, as fire is
increased by fire, the vegetative faculty by the sentient,
and both by the rational. The less rests in the greater as in
its own principle, and is more fully perfected by it, as it
more fully ceases to be its own, and partakes of the
perfection of another. Thus it will be, in the resurrection
of the dead and in eternal life. The nature of man will be
both perfected and glorified above the mode of nature. It
will so obtain the perfection of nature, as to rest in that
divine and supernatural perfection; and nature will not be
abolished, but be clothed in a supernatural mode, as the
apostle says of the body, in 1 Corinthians 15. These things,
however, are merely incidental.
Your second argument may be stated thus: -- Sin is the
meritorious cause of that negative act; -- Man, in a merely
natural state, has no sin; -- There is not then, in him any
meritorious cause. By consequence God has not any cause of
that negative act. The whole prosyllogism is admitted, but
the inference is denied, because it is made from a particular
case. It would indeed be true if the negative act of the
Deity resulted only from a meritorious cause, but this
position is very far removed from the truth. The cause of
every negative act is either in God or in the creature. The
same is true of this act. But the cause of this act is not in
the creature. Therefore, it is in God. This prosyllogism will
be denied by none. In the will of God alone, exists the cause
that you are not an apostle, and that you may not live to the
age of Adam or Methuselah. Iniquity in man is the cause that
he is far from God, and that God is far from him; namely, in
that respect, of which Isaiah spoke. (Isa. lix, 2.) For, in
other respects, not only is iniquity a cause, but also the
will of God; who, if he would, might remove their iniquity as
a cloud, and bring man near to Himself: I prove that the
cause of this act is not in the creature, as was said before
in the 10th proposition; first, by the authority of Christ in
Matthew 25, and of Paul in Romans 8 & 9, and Ephesians 1;
secondly, by reason, since even that first sin did not take
place, except from the negative act of God, of which negative
act sin cannot be the cause, for the same thing cannot be
both cause and consequence of another thing. But election and
non-election were prior even to the first sin, as we have
before demonstrated. A positive and a negative act of God
also precede every act of the creature, whether good or bad.
For there is no evil act which has not been preceded also by
a negative act of the Deity, permitting the evil. Adam and
Eve sinned, certainly not without a negative act of God,
though there had been committed by them no previous sin,
deserving that negation. What, then, was the cause of that
negative act if it was not the free will of God? In
subsequent sins, however, it may be admitted that sin is,
indeed, the meritorious cause, and the free will of God is
also a cause; for He destroys even sins, when He wills. He
has that power, and if He does not destroy them, it is
because He does not will to do it. But those sins which He
destroys, can not, though a meritorious cause, produce the
negative act of God. You see then, my brother, that sin may
be indeed a meritorious cause of that negative act, but not
singly or alone or always; therefore, it is not the necessary
cause.
Thirdly, by the example of the Angels? What has restrained
the holy Angels from evil and confirmed them in good? The
positive act of God, that is, the manifestation of Himself in
election; for they are elect. What did not restrain the
fallen Angels from evil, into which they rushed of their own
will? The negative act of God, in non-election or preterition
which Augustine also calls reelection. It also belongs to
this act of election, that the former were confirmed in good
against evil, and to reprobation, that the latter were left,
who (as Christ says in John 8.) speak a lie of their own, and
commit sin. However, I wish that you would always remember,
in this case and in subsequent arguments, that it is not
suitable to substitute, for the proper and proximate end, a
remote consequence, or event (which is also called in its own
mode, an end), namely, supernatural happiness. That it is
appropriate and proximate to assert that sin is the
meritorious cause of that divine negative act, by which He
does not adopt certain men as children unto Himself by
Christ, the consectary of which adoption is happiness, is
denied, my brother, by nature herself. God begets sons unto
Himself according to His own will, not according to their
character, whether good as in the case of the elect angels,
or bad as in our own case. He looks upon all, in Christ, not
in themselves, that Christ "might be the first-born among
many brethren." (Rom. viii, 29.) In nature, children are
begotten by parents, without reference to their future
character, and may not God beget his adopted children,
without reference to their character? Nature claims the whole
for itself in those about to be begotten; may grace claim but
a very small part? God forbid.
Of the same nature is the position that "denial of happiness
to man cannot be considered otherwise than as punishment."
For in the first place, "denial of happiness" is not suitably
introduced into the discussion, the subject of which is the
denial of adoption, which, as we have said, is the
appropriate and proximate end of election. This, then, is
not, primarily and per se, the proposition. Again, if the
subject of discussion is adoption, the statement is not true;
for a denial of adoption is not properly punishment; it is,
indeed, previous to punishment, since it is even previous to
sin, but it is not, therefore, punishment. Who, indeed, can
affirm that the antecedent is the same with its consequent,
and that a most remote one? But if, as you think, the
statement is made in reference to happiness, it is not, even
in that case universally true; for a denial of happiness, on
account of sin, is considered as punishment of sin, but a
denial of happiness on account of a voluntary arrangement, or
of the will only, is not punishment. To Adam, in his
primitive state of holiness, God denied supernatural
happiness, until he should fulfill his appointed course. That
was not punishment to Adam. To a private individual it is not
a punishment that he is not an emperor. The denial of
happiness, is not punishment, then, of itself alone, but of
some accident, as a final consequence, (as they say), of the
sin of the creature.
The same consideration is fatal to your statement, that
"denial of happiness is necessarily preceded by the act of
sin." That is true, indeed, of the denial of final happiness,
as they style it; but we are now discussing the denial of the
principle of happiness, that is, of grace and gratuitous
adoption in Christ Jesus. Therefore, though it may be
conceded to you, that sin precedes, in fact, that denial, yet
this also should be added, that antecedent to sin is
particular reelection by God in the beginning and progress of
sin, but that the foundation of that particular reelection is
non-election, or preterition and reprobation, which we
acknowledge to be, not the cause, but the antecedent of sin.
So, likewise, your statement is not universally true, that
"the appointment of that act is preceded by the foresight of
future sin." For that foresight of future sin is both the
consequent, and the antecedent of that divine denial; since
the divine negative act, (as they call it), precedes the
commission of sin, but, as has been before shown, follows
that commission by imposing final unhappiness on the sins of
men. These answers may also be adapted, in the most complete
manner possible, to the arguments which follow.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWELFTH PROPOSITION
Definition and demonstration are distinguished by their
objects. The former, is used for explanation, the latter, for
proof: the former, for the discussion of a single question,
the latter, for that of a compound question. But in this
case, I did not undertake to explain, but to prove. I
therefore, thought I must make use, in my argument, of
definition so far as would tend to prove that which I had
undertaken to prove, which was the reason that I did not use
special effort to adapt my definition of election or
preterition to the rules of art. For if what I lay down is on
the whole kata< pantov true, even if it do not reach the
truth in all respects, kaq o[lou it will be sufficient for
me, for the proof which I have proposed to myself. Hence,
even with those substitutions, which you have considered
important, my proof remains valid, and therefore, that
correction does not seem to be necessary for our purpose.
Yet, I must say something concerning that matter. In general,
I remark, that you could see that I was treating distinctly
of that predestination which is unto glory, not of that which
is unto grace, and of that preterition, by which glory was
not prepared for some, not of that by which God determined
not to communicate grace. This is evident from my eighth
proposition. I must then abstain from matters which belong in
general to grace and glory. Among those general matters is
adoption as children, for the beginning and progress of
which, grace is prepared, and glory for its consummation.
Thus you also remark elsewhere in this answer.
I remark particularly, in reference to your corrections to
the first; -- in adoption and non-adoption consists the
essential difference of election at once to grace and to
glory, and of reprobation from both. Therefore, that the
former difference pertains not to election to glory alone,
and the latter, is not of reprobation from glory alone. For a
difference of genus can not be a difference of species.
Therefore, I ought not in this case to have mentioned
adoption unless I wished, in discussing a species, to set
forth the genus contrary to the law, referred to above kaq
o[lou.
To the second; -- I mentioned no end in my definition of
election, or rather in the part of the definition which I
presented. I did not, indeed, desire to present it in full.
For supernatural happiness or glory is not the end, but the
material or subject of election, which material, embraced in
your Theses in the term blessing, you divide into grace and
glory. I know, indeed, that supernatural happiness is not
communicated to us, except by an antecedent union of
ourselves with God, which is implied in these words from the
same proposition, "to deny supernatural happiness, and
resulting from the union with Himself, and from His
indwelling in man." But let us notice the definition of
preterition contained in your Theses. "Preterition is an act
of the divine pleasure by which God determined, from
eternity, to leave certain of His creatures in their own
natural state, and not to communicate to them supernatural
grace, by which their nature, if unfallen, might be
confirmed, and, if fallen, might be restored; for the
declaration of the freedom of His goodness." In the phrase
"to leave in their own natural state," is comprehended, also,
exclusion from supernatural happiness, or it is not. If not,
the definition is incomplete. I think, however, that you
designed to include, also, that idea, otherwise your Theses
are imperfect, as they treat of the predestination by which
grace and glory are prepared for the elect, but nowhere of
the negative act by which God does not appoint glory for the
non-elect, if not in those words. Yet, even in those words,
according to your idea, that preterition, by which God does
not determine to bestow glory on any one, can not be
included. For you define preterition (Thesis 14) to be
"contrary to the preparation of grace." But the preparation
of punishment is an affirmative act, by which He appoints
punishment for the sinner, opposed, not negatively, but
affirmatively to the preparation of glory. When, therefore, I
wished to describe preterition or non-election, so far as it
is an act by which God does not determine to bestow glory on
some persons, it seemed proper that I should, in some
measure, keep in your track, in that, you nowhere, in your
definition of preterition, mention exclusion from adoption
and union with God.
To the third; -- It is manifest that what is inserted, in
parenthesis, was added for the sake of explanation, and does
not come within the order or relation of the definition, like
the other statements. I do not, however see, that even those
statements are false or faulty, though they may be related,
in the mode which you consider them, to that definition. For
they mark, not an affirmation, but a negative act, and there
is emphasis in the word (tantum) which marks the negative. To
will the bestowment of natural happiness is an affirmative
act, but to will only that bestowment is a negative act, for
it excludes all other happiness, which He does not determine
to bestow. Also, what is that act by which God determines to
bestow only natural happiness, if not preterition or neglect.
If to leave in a natural state is a negative act, and
otherwise your definition of non-election, which considers it
as opposed negatively to predestination, is erroneous, I do
not see how those words "to bestow only supernatural
happiness," do not designate a negative act. If you explain
it so as to distinguish, in this case, the two acts, one,
that by which God determined to bestow natural happiness, the
other, that by which He determined to bestow only that, and
not some other kind of happiness, then I acknowledge that the
former, as an affirmative act, does not pertain to this
decree of preterition. But we have never discussed that kind
of happiness. It might, then, have been easily understood
that I used those words so as to note a negative act, that of
the non-bestowment of any happiness other than natural. When
I was writing those words, I thought of using the phrase "to
leave" in imitation of you, but judged that it would be
unsuitable as presupposing that the bestowment was already
made, and I considered that supernatural happiness was not
yet bestowed, but to be bestowed, if man should live in
obedience. In which I have also your assent, as is manifest
from your answer to my third proposition, at the end. The
definition, therefore, remains, and there is nothing in it to
be blamed, for which there can not be found apology in the
example of your Theses, which I have constantly had before my
eyes in this discussion. That this may be made more plain, I
will compare your definition with mine. You thus define the
preterition by which grace is denied: "Preterition is an act
of the divine pleasure, by which God, from eternity,
determined to leave some of His creatures in their natural
state, and not to communicate to them supernatural grace, by
which their nature, if unfallen, may be confirmed, and, if
fallen, may be restored, to the declaration of the freedom of
His own goodness." If I define the preterition by which glory
is denied, analogically according to the form of your
definition, it will be like this. "Preterition is an act of
the divine pleasure, by which God, from eternity, determined
to leave some of His creatures in their natural state and not
to communicate to them supernatural happiness, or glory, by
which their natural happiness may be absorbed, or into which
their ignominy may be changed, to the declaration of the
freedom of His own goodness." In this definition, I have
proposed that which was sufficient for my purpose; with no
evasion, since, the other adjuncts are neither to the
advantage, nor to the disadvantage of my argument. Therefore,
the Major of my syllogism is true, even if it would not be
true, as a complete definition and reciprocally. For a
conclusion can be proved from a Major, which is on the whole
kata< pantov true.
I come now to the Minor, which I proved by two arguments. The
first is not refuted by you, as it is proposed in a mutilated
condition, and so it is changed into something else. For I
did not deny that natural happiness was prepared for man, but
I added "which is, the design and end of man," in which
words, I meant not that it alone, but that it also was
prepared, but on this condition that it would be absorbed by
the supernatural happiness, which should follow. I wish that
the explanation, which I add, may be thus understood; namely,
that natural happiness, could, neither in fact nor in
possibility, occur to man, as the design of man and his end.
For God promised to man, on condition of obedience, not only
natural but also supernatural happiness. In which, since, I
have also your assent, I conclude my proposition thus. God
does not will to bestow upon any man, considered in his
original natural state, natural happiness alone, as the end
and design of man, to the exclusion of supernatural
happiness. Therefore, God passed by no one, considered in his
original natural state. For whether preterition is the act by
which God does not determine to bestow supernatural happiness
on any one, or that by which He determines to bestow natural
happiness, which I think that you concede, it is equally to
my purpose.
I prove the antecedent in this way. All men are considered in
Adam, on equal terms, whether in their original natural sate,
or in a state of sin, unless some difference is introduced by
the will of God. But I deny that any difference was made in
respect to man's original state, and you confirm the first
reason for that denial, when you say that both kinds of
happiness were prepared for man. Again, that, which God, by
His providence, has prepared for man, is not denied to him by
preterition, the opposite of election, unless from the
foresight that he would not attain to it, under the guidance
of providence, but would turn aside freely, and of his own
accord. But God prepared for the first man, and in him, for
all men, supernatural felicity, for He bestowed on him means
sufficient for its attainment; with the additional aid of
divine grace, (if this was also necessary in that state,)
which is not denied to any man unless he first forsakes God.
Your opinion that I have been led into an error, by a two
fold idea, namely, that of the end and the mode, and that I
thought that a single end only was before mankind, is
incorrect, for my words do not, of themselves, imply this. I
made a plain distinction between the subordinate ends, when I
mentioned natural felicity, which I denied was the end of man
and his ultimate. I, therefore, conceded that natural
happiness belongs to man, otherwise there would have been no
necessity of the addition of the statement that this does not
belong to him as the end of man, and his ultimate, that is,
as that, beyond which nothing further can happen to man. Does
not he, who admits that natural happiness pertains to man,
but not as the end of man and his ultimate, acknowledge a two
fold end of man, one subordinate, namely, natural happiness,
and the other final, which is the end and ultimate of man,
namely, supernatural happiness? I do not, however, think that
it can be said truly that happiness is the end and ultimate
of man. Your additional remarks, concerning the order of
natural and supernatural happiness, I approve, as truthful
and learned; but they are, as you admit, "merely incidental,"
and do not affect the substance of my argument.
My second argument is also valid, but it should be arranged
correctly, thus; -- An act of the divine pleasure by which
God determined to deny to any man spiritual or supernatural
blessedness, depends on a meritorious cause, which is sin;
Preterition is such an act; -- Therefore preterition depends
on sin as its meritorious cause. The reason for the Major is
contained in these words, "that denial of happiness can not
be considered otherwise than as punishment," but it is
necessarily preceded by sin, as its proper cause, according
to the mode of merit. From this it follows that God can not
have reference in that act to men, considered in a merely
natural state, without reference to sin.
I will briefly sustain the Major, and the reason assigned for
it, and then examine your answer. I prove the Major thus:
That which the Providence of God has prepared for man, under
a condition, is not denied to him, except on the non-
performance or the violation of the condition. But God, by
His Providence, prepared supernatural happiness for man, &c.
Again, the passage from Isaiah plainly shows that God would
not have deserted the Jews, if they had not merited it by
their "iniquities." The reason, assigned for the Major, I
sustain in this manner: Whatever is contrary to the blessing
of happiness, prepared, promised, and therefore conditionally
due to man, as made in the image of God, cannot be considered
otherwise than as punishment. A denial of supernatural
happiness is contrary to the blessing of happiness, prepared
for man, as such, for even supernatural happiness was
prepared for him as such. Therefore its denial is punishment.
Again, there is no passage of Scripture, I assert it
confidently, from which it can be shown that such denial is
or can be considered otherwise than in the relation of
punishment, than as it is prepared only for sinners. For we
have stated, with truth, that punitive justice has place only
in reference to sinners.
I proceed to examine your answer. In my syllogism the
inference is not "made from a particular case." For that
negative act of God, now under discussion, only exists in
view of a meritorious cause, that is, it does not exist
except in view of that cause, and that act of God would not
exist, if that cause did not exist. The particle "only" does
not amount to an exclusion of the will of God. For it is
certain that sin is not, in fact the cause of punishment,
except as the will of God, who wills to punish sin according
to its merit, otherwise he can remove sin, and remit its
punishment. How indeed could you suppose that he, who made
sin the meritorious cause of punishment, wished to exclude
the will of God, when the very nature of meritorious cause
requires another cause also, which may estimate merit, and
inflict punishment in proportion as it is merited. I
acknowledge that the cause of every negative act does not
exist in man, nor have I made that statement, for why should
I needlessly enter into the general discussion of this
matter. My subject is the act of preterition or non-election,
by which God denies supernatural happiness to man, and I
affirm that the cause of this is in and of man, so far, that
without the existence of this cause, that act would never be
performed. But you argue that the cause of this act does not
exist in man. First, by authority, then by reason, finally by
example. I deny that proof is contained in the passages,
cited as authority. Let it be shown in what sense, these are
the antecedents, from which this consequence may be deduced.
We have previously examined those passages, so far as the
necessity of the subject required.
Your argument from reason is not more conclusive. You say
that the "first sin did not take place, except from the
negative act of God," also "a positive and a negative act of
God also precede every act of the creature," and "there is no
evil act, which has not been preceded also by a negative act
of the Deity, permitting the evil. I concede all those
points, if rightly understood. But an affirmative statement,
reasoning from the general to the specific, is not valid,
unless a mark of universality is added. Many negative acts of
the Deity precede the act of sin; therefore, also the
negative act of preterition precedes sin. I deny the
sequence. The controversy concerns that very act. The first
sin results from a negative act of God, but not from the act
of preterition. A positive and a negative act precede every
act of the creature, but not the act of election and that of
preterition. You affirm that election and non-election are
prior to sin. To sin, as existing in fact, I admit, but not
to sin, as foreseen. That point, however, has been previously
discussed. But you affirm that the free will of God is the
cause also of this negative act. Who denies it? It is indeed
within the scope of God's free will, either to punish or to
remit sin, but neither is necessary, even though sin has been
committed, (that is, since God is "in Christ reconciling the
world unto Himself,") but neither is possible unless sin has
been committed. The will of God is, in the most complete
sense, free, as the cause of creation, the cause of
glorification, the cause of condemnation. But He creates
those non-existing; He glorifies those created and existing,
and, indeed, called and justified; He condemns only sinners,
and those, who die in their sins. There is, then, no
limitation placed on the freedom of God, even if we consider
sin as antecedent, and necessarily so, to that negative act
of God. You see, then, that sin is the meritorious, cause,
which necessarily precedes that negative act of God; and that
I have reasoned correctly from that cause, necessarily
antecedent, that God, in that negative act of preterition,
has reference only to sinners.
That the example of the angels, in this case, is not
analogous, I show in a word. You say that "the negative act
of God, in non-election or preterition, which Augustine also
calls reelection, did not restrain the fallen angels from
evil." But I affirm that the negative act of God, by which
man is not restrained from evil, but permitted to fall into
sin, is not the act of preterition, but a negative act of
providence, and I prove, by two arguments, that this is
distinguished from predestination. If it is by the negative
act of preterition, then all are passed by, for all have
sinned. Also, if it is the negative act of preterition, then
all men have sinned irretrievably, and without hope of pardon
and remission, as in the case of the angels who sinned. I add
a third consideration, that an act of election, opposed at
the same time to preterition, must have place here, in
respect to certain individuals; but there is not and can not
be such an act, in this case, since all men are comprehended
under that preterition. There is a great difference between
the negative act, by which God left man to his own counsel,
and the negative act of preterition, which is to be here
considered. Nor do I think that it is of much importance to
this subject that, for non-adoption, as the proper and
proximate end, I have substituted, the remote consequence,
the absence of supernatural happiness. For, in addition to
the fact that adoption, in your Theses already often cited,
occupies the place of form not of end, I affirm that, in the
negative act, by which He did not will adoption for any man,
God could not, or, at least, did not have reference to any
except sinners.
But you say that "God begets sons unto Himself according to
His own will." He does this, however, from among sinful men.
"He looks," you say, "upon all in Christ, not in themselves."
Therefore, I affirm, He considers them as sinners, not in
themselves, as having, in themselves, any reason that He
should regard them, but in themselves, as in need of being
considered in Christ as Mediator of such character. "May not
God," you ask, "beget His adopted children without reference
to their character?" I admit that He may, without such
reference to them as may influence God to beget them, not
without such reference to them, that, not generation, but
regeneration may be necessary to them. Grace claims for
itself the whole in generation, but more strongly claims the
whole in regeneration. But that God begets sons to Himself
from among men, the word generation being used in any other
sense than that of regeneration, I consider contrary both to
theology and to Scripture. The subject, however, of
discussion is adoption according to the decree of God.
Let us now consider the position, by which I strengthened my
argument. I said that the "denial of happiness to man can not
be considered otherwise than as punishment. I said "denial of
happiness" not "of adoption." For I am, here, discussing the
denial of glory, not of grace; but non-adoption, either alone
or also, pertains to the latter. I wish, however, that it
might be shown in what mode a denial of adoption to a man,
made in the image of God, has not the nature of punishment,
and is not caused by sin. You indeed affirm that it is
previous to punishment, since it is previous even to sin. I
deny both parts of the assertion. It belongs to him, who
makes an assertion, to prove it, but I, though denying the
assertion, will give the reason of my denial, to show the
strength of my cause. He, who is made in the image of God, as
Luke says of Adam, "which was the Son of God," (chap. iii,
38,) is, by the grace of creation, the son of God. But Adam
was, not begotten, but created, "the son of God," as said in
the marginal note of Beza's Testament. That, which any one
has by the gift of creation, is not taken from him, unless
the demerit of sin precedes, according to the justice of God.
Supernatural happiness, whether it is bestowed on condition
of obedience to law, or according to the condition of the
covenant of grace, is always to be considered in the relation
of an inheritance; but it was promised to Adam, on the
condition of obedience; therefore, Adam was then considered
as the Son of God. Filiation, then, could not be denied to
him except on account of sin and disobedience. But the
subject, of which I was treating, was denial of happiness.
You assert, that denial of happiness, considered in general,
is not punishment, since that, which exists on account of a
voluntary arrangement of God, is not punishment. I wish that
you would show that any denial of supernatural happiness is
according to voluntary arrangement of God, apart from the
consideration of sin. You remark, in proof of your assertion,
that "to Adam God denied supernatural happiness, until he
should fulfill his appointed course. That was not punishment
to Adam." I reply, the term, denial of supernatural happiness
is ambiguous; it may be either final or temporary. The former
is peremptory, the latter is conditional. That, of which we
treat, is final and peremptory. The decree of predestination
and preterition is peremptory, and that, which is prepared
for or denied to any one, according to that decree, he will
finally enjoy, or want. But you treat of temporary denial,
"until he should fulfill his appointed course," according to
the rule of divine justice, and of denial, on the
consideration that he should not live according to the
requirement of God, -- which denial belongs to the just
providence of God, in contra-distinction to predestination
and preterition. Indeed what you call a denial, can not be so
called except in catachrestic sense. For how shall he be said
to deny happiness to any one, who has promised it on a
certain condition? You concede, however, that sin is
antecedent to the denial of final happiness. But preterition
or non-election is a denial of final happiness. Therefore,
sin is antecedent to preterition. You say that it should be
stated in addition "that antecedent to sin is particular
abandonment by God, in the beginning and progress of sin, the
foundation of which abandonment is non-election, or
preterition and reprobation." I concede that abandonment by
God was antecedent to sin, so far that God left man in the
power of his own purposes; but it is not particular, but
universal, in respect to the beginning of sin, for in that
abandonment he left Adam, and, in him, all men; hence
preterition can not be the foundation of that abandonment.
For all mankind were left, in the beginning of sin. In
respect to its progress, it may be called particular, for He
freed some from sin and left others in sin; and non-election
or preterition may be called the foundation of this
abandonment, since some were left in the progress of sin,
others being freed from sin by the gratuitous election of
God, which is the direct opposite of preterition. Hence it
follows that it can not be rightly said that preterition or
non-election is the antecedent of sin, since it is only the
antecedent of the progress of that which has already been
perpetrated, and, indeed, its cause, by a denial of that
which prevents the progress of sin, namely, grace. I affirm
that it is universally true that the foresight of sin
precedes the appointment of that negative act by which he
does not determine to bestow felicity on an individual. For
the act of preterition does not precede commission of sin, as
has been already frequently shown. Sin, which is common to
all men, does not result from that negative act which
discriminates among men, but from a negative act common to
all men. Preterition is a negative act, not common to all
men, but discriminating among them. Therefore, preterition is
not an act antecedent to sin. So my arguments are confirmed
against your answers; they may, therefore, also be available
for the decision of the other questions.
THIRTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The second question, referring to the preparation of grace,
and its opposite, preterition, is not, whether God designed
to bestow saving grace only on some persons, and those
considered in certain relations, and did not design to bestow
it on others, for this is very manifest from the Scriptures,
in many passages. But the question is, whether God, in the
act of predestination and its opposite, preterition, had
reference to men, considered in a natural condition. I have
not been able to persuade myself, either from the writings of
Thomas Aquinas, or from those of the advocates of his views,
that this question is to be answered affirmatively. My
reasons for answering it negatively, are these: --
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE THIRTEENTH PROPOSITION
I have previously stated that divine election and non-
election have reference to men in general, and this is very
true. The phrase, "merely natural state," is ambiguous. The
question before us, then, is not, whether election has
reference only to men, considered in a natural condition, (as
you understand that phrase,) if one attends closely to the
subject. This is rather the question, whether it also has
reference to men, so considered. We answer this
affirmatively. Indeed, though it differs, in phraseology,
from the first theory, yet we think that, in fact, it is very
much in harmony with it, since this particular relation was
added neither by Thomas Aquinas, nor by others, that the
relations, previously noticed, might be excluded, but only
that, in this argument, a consideration of sin, as a cause,
might be excluded. Yet, let us examine your arguments as they
are presented.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE THIRTEENTH
PROPOSITION
That man, considered in general, is the object of the decree
of which we treat, has not yet been made clear to me from
your answers. Indeed I have proved from many arguments,
adduced, as opportunity has been offered, that a general
consideration of man has no place in that decree, and I shall
prove the same by other arguments, as there may be occasion.
Concerning the state of the question, as you propose it, I
will not contend with you. Let the question be as you state
it, whether God, in the decree of predestination and
reprobation, has reference also to men, considered in a
merely natural state. I maintain the negative. Not only does
the affirmative of this question please you, but, from your
Theses and other writings, you seem to me to incline to it so
strongly that you seem even to have proposed the affirmative
of the former theory. For if He, who predestinates and passes
by, did not consider man as a sinner, then He did consider
him as created among those things, on which He imposed
certain conditions, or as not created, or as to be created.
But let these remarks suffice. I have every where denied, and
still deny, that God, in the act of predestination and of
preterition, had reference also to men, considered in a
merely natural state; but I assert that He had reference only
to men, as considered in their sins. Concerning the
difference between the first and second theory, we have
already spoken.
FOURTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
First, because Adam and, in him, all men were created in a
state of supernatural grace, hence no one could be considered
in a merely natural state. The antecedent is proved, because
all were created in Adam after the image and likeness of God;
but that is supernatural grace, as has been said: secondly,
the law, which was given to Adam, was enacted for all, which
is evident from the fact that all sinned in Adam, and became
guilty of transgression. But that law could not be obeyed
without supernatural grace, which I prove from the subject of
the law, from the appendix of the law, from the instigator of
transaction, and from the mode of instigation. The law
required obedience towards God, that man should live, not
according to man, but according to God, which life is not
animal, but spiritual, and its cause in man is supernatural
grace. The appendix of the law consisted in the threatening
of temporal and spiritual death, that of the body and of the
soul. Punishment, which is spiritual and opposed, not only to
animal, but also to spiritual good, ought not to be annexed,
in equity, to a law which can be observed without
supernatural grace; especially when the same law, if
observed, could not afford supernatural or spiritual good,
since it can be observed without supernatural grace. It seems
unjust that the transgression of a law should deserve eternal
and spiritual death, but its observance could not obtain
eternal and spiritual life from God, on the terms of divine
goodness and justice. The instigator was Satan, whose design
was to cast down man, by transgression, to death, not only of
the body, but of the soul, and when man could only resist
through supernatural grace. The mode of temptation was such
that it could not be successfully resisted by man, if
destitute of supernatural grace.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FOURTEENTH PROPOSITION
Your antecedent, namely, "Adam and in him all men were
created in a state of supernatural grace," is ambiguous.
Again, it can not be proved, as we have shown, in answer to
the tenth proposition. The consequent is denied, and is also
ambiguous. Since I have previously discussed both of these
points, I come now to the arguments. The proof from the image
of God, was related in the same answer, and it was shown that
it was not supernatural of itself; but that it had relation
and adjustment to supernatural grace, not of nature or its
own essence, but by the arrangement of grace. This argument,
therefore, now, as before, is denied. The first position in
the second argument, is not to be admitted without some
distinction, for one law, given to Adam, was general; the
other particular. The general law, namely, that which is
natural and joined to the natural, was enacted for all. This
was by no means true of the particular law. The latter was
that he should not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and
evil. It is not credible that this law, which was one of
particular requisition should have been enacted for all; it
is not credible that, if all had remained unfallen, they
would have come into Eden to that tree, that their obedience
should be tested.
The Scripture, also, does not make this statement. We concede
the second position in reference to the universal law, not in
that the law was natural, but in that the nature of man
itself and the natural law, was adjusted to grace. The
natural, as such, was within the capability of man; as it was
related and adjusted to grace, it could not be observed
without supernatural grace. In reference to the special law,
the second position is erroneous. For the mere act of eating
or not eating of any fruit, is natural. The power to eat or
abstain from that fruit, was, in fact, possessed by man,
though these acts were not both left with him by the
requisition and arrangement of the special law declared by
God. Therefore the second point is, in this case, erroneous,
for it was possible for him not to choose, not to touch, not
to eat the fruit, as it was to do the contrary. This was of
natural power (which possessed full vigour) in a natural
subject. To establish this point, you adduce four arguments,
all pertaining to the mode of general law. I will briefly
examine each in order. The first argument pertains to general
law, both as it is natural and as it is adjusted to grace. We
concede, then, that the affirmative is true of general law,
but deny it as to the particular law, by which God required
obedience in a particular matter, and in one merely natural
or animal. It pertained to natural power to abstain from or
to eat that fruit; it pertained to natural will to avoid the
experiment of sin and death, of which God had forewarned
them. God tested the obedience of man in a matter merely
natural, and in the same thing he miserably renounced
obedience to God, of his own will, not by any necessity. He
had then no just ground of complaint that God should hold him
responsible, because, in a matter of no difficulty, and
according to nature, he did not willingly render due
obedience unto the Lord, but preferred, to His word, the word
of the serpent in the case of Eve, and that of his wife in
the case of Adam.
You will perhaps say that he would not have committed that
transgression, if grace had been bestowed upon him. Must you,
then, always require grace, and make it ground of accusation,
if it is not bestowed, even in a matter which is natural,
and, indeed, merely natural? God bestowed a natural
constitution on Adam, for this very reason, that in a matter
merely natural, he might use his natural powers. He gave that
which was sufficient. Do you demand more? I quote, on this
point, the words of Tertullian (lib. 2 advers. Marcion, cap.
7.) "If God bestowed upon man the freedom of the will and
power to act, and bestowed it suitably, He undoubtedly,
according to His authority as Creator, bestowed them to be
enjoyed, but to be enjoyed, so far as depended upon Himself;
in accordance with His own character, that is 'after God,'
that is according to goodness, (for who would grant any
permission against himself,); but so far as depended upon
man, according to the motions of his freedom. Who, indeed,
bestowing on a person any thing to be enjoyed, does not so
bestow it, that it may be enjoyed according to his mind and
will? It was, therefore, a consequence that God should not
interfere with the liberty once granted to man, that is, that
He should retain in Himself the action of His prescience and
prepotency, by which He could have intervened, so that man
should not fall into danger, in attempting to enjoy his own
freedom, in an evil mode. For had He thus intervened, He
would have rescinded the freedom of the will, which, in
reason and goodness, He had bestowed. Then let it be supposed
that he had intervened, that He had destroyed the freedom of
the will, by calling him back from the tree by not permitting
the tempting serpent to converse with the woman, would not
Marcion exclaim, O futile, unstable, unfaithful Lord,
rescinding that which He had established! Why did he bestow
the freedom of the will, if He must interfere with it? Why
did He interfere, if He bestowed it? Let Him then choose the
point in which He shall charge Himself with error, whether in
its bestowment, or in its rescission, &c."
Your statement, that "supernatural grace is the cause of
spiritual life in man," we believe to be most certainly true,
and we avow the same thing. Yet there was one mode of
spiritual life in Adam, and there is another mode in us, in
whom supernatural grace alone produces this life, while Adam
had, together with this grace, the image of God unimpaired
and uncorrupted, and therefore had spiritual life in both
modes, the natural and supernatural. But these things will be
introduced, appropriately, in another place.
Your second argument, from the appendix of the law, is
plainly in the same condition. This seems to be its scope. If
God, in the case of election and reprobation, had reference
to men considered in a merely natural state, (that is, with
the same ambiguity, and on the supposition which we have
denied above,) He would not have ordained spiritual
punishment, opposed not only to animal, but is spiritual
good, for transgression of a law, which might be observed
without supernatural grace; for it is in accordance with
equity (which point was also regarded in the law of the
twelve tables) that the punishment should be adapted to the
crime; -- But God ordained punishment of this kind; --
Therefore, He did not have reference to men, considered in a
natural condition. In reference to the antecedent of the
Major, I will say nothing; I have already spoken often on
that point. The consequent is denied. It would be true, if
both sins or evil deeds and their punishments were estimated
only from the deed (which the law forbids), and according to
its kind. But there are many other things, by which the
gravity of offenses is usually, and most justly estimated;
the author of the law, the author of the crime, its object,
end, and circumstances. We must consider the author of the
law, for the authority of a law, enacted by an emperor, is
greater than that of one, enacted by a tribune, of one
imposed by God, than of one imposed by man. The author of the
crime, whether he commands it, or personally commits it. For
a crime is greater which is committed through the persuasion
of an enemy, than one committed through that of a master or
father. The same distinction may be applied to the personal
commission of sin. The object, for an offense, against a
parent, is more heinous than against a stranger, against
one's self and family, than against a person not thus
connected, against God than against man. The end, for it is a
greater sin, if you transgress a law with an unimportant end
or no end in view, than if the same thing is done of
necessity, if with all unworthy and wicked design than if
with a worthy and good design.
What shall I say in reference to circumstances? What I have
already said is, in my judgment, sufficient. But he, who
transgresses the law of God, is guilty of these aggravating
particulars, of which even the first, alone, is sufficient
for the infliction, with the utmost justice, of spiritual
punishment. Should he regard lightly the legislator, God?
Adding the second, should he listen to an enemy, the enemy of
God, and of his race, and of the universe, Should he, the
recent workmanship of God, and the tenant of Paradise,
transgress the recent commandment of God, Adding the third
particular, should he rush forward against himself, his
family, and God, not ignorantly, but with due warning? Do not
these, my brother, seem to you to be cases of the greatest
aggravation? Are they not worthy of bodily and spiritual
punishment? As in general, so in special or particular law,
the same rule is to be observed. The law was particular, and
that in a natural requirement, which man could perform
naturally, as we have before said. Here perhaps, you will
say, that it is improper that supernatural punishment should
be imposed in reference to a natural offense. But consider
all those things which I have just said. Man transgressed the
law of God, from which he has just received the blessings of
nature and of grace, and to whom he owed all things as his
Supreme Ruler. He transgressed by the persuasion of the
Devil, the public and sworn enemy of God, of the universe,
and of the human race, to listen to whom, once only, is to
renounce God. At the time of his transgression, he was the
recent work of God, the heir of all natural and supernatural
good, the inhabitant of Paradise, the foster-child of heaven,
the lord of all things, servant of God alone. Man
transgressed, using violence against himself, and bringing
sin and death, and all evils upon himself and his posterity,
dishonouring God in himself, though forewarned by the God of
truth, and prescient, in his own mind, of coming evil. He
transgressed in a matter, most trivial, entirely unnecessary,
of the least importance, when he really abounded in the
blessings of the whole world, and this with a most unworthy
and plainly impious design, that he might be like God,
"knowing good and evil." How could he, who was not faithful
and obedient in a matter of the least importance, be faithful
in one of great importance, He transgressed in a beastly
manner, served his belly and appetite, blind to all things
belonging to heaven and earth, except the flame of lust,
wickedly placed before his eyes, deaf to all things except
the voice of the devil. Here, if we please to glance at other
circumstances, how many and how strong arguments exist for
most just though most severe damnation! Truly, was that, in
many respects, an infinite fall, which brought infinite ruin.
But should any one affirm, that it was an unworthy thing that
man should be condemned for so small a matter, let him
consider these two things; first, it was an unworthy thing
that man, in "so small a matter," should disobey the mandate
of his Supreme Ruler, of the author of nature, of grace, and
of his salvation; secondly, it is not a small matter, which
was ordained for the manifestation of due obedience in
natural things, and as a just method of the perception of
supernatural blessings. God willed that Adam should, by this
sign, manifest his religious and voluntary obedience in
natural things, and in this way suitably exert himself to
attain supernatural blessings. Does this seem a small matter,
when he acted contrary to the will of God, and to all natural
and supernatural blessings in a thing of so little
importance? But, to proceed; do you think, my brother, that
this punishment can be inflicted on man more justly, if
considered in his fallen state, than if considered in his
natural condition, This is the amount of your argument. I
have not indeed hesitated to affirm the contrary. I say that
the sin of Adam was more heinous, because he sinned when
unfallen, than if he had sinned, as a fallen being. Consider
the simple fact in the case of man. You will, I know, declare
that it was a more unworthy thing that man, in a state of
integrity, should become the slave of sin, than if, in a
sinful state, he should fall into sin. It is, therefore, more
just that Adam, at the time of that transgression, should be
considered as unfallen, than in reference to the fall which
afterwards supervened. This illustrates the truth of the
righteousness of God. As to your statement, "it seems unjust
that the transgression could deserve eternal and spiritual
death, &c." I wonder, indeed, that it could have been made by
you. For you are not ignorant that the law of God, whether
general or particular, is the appointment of the present
course according to which we both worship God in the
discharge of duty, and reach the goal of supernatural grace.
As a traveler, to whom his Lord has prescribed the mode of
his journey, if he departs from the prescribed path, by the
same act renounces both his journey and its goal, by his own
sin, but if he remains in the path, he performs his duty,
thus I judge that it was necessary that Adam should be
treated. The unhappy traveler left the right path. Did he
not, therefore, also renounce the good which God had
graciously set before him? If he had remained in the path he
certainly would have attained the goal, of grace, not of
merit. How, not of merit? Because, by not keeping the path,
the servant loses both his way and his life, as the proper
cause of his own evil, but by keeping the way, he obtains
life, as the result of his journey. Life is proposed, of
grace, not of merit, both to the obedient and to the
disobedient, as the result of pursuing the right path. In
this way the obedient obtains grace, and the disobedient is
the cause to himself that he does not obtain grace, and, by
his own act, forfeit the life, which depends on that grace.
The third argument, from the instigator of the transgression,
and the fourth, from the mode of temptation, are disposed of
in the same answer. The third argument is this; "man could
resist the Devil only through supernatural grace; therefore
the law could not be observed without supernatural grace" --
and the fourth; "the mode of temptation was such that it
could not be successfully resisted by man, if destitute of
supernatural grace; therefore, the law could not be observed
without supernatural grace."
In the first place, though I should admit both arguments, in
reference to general law according to our previous
distinction, yet we might, with propriety, deny their
validity in reference to that particular law, which enjoined
a natural act, situated properly and absolutely within the
capability of nature, for it is as truly natural not to eat
that which is bad in its nature or effect, as it is to eat
that which is good. It was then within the capability of man
not to sin, for the refusal or neglect to eat was in the
capability of man, of his own natural power.
In the second place, we must make a distinction in reference
to both those arguments, even when referred to the general
law of God, concerning that which is called supernatural
grace. For, as in nature, the work of Providence is
threefold, to sustain a thing as to its existence, to govern
it as to its action, and to protect or preserve it as it may
be liable to destruction, so also in the pious, the work of
grace is threefold, for it is accustomed to sustain, and to
govern, and to protect them. It always sustains, because
inherent and common grace is permanent, but it rules and
protects, or preserves when and as it chooses; for this act,
as it is assisting and not inherent, is particular, and the
free act of variable grace. This distinction having been
stated, we thus judge concerning these arguments. Man was
never without supernatural grace, either inherent or
habitual: he was not without assisting grace, except in that
particular act, in which God did not govern, did not
preserve, because it was an act of nature, which must be
tested in its own mode, which has been allotted to it by the
infinite wisdom of God. For, as Tertullian says -- God
retired, from the administration not of all grace, but of
supernatural grace from the time when he said to man, "Of
every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat. But of the
tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat of it,"
(Gen. ii, 16 and 17,) and committed the whole matter, of
compact and solely, to the nature of man." Indeed he wholly
transferred to the will of man, according to the law of his
nature, the power to render or not to render obedience in all
matters pertaining to nature. But "he could not resist the
devil, and the mode of the temptation was irresistible." This
is denied; for if he could, according to his nature, refrain
from eating of the forbidden fruit, he could, in this, resist
the devil, and the mode of the temptation was not
irresistible. He could refrain from eating, because that was,
in the simplest sense, natural, and, by compact, as we have
just said, was placed in the power of man. But he did not
refrain from eating, certainly, because he did not wish to do
so, but he willingly consented to the temptation, concerning
which point, we have already under Prop. 9 noticed the
opinion of Augustine.
In the observance of general law, the case is different,
cause, as we have before said, the law operates on nature and
adjusts nature to the supernatural, and it could not be
observed, nor indeed could the devil be resisted, without
supernatural grace.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FOURTEENTH
PROPOSITION
My object, in the arguments which I now present, is to prove
that Adam, and in him, all the human race, were created in a
state of supernatural grace, that is, that in their original
condition they had, not only natural attributes, but also
supernatural grace, either by the act of creation or
superinfusion. From which I conclude, that God, in the act of
predestination, and preterition or reprobation, could
consider no one in a merely natural state. My first argument
is taken from the nature of the divine image, to which or in
which man was created. Another argument is deduced from the
law, which was imposed on Adam, and on all men in him, which
I assert, was not to be observed without supernatural grace.
The former argument was discussed in my reply to the answer
to the tenth Proposition, and I refer to what was then
stated.
We will now consider the latter, and, in the first place, its
Major, which supposes that the law, given to Adam, was
enacted for all men, with the addition, as proof, of the fact
that all men have sinned in Adam, and become partakers of his
transgression. You discuss this Major Proposition, without
reference to the proof. I notice the mode in which you assail
the former, and what force is possessed by the latter for its
confirmation. You make a distinction in the law, imposed on
Adam, and regard it as having a two-fold relation, first, as
common and natural; second, as particular. You say that the
former was enacted for all men, the latter, not for all men.
I agree with what you say concerning common or general law,
and shall hereafter make use of it to confirm my own
proposition. I do not, in all respects, assent to what you
say concerning particular law. The law, concerning the
forbidden tree, had, in part, a particular reference, and in
part, a general one. For it is symbolical, and consists,
therefore, of two parts, the symbol and that signified by it.
The symbol was abstinence from the forbidden tree; the thing
signified was abstinence from disobedience and evil, and the
trial of obedience. So far as abstinence from disobedience
and evil was prescribed by that law, it was a general law.
But as the law required an observance of a symbolical
character, it must be considered in a two fold light, either
as prescribing symbolical observance in general, or the
observance of that particular symbol. So far as the law
should prescribe the observance of any symbol, in general, to
test the obedience of man, it would, to that extent, be
general. For God would have determined to test the obedience
of all men by some symbol, either this one or some other, if
it had been their lot to be born in a state of integrity. I
prove this first from the fact that He purposed that the
condition of all men should be the same with that of Adam, if
they should be born in the state in which Adam was created,
in respect to the image of God. Secondly, it was most
suitable that the experiment of obedience should be made in a
matter which was indifferent; but a law, which commands or
forbids any thing indifferent is symbolical and ceremonial.
But, so far as the observance, prescribed by the law, had
reference to that particular symbol, namely, abstinence from
the fruit of the forbidden tree, it can, in one sense, be
called general, and in another, it may be particular. It was
general as prescribed to Adam and Eve, the parents and social
head of the human race, in whom, as in its origin and root,
was then contained the whole human race. It was particular,
as prescribed to the same persons as individuals, and as it,
perhaps, would not have been imposed on other human beings,
if they had, at that time, been born, and considered in
themselves, and not in their first parents. I say perhaps;
for you know that there are those who think, that if the
first human beings had maintained their integrity, that their
descendants would have been born and would have dwelt in
Paradise, and this idea has some probability. For if that
earthly paradise was a symbol of the heavenly kingdom, as
seems probable from the fact that the third heaven, the
residence of the blessed, is called, in the Scripture,
paradise, it is most probable that no one of the human race
would have been excluded from that paradise on earth, if he
had not first rendered himself worthy of the heavenly
paradise. This point may, however, be left without decision.
That the law (to come to the argument of my Major) which Adam
transgressed, was enacted for all men, I proved by an
irrefragable argument, which you passed by. "Sin is the
transgression of the law." (1 John iii, 4.) The law can not
be transgressed by him for whom it was not enacted. Hence
that law, which Adam transgressed, was enacted for all who
are said to have sinned in him. But that law was the same
which is called particular by you. More briefly; the law,
which all men transgressed in Adam was enacted for all men.
But all men transgressed, in Adam, the law concerning the
forbidden tree. For against no other law is Adam said to have
sinned, and, indeed, we are all said to be guilty of the sin
committed against that law. Therefore that law was enacted
for all men. In whatever respect, then, it is considered, it
is equally in my favour, and is equally adapted to sustain my
sentiment.
I come now to the Minor. "But that law could not be obeyed
without supernatural grace." You grant this in reference to
the general law, you deny it concerning that in which the
eating of the fruit of that tree was forbidden. I may assent
to your position for the sake of the argument, and from that
position sustain my proposition. A law which can not be
observed without supernatural grace, should be imposed only
on those to whom supernatural grace has been given by God; --
But that general law could not be observed without
supernatural grace; -- Therefore, it should be imposed only
on those to whom supernatural grace was given by God. It was
imposed on Adam, and, in him, upon all men. Therefore, Adam,
and, in him, all men, had supernatural grace. Therefore, they
could not be considered in their natural condition by God in
the act of predestination and reprobation. This might suffice
for my purpose. I affirm, however, that even the particular
law concerning the forbidden tree could not be obeyed without
supernatural grace, not indeed so far as the external act of
abstinence from the fruit of that tree was prescribed, but
as, under that symbol, obedience was commanded, and it was
enjoined on man to live not according to man, but according
to God. This you acknowledge when you say that "these acts"
(eating and abstaining), "were not both left with him by the
requisition and arrangement of the special law declared by
God, though the power to eat is to abstain from that fruit
was in fact absolutely possessed by man. That law, however,
was to be observed, not according to fact only, but according
to the arrangement of that particular law. You say that my
argument "pertains to the mode of general law." Let that be
admitted, and still sustain my proposition, as I have before
demonstrated, and I have also shown that, in the law which
you call particular, there is something of the nature of
general law. Those arguments are, therefore, in this respect
valid. The first also is sustained, as is apparent from our
previous statements. For as the law required obedience which
should consist, not only in the external deed, but in the
external disposition of the mind, for that reason it could
not be obeyed without supernatural grace.
My second argument does not seem to have been understood by
you in accordance with my meaning. The design of the argument
was -- and in this consists its force -- that spiritual
punishment could not be inflicted for the transgression of
that law, to the observance of which spiritual good was not
promised. But spiritual good was not promised to the
observance of this law, if, indeed, it could be observed
without supernatural grace. For supernatural grace and
supernatural happiness are analogous. Hence it follows, that
if spiritual punishment was the penalty of the transgression
of that law, then, also spiritual good was promised to the
observance of the same, and, therefore, it could be observed
only by supernatural grace; otherwise nature could, by its
own fact, obtain supernatural good. Here we must consider a
three-fold distinction in the transgression and observance of
law. First, a single transgression of law deserves
punishment, but reward pertains only to those who observe the
law even to the end; secondly, the violation of one precept
deserves punishment, but reward is bestowed only on those who
have kept all its precepts; thirdly, the violation of a
precept may be estimated from the omission either of an
external act or of an internal feeling, or of both at once,
also, from the intention, so that he, who fails in one of
these points, may be considered a transgressor, but
observance is judged of from all these united, nor can it be
regarded as perfect if it is not complete in all these
points. I acknowledge that what you say concerning the
heinousness of the sin perpetrated by our first parents is
very true, nor do I think that its heinousness can be
declared in words. But how do you infer that my argument is
designed to set forth that punishment would be inflicted more
justly, on a man, if he should violate the law, when he was
corrupt and sinful by nature, than if he should do the same
thing, when he was pure by nature, These states of human
nature were placed in opposition by me, but I contrasted man
in a natural condition with one endued with supernatural
grace. Punishment is inflicted with greater justice on the
latter than on the former; indeed it would be inflicted
unjustly on the former, if the law could not be observed
without supernatural grace; and if the observance of the law
had not the promise of spiritual good, spiritual punishment
is inflicted unjustly on the transgression of that law.
I will not now speak of my last two arguments and your
answers to them, both because so much has been said on the
preceding points, and because you concede to me that man was
not without habitual, supernatural grace. I conclude then
that man could not be considered in a merely natural
condition by God in the act of predestination, since he was
not in that state. In this, then, we agree. But you say,
"these arguments have no weight against the opinion which
considers man in general." I answer, that these arguments
prove that man could not have been considered in general, for
he could not have been considered in a merely natural
condition. But in the state of supernatural grace, he was not
considered as reprobate or passed by. For, in reprobation or
preterition, man is left in the state of nature, which can
have nothing supernatural or divine, as is stated in your
Theses. Also, that state of supernatural grace has its
measure and proportion to supernatural felicity according to
the providence of God. Moreover as to those, on whom God
wills to bestow supernatural happiness, by the affirmative
act of His providence, on them he cannot, by the negative act
of preterition, will not to bestow the same happiness, unless
he has considered them as failing to attain, by those
supernatural means, to that happiness, but as either about to
sin, or as having already in fact transgressed, of their own
free will. Otherwise there would be two contrary acts of God
in reference to one subject, considered in the same relation,
and performed at the same time.
FIFTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Secondly, because the grace of predestination, or that
prepared for man in predestination, is Evangelical, not
Legal; but that grace was prepared only for man considered as
a sinner. That it is Evangelical is clear, because the decree
of predestination is peremptory. It has reference, then, not
to Legal grace, of which a man may not make use, as in the
case of transgression of law, and yet be saved, but to
Evangelical grace, by which he must be saved, or excluded
from salvation.
Again, the grace, prepared in predestination, is that of the
remission of sins, and of regeneration, that is, of the
turning of sin and to God, by the mortification of the old,
and the vivification of the new man.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FIFTEENTH PROPOSITION
I accede to your first statement, if it be correctly
understood, but some explanation may be necessary concerning
the second. In the assumption which you make, there should be
a distinction, for it is false, if referred to Evangelical
grace, understood with a general reference to nature; if that
grace be understood with reference to ourselves, it is very
true. But, as you know, it is fallacious to argue from the
concrete to the abstract. I will explain the subject in a few
words. In supernatural Evangelical grace there are two parts,
one to preserve those who are now in a state of grace; the
other to gain those who are not in that state. The order of
this grace, considered according to nature, is one thing;
considered according to ourselves it is another. The order of
nature is that they, who are in a state of grace, should be
preserved (as in the election and predestination of angels),
and afterwards that they, who are not in that state, should
be brought into it, as is done for men. Considered according
to ourselves, who have fallen from grace, the order is
different. It is necessary that they, who have fallen, should
first be raised up, as Christ does in the gospel, and then be
kept, as He will do for us eternally, in heaven, when we
shall be like the angels. Your second statement, then, is
false in the abstract, if you say that Evangelical grace, in
general, is not prepared for man, except as he is considered
sinful, for it was prepared for man in the abstract and in
common, as God also testified to man, in the symbol of the
tree of life, placed in Eden. But if you speak of Evangelical
grace, in the latter sense, that is considered in this mode
and order, then indeed I accede to your statement. But then
the conclusion will not be valid, as we have just said. For
the Evangelical grace of God is one in its substance, but
two-fold in its mode and order, which mode and order does not
change the substance of the thing. Hence it was not at all to
the purpose that your first statement might be sustained,
which we also, if it is rightly understood, strongly affirm.
Your statement that "a man may not make use of Legal grace
and yet be saved," is a doubtful one, unless it be fully
explained, and as I know that you understand it; but this
does not relate to the question. Finally, Evangelical grace,
by your limitation to the remission of sins, regeneration,
&c., is, as you also, my brother, perceive from what we have
now said, rendered incomplete, because you pass over
preservation, which is one essential part of it. In other
respects we accede to your proposition.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE FIFTEENTH PROPOSITION
My argument may be stated thus: -- Evangelical grace is
prepared only for man, considered as a sinner; -- But the
grace of predestination, or that prepared for man in
predestination, is Evangelical; -- Therefore, the grace of
predestination is prepared only for man, considered as a
sinner. This is a syllogism in form, mode, and its three
terms. Hence it includes nothing else and nothing more than
is in the premises. Though Evangelical grace, considered in
general, might have two parts, yet I have restricted the
Evangelical grace, which was prepared for man. But grace,
considered in the abstract, was not prepared for man, but
only one part of it; that is, the acquisition of those who
are not in a state of grace, not the preservation of those
who are in a state of grace, for no one of men has been kept
in that state of grace, which he obtained at his creation,
all have fallen. There is, therefore, in this case no fallacy
from the concrete to the abstract. I use the term Evangelical
grace in my first and second statements in entirely the same
manner; not in one case "according to nature" and, in the
other, "according to ourselves" or vice versa, but in both
cases "according to ourselves," namely, as that which was
prepared, for men, not angels. Therefore, by your own
acknowledgment, both my statements are true. You say that "it
is false, in the abstract, that Evangelical grace is not
prepared for man, except as he is considered as sinful, for
it was prepared for man in the abstract and in common, as God
also testified to man in the symbol of the tree of life
placed in Eden." I reply -- there is an equivocation in the
word "prepared," and when that is removed, the truth of my
view will be manifest. The preparation of grace is either
that of predestination or of providence, as used in contra-
distinction to the former. In providence, sufficient grace is
prepared, and if it is efficacious, as some think, it is not
finally efficacious. In predestination, grace, which is
efficacious, and indeed finally efficacious, is prepared.
Predestination superadds to providence, as the School-men
say, fire certainty of the event. In providence is prepared
that general grace, which pertains promiscuously to all men;
in predestination is prepared that particular grace, which is
peculiar to the elect. In providence is prepared both Legal
and Evangelical grace; in predestination only Evangelical
grace. In providence is prepared grace communicable both in
and out of paradise; in predestination is prepared grace,
communicable only out of paradise. It is true that God
symbolized, by the tree of life, general not particular
grace, Legal not Evangelical grace, grace communicable in
paradise, and, finally, sufficient, not efficacious, grace.
Therefore, the grace, which God symbolized by the tree of
life, is that of providence, not of predestination. But
Evangelical grace, which is finally efficacious, particular
not general, only communicable out of paradise, and which is
prepared for man in predestination, is no other than that
which is adapted only to man considered as a sinner. I refer,
then, in my first and second statement, to Evangelical grace,
in this mode and order. Therefore, my conclusion is valid.
And, though grace is the same, in substance, and varies only
in its mode and relation, yet that variation of mode, is a
reason that grace, constituted in that mode and order, can
certainly be prepared only for the sinner. The whole matter
will be more manifestly evident, if I conclude by the
addition of proofs of the Minor of the preceding syllogism.
Evangelical grace, by which man is in fact saved, which
consists in the remission of sins and in regeneration,
belongs only to man considered as a sinner; -- But the grace,
prepared in predestination for man, is Evangelical grace, by
which man is in fact saved, consisting in remission of sins
and in regeneration; -- Therefore, the grace, prepared for
man in predestination, does not belong to man except as he is
considered as a sinner. Consequently man was not considered
by God, in the act of predestination, in his natural
condition.
If any one should argue thus, "Evangelical grace was prepared
for man in the abstract and in common; -- But the grace,
prepared for man in predestination, is Evangelical grace;
Therefore, grace was prepared in predestination for man,
considered in the abstract and in common," he will, on more
than one account, be chargeable with fallacy. In the first
place, the Major, considered in the abstract, is false. For
that grace, which preserves its subjects in their primitive
state, which you call, also, Evangelical in respect to the
angels, was not prepared for man. Again, there are four terms
in the syllogism. For, in the Major, Evangelical grace is
spoken of in the abstract; in the Minor, it is spoken of in
the concrete. If it be said that it is understood in the
Minor in the same manner as in the Major, then the Minor,
also, is false. For the grace prepared for man in
predestination is Evangelical grace, in the concrete, and
understood in respect to us. I use your phraseology. But what
if I should deny that the grace which is bestowed on angels,
in election and predestination can be called Evangelical, and
should ask for the proof of your statement? This I could do
with propriety and justice. For it is certain, especially as
the gospel is explained to us in the Holy Scriptures, that
the grace bestowed on angels can not be called Evangelical.
The sum of the gospel is this, "Repent and believe the
gospel" or "believe in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and your
sins shall be remitted unto you, and ye shall receive the
gift of the Holy Ghost, and afterwards, eternal life." These
expressions are by no means adapted to the elect angels.
If you say that it is not Evangelical in the mode in which
the gospel is adapted to sinful men, yet, it can be called
Evangelical as, according to it, they are preserved in their
own state, you will permit me to ask the proof of that
statement. In the weakness of my capacity, I can conceive of
no other reason for that sentiment than that Christ is also
called the Mediator of angels, and that they are said to be
elect in him. You know, however, that this is in controversy
among the learned, and we have already presented some
thoughts concerning it. But, even with the concession that
Christ can be called the Mediator of angels, I can not
persuade myself that the grace, which was bestowed on the
angels, was prepared or obtained for them by any merit of
Christ, or any work which he performed, in their behalf,
before God. Grace, which Christ did not obtain, can not, in
my opinion, be called Evangelical. Again, I think that, in
general, there is a two-fold mode and way of obtaining
supernatural and eternal happiness. One of strict justice and
Legal, the other of mercy and Evangelical, as there is, also,
a two-fold covenant with God, of works and of faith, of
justice and of grace, Legal and Evangelical. In the former
mode and relation, happiness is obtained by perfect obedience
to the law, given to the creature by God; in the latter,
happiness is obtained by remission of disobedience and the
imputation of righteousness. The human mind can not conceive
any other mode; at least, no other is revealed in the
Scriptures. These two modes have, to each other, this
relation, that the former precedes, as is required by the
justice of God, by the condition presented to the creature,
and by the very nature of the case; the other follows, if, in
the former way, happiness can not be allotted to the
creature, and it seems good to the Deity, also, to propose
the latter, which depends on the mere will of God. For He can
punish or pardon disobedience. Both modes are used in
reference to man, as the Scriptures declare in many places,
and briefly in Rom. viii, 3.
"For what the Law could not do, in that it was weak through
the flesh, God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful
flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh."
I think that the former mode only was used in reference to
the angels, and that God determined to treat the angels
according to the Legal covenant strictly of justice and
works; but to display all His goodness in the salvation of
men. This is apparent from the fact that the angels, who
fell, sinned irremediably and without hope of pardon, and the
other angels did not obtain pardon for sins, for they had not
committed them, but were preserved and confirmed in their own
state, through the grace, it may be, which they received
through the mediation of Christ, and which he communicated to
them, not, in a correct sense, by that which Christ either
merited or obtained for them by any work performed in their
behalf, before God. These things, however, are irrelevant.
In my statement that it is possible for man not to use Legal
grace, and yet be saved, I intended to convey the same idea
which you also have expressed, that God can, if he will, move
iniquity "as a cloud;" and I think that the apostle says the
same in Romans iv, 5. "To him that worketh not," (that is,
who does not fulfill the law, and therefore, does not use
Legal grace,) "but believeth on Him that justifieth the
ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness."
In limiting Evangelical grace to the remission of sins and
regeneration, I committed no fault. For I explained it, not
in the abstract, (if it is ever so used), but in the
concrete. But, thus explained, it excludes that part which
you call "the grace of preservation" (unless that phrase is
applied to perseverance in a state of restoration). We were
not saved, in the primitive state, by that grace, for it was
not prepared for in that state, by predestination. For we all
fell and sinned. Here, again, there is need of the admonition
that we are not now treating of angels, therefore those
things which may be common to angels and men, are here,
according to the law of general and specific relations kaq
o[lou, to be so restricted as to apply only to men,
otherwise, in discussing the species, we shall treat of the
genus.
SIXTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Thirdly, because the reelection of a creature, in his natural
state, of a creature, on whom is imposed a law only to be
performed by grace, is a cause of sin by the removal or the
non-bestowment of that which alone can restrain from sin.
This is grace. According to which view this sentiment is
equivalent to the former, which ascribes the ordination of
sin to a decree, from which sin necessarily exists.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SIXTEENTH PROPOSITION
The proposition can not be predicated of man in his primitive
integrity, for the law, to Adam in his integrity, was not
only his glory, but it was to be performed both by nature and
grace, since his nature was rightly adjusted to grace, but he
fell in a matter pertaining to nature, and capable of
performance by nature, which did not belong to general law,
which is here the subject of discussion, but to that
particular law, which had reference only to nature, and
absolutely pertained to it, and was to be observed by its
power alone, as was declared to Adam by God, as shown in the
answer to the fourteenth proposition. In reference to
ourselves, however, as we now are, it can be stated, with the
utmost propriety, that the law can be observed only by grace.
Indeed, it can not be observed at all by us, but its
observance is imputed of grace and is apprehended by faith in
Christ. The statement, also, is erroneous that "the
reelection of a creature, in his natural state, is a cause of
sin by the removal or non-bestowment of restraining grace,"
if it is understood in a universal sense. It is a partial
cause of sin, when removed or not bestowed, if there was
obligation to bestow it, but if there was no such obligation,
it can not, with propriety, be called a partial cause of sin.
If there was obligation to bestow it, there is
responsibility, it there was no such obligation, there is no
responsibility for the sin, even if that grace should be
wanting. This is taught by nature itself, and it is very
fitly illustrated by Clemens Alexandrinus, in two places.
But, in the law, there was something natural, which Adam
could perform by nature, and something adjusted to grace, for
which he could not, by nature alone, be sufficient.
Therefore, though Adam sinned against natural law, if he did
sin in a matter pertaining to nature, (in which grace was not
due), his own will alone was in fault, not destitution of
grace, as evidently happened to him in the particular law,
given to him in Adam. The conclusion, then, is unsound.
Of the ordination of sin, and the decree of God, and what is
signified by ordination, properly understood, we have spoken,
in answer to the sixth proposition. Your argument, that sin,
therefore, necessarily exists, is inconclusive; since the
Divine ordination would perform nothing unobligatory upon it,
but that is done by him who commits sin; and it omits nothing
obligatory upon it, but must perform and most wisely perfect
all thing. But there has been, in the answer to the sixth
proposition, a sufficient discussion of this whole subject.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SIXTEENTH
PROPOSITION
When I speak of grace, I do not exclude nature, for the
former presupposes the latter. The phrase "only to be
performed by grace" is equivalent to this, "not to be
performed without grace," the word "only" referring, not to
the exclusion of nature, but to the necessary inclusion of
grace. But these antecedents being supposed -- a law was
given to man, which he could not perform without grace -- and
-- grace was not bestowed -- the conclusion follows that the
cause of sin was not man, but he, who imposed such a law and
did not give the means of its observance, or, to speak more
correctly, a transgression of a law cannot be called sin,
when the law is unjust, as that of God, reaping where He has
not sown, which is far from a good and a just God, and its
transgression is necessary, not voluntary, on account of an
inability not to transgress. It is, then, in all respects,
true, that he, who does not bestow that without which sin can
not be avoided, or removes that without which the law can not
be observed, is truly the author of sin, or rather the cause
that the law is not observed, which non-observance, can not
have the relation of sin. The condition, "if there was
obligation to bestow restraining grace," is added, in this
case, in vain. For God is, necessarily, under obligation to
bestow on man the power to keep that law, which He imposes on
him, unless, indeed, man has deprived himself of that power,
by his own fault, in which case, God is not under obligation
to restore it. That, however, was not the case in the
primitive state of man, before his sin. In this sense, I
grant that he, who is not under obligation to bestow the
power, to observe the law and to avoid sin, is not the author
of sin, if he does not bestow it; but this statement should
be added, that God is under obligation to give that power, if
He gave the law, the observance of which necessarily implies
the power. God does not, indeed, owe any thing to any person,
in an absolute sense, for no one has given that to Him which
should be repaid, but God can, by His own act, place Himself
under obligation to man, either by promise, or by requiring
an act of him. By promise, if He has made it absolutely or on
a condition, then He is a debtor, absolutely or
conditionally; "God is not unrighteous to forget your work."
(Heb. vii, 10.) By requiring an act, He is placed under
obligation to bestow the power necessary for the performance
of the act. If He does not bestow it, and yet, by an
enactment of a law, requires the performance of the act, then
He, not man, is the cause of the transgression of that law.
In reference to those antecedents, whether a law was imposed
on man, to be observed without grace, or not, and whether man
received, in his primitive state, supernatural grace, there
has been sufficient discussion under propositions tenth and
fourteenth. Nor is it to the purpose to say that "if he
sinned in a matter pertaining to nature, (in which grace was
not due,) his own will alone was in fault, not destitution of
grace"; who denies that statement, if that law could be
observed by the powers of nature? But I deny that such was
the case in that particular law given to Adam, and the
reasons for this denial have been already given in my review
of your answer to the fourteenth proposition. We have also
remarked, at sufficient length, in the sixth proposition,
concerning the ordination of sin, and how it is made,
according to the view of Calvin and Beza, the basis of the
divine decree. I grant that the ordination of God does
nothing unduly, but as an ordination of sin, such as they
attribute to the Deity, is not in harmony with the character
of God, it is not wonderful that, from it, something undue
should he attributed to God.
SEVENTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
In reference to the third question, it is not in controversy
whether God, foreseeing the sins of some, prepared for their
deserved punishment, but whether, foreseeing the sins of
those thus passed by and left in their natural state, He
prepared punishment for them from eternity. The latter does
not seem to me to be true.
REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE SEVENTEENTH PROPOSITION
They, for whose sins God prepared merited punishment, are not
the elect: therefore they are passed by and reprobate. It has
been before demonstrated that they were passed by, in a mode
in harmony with the wisdom of God.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SEVENTEENTH
PROPOSITION
It is not true, universally, that "they, for whose sins God
prepared merited punishment, are not the elect," for He
prepared merited punishment even for the sins of the elect,
both by laying them upon Christ, that he might expiate them,
and by sometimes inflicting the consequences of sin even on
the elect, that they may learn how they have deserved to be
treated forever, and how they would have been treated, if God
had not determined to have mercy upon them. It is true,
however, if it is understood with reference to the
preparation of punishment by the decree now under discussion.
For by that decree, the merited punishment of sin, is not
only prepared, but it is, in fact and forever, inflicted on
sinners. It is indeed true, rather, that, by the decree,
punishment is prepared for sin, not as merited and due, but
as not remitted by mercy, which forgives the debt to some.
This distinction is required by the order of election, and of
predamnation, its opposite. For election remits merited and
due punishment. Its opposite, preordination, does not remit
merited and due punishment. This then is inflicted, by
damnation, which is the execution of predamnation, not as
merited or due, but as not remitted.
Again, a distinction is to be made between the preparation of
punishment, made by the just Providence of God, and that made
by the decree of divine predamnation, which is the opposite
of election. For the former is avoided by all who repent and
believe in the Son. The latter is avoided by none, since the
decree of predamnation is irrevocable and peremptory. The
question is not whether God prepared punishment for those
passed by in a mode in harmony with the wisdom of God"; for
who denies that, if any are passed by, they are passed by in
a manner in harmony with the wisdom of God? But the question
is, whether God, foreseeing the sin of those, so passed by
and left in their natural state, as has been explained,
prepared punishment for them by the decree of predamnation,
which does not seem very probable to me. I have presented
arguments for this opinion, which we will now consider.
EIGHTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
In the first place, from what has been already stated: since
punishment can not be justly prepared, of the mere act of the
divine pleasure, for those passed by on account of foreseen
sin, which must be committed, as the necessary result of that
preterition and reelection in a state of nature. Secondly,
the punishment ordained for them is spiritual, but spiritual
punishment can not be ordained for those falling from their
original state, if spiritual reward, on the contrary, is not
prepared for those who should remain in their original state.
But a reward of this kind was not prepared for such, since
they could, by mere natural power, remain in their original
state, and spiritual happiness could not be acquired by them.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE EIGHTEENTH PROPOSITION
In reference to the first argument, I deny:
1. that Adam was, to speak in general terms, passed by and
left in a state of nature by God, but, according to the mode
of nature, he was left to himself only in reference to a
particular and natural act, which was in the power of mere
nature, and that he was carefully forewarned by God, and that
he received information from God, as by compact.
2. It is denied that sin was committed by him, of necessity,
in view of that preterition. For, if it was necessarily
committed, it would have been a habit, or passive quality in
the nature of man; but it pertained to capability, his will
being free, and borne contingently in this or that direction.
It was not then perpetrated necessarily; therefore he
committed it contingently, (as the Scripture and the
agreement of the church have always declared,) according to
the free natural power, which is that of the will. The wise
man rightly says in Eccl. vii, 27, "Lo, this only have I
found, that God hath made man upright; but they have sought
out many inventions."
Concerning the second argument, I remark that the word "also"
should be added to your proposition in this manner: "the
punishment ordained for them is also spiritual." For
punishment of both kinds, of the body and of the spirit, was
ordained for them, by the testimony of Scripture. Your
assumption is denied, which states that a reward of this kind
was not prepared for them, in general, if they had remained
in their original state. For it is entirely evident that it
was proposed to them in the covenant of nature, and in the
ordination to grace, if they should remain in their original
state, as was also signified in the symbol of the tree of
life, and declared in the denunciation of death. For what is
death but the privation of this and of the future life? What
privation could there be, if man did not possess life, on the
one hand by nature, and on the other by the ordination of
grace to be consummated after the natural course of this
life. But to prove this statement, you add, "for they could,
by mere natural power, remain in their original state." This
also is denied. They could do so only in natural things, but
by no means in things pertaining to grace, as we have already
frequently showed. The whole argumentation, then, is
erroneous. "But," you will say, "my reasoning is valid on the
hypothesis of Aquinas, who held that man, in the matter of
election, was considered in his natural condition." I reply
in this manner:
1. This does not affect us, who affirm that God, in election,
has reference to man in general.
2. Though Aquinas uses that form of expression, yet it must
be correctly understood, since there may be ambiguity here,
for the relation of election: concerning which we have
already presented the sentiment of Aquinas, in my answer to
the sixth proposition, is one thing, and that of the
condition of Adam, when he fell into sin, is another. It is
evident from all his writings, that it did not, even in a
dream, enter into his mind, that Adam was then merely in his
natural condition. Could he, indeed, entertain such an idea,
who every where openly avows that man was made in a state of
supernatural grace, and expressly asserts this in his
controversy with the Master of Sentences. Therefore the
hypothesis is false, and is erroneously ascribed to Aquinas.
If that is false, the argument also is without force. Man
also could not, by natural power alone, continue in his
primitive condition and state, (for I prefer these
expressions to "origin," as more clearly conveying the idea,)
or by its means acquire spiritual happiness. For that
happiness is not the reward of labourers, but the inheritance
of children in Christ, bestowed by grace, not obtained by
labour.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE EIGHTEENTH PROPOSITION
My first argument rests on the hypothesis of the definition
by which preterition is described in your Theses. That
definition is in these words: "Preterition is the act of the
divine pleasure, by which God, from eternity, determined to
leave certain of His creatures in their natural state, and
not to communicate to them the supernatural grace by which
their pure nature might be strengthened, or their corrupt
nature might be restored, to the declaration of the freedom
of His own goodness, but a natural state is that in which
there can be nothing supernatural or divine," according to
Thesis 10, of the same disputation. For those, who are passed
by, are left in the same natural state and condition in the
same manner, as that from which they, who are predestinated,
are raised up. Being left in such a natural state, "in which
there can be nothing supernatural or divine," they can not
keep the law, which is not to be kept without supernatural
grace. Hence punishment can not be justly prepared for them
on account of sin, committed against a law which can not be
kept by them. Therefore your first negation seems to me to be
irrelevant.
We are not treating of the mode in which Adam was left to his
own nature and given up to his own direction. The reelection
of Adam to himself belongs, not to the decree of
predestination, but to that providence, in which God, without
the distinction of predestinate and reprobate, had reference
to man, newly created, and this, indeed, of necessity,
according to the hypothesis that He purposed to create man
free. But we are treating of his reelection in a natural
state, which belongs to the decree of preterition. If you
should say that they who are passed by are considered by the
Deity in Adam, as partakers of the same things, which Adam
had in his primitive state, I answer that, thus considered,
they were not left in that natural state, which can effect
nothing supernatural or divine. Hence the hypothesis will be
false, which seems only to rest on the definition of
preterition given in your Theses.
To your second negation, I reply -- from the reelection in a
natural state "which can effect nothing supernatural or
divine," (that is, neither of itself, as I admit, nor by any
thing superinfused, so that nothing supernatural may be added
to it, according to the hypothesis of your definition,) sin
must of necessity be committed by the person left, and it can
not be avoided without supernatural grace. The will is,
indeed, free, but not in respect to that act which can not be
performed or omitted without supernatural grace, just as it
is not free in respect to that act by which it wills the good
of the universe and of itself. The reason of this is -- there
is in man a passive quality, inclining him to that forbidden
act, and impelling the will to a consent to and commission of
that act; and necessarily impelling it, unless the will is
endued with some power to resist that motion, which power is
supernatural grace, according to our hypothesis. To explain
this subject more fully, I add a few thoughts. The negative
act of the Deity, which preceded the sin of man, pertained
either to providence, or to reprobation, or to preterition,
as distinct from providence. In the first place, it did not
pertain to reprobation.
1. Because the act of reprobation has reference to some men,
not to all, for not all are reprobates.
2. If sin exists from the act of reprobation, or not without
it, then only some men commit sin, and the rest do not commit
it, that is, they sin, to whom God had reference in the
negative act of preterition, and they do not sin, to whom He
had no such reference. But all have sinned. It is not then
from that act.
3. If sin exists from the negative act of reprobation, it
then follows that Adam and all men in him are reprobates, for
Adam, and, in him, all men have sinned. This consequence is
false, therefore the antecedent is also false.
4. By converse reasoning, if the sin of man resulted from the
negative act of preterition, then, from the affirmative act
of predestination, which exists at the same moment with the
opposite of the act previously referred to, for neither of
these acts exists without the other, and they are oppositely
spoken of, results the perseverance of man in goodness, at
least in reference to this single act. But no man perseveres
in the good in which he was created, according to the
affirmative act of predestination. Therefore, also, the sin
of man is not from the negative act of reprobation or
preterition.
5. To those, to whom God once, by the negative act of
reprobation, denies efficacious aid, He finally denies
efficacious aid, otherwise the reprobate are not reprobate.
He does not deny, finally, to all men, efficacious aid, for
then all would be reprobate. Therefore, that act, by which
efficacious aid was denied once to all men, is not an act of
reprobation. But some negative act of the Deity preceded the
sin of man, for otherwise man would not have sinned.
Therefore that is an act of providence.
Here, however, two things are to be considered. First, sin
did not exist of necessity from that negative act, but, in
view of that act, it might or might not be committed. For
providence ordained man to eternal life, and conferred means
sufficient and necessary for the attainment of that life,
leaving, (as was suitable at the beginning), to the choice of
man, the free use of those means, and refusing to impede that
liberty, lest it might rescind that which it had established,
as Tertullian happily remarks in the passage quoted by you,
(Advers. Marcion, lib. 2, resp. 14). From which act of God,
refusing to prevent sin efficaciously, (the opposite of
which, the affirmative act of determining to prevent it
efficaciously, would be inconsistent with the first
institution of the human race, and the affirmative act of
determining to prevent a sin, finally, would have pertained
to predestination,) results the fact that man could commit
sin, not that he did commit it, but because God, in His
infinite wisdom, saw, from eternity, that man would fall at a
certain time, that fall occurred infallibly, only in respect
to His prescience, not in respect to any act of the divine
will, either affirmative or negative. Whatever happens
infallibly in respect to an act of the divine will, the same
also happens necessarily, not only by the necessity of
consequence but by that, also, of the consequent. It may be
proper, here, to mark the difference between what is done
infallibly and what is done necessarily. The former depends
on the infinity of the knowledge of God, the latter on the
act of His will. The former has respect only to the knowledge
of God, to which it pertains to know, infallibly and with
certainty, contingent things; the latter belong to the
existence of the thing itself, the necessity for which
resulted from the will of God.
In the second place, the providence of God does not
discriminate definitely between the classes of men, as elect
and reprobate. Therefore, that negative act of God has
reference to all men in general, and universally, without any
distinction of elect and reprobate. From these thing, I
conclude, since that negative act, which preceded sin, was
not of reprobation or preterition, but of providence as
distinct from the former, it follows that God, in the act of
preterition, had not reference to men apart from sin or
considered as not yet sinners. For no negative act of
preterition preceded, either in order or in time, this
negative act of providence. Likewise no other act of
preterition intervened between this act of providence and
sin. If any act of preterition intervened, an act of
predestination also intervened. There was no intervention of
the latter, and, therefore, there was not of the former. This
act of predestination would be the preservation of some in
goodness, and their deliverance from possible sin. No one of
mankind has been preserved in goodness and delivered from
possible sin, for all have sinned. It was not, however,
necessary to prove here that man sinned, not necessarily but
freely, for that point is not in controversy, but it was to
be shown, that, if preterition is supposed, man,
nevertheless, sinned freely, and not of necessity.
My second argument is also based on a hypothesis, which, in
my opinion, whether incorrect or correct your wisdom will
decide, I have taken from your Theses. The hypothesis
consists of two parts; -- first, supernatural happiness
cannot be acquired by the powers of nature alone; secondly,
the law, given to Adam, could be observed by the powers of
nature alone. The first part is true. The second is contained
in your Theses. Man is left in a state of nature, which can
effect nothing supernatural or divine. But yet he was able to
keep the law, otherwise God is unjust, who imposes a law,
which cannot be obeyed by the creature. Hence I concluded
that spiritual punishment ought not to be inflicted for the
transgression of that law, to the observance of which
spiritual or supernatural reward is not promised. But
supernatural reward is not promised to the observance of a
law, which can be obeyed by the powers of nature alone,
otherwise nature could acquire that which is supernatural,
therefore, spiritual punishment ought not to be the penalty
of the violation of the same law. Further, the law, imposed
on Adam, could be performed by the powers of nature alone,
according to your view, as I have understood it; therefore,
spiritual punishment ought not to be its penalty. But its
penalty is spiritual; therefore it is unjust.
I will not, at this time, inquire whether such may or may not
be the consequence of your Theses, since you now say
distinctly that a supernatural reward was prepared for our
first parents, if they should remain in their original
integrity. Therefore, I claim that my reasoning is valid,
though the hypothesis, on which it was based, is removed.
From your own statement, indeed, I deduced an inference in
favour of my sentiment. That which was prepared for all men
on condition of the obedience, which they could render the
gift of divine grace, bestowed or to be bestowed on them,
could not be denied to some men by the sure and definite
decree of God, except on account of their foreseen
disobedience. Eternal life was prepared for all men, on
condition of that obedience which they could render.
Therefore, eternal life could not be denied to some men, by
the sure and definite decree of God, that is, by preterition,
except on account of their foreseen disobedience. Therefore,
also, men are considered by God, in the act of preterition,
as sinners; they are not, then, considered in general.
I do not touch the sentiment of Aquinas, except as it is
explained in your Theses. I might, however, require him to
prove that God passed by man, considered in a state of
integrity, in which he had, not only natural, but also
supernatural endowments. I grant that supernatural happiness
is that inheritance of the children of God, but it would have
been given to those, who should remain in their primitive
integrity, though in a different mode from that in which it
is bestowed on believers in Christ. It would have been given
to the former "of the works of the law;" it is given to the
latter "of faith;" to the former the reward would have been
reckoned not "of grace, but of debt;" (Rom. iv, 4), to the
latter, as believers, it is "reckoned of grace;" to the
former, it would have been given by "the righteousness which
is of the law," which saith "that the man which doeth these
things shall live by them," to the latter by "the
righteousness of faith, which speaketh in this wise, if thou
shalt believe in thine heart," &c. (Rom. x, 6, 9.) We have
already spoken in reference to that primitive state, and to
perseverance in it.
NINETEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
In addition to all that has been said, it is proper to
consider that, since predestination, preterition, and
reprobation, really produce no effect on the predestinate,
passed by, and reprobate, the subject of the actual
execution, and that of the decree in the divine mind, are
entirely the same and are considered in the same mode. Hence,
since God does not, in fact, communicate grace, except to one
who is a sinner, that is, the grace prepared in
predestination, since he does not, in fact, pass by, does not
condemn or punish any one, unless he is a sinner, it seems to
follow that God did not decree to impart grace, to pass by,
to reprobate any one, unless considered as a sinner.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE NINETEENTH PROPOSITION
Before I treat of the subject itself, it is necessary to
refer to the ambiguity which was alluded to, in my answer to
the second proposition. In the whole of your letter, to
reprobate is to damn, and reprobation is damnation. But in my
usage, reprobation, and preterition or non-election are the
same. Hence that the subject may be made more plain, you will
not complain if I should substitute the word damnation for
the word reprobation. You say that "predestination,
preterition and damnation, have no reference to action in the
predestinate etc," that is, that the predestinate or elect,
the passed by, and the damned, are elected, passed by, and
damned by God without any consideration of quality which
exists in the individual. I think, indeed, that the relation
of these things is different according to the Scriptures.
Election and non-election have reference to nothing in the
elect and the passed-by: but damnation supposes sin, in view
of which the sinner is damned, otherwise the entire work of
predestination, is limited to eternity.
I readily acknowledge that, in these matters, the subject
must be considered in the same light whether existing in fact
or only in the mind. For the elect is elected, and the
reprobate is passed by as a man; he is damned as a sinner.
He, who is, in fact, elected or passed by as a man, is so
elected or passed by in the mind of the Deity. He who is
damned as a sinner, is so predamned. Else, the internal and
the external acts of God would be at variance, which is never
to be admitted. This being fully understood, you see, my
brother, that whatever things you construct on this
foundation, they can, in no way, be consistent.
You say that" God does not, in fact, communicate the grace
prepared in predestination," that is, saving grace, "except
to one who is a sinner, he does not, in fact, pass by any
one, unless he is a sinner." If you affirm this of saving
grace, in an absolute and universal sense, it is shown to be
false by the salvation of the elect angels, and the
preterition of others. Did God elect and pass by the angels
as sinners. Origen may hold this view. We hold an entirely
different one. If, however, you say that you are speaking of
grace towards man, then it follows, from this statement, that
the first man, in that primitive integrity, had not the
communication of saving grace. This, indeed, I think that you
will not affirm. Therefore, this grace is communicated to man
as man, though not as a sinner, and not to man only, but to
the angels. If you say that it was communicated to man, in
his present sinful character, we do not deny it. Indeed, we
believe that it is now communicated to none except he is a
sinner, since no one of the human race is not a sinner. We
readily concede to you that no one is damned or punished
unless he is a sinner. Thus, a part of your conclusion is
denied, namely, that which has reference to election, and a
part is conceded, namely, that which refers to damnation.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE NINETEENTH PROPOSITION
I used the word reprobation in the sense in which you use it,
as I have several times already stated and proved. I do not,
however, object to your substitution, in its place, of the
word damnation. But you do not take my argument in its true
sense. I do not, indeed, consider that the predestinate, the
passed-by, the damned are elected, passed by, damned by the
Deity without reference to any quality, which may exist in
them. Is it possible that I should do so, when I, always and
every where, endeavour to prove that sin is a condition or
quality requisite in the object of the divine decree, My real
meaning is this. Predestination, preterition, pre-damnation,
as acts remaining in the agent, or as internal acts, produce
no feeling in an external object, but the execution of those
internal acts, which consists in external acts, passes over
to external things, and produces an effect on them, as is
explained by Thomas Aquinas (Summa prima quaest. 23, artic.
2), from which passage it is apparent that, in the scholastic
phraseology, it is one thing to produce an effect and another
thing to suppose or have reference to something in the elect,
the passed-by, the damned. But if those internal acts have no
effect on the object, then it follows that the object is the
same in every respect, and is considered in the same mode by
the Deity, both in the act of decree and in that of
execution. Hence, I conclude that, since it is certain that
God, in the external act, communicates the grace, which is
prepared in predestination, to man, only as a sinner, and, in
the external act, passes by man only as a sinner, and, in the
external act, damns man only as a sinner, it follows that
God, in the internal act, prepared grace only for a sinner,
determined to pass by only the sinner, and predamned only the
sinner, that is, in the internal acts of predestination,
preterition, and predamnation, had reference only to man
considered as a sinner. That God communicates the grace,
prepared in predestination, only to the sinner, passes by
only the sinner, (concerning damnation, we agree), is, I
think, most evident. Your two-fold argument does not at all
affect this truth. To the first part, I make the answer,
which your foresight has anticipated that we are discussing,
not the predestination and reprobation of angels, but those
of men, the term grace being restricted to that which was
prepared for man, in the act of predestination.
To the second part of your argument, which charges my
proposition with absurdity, I reply, that there is an
ambiguity in the phrase, saving grace. It may refer to that
grace which is sufficient and able to confer salvation, or to
that which is efficacious, and does, certainly, and in fact,
bestow salvation. Again, it may refer to the grace, which God
bestowed on man in his primitive state, or to that which is
now bestowed in his sinful state, that, being made free in
Christ, he may, through Him, obtain life from the dead. My
proposition concedes that man possessed the former in his
state of innocence, and so avoids absurdity. It also denies
that he possessed the latter before the fall, and, at the
same time, denies that this is absurd. This latter grace, and
not the former, was prepared in predestination, and so my
argument remains firm and immovable.
For these reasons, Reverend Sir, I can not yet persuade
myself that man, considered as a sinner by the Deity, is not
the adequate object of predestination, preterition and
predamnation.
TWENTIETH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
It does not seem to me that this sentiment is established by
the argument from the necessary declaration of the freedom of
grace and of the divine goodness. For though I might concede
that the declaration of that freedom was necessary, yet I
might say that it is declared in the very creation and
arrangement of things, and moreover that it could, and indeed
ought to be declared in another way.
The argument, from the necessary declaration of the divine
justice, has no more weight with me, both because justice in
God, as His nature, is equally directed towards the whole
object and all its parts, unless, there be some diversity,
dependent on His will, and because God has declared Himself,
in Scripture, to be of such character that it was not
necessary for Him to punish the sinner, according to strict
legal justice, in order to the manifestation of His justice,
but that He knew another, more noble, way for the revelation
of His own justice. Nor, does the argument, deduced from the
nature of providence, seem to have weight, since it pertains
to providence to permit that some should fail of the highest
good, and of a supernatural end, and that permission,
understood in harmony with this sentiment, is to be
attributed not so much to a sustaining and governing, as to a
creating providence.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTIETH PROPOSITION
After the discussion of election and reprobation, we come in
this place to the consideration of the design, according to
which, the good or evil of an action is often to be decided.
But here a three-fold design is presented; having reference
to the divine freedom in grace and goodness, and to the
divine justice, and to the divine providence. Other
attributes, might indeed, be considered, but from these a
decision may be made concerning others. In reference to the
first design, you present two arguments.
1. You affirm that this freedom "is declared in the very
creation and arrangement of things." You would infer then,
that it was unnecessary that it should be also declared in
this way. This inference is denial. For it was not sufficient
that such declaration should be made in the creation and
arrangement of things, if it should not be declared also in
their progress and result. Nor, indeed, if it has been
sufficiently declared in our present nature and life, does it
follow, of consequence, that there is no necessity of any
declaration in the life of the future world. For, on the
contrary, if God should have declared His liberty in matters
of an inferior nature only, and not in those, which are
superior and pertain to the future world, it would seem that
he, through want either of knowledge or of power, had omitted
the more worthy declaration of His own freedom. For the
nobler manifestation of that freedom is made in things of a
nobler nature; and that good is better and more noble, the
consequences of which are better and more noble. Who can
believe that God lacked either knowledge, power, or will in
this matter.
2. You affirm that this liberty "could, and indeed ought to
be, declared in another way." I grant it. It could and ought
to be, declared in this, and in other modes, as has been done
by the Deity. But if you use the phrase another, in an
exclusive sense, as having reference to some particular mode
and not to this one, it is denied, and, in the preceding
argument, is sufficiently confuted.
The second design is, in like manner, opposed by two
arguments. Your first argument, contained in these words,
"because justice in God, as His nature is equally directed,
&c.," is, in the very same sentence, refuted by the addition
of the words, "unless there be some diversity, dependent on
His will." For justice in us is regarded in two aspects, as a
habit and as an act proceeding from that habit, and diffusing
itself first inwardly and then outwardly. In God, it is also,
considered in two modes, as nature, and as an act of nature
through the will, flowing from the nature and according to
the nature of God. In the former mode, it is the very essence
of God; in the latter, it is the work of that essence. Of the
former, you rightly affirm that "justice in God as nature is
equally directed towards the whole object, and all its
parts." The phrase "as nature" is susceptible of a two-fold
reference, as equivalent either to w[sper fusiv and imply a
similarity of operation to that of nature, (in which sense I
understand you to use it), or to kaqw<v fusiv and implying
that the nature of God or His essence is justice itself. For
since the essence of God is entirely simple, justice, nature,
essence, and His other attributes are, in fact, one, though a
distinction is made in them in our usage. In reference to the
latter mode of justices the expression "unless there be some
diversity dependent on His will," is subjoined most suitably,
and yet with some ambiguity. For in the justice of God, as
His nature, there is never diversity, not even as the result
of His will. What? Can a change in His essence, in His own
nature result from the will of God, whose attribute, I do not
say in all respects, yet absolutely, and pertaining to Him
alone, and always, is immutability? But that justice, which
is the work of the divine essence, emanating from that will,
whether outwardly or inwardly, may indeed be diversified in
an infinite number of modes, according to His wisdom and
will.
Your second argument, to speak in a few words and with
directness, is faulty in two respects. First, though your
statement is true, if properly understood, namely, "God has
declared Himself, in Scripture, to be of such character that
it is not necessary for Him to punish the sinner, according
to strict legal justice, in order to the manifestation of His
justice," since His justice, in all respects and infinitely,
surpasses legal justice, as, in the nature of things, the
reality exceeds the type, and the substance exceeds the
shade. Yet it, by no means, follows from this, that God must
not so punish the sinner for the manifestation of His own
justice, or that it is from legal justice that He so punishes
him. But, on the contrary, it follows rather that God must so
punish the sinner for the manifestation of His own justice,
and that the fact of such punishment is dependent on His
justice, which exceeds and in a most excellent, that is, in a
divine method, surpasses legal justice, and which, in His
word, to us, according to our measure, takes the form of
legal justice, as the shadow of that most excellent justice.
There is no element of justice, expressed to us in the law,
which does not exist in the justice of God, and flow from it
in a most excellent manner. In the law, He has both expressed
the justice due from us, and shadowed forth His own. Consider
only this, that God is justice in an absolute sense, or (if
you prefer), that He is the absolute principle and cause of
all justice, as of all good, you at once destroy your own
argument. For if He is, absolutely, justice, or the absolute
principle and cause of all justice, then He is the principle
of this justice also, and the cause and effector of it, as
not only mediately shadowed forth in the law, but also,
immediately effected by His own work. For whence is that
legal justice, if not from God, expressing by His own
infinitely wise will, what He is, and what He does, as it is?
Besides, if God is, absolutely, justice, and the principle of
justice, he punishes not according to the justice of the law,
but according to His own justice, which the law adumbrates to
human comprehension, and which He cannot but set forth in His
creatures, both in the present and the future worlds as he
has declared in His word. I am still less satisfied with your
second statement, in which you affirm that "He knew another,
more noble way for the revelation of His own justice." God
certainly knew and thoroughly understood both that and the
other, and every possible way, according to the divine mode.
But it is necessary, my brother, that you should, in this
case, consider that God always contemplates all things,
according to their individual relations, and according to
their relations to the universe, over which He presides. If
it should be denied that God, in respect to its individual
relation, knew another more noble way for the manifestation
of His justice, how, I pray, would you prove it? Would it
not, indeed, on the contrary, seem, to the pious to be
altogether more probable, since God is infinitely wise, that
He most wisely adopted the noblest way to manifest (which is
the work of the divine wisdom) His justice, to His own glory,
to our instruction, and to the perfection of the universe,
Let it, however, be conceded that God, since He has all
knowledge, knew another more noble way for accomplishing this
thing, yet I deny, that with reference to the relations of
the universe there existed another more noble way, in which
God could obtain this object, since it would have been better
that He should use that other nobler way. For it concerns the
wisdom of God, that every variety of way should be adopted in
manifesting His justice, and should be set forth before the
eyes of all in the universe. For example, let the more noble
way of displaying that wonderful justice of God, be that
which has punished and shall forever punish the wicked
angels. Should I grant this, do you not see that it would
pertain to divine wisdom to vary in this case also, the mode
of the divine justice? This is sufficient in reference to the
second argument. The third design, which has reference to the
Providence of God, is excluded in your argument, in a
peculiar manner, by limitation, as it is called, "since that
permission is to be attributed, not so much to a sustaining
and governing, as to a creating Providence." By your
permission, this whole limitation is denied. It is indeed
destroyed by the very definition of the terms, without any
argument on my part. Describe the course of the divine
Providence. Its principle, or first step, is called creation,
that is the production of existence from non-existence. Its
middle step is government, containing ordination and
sustainment. Its third or last step is consummation.
Consider, now, to which part permission shall be ascribed.
Creation is an act of God alone, the glory of which He, by no
means, communicates to the creature, for it is created, not
creating. In the act of creation, existence is bestowed on
some thing, that it may become what it is not, essentially,
in nature. By creation, then, it is given to man that he
should be a man, and that there should be in him whatever
belongs to him as a creature. Thus freedom of the will was
bestowed on man.
What is permission? Not an act of God, but a cessation of
action. It does not bestow existence, but gives to that,
which already exists, power over its own life. Nature itself
affirms that creation differs in kind and characteristic from
permission. Creation is not a part of ordination, but it is
the principle, point, first term. Permission belongs to
ordination, consequent on that principle. It does not then
pertain to creation.
It is true, that freedom of the will in man pertains to
creation, but as an essential faculty, not as developed in
action; which action, without doubt, after the creation of
the faculty and its endowment with its qualities, depends on
the divine ordination, and that ordination on providence. I
do not, indeed, see how that permission could be bestowed on
our first parents at their creation, which, in our case, must
be referred to ordination. It is necessary that there should
be correspondence in both cases. But, finally, though I
should concede that permission pertains to creation, this
also, even on your authority, would be the work of
providence, since you say that providence is creating, as
well as sustaining and governing. Permission, then, by your
consent, belongs to providence. It belong, according to our
argument, and, as I hope, with your assent, to governing or
ordaining providence. Therefore, whatever may be said
concerning the relation of providence, permission, by
necessary consequence, pertains to it.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTIETH
PROPOSITION
I have now discussed the theory, which considers man as the
object of predestination and preterition, either in a purely
natural state, or also with some supernatural endowments, yet
apart from the consideration of sin as a condition requisite
in the object. And I think that I have proved that man is
considered by God, in His decree, not otherwise than as a
sinner. I proceed to answer the three arguments usually urged
in favour of this theory; and I only show that a theory, like
this, is not sustained by those arguments. It seems,
therefore, to be requisite, not only that my reasoning should
be refuted, but also that the force of those arguments should
be established. The latter has been entirely neglected by
you. We will now consider in what respects my reasoning has
been invalidated.
The first argument from the necessary declaration of the
freedom of grace and of the divine goodness, I answer, first,
by simply denying that such necessity exists, and then, if
that necessity is conceded, by denying that mode, which is
preterition, such as is described in the theory which I
oppose. This denial is confirmed, partly from the fact that
God has declared the liberty of His own goodness in the
creation and various circumstances of material things; partly
because he could, and indeed must declare that same liberty
also in a mode other than that of preterition. For the better
understanding of these things, I will make a few illustrative
remarks.
First, since no external act of the Deity is absolutely
necessary, no declaration of the freedom of the divine
goodness is absolutely necessary. For God is happy by the
internal and essential knowledge of Himself, and is glorious
in Himself. Secondly, since, nevertheless, it seemed good to
the Deity, to communicate, by the free act of His will, His
own good, to the declaration of His goodness, it was suitable
that there should be a declaration, not only of His goodness,
but also of the freedom of that goodness, that it might be
manifest that God communicated good to His creatures, not by
any necessity, but of His mere will; not to the increase of
His own good, which was already perfect, but to the
perfection of Nothing, and of the beings created out of it,
according to the mode of communication, adopted by the
internal act of His will, both to the single parts of
Nothing, and to the individual creatures. The good which God
purposed to communicate, is two-fold in respect to the
subject, on which He determined to bestow it, natural and
supernatural. In the communication of both, it was just that
He should declare, not only His goodness, but also the
liberty of His goodness and grace. In the communication of
natural good, He declared the freedom of His goodness in the
creation and various condition of material things. For when
He communicated to that part of original nature, which is
purely nothing or chaos, this entity and form, He declared
His own liberty to communicate an entity and form which
should be different.
In the communication of supernatural good, He manifested the
same freedom, when He made a great part of His creatures
without a capacity to receive supernatural blessings, and
made angels and men alone capable of those blessings, and
actually partakers of some of them. In respect to those
blessings of which He made all the angels, and the first
human beings, and in them all, conditionally, who should be
born from them, partakers, there is no place for preterition
of this kind, as this pertains to a portion either of angels
or of men, but only for that preterition, which has reference
to other creatures, who were passed by, in the communication
of supernatural blessings. But in the communication of
blessings, of which he made angels and men not actual
partakers, but only capable, the freedom of the divine
goodness and grace was also to be declared, that it might, in
this way, be evident both that those things, which they all
received, were bestowed, and that those things, of which they
were made capable, would be bestowed on angels and men, not
according to the excellence of their nature and of merit, but
of grace.
I thus acknowledge and concede this, but I deny that the mode
of declaring the divine freedom in the communication of these
blessings is the preterition now under discussion; and I deny
that this preterition was used by the Deity for the display
of that freedom, and this was my meaning when I said "it
could and indeed ought to be declared in another way," by the
word "another," excluding that mode which is contained in
that preterition.
If it should be asked in what other way the freedom of the
divine goodness "could and indeed ought to be declared," I
reply that, in reference to men, (I have always excluded
angels from the discussion), it was possible to declare that
freedom, if God should prescribe the condition on which He
would communicate good; that it was declared by his eternal
decree, when he prescribed to man the condition on which he
might obtain eternal life, and those gifts of grace, which,
in addition to what had already been bestowed, might be
necessary for its attainment. I reply also that it ought to
be declared in some other way, if declared at all, since it
ought not to be in that way, for that one is in accordance
neither with the wisdom of God nor with His justice, since,
by it, to creatures, capable of certain blessing from the
divine goodness and grace, the same blessings are, absolutely
and apart from any condition, denied. Therefore, it ought to
be declared in some other way, and, indeed, in that way of
which I have spoken. For God can not decree not to give to
any creature that of which it is capable and for which it was
made, except on condition that it has made itself incapable
of receiving the blessings of which it was made capable by
its Creator. But whatever may be true in reference to this,
you should have shown in what manner the argument from the
freedom of the divine goodness and grace proves the
preterition or non-election which is described in your
Theses. The second argument is from the necessary display of
the divine justice. I impugn it in two ways. That it may be
seen how my reasoning avails against this argument, it is to
be considered that I design to assail it, in the form in
which it is presented in your Theses. These are your words: -
- (Thesis 17.) "The preparation of punishment is an act of
the divine good-pleasure, in which God purposed, from
eternity, for the display of His grace, to punish His
creatures, who should not continue in their original
integrity," &c., and (Thesis 18) "God prepares punishment for
His creatures, who, sin contrary to His law, to be reprobated
on account of sin, according to the necessity of His
justice." Since reprobation and preparation of punishment,
which are here used as synonymous, are in these words said to
have originated in "the necessity of the divine justice," I
wished to confute it, as, for two reasons, not in harmony
with the truth. The first reason is this; -- If God prepares
punishment for sinners from the necessity of His own justice,
then He prepares punishment for all sinners universally, that
is, by the decree of predamnation. But the consequent is
false; therefore, the antecedent is also false. The reasoning
is certainly valid. For, since justice in God is considered
as a natural attribute, it acts in the same manner towards
its whole object and all its parts. Sinners are the objects
of justice in this case. Therefore, it acts equally on all
sinners, that is, it prepares punishment for all. This is
plainly signified in the word "necessity" in connection with
"justice." For, if He necessarily prepares punishment for
sinners or for those about to sin, He prepares it for all
without distinction, and that word added to "justice"
indicates that justice is to be considered as a natural
attribute in God, and it can not, for the reason already
mentioned, superintend predamnation. I added, however, the
qualifying remark "unless there be some diversity dependent
on His will," my meaning, in which, was that it is dependent
on the will of God whether that attribute should act in an
absolute manner or respectively, in reference to all sinners,
or in reference only to some. In this way I refute not that
which I previously said, but that necessity, which is
considered as laid on predamning justice. For if, by the will
of God directing that justice, it occurs that God prepares
punishment for some sinners, and does not prepare it for
others but remits it to them, then that predamnation, or
reprobation (as it is here called), was decreed by God, not
by the necessity of His justice.
Let me more briefly state this idea. Justice in God tends to
the punishment of sin, as mercy or grace tends to its
remission, without any distinction in those who have
committed sin. If justice should administer its own act, all
sinners would be punished; if mercy should administer its own
act, all sinners would be pardoned. These acts could not be
performed at the same time, and, in this case, the one would
oppose the manifestation of the other, which could not with
propriety occur.
Therefore, the wisdom, appointed over them, for the direction
of both, judged that its own sphere of action should be
assigned to each. In accordance with this decision, the will
of God directs His justice in such manner, that there can be
opportunity for mercy, and His mercy, that the honour of His
justice may also, in the mean time, be maintained. But it can
not, in my opinion, be affirmed that what is decreed by the
divine will, was done by the necessity either of justice or
of mercy.
The second reason is this. If God knew a more noble way for
the manifestation of His justice than that by which,
according to the law, punishment was prepared for those who
should sin, then the display of justice, according to the
law, was not necessary. But the former is true, therefore the
latter is also true. The reasoning is conclusive. If two ways
were open for the illustration of the divine justice, then it
is not absolutely necessary that God should make use of one
to the complete conclusion of the other. The justice of God
may be displayed in the exaction of punishment from the
individuals who have sinned; the same justice may also be
displayed in the exaction of the same punishment from him,
who has, according to the will of God, offered himself as the
pledge and surety for those sinners. He is "the Lamb of God,
which taketh away the sin of the world," (John i, 29.) "He
hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin," (2 Cor. v,
21). This is that "other more noble and more excellent way."
In it there is a more vivid display of the Divine execration
of sin, than in that, which demands punishment from the
sinners, in their own persons, both from the fact that, in
the latter case, the infliction of punishment could be
ascribed, by His enemies, to the vindictive passion of the
Deity, and not to His justice, alone, which would be
impossible in the former case, since the punishment is
inflicted on one, who has not personally sinned, and from the
fact that in this way, the inflexible rigor of divine justice
is displayed, which could not grant, even to the intercession
of His Son, the pardon of sin: unless punishment had been
inflicted; according to which, indeed, that Son could not
even intercede, if his own blood had not been shed, and
atonement had not, by it, been made for sin. I conclude,
then, that the display of justice, according to the law, was
not necessary, and consequently that punishment was not, from
any necessity of the divine justice, prepared for these, who
should sin, since God was free to impose on His own Son, to
be received and suffered, their due punishment, removed from
the individual sinners.
That, which you adduce in opposition to these ideas, does not
seem to me to be valid. For God, of His own justice, punishes
either sinners or their surety. The former mode of its
manifestation is according to the law, the latter mode
transcends, the former is revealed to us in the gospel. It
may be said, however, that both modes were necessary. I deny
it. The latter, depended on the mere good pleasure of God;
the former could be changed to it. Otherwise it would have
been necessary, for "without shedding of blood there is no
remission." (Heb. ix, 22.) These things which are said
concerning the justice of God, as exceeding the justice of
the law, are not to the purpose; for it was not my meaning
that the justice, which actuates God in the punishment of
sin, and by which He punishes sin, is legal justice, but that
He should punish it according to the letter of the law, "In
the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die,"
(Gen. ii, 17) and "Cursed is every one that continueth not in
all things which are written in the book of the law to do
them." (Gal. iii, 10.) It should also have been shown in this
place how this argument, from the necessary display of the
divine justice, proves this preparation of punishment.
The third argument, deduced from the nature of providence, is
of this nature, in the view of Thomas Aquinas, (summa prima,
quæs. 23, act 3.) "To permit some to come short of the
highest good, pertains to the providence of God;" -- "But to
reprobate is to permit some to come short of the highest
good; -- Therefore, the reprobation of some pertains to the
providence of God." I affirmed that this argument possessed
no weight in favour of the theory, which I now oppose;
against that which makes sin a requisite condition in the
object of reprobation or preterition. I proved it from the
fact that permission, understood in accordance with that
theory, is to be attributed not so much to sustaining and
governing providence, as to creating providence. I will first
explain my meaning, and then show the force of that argument.
I make three sets of providence -- creation, sustainment, or
preservation of the creature, and its government, and
according to those acts, I say that providence is creating,
sustaining and governing, and I attribute to each of these
modes its own particular acts, which are appropriate to each
of them. I also say that there are some acts, which so
pertain to one of these, as, at the same time, to depend on
another preceding act, so that they may not be entirely under
the control of that providence from which they proceed, but
may be limited and determined by the act of some preceding
providence. These acts, being mixed in their nature, can be
referred both to this and to that providence, to one as
immediately flowing from it, to the other as determined by
it, and necessarily dependent on its previous set. Such acts
seem to be attributed not so justly to that providence from
which they immediately flow, as to that, which prescribed
their form and mode, to which mode and form that immediate
providence was bound, and in reference to those acts was a
servant to the other as principal. I now apply these
thoughts. The permission, by which God left man to his own
counsels, pertains immediately to governing providence, but
it is government uncontrolled, determined by a preceding act
of creation. For it could not choose between leaving and not
leaving man to himself, for then, that, which had been
already divinely instituted, would be rescinded; it was bound
by that condition of creation, by which freedom of the will
was bestowed on man, and he was left to his own counsel.
This was my meaning, when I said that this permission
pertained, not so much to governing or sustaining, as, to
creating providence. We may now consider the validity of my
argument in sustaining my view. We must here consider a two-
fold permission, that by which man is left to his own counsel
and permitted to sin, and that by which the sinner is left in
his sins and permitted finally to fail of the highest good.
The former, pertains to governing providence as was said, but
determined by the act of creation; the latter, pertains to
governing and uncontrolled providence. The former, pertains
to providence, the latter, to preterition in
contradistinction to providence. For all men, represented in
Adam, have been left to themselves, and to their own counsel,
yet all are not reprobates or passed-by. But all, who are
finally left in their sins, and given up to their own
counsel, after the commission of sin, are reprobate and
passed by, and they who are passed by, are all left finally
in their sins, and are permitted to fail of the highest good.
Now I grant that, if by permission is understood a final
reelection in sin, the whole syllogism is sound and valid,
but, in that case, it sustains the theory, which makes sin a
requisite condition in the object of reprobation or
preterition. For that permission has reference to sinners.
But, if it is referred to the leaving of men to their own
choice before the commission of sin, I deny that reprobation
can be defined by that kind of permission. It is apparent,
then, that no conclusion can be drawn from that syllogism in
favour of the second theory, and against the view which I
advocate. For the second theory presents man, apart from any
reference to sin, as the object of preterition and
reelection. That syllogism, however, is unintelligible, if it
does not refer to permission and reprobation of sinners. For,
in the permission by which the first men were permitted to
sin, no one failed of the highest good, unless there was also
a dereliction in sin; and reprobation is not that permission
by which men were permitted to sin. It should also have been
shown, in this place, how that argument from providence and
permission is adapted to the confirmation of the second
theory.
This might be sufficient for my purpose, but I am disposed to
add some thoughts concerning providence, in view of your
remarks in reference to it. Far be it from me, indeed, to
disapprove them. They, however, omit the mutual arrangement
and connection of the particular parts of providence. I made
the distinction of providence into creating, sustaining and
governing, not so much from my own idea, as from that of Dr.
Francis Gomarus, who, in many passages of his writings,
comprehends creation in the term providence. In the Theses on
The Providence of God, discussed under his direction as the
presiding professor, by Hadrian Cornelius Drogius, in the
year 1596, it is said (Thesis nine) "The parts of this
execution" (that, by which God executes the decree of
providence) "are two, creation and government, &c., under
which government are comprehended continuation, and
preservation, and legitimate ordination." (Libre de
provdentia Dei, cap. 1, ex Cicerone) "I affirm, then, that
the world and all its parts were constituted at the
beginning, and are administered through all time by the
providence of God." (Ex Lactantio) "There is, then, a
providence, by the force and energy of which, all things,
which we see, were made, and are ruled." (Ejusdem, libro 7)
"That execution is distributed into the creation and the
government of this world. The parts of this government are
two, the preservation and ordination of the world, thus
constituted." Your view is also the same, as presented in
your disputation. On the providence of God, discussed in the
year 1598, for, in the first Thesis, are these words: "The
word providence, taken in a wider sense, embraces the eternal
decree of creation, government, and ordination, and its
execution." I am not very solicitous in reference to the
distinction of these words, government, preservation,
ordination; whether government embraces both preservation and
ordination, or only the latter, and there is a
contradistinction between it and the former.
As to the arrangement and mutual connection of those parts, I
affirm that it is possible that the act of the latter should
depend on some act of the former, and in such a manner that
the act of the latter should be determined to one direction
by the former. I showed this in the example of the
permission, by which God let, man to his own counsel. That
act originated in the government of God, or in His governing
providence, but it was determined by His creating providence,
which made man free and self controlling, so far as pertained
to that freedom, but, in other respects, responsible to the
law of God. I here do no injustice to the providence of God,
nor do I deny to Him universal liberty in His own action. I
acknowledge that the providence of God is absolutely free. In
the creation of man, He acted freely; in bestowing free will
on man, He acted freely. But, if one action of the Deity,
through the providence of God itself, be supposed, the
necessity of another act of the divine providence can be
deduced from it, which necessity is dependent on the free
dispensation of the antecedent act of providence.
I will present another example, by which the same may be
demonstrated. God has created angels with this condition,
that they, who should not continue in their original
innocence, should be punished forever without pardon. Some
sinned. God, in the act of his governing providence,
inflicted punishment on them by an act determined by previous
creation, so that, if he did not wish to change that which
was established in creation, he could not remit their
punishment. This was my meaning in what I presented in answer
to the third argument, which you do not refute, even though
it be conceded that permission pertains to governing or
ordaining providence, which I freely concede to you in the
sense in which I have explained it. It should have been
proved that the permission, by which man was left to his own
control, pertains to reprobation or preterition, or that the
permission, by which he was permitted to fail of the highest
good, has place in reference to man, not a sinner, or
considered as a sinner. Hence, also, those words of Thomas
Aquinas (prima sum, quaes. 23, art. 3, in respons.
generali), "For as predestination includes the purpose to
bestow grace and glory, so reprobation includes the purpose
to permit some to fall into transgression, and to inflict the
punishment of damnation for that transgression," if
diligently examined, are not accurately true. For the purpose
to permit some to fall into transgression, does not belong to
reprobation, since God permitted all men to fall into
transgression. This is also susceptible of proof from the
acts which he attributes to predestination. The purpose of
bestowing grace and glory is attributed to predestination.
What grace? That by which some are not permitted to fall into
transgression, but are preserved in their original state of
integrity? By no means; but that grace by which some are
delivered from that sin into which all were permitted to
fall. The act of reprobation, then, should have been directly
opposed to that act of predestination. But that is a
permission to remain in sin, or an abandonment in sin, which
is a negative act, and a purpose to inflict punishment for
the sin, which is an affirmative act. The former is the
opposite of grace, the latter, of glory. But it is not
strange that a man who has written so many most erudite
volumes, should not have been able to examine accurately each
and every subject.
TWENTY-FIRST PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
In a comparison of these two theories, the latter seems not
more probable than the former, since it involves the same
absurd consequence. This I will briefly prove. In the former
theory, the following order may be observed. God decreed to
illustrate His own glory by mercy and punitive justice. He
could not effect this without the introduction of sin. Hence,
sin must, of necessity, and with certainty, have been
committed. It could only be committed by him who, being
accountable to the law, was able to fulfill its requirements,
but it could not be committed, of necessity and with
certainty, by a free and contingent cause, (which could
commit sin or refrain from it,) if it was not circumscribed
and determined by a more powerful agent, surely and with
certainty moving or impelling the cause, in its own nature,
free and contingent, to the act of sin, or else withholding
or withdrawing that which was necessary to the avoidance of
sin, on which conditions the necessity and certain existence
of sin, committed by the creature, depend. The chief
advocates of the first theory disapprove of the former mode
of action in the more powerful agent (that which moves and
impels), and incline to the latter mode (that which withholds
or withdraws). This mode is also stated in the second theory.
For the creature, left to his own nature, necessarily sins,
if a law is imposed upon him, which can not be observed by
the natural powers alone. God determined to leave the
creature in his natural state. He, therefore, determined also
that the creature should sin, since that was the necessary
sequence. But the reason of that determination can not be
given, if it is not that which is proposed in the former
theory. Indeed the former theory seems even more probable
than the latter.
ANSWER OF JULIUS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST PROPOSITION
We have previously shown that those, which are called two
theories, are not, in fact or substance, two, but differ only
in their relations and mode of explanations; that there is,
therefore, one, I say not probable, but true theory, founded
on the truth of God, and the authority of the Scriptures. We
have, also, in the appropriate place, shown that the charge
of absurdity which is made against this theory is futile.
Since, however, this objection is repeated, we may also
briefly repeat in what respects and on what grounds we demur
to it. The first position -- "God decreed to illustrate His
own glory by mercy and punitive justice," we have, in answer
to the third proposition, shown to be expressed in too narrow
terms.
The second, "He could not effect this without the
introduction of sin," we thus proved to be an erroneous
statement; for if the creature had remained righteous, there
would have been an opportunity for mercy and justice, though
the latter would not have been punitive in its character.
Punitive justice, even, might have been displayed in respect
to those things, which were unsuitable, on account, not of
guilt, but of imprudence, for any just person is liable to
this without sin or guilt.
In the third place, we deny that" sin must of necessity have
been committed," as dependent on the energy of a cause,
universally or in some measure, efficient. That it must
certainly have been committed, we acknowledge, since it
existed certainly in the knowledge of God, as knowledge, not
as a cause of sin. If, then, the word certainly is
explanatory of the word necessarily, and the latter word
means no more than the former, we assent to its use; but if
otherwise, we deny the latter (necessity), and assent to the
former (certainty). The first man was not under the necessity
of committing sin, either from an internal, or an external
cause. He did it of his own free-will, not of any necessity.
Again, this conclusion is not valid, since it is deduced from
incomplete and erroneous antecedents, as we have just shown.
Therefore, it is true, that sin could have been committed
with certainty, by a free and contingent cause, which sinned
(as was the case in the will of devils and of men), and could
have been avoided with certainty by a free and contingent
cause, which did not sin, (as in the case of the good and
elect angels), and, on the contrary, it is false, that it
could have been committed of necessity, if you refer to the
necessity of any sufficient cause, that is, an external and
internal cause, for the will was the cause or rather the
principle -- the attribute of which is freedom at that time
free from all necessity, now bound by its own necessity, but
nevertheless free, and thus producing contingent, not
absolutely necessary effects as is the case in nature. When
it is said that it could have been committed necessarily,
there is an opposition in terms. For the word "could," which
in this sentence is used in its legal sense, supposes
contingency, to which the adverb necessarily is directly
opposed.
In the fourth place, two conditions, are presented for the
existence of sin, neither of which is probable. The former is
that "sin could not be committed by a contingent cause, if it
was not circumscribed and determined by a more powerful
agent, surely and with certainty, moving or impelling the
cause, in its own nature, free and contingent to the act of
sin." This condition is denied; for, in the first place, it
is contrary to nature, which per se can do or not do;
otherwise it indeed has no power. Reference may, perhaps be
made to partial power. This, certainly, is inapplicable to
the human will, for it is a principle of action, and no wise
man would ever place principles of action among partial
powers. Again, if it is limited and determined by a more
powerful agent, that agent must hold the relation of
principle or cause. If the latter, the will must cease to be
a principle, for principle pertains to the cause, it does not
originate in the cause, of which it is the principle; the
same thing can not at the same time, be the cause and the
effect of itself. If the former is true, and the will is
determined by a superior principle, there is this difficulty,
that no superior principle so acts on an inferior one as to
take away its peculiar mode of action, as we have before
quoted from Augustine. But freedom is the peculiar mode of
the will, and its appropriate adjunct is contingency, since
it is freely per se inclinable in this or that direction.
Besides, if it is "circumscribed and determined by a more
powerful agent," that agent, either acts efficiently in each
particular case, or ordains generally according to an
established order in the universe. We have before, in answer
to the sixth proposition, admitted that such an ordination
occurred. You say that it is affirmed that the will is
determined by an agent, absolutely efficient in particular
cases. I deny that this can, with propriety, be attributed to
our writers, whom it is unjust to charge so abruptly with
that sentiment, if some of their expressions seem to savour
of this, since it is contrary to their view, as they explain
themselves in other passages. I will not argue this point
further, but repeat the simple denial that it can be
absolutely effected by a more powerful agent, operating
efficiently, that a principle and contingent cause should
sin. Here, my brother, you present two modes, one efficient,
the other deficient, yet each, in its own way, efficient. For
that which acts efficiently, is present with the work, and
effects it; that, which is deficient, abstains from the work,
and in itself effects that abstinence. You refer to the
former mode in these words, "by a more powerful agent, surely
and with certainty moving or impelling the cause in its own
nature, free and contingent, to the act of sin." This we
deny, and you, indeed, acknowledge that it is denied by our
writers.
Let us, then, consider the other mode which you express, in
these words, "or else withholding or withdrawing that which
was necessary to the avoidance of sin, on which conditions
the necessity and certain existence of sin, committed by the
creature, depend." Here, also, the mode is two-fold, namely,
that the "more powerful agent" withholds that which is
necessary to the cause, if it is absent, and removes it if it
is present; either of which would be a cause for the
production of sin. Here three things are to be considered,
the necessity of the avoidance of sin; -- the withholding or
even the removal of what is necessary; -- and the
consequence.
Concerning the first, it may be observed that every sin, that
is, every inordinate act contrary to law, whether it is
regarded in a universal or particular relation, is a habit or
act of the individual, for genera or species do not act per
se. It is, therefore, primarily and per se inordinate in the
individual agent, and pertains, in a secondary sense, to that
which is common and universal. Indeed, it does not at all
concern the constitution of the universe that sin should be
prevented, not only because sin could not disturb the
relations of the universe, and the Ruler of the universe
maintains its order, but also, because sin might,
incidentally, be of advantage even to the constitution of the
universe, and illustrate the wisdom, goodness, grace, mercy,
justice, patience, power, and all the beneficent attributes
of the Ruler of the universe. It was, then, plainly not
necessary, in the abstract, to the constitution of the
universe that sin should be avoided, and, therefore, nothing
was necessary for the avoidance of sin. If it had been
necessary to the constitution of the universe, God would have
provided for it, in the most complete manner, as Augustine
(Enchiridio ad Laurentium ) proves.
It may be said that it was necessary to the constitution of
the individual agent. It is true that if we regard the good
of the individual only, the avoidance of sin seems to be
necessary. But since the common good of the universe must be
preferred to the good of the individual, and even sin itself,
though incidentally, may be to the advantage of the
constitution of the universe, and sin is committed only by
the individual, it should be stated that the constitution of
the universe does not allow the assertion that it is
necessary that sin should not occur. If, however, the
creature knows that it is necessary, not for the universe,
but for himself, that he should not commit sin, the
prevention of sin must be sought, neither from the universe,
nor from its ruler, but from the individual agent, especially
when the ruler of the universe bestowed on that same agent
the unrestrained power to sin or not to sin, publicly and in
the very condition of his nature, and when He made him the
master of his own course, informed him of his power in that
respect, and most carefully admonished him of the necessary
result of his conduct in view of his individual end, with the
addition, even, of threatening. What then? Should God resume
that which He had bestowed. That would have been the act of
an imprudent, inconstant or impotent being, neither of which
qualities can be attributed to the Deity. Should He not have
made the original bestowment. In that case He would not have
displayed all the modes of His own wisdom, and man would have
desired that, which had not been bestowed upon him, for he
desired that which was far higher, and indeed impossible --
to be like God. If we have suitably considered these points,
which Tertullian discussed at length in his second book
against Marcion, we see, at once, that it was necessary,
neither to the constitution of the universe nor to the
relations of the individual agent, that sin should be
prevented by an external influence, since man himself
possessed, within his own power, the means of preventing it,
and had in the strongest possible mode, received from the
Deity, the knowledge of the necessity existing in his case in
view of his end. God infused into him the principle of
freedom. We, forsooth, wise in view of the result, judge that
that this was badly done by the Lord, that it would have been
better that He had not infused that principle, or, at least,
that it would have been better to have restrained that
freedom.
Concerning the second, we have shown that it was not
necessary that sin should be prevented. It belonged to man to
avoid it, not to another being to prevent man. This being
proved, we need not refer to the withholding and the removal
of that which was necessary for the avoidance of sin. But
that the truth may be presented, we remark, further, that it
did not pertain to the Deity to bestow that, which was
necessary to the avoidance of sin, in that particular act of
Adam; first, because He had already bestowed it; secondly,
because He could not bestow it, unless He should resume what
He had already bestowed. That He had already bestowed it is
evident from the gift of the free-will to man, which was a
principle, in the highest sense, free, and sufficient for
either course, either for the commission or the avoidance of
that sin. Nor, indeed, could He bestow any other hindrance,
unless He should resume that which He had already bestowed;
for that was a natural principle, namely, the free-will,
constituted, by the Deity, without any exception or
modification, the pure and absolute mistress in natural
things. If He had prevented it, either the will must have
wholly ceased to be a principle of action, or, in that
particular act, the condition of that principle, which God
had given to man by nature, and which He had, in that very
act, pledged to keep unviolated by Himself, would have been
violated. Why should God use such precaution with the man to
whom He had given full power over himself, and whom He had
already cautioned by an admonitory precept. Then, you will
say, He should, at least, not have withdrawn that which He
had bestowed; for He bestowed grace, and then withdrew it. I
deny that He withdrew any thing, previously bestowed, except
on account of sin, when man rejected it. Grace, that is, the
gift of grace, had been bestowed on man for the work of
grace, that is, according to which nature was ordained to
supernatural glory. For the work of nature, He bestowed, not
grace, but nature and the will. It was the office of nature
that the man should eat or not eat; it was the office of the
will, according to the command of God, that he should not eat
of the forbidden fruit. This was purely and merely the office
of the will, to which it was not necessary that grace should
be added, since it was bestowed in reference to things of a
gracious, not of a natural character.
Concerning the third, it may be observed that the remark "on
which conditions the necessity and certain existence of sin,
committed by the creature, depend," is wholly erroneous in
reference to the act of Adam. For Adam was under no
necessity, from any source, of committing sin; he was endowed
with pure freedom, as we have now, and frequently at other
times, affirmed. Indeed that assertion is not absolutely and
properly true in the present condition of the human race.
For, on the will of the creature, that is, on our will,
depends the necessity of the commission of sin, which
necessity the infinitely wise will of God permits and
ordains; but, on the contrary, the necessity of the non-
commission of sin, by the communication of grace, depends on
that infinitely wise will of God. It is hardly correct to say
that the necessity of the commission of sin depends on the
will of God, withholding or withdrawing His grace. Yet that
statement, in a certain sense, may be allowed.
In the fifth place, we admit your proposition "the creature,
left to his own nature, necessarily sins, if a law is imposed
on him, which cannot be observed by the natural powers
alone." But that particular law, imposed on Adam, was
observable by the natural powers alone, as we have proved in
answer to the fourteenth and sixteenth propositions. This
whole argument, therefore, and whatever depends on it, is
destroyed. Adam was prepared, by nature and grace, for the
observance of natural law. He was prepared for the observance
of this particular command, because the requisition was only
of a natural character, and of the utmost facility. Your
assumption is ambiguous and improper. The proper form would
be "God placed the creature in his natural state." It is
improperly affirmed that He "determined to leave the
creature, &c." Man left God, before God left man, as we have
before shown. The conclusion is, therefore, false. Your
assumption is ambiguous on account of the various use of the
verb, statuit, which is used in this place. We referred to
that ambiguity in our answer to the sixth proposition.
Finally, it is unsuitably affirmed that "the former theory
seems more probable than the latter." Since in fact or
substance and in their relation they are but one theory,
differing only in the mode of discussion and language. Let
us, however, see wherein one is more probable than the other.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-FIRST
PROPOSITION
The respects, in which those theories differ, have been
already stated in the reply to your answer to the first
proposition. We now inquire whether the first or the second
theory is founded on the truth of God and the authority of
the Scripture. I have already showed that the absurdity,
which I alleged against the first theory, is its necessary
consequence. You have not vindicated it, as it is explained
by those authors, from that charge, but have explained it
differently from the view of its authors, and have proved
that, so explained, it can be, in various ways, defended from
the allegation of absurdity, but this is irrelevant to our
present discussion. There has never been any question between
us concerning that theory, explained, as you think that it
ought to be explained. In this proposition, however, I do not
repeat this allegation, but show that the second theory is
liable to the same objection, and prove it by a comparison of
the first and second theories. This is the plan and scope of
the twenty first proposition. It will, therefore, be
necessary that we consider, first, the grounds of the correct
and deserved allegation of absurdity against the first
theory; secondly, the same allegation against the second
theory, and, at the same time, what you have said in defense
of both.
As to the first theory, I will show by certain syllogisms,
that it is a legitimate inference from it that God is the
author of sin. Then I will examine what you say in its
behalf.
The declaration of mercy, saving from actual misery, and of
justice, punishing sin is necessary, according to the decree
of God; -- But such mercy and justice cannot be declared
without the existence of sin and misery; -- Therefore, the
existence of sin and misery is necessary from the decree of
God, or -- therefore, sin must necessarily be committed from
the decree of God. All the points of this syllogism are taken
from the first theory, rightly understood according to the
sentiments of the authors themselves, as I proved in my reply
to your answers to propositions third and sixth.
Again; -- Sin cannot be committed necessarily by a free and
contingent cause, unless it be circumscribed and determined
by a more powerful cause, which it can not resist; -- But the
will of man is a free and contingent cause; -- Therefore, sin
cannot be necessarily committed by the will of man (which
must be the proximate cause of sin,) unless it be
circumscribed and determined by a more powerful cause which
it cannot resist. I add, that the mode of that determination
is two-fold.
Lastly; -- the cause, which determines the will, in its own
nature free and contingent, to the commission of sin, is, by
that determination, the cause of sin; -- But, according to
the first theory, God is the cause, which determines the will
to the necessary commission of sin; -- Therefore, God is, by
that determination, the cause of sin.
Now let us proceed to those things which you adduce in
apology and defense of that first theory. First, you affirm
that "the first position, 'God decreed to illustrate His own
glory by mercy and punitive justice,' we have, in answer to
the third proposition, shown to be expressed in too narrow
terms." I reply that the question is not whether the position
is true or false, or whether it is expressed in too wide or
too narrow terms, but whether it is assumed by those against
whose theory I have alleged absurdity, as its consequence.
And I showed in my reply to that answer that they, in so many
words, assume this position.
In the second place, you say that "the second, -- 'He could
not effect this without the introduction of sin' we thus
proved to be an erroneous statement." I reply, that it is not
the question whether the statement is erroneous or not, but
whether it is made by those, whose theory I charge with
absurdity. That they do assert this, and in plain language, I
proved in the reply just mentioned. The error is, then, to be
charged on them, not on me. Their assertion, however, is
true, that "mercy and justice -- as understood by them --
could only be declared by the entrance of sin into the
world." For sin is the formal cause in the object of that
justice, and of that mercy, as having consequent misery, as
its adjunct.
In the third place you "deny that 'sin must, of necessity and
with certainty, have been committed.'" This is not the point
in controversy. For I, also, admit that it is not true that
sin must necessarily be committed, and affirm that they, who
take the opposite ground, blaspheme the goodness and justice
of God, though I grant that the advocates of this theory do
not perceive this consequence, and the concession is due to
them, that in other places they teach that which is precisely
the contrary. But if those two premises are granted, I affirm
that it is a legitimate consequence that sin must of
necessity have been committed. You concede that it "must
certainly have been committed," but "certainly" in the
knowledge of God, not "certainly" in the relation of the
divine decree, which is dependent on the will of God, with
foreknowledge, as its antecedent. Those authors of the first
theory, of whom I have spoken, say that sin "must have been
committed certainly and necessarily in the relation of the
decree, and that it could only have been a subject of certain
foreknowledge, because it was decreed and ordained by God to
be committed." But I denied and still deny that sin could
necessarily have been committed by a free and contingent
cause. The cause of a necessary effect is necessary, that of
a contingent effect is contingent. But the will of man is a
free and contingent cause. Sin, therefore, could not have
been committed necessarily by it.
The "opposition in terms" is in your words, not in mine. I
did not say that sin "could have been committed necessarily"
but that it "could not have been committed necessarily."
There is here no contradiction in terms, as will be evident
by an examination of the statement in the following form; --
It could not occur that sin should be committed necessarily
by a free and contingent cause. Is it an absurd statement
that it can occur that a necessary cause should produce a
necessary effect, or its effect necessarily? Indeed it must
occur. I admit that the distinction which you make between
the words certainly and necessarily, is founded in truth;
certainty pertains to the knowledge of God; the necessity of
an event, to the will and decree of God. If this distinction
had been correctly observed by many, it might serve greatly
to the solution of many grave questions connected with this
matter; this you have illustrated, in a very learned manner,
in your book Concerning the fall of Adam.
In the fourth place you say that "two conditions, neither of
which is probable, are presented for the existence of sin."
Let us examine both. The former is not fully stated by you,
for the word which is the whole subject of controversy, is
omitted. Its insertion strengthens what I have affirmed; if
it is taken away, my statement is weakened. That word is
necessarily, and the condition should have been stated thus,
"The former is 'that sin could not have been committed
necessarily by a contingent cause, &c.'" Those things, which
you adduce, do not affect this condition. You indeed proved
that the will of man, as principle and complete power, could
have, freely and contingently, committed sin, but who denies
that statement? I add that if it did not freely sin, it did
not, at all, sin; and there is a contradiction in terms, if
it is asserted that the will sins necessarily, and this, not
in a single, but in a two-fold mode. For it pertains to the
will to do freely that which it does, and sin, if it is
necessary, is no longer sin. We are here speaking on the
hypothesis of the first theory, which we have undertaken to
refute.
You deny that the will is determined by a more powerful
agent; since it is not determined by a cause for then "the
will must cease to be a principle;" not by a principle, for,
as opposed to partial power, a superior principle so acts on
an inferior one as not to take away its peculiar mode of
action." I readily concede that this is truly and learnedly
affirmed. But did I say that the will was determined by a
more powerful agent? By no means. I affirmed that it could
not occur that the will should sin necessarily, unless it was
determined by a more powerful agent. That conclusion was to
be refuted by you, if, indeed, you wished to speak against me
in these things, not the antecedent or the consequent,
concerning which there is no controversy between us. I grant
that if the will is determined by a cause, it ceases to be a
principle; if by a principle, there is, in fact, no
determination, for, if its peculiar mode, which is freedom,
is not taken away, then it is not determined. If, then, it is
determined, it is by a cause; -- But it is determined, for
thence results the necessity of sin; -- Therefore, it is
determined by a cause. But if it is determined by a cause,
then, you say, the will must cease to be a principle, which
is absurd. I assent to this, and, therefore, affirm that the
first theory which involves this absurdity, is deservedly
disapproved. In your addition that in that determination, the
superior agent "either acts efficiently in each particular
case, or ordains generally," you do not, in my opinion,
correctly separate and distinguish between these two things,
if you do not previously show how that, which acts
efficiently, can be separated from that which ordains, (the
latter word being used, in the sense of Calvin and Beza in
the first theory, for the ordination, not of a thing already
done for a certain end, but of a thing to be done to secure a
fixed and prescribed result). If the same word is used
according to your idea, and as it should be used, I admit
that the distinction is a valid one, but this is not the
point in controversy, for it is in reference to the theory of
Calvin and Beza, who do not, at any time, so speak, but whose
meaning and sentiment is, invariably, that which I have
presented.
I concur, then, in your denial that it can be absolutely
effected, by a superior, efficient cause, that a principle
and a contingent cause should sin. Your denial, however,
should have been that the necessity of sin is a legitimate
sequence of that theory, and this denial should have been
sustained. Indeed, you should not have said that it can not
"be absolutely effected by a more powerful agent, operating
efficiently, that a principle and a contingent cause should
sin," but that it can not be so effected that a man should
necessarily sin, for, in the case supposed, a man ceases to
be a principle and contingent cause. I stated that "the chief
advocates of the first theory disapprove of the former mode
of action in the more powerful agent (that which moves or
impels) &c.," but they do this only in word, and do not show
how that mode has not an appropriate place in their theory.
Let us now examine the second mode, which I did not lay down
as absolutely necessary; but because I saw that the necessity
of the commission of sin could only be made out in one of
these two modes, therefore, I separately presented both. It
seems, however, to have belonged to your duty in this case,
in the first place, to show that it was possible that sin
should be committed, apart from either of these modes; in the
second place, set forth that other mode in which this could
be, and, in fact, was done; and in the third place, to prove
that this mode was such as not to make God the author of sin.
You do neither of these things: and I could, therefore, have
passed over all these things, as not within the scope of our
discussion, and as having no weight against my arguments. We
will, however, consider your answer.
In the first place, you show, by prolix argument, "that it
was necessary, neither to the constitution of the universe,
nor to the relations of the individual agent, that sin should
be prevented." No one denies this; no one affirms the
contrary. In that case, sin would not have been committed;
but it was committed. How could you have supposed that I had
any affinity for that sentiment, when I have at all times
contended that God made man of free-will, and of self control
that he might be able, of his own accord, and freely, to
avoid sin, or to commit it of his own choice, to which divine
constitution is directly opposed this idea of the necessary
prevention of sin. I, therefore, concede that it was not
absolutely necessary that sin should be prevented, that is,
that sin should not occur. If, however, I may be permitted
briefly to consider this point, though it may be a
digression, I will note some things which do not seem to me
to be said, with sufficient correctness. You say that it was
not necessary to the universe that sin should be prevented,
that is, as I interpret your meaning, it did not pertain to
the good of the universe that sin should be prevented. I may,
with your permission, deny this. For it pertained to the good
of the universe that the creature should remain in the
perfection of that state, in which the universe was created,
and established in the economy of the creation, by the Deity.
But by sin, it fell from that perfection of the universe, and
"was made subject to vanity" (Rom. viii, 20), whence results
the desire of deliverance from that vanity (v, 21 and 22). If
this does not pertain to the good of the universe, it would
not desire it. If it were not necessary, the whole universe
would not desire it. For its desire is for every good thing,
and its natural desire is for necessary good.
You prove your affirmation by a two-fold argument, first,
"because sin could not disturb the relations of the
universe," and secondly, "because sin might, incidentally, be
of advantage even to the constitution of the universe, and
illustrate the wisdom, goodness, grace, mercy, justice,
patience, power, and all the beneficent attributes of the
Ruler of the universe." To the first, I reply that it does
not seem to me to be very probable. The constitution of the
universe was such, by the creation and ordination of God,
that man was made in the image and likeness of God, and other
creatures were made subject to man, and subservient to his
use and advantage, because he was made in the image of God.
Sin has very greatly disturbed this relation and order. By
it, man became a rebel against God, and the whole creation
was not only removed from under his authority, but armed for
his destruction, except so far as there has been a
restoration in Christ. (See Heb. ii, 6-9.) There are those
who explain the word ajnakefalaiwsasqai used in Ephes. i, 10,
as referring to the restoration of all things to that
original condition from which they had fallen, on account of
human sin. The relation of divine providence in which it
sustains and governs all things, is far different from that
which would have existed, if sin had not entered into the
world, as may be very clearly proved from many passages of
the Bible. "But," you will say, "sin could not so disturb the
constitution of this universe, that God could not reduce it
to order." This, I acknowledge; but that order is not one,
which prevented that disturbance, but followed and corrected
it.
In the second argument, I think that there are two things to
be observed and corrected. First, that you say that "sin
might incidentally be of advantage, even to the constitution
of the universe," for neither per se nor incidentally, could
sin be of advantage to the constitution of the universe. Not
per se, for it resulted not from the intention of the Creator
of the universe, but from the disobedience of the rational
creature. Not incidentally, for, since this whole universe is
finite, its constitution is also finite; and, therefore, the
good, which pertains to its natural perfection, is finite;
the opposite of which finite good, that is, evil or defect,
erring from it, could be incidentally to the advantage of the
universe, that is, could be reduced to the good of the
universe. But sin is an evil, opposed not to finite but to
infinite good, to the justice and will of God. Hence, it
could not, incidentally, be to the advantage of the
constitution of the universe, determined and circumscribed by
its own limits. It could contribute, incidentally, to the
glory of the infinite good, because that infinite good, more
powerful than it, could, according to its own choice, turn it
out of its natural course, and, in this way, reduce to order
that, which is most disorderly; to the order, not of this
universe, but to one far transcending this whole universe,
and only circumscribed by the limits of infinite good. It can
not occur that any creature should so pass out of its own
appropriate order, or that of the whole universe, as not to
be under the control of the Infinite Author. I know, indeed,
that sin is, in a certain respect, opposed to finite good,
namely, to man, with whose happiness it interferes, but it
does not primarily prevent it, unless it is previously
regarded as opposed to the justice and will of God.
Secondly, I think that your statement, -- "Sin might,
incidentally, illustrate the wisdom, goodness, etc, of the
Ruler of the universe," is worthy of notice. This
illustration of the divine attributes is not the effect of
sin, but of the action of God, which makes use of sin to the
illustration of those divine attributes. Sin, in itself, or
abstractly, disgraces and dishonours God. Sin is said to do
this incidentally, for this is the common phraseology, but,
in my opinion, it will be more correctly affirmed of sin that
it is, incidentally, an occasion of illustrating the divine
glory by the exercise of those attributes. Indeed, if God had
not been able to triumph over sin, and to reduce it to order,
He would, by no means, have permitted it to be committed.
To return from this digression, I affirm that the subject of
discussion is not the necessity of avoiding sin, but what is
necessary for such avoidance, namely, that without which sin
can not be avoided by a man on whom the law is imposed.
Concerning this, indeed, you acknowledge that God gave to man
those things, which were necessary to the avoidance of sin,
which He neither resumed nor withdrew until man had, by his
own sin, rejected them. In this, I agree with you. This,
however, was not the point in controversy. It was to be
explained how, if a man could, avoid sin, the same man must
necessarily sin, which is the inference from the hypothesis
of the theory, which I impugn. It has been, previously,
discussed, at sufficient length, to what extent and in what
respects, grace was necessary for the observance of this or
that law. I readily admit that, with the explanation, which
you make, the inference is that Adam was under no necessity
to commit sin; but this is irrelevant to the controversy, and
indeed, is contrary to the view of Calvin and Beza. As we
have just affirmed, it was to be explained how it could be
true that Adam was under no necessity to commit sin, and yet
that he did necessarily commit sin, and how, if there was
imposed on him any necessity, either in this or that mode, or
in any mode whatever, God is not made the author of sin. Far
be it from me to make such a charge against the Deity, but I
affirm that it is a legitimate inference from that first
theory, and that the theory is, therefore, to be disapproved.
I come, now, to the second theory, of which I affirm that the
same absurdity can be inferred from it, in the following way.
My argument may be stated in the following syllogism, -- That
creature sins necessarily, on whom, left to his own nature, a
law is imposed, to the observance of which, the powers of
that nature are not adequate; -- But on man, left to his own
nature, a law was imposed, to the observance of which, the
powers of that nature were not adequate; -- Therefore, man,
left to his own nature, necessarily sinned. By consequence,
God, who imposed that law, and determined to leave man in a
state of nature, is the cause of the sin of man.
You admit the truth of the Major, but deny that of the Minor,
and then refer to your answer to the fourteenth and sixteenth
propositions. To these answers, we replied, -- We remark
further that if man has the ability to observe that law, and
God neither takes it away, nor prevents its free use, then it
must be conceded that it does not follow that man necessarily
commits sin. The phrase, which I use in the Minor, if
improper and ambiguous, is not to be imputed to me, who, in
explaining and impugning the theory of others, have used
their phraseology. For, in your disputation, already
frequently cited, Thesis fifteen, I find the following
statement. "Preterition is an act of the divine pleasure, by
which God, from eternity, determined to leave some of His
creatures in their natural condition." But, though I may not
be able to prove by that syllogism, the Minor of which I have
thought to be laid down by yourself in your Thesis -- in view
of the denial of that Minor -- that the necessity of sin may
be deduced from that theory, and that God is, therefore, as a
consequence of the same theory, made the author of sin, yet I
do not see how that denial of the Minor is consistent with
the sentiment set forth in your thesis, and how the necessity
of sin is not deducible from the same sentiment, and I will
give the reasons of my difficulty in both cases.
In the former case, you affirm that man could, by those
powers, which he has received from God, whether of nature or
of grace, observe the law which was enacted for them. Also,
in your Theses, you affirm that God passed by men, of such
character and capability, without the condition of sin, or
any foresight of the same. I deny that these two things are
mutually consistent, and prove it thus; -- "To him who is
made, from the condition of his nature, capable of any grace,
that is, of grace without which he can not obtain the end for
which he was made, that grace can be considered to be denied
only in view of the foresight of some act by which he may
have made himself incapable and unworthy of receiving it. But
such an act could only be sinful." In proof of this Major, I
remark that, otherwise God in vain bestowed on man the
capacity for that grace, which is absurd. I add that, if
nature does not fail to bestow that which is necessary, much
less is this true of God, the author and finisher of nature.
But God does not fail in things which are necessary, if He
denies to man that grace, without which he is unable to
attain the end for which he was made, which is also absurd. I
proceed with the syllogism: "But all men, not only the first
pair, but, in them, their posterity, considered in respect to
the primitive state, were capable of that grace, and were
created for an end, which was attainable only through that
grace; -- Therefore, that grace could be denied, or could be
considered as denied to man apart from the fact that he was
considered as a sinner." I sustain this consequent, namely,
that all men were capable of that grace, first, because all
men were created in the image of God. Secondly, if they were
not thus capable, they, who are to receive that grace, must
be made capable by some act on His part, which act could not
be that of predestination. For it is reasoning in a circle,
to argue that any act of predestination should make a person
capable of receiving the grace of predestination. Again, it
does not pertain to predestination to render any one capable
of receiving grace, but simply to bestow grace. The act must,
then, be one common to all men. If it is such, then by it all
men were made capable of that grace, which coincides with my
assertion that all were capable. I wish, on this account,
that it might be shown, in this place, how God could justly
deny, by a mere act of His pleasure, to any man that grace,
the capability of which He bestowed on him, and without which
he could not attain the end for which he was made, unless the
man had made himself, by his own demerit, unworthy of that
grace, and unable to receive it.
In the latter case, namely, that the necessity of sin is not
excluded from the theory, which is set forth in your Theses,
but may be fairly deduced from them, I show in the following
manner; -- The denial of grace, necessary to confirm the pure
nature of man, is a cause of the fall of man, that is, of his
sin, by the withdrawal or the non-bestowment of the necessary
preventive; -- But preterition, as defined in your Theses, is
a denial of grace, necessary to confirm the pure nature of
man; -- Therefore, preterition, thus defined, is a cause of
the fall of man, that is, of his sin, by the non-bestowment
of the necessary preventive. The truth of the Major is self-
evident; nor is it affected by the exception, "if that grace
was due to man, for it was due to him, if it was necessary to
the confirmation of his nature, without which he could not
attain the end for which he was made. The Minor is sustained
by your Thesis. "Preterition is an act of the divine
pleasure, by which God determined not to communicate to some
of His creatures that supernatural grace, by which their pure
nature might be confirmed, &c." But that grace is either
necessary or not necessary for the confirmation of the pure
nature of man. If it was not necessary, that pure nature
could have remained unfallen, without that grace. If it could
have remained unfallen without that grace, then those who
maintained their integrity, would have been partakers of
eternal life, and then, those, to whom, He had determined to
deny His grace, could have been among those not passed-by.
This is at variance with the definition, considered both in
itself and in relation to the other Theses. The necessity of
that grace, therefore, follows from that definition, and
consequently the denial of the same is the cause of the fall
by the non-bestowment of the necessary preventive.
Again, the final denial of supernatural happiness, of
necessity, either supposes or induces sin, for supernatural
happiness is denied, and can be denied only to sinners.
Preterition is the denial of final supernatural happiness.
Therefore, it necessarily either presupposes or induces sin.
But preterition, as defined in your Theses, does not
presuppose sin; it must then induce it. I do not see how it
can do this in any way, other than that of which I have
spoken. Let another way be presented, and one which may not
charge the Deity with the responsibility of sin, and this
theory may be freed from the allegation of absurdity.
You say that the Minor is improper and ambiguous. If this is
true, the responsibility is not on me, but on yourself, who
have thus spoken in the Theses so frequently cited, for in
them are the words "God determined to leave, &c." This
phraseology, however, is neither improper nor ambiguous. It
is not improper; for if He forsakes either the men who have
not already forsaken Him, or those who have forsaken Him, the
words "determined to leave" are properly used. It is not
ambiguous, since the word "determined" is used in the same
sense, in all parts of the syllogism, as we demonstrated
concerning the word "ordain" in the sixth proposition. We
spoke of the difference between this theory and the first, in
reply to your answer to the first proposition.
TWENTY-SECOND PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
First, it presents to the Deity, in the act of election, of
non-election, of predestination, and of preterition, man as
created, and created of such a character as did not in fact
pertain to him, while the first theory presents to the Deity,
in the act of predestination and of reprobation, man as to be
created, and to be created such as he was, in fact,
afterwards created.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND PROPOSITION
That this difference is not real, we have sufficiently
demonstrated in answering the sixth and tenth propositions.
The decree has reference to man to be created, considered
generally; and its execution to man as created according to
his various relations.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-SECOND
PROPOSITION
I affirmed that the second theory was less probable than the
first, and proved it by five reasons. We proceed to a more
extended consideration of them, and, in the first place, we
examine the first, that is, the one presented in this
proposition.
The theory of Calvin regards the Deity, as engaged, in the
decree of predestination, with an object identical with the
object of the execution of that decree, but the second theory
regards the Deity as having reference, in the decree of
predestination, to man as he is considered in a purely
natural state, which can effect nothing supernatural or
divine, while, in its execution, He can not have reference to
man in such a condition, since no man ever existed wholly
without a participation of supernatural endowments, either by
creation or superinfusion. It should be observed that
predestination does not intervene between creation and
superinfusion, and that superinfusion is not the work of
predestination, as was previously demonstrated. The answer
which you present does not seem to be relevant. For though
the decree was made before the creation of man, yet
predestination, explained according to the second theory, had
reference only to man considered as created. Creation is not
a result of the execution of the decree of predestination,
understood in that sense, and though the execution of the
decree may, according to this theory, refer only to man as
created, yet the question is to be answered -- whence did the
first act of execution take its origin? Let those things be
examined which are said in reply to your answer to the 6th
and 8th propositions.
TWENTY-THIRD PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Secondly, because it does not unite decrees between which
there is a just coherence. For it unites the decree in
reference to leaving some in their natural state with the
decree of reprobation by the mode of the foresight of sin,
which foresight, or which sin it considers as contingent;
while from the decree of preterition sin results of
necessity, and therefore, the reprobation, according to the
justice of God, of those on whom He has determined not to
have mercy, should have been united to that decree, not by a
conditional, but by a necessary copula. Those things, which
have, to each other the relation of necessary sequence, are
decreed, by the Deity, in decrees which necessarily cohere; -
- Preterition and sin necessarily cohere; -- Therefore,
decrees concerning them should be conjoined by a closer bond.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-THIRD PROPOSITION
We affirm, on the contrary, that, according to this theory,
there is a just copula of the decrees which mutually cohere.
For it is necessary that any transition from one decree to
the other must be in harmony with its own execution. But the
transition has not reference properly and per se to the
necessity of that decree, but it pertains to contingency. As
in the predestination of the saints, the decree is two-fold,
first, that of election and the preparation of grace,
secondly, that of glory; and the transition of the former to
the latter, is by death which is contingent, as the wages of
sin, so also in the predestination of the reprobate is
contained a two-fold decree, first, that of non-election, or
preterition, or reprobation and alienation from grace,
secondly, that of damnation; and the transition from the
former to the latter, is by sin and death, the consectary of
sin, between which God graciously leaves a space that there
may be even in sinners and the reprobate themselves, a proof
of the divine forbearance, calling them to repentance. In
this case, then, the copula should have been stated to be not
necessary, but contingent. For everywhere in the Scriptures
God disavows sin, and the saints commit it, "for the
righteous Lord loveth righteousness; His countenance doth
behold the upright." (Psalm xi, 7.)
We concede that "from the decree of preterition sin results
of necessity," that is, certainly; since the inference from
that which is true is necessarily true? But we most firmly
deny that sin is, universally or in part, of necessity, in an
efficient sense, the result of that decree, by the necessity
of the consequent or the conclusion. We by no means deny that
sin is the consequent of that decree, though not as caused by
it, or as its necessary effect.
A syllogistic argument is added for the proof of assertion,
but we can not absolutely or simply approve the Minor. We
deny that "preterition and sin necessarily cohere," per se,
for if they necessarily cohere, it would be as true that all
are passed by who have sinned, as that some are passed by who
have sinned; that is, all sinners would be passed by as all
the passed by are sinners. But the consequent is false,
therefore, the antecedent is also false. It is not necessary,
indeed, that there should be a reciprocal coherence between
those things, which differ in mode, one being necessary and
the other contingent; if it were so, nothing would be
contingent. There are many things which are necessary; yet
without a cohering contingency. But on the contrary, nothing
is so contingent, as not to have, with it, something of a
necessary character. Such is the connection of preterition
and sin, in relation to themselves. But, in relation to man,
in the case of those who are descended from Adam, and
involved in his corruption and fall, and who are passed by of
God, we confess that preterition and sin cohere necessarily,
that is immutably, since, though it is committed
contingently, yet that necessity of the connection of sin
with preterition and reprobation becomes absolute and
immutable, as he who contracts a debt, if he is not able to
pay, necessarily remains a debtor. The other points have been
previously discussed.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY THIRD
PROPOSITION
Those decrees, neither of which can exist or not exist
without the other, are said to be united by a necessary
copula. By this copula the decree of the preparation of grace
should be connected with the decree of the preparation of
glory. For neither exists without the other, and neither can
exist without the other. If preterition and predamnation are
to be connected by the same copula, I have already obtained
what I desired. But the transition by which one passes from
grace to glory is not the copula by which one decree is
united to the other, but that copula is the will of God,
which wills to bestow, upon no person, one without the other,
and which wills to bestow both where it wills to bestow
either. The transition to glory is death; to which sin does
not hold a corresponding relation in the decree of
preterition and predamnation. For predamnation is on account
of sin; glory is not account of death. With reference to sin
and its merit, God determined to damn some, for sin alone is
the meritorious cause on account of which God can damn a
person. Death has no such relation to glory, which, after
death, follows of the divine predestination and grace. That
death is not the copula is apparent from the fact that it is
the transition both from grace to glory, and from non-grace
to damnation or punishment by the intervention of sin. For
the copula of those opposite decrees can not be the same, and
without any modification.
I accede to what is said concerning death and transition, and
I wish that the consequence may be considered. If death is
the transition from the decree of the preparation of grace to
glory, it follows that the decree of preparation of grace and
glory has reference to sinners. For death can not be the
transition from one decree to another, or from execution to
execution, apart from the relation of sin, as a condition
requisite in the object. I concede that death, as a
transition, depends not, per se and properly, on the
necessity of the decree, by which God determined to bestow
grace and glory on any creature. It does, however, depend on
the necessity of that decree by which God ordained to lead
man to glory only by the intervention of death. This decree
supposes sin. It has been proved that sin necessarily results
from the decree of preterition, that is, of preterition,
defined according your Theses.
In the Minor of my syllogism there was a verbal mistake, and
the word reprobation should be substituted for the word sin,
and the syllogism should be read with this correction.
Preterition and reprobation (the latter referring to
preparation of punishment,) necessarily cohere, as is
apparent from the previous statement, in which I said that
"it unites the decree in reference to leaving some in their
natural state, with the decree of reprobation by the mode of
the foresight of sin, &c." The Minor, thus corrected, is
true, and, when I wrote it, I satisfied myself of its truth
by that very argument, which you use. For all the passed-by
are predamned (to substitute that word according to the view
which you have set forth in this answer,) and all the
predamned are passed by. Therefore, the decree concerning the
passing-by of some must be connected, by a necessary copula,
with the decree concerning the damnation of some. But, in
this case, they are united, not by a necessary, but by a
contingent copula; for they are connected by the mode of the
prevision of sin, which is made contingent. But preterition
and predamnation have a necessary mutual coherence;
preterition and sin also necessarily cohere. For predamnation
is decreed only on account of sin.
Let us now consider your answer to my Minor as it was
erroneously stated by me. You "deny that preterition and sin
necessarily cohere," as asserted in my Minor. Your reason for
denying it, is that "all sinners would be passed by, as all
the passed-by are sinners," and this is not true, for all the
passed-by are indeed sinners, but not all sinners are passed-
by. I concede the antecedent, and yet deny the consequent. It
is not, of necessity, true that every case in which a copula
is necessary, that it should be so in a reciprocal sense. Sin
and preterition can cohere by a necessary copula, even if
this is not reciprocally true. Man and animal are connected
by a necessary copula, but this is not reciprocally true. We
may say that every man is necessarily an animal, but we may
not say, reciprocally, that every animal is a man. Here let
us consider the reason on account of which it can be truly
said that all the passed-by are sinners, but it cannot be
truly said that all sinners are passed by. It is not this,
that sin is a wider term than preterition, and sinners a
wider term than the passed-by, whence also it seems to me to
be a very probable conclusion that sin was prior to
preterition, since things, which are generic in their
character, are naturally prior to those which are specific.
It also seems to me to be deducible from this reciprocation
and inversion, (namely, all the passed-by are damned, and all
the damned are passed by, and all the passed-by and damned
are sinners, and, indeed, only sinners are passed by and
damned), that, consequently, preterition and predamnation
pertain to sinners, and, therefore, to men considered in
their sins, which I designed to argue, and have especially
undertaken to prove. In this way also, sin precedes both
preterition and predamnation, and if its natural efficiency
is considered, all sinners, not some merely, will be passed
by and damned. But since the natural efficiency of sin is
hindered in some, by the force of a superior cause, which is
the will of God, it hence occurs that those sinners are
passed by and damned on whom God has determined not to have
mercy, those are not passed by or predamned, on whom He has
determined to have mercy.
Your observations concerning the mode of coherence between
the necessary and the contingent, are not opposed to my view,
even if they are true, which I do not think to be beyond
controversy. The necessary and the contingent differ in their
entire essence, so that no thing, whatever it may be, can be
said, at the same time, to be necessary and contingent, that
is, (to preserve the phraseology,) to be done necessarily and
contingently. Yet I think that it can not, without an
exception necessary to be considered in this place, be said
that he necessarily remains a debtor, who has contracted a
debt, and is not able to pay it. There should have been the
addition of the exception "unless a remission of the debt is
granted by the creditor," for without that exception, there
would be a reciprocal relation between sin and damnation, so
that all sinners would be damned, and all the damned would be
sinners. For sin is a debt in which all sinners are involved,
and not only does it deserve punishment, but it will also be
certainly punished, unless it shall be pardoned and remitted.
From what you here say, I think that it is possible to deduce
an argument in favour of my theory. For you make an analogy
between the contingent act of sin and the contraction of
debt; also between the being necessarily a sinner, the being
necessarily passed by, and the remaining necessarily in debt,
unless there is ability to pay. There is between the first
terms in each, an analogy, and also, between the second
terms, such a relation that in each case the former naturally
precedes the latter; hence sin was committed contingently by
man before he was necessarily constituted a sinner, also,
before he was passed by of God. And who does not know that
man, since he freely sinned, made himself the bond-slave of
sin, and, therefore, is necessarily subject to sin, until his
deliverance is effected through Christ, the Mediator,
according to the words of Scripture, "Whosoever committeth
sin, is the servant of sin. If the Son, therefore, shall make
you free, ye shall be free indeed." (John viii, 34-36.)
TWENTY-FOURTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Thirdly, because it leaves a hiatus in the decrees, not
introducing, between the decree of preterition and that of
reprobation, the decree concerning the certain and necessary
existence of sin; for, sin, in my judgment, necessarily
results from preterition itself, by the removal, as they say,
of the hindrance
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH PROPOSITION
We deny that any intermediate decree is necessary between the
decree of preterition and that of damnation, (for so you
understand the word reprobation), or that any decree is
interposed, and claim that this is so from the very nature of
the decrees. For these decrees are of the divine efficiency,
and they are effected by the Deity, immediately of His own
will, and justly of His own wisdom. But the decree concerning
the existence of sin pertains to the mediate work of nature,
and is effected in that mode, in which God decreed, that is,
contingently, from a contingent cause, for the will is, in
this case, the principle of contingent causes, and that
particular motion of Adam towards the fall was the contingent
cause of the fall and of sin, which befell our race.
Therefore, it is necessary that a distinction should be made,
in this mode, in what is said concerning the certain and
necessary existence of sin. The existence of sin, if you
regard its origin, was certain in the knowledge of God, but
not necessary by the power of the decree as a cause, because
God, as absolutely as possible and without any exception, by
the order of nature in natural things, bestowed on the will
of Adam, the free power of committing or avoiding sin. Thus,
by the power of that decree, it was necessary that man should
sin or should not sin; by the power of the will, it was
contingent that man should sin; finally sin was committed
contingently by the motion of the will, because it was
decreed contingently.
But the existence of sin, if you have respect to the act in
which our first parents fell, though contingent in its
origin, is yet certain and necessary in the order of nature,
by which it occurs that the leprosy of that sin, which
infected them, is transmitted to their posterity. For an evil
cause produces an evil effect, "a corrupt tree bringeth forth
evil fruit," (Matt. vii, 17), a serpent begets a serpent, a
leper begets a leper. That, which pertains to nature, can,
with no probable reason, be ascribed to a decree concerning
supernatural things. The existence is, in every mode, of
nature. It can not then be ascribed to supernatural decrees.
You present, as the reason of your affirmation, that sin
necessarily results from preterition itself, by the removal
of the hindrance. This was, in my judgment, refuted with
sufficient clearness, in the answer to your twenty-second
proposition.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH
PROPOSITION
The mode should have been pointed out here, in which it could
occur that the decree of preterition should necessarily
cohere with the decree of predamnation, without a necessary
copula. The foresight of contingent sin is not a necessary
copula. That they may necessarily cohere, since the decree of
preterition considers man, not as a sinner, and that of
predamnation considers him only as a sinner, there must, of
necessity, be the necessary existence of sin, either by the
force of the decree of preterition, or of some other divine
decree, such, for example, as Beza describes. We speak here
of the existence of sin, in respect to the act of Adam, not
of its necessary existence in respect to our corrupt
conception and birth. For the latter is the effect of the
former, by the mode of merit, by the intervention of the
judgment and sentence of God, imputing the guilt of the first
sin to all the posterity of Adam, not less than to Adam
himself and to Eve, because they also sinned in Adam.
I concede the truth of what you say, at the end of your
answer, that those things, which are natural, are not to be
ascribed to supernatural decrees. But sin, if it is
necessary, that is, if it is necessarily committed, and is
not a natural act, namely, an act dependent on the will of
man, as the principle of his own action; and if sin is
natural, then its necessity would not have been ascribed, by
Calvin and Beza, to the decree of predestination. We do not
here discuss the thing considered in itself, but considered
on the hypothesis of that theory which unites preterition
with predamnation, by a necessary copula, not by sin,
existing previously both to preterition and predamnation.
Whether that, which I said concerning the necessary existence
of sin as a result of the decree of preterition, by the mode
of the removal of the hindrance, was refuted by you, may,
perhaps, be decided by a reference to my reply to your answer
to the twenty-second proposition.
TWENTY-FIFTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Fourthly, because it is not consistent with the condition of
the creation and perpetuation of the human race, which was
that all should be considered in one, and that all should
come from one. It regards men, either as not considered in
Adam, or as considered in various modes in Adam, that is, in
him as just created, not yet fallen.
REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-FIFTH PROPOSITION
Those things, which are distinct in their whole genus, are
distinct also in their mode. The condition of the creation
and the perpetuation of the human race, is natural (for
creation is natural by reduction, as unity is ascribed to
number, a point to a line,) but the condition of election and
predestination is wholly supernatural. They differ,
therefore, in mode. A consequence, from things which lack
analogy and equality, is not valid. All things, indeed, in
nature are considered in one thing, and all come from one,
but in the case of predestination, all are not considered in
one, but each is considered in himself, nor do all come
naturally from one, but all are supernaturally distinguished,
by God, in Christ. Man, according to nature, is considered
universally and individually in Adam; according to grace, he
is considered only individually in Christ, for this is not
the order of nature, but the benefit of grace. Therefore, the
predestinate are considered, not in nature and according to
nature, but of nature according to grace, which is personal
and not natural. Law pertains to nature; privilege to grace.
Consequently, what is presented in reference to the
consideration of men in Adam, is irrelevant.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-FIFTH
PROPOSITION
The force of my argument is sustained. For though creation
and predestination differ in mode and genus, as natural and
supernatural, yet predestination and reprobation, which
impinge on the conditions of creation, can not be true. I
should have used a more correct phraseology, if I had said
inconsistent instead of not consistent. For a supernatural
action can add something to created nature, and exceed the
order of nature, but can do nothing contrary to creation. But
predestination and reprobation, as set forth in your Theses,
ordain something contrary to the conditions of creation; they
cannot, then, have place among true doctrines. I will prove
my assumption. You state that some are passed by apart from
the consideration of sin. But a man can be considered apart
from sin, only as he was in his primitive state, but the
theory under consideration regards some as passed-by,
considered in their primitive state, which can not be true,
because, in their primitive state, they had the power to
persevere in good, and in the avoidance of sin, and,
therefore, they could be saved by obedience to the law, and,
by consequence, they were not passed by, considered in that
state, since the passed-by, according to the definition of
your Theses, necessarily fail of salvation, and are even
necessarily damned, though with the intervention of sin. If
you say that they were necessarily damned after they were
foreseen as sinners, I reply that they were also passed by
after they were foreseen as about to sin, indeed, seen as
sinners. We notice, also, your two-fold distinction in that
consideration. Men are considered in one, and they are
considered also, each in himself, but all are considered in
one such as they are in him, and each is considered in
himself, such as he is in himself, else the distinction is
false. This consideration is two-fold in reference to a two-
fold condition. They are considered in the condition of
primitive integrity, and in that of fallen, sinful creatures.
In the primitive state, all are considered in one, as in
their origin and stock, and while this stands, they stand.
Each is considered in himself as standing, and as having,
from the arrangement of nature and grace, every thing which
the original stock had, whether of nature or of grace -- the
term grace being used in contradistinction to nature,
otherwise whatever a man has may be regarded as of gracious
bestowal. Therefore, all are considered as true, just, and
holy. In the state of sin, all are considered in one who
sinned, and all are considered to have sinned in him. Each is
considered in himself as deficient in those things, which he
would have had of grace, if the first man had remained pure,
and as involved in sin and in the demerit of sin. Now, so far
as all are considered in one, whether as a pure or as a
fallen being, there is no predestination, no preterition or
reprobation, no predamnation. For then all would be
predestinate and none reprobate, or all would be reprobate
and none predestinate. Therefore, predestination and
reprobation have place in reference to them, as they are each
considered in themselves. Concerning this, then, there is no
question between us. But the point at issue, is this -- In
what state are they each considered by God, in the act of
predestination and of preterition? You answer, that they are
considered in the primitive state, or rather that they are
considered in general; I affirm that they are considered,
individually and definitely, in the state of sin. Otherwise,
I say that this decree impinges on the conditions of
creation, as I have demonstrated. This is absurd, for
supernatural things can and indeed must be superior to
natural, but by no means contrary to them.
TWENTY-SIXTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Fifthly, because, according to it, the decree is equivocal,
and true only on condition of a distribution of its terms. It
is equivocal because glory and grace, which are prepared in
election and reprobation, are equivocal; for it is the glory
which follows the ignominy of sin through the grace of
remission and regeneration, or it is glory bestowed on
nature, as originally created, by supernatural grace
superinfused into that nature. It is true only on the
condition of a distribution of its terms, because it
absolutely ordains neither kind of grace to its subject; not
the grace, superinfused upon nature, and glory by means of
it, because it is not that grace by which a man is saved and
glorified; not the grace of remission and removal, because it
can ordain that grace only to the sinner. The decree must,
then, be understood with this distribution; -- I will to this
man glory and grace, certainly indeed, yet of the former or
latter kind, as one or the other may be necessary for him,
according to the diversity of his condition.
REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-SIXTH PROPOSITION
We deny that "the decree is equivocal and true only on
condition of a distribution of the terms." It is not
equivocal for it is expressed in general terms and refers to
grace and glory in a general sense. That which is thus stated
is not equivocal. Neither grace nor glory, in the decree, is
two-fold, but both are one in substance, in fact, and in
relation, but different in degrees in relation to their
object. As life in man is not two-fold in its nature, though
it may increase of itself, by the law of nature, so neither
grace nor glory is two-fold, though each may progress in us
by its own degrees. Grace, in both cases, is supernatural,
both when it graciously renews nature, and when it raises a
person above the mode of nature. Whatever may be said of it,
it is supernatural and in fact one. Glory, also, in both
cases, is universally supernatural, both that which is
adequate to the mode of nature, and that which is above
nature. The latter embraces and absorbs the former, as the
greater light does the less; yet, in both cases, it is light,
and is supernatural, since nature lost and grace may restore
it. Nor, indeed, is that decree to be considered as certain
only on condition of a distribution of terms; for God
absolutely ordains His whole grace, that is, every mode of
it, to His own elect, without modification or any exception.
Therefore, also, He ordains and bestows upon them the grace
of remission and renewal, as its antecedent mode, and the
grace of that celestial glory, as its consequent mode.
Indeed, if it was possible that any thing of a supernatural
character, in addition to the antecedent grace or consequent
glory pertaining to nature, should be desired, and if there
is any thing else to which I might wish to refer, God will
fully bestow it, because He has universally decreed to His
own, that grace and glory which is, indeed, communicable. But
God can ordain the grace of remission and renewal only to the
sinner and in relation to sin, but He had respect to the
whole man, generally, on whom He could bestow His whole grace
and apply it in a supernatural mode. The decree, then, of
grace and of glory is to be understood absolutely, because it
was ordained absolutely and generally, without restriction,
exception or modification of the grace and glory which God
communicates to His own. There is variety in the object and
in its mode, but the fact that grace and glory is absolutely
and generally decreed and bestowed on various objects, does
not evince that the grace and glory are diverse in
themselves; as the light of the Sun is not various, if it
comes to us variously, or is variously perceived by us.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-SIXTH
PROPOSITION
You seem not to have fully understood my proposition. -- That
you may understand it according to my meaning, I will, so far
as I am able, state it in phraseology, used by yourself in
this matter. I say that this decree is equivocal, because
grace and glory, prepared in this decree, are equivocal, that
is each of them is equivocal. For the grace, which preserves
and confirms in original integrity, is one thing; that, which
restores from a sinful state is another. Also, glory, in
respect to the mode of the object, which, being above nature,
is superadded to that which is adequate to the mode of
nature, is one thing, and that, which is bestowed on nature,
freed from the ignominy of sin and misery, is another.
This decree is true only on condition of a distribution of
its terms, because it does not ordain to man either this
grace or that, or glory of this or that mode, absolutely, but
one only, in the case of grace or of glory, and on a certain
condition. It does not ordain to man, absolutely, the grace
of preservation in his original integrity, and glory from or
through that grace, because that is not the grace and glory,
by which man is saved and glorified. It does not ordain to
man, absolutely, the grace of restoration from a state of
sin, and of glory from a state of ignominy, because it can
absolutely ordain that grace and glory only to a sinner.
Therefore the decree must be understood with the following
distribution of its terms: -I ordained to this man grace or
glory, certainly indeed, but either of this or of that mode
as the former or the latter shall be necessary for him,
according to his different state of integrity or of sin.
I will now consider your answer. You deny that this decree is
equivocal: I affirm it. To sustain your denial, you add, "it
is expressed in general terms, and refers to grace and glory
in a general sense. That, which is thus stated, is not
equivocal." I concede the latter, and deny the former. I
affirm that grace and glory are spoken of, indeed in general
terms, but they are not understood in a general sense, which
is equivocation. I prove that they are not understood in a
general sense, because grace and glory are prepared for man,
in predestination, not understood in a general sense, but as
they are spoken of particularly. Examine your remarks in
answer to Proposition 11th. That cannot be said to be
prepared generally, which is not prepared in some particular
part or species. Much less can that be said to be so
prepared, which is of a nature, such that, if it is prepared,
in one part or species, of itself, it can not be prepared in
another. But this is the state of the case. Grace, taken
generally, comprehends the grace of preservation in the state
of integrity, and of restoration from the state of sin.
Glory, taken generally, comprehends glory superadded to
primitive nature and glory bestowed on fallen nature, raised
from a state of ignominy. Neither grace nor glory, generally,
is prepared for man. If, indeed, the grace of preservation in
a state of integrity, and glory, superadded to nature, was
prepared for man, then the grace of restoration from a state
of sin, and glory, from a state of ignominy, could not be
prepared for him, since he did not need this latter grace and
glory, if he obtained the former, and there could be no place
for the latter, if the former had a place. But, if there is
any place for the grace of restoration from a state of sin
and of glory from one of ignominy, a place was not made, in
the predestination of God, for the grace of preservation and
for glory by means of that grace. Hence it is apparent that
my proposition was not clearly understood by you, who have
thought that there is such a relation of two-fold grace and
glory, that one grace embraces and absorbs the other, and one
glory has the same relation to the other, according to the
illustration of light. Grace, renewing the nature, and grace,
exalting, above the mode of nature, the same renewed nature,
sustain this relation, for one embraces and perfects the
other. I did not, however, refer to that two-fold grace, but
to the grace of preservation in the primitive state, and to
that of restoration from a state of sin. These are not
mutually dependent; one does not comprehend the other, but
one excludes the other. But glory, adequate to the mode of
nature, and glory, above nature, sustain such a relation,
that one perfects and embraces the other. I did not, however,
refer to this two-fold glory, but to glory, in both modes
supernatural, in one superadded to primitive nature, in the
other bestowed on fallen nature, restored from its ignominy.
In this sense, therefore, that decree is equivocal, since, in
it, the words, grace and glory, are spoken of, generally and
in a universal sense, but they are not prepared, generally
and in a universal sense, in predestination, but separately,
distinctly and particularly.
You also deny that "this decree is true only on condition of
a distribution of its terms," but you deny it in the sense,
which was really intended by them. Your denial is true in the
former sense. For the grace of remission and that of
renovation, as an antecedent mode, are simply and truly
prepared for man. But that was not my meaning, as is most
clearly apparent from the words themselves. For I placed the
grace of remission and of renewal in contrast not to the
grace of celestial glory, but to the grace of preservation in
a state of integrity. God, in predestination, did not
absolutely ordain grace in those two modes, or those two
parts or species of grace for man, or either of them
absolutely; but one only, and that on the condition of
distribution, according to the decree of which we treat. He
did not ordain both parts absolutely, since both parts can
not have place at the same time. The former excludes the
latter as unnecessary, and, indeed, as not being able to have
place at the same time; the latter excludes the former, as
not having been applied, from which want of application in
the case of the former, namely, the grace of preservation in
the primitive state, the latter, namely, that of restoration
from a sinful state, became necessary, if indeed man was to
be saved of grace. He did not ordain either of these, simply
and absolutely without any condition; not that of
preservation, for it was not bestowed on man, and it would
have been bestowed, if it had been prepared absolutely and of
predestination; not that of remission of sins and of renewal,
that is, of renewal from a state of sin, because He could
ordain that grace absolutely only to a sinner, and that
decree did not regard man as a sinner. But it ordained, on
condition of the distribution of the terms, either this or
that, as the condition of man demanded one or the other.
That a decree of this kind is true only on condition of the
distribution of its terms is clear from the terms, if
correctly understood. I will illustrate it by an example.
Every statement is necessarily true or false; -- But this is
a statement; Therefore it is necessarily true or necessarily
false. This does not follow. For on condition of a
distribution of the terms, it is true that every statement is
necessarily true or false, and neither part is, abstractly
and separately, necessary. The nature of the decree of
predestination demands that it should be absolutely certain
and true that God ordained for a man the grace of
preservation in a state of integrity, or absolutely certain
and true that God ordained for a man the grace of renewal
from a state of sin. But God does not ordain, on condition of
the distribution of terms, for a man either the grace of
preservation or the grace of renewal.
But since predestination, as it is defined by you, refers to
the last mode, I affirmed correctly that it is only certain
on condition of the distribution of terms. I conclude, by a
fair deduction, that it is, therefore, not predestination. If
it truly pertains to predestination to ordain, absolutely and
definitely, the grace of preservation and, if it does not
ordain that, to ordain, absolutely and definitely, the grace
of restoration, then it follows that God did not and could
not regard man in general. For the ordination of the former
grace definitely excludes sin, that of the latter definitely
includes the consideration of sin, and, in both modes, that
general consideration is equally refuted. For the general
consideration of an object neither excludes any circumstance,
nor is united to any certain and special circumstance. That
predestination of grace, however, which preserves in a state
of integrity, excludes the circumstance of sin, and this
predestination of grace restoring from a state of sin, is
definitely united to the circumstance of sin. Therefore the
decree of predestination was not made abstractly and
universally or generally, without any restriction or
modification of grace and glory, but it was, and necessarily
must have been, made with a restriction and modification of
grace and glory. For the decree of predestination is that, by
which is prepared the grace, through which a man is certainly
saved, not that, by which salvation would be possible, if
indeed any state of man might require the application of such
grace, nor that, by which he would be saved, if it should be
applied to any state of man. But that grace, by which a man
is certainly saved, must be modified and restricted. For he
is saved either by the grace of preservation, or by that of
restoration, by one or the other, of necessity. If he is
saved by one, he does not need to be saved and he can not be
saved, by the other; if he is not saved by one, he must be
saved by the other, or excluded from salvation, and that, by
which he is saved, is prepared in predestination, and the
other, by which he is not saved, is absolutely excluded.
You affirm that "there is variety in the object and in its
mode." But we here treat of that variety in the object and
its mode, which variety is so great that grace and glory must
be modified and restricted to this or that variety of the
object; the grace of preservation in the state of integrity
and glory, by means of it, are suitable to the object,
considered in its original state; the grace of restoration
and glory, by means of it, are suitable to the object,
considered in sin and misery. Grace and glory, considered
absolutely and universally, can not be decreed or bestowed,
in predestination, upon various objects. For predestination
has reference, necessarily, to a uniform and univocal object,
that is either to one absolutely not a sinner, or to a
sinner, and it bestows grace only on a subject, of one mode
and univocal. It saves one, absolutely not a sinner or
absolutely a sinner; it does not adapt itself to this one or
that one, of this or of that character, but it adapts itself
absolutely to an object of this character, and not otherwise
considered. The grace of preservation saves, absolutely, the
angels, for the grace of restoration was never ordained
concerning them or bestowed upon them. The grace of
restoration absolutely saves human beings, for the grace of
preservation, in their original state of integrity, was never
ordained for them or bestowed upon them. Grace is, indeed, as
you say, one in itself, and in its essence, as, also, is
glory, but each is variously applied according to the mode
and relation of the object; and, between the application of
grace and the mode and relation of the object, there is this
reciprocity that, from the application of grace, the relation
of the object may be inferred, and from the mode of the
object, reciprocally may be deduced what grace it may be
necessary to apply to that object. The same is true of glory.
The illustration of the light of the Sun, introduced at the
end of your answer, may also serve my purpose. The light of
the Sun is one and the same, whether it is shed upon and
renders more luminous a body already illuminated, or it is
shed on a dark body and drives away the darkness, and renders
that light which was before dark. If only the same difference
existed between an illuminated and a dark body, as exists
between a man in his original state and a sinner, then rays
of the Sun, sufficient to illuminate the body already light,
would not suffice to illuminate the dark body, unless they
were greatly increased and multiplied.
TWENTY-SEVENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I will not now touch the theory of Augustine, because that
would be a futile task, if the theory of Aquinas, of prior
consideration, can be sustained to my satisfaction. These,
then, are the matters which I would present to your
consideration.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-SEVENTH PROPOSITION
I have always thought, and yet think, that the theory of
Augustine was substantially consistent with the two theories
which have been considered. You will see that this is the
fact, if you make allowance for certain modes of expression
used by him, and for a single diverse circumstance.
I have thus, my brother, in this subject, used the diligence
and promptitude which was possible, in view of the duties
which have, not rarely, interrupted me. Receive my effort
with kindness, if it may not answer your expectation. May the
God of truth and peace seal on your mind that saving peace,
more and more, and graciously guide both of us and all His
servants in the way of truth to His own glory, and to the
edification of His church in Christ Jesus our saviour. Amen.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-SEVENTH
PROPOSITION
The theory of Augustine is very different from both the
preceding theories, as may be seen from this whole
discussion, on account of the circumstance, added by him to
the object of the decree, concerning which we treat. For, if
the circumstance of sin was, of necessity, to be considered
by the Deity, in the act of decree, and was definitely
considered in that very act, then it must be true that those
discussions and explanations of the same decree, err greatly
from the truth, which state that there was no necessity of
the consideration of sin, and no actual consideration of it
by God, when He ordained the decree. The remark may be added,
with propriety, that, by the mere addition to the object of
the decree and right explanation of the circumstance of sin,
all the absurdities and blasphemies, which are usually
alleged against the decree of predestination and reprobation
may be repelled and clearly refuted, not being logical
consequences of that decree.
I have thus presented my objections to your answers to my
propositions, not so much with the thought of refuting them,
as with a desire to elicit from you more extended answers and
explanations, by which I might perhaps be satisfied and my
mind might be freed from its difficulties on this subject. I,
therefore, beseech God, that, if I have written any thing
contrary to the truth, He may pardon me concerning it, and
may reveal the truth unto me; if I have advanced any thing
agreeable to the truth, that He will confirm me in it, and
that he will grant to me yourself, assenting to my views, and
aiding me, that, by means of you, the truth may daily gain
greater authority, and may be more and more propagated to the
glory of the divine name, to the advantage and increase of
the church, in our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen.
APPENDIX
THESES OF
DR. FRANCIS JUNIUS
CONCERNING DIVINE PREDESTINATION,
COMPOSED, IN THESE VERY WORDS, BY HIMSELF, AND PUBLICLY
DISCUSSED, UNDER HIS DIRECTION, BY WILLIAM CODDAEUS,
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LEYDEN, IN THE YEAR 1593 -- ALSO SOME
BRIEF ANNOTATIONS OF JAMES ARMINIUS.
As we have frequently referred to the Theses of Doctor
Francis Junias concerning Predestination, we will here insert
them, and make some brief annotations upon them.
THESIS 1
Predestination is properly, according to the etymology of the
word, a determination to an end, but in common usage, it is
equivalent to the Greek word protagh and signifies the
relation of the whole arrangement to the end, and thus we use
it.
Destination is a determination of an existing object to its
end; the particle prae, prefixed to the word, denotes that
the act of destination is antecedent to the actual existence
of the object.
THESIS 2
Predestination, therefore, is an act of the divine good-
pleasure, by which God, from eternity, prepared the plenitude
of His blessings, in Christ, for those, who should be heirs
of salvation, to the praise of His glorious grace. The word
eujokia or good-pleasure, is here used, correctly, according
to the Scriptural sense, for the particle eu+ refers to the
favourable and benevolent inclination of God towards its
object, not to the precise and determinate will of God in
reference to any of His own purposes, as the word good-
pleasure is used by the school-men, when they distinguish the
will of God into his revealed will and the will of His good-
pleasure. Prepared in Christ.] No blessings are prepared in
Christ for men, except those which are adapted to sinners.
Christ himself; the saviour of men, is called Jesus only
because "He shall save His people from their sins," (Matt. i,
21). No one is blessed in Christ, if he is not a believer;
"So then, they, which be of faith, are blessed with faithful
Abraham" (Gal. iii, 9.)
For those who should be heirs of salvation]. Salvation
itself; and the inheritance of eternal life, are comprehended
in the fullness of those blessings, which God has prepared in
Christ. Therefore those, for whom that fullness was prepared,
should have been otherwise described. For there is an
absurdity in the statement, -- "predestination is an act, by
which God has prepared salvation for those who shall be heirs
of salvation." For they are made heirs of salvation according
to which, the inheritance, comprehended in the fullness of
those blessings, was prepared. Persons, as one part of the
material or object of predestination, are not to be described
by the divine things, which were prepared for them in that
predestination, and which constitute the other part of the
material or object of predestination. The persons are more
correctly described by Sohnius, thus: "Predestination unto
life, or election, is that by which God decreed, from
eternity, to justify and to accept unto eternal life,
believers, or the faithful, to whom he decreed to teach
faith." To the praise of His glorious grace]. The Scriptures
recognize the grace of God as the cause and end of
predestination, only as mercy is united with it, and as it is
exercised towards sinners and the miserable.
THESIS 3
It is an act (for God is simple energy) proceeding not from
any external cause, but purely from Him who predestinates;
otherwise it would not be, purely, predestination, preceding
all things and causes.
The divine predestination, indeed, precedes all things and
causes, so far as their actual existence is considered; or it
was decreed from eternity. It, however, follows, in the mind
and prescience of God, the pre-existence of some things and
causes; that of sin, for example, without which neither
grace, as it is described above, nor Christ, in his true
character, nor those blessings could have any adaptation to
men. Therefore, although this predestination may not depend
on an extrinsic cause, yet it was occasioned, as they say, by
sin.
THESIS 4
Its cause is eujdokia good-pleasure, by which He was
favourably disposed towards those, whom He pleased to adopt
as sons, through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of
His election.
By that same good pleasure, by which God was favourably
disposed towards some. He also was pleased to adopt the same
persons as sons. Therefore, this is not a correct description
of the persons towards whom God was favourably disposed.
Indeed, it was because He was favourably disposed towards
them, that He adopted them as sons.
To adopt as sons]. Observe here that adoption is not placed
among the prepared blessing, but that it is used to describe
the persons for whom blessings are prepared. Compare this
with your answer to my first proposition.
But, that the inappropriateness of that definition may be
more manifest, let it be put in this form; -- Predestination
is an act of the divine good-pleasure, by which God, from
eternity, prepared filial adoption, and its consequent,
eternal life, in Christ, for those whom He pleased to adopt
as sons, and who should be heirs of salvation.
To adopt as sons through Jesus Christ]. Christ Jesus is here
to be considered not only as the foundation on which is based
the execution of the decree, but also as the foundation on
which the decree itself is based. For we are adopted in him
as in our head, therefore he is, in the order of causes,
first constituted and predestinated to be our head, then we
are predestinated in him as his members. This admonition I
present, not because I think that you understand that
expression differently, but because I perceive that Beza on
the first chapter to the Ephesians, adopts an order entirely
different, and which seems to me to invert the correct order
of predestination.
According to the purpose of his election]. This purpose of
election is nothing else than the good-pleasure of God, by
which he is favourably disposed towards some, and by which He
pleases to adopt some, in Christ, as sons. But your words are
so arranged as to convey the idea that this purpose is
something different from that good-pleasure.
THESIS 5
It is, therefore, God alone, who predestinates, the cause of
His own predestination, and of that preparation which He
proposed to Himself, according to that good pleasure of His
will.
THESIS 6
Therefore, this act is said to be from eternity, that is,
before all things and causes, in things or of things, which
He predestinated to exist.
If this Thesis excludes also the sin of man as a condition
requisite in the object of that predestination, it is not
correctly said that predestination precedes the provision of
sin; for, though sin did not move God to the act of
predestination, (for it is the appropriate effect of sin to
move the wrath of God), yet this predestination was made in
view of sin, the occurrence of which in time, God foresaw in
the infinity of His knowledge.
THESIS 7
The material of predestination is twofold; divine things, and
persons to be partakers of them.
Divine things and persons, to be partakers of them, have a
mutual relation to each other, so that a conclusion
concerning the character of the persons can be formed from
the nature of those things, and conversely, the nature of
those divine things may be inferred from the character of the
persons. The things are adapted to the persons, and such
persons need such things for salvation. Thus, from the grace
of the remission of sins and the renewal of the Holy Ghost,
we infer that the men, for whom those things are prepared,
are sinners; also, if men are sinners, it is inferred that
such grace is necessary for them.
THESIS 8
The genus of the divine things, which are communicable
through Predestination, is blessing, which the Apostle
circumscribes within these modes; it is complete, not
partial; spiritual, not carnal; "in heavenly places," not
natural, but surpassing all nature; finally, in Christ, that
is, divine in its principle and foundation, that Christ may
be the eternal head of the predestinate.
The expression, in which divine things are said to be
communicable through predestination, does not seem to me to
be in harmony with the nature of predestination. For
predestination does not cause that those things should be
communicable, but does in fact communicate them. They are
made communicable by the blood and death and resurrection of
Christ, by which those blessings were acquired and obtained
from the Father. Since any thing is communicable before it
is, in fact, communicated, it follows that predestination is
posterior, in the prescience and preordination of God, to the
death and resurrection of Christ. I leave the inference for
the consideration of the intelligent.
Spiritual, not carnal]. spiritual is contrasted in the
Scriptures not only with carnal, but, also, with natural; as
in 1 Corinthians ii, 14, also, in 1 Corinthians xv, 44, 45,
46. Carnal, however, may sometimes also comprehend in itself
the natural.
"In heavenly places," not natural]. Heavenly things are, in
the Scriptures, contrasted with mundane and earthly good,
adapted to nature as such, and, thus, heavenly and natural
are indirectly opposed.
Finally, in Christ]. Christ obtained those blessings by his
death; he has received the same from his Father to be
communicated to his followers; in him believers are
predestinated to a participation in the same.
Divine in principle and foundation]. Blessing is divine in
principle, for its principle is God, the Father, who confers
it; but it is not said, in the same sense to be divine in its
foundation. For Christ is the foundation of that blessing,
not as he is God, but as he is God-man, Qeanqrwpov Mediator,
saviour and Head of the church. This consideration of Christ
is, everywhere in the Scriptures, distinguished from that, in
which Christ is regarded as God, as in John xvii, 3; xiv, 1;
1 Tim. ii, 5, 6; 1 Pet. i, 18, 19, 20, 21; 1 Cor. v, 19, &c.
That Christ might be the eternal head of the Predestinate].
Whether Christ was constituted the head of those who were to
be predestinated, or of those who had been already
predestinated, has been a point in dispute among Theologians.
It is my opinion that, in the order of nature, the decree by
which Christ was constituted the head of those to be saved,
was prior to that decree by which some are ordained in Christ
to a participation in salvation. For Christ, as our mediator
before God and our High Priest, merited those blessings,
which were to be communicated by predestination, and, at the
same time, the dignity of head, and the power to communicate
those blessings. Then he actually received those blessings
from the Father, and obtained the titles of Head, King and
Prince. "Having been made perfect, or consecrated, he became
the author of eternal salvation to all who obey him."
Finally, in him believers are predestinated, that they should
be partakers of those blessings, by union with him. For God
loves, in Christ, those whom He has determined to make
partakers of eternal life, but this love is the cause of
predestination. It was, indeed, in Christ born, dead, raised
again, and constituted the head of the church. "But," some
will say, "God so loved the world that He gave His only-
begotten Son." -- I answer, that the love, referred to in
this passage, differs in degree from that which is the cause
of predestination, and is prior to it. For that love, which
sent His Son, did not, with certainty, ordain eternal life to
any one, and, indeed, it could not do so, for Christ had not
merited it by his death. Indeed, by making Christ the
foundation and Head of the predestinate, you seem to declare
that Christ was made the Head of them who were to be
predestinated in him unto life.
THESIS 9
Of these blessings, the chief points are two, grace and
glory; the former, acting on men in the present life, the
latter to be consummated in them in the future life.
THESIS 10
Human beings are creatures, in a condition of nature -- which
can effect nothing supernatural or divine -- to be exalted
above nature, and to be transferred to a participation of
divine things by the supernatural energy of the Deity.
It is here most manifestly evident that the object of
predestination is considered by you to be men in their
natural state, which can effect nothing supernatural or
divine, that is, as I have said, considered, in a merely
natural state, apart from supernatural endowments, and from
the corruption which afterwards supervened. But this is not
an adequate object of this decree. For the exaltation, which
is according to predestination, is not from nature, but from
sin beginning. The divine things, a participation in which is
prepared by predestination, are not adapted to man in his
natural state, but to man involved in sin and misery. That
supernatural power belongs to God, which He exercises in
Christ, "the power of God and the wisdom of God," 1
Corinthians i, 24, the Jews and Gentiles being called to
salvation. Therefore, it was applied to man, considered not
in his primitive natural state, but in sin and misery.
THESIS 11
The form is adoption, as sons, through Jesus Christ, that is,
that real relation and ordination, in which we are blessed of
God, by the communication of "all spiritual blessings in
heavenly places" in Christ. Predestination is unto adoption,
therefore adoption is not the form of predestination. For
"the form gives being to the thing," and adoption does not
give being to predestination, but receives its own being from
predestination; and it is the first per se and immediate work
of divine predestination, and its consequent is life and the
heavenly inheritance. Nor is that real relation and
ordination, in which we are blessed, "the form of
predestination;" for that ordination, in which we are
blessed; is the execution of the divine predestination. But
the preparation of those blessings is the form of
predestination, for, by it, predestination has its being.
That preparation is internal and eternal, and that is true
also of predestination. Or -- to speak with greater accuracy
-- the preparation of those blessings is not the form of
predestination, for that preparation was made by the death of
Christ, the Mediator, but the form consists in the
preparation of the communication of those blessings to
believers in Christ. We might add that the preparation is
certain, and that, according to it, a communion in the
benefits of Christ is certainly bestowed on those for whom
the participation is prepared.
THESIS 12
The order of this form is placed in the preparation, of
persons, by election, vocation, and "gathering together in
Christ" (Ephes. i, 10); but of things, by a gracious
beginning, progress, and glorious consummation of blessings,
in a perfect union with Christ.
The order of that preparation, as the form, can, indeed, be
declared, in respect both to persons and to things. Persons
are prepared in the minds of God, when election from the
world, vocation to a union with Christ, and the gathering
together in Christ, are ordained for them. Things are
prepared in this order, that their gracious communication
should he ordained, in reference to its beginning, progress,
and final consummation; the beginning, in Christ; the
progress, in the same; but the consummation, in the perfect
union with God. For this is the consummation of a
supernatural felicity "that God may be all in all." If,
however, the subject of discussion be the mediatorial
consummation, I concede that this is effected in Christ, but
this tends to that chief consummation, which is union with
God, to which we come by a perfect union with Christ. For
Christ shall deliver up his own kingdom "to God even the
Father, that God may be all in all." (1 Cor. xv, 24, 28.)
THESIS 13
The end is the praise of the glorious grace of God, by which
He has freely made us acceptable unto Himself, in the Son of
His love.
The grace, by which God "has freely made us acceptable unto
Himself, in the Son of His love, is grace only adapted to
sinners." The praise of that grace is sung to God and the
Lamb, who died and lives again, "who was delivered for our
offenses, and was raised again for our justification." (Rom.
iv, 25.) That praise is ascribed to God by sinners, whom God
has redeemed by the blood of His Son, "out of every kindred,
tongue, and people, and nation." (Rev. v, 9.)
THESIS 14
What is contrary to this predestination can not, with
propriety, be expressed in a single term, since the relation
of predestination is single, that of its contraries is
various. For preterition is contrary to the preparation of
grace, and reprobation or preparation of punishment is
contrary to the preparation of glory.
Grace and glory are prepared in predestination. To this
preparation, as an affirmative act, is opposed the negative
act of the non-preparation of grace and glory, and the
affirmative act of the preparation of those things, which are
affirmatively contrary to grace and glory. But here, to the
preparation of grace, is opposed only the negative act of
preterition, and, to the preparation of glory, only the
affirmative act of reprobation or the preparation of
punishment. Hence it seems to me to be a correct conclusion
that this discussion is not absolutely consistent in all its
parts, unless, perhaps, there is no affirmative act, which
can be opposed to the preparation of grace. There is,
however, such an act, namely, hardening, blinding, and the
delivering to a reprobate mind, which can be fitly and fully
explained only by negative acts. Also, the denial of
celestial glory is a negative act opposed to the preparation
of glory. It is to be observed, here, that the word
reprobation is used for the preparation of punishment, while,
in your answers to my propositions, you affirm that it
properly signifies non-election or preterition.
THESIS 15
Preterition is the act of the divine will, by which God, from
eternity, determined to leave some of His creatures in their
natural state, and not to communicate to them that
supernatural grace, by which their nature might be preserved
uncorrupt, or, having become corrupt, might be restored, to
the declaration of the freedom of His own goodness.
Preterition is defined to be a denial of grace only, not of
glory, while, nevertheless, glory is denied to the same
persons. It is rightly called an act of the divine pleasure,
not good-pleasure; for pleasure is the general term, applied
to any purpose or decree of God; good-pleasure, as has been
remarked, includes a favourable and benevolent disposition in
the Deity. To leave in their natural condition]. From this
also it is evident that the object of predestination is, in
your view, men considered in a merely natural state.
Supernatural grace, by which their nature might be preserved
uncorrupt, or, having become corrupt, might be restored]. If
the e words are to be understood to have reference to the
particular predestination of men, then that distinction is
not correctly used. For the grace by which nature is
"preserved uncorrupt," is not denied by the decree of
preterition. For that grace was denied to all men without
distinction. But the denial of grace, by which nature, having
become corrupt, is restored, is peculiar to the decree of
preterition, and, therefore the object of preterition is
fallen man, and to one who needs renewing grace.
To the declaration of the freedom of His own goodness.] The
freedom of the goodness of God is declared not only when God
communicates to one, and denies to another, His own goodness,
but also when He communicates it only on the condition, which
He has been pleased to impose; I concede, however, that the
freedom of the divine goodness is also declared in the former
mode. But there is a declaration in preterition, as described
to us in the Scriptures, not only of the freedom of the
goodness of God, but of His justice. For God, according to
justice also, uses preterition, by which He determines to
deny His grace to some on account of their sins. Sin, indeed,
is the only meritorious cause of the denial of grace, which
is here discussed. Therefore, the statement of the end of
that preterition was not sufficiently complete.
THESIS 16
This preterition is without blame: for God bestowed on man
the perfection of human nature, He was not under obligation
to bestow grace upon any one. It is grace; therefore, there
is no obligation.
God, in the abstract and absolutely, was not under obligation
to bestow grace on any one, but He could place Himself under
that obligation in two ways, by promise, and by making
certain requisitions. By promise, if He should promise to
bestow grace, either with or without condition. By
requisition, if He should require, from a man, an act, such
that it could not be performed. without His grace, for then
He would be under obligation to bestow it, otherwise He would
reap where He had not sowed.
THESIS 17
The preparation of punishment is the act of the divine
pleasure, by which God, from eternity, determined, for the
declaration of His own justice, to punish His creatures, who
should not continue in their original state, but should
depart from God, the author of their origin, by their own
deed and depravity, You call the preparation of punishment an
affirmative act, opposed to predestination; but it is
opposed, affirmatively, to the preparation of glory. That,
which is opposed affirmatively, to the communication of grace
is not here stated. I think that it should be called
hardening and blinding, and that it should have been also
treated in this Thesis.
To punish His creatures who should not maintain their
original integrity]. This decree was ordained by God, not
until after the certain foresight of future sin, lest any one
should think that sin is necessarily inferred from that
decree, as some of our Doctors believe.
Should full away from God by their own act and
transgression]. It should be explained how he can, by his own
act, fall away from God, who has, already, been passed by of
God, in the communication of that grace, which is necessary
for the avoidance of defection from God. And since all the
passed-by are also predamned, I could wish that it might be
explained how preterition and predamnation necessarily
cohere, if preterition existed apart from any consideration
of sin, but predamnation, only on account of sin.
The declaration of the justice of God, also, as has been
previously remarked, has a place in preterition.
THESIS 18
Therefore, in the predestinate, God does all things according
to the good-pleasure of His own predestination. In those who
are not predestinate, He uses preterition according to the
pleasure of His will, and prepares punishment for His
creatures who transgress against His order, and who must be
reprobated, on account of their sins, from the necessity of
His justice.
In predestination, God provides only for the salvation of the
elect; yet, in such a manner, that many acts of the divine
Providence concur to the same effect, which acts are so
administered by the Deity, that from them salvation certainly
results, which is the proper work of predestination. God uses
many acts of His providence towards those, who are not
predestinated, sufficient, indeed, for salvation, yet not
efficacious, since this pertains to predestination. It is not
absurd nor irrelevant, then, to observe, here, this
distinction between providence and predestination. Who must
be reprobated on account of their sins]. You here, also, use
the word reprobation for the preparation of punishment.
THESIS 19
If reprobation is made the opposite of predestination, the
statement is figurative, and synecdochical: wherefore, it
either should not be made, because it is improper, dangerous,
and liable to give offense, or it should be distinctly
explained, as pious and learned men have done.
In your answer to my second proposition, you use this
language: "Reprobation is used in three senses, one common
and two special. In its common use, it comprehends
preterition and damnation. Its second mode is special, when
it is opposed to election, and signifies non-election or
preterition. The third is also special, when it is used for
pre-damnation. The first mode is by synecdoche, the second
proper, the third metonymical, and it may also be called
catachrestic." Here, you call that meaning of reprobation
common, which, in your Theses, and elsewhere, you call
figurative. We are not to abstain from the use of the term,
for it is Scriptural, but we are to be careful that it be
also used in the sense in which it is used in the Scriptures.
THESIS 20
The presentation of this doctrine is especially necessary, if
it is treated skillfully, soberly, and reverently, that is,
that not any thing else be treated, not otherwise, not to
another end than as the Holy Scriptures teach, both in
explanation and in application, according to the advice of
St. Paul: "not to think of himself more highly than he ought
to think, but to think soberly." Rom. xii, 3.
That, which is taught, and inculcated in the Holy Scriptures,
can not but be esteemed useful and necessary for salvation,
though there may be different degrees of necessity. But the
doctrine of predestination, and its opposite, that of
reprobation, is taught and inculcated in the Scriptures; it
is, therefore, also necessary. It should, however, be
considered what that predestination is, and what is its
character, which is discussed in the Scriptures as necessary,
and which is called the foundation of our salvation. Your
admonition is altogether proper and necessary, by which you
enjoin that the doctrine should be set forth entirely in
accordance with the Scriptures -- "not any thing else, not
otherwise, not to another end than as the Holy Scriptures
teach." But there is a practical difficulty in this matter,
because each one desires to appear to present his own
doctrines according to the Scripture. I am satisfied that, in
your discussion of this doctrine, you are not, in every case,
sustained by the Scripture, but in some parts you err, and I
have treated this more fully in the discussion held between
us.
AN EXAMINATION
BY
REV. JAMES ARMINIUS, D. D.
OF A TREATISE; CONCERNING THE ORDER AND MODE OF
PREDESTINATION AND THE AMPLITUDE OF DIVINE GRACE BY REV.
WILLIAM PERKINS, D.D., A THEOLOGICAL WRITER IN ENGLAND ALSO,
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CHAPTER OF THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS
AN EXAMINATION OF THE TREATISE OF WILLIAM PERKINS CONCERNING
THE ORDER AND MODE OF PREDESTINATION
PART 1
William Perkins,. D. D., Fellow of Christ' s College,
Cambridge, was a Theological writer at the close of the
sixteenth century. As will be seen from the following
strictures on one of his treatises, he advocated views highly
Calvinistic. The following "Examination, etc," was written by
Arminius, in 1602.
Reverend Sir, and Beloved Brother in Christ, -- While I was
lately, and with eagerness, examining a certain library,
abundantly supplied with recently published books, a pamphlet
presented itself to me, entitled "A Christian and Perspicuous
Discourse concerning the Order and Mode of Predestination,
and the extent of Divine Grace." When I observed that it bore
your name, which was already well known to me by previously
published works of a high character, I thought that I must
diligently read and consider it, and see whether you, who are
devoted to the most accurate learning, could remove, in that
work, the difficulties which have long disquieted my mind. I,
therefore, read it once and again, with impartiality, as far
as I could, and with candour, as you desire. But, in reading,
I perceived that all my difficulties were not removed by your
work, while I thought that some things, written by you,
deserved to be examined in the light of truth. Accordingly, I
judged it not improper to commence a friendly discussion with
you concerning your treatise. This I do, with the greater
freedom and confidence, because, in the second page of your
pamphlet, you say, to the encouragement of my mind, that you
"have written these things, that, by those devoted to
theological investigation" -- among whom I willingly reckon
myself -- "they may be read without prejudice or acerbity of
mind, duly weighed, and judged by the pure word of God." This
I undertake, and pledge myself to do according to my ability;
asking of you that in return, you will, with the same
disposition, read my remarks, weigh them, and examine and
judge them by the rule of the same Scriptures. May God grant
that we all may fully agree, in those things which are
necessary to His glory, and to the salvation of the church;
and that, in other things, if there can not be harmony of
opinions, there may at least be harmony of feelings, and that
we may "keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace."
With this desire, then, expressed at the beginning of our
discussion, I enter on the subject itself, following in the
track, which, in your writing, you have pursued before me. I
will commence with your "Epistle to the Reader," and then
proceed, with the divine help, to the treatise itself.
EXAMINATION OF THE EPISTLE
In your Epistle to the Reader, you lay down two fundamental
principles, on which this doctrine of Predestination and
Divine Grace, can and must be built. The first is "the
written word of God;" the second "the common ideas, and the
principles which God has infused into the minds of men," I
have no opposition to make at this point, only let this be
added, that, when, on account of the darkness of our minds,
and the weakness and diversity of the human judgment (which
you regret), it is not possible for us to agree concerning
these matters, we must recur, for definite and final
decision, to that which is first and equivalent to all other
things -- the word of God.
Of the first principle, laid down by you, I remark that it is
true; but care must be used, lest any thing, which is not in
accordance with human judgment, should be attributed to God,
and defended as just, on the consideration that it is
declared to be unjust by corrupt human judgment; unless it
can be made clear, by a conclusive argument, that it is
suitably ascribed to the Deity. For, it is sufficient, for
the sake of referring any action or work to God, to say that
He has justly performed it; though, from the antecedent, God
has done this, will follow, of necessity, the consequent,
therefore, it is just.
Of the second; -- I concede that it is true. For He is the
first cause, and the cause of causes, who, from the foreseen
free act of rational creatures, takes occasion to make any
decree, and to establish a certain order in events; which
decree He would not have made, and which order He would not
have established, if the free second causes had acted
otherwise. The Apostle says, "the creature was made subject
to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of Him who hath
subjected the same," (Rom. viii, 20.) To this vanity the
creature would not have been subjected, if he, for whose sake
it was created by God, had remained in his original
integrity. The decree, in reference to sending Christ into
the world, depends on the foresight of the fall; for he is
"the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world,"
(John i, 29.) He "was made a little lower than the angels,
for the suffering of death," (Heb. ii, 9); "as the children
are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise
took part of the same; that through death he might destroy
him that had the power of death, that is, the devil," (Heb.
ii, 14.) He was constituted a "high priest, ordained for men,
that he might offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins,"
(Heb. v, 1.) The decrees of God, by which He ordains to
punish His creatures, are universally on this principle,
according to the Scriptures: "That be far from thee to do
after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked:
shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" (Gen. xviii,
25.) "Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out
of my book," (Exod. xxxii, 33.) "I said, indeed, that thy
house, and the house of thy father, should walk before me
forever, but now the Lord saith, be it far from me; for them
that honour me I will honour, and they that despise me shall
be lightly esteemed," (1 Sam. ii, 30.)
But it is not therefore to be supposed that the imposing of
penalties depends on second causes; so far from it, they
would put forth every effort to escape punishment, if they
could do so either by reason or force. I could wish also that
the word "ordaining" were used in its proper sense: from
which they seem to me to depart, who interpret it -- to
decree that something shall be done. For its true meaning is
to establish the order of things done, not to appoint things
to be done that they may be done; though it is used sometimes
by the fathers in the latter sense. But then God is denied,
by the fathers, to be the ordainer of evils. Thus says
Augustine: "God knows how to ordain, not crime, but the
punishment of crimes."
Of the third; -- It is characteristic of a wise being to do
nothing in vain. But he does something in vain, who does it
not to attain some end. But God is infinitely wise. Let me
caution you, then, not to extend the phrase, "to regard with
indifference," farther, or to interpret it otherwise than is
suitable. There is a real distinction between doing and
permitting. He, who permits any thing, that he may attain
some end, does not regard it with indifference. From this it
is clear that not to regard with indifference is not the same
as to do or to make. Of this also I remind you for a certain
reason. Then consider whether the phrase, which you use, is
correct. The word "prudently" seems to be too feeble to be
applied to so great wisdom. And it is not a usual form of
expression to say that an action is performed "in view of a
certain end," but for the sake of that end. The statement, He
does not will or decree that which He can not, is ambiguous,
and not sufficiently full. It is ambiguous, because it may be
understood to mean that He can not will or decree, or that He
can not do. It is not sufficiently full, because there should
be an addition, so that the statement would be this: "He does
not will or decree to do or permit that which He can not do
or permit." For which reason also your conclusion is likewise
imperfect, and, to the expression, "He has decreed thus to
do," add, "or permit."
Of the fourth; -- The decree of God is two-fold; that of
efficacious action and that of permission. Both are
immutable. The creature, however free, can not change himself
by his own act, or receive any change from another, contrary
to either of these decrees, and without the certain and fixed
determination of the former or the latter. But it is not
merely necessary that God should fix these, and not other,
limits of the change, as if the creature -- if this was
possible without the divine superintendence of the change --
might be able either to change himself, or to receive change
from another, to such an extent that God could not bring it
into order, and have occasion for the illustration of his
glory. For to Him even NOTHING ought to be material for the
declaration of His glory: and any change from Nothing to
Something, produced by Him, ought to serve the same purpose.
Of the fifth; -- All the judgments of God, "whatever they may
be, whether hidden or partly known to us, are to be honoured,
and to be adorned with the praise of righteousness, provided,
however, that it be manifest that they are the judgments of
God. But under this pretense, no judgments are to be
attributed to God which the Scripture does not assign to Him;
much less those which are contrary to the righteousness of
God revealed in the Scriptures. Thus Augustine says: "As man
becomes more like God, so the more does the damnation of
perishing men move him: it moves also our saviour himself,
and caused his tears, not once only, to flow. It moves also
God Himself; who says: "What could have been done more to my
vineyard that I have not done in it?" (Isa. v, 4.) "O that my
people had hearkened unto me." (Psalm lxxxi, 13.) "Have I any
pleasure at all that the wicked should die," (Ezek. xviii,
23.) But it so moves God, that He is yet delighted in the
destruction of His enemies, who are refractory and refuse to
repent. For His righteousness demands this. It moves Him, I
say, because they are unwilling to be saved, not because,
when they are unwilling to be saved, He may devote them to
just destruction. It so moves Christ, the saviour, that he
shall yet, willingly, banish, from his presence, unbelievers
and evil doers, and adjudge them to eternal fire. For this is
demanded by the office of Judge. It so moves a pious man,
that he may not utter any objection against God in reference
to His various decrees, and the execrations of His righteous
judgments on the obstinate. This is required by the obedience
which the creature owes to his Creator and Redeemer."
Concerning that objection, I may be allowed, with the leave
of Augustine, to say that it is not the offspring of infirm
and weak human nature, but of the refractory disposition of
the Jews and of those like them, of whom the apostle speaks,
(Rom. ix, 20.) It is indeed true that we, when compared with
God, "are as grass-hoppers," yea, and "are counted to Him as
less than nothing," (Isa. xl, 17, 22.) But, in such
exaggerations of human insignificance, we are to be careful
not to do injustice to the creation of God. For man was made
in the image of God, and therefore, even to God Himself, man,
not any beast, is the noblest creature, with whom, as the
wisdom of God declares, are His delights, (Prov. viii, 31.)
Of the sixth; -- The concurrence of God with second causes to
perform any act, or produce any work, is two-fold, of the
general, and the special aid of His grace. It is most certain
that nothing good can be performed by any rational creature
without this special aid of His grace. But whether it is the
province of the divine will, absolutely willing it, to
communicate this gracious aid, and by this communication, to
absolutely work good in us, is in controversy among
Theologians. This is not improperly so, since the word
absolutely can not be found in the Scriptures, and it has not
yet been proved that its equivalent is found in the
Scriptures.
Of the seventh; -- So also it is certain that "no evil can be
avoided if God does not prevent it." But there is dispute
concerning the mode of prevention; -- whether it is by the
omnipotent action of the Deity operating on the human will
according to the mode of nature, from which there exists a
necessity of prevention, or by such an action as operates on
the will, according to the mode of the will as respects its
freedom, from which the certainty of prevention exists.
Of the eighth; -- It can not be concluded from an event that
God has willed something, but we may know either this fact,
that He was unwilling to hinder an event which He foresaw
would occur. -- Otherwise the distinction, which exists
between the action and the permission of God, is destroyed.
For some things occur, because God produces them, but others,
because He permits them to occur, according to Augustine and
to truth itself. But to will that any thing should occur, and
to be unwilling to prevent its occurrence, are not the same
things. For, in the former case, the event is resolved into
the will of God as its first and special cause; in the
latter, it is resolved affirmatively into a second cause, and
negatively into the divine will, which has not prevented it,
which prevention also is produced either by power according
to the mode of nature, or by persuasion according to the mode
of free-will. But concerning permission and prevention we
shall treat more fully hereafter in their own place. Of the
ninth; -- But let us examine this idea; "to be able to
perform," "to will to do," and "actually to do," are divine
gifts and effects on men. But there should be this additional
remark, that God gives to no one the power of doing right,
unless He is ready also to give the will and the act itself,
that is, by the further aid of grace, to concur with man in
willing and in actually doing that good, for which He has
received sufficient strength, unless the man on his part may
interpose, or, as the school-men say, may have interposed
some obstacle. "For unto every one that hath shall be given;
but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that
which he hath." (Matt. xxv, 29). Were this not so, the power
would have been given in vain. But the all-wise God doth
nothing in vain. Thus He gave to Adam the faculty of
observing the law which He had enacted, and He was prepared
to give him whatever else was needed, in addition to that
faculty, for actual obedience, namely, both to will and to
do, unless Adam willingly and by voluntary motion turned
himself away from God, and from His grace. I see here a
labyrinth which I will not now enter, because I should not be
permitted to make my egress from it, except by the thread and
guidance of an accurate explication of the mode of the
concurrence of God with man in the performance of any good
thing; which explication does not belong to this place, or,
as I indeed, acknowledge, to my abilities.
Of the tenth; -- That "God presides over the whole world, and
all things created by Himself, and administers and governs
all and each of them" is certain. But this is not only in
justice, but also in mercy, even so far as He, in His
infinite wisdom, knows what place ought to be assigned to
each. But, indeed, do all those axioms seem to you to be
natural and common notions, They, indeed, belong to nature,
as it was when it come from the hand of its Creator, surely
not to it, as it has been darkened by sin. For to few among
men is it given to know and understand those things. The
whole troop of Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians in the church
itself, do not know them. What the opinion of many of the
Greek and Latin philosophers was concerning most of them, is
apparent from an expression used by not one of them only:
"What we are, is given to us by the Gods; what of good we
are, we have from ourselves." To this notorious falsity,
Augustine in more than one passage, sharply opposes himself.
On these principles in part, as a foundation, you build up a
doctrine of Predestination, which is, indeed, beset with
difficulties. This is caused by the fact, that men do not
fear to add to the Scriptures, whatever they think proper,
and are accustomed to attribute as much as possible to their
own conceptions, which they style natural ideas. I can not
but praise your effort. For light ought, by all means, to be
thrown upon truth by all, to the utmost of their ability.
Calumnies and accusations, by which the truth is assailed and
beset, are to be refuted. Minds, embittered against it, are
not only to be softened and soothed, but also, to be induced
to embrace it. It can not be made an objection against you,
that you adduce the opinions of the ancient Theologians,
especially those whom you quote, some caution being observed,
lest we go too far in that direction. For the Fathers are
themselves also liable to diverse interpretations, and,
indeed, more than the divine and inspired writers, as they
were endued with knowledge of the truth, which was less in
degree and in clearness, and they could express the thoughts
of their minds only with less accuracy and fitness. When I
consider this, I doubt whether they have consulted the best
interests of the church, who have thought that, in this age,
the opinions of the Fathers are to be considered by them as
authority in matters of religion. But the die is cast, and we
must advance, whithersoever the fates of the Church bear us.
In reference to your declaration, that you present the
testimony of the ancient Doctors and School-men, for the sake
of exhibiting an agreement in that part of doctrine, I do not
see how that is so. For I am quite persuaded that nothing can
be thought of, more adapted to bring that whole doctrine of
Predestination and the grace of God into confusion, and to
overwhelm it with darkness, than the effort on the part of
any one to bring forward and unite together all the opinions
of the Fathers and the School-men, in reference to it. But I
desire that you may not at once pronounce him an unjust
estimator or judge, who dares to assert that the dogmas,
which you present in this treatise, are found neither in the
Scriptures nor in the Fathers. For if you shall, after
reasons have been adduced by that estimator, arbiter or
judge, be able to sustain your statement, you will find him
not struggling against it, with an unfair and obstinate mind,
but ready to yield to what is proved to be the truth with
becoming equanimity. Nor will it be an easier matter to
persuade me that the dogmas of which you here treat, are, in
that same mode and sense, proposed and set forth in all the
Reformed Churches. I say this, lest you should think that you
can bear down one thinking differently by the prejudgment of
those churches.
EXAMINATION OF THE TREATISE
I come now to the treatise itself, which I will examine with
somewhat more care and diligence. You will not complain if,
in some places, I may with the closest criticism also subject
some of the nicer points to the most rigid scrutiny. For who
would not consent that a serious and solid discussion should
be, as it were, spiced by a friendly diversity and a pleasant
contest concerning the more accurate handling of a subject.
You begin and rightly with a definition of Predestination.
But that definition does not seem to be adapted to the
Predestination, which is set forth in the Scriptures. For the
Predestination, of which the Scriptures treat, is of men in
their relation as sinners; it is made in Christ; it is to
blessings which concern, not this animal life, but the
spiritual life, of which a part also are communicated in this
animal life, as is clearly evident from Ephesians 1, where,
among the spiritual blessings to which we have been
predestinated in Christ are enumerated "adoption of children
(verse 5), "redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of
sins," (verse 7th), "having made known unto us the mystery of
his will," (verse 9th), which blessings are given to the
predestinated in this life. The apostle well say "the life,
which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son
of God," (Gal. ii, 20)
signifying that he, in this animal life, was a partaker of
spiritual gifts, and from them lived a spiritual life. But
perhaps you did not wish to give an accurate definition, but
only by some description to give us an idea of
predestination. I may concede this, yet in that description
there seem to be many things which ought to be noticed. For
the word "counsel," by which you have desired to explain one
kind of Predestination is not a kind of Predestination, but
pertains to its efficient cause; for a decree is made by
"counsel," which decree can be fitly considered a kind of
Predestination -- if indeed counsel can be attributed to God,
by which He may decree anything, as in the Scripture, -- e.g.
Acts iv, 28, and Ephes. i, 11. This I say, is apparent from
the passages quoted. For in the former (Acts iv, 28),
"counsel" is said to determine before or predestinate things
to be done; in the latter (Ephes. i, 11), it is said that God
"worketh all things," -- even institutes predestination-after
the counsel of His own will.
There is, in this life, an equality of the pious and the
wicked as to external blessings, but they are to be
considered generally. For in individual cases there is a
great difference both among the pious and the wicked, and so
great indeed is it that, to those, who are dissatisfied with
that inequality, it may need a defense by an argument for
reducing it, hereafter, to an equality. Indeed it is said of
the pious and the faithful "if in this life, only, we have
hope in Christ, we are, of all men, most miserable." (1 Cor.
xv, 19.)
I approve what you say concerning "the final cause of
Predestination," when rightly understood, that is, if a
declaration of the glory of God through mercy and justice is
attributed to Predestination, so long as it is the
foreordination of sinners who shall believe in Christ to
eternal life, and on the contrary, the predamnation of
sinners who shall persevere in sins to eternal death; who
shall believe, through the gracious gift of God, and who
shall persevere in sins through their own wickedness and the
just desertion of God. But if you think that God, from
eternity, without any pre-existence of sin, in His
prescience, determined to illustrate His own glory by mercy
and punitive justice, and, that He might be able to secure
this object, decreed to create man good but mutable, and
ordained farther that he should fall, that in this way there
might be a place for that decree, I say that such an opinion
can, in my judgment, be established by no passage of the word
of God.
That this may be made plainer, a few things must be said
concerning the glory of God and the modes of its
manifestation. No one can doubt that God, since He is the
first and Supreme Efficient Cause of all His own acts and
works, and the single and sole cause of many of them, has
always the manifestation of His own perfection, that is, His
own glory, proposed to Himself, as His chief and highest
object. For the first and supreme cause is moved to produce
any effect, by nothing, out of itself otherwise it would not
be the first and supreme cause. Therefore, not only the act
of Predestination, but also every other divine act has "the
illustration of the glory of God" as its final cause. Now it
is equally certain and known to all, who have even approached
the threshold of sacred letters, that the manifestation of
the divine perfection and the illustration of his glory
consists in the unfolding of His essential attributes by acts
and works comparable to them: but an inquiry is necessary
concerning those attributes, by the unfolding of which He
determined to illustrate His own glory, first, by which, in
the second place, and so on, by successive steps. It is
certain that He could not, first of all, have done this by
means of mercy and punitive justice. For the former could be
exercised only towards the miserable, the latter only towards
sinners. But since, first of all, the external action of God
both was and must be taken up, so to speak, with Nothing, it
is, therefore, evident that goodness, wisdom, and omnipotence
were, first of all, to be unfolded, and that by them the
glory of God was to be illustrated. These, therefore, were
unfolded in the creation, by which God appeared to be
supremely good and wise, and omnipotent.
But, as God made all His creatures with this difference that
some were capable of nothing more than they were at their
creation, and others were capable of greater perfection, He
was concerned, as to the former, only with their preservation
and government, accomplished by goodness, wisdom and power of
the same kind and measure, since preservation is only a
continuance of creation, as the latter is the beginning of
the former, and government may not go beyond the natural
condition of the creatures, unless when it seems good to God
to use them, for the sake of men for supernatural purposes,
as in the bread and wine used, in the Lord's Supper, to
signify and seal unto us the communion of the body and the
blood of Christ; as to the latter, which He made capable of
greater perfection, as angels and men, the same attributes
were to be unfolded, but in a far greater measure. In the
former case, the good communicated is limited, as each
creature receives that which is appropriate to itself,
according to the diversity of their natures, but, in the
latter, there is a communication of supreme and infinite
good, which is God, in the union with whom consists the
happiness of rational creatures. Reason demanded that this
communication should be made contrary to justice, wherefore
He gave a law to His creatures, obedience to which was made
the condition on which that communication should be made.
Therefore, this was the first decree concerning the final
cause of rational creatures, and the glory of God to be
illustrated by justice and the highest goodness -- highest as
to the good to be communicated, not absolutely; by goodness
joined to justice, in the case of those who should be made
partakers of the highest good, through steadfastness in the
truth; by punitive justice, in the case of those who should
make themselves unworthy of it by their disobedience. Then we
see that justice, rewarding obedience, which was its office,
according to the gracious promise of God, and punishing
disobedience as it deserves, according to the just
threatenings of God, holds the first place; in the former
case, justice joined to goodness, in the latter, punitive
justice opposed to the gracious communication of the highest
good, without any mention of mercy, unless it may be
considered as preserving the creature from possible misery,
which could, by its own fault, fall into misery; as mercy is
not considered when it is predetermined by the decree of
Predestination. That decree was peremptory in respect to the
angels, as in accordance with it, they are condemned:
wherefore the predestination and reprobation of angels was
comprehended in this. But what grace was prepared for the
former in Predestination and was denied to the latter in
Reprobation, and in what respects, I do not now argue. But it
was not peremptory in reference to men, whom God did not
decree to treat according to that highest rigor of the law,
but in the salvation of whom He decreed to exhibit all His
goodness, which Jehovah showed to Moses in these, His
attributes, "The Lord, Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-
suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth" (Exod. xxvi,
6). Therefore, the Predestination and Reprobation of men were
not considered in that decree. For since Adam sinned, and in
him all who were to be his descendants by natural
propagation, all would have been devoted to eternal
condemnation without hope of pardon. For the decree of
Predestination and Reprobation is peremptory. So far, then,
no predestination of men unto life, and no reprobation unto
death had any place. And since there could be no
Predestination and Reprobation, except in accordance with
those attributes by which men are at once saved or damned --
but the predestinated may be saved at once by mercy, and the
reprobate may be damned at once by justice opposed to that
mercy -- it follows that there was no fixed predestination
and reprobation of men, in reference to whom there could be
no place for mercy and justice opposed to it. But there could
be no place for them in reference to men who were not
miserable, and not sinners. Then, since Predestination
includes the means by which the predestinated will certainly
and infallibly come to salvation, and Reprobation includes
the denial of those same means, but those means are the
remission of sins and the renewing of the Holy Ghost, and its
perpetual assistance even to the end, which are necessary and
communicable to none, except sinners, I conclude that there
was no Predestination and Reprobation in reference to men, in
whose case these means were neither necessary nor
communicable.
Finally, since God can love no sinner unto salvation, unless
he be reconciled to Himself in Christ, hence it is, that
there could be no place for Predestination, except in Christ.
And since Christ was ordained and given for sinners, it is
certain that Predestination and its opposite, Reprobation,
could have no place before human sin -- its existence as
foreseen by God -- and the appointment of Christ as Mediator,
and indeed his performance, in the prescience of God, of the
functions of the office of Mediator, which pertains to
reconciliation. Nor does it follow from this, that God either
made man with an uncertain design, or failed of the end at
which He aimed. For He prescribed to Himself, both in the act
of creation, and in that of glorification, and its opposite,
condemnation, the illustration of His own glory as an end,
and He obtained it; by goodness, wisdom and power in
creation, and He obtained it; by the same, but in a greater
measure, and joined with justice in glorification and
condemnation, and He obtained it. But, though the mode of
illustrating His glory by mercy, which is a certain method of
communicating goodness and the approach of the same to a
miserable creature, and by justice, opposed to that mercy,
could have no place except from the occasion of human sin,
yet the decree of God is not, therefore, dependent on the
man, for He foresaw from eternity what would be in the
future, and in ordaining, concerning the future, to that end,
He freely arranged it according to His own choice, not
compelled by any necessity as if He could not, in some other
way, have secured glory to Himself from the sin of man. But
that the glory of God does not consist merely in the
illustration of mercy and, its opposite justice, is evident
from the fact that, then, He would not have obtained glory
from the act of creation, nor from the predestination and
reprobation of angels. It is to be understood, that mercy is
not an essential attribute of the Deity distinct from
goodness itself, as in the womb and the offspring of
goodness; indeed, it is goodness itself extending to the
sinful creature and to misery. It can for this reason be
said, in simple terms, that, in all His eternal acts, God
determined to declare His own glory by goodness, wisdom, and
omnipotence, with the addition of justice when equity
demanded it at the prescription of wisdom, but that He
adapted the mode to the state, or rather to the change of the
object, in reference to which He had determined to unfold
those attributes. In reference to this thing Tertullian says,
in a beautiful and erudite manner, "God must, of necessity
use all things in reference to all being, He must have as
many feelings, as there are causes of them; anger for the
wicked. and wrath for the ungrateful, and jealousy for the
proud, and whatever else would not be for the advantage of
the evil; so also, mercy for the erring, and patience for
those not yet repentant, and honour for the deserving, and
whatever is necessary for the good. All these feelings He has
in His own mode, in which it is fit that He should feel them,
just as man has the same, equally after his own manner."
(Adversus Marcion, Lib. 2, cap 16.)
Predestination does not arise merely from goodness simply
considered, the province of which is, indeed, to communicate
itself to the creature, but also from that mode of mercy,
which goes out from that goodness to the miserable to remove
their misery, of grace in Christ, which goes out from it to
sinners to pardon their sins, of patience and long-suffering,
going forth from the same goodness towards those who, for a
long time, struggle against it, and do not at once obey the
call, thus prolonging the delay of conversion. So also
reprobation is not merely fixed by justice, the opposite of
that goodness, simply considered, but by justice tempered by
some mercy and patience. For God "endured with much long-
suffering the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction." (Rom.
ix, 22.)
From these things, thus considered, I may be allowed, with
your kind permission, to conclude that Predestination has not
been sufficiently well defined or described by you. If any
one is inclined to consider the series and order of the
objects of the knowledge and the will of God, he will be more
and more confirmed in the truth of the things briefly set
forth by me. The passage from Augustine, is in agreement with
these views, if one wishes to gather his complete opinion
from other passages. Fulgentius and Gregory most clearly
support me in the passages quoted by you. For, if the act of
predestination is the preparation for the remission of sins
or the punishment of the same, then it is certain that there
is place for predestination only in reference to sinners. If
also the act of Predestination is the pre-election of some
who are to be redeemed from their depravity, and the leaving
of others in their depravity, from this also it is evident
that predestination has to do with men considered as sinners.
That sentiment of the School-men agrees most fully with the
same views. For it openly declares that Predestination
depends on the foresight of the fall, when they say that the
perfection and goodness of God, who predestinates, is
represented by the mode of mercy and punitive justice, which
mode, as I have now frequently said, can have place only in
reference to sinners. If any one acknowledges that this is
indeed true, but says that God has arranged this, as an
occasion for Himself, by decreeing that man should fall, and
by carrying forward that decree to its end or limit, we ask
the proof of that assertion, which, in my judgment, he will
be unable to give. For that sentiment is at variance with the
justice of God, as it makes God the author of sin, and
introduces an inevitable necessity for sin. This I will
prove. For if that decree existed, man could not abstain from
sin, otherwise the decree would have been made in vain, which
is an impious supposition. For "the counsel of the Lord
standeth forever." (Psalm xxxiii, 11). We remark also that
the human will would have been circumscribed and determined
by that decree, so that it could not turn itself except in
one direction, in which there would be sin; by that act its
freedom would be lost, because it would move the will, not
according to the mode of free-will, but according to the mode
of nature. Such an act it could not resist, nor would there
be any volition in that direction, indeed, there would not be
the power to put forth that volition on account of the
determination of the decree. Consider, also, that, by that
sentiment, mercy and justice are considered as means
resulting from Predestination, while they are the primary
causes of Predestination, as is evident from the fact that
the final cause of Predestination may be resolved into the
manifestation of mercy and justice.
Here, observe, also, in what way you make the creation and
the fall of man the means in common lying at the foundation
of the counsel, or rather the decree of predestination, I
think, indeed, that both the creation, and the fall preceded
every external act of predestination, as also the decree
concerning the creation of man, and the permission of his
fall preceded, in the Divine mind, the decree of
Predestination. I think, also, that I have partly proved
this, in my preceding remarks. But it will be well to look at
this with a little more diligence.
Every act, which has reference to an object, is posterior in
nature, to its object. It is called an object relatively.
Therefore, it has an absolute existence prior to the
existence of its relation to the act. The object, then,
exists in itself, before it can be under the influence of the
act which tends towards it. But man is the object of
Predestination. Therefore, man is prior to the act of
Predestination. But man is what he is by creation. therefore,
creation is prior to Predestination -- that is, in the divine
mind, or the decree concerning the creation of man is prior
to the decree of Predestination, and the act of creation is
prior to the execution of the decree of Predestination. If
any one should reply that God, in the internal act of
Predestination, is employed with man considered as not
created, but as to be made, I answer that this could neither
take place, nor be so understood by a mind judging rightly.
For Predestination is a decree, not only to illustrate the
divine glory, but to illustrate it in man, by the mode of
mercy and justice. From this, it follows that man must also
exist in the divine mind before the act of Predestination,
and the fall of man must itself, also, be previously
foreseen. The attributes of God, by which creation is
affected, are, therefore, considered as prior, in the divine
nature, to those in which predestination originates.
Goodness, simply considered, wisdom, and power, operating
upon Nothing, are, therefore, prior to mercy and punitive
justice. Add, also, that since predestination originates, on
the one hand, in mercy, and on the other, in justice, in the
former case having reference to salvation -- in the latter,
to damnation -- it cannot be that any means exist pertaining,
in common, to the execution of election and of reprobation.
For they are provided neither in mercy nor in justice. There
exist, then, no means of Predestination, common to both parts
of the decree.
Whether the definition of the creation of man is correct. If
you wished to define the creation of man that should have
been done with greater accuracy. But if you wished only to
describe it, there is yet, in that description, something
which I may note. "Man was made mutable," as was demanded by
the very condition of that Nothing from which he was made,
and of the creature itself. which neither could nor ought to
be raised, by creation, to the state of the Creator, which is
immutability. But he was made mutable in such a sense that
actual change from good to evil would follow that possible
mutability, only by the voluntary and free act of man. But
the act of the creature does not remain free when it is so
determined in one direction, that, if that determination
continues, there cannot but be a change.
Whether the permission of the fall, is rightly defined. But
of the "permission of the fall," we must treat at somewhat
greater length: for very much depends on this for the
expediting of this whole matter. It is certain that God can
by the act of His own absolute power prevent all things
whatever, which can be done by the creature, and it is
equally certain that He is not absolutely under obligation to
any one to hinder him from evil. But He can not, in His
justice, do all that He can in His absolute power. He cannot,
in His justice (or righteousness), forget the "work and
labour of love" of the pious (Heb. vi, 10). The absolute
power of God is limited by the decree of God, by which He
determined to do any thing in a particular direction, And
though God is not absolutely under obligation to any one, He
can yet obligate Himself by His own act, as, for instance, by
a promise, or by requiring some act from man. He is obligated
to perform what He promises, for He owes to Himself the
immutability of His own truth, whether He has promised it
absolutely or conditionally. By requiring an act, He places
Himself under obligation to give ability and the strength
without which that act can not be performed; otherwise, He
would reap where He had not sown. It is plain, from these
positions, that God, since He conceded the freedom of the
will, and the use of that freedom, ought not, and indeed
could not, prevent the fall in any mode which would infringe
on the use of that freedom; and farther, that He was not
obligated to prevent it in any other way than by the
bestowment of the ability which should be necessary and
sufficient to the avoidance of the fall. Permission is not,
therefore, a "cessation from the act of illuminating and that
of inclining" to such an extent that, without those acts, a
man could not avoid sin. For, in that case, the fault could
be justly and deservedly charged upon God, who would be the
cause of sin, by way of removing or not bestowing that which
is necessary for the performance of an act which Himself has
prescribed by His own law. From which it also follows that
the law is unjust, as it is not in proportion to the strength
of the creature on which it is imposed, whether that
deficiency of strength arises from the nonbestowal or the
removal of it before any fault has been committed by the
creature.
Permission is, indeed, a cessation of the act of hindrance,
but that cessation is to be so explained that it may not be
reduced to an efficient cause of sin, either directly, or by
way of the denial or removal of that, without which sin can
not be avoided. In reference to this permission, if it be
fitly explained, it can be doubtless said that "God not only
foreknows it, but He even wills it by an act of volition"
affirmatively and immediately directed to the permission
itself, not to that which is permitted. As it can not be said
concerning this, that God wills that it should not be done,
for He permits it, and not unwillingly, so, also, it can not
be truly said that God wills it. For permission is an act
intermediate between volition and nolition, the will being
inactive.
But the cause, in view of which He permits sin, is to be
found, not only in the consequent, but in the antecedent. In
the antecedent, because God constituted man so that he might
have a free will, and might, according to the freedom of his
will, either accord obedience or refuse it. He could not
rescind this constitution, which Himself had established, in
view of His own immutability, as Tertullian clearly shows, in
his argument against Marcion (Lib. 2, cap. 5, 6 and 7). In
the consequent, because He saw that He could use sin as an
occasion for demonstrating the glory of His own grace and
justice. But this consequent does not naturally result from
that sin. From this, it follows that even from the highest
evil, (if there be any highest,) evil, only, could result per
se, or there would be an injury to the divine majesty,
opposed to the divine good; but that consequent is an
incidental result of sin, because God knows and wills to
elicit, by His wisdom, goodness and power, His own glory from
it, as light from darkness. As, then, evil is not good, per
se, so it is not absolutely good that evil should occur. For
if this be true. then God not only permits it, but is its
author and effector. But it is incidentally good that evil
should occur, in view of that wisdom, goodness, and power of
God, of which I have spoken, by which God takes from sin the
material for illustrating his own glory. Therefore, sin is
not, in this respect, the means per se, for illustrating the
glory of God, but only the occasion not made for this
purpose, nor adapted to it by its own nature, but seized by
God and used in this direction with wonderful skill, and
praiseworthy perversion. No absolute good in the universe
would be prevented, even if God should prevent evil, provided
that prevention should not be affected in a manner not
adapted to the primitive constitution of man; and God is free
to prevent sin, but in a way not at variance with the freedom
of the will. Any other method of prevention would be
absolutely contrary to the good of the universe, inasmuch as
one good of the universe consists even in this, that there
should be a creature endued with free will, and that the use
of his own free will should be conceded to the creature
without any divine interference. But if the existence of evil
or sin should absolutely contribute to the good and the
perfection of the universe, then God ought not only not to
hinder sin, but even to promote it, else He would fail in His
duty to His own work, and do injury to His own perfection. I
admit that, without the existence of sin, there would not be
that place for the patience of the martyrs, or for the
sacrifice of Christ; but the patience of the martyrs and the
sacrifice of Christ are not necessary results of the
existence of sin. Indeed we shall see, by considering the
natural effect of sin, that from it would result impatience
in those who are afflicted, and by it the wrath, of God would
be kindled, which not only could, but in fact, would, prevent
the bestowment of any good, even the least, and much more
that of his Son, unless God should be, at the same time,
merciful, and could, in His wisdom, find a way by which He
might prevent the natural effect of sin, and using sin as the
occasion, might promote other effects, contrary to the very
nature of sin.
The passages cited from Augustine and Gregory, are not only
not opposed to, but actually in favour of this opinion. For
they do not say that it would have been good absolutely that
evils should occur, but that God judged it better to bring
good out of evils than to prevent them; thus comparing two
acts of the Deity, and esteeming the one better than the
other. I may be allowed to observe, in reference to the
remark of Gregory, that he is not sufficiently accurate, when
he compares the evils which we suffer on account of sins with
the blessing of redemption as something greater: for he ought
to compare our sins and faults, not the evils which we suffer
on their account, with the blessing of redemption. If he had
done this, and had carefully considered the words of the
apostle, "and not rather (as we be slanderously reported, and
as some affirm that we say), Let us do evil that good may
come," (Rom. iii, 8), he would have judged otherwise, or, at
least, would have expressed his views more fitly, without
making such a transition, and without substituting the
punishment of sin for sin itself. It is indeed right, for men
and for any believer, to say with entire confidence, that
there can be no redemption so excellent and no method of
redemption so glorious that, for the sake of obtaining
either, any sin, however small, is to be committed. For the
Redeemer "was manifested that he might destroy the works of
the devil," (1 John iii, 8,) i.e., sins; they are not,
therefore, to be committed in order that the Son of God, the
Redeemer, might come. For that circular form of reasoning,
the Son of God came that he might destroy the works of the
devil, and sin was committed that it might be destroyed by
the Son, is not only contrary to the Scriptures, but also
hostile to all truth, as it leads infinitely astray.
From this it is also easily proved that the fall can not be
called a happy transgression, except by a catachrestic
hyperbole, which, while it may be adapted to declamations,
panegyric orations, and rhetorical embellishments, should be
far removed from the solid investigation of truth. To these
is always to be added the remark, which I have made,
frequently and with reiteration, that redemption could not
have resulted from transgression, except as the latter might
afford an occasion for it, by the arrangement of God, in
accordance with His will, that the transgression should be
expiated, and washed away by a Redeemer of such character and
dignity.
But the distinction which you make between "the permission of
the fall" and "the permitted fall" seems to me to be of no
force. For the permission of the fall is not less by the
Divine arrangement than the permitted fall. For God ordained
His own permission for a certain end. But consider whether it
is not absurd to distinguish between "the permission of the
fall" and "the permitted fall." In the latter case, I speak
of the fall, not considered in that it is a fall, but in that
it is a permitted fall: as you must, of necessity, consider,
when you style it "the means of the decree," which
appellation is not appropriate to the fall except on account
of the adjunct "permitted." For not the fall but the
permission of the fall, tended to the glory of God; not the
act of many which is the fall, but the act of God, which is
permission, having immediate reference to that act of man
according to the prescript of the Divine arrangement, tended
to His glory. But I acknowledge that permission is the means
of the decree, not of predestination, but of providence, as
the latter is distinguished from the former. I speak now of
providence, as governing and administrative, which is not
only not prior, in nature and order, to predestination, but
is also the cause of the mission of the Son as the Redeemer,
who is our head, in whom predestination is made, as the
apostle teaches, (Ephes. 1.)
But how can it be true that the fall is permitted by God, and
yet that "it would not have occurred unless God had willed
it" I wish that it might be explained how God could, at once,
will that the fall should occur, and permit the same; how God
could be concerned, by His volition, with the fall both
mediately and immediately -- mediately by willing the
permission, and immediately by willing the fall itself. I
wish also that these things may be harmonized, how the fall
could occur by the will of God, and yet the will of God not
be the cause of the fall, which is contrary to the express
declaration of God's word, "Our God is in the heavens; He
hath done whatever He pleased," (Psalm cxv, 3.) Also, in what
way could God will the fall, and yet be "a God that hath no
pleasure in wickedness," (Psalm v, 4,) since the fall was
wickedness. The distinctions which are presented are not
sufficient to untie the knot, as I shall show in the case of
each of them separately. For they distinguish between the
fall and the event of the fall; between the will of open
intimation and that of His good-pleasure, revealed or hidden;
between the fall as it was sin, and as it was the means of
illustrating the divine glory. They say that God willed that
the fall should occur, but did not will the fall; that He
willed the fall according to His good-pleasure and His hidden
will, not according to His will, of open intimation, revealed
and approving; that He willed the fall, not as it was sin,
but as it was the means of illustrating His own glory.
The first distinction is verbal, and not real. He, who willed
that the fall should occur, willed also the fall. He who
willed that the fall should occur, willed the event of the
fall, and He, who willed the event of the fall, willed the
fall. For the event of the fall is the fall, as the event of
an action is the action itself. But if He willed the fall, He
was the cause of the fall. For "He hath done whatsoever He
pleased," (Psalm cxv, 3.) If any one replies, that He willed
that the fall should occur by the act of another, not by His
own act, I answer -- it could not be that God should will
that the fall should occur by the act of another, and not by
His own act: for it would not happen by the act of another,
unless He should interpose with His own act, and, indeed,
with an act, such that, from it, the act of another should
necessarily exist; otherwise that, which He wished should
occur by the act of another, would not be effected or occur
by that act of another. The force of the argument is not
increased: whether God willed that the fall should occur,
mediately, by the act of another, or, immediately, by His own
act. These are mediately connected -- the act of God and the
act of another, that is, of man, or the fall. The fall
proceeded from the act of man, but that depends of necessity
on the act of God; otherwise it could happen that the act of
another should not be performed, and thus it could happen
that the fall should not occur, which, nevertheless, God
willed should occur. It is not, therefore, denied that God is
the cause of the fall, except immediately; it is conceded
that He is so, mediately. No one, indeed, ever wished to
deduce, from the declaration of any one, that God is the
immediate cause of the sin perpetrated by man, for he would
deduce a contradiction in terms, as they say in the schools,
unless, indeed, the subject might be the general concurrence
of God with man, in producing an act which can not be
produced by man without sin.
The distinction of the will into that of hidden and revealed,
while it may have place elsewhere, can not avail here. For
the hidden will of God is said to be efficacious; but if, in
its exercise, God willed that the fall should occur, it is
certainly a necessary conclusion, also, that He effected the
fall, that is, He must be the cause of the fall; for whatever
God wills, even by His hidden will, the same, also, He does
both in heaven and on the earth; and no one can resist His
will, namely, that which is hidden. But I may remark
concerning that distinction in the will, that I think that it
may be said, that neither of these can be so contrary, or
opposed to the other, that God, by one, wills that to be
done, which, by the other, He wills not to be done, and vice
versa. God wills by His revealed and approving will, that man
should not fall, it can not, therefore, be true that God, by
any will, considered in any way whatever, can will that man
should fall; for though there may be distinction in the will
of God, yet no contradiction can exist in it. But it is a
contradiction, if God, by any act of His own will, should
tend towards an object, and at the same time towards its
contrary.
The third distinction, in which it is said that God wills
sin, not as such, but as the means of illustrating His own
glory, defends God from the charge of efficiency in sin no
more than the two preceding. For that assertion remains true
-- God doeth whatsoever He wills, but He wills sin,
therefore, He effects sin, not indeed as it is such, but as
it is the means of illustrating His own glory. But if God
effects sin, as it is the means to such an end, it can not be
effected, unless man commits sin as such. For sin can not be
made a means, unless it is committed. There exists, indeed,
that distinction of sin into separate and diverse respects,
not really, and in fact, but in the mode of considering it.
But that we may make that distinction correctly, as it is
indeed of some use, it must be said that God permits sin as
such, but for this reason, because He had the knowledge and
the power to make it the means, yea, rather, to use it as the
means of illustrating His own glory. So that the
consideration of sin as such was presented to the Divine
permission, the permission itself being, in the mean time,
caused both by the consideration that the sin could be the
means of illustrating the Divine glory, and by the
arrangement that the sin, permitted, should be, in fact, the
means for illustrating that same glory.
The simile, which you present, of the mutable decaying house
is not apposite for many reasons. For in the first place, in
its fall, the house is passive; but in the fall of man he is
active, for he sins. Secondly, that house is, not only
mutable, that is, capable of decay, but subject to decay; but
man, though capable of sinning, was still not subject to sin.
Thirdly, that house could not stand if attacked by the winds;
but man could preserve his position, even though tempted by
Satan. Fourthly, the necessary props were not placed under
that house; but man received strength from God, sufficient
for steadfastness against the onset of Satan, and was
supported by the assistance of divinity itself. Fifthly, the
builder anticipated the ruin of the house, and in part willed
it, because he was unwilling to prevent the fall when he
could have done it; God, indeed, foresaw sin, but He did not
will it; indeed, He endeavoured to prevent it by precept and
the bestowment of grace, necessary and sufficient for the
avoidance of sin. Farther than this, He must not prevent,
lest He should destroy the constitution which He had
established. The ideas, I will the ruin, and I will it, so
far as I will not to prevent it, do not agree. For the ruin
and the permission of the ruin can not be at the same time
the immediate object of the will. For God can not be
concerned in the fall, at the same time, both by an
affirmative and by a negative act of the will. The act of
willing the fall was affirmative, the act of not willing to
prevent is negative, intermediate between two opposite
affirmative acts, namely, between the act of volition and
that of nolition concerning the fall. It is altogether true,
that so much causality or efficiency is to be attributed to
the builder as there is of will, directed to the ruin of the
house, attributed to him. Let us now consider the application
of the similitude. God left Adam to himself, but yet Adam was
not deserted by God; for He placed under him as it were a
triple prop, lest he might sin or fall. He gave him a
precept, that he might, in obedience, not choose to sin; He
added a threat that he might fear to sin on account of the
annexed and following punishment; He bestowed grace that he
might be able in fact to fulfill the precept, and avoid the
threatened punishment. It may be lawful, also, to call the
promise, which was placed in opposition to the threatening,
and which was sealed by the symbol of the tree of life, a
fourth prop. The reason, in view of which, God left man to
himself, was not that his ability might be tested by
temptation, for from the actual occurrence of the fall, his
inability to stand could be neither proved nor disproved; but
because it was suitable that there should be such a trial of
the obedience of him whom God had made the ruler of his own
will, the lord and the head of his own voluntary sets. Nor
was permission instituted to this end, that it might be seen
what the creature could do, if the Divine aid and government
over him, should cease for a time, both because the Divine
aid and government was not deficient, and because it was
already certain that man could do nothing without the
government and general aid of God, and nothing good without
the special aid of His grace.
That "God was not the cause of that defection" is a
Theological axiom. But you, by removing those acts, do not
remove the cause of the defection from the Deity. For God can
be regarded as the cause of sin, either by affirmative or
negative acts. You, indeed, take from Him the affirmative
acts, namely, the inclining of the mind to sin, the infusion
of wickedness, and the deprivation of the gift, already
bestowed, but you attributed to Him a negative act, the
denial or non-bestowal of strengthening grace. If this
strengthening grace was necessary to the avoidance of sin,
then, by that act of denial, God became the Author of sin and
of Adam's fall. But if you attribute the denial or the non-
bestowal of strengthening grace to God, not absolutely, but
on account of the transgression of Adam, because he did not
seek the Divine aid, I approve what you say, if you concede
that it was in the power of Adam to seek that aid; otherwise
it was denied to him to seek that also, and so we go on
without end.
You say -- "There are two parts or species of predestination,
the decree of Election and that of Reprobation," concerning
which it must be stated that one can not exist without the
other, and that, one being supposed, the other must be also.
This is signified by the word election, otherwise,
predestination may be considered per se and without an
opposite, and so all men universally would be predestinated
unto life. In that case, there would be no election, which
includes the idea of reprobation, as united to it by a
necessary consequence and copula. Election and Reprobation
are opposed to each other both affirmatively and negatively.
Negatively, because election refers to the act of the will by
which grace and glory are conferred, reprobation, that by
which they are not conferred. Affirmatively, since
reprobation refers to the act of the will, which inflicts
punishment on account of sin.
It is worthy of consideration that God, both in the decree of
Election and in that of Reprobation, was concerned with men
considered as sinners. For the grace which was provided by
election or predestination, is the grace of the remission of
sins, and the renewal of the Holy Ghost; and the glory which
He has prepared by the same decree, is out of the ignominy to
which man was liable on account of sin. Reprobation, also, is
a denial of that grace and a preparation of the punishment
due to sin, not in that it was due, but that it was, through
mercy, not taken away. Isidorus and Angelomus, quoted by you,
express this condition of the object both of Election and
Reprobation. The former, when be says -- "the reprobate are
left, and predestinated to death," the latter, when he says
that -- of "the unbelieving people some are predestinated to
everlasting freedom, but others are left in their own
impiety, and condemned to perpetual death by occult
dispensation, and occult judgment."
Your definition of Election is obscure from the want of some
word. It seems that the phrase to be illustrated ought to
have been added, thus: "The decree of election is that by
which God destines certain men to His glorious grace to be
illustrated in their salvation and heavenly life, obtained
through Christ," otherwise the phraseology is not
sufficiently complete. But the definition, even when
completed, in that way, seems to me to have been, ineptly
arranged, as the parts are not arranged according to their
mutual relations. For "salvation" and "heavenly life" hold
the relation of the material prepared for the decree of
election; "certain men" hold the place of the object or
subject for which that salvation is prepared; the
"illustration of His glorious grace" is the end of election;
"Christ" is here made the means of obtaining that salvation
and life. The order of all these in the definition according
to their mutual relations, ought to be, -- "The decree of
election is that, by which God destined certain men to
salvation and heavenly life, to be obtained through Christ,
to the praise of His glorious grace." In this definition,
however, Christ does not seem to me to obtain that place,
which he deserves, and which the Apostle assigns to him. For
Christ according to the Apostle is not only the means by
which the salvation, already prepared by election, but, so to
speak, the meritorious cause, in respect to which the
election was made, and on whose account that grace was
prepared. For the apostle says that we are chosen in Christ
(Ephes. i, 4), as in a mediator, in whose blood salvation and
life is obtained for us, and as in our "head," (Ephes. i, 22)
from whom those blessings flow to us. For God chooses no one
unto eternal life except in Christ, who prepared it by his
own blood for them who should believe on his name. From this
it seems to follow that, since God regards no one in Christ
unless they are engrafted in him by faith, election is
peculiar to believers, and the phrase "certain men," in the
definition, refers to believers. For Christ is a means of
salvation to no one unless he is apprehended by faith.
Therefore, that phrase "in Christ" marks the meritorious
cause by which grace and glory are prepared, and the
existence of the elect in him, without which they could not
be elected in him. The definition, then, is susceptible of
this form. "Election is the decree of God, by which, of
Himself, from eternity, He decreed to justify in (or through)
Christ, believers, and to accept them unto eternal life, to
the praise of His glorious grace." But you will say, "Then
faith is made dependent on the human will, and is not a gift
of divine grace." I deny that sequence, for there was no such
statement in the definition. I acknowledge that the cause of
faith was not expressed, but that was unnecessary. If any one
denies it, there may be added after "believers" the phrase
"to whom He determined to give faith." But we should observe
whether, in our method of consideration, the decree, by which
God determined to justify believers and adopt them as sons,
is the same with that by which He determined to bestow faith
on some, but to deny the same to others. This seems to me not
very probable. For there are, here, two purposes, each
determined by the certain decree of God; their subjects are
also diverse, and different attributes are assigned to them.
I think that this ought to have been noticed in treating
correctly of the Order and Mode of Predestination. I do not
much object to your statement that "the act of the divine
mind is two-fold, regarding the end, and the means to the
end, or to salvation," but that remark does not seem correct
to me, in which you say that "the former is commonly called
the decree, and the latter the execution of the decree" --
for such is your marginal annotation -- each of these is an
act of the decree, as you acknowledge; but an act of the
decree is internal, and precedes its execution whether it is
in reference to the end or the means. The passage in Romans
9, does not favour your idea as you claim. For it not
distinguish the purpose from election, nor does it make the
election prior to the purpose of damning of conferring
salvation, but it says that the purpose is "according to
election," not without election or apart from election, as is
clearly evident from the words of the apostle. For they are
as follows -- "i[na hJ kat ejklogh<n tou~ Qeou~ proqesiv
menh| " that the purpose of God according to election might
stand," from which it is apparent that, by these words, is
described the purpose of God, which is "according to
election."
But that this may be more plainly understood, we may examine
briefly the design and the scope of the apostle. The Jews
objected that they, by virtue of the covenant and the divine
word, committed to them, were the peculiar people of God,
and, therefore, that honour could not be taken away from
them, without the disgrace and the violation of the divine
decree. They asserted, however, that the honour referred to,
and the title of the people of God was taken from them by the
Apostle Paul, when he made those only, who should believe in
the Christ whom he preached, partakers of the righteousness
of God, and of eternal salvation. Since they had not believed
in that Christ, it followed, according to the doctrine of the
apostle, that they were strangers to the righteousness of God
and eternal salvation, and unworthy to be longer considered
the people of God. But since they considered this to be
contrary to the decree and the covenant of God, they
concluded that it was, at the same time, absurd and foreign
to the truth. The apostle answers that the covenant, decree,
or word of God hath not "taken none effect," (verse 6), but
remains firm, even if many of the Jews should not be reckoned
among the people of God, because that decree or covenant did
not comprehend all Israelites, universally without election
and distinction; for that decree was "according to election,"
as set forth in those words of God announcing his purpose.
For God said "In Isaac," not in Ishmael, "shall thy seed be
called." Also "The elder," Esau, "shall serve the younger,"
Jacob. The apostle asserts that God declared most clearly in
these words, that He did not regard the whole progeny of
Abraham, or that of Isaac, or of Jacob, or all of their
individual descendants, as His people, but only those who
were "the children of the promise" to the exclusion of "the
children of the flesh." The Apostle reasons, most
conclusively from those words of God, that the purpose of God
is according to election, and that it, therefore, embraces,
in itself, not all the Israelites, but, while it claims some,
it rejects others. From which it follows that it is not
wonderful or contrary to the purpose or covenant of God, that
some of the Jews are rejected by God, and those indeed, who
are specially excluded by that decree according to those
words of God, as "the children of the flesh," i.e. those who
were seeking to be justified "by the works of the law" and
according to the flesh. Compare Rom. ix, 7-11 and 30-32, also
x, 3-5 with ch. iv, 1-3.
In Romans viii, 29, those acts -- I refer now to the decree
and the execution of the decree -- are clearly distinguished.
In the decree two things are mentioned, foreknowledge and
predestination, "for whom He did foreknow, He also did
predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son." It is
inquired -- what is the import of this foreknowledge or
prescience? Some explain it thus: -- "whom He foreknew," i.e.
whom He previously loved, and affectionately regarded as His
own, as indeed the simple word "to know" is sometimes used,
as "I know you not." (Matt. xxv, 12.) "The Lord knoweth the
way of the righteous." (Psalm i, 6.) Others say that
foreknowledge, or prescience of faith in Christ, is here
signified. You assent to the former, and reject the latter,
and with good reason, if it has the meaning, which you
ascribe to it. But it is worthy of consideration whether the
latter meaning of the work "foreknow" may not be so
explained, as not only not to impinge upon the former, but
also to harmonize with it most completely so that the former
cannot be true without the latter. This will be evident, if
it shall be demonstrated that God can "previously love and
affectionately regard as His own" no sinner unless He has
foreknown him in Christ, and looked upon him as a believer in
Christ.
To prove this I proceed thus: -- God acknowledges, as His
own, no sinner, and He chooses no one to eternal life except
in Christ, and for the sake of Christ. "He hath chosen us in
Him," (Ephes. i, 4); "wherein He hath made us accepted in the
Beloved," (verse 6). "Nor any other creature shall be able to
separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our
Lord." (Rom. viii, 39). "God was in Christ reconciling the
world unto Himself." (2 Cor. v, 19).
For, if God could will to any one eternal life, without
respect to the Mediator, He could also give eternal life,
without the satisfaction made by the Mediator. The actual
bestowment of eternal life is not more limited, than the
purpose to bestow it. God truly loved the world, and, on
account of that love, gave His own Son as its Redeemer. (John
iii, 16). But the love, here spoken of, is not that by which
He wills eternal life, as appears from the very expression of
John -- for he interposes faith in Christ between that love
and eternal life. Hence God acknowledges no one, in Christ
and for Christ's sake, as His own, unless that person is in
Christ. He who is not in Christ, can not be loved in Christ.
But no one is in Christ, except by faith; for Christ dwells
in our hearts by faith, and we are engrafted and incorporated
in him by faith. It follows then that God acknowledges His
own, and chooses to eternal life no sinner, unless He
considers him as a believer in Christ, and as made one with
him by faith. This is proved by the following testimonies:
"As many as received him, to them gave He power to become the
sons of God, even to them that believe on his name." (John i,
12.) But to those, to whom He gave this power, and to them,
considered in one and the same manner, He also decreed to
give this power, since the decree of Predestination effects
nothing in him who is predestinated, and there is, therefore,
no internal change in him, intervening between the decree and
the actual bestowment of the thing, destined and prepared by
the decree. "God so loved the world that He gave His only
begotten Son that whosoever believeth in him shall not
perish, but have everlasting life." (John iii, 16). "They
which be of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham." (Gal.
iii, 9.) "Without faith it is impossible to please him."
(Heb. xi, 6.) Hence he is not in error who says that
foreknowledge or prescience of faith in Christ is signified
in Rom. viii, 29, unless he adds the assertion that the
faith, referred to, results from our own strength and is not
produced in us by the free gift of God.
The same explanation is proved true from the following
member: "whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be
conformed to the image of He Son." No one is conformed to the
image of the Son of God if he does not believe on him.
Therefore, no one is predestinated by God to that conformity,
unless he is considered as a believer, unless one may claim
that faith itself is included in that conformity which
believers have with Christ -- which would be absurd, because
that faith can by no means be attributed to Christ, for it is
faith in him, and in God through him; it is faith in
reference to reconciliation, redemption, and the remission of
sins. It is true, also, since it is the means of attaining
that conformity. But you say, -- "They, who are predestinated
to be justified and to become the sons of God, are also
predestinated to believe, since adoption and justification
are received by faith." I deny that consequence; indeed I
assert that just the contrary can be concluded from that
argument, if the act of predestination is one and the same.
This I will prove: -- If adoption and justification is
received by faith, then they, who are predestinated to be
justified and to become the sons of God, are, of necessity,
considered as believers. For that, which is destined to any
one by Predestination, will certainly be received by him. And
as he is when he receives it, such he was considered to be,
when he was predestinated to receive it. Therefore, the
believer alone was predestinated to receive it. From which I
again conclude, that no one is chosen by God to adoption and
the communication of the gift of righteousness, unless he is
considered by Him as a believer. You add -- "It cannot be
said correctly, that God foreknew that men would believe, and
then predestinated them to faith, since those, whom He
foreknew to believe, He thus foreknew because He decreed that
they should believe. But what relation has this to the
matter. Such an affirmation is not made by the defenders of
the sentiment to which I have referred. You confound two
kinds of Predestination, and unite together acts of a
different character. The Predestination in which God decreed
to justify and adopt as sons believers in Christ, is not the
same with that, in which He decreed, by certain means, to
give faith to these and not to those. For the decree, is in
this case, concerning the bestowment of faith in that,
concerning the justification and adoption of believers;
which, can not, indeed, be the same decree, on account of the
diversity of the subject and the attribute. Otherwise it is
true, that "God first foreknew that men would believe, and
then predestinated them to faith." For He foreknew that they
would believe by His own gift, which decree was prepared by
Predestination. These things, having been thus plainly set
forth, may throw some light on this whole discussion, in
reference to Predestination. This we will do, at greater
extent, hereafter, when we shall subjoin our own view of the
mode and order of Predestination.
Those testimonies, which you cite from the Fathers and
School-men, can be very easily harmonized with what has been
said by us, yet to avoid prolixity, I will dispense with that
labour. One thing, however, I will observe; namely, that the
explanation of Peter Lombardus, however true it may be
elsewhere, it is not adapted to the passage in Rom. viii, 29.
For the Apostle has there presented the object of
Predestination, (conformity to the image of Christ,) in a
different light from that in which it is set forth or
presented by Lombardus, namely, "that they should believe the
word preached unto them." I will add, also, that you do not
rightly conclude, because the word foreknowledge is used
elsewhere by the Holy Spirit for the purpose of God, that, in
the passage under discussion, it can not signify prescience
of faith.
Further, in the decree of election, you refer to two acts,
one "the purpose of choosing certain men to His love and
grace, by which choice, men are made vessels of mercy and
honour;" the other, "the purpose of saving, or of the
bestowment of glory. This is not an unimportant distinction,
if all things are correctly understood. For those things,
which God prepares in election, are contained in grace and
glory. But your statement -- "Some, by the divine purpose,
were chosen to the eternal love of God," must be explained to
refer to that communication of love, by which God determined
to communicate Himself to some.
If you regard, in a different light, that love of God which
embraces us, it must be considered as preceding, in the order
of nature, that decree or the Divine purpose by which grace
and glory are prepared for us, grace, I say, which is the
means of attaining to glory. Otherwise if you understand, by
that word, the gracious disposition of God towards us, it
coincides with the love of God, and is to be placed above the
purpose or decree of God as its cause. This also is indicated
by the order of the predicaments (in the logical sense of
that word). For the purpose or decree is placed in the
predicament of Action, the gracious affection and love, in
the preceding predicament of Quality. This is evident from
Ephes. i, 5-6, where God is said to have predestinated and
adopted us "to the praise of the glory of His grace." If
grace, then, is to receive praise from those acts, it must be
placed before them as their cause.
Your position that "men to be created," are the object of the
former purpose is not correct. For we are now treating of the
subject, not as it is, in itself -- for we know that the
eternal purpose of God is antecedent to the actual existence
of man -- but as it is presented to the divine mind, in the
act of decree, and in that of Predestination. If the object
of that purpose is considered with that limitation, it is
certain that men, not" to be created," but "already created,
and sinners," -- that is, in the divine mind -- are the
object of the divine purpose and Predestination. This is
evident, from the love and gracious affection from which, and
the grace to which he chose them. For that love is in Christ;
in him is that gracious affection of God towards us; the
grace which is prepared for us as a saving means, has place
in Christ, and not elsewhere. This you have, with sufficient
clearness, signified, when you said that men, in that grace
to which He chose them, were made vessels of mercy;" which
word is misplaced, except when wretchedness and sin have
preceded it.
But if you think of the love and gracious affection of God,
as in God apart from any consideration of Christ, I shall
deny that the purpose and decree of Predestination was
instituted and established by God, according to those things,
so considered, and I shall claim from you the proof, which,
in my judgment, you will not be able to give, both because
the love of God towards those "to be created" is uniform
towards all, for in Adam all were created without any
difference, and because that love and gracious affection, by
which the purpose of Predestination was executed, saves with
certainty, the predestinated; but the predestinated are not
saved by that love and affection, considered out of Christ.
If you say that the love and gracious affection in God is the
same, whether considered in Christ or out of Christ, I admit
it: but man, "to be created," and man "having been created,
and a sinner," are the same man. Created, and continuing in
the condition of creation, he could be saved, by obedience,
of the love and gracious affection of God, considered out of
Christ. As a sinner, he could not be saved, except by the
same feelings, considered in Christ. If you make the sinner
the object of Predestination, you ought to add to
predestinating grace, a mode adapted to the sinner who is to
be saved. If you do not add this, will grace, considered
without that mode, be sufficient? I do not think that you
will urge that the grace and love, by which a man, who is not
a sinner, can be saved, and which is separate from mercy, is
to be considered in Christ, and affects us on account of, and
in respect to, him. If, however, you do this, I shall ask the
proof. And, after all the proof which you may be able to
present, it will be proper to say that Christ himself is to
be here considered in different relations; in the former
case, as Mediator, preserving and confirming the
predestinated in the integrity of their state; in the latter,
as Mediator, redeeming and renewing the same persons from the
state of sin and corruption; and I will add that grace and
salvation come to us, not by the former, but by the latter
mediation. For he is "Jesus, for he shall save his people
from their sins." (Matt. i, 21.) He is "the Lamb of God,
which taketh away the sin of the world" (John i, 29). He is
the Redeemer of the world by his flesh given "for the life of
the world" (John, vi, 51); by the destruction of "the works
of the devil" (1 John, iii, 8, and Heb. ii, 14); and by that
reconciliation, which consists "in imputing their trespasses
unto them, and hath committed unto us the word of
reconciliation." (2 Cor. v, 19).
That act, indeed, is "of the mere will of God," but not
"without respect to sin in the creatures;" of sin, which is
considered, not as the cause moving God to election, but as a
condition, which must exist in the object of that act. And,
in this sense, He does injury. to no one, if He does not
elect all, since He is not under obligation to bestow mercy
on any one. But He can ordain no one to punishment, without
the prevision of sin, in view of any right which He possesses
over His creatures. For that right is not unlimited, as many
think -- unlimited, I say, in such a sense that God can
rightly inflict any act, possible to His omniscience, upon
any creature considered in any respect, and without injustice
bring upon the creature all things which the creature can
suffer from his omnipotent Creator. This can be made plain by
the following demonstration: Every right of God, over His
creatures, depends either on the goodness of God towards His
creatures, or on their wickedness towards Him, or on some
contract entered into between God and His creatures. Without
considering the right, which depends on contract, let us
discuss the others. The right, which depends on the goodness
of God, or on the wickedness of men, can not exceed the
magnitude of those things severally. Man received from God,
by His goodness in creation, his existence, both that of
nature, and that of supernatural grace, in the latter of
which is also included the power of attaining to the highest
felicity, and that of a supernatural nature, which God
promised to man on the condition of obedience. The opposite
of this highest felicity is the deepest misery into which the
same man would fall, justly and according to divine right, if
he should transgress that law. Hence, exists the right of God
over man, in that he is a creature, according to which He can
take from him that very being which He has given, and reduce
it to its pristine Nothing. Hence, also, He can not have the
right to condemn to eternal punishment a man unless he has
become a sinner. For these four things -- existence, non-
existence, happiness, misery -- are so mutually connected,
that, as happiness is better than existence, so misery is
worse than non-existence. This, Christ signified when he said
"good were it for man if he had never been born" (Mark xiv,
21). Therefore, the divine right does not permit that He
should inflict misery on man, to whom He has given existence,
except on the commission of that, by the opposite of which he
could obtain felicity, the opposite of that wretchedness.
Hence, if He should not elect all, He would do injustice to
no one, if the non-elect should be only deprived of the good
to which they had no claim; but injustice would be done to
them, if, by non-election or reprobation, they must suffer
evil which they had not deserved. The right of God does not
so far extend itself over them.
There seems to have been need of this explanation, otherwise,
we must, of necessity, far into many absurdities, and impinge
on the righteousness of God. This, Augustine also, admits, in
many passages. I will quote one or two: "God is good, God is
just; He can deliver some without merit, because He is good;
He can not damn any one without demerit, because He is just."
(In Julian, lib. 3, cap. 18.) "If it is believed that God
damns any one, who does not deserve it, and is chargeable
with no sin, it is not believed that He is far from
iniquity." (Epistola 106, ad Paulinum.)
I may be permitted, with your leave, to note some things in
the explanation of the second act, which seem to have been
propounded by you with too little accuracy. For, when you,
here, change the formal relation of the object, and consider
men, under this act, as "about to fall," whom, under the
first act, you presented as "about to be created," you seem
to do it with no good reason. For, in your mode of
considering the subject, men "to be created" are the object
of both acts. But if all things are duly weighed, the object
in both is, in fact, men as sinners, neither more in the
former than in the latter, nor more in the latter than in the
former act. Nor was it necessary to use the participle of
future time, since the discussion is, here, concerning the
act of the divine mind to which all things are present. I
pass over the fact that the ordination to salvation depends
on the fall, as the occasion of making that decree,
wherefore, you should have said "fallen," not "about to
fall." I could wish, also, that there might be an explanation
how that act, which is the purpose of saving and of bestowing
of glory, is the same with the act under which they are
ordained, on whom that glory is bestowed, and to whom it is
manifested; also, how the second act, namely, the purpose of
saving, pertains to the execution and completion of the
former purpose, namely, that by which He chooses some to His
own love and grace.
That "the act referred to has no preparative cause, out of
the good-pleasure of God," is true, only let Christ be duly
included in that divine good-pleasure. To this, you seem,
indeed, to assent, when you say "that act is in respect to
Christ, the Mediator, in whom we are all elected to grace and
salvation."
But when you so explain your meaning that we are said to be
elected, in Christ, to grace and salvation, "because he is
the foundation of the execution of election," you again
destroy what you have said. For, if Christ is only the
foundation of the execution of election, the election itself
is made without respect to Christ in the decree of God,
preceding, in fact, the execution of it. It can not be said,
then, that we are elected in him to grace and salvation, but
only that we, having, out of Christ, been previously elected
to grace and salvation, are by Christ made partakers of them.
But the Scriptures make Christ the foundation not only of the
execution, but of the act of election. For He is, according
to the Scriptures, Mediator, not only in the efficacy of the
application, but in the merit of obtainment; wherefore, also,
when they speak of Christ, the Scriptures affirm that grace
and eternal life are bestowed upon us, not only through him,
but on account of him, and in him. The direct relation is
first presented, because God can not love the sinner unto
eternal life, except in Christ, and on account of Christ,
since the justice of God requires that reconciliation should
be made by the blood of Christ.
The sum of the whole is, that both acts, that of choosing to
grace and the love of God, as well as that of the bestowment
of glory and the preparation of the means necessary to
salvation, depends upon Christ as their only foundation --
upon Christ, ordained by God to be High Priest and Mediator
by the blood of his cross, the saviour from sins, the
Redeemer from the bondage of sin and Satan, the Author and
Giver of eternal salvation. Therefore, neither of those acts
is in reference to men as "to be created," but both of them
in reference to them, as "fallen sinners, and needing the
grace of the remission of sins and the renewing of the Holy
Spirit."
Those "five degrees" are well considered as mutually
dependent, but they can not all be attributed, nor are they
all subordinate to the "second act;" nor yet, indeed, to the
first act. For the first three, namely, the "appointment of
the Mediator, the promise of him, as appointed, and the
presentation of him, as promised" are in the order of nature
and of causes antecedent to all predestination of men to
grace and glory. For Christ, appointed, promised, presented,
yet more, having accomplished the work of reconciliation,
having obtained eternal redemption, and having procured the
Holy Spirit, is the head of all those who are predestinated
in him unto salvation, not yet, in the order of nature,
predestinated, but to be predestinated. For Christ is the
head; we are the members. He was, first, in the order of
nature, predestinated to be the head, then we to be the
members. He was first, ordained to be the saviour, then we
were ordained, in him, to be saved for his sake and in him.
He inverts the order laid down in the Scripture, who says
"God first predestinated men, and then ordained Christ to be
the head of those predestinated." It need not be inquired,
with much prolixity, why many have conceived that the order
should be inverted, yet I think that some passages of the
Scripture, in which the love of God towards men is said to be
the cause of the mission of his Son, on the one hand, and on
the other, that, other passages, in which Christ is said to
gather together and to bring to salvation the children of
God, and the elect, have given occasion for a conception of
this kind -- an occasion, not a just cause. For that love is
not the cause of predestination, and it has no necessary
connection with predestination, and Christ is not only the
saviour of those, who have been elected and adopted as Sons
by God, but he is also the Mediator and head in whom the
election and adoption were made. This I have already often
said. Your definition of the "appointment of the Mediator"
was not sufficiently complete, for the condition of men was
omitted, in reference to which the whole matter of Mediation
was arranged. The passage which you have cited from 1 Peter
i, 18-20, might admonish you of this. For Christ is there
said to be the foreordained Mediator who redeemed us by his
own "precious blood, as of a lamb without blemish, from vain
conversation." The word "sinners" ought to have been added.
For Christ was ordained to be Mediator, not between God and
men absolutely considered, but between God and men considered
as sinners. From this, I may also deduce a proof of what I
have already argued in reference to the object of
predestination. For if Christ is Mediator for sinners, then
it follows that no one is loved, in Christ the Mediator,
unless he is a sinner. Therefore, no one is predestinated in
Christ, unless he is a sinner.
It seems to me that there is, also, some confusion in your
discussion of "the promise of the Mediator". For the promise
is considered either as the pure revelation of the decree to
give and send the Mediator, or as having, united with it, the
offering of the Mediator, who was to be given, with all his
benefits. The former is a mere prediction of the advent of
the Messiah himself, antecedent to his mission. The latter is
the offering of the Messiah, in reality to come at a future
time, but, in the decree of God, having already discharged
the office of Mediator, pertaining, with the gifts obtained
by the discharge of the office, to the application of its
benefits. In this latter respect, it is made subordinate to
predestination. Considered in the former respect, it
precedes, not predestination, it is true, for that is from
eternity, but the execution of predestination. The
revelation, without the offering, consists in these words, "I
will give a Mediator to the world;" but the offering in these
words "Believe in the Mediator, whom I will give unto the
world, and you shall obtain salvation in him." By that
revelation and prediction, God binds Himself to offer the
Mediator to the world, whether it should believe or not; but
by that offering He demands faith, and by the internal
persuasion of the Holy Spirit, added thereto, He effects
faith and binds Himself to give salvation to the believer. It
appears from this, that the promise is to be considered with
this distinction, that in the former part, only, it is
antecedent to the mission of the Messiah, but in the latter
part it pertains to the execution of predestination.
Let us now, passing over that distinction of the promise and
the offering, consider the universality of the promise, and
the offering, taken jointly and in connection. Its
universality is not to be measured by the degree of faith.
For faith is posterior to the promise and the offering, as it
marks the apprehension and embraces the application of the
promise. But a distinction must be made between the promise
and offering made by God, with the act of man which
apprehends the promise, which is faith, and that act of God
which applies, to the believer, that which is promised and
offered. The promise and the offering extends itself to all
who are called, -- called by the external preaching of the
gospel, whether they obey its call or not. For even they
received an invitation, who "would not come" to the marriage,
and were, therefore, judged unworthy by God, (Matt. xxii, 2-
8), since they "rejected the counsel of God against
themselves," (Luke vii, 30), and by the rejection of the
promise, made themselves unworthy (Acts xiii, 46). It is not
that unworthiness, in accordance with which all sinners are
alike unworthy, as the Centurion, and the publican, who are,
nevertheless, said to have had faith, and to have obtained
the remission of their sins from Christ; from which they are,
in the Scripture, called "worthy" (Rev. iii, 4). But the
passages of Scripture which are cited by you, do not limit
the promise made, but the application by faith of the
promised thing, with the exception of the second, Matt. xi,
28, which contains only an invitation to Christ, with the
added promise of rest, as an inducement to come, but in
reality not to be given, unless they should come to Christ.
You say also, that" an exhortation or command to believe is
joined with the promise, and that this is more general than
the promise." In this last assertion you are, in my judgment,
in an error. For the promise, as made, and the command to
believe are equally extensive in their relation. If the
promise does not refer to all, to whom the command to believe
is given, the command is unjust, vain, and useless. It is
unjust, Since it demands that a man should have faith in the
promise, not generally, that it pertains to some persons, but
specially, that it was made for himself. But the promise was
not made for him, if the command is more extensive than the
promise. This command is vain, since it is in reference to
nothing. It commands one to believe, but presents no object
of faith, that promise which is the only object of faith,
having been taken away. For which reason, also, the command
is useless. It can in no way be performed by him, to whom the
promise, as made, does not pertain. Indeed, should he attempt
to obey the command to believe, he would effect nothing else
than the conception in his mind of a false opinion of a
falsity. For since the promise was not made to him, he can
not believe that it was made for him, but only think so, and
that falsely. The Scripture, however, every where represents
the promise and the command to believe as of equal extent.
"Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus
Christ, for the remission of sins; and ye shall receive the
gift of the Holy Ghost. For the promise is unto you and to
your children, &c." (Acts ii, 38, 39.) "Come unto me all ye
that labour" the command; "and I will give you rest," the
promise, made to all who are commanded to come (Matt. xi,
28). "If any man thirst, let him come unto me and drink," the
command; "He that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath
said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water,"
the promise, made to all who are commanded to come to Christ
and drink (John vii, 37, 38). Perhaps some may prefer to join
the phrase "drink" to the promise, in this way, "if any one
thirst, let him come unto me; if he shall do this, he shall
drink so abundantly that out of his belly shall flow rivers
of living water." But explained in this way, it equally
answers my present purpose.
You may say that you make the promise, in respect, not to its
presentation, but to its application, of narrower extent than
the command to believe. This, indeed, is correct. But the
comparison is then incongruous. As, in the promise, three
things are to be considered, as we said before, the promise
made. faith exercised in the promise made, and the gift or
application of the promised good, so, also, in the command,
three things are included, the command itself, the obedience
yielded to the command, and the reward bestowed on obedience.
These three things, in each, answer severally to their
corresponding opposites; the promise, as made, to the
command; faith exercised in the promise, to the obedience
yielded to the command; the gift or application of the
promised good, to the reward bestowed on obedience. It was
suitable that you should have instituted the comparison in
this way. If you had done so, you would not have made the
command more general than the promise; unless in this way,
that the command is to be considered more general than the
remuneration, which is bestowed on obedience. But who does
not know that the promise is made to many, by whom it is not
apprehended by faith, and that the command is addressed to
many, by whom it is not obeyed? Hence you can perceive that
it was not fitly said -- "the promise relates to believers,
(that is, the promise, not as merely made, but as applied,
for the promise in the latter sense is antecedent to faith);
and "the command relates to believers and to non-believers."
It belongs to neither. The command is prior to faith, demands
faith, and prohibits unbelief.
But what are those things which follow? You seem, most
learned Perkins, to be forgetful of yourself, and to be
entirely a different person from him whom you have displayed
in other of your published works. Again and again I intreat
you to be patient with me, as I shall discuss these points
with candour and mildness.
First, observe the coherence of that, which follows, with
that, which precedes. "For the elect are mingled with the
wicked in the same assemblies." What then? Is the promise, as
made, therefore, less extensive than the command to believe?
You answer affirmatively, for the reason that the promise
relates to the elect only, the command pertains to the elect
and to the wicked. I reply, that the promise, as made and
proposed by God, relates not to the elect only, but to the
wicked, whom you place in opposition to the elect: and that
the command, is not imposed either on the elect or on those
opposed to them, except with the promise joined. I think that
I see what you mean, namely, that, as the promise is not
applied except to the elect, so also the same is not proposed
except to the elect, that is: according to the divine mind
and purpose. How this may be, we shall see hereafter.
Meanwhile, I make the same remark in reference to the
command. As the command, by which faith is not obeyed except
by the elect, so, also, it is not proposed except to the
elect, that is, according to the divine mind and purpose. For
as, in the former case, the promise is proposed to the non-
elect, without the divine purpose of applying the promise; so
in the latter case, the command is proposed to the non-elect,
without the divine purpose that they should fulfill or obey
the command. If, on account of the absence of the divine
efficacy, you think that the promise is not made to the non-
elect, on account of the absence of the divine efficacy, I
affirm, also, that the command is not imposed on the non-
elect. The fact is the same in reference to both. We will,
hereafter, more filly discuss that matter.
Secondly, the phrases "elect" and "wicked" are unsuitably
placed in opposition to each other, since with the former,
"reprobate," and with the latter, "pious," should have been
contrasted, according to the rule of opposition. But here the
opposition of the two things is unsuitable, since, in one of
the opposites, the other is also comprehended. For the
wicked, in this case, may comprehend also the elect. For it
refers to those who are commanded, in the exhortation of the
ministers of the word, to repent. But repentance is
prescribed only to the wicked and to sinners, whether they
are elect or reprobate, though with a contrary result in each
case. I now speak of the call to repentance.
Thirdly, you seem to me to limit the office of ministers to
the mere calling of sinners to repentance, excluding the
presentation of the promise, which is another part of the
message entrusted to them. For they say -- "Repent and
believe the gospel, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand."
Finally, of what importance is it, whether they know, or do
not know, "who, and how many are elect and to be converted"?
"Then," you will say, "they might arrange their sermons, and
present them to each person with an adaptation to his state."
This I deny. For Christ knew and understood that Judas was a
reprobate, and yet he did not arrange his sermons differently
on his account. The preachers of the word must not desist
from the functions of their office in any assembly, as long
as they may be permitted to discharge them, and there are
those who are willing to hear. But when they are cast out,
and none whatever listen to their word, they are commanded by
Christ to depart, and to shake off the very dust from their
feet as a testimony against them. From this it appears, that
their rule of teaching and exhorting is not an internal
knowledge, which they can have, of the election of some and
the reprobation of others, but the external obedience or
contumacy of those whom they teach, whether they be elect or
reprobate.
You add, moreover, the cause, in view of which, "God wills
that they should be admonished to repent, who, as He sees,
never will repent, namely, that they may be left without
excuse." But this, I say, is neither the only object, nor the
chief object, nor the object per se, but incidentally, and
the event rather than the object, except in a certain
respect, as we shall see. It is not the only object, since
there is another, that they should be admonished of their
duty, and invited and incited to faith and conversion, "not
knowing that the goodness of God leadeth them to repentance"
(Rom. ii, 4); also that God may satisfy Himself, and His own
love towards His own creatures also, by that exercise of long
suffering and patience. "What more could have been done to my
vineyard, that I have not done in it?" (Isa. v, 4.) "God
endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted
to destruction," (Rom. ix, 22.)
These two objects are, also, of far greater importance than
that of rendering the impenitent inexcusable; therefore that
is not the chief object. It is not the object per se, because
the admonition does not render them inexcusable, unless it is
despised and rejected, but this result of the admonition
depends on the wickedness of those called. God does not will
this result, unless He also foreknows that future admonition
will be useless through the wickedness, not through the
infirmity, of those who are admonished, and unless He has
already frequently invited them in vain to repentance, as in
Isa. vi, 10, "Make the heart of this people fat, and make
their ears heavy," &c. For a distinction should be made
between the admonition, as first addressed to a person, and
as repeated the second or third time, and the final
presentation of the same, after long contumacy. For the
former is done through grace and mercy to miserable sinners,
the latter through wrath against the obstinate, who, having
hardened themselves by their own sin, have made themselves
worthy of divine hardening. Therefore the rendering them
inexcusable is rather the event of the admonition than an
object proposed to the Deity, except against the obstinate,
and those who are incorrigible through their own voluntary
wickedness. This event deservedly, indeed, results from that
rejected admonition, as the admonition becomes a savour of
death unto death to those who were unwilling that it should
be to themselves a savour of life unto life, that it might
become against them a testimony of contumacy, as they refused
to have the remedy of repentance, that they might endure the
just and punitive will of God, who refused to obey His
merciful and benevolent will.
But some one may reply that no other end was proposed to the
Deity, in the exhortation, than that they should be indeed
inexcusable, both because God, in the decree of reprobation,
determined not to give the repentance and faith, which they
could not have, except by His gift, and because God obtained
no other end than that of rendering them inexcusable, and yet
He is never frustrated in His design. These arguments seem,
indeed, to be of some value, and to present no little
difficulty, and if they can be fitly answered, by the use of
necessary analysis and explanation, there is no doubt but
that much light and clearness may in this way be thrown upon
the whole subject of which we treat. I will endeavour to do
what I may be able, trusting in divine grace, and depending
on the aid of the Holy Spirit. Do you, my friend Perkins,
assist me, and if you shall desire any thing, which may not
be presented by me in the discussion, kindly mention it. I
pledge myself that you will find me susceptible of admonition
and correction, and ready to give my hand to the truth, when
proved to be so. It will facilitate the discussion, if I
arrange both the arguments with the parts of the subject
under discussion in the form of a syllogism, and then examine
the parts of the syllogism by the rule of the truth. That
which belongs to the former argument may, in my judgment, be
arranged thus: Those to whom God by a fixed decree has
determined not to give repentance and faith, He does not
admonish to repent and believe with any other object, than
that they should be rendered inexcusable; -- But God has
determined, in the decree of reprobation, not to give
repentance and faith to the reprobate; -- Therefore, when God
admonishes the reprobate to repent and believe, He does it
with no other object than that they should be rendered
inexcusable.
I reply to the Major; -- It seems to depend on a false
hypothesis. For it presupposes that "God, by the external
preaching of the gospel, admonishes some to repent and
believe, to whom He has determined by a fixed decree not to
give repentance and faith." This proposition seems to me to
disagree with the truth.
In the first place, because it inverts the order of the
divine decrees and acts. For the decree, by which God
determined to exhort some to repentance and faith, by the
external preaching of the gospel, precedes the decree of the
non-bestowment of repentance and faith. For the former
pertains to the will of God, in the relation of antecedent,
the latter, in that of consequent. This can be proved from
many, and very clear passages of the Scripture. In Isaiah 6,
hardening and blinding is denounced against those who refuse
to obey "the calling of God," as appears from the fifth
chapter. The Apostle Paul manifestly agrees with this in Acts
xxviii, 26, 27, citing the declaration of Isaiah against
those Jews who did not believe. Again, it is said, "My people
would not hearken to my voice; and Israel would none of me.
So I gave them up unto their own heart's lust; and they
walked in their own counsels" (Psalm lxxx, 11-12). In Hosea
i, 6, the Israelites are called "not beloved," or "not having
obtained mercy," "and not the people of God," only, after
they had merited that rejection by the foul crime of unbelief
and idolatry. "The Pharisees and lawyers rejected the counsel
of God against themselves, being not baptized of him" (Luke
vii, 30. "Paul and Barnabas waxed bold, and said, It was
necessary that the word of God should first have been spoken
to you; but seeing ye put it from you, and judge yourselves
unworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles"
(Acts xiii, 46).
The Jews are said in Romans ix, 22, to have "stumbled at that
stumbling stone," because they had not sought to be justified
by faith in Christ, but by the works of the law. In 1 Peter
ii, 7, 8, Christ is said to be "a rock of offense, even them
which stumble at the word, being disobedient." From this it
appears that the decree of blinding and hardening, of the
non-bestowment of the grace of repentance and faith, pertain
to the decree of God, in the relation of consequent,
depending on the foresight of incredulity, disobedience and
contumacy. This proposition, then, ought to be enunciated
thus, the subject being changed into the attribute, and vice
versa; -- "God determined, by a fixed decree, not to give
repentance and faith to those who, as He foresaw, would
reject, in their wickedness and contumacy, the preaching of
the gospel, by which they should be called to repentance and
faith." It does not, indeed, follow from this, that God
decreed to give faith to those whom He foresaw to be
obedient. For there is a wide difference between the acts of
divine mercy and divine justice. For the latter have their
cause in men, the former have their occasion, indeed, from
men, but their cause from God alone. This is the purport of
that passage from Augustine, (Book 1, to Simplicianus, Ques.
2), "Esau did not will or run; but if he had willed or run,
he would have found God to be his helper, who would even have
effected that he should will and run by calling him, unless
he had become reprobate by the rejection of the call." In the
second place, because it charges God with hypocrisy, as if He
would demand, by an admonition to faith made to such persons,
from them, that they should believe in Christ, whom He had,
nevertheless, made to them, not a saviour, not a savour of
life unto life, unto the resurrection, but a savour of death
unto death, a rock of offense, which charge must be
contradicted both in its statement and proof.
If any assert that God demands faith not of them, but of the
elect, who are mingled with the reprobates, but that this
admonition, being presented by the ministers of the world,
ignorant who may be the elect, and who reprobate, is to be
presented also, to them, I shall reply that such can not be
called "disobedient," because they do not obey an admonition,
not made to themselves. If, however, that hypothesis is
false, then the argument which follows is of no weight, since
it is presupposed on both sides, that God does exhort to
repentance and faith, those to whom He has determined not to
give repentance and faith. For if He does not exhort such to
repentance, He does not exhort them to any end, either that
they may be rendered inexcusable, or any other.
It is in no way unfavourable to my reply, that the decree of
reprobation was made from eternity. For we must consider what
is the first external act, either negative or affirmative,
towards, or in reference to a man, reprobate from eternity by
the internal act of God. For the first external act, towards,
or in reference to a man, when really existing, makes him
reprobate in fact, as the internal act of God makes him
reprobate in the mind and counsel of God, that is, as is
commonly said, a distinction is to be made between the decree
and its execution. It is certain that a man can not be called
a reprobate in fact, in reference to whom God has not yet, by
an external act, begun to execute the decree of reprobation.
I also remark, that the Major seems to me to be at variance
with the truth, because it regards those who are reprobate,
as being rendered inexcusable, while the order should be
inverted, and those who are inexcusable should be made
reprobates. For reprobation is just, and therefore, the
reprobate must have been inexcusable before the act of
reprobation; inexcusable in fact, before the external act of
reprobation, and, foreseen or foreknown as inexcusable before
the decree of reprobation. If they were reprobate on account
of original sin, they were inexcusable on this account; if
reprobate on account of their unbelief and rejection of
Christ, they were inexcusable on account of that unbelief,
&c.
I reply to the same Major that it is not possible that the
exhortation is made, only to this end, that it might render
one, who should hear it, inexcusable, and should, in fact and
of right, render him inexcusable. For the exhortation renders
its hearer inexcusable, not as it is heard, but as it is
rejected. Moreover a rejection, which must render the person,
who rejects, inexcusable, ought not to be inevitable. But the
rejection of the exhortation, which is here discussed, is
inevitable. First, because the exhortation is addressed to
one in reference to whom God has already been employed in the
external act of reprobation. But such a man can not avoid
disobedience, according to the sayings of Christ. "Therefore,
they could not believe, because that Esaias saith again, He
hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their hearts, &c. (John
xii, 39-40.) Secondly, since it is only presented to the end
that it may be rejected. But this presentation is of the will
of God, in the relation of consequent, which is always
fulfilled, and attains its end.
Therefore, that rejection is inevitable. As then the Major is
false in these three respects, it follows that the conclusion
from the syllogism is not legitimate. But let us look at the
Minor. For in reference to this also, and by occasion of it,
there will be some things to be said which will be, in no
small degree, adapted to our purposes.
The Minor was this, -- "But God has determined, in the decree
of reprobation, not to give repentance and faith to the
reprobate." I willingly agree to that statement, but let it
be correctly understood. That it may be correctly understood,
it is necessary to explain the non-bestowment or denial of
repentance and faith, which is established by the decree of
reprobation. For there is another denial of repentance and
faith, which is administered by the decree of providence,
inasmuch as this is distinguished from the decree of
reprobation. If there is not an accurate distinction between
these, error can not be avoided. I say, then, that it is very
plain, from the Scriptures, that repentance and faith can not
be exercised except by the gift of God. But the same
Scripture and the nature of both gifts very clearly teach
that this bestowment is by the mode of persuasion. This is
effected by the word of God. But persuasion is effected,
externally by the preaching of the word, internally by the
operation, or rather the co-operation, of the Holy Spirit,
tending to this result, that the word may be understood and
apprehended by true faith. These two are almost always
joined. For God has determined to save them, who believe by
the preaching of the word, and the preaching of the word,
without the co-operation of the Holy Spirit, is useless, and
can effect nothing, as it is said "Neither is he that
planteth anything, neither he that watereth, but God that
giveth the increase" (1 Cor. iii, 7). But God does not will
that His word should be preached in vain, as it is said, "So
shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth: it shall
not return unto me void; but shall accomplish that which I
please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it"
(Isa. lv, 11).
It is in vain without the co-operation of the Holy Spirit;
and it has, always joined with it, the cooperation of the
Holy Spirit. For which reason, the gospel is called "the
ministration of the Spirit" (2 Cor. iii, 8), and they who
resist it are said "to resist the Holy Spirit," (Acts 7 & 13,
and Matthew 12), not only because they oppose the external
preaching administered by the command and the guidance of the
Holy Spirit, but also because they strive against the
cooperation of the Holy Spirit. Whence, also, some are said
to sin against the Holy Ghost, in that they wickedly deny,
and, through their hate, persecute and blaspheme the truth of
which they are persuaded in their own minds, by the
persuasion of the Holy Ghost. This internal persuasion of the
Holy Spirit is two-fold. It is sufficient and efficacious. In
the former sense, since he, with whom it is employed, is able
to consent, believe, and be converted. In the latter, because
he, to whom it is applied, does consent and believe, and is
converted. The former is employed, by the decree of
providence, with a sure prescience that it will be rejected
by the free will of man; the latter is administered by the
decree of Predestination, with a sure prescience that he, to
whom it is applied and addressed, will in fact consent,
believe, and be converted, -- because it is applied in a way
such as God knows to be adapted to the persuasion and
conversion of him to whom it is applied. These remarks are
made in accordance with the sentiments of Augustine. Hence
also there is a two-fold denial of grace, namely, of that
which is sufficient, without which he can not believe and
repent, and of that which is efficacious, without which he
will not repent or be converted. In the decree of
reprobation, sufficient grace is not, with propriety, said to
be denied, since it is bestowed on many, who are reprobate,
namely, on those, who by the external preaching of the
gospel, are called to faith and repentance, but efficacious
grace is denied to them, namely, that grace by which they not
only can believe and be converted, if they consent, but by
which they also will consent, believe, and be converted, and
certainly and infallibly do so.
The Minor has this meaning, -- God has determined by a sure
decree of reprobation not to give to some persons repentance
and faith, that is, by using with them efficacious grace, by
which they will surely believe and be converted. But has not
by that decree denied the grace, by which they may be able,
if they will, to believe and to be converted. Indeed by
another decree, namely, that of Providence, in distinction
from Predestination, He has determined to give to them faith
and repentance by sufficient grace, -- that is, to bestow
upon them those gifts in a manner in which they may be able
to receive them, by the strength given to them by God, which
is necessary and sufficient for their reception. God has,
therefore, ordained, by the decree of Providence, by which
external preaching is addressed to those whom God foreknew as
persons who would not repent or believe, to give to them,
having this character, sufficient grace and the strength
necessary to their faith and conversion to God. Upon this
determination, also, depends the fact that they are without
excuse, who are all called by sufficient grace to repentance
and faith. But He further decreed not to give efficacious
grace to the same persons, and this by the decree of
reprobation. But their inexcusableness does not depend upon
this denial of efficacious grace. If, indeed, sufficient
grace should be withheld, they, who do not believe and are
not converted, are deservedly excused, for the reason that,
without it, they could neither believe nor be converted. But
if these things are explained in this way, according to the
view of Augustine, and, perhaps also, in accordance with the
sense of the Scriptures, it follows that it can not be
concluded that God admonishes the reprobate to repentance and
faith with no other design than that they may be left without
excuse. For according to the decree of providence, by which
He gives to them grace sufficient to faith, and exhortation
to repentance and faith is addressed and it is to this end,
that they may be led to repentance and faith, and that God
may satisfy His own goodness and grace, and be clear from the
responsibility of their perdition. The exhortation, then, is
not made according to the decree of reprobation, therefore,
its design is not to be measured by the decree of
reprobation.
The second can also be arranged and disposed in the form of a
syllogism; God proposes to Himself in His acts, no end,
without attaining it, for He never fails of His purpose; --
But God, in the admonition which He addresses to the
reprobate, attains no other end than that they should be left
without excuse; -- Therefore God, in that admonition,
proposes no other end to Himself.
To the Major I reply that it seems to me to be simply untrue.
For God has not determined all His own deeds in accordance
with His own will, in the relation of consequent, which is
always fulfilled, but He administers many things according to
His will, in the relation of antecedent, which is not always
fulfilled. Legislation, the promulgation of the Gospel,
promise, threatening, admonition, rebuke are all instituted,
according to the will of God, as antecedents, and by these
acts He requires obedience, faith, repentance, conversion,
and those acts were instituted to this end; yet God does not
always attain those ends. The falsity of this proposition can
be proved by the clearest passages of Scripture; "Wherefore,
when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it
forth wild grapes" (Isa. v, 4); "How often would I have
gathered thy children together, and ye would not" (Matt.
xxiii, 37); "The Lord is long suffering to us-ward, not
willing that any should perish, but that all should come to
repentance" (2 Pet. iii, 9).
The Pharisees are said to have "rejected the counsel of God
against themselves" (Luke vii, 30), when they might have been
brought, by the preaching of John and baptism to a
participation in his kingdom. But though God might fail of
any particular end, yet He can not fail in His universal
purpose. For, if any person should not consent to be
converted and saved, God has still added, and proposed to
Himself, another design, according to His will as consequent,
that He should be glorified in their just condemnation.
Therefore, that this proposition may be freed from its
falsity, it must be amended thus, -- God proposes to His
will, as consequent, no end which He does not attain. If any
one should say that it follows from this that God is either
unwise and not prescient of future events, or impotent, I
reply that it does not follow. For God does not always
propose an end to Himself from His prescience -- and further
-- God does not always please to use His own omnipotence, to
accomplish any purpose which He has proposed to Himself.
As to the Minor, it also seems to me to be chargeable with
falsity. For God, by that admonition, attains another end
than that they should be rendered inexcusable, namely, He
satisfies His own goodness and love towards us. Add to this
that, as the fact of their being without excuse arises, not
from the presentment, but from the rejection of the
admonition, God has not proposed to Himself their
inexcusableness as an end, except after the foresight that
the admonition would come to them in vain. In this view,
then, their inexcusableness does not arise from the
antecedent will of God, administering the admonition, but
from the consequent will, furnishing the rejection of the
admonition.
It follows, therefore, that a true conclusion can not be
deduced from these false propositions. The words of the Abbot
Joachim must be understood according to this explanation, or
they will labour under the error, which we have now noticed
in your words.
The command of God by which He exacts repentance and faith
from those, to whom the gospel is preached, can, in no way,
be at variance from the decree of God. For no will or
volition of God, whatever may be its character, can be
contrary to any other volition. But it may be possible that a
decree may be ignorant]y assigned to God, which is at
variance with His command; also, a decree of God, which is
assigned to Him in the Scriptures, may be so explained, as to
be necessarily at variance with the command of God. The
command by which God exacts faith of any one, declares that
God wills that he, on whom the command is imposed, should
believe. If, now, any one ascribes any decree to God, by
which He wills that the same person should not believe, then
the decree is contrary to the command. For it cannot be that
God should, at the same time, will things contradictory, in
whatever way or with whatever distinction the will may be
considered. But to believe, and not to believe are
contradictory, and to will that one should believe, and to
will that he, the same person, and considered in the same
light, should not believe, are contradictory. The decree is
of such a character, that God is said to have determined,
according to it, to deny the concurrence of His general
government or of His special grace, without which, as He
knew, the act of faith could not be performed by him, whom,
by His command, He admonishes to believe. For He, who wills
to deny to any person the aid necessary to the performance of
an act of faith, wills that the same person should not
believe. For he, who wills in the cause, is rightly said to
will, also, in the effect, resulting, of necessity, from that
cause. For, as it can not be said that God wills that a
person should exist longer, to whom He denies the act of
preservation, so, also, it can not be said that He wills that
an act should be performed by any one, to whom He denies His
own concurrence and the aid, which are necessary for the
performance of the act. For the act of the divine
preservation is not more necessary to a man, that he may
continue to exist, than the concurrence of the divine aid, in
order that he may be able to exercise faith in the gospel.
If, then, that purpose not to do a thing, of which you speak,
marks a denial of the concurrence of God, which is necessary
to the exercise of faith in the promise, it certainly
impinges upon the command, and can, in no way, be harmonized
with it. For that denial, being of this character, holds the
relation of most general and most efficacious hindrance, as
that, which is not, is hindered, that it may not become
something, most efficaciously by the purpose of creation,
(i.e., by a denial of its exercise), and that which is, that
it may not longer exist, by the will of preservation (not
being exercised). If you understand the "purpose not to do a
thing," in such a sense, then, truly, you do not free the
will of God from contradiction by either of your answers.
You say that "God, in His commands and promises, does not
speak of all which He has decreed, but only in part manifests
His own will." I grant it. But I say that whatever God says
in His commands and promises, is such in its nature that He
can not, without contradiction, be said to will or determine
any thing, contrary to it, by any decree; for it is one thing
to be silent concerning certain things which He wills, and
another thing to will that which is contrary to those things
which He has previously willed. It is certain, from the most
general idea of command, that the whole will of God is not
set forth in a command, but only that which He approves and
wills to be done by us. There is no decree of God by which He
wills any thing contradictory to that command.
I wish, also, that you would consider how ineptly you express
what follows -- What are these expressions? "God does not
will the same thing alike in all. He wills conversion in
some, only in respect to their trial and exhortation, and the
means of conversion; in others, also: in respect to the
purpose of effecting it." If you say those things in
reference to the will of God as it requires conversion, they
ought to have been differently expressed; if in reference to
His will as it effects conversion, they ought, in that case,
also, to have been differently expressed. Understood in
either sense, the phraseology is not correct. But I think
that you are here speaking of the will in the latter sense,
according to which God does not will to effect conversion
equally in all, for whom He does equally, and of the same
right, require it. For, in some, He wills to effect it only
by external preaching, admonition, and sufficient means, for
so I explain your meaning. If this is in accordance with your
views, it is well, but if not, I would wish that you would
inform us what you have understood by the word "means." In
others, He wills to effect it, by efficacious means,
administered according to the decree of Predestination. There
is here, indeed, no conflict of wills, but only different
degrees of will, as far as we are concerned, or rather
different volitions of God in reference to different objects,
according to which God can not be said to will and not to
will the same object, that is, to will the conversion, and
not to will the conversion of the same man -- the laws of
just opposition being here observed. I could wish that it
might be explained how "God sincerely wills that the man
should believe in Christ, whom He wills to be alien from
Christ, and to whom He has decreed to deny the aid necessary
to faith," for this is equivalent to not willing the
conversion of any one.
To your second answer, I say, that it is not sufficient that
you should say that "the revealed will of God is not adverse
to the will of good-pleasure, but the matter of
predestination is to be so treated that the will of good-
pleasure is not to be opposed to the revealed will; for I
think that the limits of that opposition ought to have been
thus expressed. For the will which you call that of "good-
pleasure," ought to be investigated by means of the revealed
will; hence the latter is to be brought into agreement with
the former, not the former to be reconciled with the latter.
I desire, also, that it should be considered by what right
the revealed will is usually considered as distinguished from
the will of good pleasure, since the good-pleasure of God is
frequently revealed. It is the good-pleasure of God that he
who beholds the Son and believes on him, should have
everlasting life. The word eujdokia is often used in the
Scriptures, for that will of God, which is inclined towards
any one, which is called "good-pleasure" in distinction from
the pleasure of God, considered in a general sense.
Reprobation can not be referred to good-pleasure; for every
exercise of good-pleasure towards men is in Jesus Christ, as
the angels sung "good will toward men" (Luke ii, 14). In
reference to the passage in Matt. xi, 25, 26, in which the
word eujdokia is used in reference to the pleasure of God by
which He has hidden the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven
from the wise, and revealed them unto babes. I remark that
the word eujdokia is properly to be referred to that,
concerning which Christ gives thanks to his Father, that is,
the revelation of the heavenly mysteries to babes. For it is
to be understood in this way: "I give thanks unto thee, O
Father, that thou hast revealed unto babes the mysteries
which thou hast hidden from the wise." Christ does not give
thanks to the Father that He has hidden the mysteries from
the wise, for he prayed for the wise men of this world who
crucified him. For the "princes of this world" are said to
have crucified the Lord of glory" (1 Cor. ii, 8), and he is
said to have prayed for his persecutors, and particularly for
those who crucified him. In what respect is it true that the
revealed will "always agrees, in its beginning, end and
scope," with the good-pleasure, in the ordinary acceptation
of that phrase, since the revealed will has often a different
object from that of the will of good-pleasure? Also, if both
are in reference to the same object, there can not be the
same beginning, and the same end and scope to both except it
be also true that God wills by His good-pleasure, that which,
in His revealed will, He declares that He wills, unless,
indeed, that same beginning is considered universally to be
God, and the same end to be the glory of God. But that "the
revealed will of God seems often to be diverse, and, indeed,
in appearance, to be contrary to the decree of God, and also
in reference to the mode of proposing it," is true, if you
mean that this "seems" so to ignorant men, and to those who
do not rightly distinguish between the different modes and
the various objects of volition. These two wills of God,
however diverse, never seem contrary to those, who rightly
look into these things, and so judge of them. As to the death
of Hezekiah, and the destruction of Nineveh, God knew that it
belonged to His justice, unless it should be attempered with
mercy, to take away the life of Hezekiah, and to send
destruction on the Ninevites; for the law of His justice
claimed that these things should be denounced against them by
Isaiah and Jonah. But God was not willing to satisfy the
demands of justice, unless with the intervention of the
decree of mercy, by which He determined that neither death
should come on Hezekiah, nor destruction upon the Ninevites,
unless they should be forewarned to seek the face of God by
prayers, and, in this manner, to turn away the evil from
themselves; and, if they should do this, they should be
spared. But He knew that they would do this, being, indeed,
assisted by grace and the divine aid, by which He had
determined to co-operate with the external preaching; and so
He determined to prolong the life of Hezekiah and to preserve
the city of the Ninevites from destruction. Here, then, there
seems to be not even apparent contrariety.
What you observe concerning "the human and the divine will of
Christ," does not affect our present subject of discussion.
It is true that there was such a difference; but this is not
strange, since those wills belonged not to one origin, though
they did belong to one person, embracing, in himself two
natures and two wills. I may add, also, that Christ willed
both to be freed and not to be freed from death. For as a
man, he said, "O, my Father, let this cup pass from me," and
as a man, also, he corrected himself, "nevertheless, not as I
will, but as thou wilt" (Matt. xxvi, 39). That this is to be
understood of the human will, is apparent, because there is
one and the same will, as there is one nature to the Father
and to the Son, as divine. I may say, in a word, that Christ,
as to the outward man, willed to be freed from immediate
death, but according to the inward man, he subjected himself
to the divine will. And, if you will permit, I will say, that
there was, in him, a feeling and a desire to be freed, not a
volition. For volition results from the final decision of the
reason and of wisdom, but desire follows the antecedent
decision of the senses or the feelings.
That "Abraham was favourably inclined towards the Sodomites,
who were devoted, by the decree of God, to destruction," the
Scripture does not assert. It also does not seem to me to be
very probable that "he could pray in faith" for those whom he
knew to be devoted, by the decree of God, to irrevocable
destruction. For prayer was not to be offered in behalf of
such persons. God commands Jeremiah not to pray for the
people, which He had, by an irrevocable decree, and by His
will as its consequent, destined and devoted to captivity and
destruction. For although it may not be requisite in prayers,
offered for any thing whatever, that one should certainly
believe that the thing, which he seeks, shall be granted, it
is necessary that the mind of him, who prays, should
certainly believe that God, in His omnipotence and mercy, is
both able and willing to do that which is asked, if He knows
that it will be in accordance with His own grace. But that,
which God has decreed not to do, and what He has signified,
absolutely, that He will not do, He neither can do, nor will
He ever will to do, so long as the decree stands, and it is
not right for a believer to intercede with God in his prayers
for that thing, if the decree of God has been known to him.
Your third answer is, that "God, as a creditor, can require
what Himself may not will to effect." But there is an
equivocation or ambiguity in the words, "what Himself may not
will to effect." They may be understood, either in reference
to that concurrence of God, which is necessary to the doing
of that, which He commands, or in reference to that
efficacious concurrence by which that, which He commands, is
certainly done. If in reference to the latter, it is true.
There is no kind of conflict or contrariety between these two
-- "demand or command that any thing should be done," and
"yet not to do it efficaciously." If in reference to the
former, it is not true. For God does not command that, in
reference to which He denies the aid necessary to effect it,
unless any one, of his own fault, deprives himself of that
grace, and makes himself unworthy of that aid. The right of
creditor remains, if he, who is in debt, is not able to pay
by his own fault. But it is not so with the command, in which
faith is prescribed; for faith in Christ is not included in
the debt which a man was bound to pay according to his
primitive creation in the image of God, and the primitive
economy under which he lived. For it began to be necessary,
after God changed the condition of salvation from legal
obedience to faith in Christ.
We come now to "the presentation of the Mediator." consisted
both in the fact that the Mediator presented himself to God,
the Father, as a victim for the sin of the world, and that
the Father, by the word and His spirit, presents the
Mediator, having performed the functions of that office, and
having obtained remission of sins and eternal redemption to
the world, reconciled through him. The former pertains to the
provision of salvation, the latter to its application by
faith in the same Mediator. The former is the execution of
the act of appointment and promise, the latter coincides with
the actual offering, which we have previously considered in
discussing the promise. But the presentation, as it is
defined by you, not immediately antecedent to the
application, for between that presentation, and the
application, there intervenes the offering of the Mediator by
the word and the Holy Spirit.
What you say concerning the virtue and efficacy of the price,
paid by Christ, needs a more careful consideration. You say,
that "the efficacy of that price, as far as merit is
concerned, is infinite"; but you make a distinction between
"actual and potential efficacy." You also define "potential
efficacy" as synonymous with a sufficiency of price for the
whole world. This, however, is a phrase, hitherto unknown
among Theologians, who have merely made a distinction between
the efficacy and the sufficiency of the merit of Christ. I am
not sure, also, but that there is an absurdity in styling
efficacy "potential," since there is a contradiction in
terms. For all efficacy is actual, as that word has been,
hitherto, used by Theologians. But, laying aside phrases, let
us consider the thing itself. The ransom or price of the
death of Christ, is said to be universal in its sufficiency,
but particular in its efficacy, i.e. sufficient for the
redemption of the whole world, and for the expiation of all
sins, but its efficacy pertains not to all universally, which
efficacy consists in actual application by faith and the
sacrament of regeneration, as Augustine and Prosper, the
Aquitanian, say. If you think so, it is well, and I shall not
very much oppose it. But if I rightly understand you, it
seems to me that you do not acknowledge the absolute
sufficiency of that price, but with the added condition, if
God had willed that it should be offered for the sins of the
whole world. So then, that, which the School-men declare
categorically, namely, that Christ's death was sufficient for
all and for each, is, according to your view, to be expressed
hypothetically, that is, in this sense -- the death of Christ
would be a sufficient price for the sins of the whole world,
if God had willed that it should be offered for all men. In
this sense, indeed, its sufficiency is absolutely taken away.
For if it is not a ransom offered and paid for all, it is,
indeed, not a ransom sufficient for all. For the ransom is
that, which is offered and paid. Therefore the death of
Christ can be said to be sufficient for the redemption of the
sins of all men, if God had wished that he should die for
all; but it can not be said to be a sufficient ransom, unless
it has, in fact, been paid for all. Hence, also, Beza notes
an incorrect phraseology, in that distinction, because the
sin-offering is said to be absolutely sufficient, which is
not such, except on the supposition already set forth. But,
indeed, my friend Perkins, the Scripture says, most clearly,
in many places, that Christ died for all, for the life of the
world, and that by the command and grace of God.
The decree of Predestination prescribes nothing to the
universality of the price paid for all by the death of
Christ. It is posterior, in the order of nature, to the death
of Christ and to its peculiar efficacy. For that decree
pertains to the application of the benefits obtained for us
by the death of Christ: but his death is the price by which
those benefits were prepared. Therefore the assertion is
incorrect, and the order is inverted, when it is said that
"Christ died only for the elect, and the predestinate." For
predestination depends, not only on the death of Christ, but
also on the merit of Christ's death; and hence Christ did not
die for those who were predestinated, but they, for whom
Christ died; were predestinated, though not all of them. For
the universality of the death of Christ extends itself more
widely than the object of Predestination. From which it is
also concluded that the death of Christ and its merit is
antecedent, in nature and order, to Predestination. What
else, indeed, is predestination than the preparation of the
grace, obtained and provided for us by the death of Christ,
and a preparation pertaining to the application, not to the
acquisition or provision of grace, not yet existing? For the
decree of God, by which He determined to give Christ as a
Redeemer to the world, and to appoint him the head only of
believers, is prior to the decree, by which He determined to
really apply to some, by faith, the grace obtained by the
death of Christ.
You allege these reasons in favour of your views, concerning
the death of Christ. "Christ did not sacrifice for those for
whom also he does not pray, because intercession and
sacrifice are conjoined; -- But he prays, not for all, but
only for elect and for believers, (John xvii, 9,) and, in his
prayer, he offers himself to the Father; -- Therefore he
sacrifices not for all, and, consequently, his death is not a
ransom for all men.
I reply that the Major does not seem to me to be, in all
respects, true. The sacrifice is prior to the intercession.
For he could not enter into the heavens that he might
intercede for us in the presence of God, except by the blood
of his own flesh. It is also prior, as sacrifice has
reference to merit, intercession to the application of merit.
For he is called the Mediator by merit and the efficacy of
its application. He acquired merit by sacrifice; he
intercedes for its application. He does both, as Priest; but
he makes that application as King and Head of His church. It
is indeed true that Christ, in the days of his flesh, offered
up prayers with tears to God, the Father. But those prayers
were not offered to obtain the application of merited
blessing, but for the assistance of the Spirit, that he might
stand firm in the conflict. If, indeed, he then offered up
prayers to obtain the application referred to, they depended
on the sacrifice, which was to be offered, as though it were
already offered. In this order, sacrifice and intercession
are related to each other.
In reference to the Minor, I assert, that Christ prayed also
for the non-elect. He prayed for those who crucified him, for
his enemies, among whom also were non-elect persons. For "the
princes of this world" crucified him, and to most of them the
wisdom and power of God, which is Christ, was not revealed (1
Cor. 2). Secondly, the prayer of Christ, which is contained
in the 17th chapter of John, was offered, particularly for
those who had believed, and those who should afterwards
believe, and, indeed, to obtain and apply to them the
blessings merited by the sacrifice of his death. He asks that
they may be one with the Father and the Son, as the Father
and the Son are one; which He could not ask unless
reconciliation had actually been made, or was considered, by
God, as having been made. But such is not the character of
all the prayers of Christ. Thirdly, I remark that the word
"world," in John xvii, 9, properly signifies those who
rejected Christ, as preached to them in the word of the
gospel, and those who should afterwards reject him. This is
apparent from the contrast -- "I pray not for the world, but
for them which thou hast given me," whom he describes as
having believed (8th verse) and as believing at a future time
(20th verse). The word is used similarly in many other
passages -- "The world knew him not" (John ii, 10); "Light
has come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than
light" (iii, 19); "The Spirit of truth, whom the world can
not receive" (xvi, 17); "He will reprove the world of sin,
because they believe not on me" (xvi, 8, 9); "How is it that
thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world?"
(xvi, 22.) Therefore the extent of the sacrifice is not to be
limited by the narrow bounds of that intercession.
I could wish to learn from Illyricus how it can be in
accordance with the justice of God, and the infinite value of
Christ's sacrifice, that "prayer is expiatory and the rule of
the Sacrifice [Canon Sacrificii]. "I think, not only that
Christ did not ask of the Father to regard favourably his
sacrifice, but that it was not possible that He should
present such a petition: if that is indeed true, which our
churches teach and profess with one voice, that the most
complete satisfaction was made to the justice of God by the
sacrifice of Christ. But that idea originated in the Polish
mass, in which, also, are those words-"Canon Sacrificii."
But the words, which contain your conclusion are remarkable,
and have no right meaning. What is meant by this? -- "Christ
was appointed to be a ransom by the intercession and oblation
of the Son." Intercession is subsequent to ransom. Therefore
the latter was not appointed by the former. Oblation belongs
to the ransom itself, and is therefore prior to the
intercession, and could, in no way, be concerned in the
appointment of the ransom. But the action itself has the
character of an oblation. Hence, also, the ransom itself, as
I have already often said, is prior to election. For election
is unto life, which has no existence except by the oblation
of the ransom; unless we may say that election is unto life,
not now existing, nor as yet merited, not even in the decree
of God. For he is the "lamb slain from the foundation of the
world."
You proceed further, and endeavour, but in vain, to confirm
the same sentiment by other arguments. They seem to have some
plausibility, but no truth. You say, that "Christ is only the
Mediator of those, whose character he sustained on the cross;
-- But he sustained the character of the elect only on the
cross; Therefore he is only the Mediator of the elect." I
reply to the Major, that it belongs not to the essence or the
nature of Mediator to sustain the character of any one. For
he is constituted a Mediator between two dissident parties.
Therefore, as Mediator, he sustains the character of neither;
unless, indeed, the nature of the mediation be, of necessity,
such as to demand that the mediator should sustain the
character of one of the parties. But this mediation has such
a nature as the justice of God required. For it could enter
upon no way of reconciliation with a world, guilty of sin,
unless the Mediator should pledge satisfaction, and, in fact,
should make it in accordance with the right of surety. This
is what is said in 2 Corinthians v, 19, 21, "God was in
Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself -- for He hath
made him to be sin" for the world, that is, a sin offering.
In this sense, also, it is truly said that Christ is not a
Mediator, except for those, whose character he sustained. I
speak here in respect to the Sacrifice; "For every high
priest taken from among men, is ordained from me," &c., (Heb.
v, 5, 1.) Here, also, a distinction may be made between the
act, by which reconciliation is obtained, and the completion
of that act, which is reconciliation. The act, obtaining
reconciliation, is the oblation of Christ on the cross. Its
completion is the reconciliation. In respect to the act, he
sustained our character, for we deserved death, not in
respect to the completion. For the effect, resulting frown
the oblation, depends on the dignity and excellence of the
character of Christ, not of us, whose character he sustained.
Indeed, if it be proper to use distinctions of greater
nicety, in this place, I may say, that Christ sustained our
character, not in respect to action, namely, that of
oblation, but of passion. For He was made a curse for us, and
an offering for sin. From which it is evident, that, as all
men are sinners and obnoxious to the curse, and Christ
assumed human nature common to all, it is probable that he
sustained the character of all men.
We see this also in the Minor of your syllogism, which is
"Christ sustained the character of the elect only on the
cross," in which I notice a two-fold fault, that of falsity
and that of incorrect phraseology. Its falsity consists in
this, that Christ is said to have sustained on the cross the
character of the Elect only. I prove it, from the fact that
the Scripture no where says this; indeed it asserts the
contrary in numerous passages. Christ is called "the Lamb of
God which taketh away the sin of the world" (John i, 29) God
is declared to have "so loved the world that He gave His only
begotten Son" (iii, 16). Christ declares that he will give
"his flesh for the life of the world" (vi, 51). "God was in
Christ reconciling the world unto Himself" (2 Cor. v, 19).
"He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only,
but also for the sins of the whole world" (1 John ii, 2). The
Samaritans said "We know that this is indeed the Christ, the
saviour of the world" (John iv, 42). Also 1 John iv, 14, "We
have seen and do testify, that the Father sent the Son to be
the saviour of the world." That, in the word "world," in
these passages, all men, in general, are to be understood, is
manifest from these passages and from Scriptural usages. For
there is, in my judgment, no passage in the whole Bible, in
which it can be proved beyond controversy that the word
"world" signifies the Elect. Again, Christ it is said to have
died for all, in Hebrews ii, 9, and elsewhere. He is said to
be "the saviour of all men, especially of those that believe"
(1 Tim. iv, 10), which declaration can not be explained to
refer to preservation in this life without perversion and
injury. Christ is also styled the "Mediator between God and
men" (1 Tim. ii, 5). He is said to have died for those
"without strength, ungodly, and yet sinners" (Rom. v, 6-8.)
What I said a little while since, is important also on this
point; -- that the case of the whole human race is the same,
all being alike conceived and born in sin, and the children
of wrath; and that Christ assumed human nature, which is
common to all men, not from Abraham only and David, as
Matthew traces his genealogy, but also from Adam, to whom
Luke goes back in his third chapter. He offered, therefore,
the flesh which he had in common with all. "For as much then
as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also
himself likewise took part of the same, &c." (Heb. ii, 14).
He offered that flesh for the common cause and the common
sin, namely, for the sin of the world, in respect to which
there is no difference among men, and the Apostle adds this
cause in the passage just cited, "that through death he might
destroy him that had the power of death." Let the dignity and
excellence of the person, which could offer an equivalent
ransom for the sin of all men be added to this. Let the
gracious and tender affection of God towards the human race
come into consideration, which, in the Scriptures, is usually
spoke of by the general term filanqrwpia as in Tit. iii, 4.
Which term signifies, in general terms, the love of God
towards men; which affection cannot be attributed to God, if
He pursues with hatred any man, without reference to his
deserts and his sin.
I know that some will reply that God indeed hates no one
except on account of sin, but that He destined some to His
own just hatred, that is, reprobating some without reference
to sin. But in that way the order of things is inverted; for
God does not hate because He reprobates, but reprobates cause
He hates. He reprobates a sinner, because the sinner and sin
are justly hateful and odious to Him. Hatred is an affection
in the Deity by which He hates unrighteousness and the
unrighteous, as there is in Him also love for righteousness
and the righteous. Reprobation is an act of God, internal in
purpose, external in execution, and the act is, in the order
of nature, subsequent to the affection. The destination of
any one to hatred, however it may be considered, has
necessarily these two things preceding it, hatred against
unrighteousnes, and the foresight that the individual, by his
own fault, will be guilty of unrighteousness, by omission or
commission.
I know, indeed, that the love of God, referred to, is not in
all respects equal towards all men and towards each
individual, but I also deny that there is so much difference,
in that divine love, towards men that He has determined to
act towards some, only according to the rigor of His own law,
but towards others according to His own mercy and grace in
Christ, as set forth in his gospel. He willed to treat the
fallen angels according to that rigor, but all men, fallen in
Adam, according to this grace. For every blessing, in which
also mercy and long suffering (Exod. xxxiii, 19 & xxxiv, 6-7)
are comprehended, He determined to exhibit, in the
deliverance and salvation of men. Some, however, may wish to
do away with the distinction, which many Theologians make
between the fall of angels and that of man. For they say that
the angels fell beyond all hope of restoration, but that men
could have a complete restoration, and they assign, as a
reason, the fact that angels sinned, by their own motion and
impulse, and man, by the instigation and persuasion of an
evil angel. To all these things, we may add, by way of
conclusion, the proper and immediate effect of the death and
suffering of Christ, and we shall see that no one of the
human race is excluded from it. It is not an actual removal
of sins from these or those, not an actual remission of sins,
not justification, not an actual redemption of these or
these, which can be bestowed upon no one without faith and
the Spirit of Christ; but it is reconciliation with God,
obtainment from God of remission, justification, and
redemption; by which it is effected that God may now be able,
as Justice, to which satisfaction has been made, interposes
no obstacle, to remit sins and to bestow the spirit of grace
upon sinful men. To the communication of these effects to
sinners He was already inclined, of His own mercy, on account
of which, He gave Christ as the saviour of the world, but, by
His justice, He was hindered from the actual communication of
them. Meanwhile God maintained His own right to bestow on
whom He pleased, and with such conditions as He chose to
prescribe, those blessings, (which are His by nature,) the
participation in which He, through His mercy, desired to
bestow on sinners, but could not actually do it on account of
the obstacle of His justice, but which He can now actually
bestow, as His justice has been satisfied by the blood and
death of Christ; since He, as the injured party, could
prescribe the mode of reconciliation, which also He did
prescribe, consisting in the death and obedience of His Son
and because He has given him to us, to perform, in our
behalf, the functions of the Mediatorial office. If we decide
that any person is excluded from that effect, we decide, at
the same time, that God does not remit his sins unto him, not
because He is unwilling to do so, having the ability, but
because He has not the ability, as justice presents an
obstacle, and because He willed not to be able. He willed
that His justice should be satisfied, before He should remit
his sins unto any one, and because He did not will that His
justice should be satisfied in reference to that person.
On the other hand, also, if we decide that the nature of the
Mediation is such, as you seem to conceive, that the sins of
all the Elect are taken from them and transferred to Christ,
who suffered punishment for them, and, in fact, freed them
from punishment, then obedience was required of him, who
rendered it, and, by rendering it, merited eternal life, not
for himself, but for them, not otherwise than if we had
constituted him Mediator in our place, and through him had
paid unto God our debt. We must also consider that, according
to the rigor of God's justice and law, immunity from
punishment and eternal life are due to the elect, and they
can claim those blessings from God, by the right of payment
and purchase, and without any rightful claim, on the part of
God, to demand faith in Christ and conversion to him. It is
not easy to tell under how great absurdities, both the latter
and the former opinion labour. I will refute each of them by
a single argument. In reference to the former, I argue that,
if God was unwilling that satisfaction, for the sins of any,
should be rendered to Himself, by the death of His Son, then
faith in Christ can not, justly, be demanded of them, they
can not, justly, be condemned for unbelief, and Christ can
not, justly, be constituted their judge. The latter, I
compute by an argument, of very great strength, taken from
the writings of the Apostle. The righteousness, rendered by
Christ, is not ours in that it is rendered, but in that it is
imputed unto us by faith, so that faith itself may be said to
be "counted for righteousness" (Rom. iv, 5.) This phrase, if
rightly understood, may shed the clearest light on this whole
discussion. I conclude, therefore, that Christ bore the
character of all men in general, as it is said, and not that
of the elect only.
I notice incorrectness of phraseology in the statement that
he bore, on the cross, the character of the Elect, when no
one is elect, except in Christ, as dead and risen again, and
now constituted by God the Head of the church, and the
saviour of them who should believe in him, and obey him unto
salvation. Therefore, there were no elect, when he was yet
hanging on the cross, that is, both of these events being
considered as existing in the foreknowledge of God; hence He
could not have borne, on the cross, the character of the
Elect. On this account, likewise, it would be absurdity to
say that Christ bore the character of the reprobate, because
reprobation had there no place. But he bore the character of
men as sinners, unrighteous, enemies to God, apart from any
consideration or distinction between Election and
Reprobation. It is evident, then, from this reply, that it
can not be concluded, from that argument, that Christ is the
Mediator for the Elect only, the work of the Mediator being,
now, restricted to the oblation made on the cross.
You advance, also, another argument to prove the truth of
your sentiment, and say; -- "Whatever Christ suffered and did
as Redeemer, the same things all the redeemed do and suffer
in him, and with him; -- But Christ, as Redeemer, died, rose
again, ascended, sat down on the right hand of the Father;
Therefore, in him and with him, all the redeemed died, rose
again, ascended, sat down at the right hand of the Father."
You then assume, as a position by consequence, that "The
Elect only die, rise again, ascend, sit at the right hand of
the Father, in and with Christ. Therefore, they alone are
redeemed." We will inspect and examine both parts of this
argument in order.
The Major of this prosyllogism seems to me to be chargeable
with notorious falsity, as can, also, be easily demonstrated.
For it confounds the sufferings and the actions, by which
redemption is effected and obtained, with the completion of
redemption itself, and the application of redemption. For
redemption does not refer to suffering, or to any action of
Christ, but to the completion, the event, and the fruit of
that suffering and action; therefore, the sufferings and the
actions of Christ are prior to redemption; but redemption is
prior to its application. They, however, are called redeemed
from the application. Therefore, that, which Christ suffered
and did to obtain redemption, the redeemed did not suffer or
do. For they were not at that time redeemed, but, by those
actions, redemption was obtained, and applied to them by
faith, and so they, as the result, were redeemed. The very
nature of things clearly proves that redeemer and redeemed
are things so related, that the former is the foundation, the
latter, the terminus, not vice versa, and, therefore, in the
former is comprehended the cause of the other, and indeed the
cause, produced by its own efficiency; whence it follows that
the redeemed did not that, which was done by the redeemed,
since, in that case, they were redeemed before the act of
redemption was performed by the redeemer, and the redemption
itself was obtained. If you say that you consider the
redeemed not as redeemed, but as men to be redeemed, I reply
that, in whatever way, they are considered, it can never be
truly said that they did, in and with Christ, what Christ did
for the sake of redeeming them. For those, who were to be
redeemed were not in Christ or with Christ, therefore, they
could, neither in him nor with him, suffer or do any thing.
You will say that "they suffered and acted in him as a surety
and pledge;" but I say in him as constituted a surety not by
them, but by God for them, and on him the work of redemption
was imposed by God. It is true, indeed, that he assumed from
men the nature in which redemption was performed; yet He, not
men in him, offered it. But, if they may be said to have
suffered, because their nature suffered in the form of
Christ, you see that, in this way also, the redemption is
general for all those to whom the same nature belongs.
Perhaps you refer to those passages of Scripture, in which we
are said to be "dead with Christ, buried with him and raised
with him" (Rom. vi, 3, 4, 5). Your explanation is
unsatisfactory, if it regards them as having reference to our
present subject. For those passages treat of the crucifixion,
death, burial, and resurrection, which we each, in our own
person, endure and experience. But they do not pertain to the
meritorious redemption, as the crucifixion, death, &c., of
Christ. Again, in those passages, the subject of discussion
is that of our engraftment into Christ by faith, and our
communion with him, which pertain to the application of
redemption; but, here, the subject of discussion is the
obtainment of redemption, and the acts which pertain to it.
Those passages teach, that we, being grafted into Christ by
faith, received from him the power of the Spirit, by which
our old man is crucified, dead and buried, and we are
resuscitated and raised again into a new life. From this it
is apparent that they have no connection with our present
subject.
The right meaning of the Minor, is that Christ, performing
the work of redemption, died, rose again, and ascended into
the heavens. For he was not the redeemer, before he offered
himself to death and rose again from the dead. I remark, more
briefly, that Christ died and rose again in that he was
Redeemer by the imposition and acceptance of the office, not
by the fulfillment of the same. For the death and
resurrection of Christ pertain to the function of the office
of Redeemer. It now appears, from this, in what sense the
conclusion is true. not in that in which you intend it, that
they, whom you call "the redeemed," died and rose again in
the person of Christ, but as I, a short time since, explained
it, in a sense, pertaining, not to the obtainment of
redemption, but to the application of the obtained
redemption. For Christ is said to have "entered in once into
the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption," (Heb.
ix, 12), which redemption he communicates to believers, by
the Holy Spirit sent from heaven.
These things being thus considered, your position by
consequence does not weigh against the opinion, which I here
defend. For it certainly happens to the Elect, only in the
sense which we have set forth, with Christ to die, rise
again, ascend, and sit at the right hand of the Father. They
also, by reason of their being engrafted in Christ, and the
application of the benefits of Christ, and of communion with
Christ, are said to be "redeemed." "Thou art worthy to take
the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou wast slain,
and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood out of every
kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation; and hast made us
unto our God kings and priests; and we shall reign on the
earth" (Rev. v, 9, l0). So, also, in Rev. xiv, 3, 4, the same
are said to have been "redeemed from the earth, and from
among men." It is, however, to be observed that this position
is not a consequence of the antecedents, unless there be
added, to the Major, a restrictive phrase, in this way:
"Whatever Christ suffered and did this all the redeemed, and
they only, suffered and did in him, and with him.
The arguments which you adduce to prove this position, are
readily conceded by me, in the sense which I have explained.
But that, which you afterwards present to illustrate your
meaning, deserves notice. For the sins of those, for whom
Christ died, are condemned in the flesh of Christ, in such a
manner that they may not, by that fact, be freed from
condemnation, unless they believe in Christ. For "there is,
therefore, now, no condemnation to them which are in Christ
Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit"
(Rom. viii, 1).
The error of confounding things, which should be distinct,
and uniting those which should be divided, is constantly
committed. For obtainment, and the act itself, which obtains,
are confounded with the application, and the former are
substituted for the latter.
You say, also, "the expiatory victim sanctifies those for
whom he is a victim. For victim and sanctification pertain to
the same persons; -- But Christ sanctifies only the Elect and
believers; -- Therefore, Christ is victim for the Elect only
and believers."
I answer to your Major, that the expiatory victim sanctifies,
not in that it is offered, but in that it is applied. This
may be plainly seen in the passage cited by yourself (Heb.
ix, 13, 14). "For if the ashes of a heifer, sprinkling the
unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh -- How
much more shall the blood of Christ, &c." For which reason,
it is called in Heb. xii, 24, "the blood of sprinkling." In
the same manner, those, who, not only slew the paschal lamb,
but also sprinkled the door-posts with its blood, were passed
over by the destroying angel. If, then, the phrase "for whom"
implies, not the oblation only, but also the fruit and
advantage of the oblation, I admit the truth of the Major.
But we are, here, discussing not the application of the
victim Christ, but the oblation only, which, in the
Scriptures, is simply said to be "for men" (Heb. v, 1). But
faith must necessarily intervene between the oblation, and
its application which is sanctification. The oblation, of the
victim, then, was made, not for believers, but for men as
sinners, yet on this condition, that He should sanctify only
believers in Christ. Hence, it can not be considered, even
though the Minor should be conceded, that Christ offered
himself for the Elect only, since Election, as it is made in
Christ, offered, dead, risen again, and having obtained
eternal redemption by his blood, must be subsequent to the
oblation.
You add -- "Christ is the complete saviour of those, whom he
saves, not only by his merits, but by efficaciously working
their salvation." Who denies this? But the distinction is to
be observed between these two functions and operations of
Christ, the recovery, by his blood, of the salvation, which
was lost by sin, and the actual communication or application,
by the Holy Spirit, of the salvation obtained by his blood.
The former precedes, the latter requires, in accordance with
the Divine decree, that faith should precede it. Therefore,
though Christ may not be said to completely save those who
are not actually saved, yet he is said to be the saviour of
others than believers (1 Tim. xiv, 10). I do not see how that
passage can be suitably explained, unless by the distinction
between sufficient and efficacious salvation, or salvation as
recovered and as applied. The passages, which you cite from
the Fathers, partly have no relation to the matter now
discussed, and partly are related to it, but they teach
nothing else than that the death and passion of Christ, which
are a sufficient price for the redemption of the sins of all
men, in fact, profit the Elect only, and those who believe
unto salvation. What you say in reference to the application
is correct; but I wish that you would distinguish between it,
and those things which precede it.
From what has already been said, the decree, in reference to
the bestowment of the Mediator and to the salvation of
believers through the Mediator, is prior to the decree of
predestination, in which some are destined to salvation in
Christ, and others are left to condemnation out of Christ.
But you say that "the decree of election is the cause and the
beginning of all the saving gifts and works in men." I grant
it, but not in view of the fact that it is the decree of
election, but in that it is the desire of the bestowment of
grace. In that it is the decree of election, it is the cause
that grace is bestowed only on those: for it is the opposite
of reprobation, and necessarily supposes it. For there is no
election without reprobation, and the term elect itself
signifies loved, with the contrast of not loved at least in
the same mode and decree, and restricts love to those who are
styled elect with the exclusion of those who are styled the
non-elect or reprobate. So far, then, as saving gifts are
bestowed upon any one in that act which is called election,
it is properly love; in that the bestowment is restricted to
some, to the exclusion of others, it is called election.
From this, it is apparent, in the first place, that the love
which is according to election, would not be less towards the
elect than it now is, even if God should declare the same
favour, and His own love towards all men in general.
Secondly, they, who make the love of God, in Christ, the
cause of the salvation of men, and that alone, do no injury
to grace, even if they deny that such love is according to
election, that is, restricted to a few by the decree of God.
They may, indeed, deny that which is true, but without injury
to grace or mercy; for I presupposed that they make the same
love to be the cause of salvation, as they do, who contend
for election. I know, indeed, that Augustine often said
against the Pelagians, that "they who make the grace of God
common to all, in effect, deny grace altogether;" but this
assertion is not, in all respects, true; but it was valid
against the Pelagians, and all those who, at that time, made
the grace of God universal. For they explained the grace of
God, to be the gift bestowed equally on all by creation, in
our original nature. I acknowledge, indeed, that, from the
universality of grace, some consequences can be deduced,
which will prove that the universality of grace may be
indirectly opposed to that grace by which the elect are
saved. But it should be known that those consequences are
not, all of them, tenable, we examine them accurately, and I
wish that you should demonstrate this.
You will thus effect much, not, indeed, in sustaining the
view which you here specially advocate, but in sustaining the
doctrine of election and reprobation in general. But it will
be said that, by the reprobation of some, that is, by
election joined with love, the elect are more fully convinced
that the love of God towards themselves is not of debt, than
they would be if that same love were bestowed by God upon all
without any distinction. I, indeed, grant it, and the
Scripture often uses that argument. Yet that love, toward us,
can be proved to be gratuitous, and not of debt, and can be
sealed upon our hearts, without that argument. It appears,
then, that there is no absolute necessity of presenting that
argument. I do not say these things because I wish that the
doctrine of election should not be taught in our churches;
far be it from me; but to show that this subject is to be
treated with moderation, and without offense to weak
believers, who, for the very reason that they hear that they
can not be certain of salvation, unless they believe that
which is taught concerning Election with the rejection of
some, begin to doubt whether the sense of certainty of
salvation, which they have at times enjoyed, is to be
attributed to the testimony of the Holy Spirit, or to a
certain persuasion and presumption in their own minds. I
write this from experience. So much in reference to Election.
Let us now consider its opposite -- Reprobation.
But you define the decree of reprobation in a two-fold
manner. First you say -- "It is the work of divine
providence, by which God decreed to pass by certain men, as
to supernatural grace, that He might declare His justice and
wrath in their due destruction." In my opinion, there are, in
this definition, four faults, which, with your consent, I
will exhibit, if I may be able to do so. The first fault is,
you have made the decree of Reprobation, "the work, &c.,"
when, as it exists in God, it can, in no way, be called a
work, which is something apart from that which produces it,
existing after an act, and from an act produced by the
efficaciousness or efficiency of an agent. I should prefer
then to use the word "act" in this case, The second fault is
-- you do not well describe the object of that act, when you
say -- "certain men are passed by," without any mention of
any condition required in the object, or any reference to the
fact that the men spoken of are sinners. For sin is a
condition, requisite in a man, to be passed by in
reprobation, or, so to speak, in one capable of being passed
by. This I shall briefly prove in a few arguments.
First, the Scripture acknowledges no reprobation of men, as
having been made by God, unless its meritorious cause is sin.
Secondly, since reprobation is the opposite of election, it
follows, if divine election has reference to sinners, that
reprobation has reference to persons of the same character.
But Election, as I have previously shown, has reference to
sinners. Thirdly, because that supernatural grace, which is
denied by reprobation, is grace necessary to sinners only --
namely, that of remission of sins, and the renewal of the
Holy Spirit. Fourthly, because justice and wrath can not be
declared, except against a sinner, for where there is no sin
there can be no place either for wrath or punitive justice,
(of which you here necessarily speak). Fifthly, because
punishment is due to no one, unless he is a sinner, and you
say that "the wrath of God and His justice are declared in
the due destruction of the Reprobate." When I make sin the
meritorious cause of reprobation, do not consider me as, on
the other hand, making righteousness the meritorious cause of
Election. For sin is the meritorious cause of the reprobation
of all sinners in general. But election is, not only of that
grace which is not of debt, and which man has not merited,
but also of that grace which takes away demerit. Even if the
meritorious cause is supposed, the effect is not at once
produced, unless by the intervention of His will, to whom it
belongs to inflict due punishment, according to the merit of
sin; but He has power to punish sin according to its desert,
or to pardon it, of His grace in Christ. Therefore, in both
cases, in election and in reprobation,. the free-will of God
is considered the proximate and immediate cause. If you
oppose to me the common distinction, by which sin is said to
be required in the object of the execution, but not in the
object of the decree itself, I reply that it is not right
that God should will to condemn any one, or will to pass by
him without consideration of sin, as it is not right for Him,
in fact, to pass by or condemn any one without the demerit of
sin. It is, then, truly said, the cause of the decree and of
its execution is one and the same. Your third fault is, that
of obscurity and ill-adjusted phraseology. For what is
implied in the phrase "to pass by as to supernatural grace,"
instead of -- to pass by in the dispensation and bestowment
of supernatural grace? There is ambiguity, also, in the word
"supernatural." Grace is supernatural, both as it is
superadded to unfallen nature, bearing nature beyond itself,
and as it is bestowed on fallen nature, changing it, and
raising it to things heavenly and supernatural.
The fourth fault is, that you present a result of the
preterition which coheres by no necessary copula, with the
antecedent cause of the preterition. For sin is not
presupposed to that act; sin does not of necessity exist from
that act; one of which facts is necessarily required from the
necessity of coherence between the act and its result. If,
indeed, you say that sin necessarily results from that
preterition, then you make God the Author of sin by a denial
of the grace, without which, sin can not be avoided. But if
that grace, which is denied to any one by preterition, is not
necessary for the avoidance of sin, then a man could, without
it, abstain from sin, and so not deserve destruction. If he
could do this, that declaration of justice and wrath does not
result from the act of decreed preterition. But you know that
the parts of a definition should mutually cohere by a
necessary copula, and that a result should not be proposed,
which, even on the supposition of any act, does not result
from that same act. For such a result would be incidental,
and therefore, ought not to be found in a definition which is
independent, and designed to convey absolute knowledge.
Let us, now, examine the other definition, which you have
adduced, perhaps for the very reason, that you thought your
former one somewhat unsound. It is this; -- "The decree of
reprobation is the purpose to permit any one to fall into
sin, and to inflict the punishment of damnation on account of
sin." I know that this definition is used by the School-men,
and, among others, by Thomas Aquinas, for whose genius and
erudition I have as high an esteem as any one; but he, here,
seems to me to be under a kind of hallucination. First,
because he makes the decree of reprobation to be antecedent
to sin, which opinion I have already refuted. Secondly,
because he attributes that permission to the decree of
reprobation, which ought to be attributed to a certain other,
more general decree, that of providence, as I will show. An
act which has reference to all men, in general, apart from
the distinction between the elect and the reprobate, is not
an act of reprobation; for, in that act, God had reference to
the reprobate only; -- But that act of permission, by which
God permitted man to fall into sin, is general, and extending
to all men; for in Adam, all sinned (Rom. 5). And all are "by
nature the children of wrath" (Ephes. ii, 3); -- That act,
then, is not one of reprobation, but of mere general
providence, regarding all men entirely without difference,
and governing and administering their primitive state in the
person of Adam. If you say that both are to be conjoined, the
permission of the fall and the infliction of punishment, and
that the whole subject, taken in a complex manner, is the
proper act of reprobation, I answer that, on that principle,
permission, according to which Adam, and in him, all his
posterity fell, which is one and univocal, is resolved into
two diverse matters, and thus becomes two-fold and equivocal;
that is, into the decree of reprobation, by which the
reprobate are permitted to fall, and the decree of
providence, by which even the elect themselves are permitted
to fall.
I add another argument, which, in my judgment indeed, is
irrefutable. Reprobation and Election are spoken of as things
separate and opposite; one is not without the other. Hence,
no act can be attributed to one of them, the opposite of
which, either affirmative or negative, may not be attributed
to the other. But no act, opposite to that of permission to
fall, can be attributed to Election. There is but one act
which is opposite to the act of permission, namely, hindrance
from failing into sin. But no man, not even one of the elect,
is hindered from falling into sin. For the elect themselves
sinned in Adam. Therefore, the act of permission is not to be
assigned to the decree of Reprobation. If you diligently
consider this argument, you will see that it is clearly
evident, from it, that permission to fall was prior both to
Reprobation and to Election, and therefore the decree of
Permission was prior to the decree of Election and
Reprobation -- prior, in order and nature. Then, also, that
other peculiarity of reprobation remains, and as it
presupposes sin, I conclude that men, as sinners, are the
object of reprobation.
You limit, moreover, the decree of reprobation to two acts.
"The former is the purpose to pass by certain men, and to
illustrate justice in them." But what justice, unless it is
punitive? If it is punitive, then it coincides with the
second act -- "the ordination to punishment." Others
distinguish that same decree into the negative act of
preterition, and the affirmative act of ordination to
punishment. If you meant the same thing, you have not
expressed it well, for punitive justice superintends the
ordination of punishment, but the freedom of the divine will
superintends preterition. Your assertion that "this
preterition has not its cause in men" will not be proved by
any passage of Scripture, which every where teaches that all
abandonment is on account of sin. Though this is so, yet it
does not follow that "the mere good pleasure of God" is not
the cause of abandonment. For God is free to leave or not to
leave the sinner, who deserves abandonment; and thus, the
will of God is the proximate and immediate cause of
abandonment, and indeed the only cause in this respect, that
when it is possible for Him not to forsake the sinner, He may
yet sometimes do so. For God dispenses, absolutely according
to His own will, in reference to the merit of sin, whether,
in His Son, to take it away, or, out of His Son, to punish
it. And how, I pray, does it "interfere with the liberty of
the good pleasure" -- I would prefer the word pleasure -- "of
God," if He is said not to be able to forsake one who is not
a sinner? For it is only in view of His justice that He is
able to forsake one unless he is a sinner. And liberty does
not describe the objects with which God is concerned, in the
operations of His will, but the mode in which He pleases to
operate in reference to any object.
I could wish that you would not attribute any freedom to the
will of God which may impinge upon His justice. For justice
is prior to the will, and is its rule, and freedom is
attributed to the will as its mode. That mode, then, is
limited by justice. Yet it will not, therefore, be denied
that God is completely free in the acts of His will. Since
then He is completely free in the acts of His will, not
because He wills all things, but because He wills freely
whatever He wills, in what respect is it contrary to the
freedom of God, if He is said not to will certain things? For
He can not, in His justice, will them, and His freedom is not
limited by a superior being out of Himself, but by His own
justice. In this sense, also, the will of God is said to be
"the cause of causes, and out of which, or beyond which no
reason is to be sought," which is true also according to my
explanation. For if any one asks, "why does God leave one,
and choose another?" the answer is -- "because He wills it."
If it be asked, -- "but why does He will it?" The cause is
found not out of Himself. But there is a cause why He could
justly will to leave any one, and that cause is sin, not
effecting actual desertion, but deserving it, and making the
sinner worthy of abandonment, and certainly to be abandoned,
if God should choose to punish him according to his demerit,
which choice is allowed to His free-will. Man is indeed as
"clay in the hands of the potter," but it does not follow
from this that God can justly make of that clay whatever it
might be possible for Him to make by an act of His
omnipotence. He can reduce to nothing the clay formed by
Himself and made man, -- for this belongs to Him by supreme
right: but He can not hate the same clay, or be angry with
it, or condemn it forever, unless that lump has become sinful
by its own fault, and been made a lump of corruption. Thus
also Augustine explains the passage in Romans 9, as having
reference to the lump of corruption. But you say, "if God had
willed by His eternal decree to pass over men as sinners
only, not as men, then He did not make them vessels of wrath,
but He found them vessels of wrath, made such by themselves."
I reply that ignorance of the phrase, which the apostle uses
in Romans 9, is shown here. For "to make a vessel unto
wrath," does not signify to sin or to make one worthy of
wrath through sin; but it signifies to destine to just wrath
him who has sinned and so made himself worthy of wrath, which
is an act of the divine judgment, peremptory indeed, because
it is an act of reprobation, but it has reference to man as a
sinner, for sin alone is the meritorious cause of wrath. If
you urge further that in the word "lump," men, not as made
but as to be made, are signified, and that this is proved by
the force of the word, shall deny that the force and radical
meaning of the word is to be, here, precisely insisted upon,
and shall assert that, in Scriptural use, the word is applied
to men, not only as made but as sinners, and as those
received into the grace of reconciliation, and transgressing
of the covenant of grace; as in the prophet Jeremiah, "Behold
as the clay is in the potter's hand, so are ye in mine hand,
O house of Israel" (chapter xviii, 6.)
In your third argument you turn aside from the controversy,
and from the real state of the case, contrary to the law of
correct disputation, and, therefore, you do not come to the
conclusion which is sought, unless you may say that to reject
grace is the same as to sin, which two things are indeed
often distinguished in the Scriptures. For the Pharisees were
already, in Adam, and, indeed, in themselves, sinners before
they "rejected the counsel of God against themselves, being
not baptized" of John (Luke vii, 30). The Jews, of whom
mention is made in Acts xiii, 46, were already sinners, in
Adam and in themselves, before they made themselves unworthy
of the grace of God, rejecting the word of life. But the
question here is whether God passes by sinners, not whether
he sees that they will reject grace.
Again, it does not follow that "reprobation, therefore,
depends on men," if God reprobates no one unless reprobation
and rejection is desired. For an effect can not be said to
depend on that cause which, being in operation, does not
certainly produce the effect. All men as sinners, but some of
them, namely, the Elect, are not left; hence sin is not the
cause of rejection, unless by the intervention of the
damnatory sentence of the judge, in which it is decreed that
sin shall be punished according to its demerit. Who does not
know that the sentence depends on the judge, not on the
criminal, even if the criminal has deserved that sentence by
his own act, without which the judge could neither conceive,
nor pronounce, nor execute the sentence. Nor does it follow
"that God chooses some, and so they are chosen by Him, and
that He rejects others, and, therefore, they are rejected."
For sin, as to demerit, is common to the elect and the
reprobate, according to the theory, which simply requires
that men as sinners should be made the object of
predestination, without any special distinction in the sin
itself.
But you present, as a proof, that the foreseen neglect of
grace is not the cause of rejection, the statement that
"infants," dying out of the covenant of the gospel, have not
neglected this grace, and yet are reprobate and "rejected by
God." I affirm that they rejected the grace of the gospel in
their parents, grand-parents, great-grand-parents, &c., by
which act they deserved to be abandoned by God. I should
desire that some solid reason might be presented to me why,
since all his posterity have sinned, in Adam, against the
law, and, on that account, have merited punishment and
rejection, infants also, to whom, in their parents, the grace
of the gospel is offered, and by whom, in their parents, it
is rejected, have not sinned against the grace of the gospel.
For the rule of the divine covenant is perpetual, that
children are comprehended and judged in their parents. The
fourth argument, which you draw from Romans 9, does not
relate to the present subject. For the apostle there treats
of the decree, by which God determined to justify and to save
those, who should be heirs of righteousness and salvation,
not by works, but by faith in Christ; not of the decree by
which He determined to save these or those, and to condemn
others, or of that by which He determined to give faith to
some, and to withhold it from others. This might be most
easily demonstrated from the passage itself, and from the
whole context, and I should do it, if time would permit. But
this being granted, yet not acknowledged, namely, that the
apostle excludes works as the basis of the decree, of which
he here treats, yet that, which you intend to prove, will not
follow. For Augustine interprets it of works, which were
peculiar to each of them (Esau and Jacob), not common to
both, such as original sin, in which they were both
conceived, when God spoke to Rebecca (12th verse). This
interpretation of Augustine is proved to be true from the
fact that the apostle regards Jacob, as having done no good,
and Esau, no evil, when it was said to their mother Rebecca,
"the elder shall serve the younger," as if it might be
thought that Esau, by evil deeds, had merited that he should
be the servant of his younger brother, who, by his good
deeds, had acquired for himself that prerogative. Therefore,
it does not exclude all respect of sin -- sins, to which they
were both equally subject. That "will" of God, in which "Paul
acquiesces," is not that, by which He has purposed to adjudge
any one, not a sinner, to eternal death, but by which, of
those who are equally sinners, to one He shows mercy, but
another He hardens; which words indeed mark the pre-existence
of sin. For mercy can be shown to no one, who is not
miserable; and no one is miserable, who is not a sinner.
Hardening also has sin as its cause, that is, contumacious
perseverance in sin.
But from your last argument, you deduce nothing against
those, who make sin a requisite condition in the object of
Predestination; for they acknowledge that "it is of the mere
will of God that this one is elected, and that one rejected."
The passage also which you cite from the author of the book
"De vocatione gentium," also places sin as a condition,
prerequisite to Predestination. For he is not "delivered" who
has not been, first, made miserable and the captive of sin.
The second act of reprobation, you make to be "ordination to
punishment," which you distinguish into "absolute and
relative." There might be also a place for the same
distinction, in the contrary act of election. For absolute
election is a reception into favour; relative election is
that, by which one person, and not another, is received into
favour. You do rightly in making the will of God the cause of
absolute ordination, yet not to the exclusion of sin. For it
is very true that, in the Deity, there is the same cause of
willing and doing that which He has decreed. Sin also has the
same relation to ordination as to damnation. It has the
relation of meritorious cause to damnation, hence it has also
the relation of meritorious cause to, ordination. There is
likewise no probable relation, to which a contrary can not be
conceived. Therefore, it can not be absolutely denied that
"sin is the cause of the decree of damnation." For though it
may not be the immediate, proximate or principal cause, yet
it is the meritorious cause, without which God can not justly
ordain any one to punishment. But I should desire the proof
that "sin does not precede, in the relation of order, in the
divine prescience, that former act" of preterition and
rejection. There is, indeed, in my judgment, no passage of
Scripture, which contains that idea; I wish that one may be
adduced. "Relative ordination is that by which this person,
and not that, is ordained to punishment, and on the same
condition." God has indeed the power of punishing and of
remitting sin, according to His will, nor is He responsible
to any one, unless so far as He has bound Himself by His own
promises. In this, also, "the liberty of the divine goodness
is exhibited," but not in this only. For the same thing is
declared in creation itself, and in the dispensation of
natural blessings, in this, that He determined that one part
of Nothing should be heaven, another the earth, a third the
air, &c. Indeed He has in creation demonstrated "the same
liberty in the bestowment of supernatural blessings." For He
has honoured some of His creatures with supernatural gifts,
as angels and men, and others, indeed all others, He has made
without supernatural gifts. He has likewise demonstrated the
same freedom, not only in the creation, but in the government
and care of His rational creatures, since He has made a
communication of supernatural felicity, according to the
fixed law and pleasure of His own will. From which angels and
men could understand that God was free to communicate it to
them according to His own will. This is declared by the
arbitrary prescription of its condition. I make this remark
that no one may think, that the act, which we now discuss,
was the first act by which God evinced the freedom of His
will.
Your words -- "and indeed if God should destroy and damn all
those who are rejected by Him, yet He would not be unjust," I
can not approve, and you will not, if you compare your
previous statements with them. For you said that ordination
to punishment is subsequent to sin in the order of nature,
and, here, you do not place sin between rejection, which is
the first act of reprobation, and damnation, which is the
second; while damnation does not follow rejection
immediately, but it follows sin. Those words; so to speak,
also contain a manifest falsity. First, because "the judge of
all the earth can not do right, if He should slay the
righteous with the wicked" (Gen. xviii, 25); and sin is the
single and only meritorious cause of damnation. "Whosoever
hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book"
(Exod. xxxii, 33). "The soul that sinneth it shall die"
(Ezek. xviii, 4). Secondly, because that rejection is the
cause into which sin can be resolved, and, therefore, the
cause of sin, by the mode of removal, or non-bestowment of
that aid, without which sin can not be avoided. No small
error is committed here, in the fact that, when you do not
suppose sin to be previous to rejection and divine
preterition, you yet make ordination to punishment subsequent
to rejection, without any explanation of the coherence of
both those acts. If you attempt this, you will fall into no
less a fault; for you will make God, on account of that
rejection, the author of sin, as can be shown by irrefutable
arguments. The illustrations, which you propose, are not
adapted to your design, and fail through want of analogy. For
it is one thing to kill a beast, by which deed it ceases to
exist and is not rendered miserable, or to exclude from your
house one whom you do not please to admit, and a very
different thing to condemn a man to eternal punishment, which
is far more severe than to annihilate the same person. "The
cause of this relative reprobation is the mere will of God
without any consideration of sin," namely, that which may
have any effect in making a distinction between different
persons, but not in giving the power to ordain certain
persons to punishment, which power indeed exists in God as
Lord and Judge, but can not really be exercised except
towards a sinner who deserves punishment from the equity of
divine justice. That which you quote from Augustine and
Gregory agrees with this distinction. For both make sin the
meritorious cause of reprobation, and consider sin and
sinners as altogether prerequisite to predestination; but
attribute the act of separation to the mere will of God.
In this "second act of reprobation," you make two "steps,
just rejection, and, damnation on account of sin." It is
apparent, from this, that you distinguish between that
rejection which you made the first step of reprobation, and
this latter rejection. Yet you do not state the distinction
between those two rejections, which, however, ought to have
been done, to avoid confusion. Yet it may be right to
conjecture, since you make the former prior to sin, that you
would make the latter consequent upon sin, and existing on
account of the desert of sin. You make the divine rejection
two-fold, but do not explain whether you mean, here, the
latter, which you consider the first step in the second act
of reprobation, or divine rejection in general. It is not the
former, in my judgment, for that, as it pertains to the
second act of reprobation, is on account of sin; and this is
considered by you to be prior to sin. Perhaps it is the same
with the rejection, which is the first act of reprobation. If
so, you can not in the passages now referred to, escape the
charge of confused discussion.
Let us see how you explain that two-fold rejection. You say
that the former is "the denial of aid, confirmation, and
assisting grace, by which the first is rendered efficacious
for the resistance of temptations, and for perseverance in
goodness," and you style it "rejection of trial or test" and
affirm that it occurs in the case of those "who have not yet
forsaken God," illustrating it from the example of the first
man, Adam. But I inquire of you, whether you consider that
aid, confirmation, and assisting grace so necessary for
perseverance in goodness, that, without it, a man could not
resist temptation? If you reply affirmatively, consider how
you can excuse, from the responsibility of sin, the Deity,
who has denied to man, apart from any fault in him, the gifts
and aids necessary to perseverance in goodness. If
negatively, then indeed, tell me by what right you call this
a rejection by God. Can he be said to be rejected by God, who
is adorned and endued with grace, rendering him acceptable,
provided with all gifts and aids necessary to perseverance in
goodness, and even fortified by the help of the Holy Spirit
to resist temptation? If you speak in accordance with
Scriptural usage you can not call it rejection. You will say
that it is not called, in an absolute sense, rejection, but
in a certain respect, -- that is, so far that God affords to
him, on whom He has bestowed all those things -- not
efficacious aid, not actual confirmation in goodness, not
that assisting grace, without which the former graces are
inefficacious. This is apparent, you say, from the event,
since, if he had obtained also those helps, he would have
been steadfast in goodness, he would not have fallen. This
you express in quoting from Augustine: -- "God rejected man,
not as to ability, but as to will." If he had possessed the
latter, he would have maintained his integrity.
Here we enter on a discussion of the utmost difficulty, and
scarcely explicable, at least by myself, as yet but a tyro,
and not sufficiently acquainted with those heights of Sacred
Theology. Yet I will venture to present some thoughts,
trusting to the grace of Him, who gives wisdom to babes, and
sight to the blind. You will assist me in part, that, by our
mutual conference, the light may shine with greater
brightness. For I have undertaken to write not against you,
but to you, for the sake both of learning and of teaching.
I see here two things which will need explanation from me.
First, in reference to sufficient and efficacious grace.
Secondly, in reference to the administration and dispensation
of both, and the causes of that dispensation.
EXAMINATION OF THE ANSWER OF PERKINS TO CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS
AGAINST THE ADVOCATES OF UNCONDITIONAL PREDESTINATION
We have, thus far, examined your doctrine of Predestination.
If now it may seem proper to you to correct it according to
our observations, it will, without doubt, be free from the
liability to be called "Manichean," "Stoic," "Epicurean," or
even "Pelagian"; though, as set forth by you, it is free from
the imputation of the last error. It can not be with equal
ease acquitted of the former, to him, who shall accurately
compare not only your opinion, but the logical consectaries
of your opinion, with the dogmas of the Manichees, and the
Stoics. Some would deduce Epicureism also from the same
opinion, but only by means of a series of conclusions. I wish
that you had with sufficient perspicuity vindicated your
doctrine from those objections. You, indeed, attempt to do
this in answering the various allegations, usually made
against the doctrine, set forth by you. We will consider
these, with your answers in order.
ALLEGATION 1
"IT IS TAUGHT BY US THAT CERTAIN MEN, AND FEW IN NUMBER, ARE
ELECTED."
It is true that your theory, manifestly includes the very
doctrine which is stated in that allegation. Therefore, in
that accusation, no sentiment contrary to your opinion and
doctrine is attributed to you. It is also true, that the
allegation contains no offense. For the Scripture in plain
terms declares that "Many are called, but few are chosen"
(Matt. xxii, 14).
"Fear not, little flock" (Luke xii, 32). In your reply, you
show most clearly that nothing false is charged upon your
theory, in that allegation. I do not, indeed, think that
there is any one who can object, on this account, to that
theory. For even all heretics, with whom we have become
acquainted, think that the elect are few; many of them, and,
I would dare to say, all of them, believe that "the few are
known to God, and so definitely, that the number can be
neither increased nor diminished, and they, who are numbered,
can not be varied." But they offer another explanation of the
term election, contrary to, or at least different from your
idea. You ought, then, to have presented this allegation, not
in such terms, that it could be made against you only by a
foolish opponent -- but as it would be stated by those who
are opposed to your view. For they do not object to your
theory, because you say that "certain persons, and few in
number, are elected by God," but because you consider that
"God, by a naked and absolute decree, without any reference
to sin or unbelief, elected certain men, and that they were
few; and that, by the same decree, He rejected the residue of
the multitude of men, to whom He did not give Christ, and to
whom He did not design that the death of Christ should be of
advantage." But something shall be said of the allegation in
that form, under the other allegations referred to by you.
ALLEGATION 2
"WE TEACH THAT GOD ORDAINED MEN TO HELL-FIRE, AND THAT HE
CREATED THEM, THAT HE MIGHT DESTROY THEM."
In that allegation, the word "men" should have been limited
and restricted to certain men, namely, to those about to
perish. For no one will impute to you such an opinion in
reference to all men, since all know that you except and
exclude the elect from that number. You ought then, to have
set forth that allegation thus; -- "We teach that God
ordained some men, as men, without any consideration of sin,
to hell-fire, and created them, that He might destroy them."
This is, indeed, a serious allegation, and contains a great
slander, if it is falsely charged upon you. If it is a true
charge, you ought, by all means, to endeavour to free and
relieve yourself of it, by a change of sentiment. I admit
that you, and they, who agree with you in opinion, are not
accustomed to speak in this way. But it is to be considered
whether or not you assert what is equivalent to this, and if
that shall be proved, you are held convicted of the charge. I
will now, for the time, take the place of those who accuse
you, yet being by no means myself an accuser; and do you see
to it, whether I plead their cause well, and convict you of
that charge.
He, who makes hell-fire the punishment of sin, who ordains
that the first man, and in him all men, shall sin, who so, by
his providence, governs that first man that he shall of
necessity, sin, and shall not be able, in fact, to avoid sin,
in consequence of which he, and all in him, commit sin, who,
finally, certainly and irrevocably decrees in Himself to
leave in Adam (i.e. in depravity) most of these, who shall
sin in Adam, and to punish sin in them by hell-fire, is said,
most deservedly, to have ordained to hell-fire, by an
absolute decree, some, and indeed most men, as men, apart
from any consideration of sin, or any demerit on their part.
There is a connection between their sin and hell-fire, from
the position of that law which is sanctioned by penalty, and
by the decree of God in reference to withholding the pardon
of their sin. Sin is also, of necessity, connected with the
decree of God, and, in truth, it depends on it, so that man
could not but sin, otherwise there would be no place for the
decree. From which it follows, that God has absolutely
ordained very many to hell-fires since He ordained men to the
commission of sins and absolutely decreed to punish sin in
many.
But I will prove, that you and those who agree with you, hold
each of these opinions. First, you say, and truly, that hell-
fire is the punishment ordained for sin and the transgression
of the law. Secondly, you say that God ordained the first
man, and in him, all men should sin; you not only say this,
but you also adduce the reason of that decree and divine
ordination, that God, in that way, might declare His
righteousness and mercy, in which His glory chiefly consists,
for which there could be no place except through sin and by
occasion at it. Thirdly, you add that God, by His providence,
so arranged the primeval state of man that, though, as far as
his own liberty was concerned, he might be able to stand and
not fall, yet he should, in fact, fall and commit sin. These
two things are mutually connected; for that God might attain
the object of His own act of ordination, it was necessary
that He should so arrange the whole matter that the object
should be attained. But you do not make prescience of sin the
foundation of that administration; wherefore it is necessary
that you should consider, as presiding over it., the
omnipotence of God, to resist which, the man would have
neither the power nor the will. This being so considered, you
make a necessity of committing sin. To all these things you
add, moreover, the irrevocable decree of God, by which he
determined to punish, without mercy and of mere justice, sin
committed according to that decree. From this, I think that
it is most clearly evident, that when that allegation is made
against you, nothing is charged upon you which is foreign to
your sentiment.
I now consider the other part of the allegation, in which it
is asserted that, according to your doctrine, "God created
men that He might destroy them." The truth of this allegation
is evident from this, that you say that God created men for
this purpose, that He might declare, in these, His mercy, and
in those, His justice, and indeed His punitive justice --
which is the opposite of mercy -- and apart from foresight.
From which it follows, as punitive justice destroys men, that
God created some men that He might destroy them. For punitive
justice and the destruction of man are connected, and the
former can not be declared except by the latter. It is
evident then that nothing, foreign to your theory is charged
against you in the whole of that allegation.
Indeed I think that you wished to show favour to your own
sentiment, when you made the charge less than it deserved.
For it is much worse that God should have ordained men to
sin, and should have created them that they might sin, than
to have ordained them to hell-fire, and to have created them
that He might destroy them. For if sin is a worse evil than
damnation, as it is, evidently, since the former is opposed
to divine good, and the latter to human good, then truly is
it greater to ordain one to sin than to ordain to hell, to
create a man that he might sin, than that he might perish.
If, however, accuracy of statement is to be sought, it should
be affirmed that, if a man is ordained to commit sin, then he
can not sin. For sin is a voluntary act, and the decree of
God in reference to sin introduces a necessity of sinning.
Further, if a man is created that he may be condemned, then
he can not be condemned by God. For condemnation is the act
of a just judge. But a just judge does not condemn one unless
he is wicked by his own fault, apart from necessity; and he
is not wicked, apart from necessity, and of his own fault,
who is created that he may sin, and thus perish.
Let us now examine your answer to this second allegation. You
think that you blunt and confute it by a distinction in the
second act of reprobation, but it is not so. For you freely
admit that God, by His absolute purpose, deserted the
creature, from which desertion, sin, according to your
opinion, necessarily exists; otherwise you can not connect
punitive justice with desertion, except in view of a
condition; namely, the contingency that man should sin after
that desertion. Therefore you admit what is imputed, in that
allegation, to your theory, you do not confute the charge.
You also blend, in a confused way, the permission of the
fall, and the permission, by which God allows one to finally
fail of blessedness. For these are not the same, or from the
same cause. For all have fallen by the divine permission, but
many do not finally perish in their fallen condition; and
permission of the fall depends on the divine providence,
which is general over the whole human race; and the final
permission to remain in that fallen condition depends on
reprobation, and only relates to some persons. Your
assertion, also, that "sin is subsequent to the desertion and
permission of God," is to be understood as referring to that
permission, by which He permits man to fall into sin, which
pertains to providence, not to that permission by which He
suffers some to finally fail of blessedness, which pertains
to reprobation. For sin is the cause of this latter
permission, that is, the meritorious cause, as has now been
frequently stated.
We, now, examine the testimonies which you present. In the
remark of Lombardus, the phrase "future demerits" is to be
understood to refer to what one has different from another.
But common demerits, though they may not be the moving cause,
yet they are the meritorious cause, and a condition requisite
in the object of reprobation. So also the assertion of Jerome
is to be referred to the doing good or evil, by which the
brothers were distinguished from each other, and not to sin,
in which they were both conceived. This is apparent from what
he says: -- "and their election and rejection displayed not
the desert of each, but the will of him who elected and
rejected. In the remark of Anselm that which I claim is
clearly apparent. For he says, that "God does justly, if He
rejects sinners." The word "miserable," used in another
remark of the same father, indicates the same thing. With
these agree the remarks of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine. For
the question is not whether the will of God is the cause of
election and reprobation, but whether it has sin as an
antecedent, as the meritorious cause of reprobation, and a
requisite condition in the object both of election and of
reprobation, which is most true, according to the views
always held by Augustine. The word "conversion," used by
Thomas Aquinas, and the word "drawing," used by Augustine,
make sin the antecedent to the act of the will which
"converts" and "draws." We would examine the testimonies of
other School-men, if their authority was of much weight with
us. But I make this remark, that there is no one of those
testimonies, which excludes the sin of Adam -- and that of
men in common with him -- from the decree of Predestination,
and some of them, indeed, clearly the same in that decree.
For when the words "grace" and "mercy" are used, there is a
tacit reference to sin.
That "the latter act" -- that of destruction -- takes place
"in reference to sin," is certain, but it is in reference to
sin, not by any previous decree ordained to take place, but
ordained to be punished in some by justice, and to be
remitted in others by grace, when it has been committed. This
explanation, however, does not show that "the allegation is a
slander," unless you, at the same time, show that sin did not
necessarily exist from that decree of reprobation or from
some other.
Your second answer consists only in words. For an act, if it
is unjust, is not excused by its end or object. It is unjust
to destroy a man apart from sin, and it remains unjust, even
if any one may say that it is done "for the declaration of
judgment," or "for declaring judgment"; and that, which is
added, seems absurd -- that "this is done for declaring
judgment in just destruction," as it can not be just unless
it is inflicted on account of sin. The statement, that "God
pleases to punish, with due destruction, a man, not as he is
a man, but as he is a sinner," has the force of a sound
answer, on the condition that the man has sinned freely, not
of necessity. For the necessity and inevitability of sinning
excuses from sin, and frees from punishment, him who commits
that act. I say act, and not sin, because an act, which one
necessarily and inevitably commits, can not be called sin.
The apparent distinction, by which a man is said to sin
freely in respect to himself, but necessarily in relation to
the divine decree, has no effect in warding off this blow;
since it can not be that one should do freely that, which he
does necessarily, or that one act can be performed
necessarily, that is, can not but be performed, and yet
contingently, that is, can possibly not be performed. For
this is at variance with the first principles of universal
truth, in reference to whatever it is proper to make an
affirmation or negation. I know that some defend this
distinction by referring to the example of God Himself, of
whom they assert that He is both freely and necessarily good.
But this assertion is incorrect. So false, indeed, is it that
God is freely good, that it is not much removed from
blasphemy. God is, what He is, necessarily, and if He is
freely good, He can be not good, and who has ever said that
those things which are in Him, of nature and essence, are in
Him freely? The assertion of Cameracensis is indeed partly
blasphemous, partly true. It is blasphemous to say that "God
can, without loss or detriment to His justice, punish and
afflict eternally His own innocent creature." It is true that
"God can annihilate one of His creatures apart from sin." But
punishment and annihilation are very different. The latter is
to deprive of that, which had been graciously bestowed, the
former is to render one miserable, and indeed infinitely
miserable, and apart from any demerit on account of sin.
Misery is far worse than annihilation, as Christ says -- "It
had been good for that man if he had not been born" (Matt.
xxvi, 24). That it is contrary to the divine justice to
punish one, who is not a sinner, appears from very many
declarations of Scripture. "That be far from thee to do after
this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked" (Gen.
xviii, 25). "Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I
blot out of my book" (Exod. xxxii, 33) "Seeing it is a
righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them
that trouble you, and to you, who are troubled, rest with us"
(2 Thess. i, 6, 7). "Fo r Go d i s n ot u nri ght eous to fo
rget yo ur w ork an d la bor of lov e," et c., (Heb. vi, 10).
The saying of Wisdom (chapter 12), quoted by Cameracensis,
likewise teaches the contrary of what he attempts to prove
from it. For it treats of the perdition of unrighteous
nations, and, in plain words, declares in the 15th verse --
"For so much, then, as thou art righteous thyself, thou
orderest all things righteously, thinking it not agreeable
with thy power to condemn him that hath not deserved to be
punished." I grant, indeed, that the error of Cameracensis
was caused by the fault of the old version. But you can not
be excused on the account of this. For you ought to omit the
testimony of an author who is led into an error by the fault
of a version, since you are acquainted with it from the Greek
text itself, and from translations better than that ancient
one. It is true that "God is not bound by created laws," for
He is a law unto Himself, He is justice itself. That law,
also, according to which no one is permitted to inflict
punishment upon the undeserving was not created, or made by
men, and it has place not among men only. It is an eternal
law, and immovable in the divine justice to which God is
bound in the immutability of His nature, and righteousness.
It is not universally true, that "whatever is right, is right
because God so wills it," as there are many things which God
wills, because they are right. It is right that God alone
should be acknowledged by the creature to be the true God. We
affirm that God wills this because it is right, not that it
is right because God wills it. The act of simple obedience is
right, not because God wills that it should be performed by
the creature, but because it is such in itself, and God can
not but require it of the creature, though it may belong to
free-will to prescribe in what matter He wills that obedience
should be rendered to Him. As far as we are concerned, also,
it is truly our duty in reference to laws, divinely enacted
for us, not so much to see whether that which they command is
just in itself, but simply to obey them, because God
prescribes and commands it. Yet this duty is founded on the
fact that God can not prescribe that which is unjust, because
that He is essential justice, and wisdom, and omnipotence.
I had designed to omit a more extended examination of the
remarks, quoted by you, from the Scholastic Theologians; but
I will say a few words. "The four signs of Francis Maro,
necessary for understanding the process of predestination and
reprobation" of which he speaks, are of no value, are
notoriously false, and are confused in their arrangement. In
the sentence from D. Baunes, the "permission by which all
nature was permitted to fall in Adam" is absurdly ascribed to
reprobation, as that permission, and the fall which followed
it, extended to the whole human race, without distinction of
the elect and the reprobate. Those "four things," which,
Ferrariensis says, "are found in the reprobate," are not in
him, as reprobate, and in respect to the decree of
reprobation, but the latter two, only; for "the permission of
the fall and sin," to use his own words, are found in the
elect, and pertain to the more general decree of providence,
by which God left man to the freedom of his own will, as has
been before and frequently said. Therefore, arguments, other
than these, should have been presented by you, for the
refutation of that charge. I very much wish that you would
cite Scripture for the confirmation of your sentiments and
the overthrow of those allegations. The writings of the
School-men, ought not to have weight and authority,
especially among us; for our Doctors of Theology with one
voice affirm of them, "that they have changed true Theology
into Philosophy, and the art of wrangling, and that they
endeavour to establish their opinions, by the authority, not
so much of the Sacred Scriptures, as of Aristotle."
ALLEGATION 3
"THE PREDESTINATION OF THE STOICS, AND THE FATALISM OF THE
STOICS, HAS BEEN INTRODUCED BY US: BECAUSE -- THEY SAY WE
ASSERT THAT ALL THINGS ARE DONE OF THE NECESSARY AND
EFFICIENT DECREE OF GOD; ALSO, THAT THE FALL OF ADAM WAS
ACCORDING TO OUR OPINION -- AS THEY ALLEGE -- DECREED AND
WILLED BY GOD."
This is, indeed, a heavy charge, and yet it is set forth in a
milder form by you, than by those who make it. You ought to
add those things which pertain essentially to this
allegation, and are charged by them upon you and your
doctrine. Such are these -- "It would follow from this, 'that
God is the Author of sin; that God really sins; that God
alone sins; and that sin is not sin,"' which Bellarmine
charges against the sentiment of certain of our doctors --
the sentiment also, which you seem to defend. But the reason
that they present all those things, as opposed to your
doctrine, is this: -- You say that all things happen by the
efficacious will of God, which can not be resisted, and that
events do not occur, because God, by an absolute decree, has
determined that they should not occur. From this, it follows,
also, that sinful acts are performed by the will of God,
which can not be resisted, and that righteous acts are
omitted, because God has simply and absolutely decreed that
they shall not be performed; and therefore, that God is the
Author of sin, and the preventer of righteousness and of good
acts. From which it is inferred that God, truly and properly
speaking, sins; and, since the necessity, from which men
perform such acts, acquits them from sin, it follows that God
alone sins, just as He alone is responsible, who strikes a
blow by the hand of another person, of which he has laid
hold. But since God can not sin, it follows that sin is not
sin. Hence, it seems to me that no injustice is done to your
doctrine by that allegation.
But let us see how you dispose of it. Neglecting the general
charge, you begin your discussion with that part which refers
to the fall of Adam. You admit that this occurred "not only
according to the prescience of God, but also by His will and
decree; yet," as you explain it -- "by His will, not
approving or effecting it, yet not prohibiting, but
permitting it." This distinction, properly used, indeed,
solves the difficulty. If it is your opinion and the opinion
of others, that God did not approve, and did not effect the
fall; did not incite, and did not impel Adam to fall; did not
lay upon him any necessity of sinning, either by acting or
not acting, but only willed not to prevent, but to permit the
fall of Adam; then, I acknowledge that all those things are
unjustly alleged against your sentiment. You, indeed, make
this statement verbally, while in fact you so explain
permission or non-prevention, that it amounts to the
"efficient decree of God." This I will prove. You say, "What
God does not prevent, occurs, because God does not prevent
it, the reason of the non-existence of a fact, or event, is
that God does not will that it should exist." I conclude,
therefore, that the divine permission or non-prevention, and
the event are mutually, and indeed immediately connected, as
cause and effect. Thus, also, non-prevention has the relation
of energetic performance. Therefore, likewise, the volition
of God, and the non-existence or event of a thing are
mutually connected as cause and effect, and hence, a volition
that a thing shall not be done, has the relation of energetic
prevention. This I show, more extendedly, in this manner.
Sin is two-fold, of Commission and Omission -- of Commission,
when that is performed which has been forbidden -- of
Omission, when that is not performed which has been
commanded. There is, in your opinion, a concurrence in that
act which can not be committed by a man without sin, and
indeed such a concurrence that God is the first cause of the
act, and man is the second, the former moving man, the latter
moved by God, and, indeed, moving, in such sense, that man,
of necessity, follows that motion, and consequently of
necessity performs that act which involves transgression. Not
to prevent sin of omission is, in your opinion, not to give
that grace without which sin can not be omitted, and the
contrary good can not be performed. But he, who, in that
manner, concurs, and denies such grace, is absolutely the
chief and efficient cause of sin, and indeed, the only cause,
as the joint cause of the act -- man, since he can not resist
the motion of the first cause, can not sin in following that
irresistible motion. But, if you can so explain your
sentiment and that of others, that it shall not, in reality,
differ from it, then I shall not object to it.
You will not escape by the distinction that "it is one thing
to will a thing per se, and another to will it as to the
event," unless, by the "event" of a thing, you understand
that which results from the prolongation and the existence of
the thing itself, which is not your sentiment. For you say
that "God wills the event of sin," that is, "that sin should
happen, but does not will sin itself;" which distinction is
absurd. For the essence of sin consists in the event, for sin
consists in action. God, also, wills sin itself, in the mode
in which He wills that sin should happen, and He wills that
sin should happen in the mode in which He wills sin itself.
He does not love sin per se. He wills that sin should happen
for His own glory; He wills also sin for His own glory. I
speak this in the sense used by yourself. Show, if you can,
the difference, and I will acquiesce.
Your assertion, that "God wills not to prevent sin," is
ambiguous, unless it is explained. What! Has not God hindered
sin, as far as was suitable, and according to the mode in
which it is right for Him to treat a rational creature,
namely, by legislation, threatening, promise, the bestowment
of sufficient grace, and even the promise of His assistance,
if man would consent to have recourse to it? This he could
do, or we go infinitely astray. But He did not hinder sin by
any omnipotent or physical action, because that would not
have been inappropriate; He would have thus prevented man
from using that primeval liberty in which He had placed him;
and, by consequence, as we have elsewhere quoted from
Tertullian, "He would have rescinded His own arrangement."
It is rightly said, that God properly, and primarily, and, we
may add, immediately, willed His own permission. But it does
not thence follow, that God also willed the event of sin. For
it is a non-sequitur -- "God voluntarily permits sin,
therefore, He wills that sin should happen." The contrary is
true, -- "God voluntarily permits sin; therefore, He neither
wills that sin should happen, nor wills that it should not
happen." For permission is an act of the will when
inoperative which inoperativeness of the will may here be
properly ascribed to the Deity, since He endowed man with
free-will, that He might test his free and voluntary
obedience. He could not have done this, if He had imposed an
inseparable hindrance upon man. But the cause of the
occurrence of that which God permits is not the permission,
although it would not happen without that permission. He who
performs the act is the proper and immediate cause, with the
concurrence of the Deity, which is always prepared for him.
But permission can not be resolved into a cause per se, if we
are to treat this subject accurately and truthfully, but only
into a cause sine qua non, or one which removes, or, rather,
does not present a hindrance, and indeed such a hindrance as
I have referred to, which cannot be resisted by the creature.
Your statement, "as no good thing can exist or be done,
except by the agency of the Deity, so no evil can be avoided,
unless God hinders it," is true, if rightly understood; that
is, the agency of the Deity being that, by which He may
suitably effect what is good by means of a rational and free
creature, and the hindrance of God being that, by which He
may suitably hinder a free creature from that which is evil.
But the limit both of doing and hindering is such that it
does not deprive man of freedom, but permits him, also,
freely and of his own will, according to the mode of will, to
do good and to abstain from evil. Otherwise good is not
performed by man, and evil is not avoided by him, but an act,
only, is performed or avoided, by a necessity either natural
or supernatural. Those words, also, are susceptible of
amendment, if any one should wish to discuss these things
with greater accuracy. The statement might have been this:
"As no good is, or is done, except by the agency of God, so
no evil is avoided, except by the hindrance of God." For by
the agency of God, good not only can be but is done, and by
His hindrance, evil not only can be, but is hindered. But if
you wish to retain that word "can," you ought to have
expressed your ideas in this way: "As nothing good can be, or
can be done, unless God wills to do it, or to give to another
the power and the will to do it, and to concur with him in
doing it, so nothing evil can be avoided unless God wills to
give, and actually does give strength sufficient for the
avoidance of sin, and wills to call out that strength and to
co-operate with it." In this sense, "not even the least thing
is done without the will of God, namely, either willing that
it should be done, or willing not to prevent, but to permit,
that it should be done." It is not true that "providence is
inactive" in permission, even explained in such a manner as
to coincide neither with that will of God, by which He wills
that something shall be done, nor with that by which He wills
that something shall not be done. If it coincides with either
of these, there is no permission, and the assertion of
Augustine -- "nothing is done except by the agency or
permission of God," is without force.
I now examine some arguments, which you present in favour of
your view. The first is deduced from several passages of
Scripture. Let us see now what can be proved from these
passages. The passage in Acts ii, 23, teaches, not that God
willed that the Jews should slay Christ, but, that he was
"delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of
God" into the power of those who wished to slay him. Nothing
more can be inferred from Acts iv, 28. For God predetermined
to deliver His own Son into the hands of his enemies, that He
might suffer from them that which God had laid upon him, and
which the Jews, of their own wickedness and hatred against
Christ, had determined to inflict upon him. God, indeed,
"determined before" that death should be inflicted on Christ
by them; but in what character did God consider them when He
"determined before" that this should be done by them? In that
character, surely, which they had at the time when they
inflicted death upon Christ, that is, in the character of
sworn enemies of Christ, of obstinate enemies and contemners
of God and the truth; who could be led to repentance by no
admonitions, prayers, threats or miracles; who wished to
inflict every evil on Christ, if they could only obtain the
power over him, which they had often sought in vain.
It is evident, then, that there was here no other action of
God in this case than that He delivered His own Son into
their hands, and permitted them to do their pleasure in
reference to him, yet determining the limit to which He
pleased that they should go, regulating and governing their
wickedness, in such a manner, yet very gently, that they
should inflict on him only that which God had willed that His
own Son should suffer, and nothing more. This is clearly seen
in the very manner of his punishment, in preventing the
breaking of his legs, in the piercing of his side, in the
inscription of the title, and the like. But there appears
here no action of God by which they were impelled or moved to
will and to do what they willed and did; but He used those
who wished, of their own malice and envy, to put Christ to
death, in a mode, which, He knew, would conduce to His own
glory and the salvation of men.
But the reason that it cannot be said, with truth, that God
and Christ, in the delivery of Christ to the Jews, sinned,
does not consist, only or chiefly, in the fact that they were
led to this delivery by various motives. What if Judas had
done the same thing with the design that Christ, by his own
death, should reconcile the world unto God, would his sin
have been less heinous? By no means. It was not lawful for
him to do evil that good might come. But the chief reason of
the difference is that God had the right to deliver His Son,
and Christ, also, had the right to deliver his own soul to
death, and consequently, in doing this, they could not sin.
But Judas had no power in this case, and he, therefore,
sinned. There is a distinction in actions not only as to
their end, but as to their principle and form. Saul was not
acquitted of sin, because he preserved the herds of the
Amalekites for sacrifice (1 Sam. xv, 9-22).
Again, what is implied by that inference? -- "therefore, we
may also say that, when Adam ate of the forbidden fruit, he
did that which the hand and counsel of God foreordained to be
done?" This, indeed, never was the language of the apostles
and of the church, and never could be, in matters having so
much dissimilarity. For the relation of Adam and of those
enemies of Christ is not the same. The former, previous to
eating the fruit, was holy and righteous; the latter, before
the death of Christ, were wicked, unrighteous, unfriendly,
and hostile to Christ. The latter, in all their desires,
sought for, and frequently and in many ways, attempted to put
Christ to death. Adam was disinclined to eat of the forbidden
fruit, even when he was enticed to it by his wife, who had
already transgressed. The death of Christ was necessary for
the expiation of sins, and was, per se, declarative of the
glory of God; the fall of Adam was wholly unnecessary, and,
per se, violated the majesty and glory of God. He needed not
the sin of man for the illustration of His own glory. What,
likewise, can be imagined more absurd than that circular
reasoning? "The death of Christ was foreordained by God, that
it might expiate the sin of Adam; the fall of Adam was
foreordained, that it might be expiated by the death of
Christ." Where is the beginning and where is the end of that
ordination? Nevertheless God ordained the fall of Adam, not
that it should occur, but that, occurring, it should serve
for an illustration of His justice and mercy. The passage in
1 Peter iii, 17, is to be explained in a similar manner. "God
wills that the pious should suffer evils," for their
chastening and trial. He wills that they should suffer these
evils from other men; but from men of what character? From
those, who of their own wickedness and the instigation of
Satan, already will to bring those evils upon them, which ill
will God already foresaw, at the time when He predetermined
that those evils should be inflicted upon the pious.
Therefore, they were moved, by no act of God, to will to
inflict evils upon the pious; they were moved, also, by no
act to inflict evils, unless by an act such as ought rather
to move them from that volition, and to deter them from that
infliction; such as would, in fact, have moved and deterred
them, unless they had been deplorably wicked. The doctrine,
life, and miracles of Christ and the Apostles, drew upon them
the odium and hatred of the world. The fact that God is
declared, in 2 Samuel xvi, 10, to have said unto Shimei,
"Curse David," also, if rightly explained, presents no
difficulty. Let Shimei, and David, and the act which may be
called "the precept of cursing," be considered. Shimei was
already a hater of David, of most slanderous tongue, and
bitter mind, impious, and a contemner of God and the divine
law, which had commanded "Thou shalt not curse the rule of
thy people (Exod. xxii, 28)." David, by his own act against
God and his neighbour, had rendered himself worthy of that
disgrace, and altogether needed to be chastened and tried by
it; he was, moreover, endued with the gift of patience to
endure that contumely with equanimity. The act of God was the
ejection and expulsion of David from the royal city and from
the kingdom. In consequence of this occurred the flight of
David, the fact that the rumor of that flight came to the
ears of Shimei, and the arrangement that David and Shimei
should meet together. Thus, by the act of God, David, fleeing
and driven before his son, was presented to Shimei "a man of
the family of the house of Saul," and an enemy of David,
ready to curse him. Add, if you please, the hardening of the
mind of Shimei, lest he should fear to curse David, on
account of the attendants of David, that so he might, in some
way, satisfy his own mind and his inveterate hatred against
David. Therefore, that opportunity, by which David, in his
flight, was presented to Shimei, and the hardening of the
mind of Shimei, divinely produced, and also the direction of
that cursing tongue, were acts pertaining to that precept of
God, apart from which acts, nothing in that precept can be
presented, which would not impinge on the justice of God, and
make God the author of sin.
A comparison of all these things will show that Shimei, not
so much as God, was the author of that malediction. Shimei
was alone the author of the volition, yet it is rather to be
attributed to God, as He effected that which He willed, not
by moving Shimei to the malediction, but by procuring for
Shimei the opportunity to curse David, and the confidence to
use that opportunity. From this, it appears, most plainly,
that God is without blame, and Shimei is involved in guilt.
The passages -- Jer. xxxiv, 22, and Sam. iii, 37 -- will be
explained similarly, and will present no difficulty. From an
examination of these, it will appear that they have no
reference to the fall of Adam, -- which was the beginning of
sin; and all other evils have place, sin having now entered
into the world, and men having become depraved by sin.
We proceed to your second argument, that "God voluntarily
permits sin" is certain, and it is equally certain that "the
will to permit is the will not to prevent." But pause here.
The will to permit or not to prevent, is not the same with
"the will not to bestow grace." For He permits that person to
fall, to whom he has given grace sufficient and necessary to
enable him to stand. Let us proceed. You say that "He, who
does not will to prevent sin, which he foreknows will happen,
by confirming grace when he can do it, in fact wills that the
same should happen." But I deny that the volition of sin can
be deduced from the nolition of preventing or hindering. For
there are three things distinct from each other, no one of
which includes another -- "to will that sin should not be
committed," that is, to will its prevention; "to will that it
should occur or be committed," that is, to will its
commission; and "to will to prevent or not to prevent it,"
that is, to will its permission or non-prevention. The former
two are affirmative acts, the last one a negative act. But an
affirmative act can not be deduced from a negative for there
is more in an affirmative than in a negative act, and there
can not be more in a conclusion than in the premises.
Further, I say that your argument, on this point, is
fallacious. For God wills to permit sin in one respect, and
to hinder it in another -- to hinder it so far as would be
appropriate, which hindrance is not followed of certainty, by
the omission of sin, and to not to hinder it, in another
mode, which hindrance would, indeed, be followed by the
omission of sin, yet without any virtue or praiseworthiness
in him who omits it, as he can not do otherwise than omit it
on account of that hindrance. But I may be allowed to argue,
in opposition to such a view, that He, who hates sin and by
the enactment of law and the bestowment of sufficient grace
wishes to hinder, wills, not that sin should happen, but that
sin should not happen, which is an affirmative act of the
will. You will say that this is a correct conclusion, the
will being understood as that "of approval." I answer that
God can not, by any mode of volition, will things which are
contradictory. But "to happen" and "not to happen" are
contradictory. Therefore, it can not be that God, by one mode
of volition should will that an event should happen, and, by
another mode of volition, should will that it should not
happen. It may indeed be true that God, in His will "of good
pleasure" as they style it, purposes to permit that which, in
His will "of approval" or "that which is revealed", He wills
should not be done. Thus your conclusion is faulty, and the
remarks of Calvin and Beza, let it be said with due respect
to so eminent men, are hardly consistent with the truth. But
examine, I pray you, your subjoined statements, and you will
see and acknowledge that you put them on paper, when you did
not observe what you said. You say that "Whatever God does
not hinder, He does not hinder it, either because He wills it
to be done, or because He is altogether unwilling that it
should be done, or because He does not will that it should be
done." What is the difference between the latter two reasons?
"To be unwilling that any thing should be done" is "not to
will that any thing should be done;" the modifying word
"altogether" is of no effect, since, in things opposed to
each other, the negative can not receive any increase, as,
for instance, in the phrase "not a man;" a wolf is as much
"not a man" as is the earth, the air, the sky; but perhaps by
the expression -- "He is altogether unwilling that it should
be done" you mean "He wills that it should not be done," or
"because His will does not act." If the first be true, my
view is correct. But the second can not be true, for it is
absurd to say "God does not will to prevent any thing because
He wills that it should not be done." You ought not, in that
enumeration of reasons, to have introduced such a statement;
for "not to will to prevent," and "to will that a thing
should not be done" are opposites and from this it is certain
that one can not be the cause of the other. In the
investigation and distribution of causes, it is neither usual
nor proper to introduce that which is the opposite of an
effect. But let that pass.
You will say then, "that 'not to hinder' must be on account
of one of those three causes." I grant it. "But it is not
'because His will does not act,' which is Epicureanism, nor
'because He does not will that it should be done,' therefore,
it is, 'because He wills that it should be done.'" I deny the
antecedent. For this is the reason that God does not hinder
an event, because He neither wills that it should occur, nor
wills that it should not occur, as will be more clearly
evident, if you consider the matter in this light. That,
which God wills to be done, He efficaciously brings to pass.
That, which He wills not to be done, he efficaciously
hinders. That, which he neither wills to be done, nor wills
not to be done, He leaves to the creature. How is it possible
that the human mind should conceive that God does not
prevent, that is, permits any thing, because He wills that it
should be done. Indeed the expression "He wills that it
should be done" has too much comprehensiveness to admit that
permission or non-hindrance should be deduced or concluded
from it.
Your objection to this argument, namely, that, from it the
conclusion is drawn that "such things are done, either
through the ignorance or through the negligence of the Deity,
is absurd; you can not defend it, even against yourself. For
you have already made a distinction between "not to will" and
"not to care that a thing should be done." Therefore, you can
not deduce one from the other. How, also, can it be asserted
that a thing is done without the knowledge of God, which is
done by the permission of God, and by His will, the agent of
that permission. But, it will hereafter appear, when we shall
have explained, more largely, in reference to that
permission, that what God permits, He does not permit without
knowledge or care. It is, however, to be understood that
permission is an affirmative volition, and not one that is
merely negative. For God wills His own permission by an
affirmative act. But in reference to the thing, which He
permits, the act of His will is a negative act.
Far be it from any one to think that any decree of God is
contrary to justice or equity. If God has decreed any thing,
it is certain that He has justly decreed it. But it is to be
considered whether, and how God has decreed it. It is not
possible that any of His decrees should be at variance with
His justice, as revealed to us in the Scriptures; it is,
then, to be understood that it is not sufficient, in order to
remove a charge from a decree which we ascribe to God, to add
-- "He has decreed it but justly;" for the addition of that
phrase does not make the decree just, but it must be shown
that the decree, which we attribute to God, really belongs to
Him, and there will, then, be no question concerning its
justice. Your third argument is weak. For, from the event of
any thing, it can not be concluded that God willed that it
should happen, but that He willed not to prevent it; and this
volition, not to prevent, is also an act of the providence of
God, which is present to all things and to each, and presides
over them, either by effecting them, or by permitting them;
yet administering and ordaining all things for just and
legitimate ends, and in such a way as to "regard, not only
the events of things, but also their commencements, and the
principles of things and actions." It is known, indeed, that
Satan and the wicked can not only not perfect any thing, but
can not even begin it, except by the permission of the Deity.
That which you add, "by His will," I do not concede, until
you shall prove it by a greater weight of arguments than you
have yet adduced. You say truly -- "It is impious to affirm
that any thing exists or is done, unless the holy and just
God has decreed it from eternity, and indeed willed either to
do or to permit it." For the decree of God is two-fold,
efficacious and permissive. Neither can take the place of, or
intrude upon the other. Let us consider also your fourth
argument -- "The decision of the ancient church." Augustine,
manifestly makes a distinction between permission and
efficiency. And although he says that "nothing is done unless
God wills it to be done" he yet explains himself when he says
"either by permitting it to be done, or by doing it Himself:"
and thus, that which He permits is not an immediate object of
the will, but permission is the immediate object, while that,
which God permits, is the object of permission. So, also, the
statements of Tertullian, Jerome and others, are to be
explained, that they may not impinge on the Scriptures, which
declares absolutely "Thou art not a God which hath pleasure
in wickedness" (Psalm v, 4.) Hence, if I may be permitted to
speak freely, I shall affirm that I should prefer that
Augustine, Jerome, Catharinus and all others had abstained
from phrases of this kind, which are not contained in the
Scriptures, and which need lengthened explanation, that they
may not be made the occasion of heresy and blasphemy.
That second distinction, according to which God is said "to
will that evil may be, and yet not to will evil," has no
force. For God hates evil, and hates the existence of evil;
and since evil exists in action, its being done is its being,
and its being is its nature. Through there may be a subtle
distinction between the essence and the existence of evil, it
can not be said that there is so much difference between them
that God wills that sin should exist, but does not will sin
itself; For since God hates the essence of evil, if I may so
speak for the sake of form, He, therefore, forbids that evil
should be done, and the reason that He is unwilling that sin
should exist, is the fact that He hates sin itself. But He
does not hate the existence of evil, or evil itself, so much
that He may not permit evil to be done by a free agent, not
because it is better that evil should be, than that they
should not be, but because it is better first, that He should
permit His rational and free creatures to act according to
their own will and freedom, in which consists the trial of
their obedience, than that, contrary to His own original
arrangement, He should take away that freedom from the
creature, or even prevent its exercise; secondly, that He
should bring good out of evil, rather than not permit evil to
be. But the idea that God wills that evil should exist not as
such, but as the means of good, needs a more extended
explanation, which by the will of God, we will hereafter
present.
The first objection to which you refer is of great weight.
For the will is said to be evil in view of an evil volition
and that volition is said to be evil, which is directed to an
object to which it ought not to be directed. But evil is an
object to which it ought not to be directed. Therefore that
volition is evil, by which any one wills evil, and by which
he wills that evil should be done. For there is a verbal
distinction, but a real agreement between those ideas. Hence,
also, "it belongs to an evil will to will that evils should
be done, whether that will delights in the evils, or wills to
use them for a good purpose." It is not right that any one
should will that evil should be done, that he may have an
opportunity of using that evil to a good end. The rule, which
you cite is correct, -- "Evil is not to be done," or even
willed "that good may come." The first wickedness exists in
the will or the volition of evil, the second in its
perpetration.
Your answer does not remove the difficulty stated in this
objection. Of what importance are those "two principles?"
Even if their correctness is conceded, the objection is still
valid. For, in reference to the first; -- As there is no evil
in the nature of things, the will can not be directed to
evil, per se, and it pertains to universal will, and not only
to that, but to universal desire and appetite to tend to
good, per se. The evil consists in this, not that the will is
directed to evil, but that it is directed towards an undue
good, or in reference to an undue mode and end. As to the
second; -- It is true that "there is no evil which has no
good joined with it." There is no supreme evil there is no
evil except in that which is good. It does not, however,
follow that it is good that sin should happen. For sin is so
great an evil that it ought to be avoided, even if it have
some good united with it: The act of fornication has this
good, it is the sexual intercourse, natural to man and woman,
yet it is to be avoided, because it can not be committed
without sin. But the good to which you seem to refer, is not
united to sin except incidentally, that is, by the
intervention of the Divine will, directing that evil to a
good end.
The remark of Augustine, if understood strictly, can not be
admitted, but, with suitable explanation, it may be
tolerated. It is not true that "it is good that evils should
exist." For God effects every good. Then it would follow,
according to the remark, that He effects the existence of
evils. This is at variance with another statement of
Augustine, in which he says -- "God does some things, but
permits other things to be done, as in the case of sin." How
can it be said, without a contradiction in terms, of God --
"He causes that evils should exist, and permits evils to
exist?" The reason, subjoined, does not prove this. For
Almighty God does not, therefore, permit evil, because it is
good that evil should exist, but because He knows that, in
His own wisdom and omnipotence, He can educe good from the
evil, contrary to its nature and proper efficacy, and this of
His own pure act, either by way of just punishment or
gracious remission. It is not good that evil should exist
unless incidentally, namely, on account of the wisdom,
omnipotence and will of God. But that, which is incidental,
is not under consideration.
But let us, now, look at your answer. You say that "sin,
considered universally in its causes and circumstances,
assumes a two-fold respect or formality." In the first place,
you say that "sin is considered not under the relation of
sin, but as far as it has the relation of good in the mind of
God, decreeing it." But I deny that sin has the relation of
good in the mind of God decreeing it. For the acts of God, in
reference to sin, altogether declare that sin is considered
by God not in the relation of good, but in that of evil. For
He permits sin, but effects good: He punishes sin, but He
punishes that which is evil, and as it is evil. He remits sin
and pardons it; but that which is pardoned is considered as
an evil by him that pardons it. But God decrees the
permission of sin because He knows that He can produce good
results from sin, not in that sin is good, but in that it is
evil. Nor is it rightly said -- "sin has the relation of good
in the mind of God, who decrees it, because God knows how to
make sin an opportunity of good acts;" for He does not
produce those acts except with the consideration of sin as
sin. It is wonderful, also, that any consideration can be
affixed to sin, which is contrary to its definition. The
definition of sin is a transgression of the law, and,
therefore, it is a violation of the Divine will. Hence it is,
also, evident that it is incorrectly said that "sin has the
relation of good, because it exists in that which is good,
and because it tends to that which is good." For "good" is
affirmed of a subject, in which sin exists as a deforming
vice and as corrupting, not of sin existing in that subject.
But how far God wills the subject, in which sin exists, that
is, the act which can not be performed by a man without sin,
we will perhaps discuss, more largely, hereafter, when we
shall speak of permission in general. Sin likewise tends to
good not per se, but incidentally only, because God ordains,
not that it should be done, but that, having been done, it
should result in good, and makes, from it, an occasion for
good. God is not said -- to will that sin should occur, so
far as in His wonderful wisdom He knows how to elicit good
from it, but He so far wills to permit and not to hinder it.
For this is the reason that He permits and does not will to
hinder, not that He wills that sin should occur.
You affirm, in the second place, that another relation of sin
is "that, in which it is considered formally and properly,
that is, as sin." Here, also, you adduce a two-fold
consideration of sin, either as it is sin in respect to men,
or as it is sin to God. But if you will listen to me, those
are vain and frivolous distinctions, and invented, not to
explain the matter, but to involve it more deeply. "In
respect to men," you say, "God does not will, or approve, or
effect sin, but wills as to its event, not absolutely, as in
the case of those things which are good in themselves, but
only by willing to permit that sin should be committed." Be
it so, and this, if rightly understood, can be tolerated. I
will not examine what you say in reference to a three-fold
action of the divine will, since it has no bearing at all on
the subject, at least against the sentiment which I defend.
What you say in the margin is true -- "God wills that sin
should happen, so far as it is possible that it should happen
without the efficiency of God." I wish that you had discussed
this subject more fully, and it would, indeed, have been
evident that you have, thus far, not rightly, set forth the
mode in which God wills that sin should happen. You so set it
forth as not to acquit God of the efficiency of sin. You say
that "sin, as such to God, is neither willed, nor approved,
nor affected, nor indeed permitted by Him." I concede the
first three, but deny the last, for the proper object of the
divine permission is evil, as it is evil, and indeed
considered by God as evil; though the reason of His
permission of sin, is not the evil itself. A distinction is
to be made between the object of permission and its cause. We
have already demonstrated that He permits evil as evil. But
you have not rightly stated the cause or reason why God
permits evil, for He does not permit evil on account of a
conjoined good, but because He can elicit good from evil,
which good can not, on that account, be said to be conjoined
to sin, because it is elicited from sin only by the action of
God. But if you understand the phrase "conjoined good" to
imply -- not in the nature of sin itself, but in the act of
God, I do not oppose you. The words of Beza, which you quote,
will not bear a rigorous examination. The former is either
false, or equivocal; false, if understood of the permission,
of which we now treat, which is opposed not to legal
prohibition, but to efficacious prevention. It is true that
God by law prohibits sin as sin, and yet permits, that is,
does not hinder the same sin as sin. But if it refers to the
permission, which is the opposite of the prohibition, made by
law, the discussion is equivocal, for we are not treating of
that permission. For who does not know that God can not, at
the same time, strictly require and not strictly require the
same thing by law. Permission has likewise been previously
defined or described by yourself as "the denial of confirming
grace" not indeed as "the non-imposition of a law." The
second statement of Beza is simply false. For punishments of
sins are not permitted by the Deity, but are inflicted by a
just judge, and have God himself for their author. "Shall
there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it?"
(Amos iii, 6). Also, of what sin, I pray, was the first sin
the punishment? Yet it was permitted. Therefore, it was not a
punishment.
The remarks of Calvin, must be understood according to the
interpretation already presented by us, otherwise they can
not be defended. But, as it was his aim to overthrow the
doctrine of the School-men on this subject, it ought not to
be said by one, who has undertaken to defend his views, that
"the School-men speak correctly when they do not disjoin the
will from permission." This you say; they, however, state
that there is this distinction between the two, -- that
permission is the immediate object of the will, but sin is
the object of permission. All the School-men openly
acknowledge that what God permits, He voluntarily permits.
Nor is the blasphemy of the Manichees to be charged upon
Calvin, because though he sometimes uses unsuitable
phraseology, he elsewhere clearly defends himself and his
doctrine from that accusation.
The second objection, noticed by you, is this, -- "God wills
contraries, if He wills that to happen, which He, in His law,
prohibits." This is, indeed, a valid objection, and your
answer does not remove it. For "to will anything to happen,"
and "to will the same thing not to happen," do not differ "in
respects" only, but "absolutely and in their whole essence."
Nor is there any respect or mode, according to which God can
be said to will that anything should happen, and at the same
time to will that it should not happen. For the divine will
can not be engaged in contrary acts about one and the same
object, in whatever respects it may be considered. Nor can
one and the same act of the divine will be engaged on two
contrary objects, such as "to happen" and "not to happen," in
whatever respects those objects may be considered. "God
prohibits evil as evil," but He permits the same, not as it
puts on the relation of good, for it is false that sin ever
puts on the relation of good, but because God knows how, from
it, to elicit and produce good. The remark of Thomas Aquinas
does not favour your view, and is not opposed to mine.
The third objection you have formed at your own pleasure,
that you might be able more easily to overthrow it. For a
boy, possessed of very little skill in Dialectics, knows that
there is a great difference between the cause consequentiœ
and the cause consequentis. The cause, indeed, can be
inferred from the effect. And therefore you, properly, affirm
that the Major of the syllogism, contained in the objection,
"is not general." But your correction, added to that Major,
has no effect as to its truth. For it is not true that "if no
middle cause intervenes between the antecedent, on the
existence of which the consequent follows, and that
consequent, then the antecedent is the cause of the
consequent." Nor does the antecedent, therefore, cease to be
the cause of the consequent, even if a middle cause
intervenes. For Satan was the cause of the eating of the
forbidden fruit, even if man was its proximate and immediate
cause. By this, the force of your reply is weakened. If you
can show that these two things are mutually consistent, that
God can will that sin should happen, and that man still sins
of his own free will, you have gained your case. I indeed
admit that man can sin certainly, and yet freely; but to sin
certainly is not the same as to sin necessarily. For the word
"certainly" is used in respect to the divine prescience; but
"necessarily" in respect to the decree of God, and the divine
will, by which He wills that sin should happen. Hence, also,
you incorrectly attribute certainty to the decree of God,
when, you ought to attribute it to His prescience, and
necessity to His decree. You also, afterwards, yourself
acknowledge that God is the author of the sin of man, that
is, by a desertion of him, and by the non-bestowment of the
aid necessary for the avoidance of sins, from which it
follows that man necessarily sinned. For he, who makes a law,
and does not bestow the aid which is necessary for the
fulfillment of the law, is the cause of the transgression of
his own law.
You say, that "in this desertion, the will of man comes in,
since he is not deserted, unless he wills to be deserted." I
answer, that, if it is so, then the man deserved to be
deserted. I ask, however, whether the man could will not to
be deserted. If you say that he could, then he did not sin
necessarily, but freely. If, on the other hand, you say that
he could not, then the fault falls back upon God not less
than before, because God is the cause of that volition, by
which the man willed to be deserted, since He did not bestow
the necessary grace, by which the man could will not to be
deserted, and nothing can be conceived, which may intervene
between this desertion on the part of God, and the volition
of man, by which he willed to be deserted.
Your second answer to this objection is of no greater
advantage to you; indeed you twice admit that God, by His own
decree, by which He willed that sin should happen, is the
cause of sin. First, you say that "sin is the mere consequent
of the decree;" whence it follows that the decree is the
cause of sin, unless you present some other relation in which
sin may be the consequent of the divine decree, which you are
wholly unable to do. You say that "the decree of God is, in
such a manner, the antecedent of human sin, that it has no
relation of cause, except that of deficiency. But I affirm
that, in the use of this second argument, you are convicted
of making God the author of sin. If that, which was deficient
through the influence of the cause, was necessary to the
avoidance of sin, then certainly God, by the deficiency of
the operation, which was necessary to the avoidance of sin,
is the cause of sin; unless you teach that man had previously
deserved this deficiency of the divine operation. The words
of Augustine do not sustain your opinion. For he only means
that sin, which is committed contrary to the precept of God,
is not committed when He is unwilling that it shall be
committed, and absolutely wills that it shall not be
committed, but when He permits it, and by a voluntary
permission. You refer to another objection. "The decree of
God is the energetic principle of all things, according to
your sentiment; therefore, also, it is the principle of sin."
You acknowledge and teach that the antecedent is true. First,
by the authority of the Scripture, and cite the first chapter
to the Ephesians, but in a sense different from that of the
Holy Spirit. For all those passages, in that chapter, refer
to salutary gifts and effects which God, in His Son, and by
the Holy Ghost, works in the elect, as is also proved by the
word "good-pleasure." Secondly, by a reason, which is a sound
one; for God is the cause of all beings and acts; yet it is
to be suitably explained how He produces all acts. You deny
the consequence, because sin is a "defect of being -- not a
real being, but only a being of the reason." It is necessary
to explain, more fully, in what sense sin is a "defect"
rather than "a real being." Sin is a being of the reason,
because it not only has its subsistence in the mind, but also
has its origin from the mind, and was produced by the mind,
that it might serve to obtain for it the knowledge of things
-- of good and evil. But a defect, even if it has no
substance or fixed form, yet exists in the subject, from
which the habitude of sin proceeds, and so affects the
subject that it is perceived by it; and it is not understood
by the mind, except in relation to its own habits, by which
its limits are also determined. From which it is apparent,
that sins are not purely beings of the reasons. You allow,
indeed, that sin is not a being of the reason, when you say
"it follows and exists, immediately and surely, from the
removal of original righteousness." But though sin is, not a
positive being, but a defect, yet if God is the energetic
cause of that act, which can not be committed by man without
sin, then He is also the energetic cause of sin. You admit
this, when you say that "God is the energetic cause of all
acts." You, then, do and must admit the consequent; unless
you show in what way it can be effected that a man should
freely perform the act, which, in respect to himself is sin,
if the same act is produced by the energetic decree of God,
which no one can resist. But more on this subject hereafter.
Finally, it is objected to your sentiment that it teaches
that "God inclines to sin and positively hardens." I admit
that this objection is made, and not without cause. It has
never happened to me to see an answer, which frees the
doctrine, which you advocate from that objection and charge.
You answer, that you "do not approve of a permission,
separate from the will." Who does approve of such a
permission? Who has ever denied that what God permits, He
voluntarily permits? You say -- "I do not attribute to God
positive or physical action, as if He would infuse corruption
and wickedness into a man." I wish, however, that you would
explain how sin is committed, "necessarily in respect to the
Divine decree," apart from any physical action of the Deity -
- whether that physical action be positive or negative --
and, indeed, if you please, apart from positive action. You
resolve that act, which is not performed without sin, into a
first cause, in such a manner as, also, of necessity, to make
God the positive cause of sin. But it is not necessary that
He should infuse wickedness or corruption to such a degree
that physical, or positive action can be attributed to Him;
it is sufficient, if He moves, if He impels to the act, if He
limits the liberty of the man, so that He can not but will
and do that, which has been prohibited. You admit that "God
effectively hardens;" which, indeed, I do not deny, but it is
necessary that there should be an explanation, such that God
may not, in any way, be made the author of sin. This we shall
hereafter see.
I do not disapprove of the threefold action of Divine
Providence in reference to human acts, referred to by Suidas.
But consider whether that "action, which is according to the
good-pleasure, by which God wills, approves, effects, and is
delighted in any thing," is referred to in a sense different
from that, in which you always use the word good-pleasure.
For you have before said, on the authority of Ephesians 1,
that "God does all things according to the good-pleasure of
His own will;" of which passage, relying on its true
interpretation, which you here present from Suidas, I have
deprived you.
In reference to "the second action of Divine Providence,
which is that of arrangement, or that of sustentation and
preservation," I would have you consider whether it is so
much the preservation and sustentation of motions, actions,
and passions as of existence and faculties. For since the
existence of things, and the faculties existing in them are
the first acts, and motions, actions, and passions, resulting
from them are the second acts, or from second acts, it seems,
indeed, that an act of Divine Providence presides over the
latter, different from that which presides over the former,
It is true, indeed, that God sustains sinful nature. But it
should be carefully explained how far and in what way God
concurs with the creature in the performance of an action;
but whatever explanation of that matter may be made, there
must always be caution that a concurrence, with a second
cause, may never be attributed to the first cause, such that
the cause of evil can be rightly ascribed to the latter. You
say -- "the will can do nothing alone, yet it can act in an
evil manner," and illustrate it by simile. Let us see how far
it is appropriate. It is especially to be considered that it
is applicable to a man, in an unfallen state, because "his
pipe is not disjointed;" therefore that simile is not to be
applied to his primitive state. Again, -- in "lameness," two
things are to be considered, namely, walking or motion, and
lameness, which is irregularity of motion." You compare
walking with the act, and lameness with the irregularity of
the act, in which the relation of sin properly consists. But
those two things are not present in every act which is evil.
For instance, the eating of the forbidden fruit, in which it
is not allowable to distinguish between the act and its
sinfulness. For the act itself ought not to have been
performed, and the relation of sin consists, not in the fact
that he performed the act of eating in a mode, in which it
ought not to have been performed, but in that he performed it
at all. That illustration would have place in acts, good in
themselves, but performed in a way, in which they ought not
to be performed. Thus he, who gives aims, "that he may be
seen of men," performs a good act, but in an improper manner,
-- he walks, but is lame. Hence it follows that no one can be
impelled to an act, the commission of which is a
transgression of the law, without sin, and blame in the
impeller and mover. You, also, see from this how cautiously
the mode, in which God is said to be the cause of an act, but
not of the sin existing in the act, is to be explained. You
say that "the third action of Divine Providence is of
concession, that of acquiescence or permission, by which God
blamelessly effects certain things, in the evil deeds of
men." It is not doubtful that this may be truly said of the
Deity.
In this third action, you make also another three-fold
division. You say that the first is "permission," but you
explained it in such a manner, that it could not be adapted
to Adam, in his original state, but to those only who have
sinned, and, by their sins, deserved to be left by God to
themselves, and given "over to a reprobate mind." For "God
did not loose the reins upon Adam. He did not remove the
impediments of sinning. He did not free him, previously
bound, with cords." I have nothing at all against "the second
action" and its explanation, if it be applied to sinners; yet
I think that some things, highly necessary, might be added to
it.
You do not seem to me to explain, with sufficient
distinctness, "ordination," which is the third action. For
the word is used in a two-fold sense -- that of decreeing and
determining that something shall be done, and that of
establishing an order in that which is done, and of disposing
and determining to a suitable end, things which are done.
This equivocal use of the word should have been avoided, and
the different significations of the word should not be
confounded, as you do, in the same discussion, when you say
that "God ordains sin as to its cause and principles," in
which case, the word "ordain" is used, in its first
signification: again -- "He ordains the same thing as to its
result and purposes," in which case, it is used in the second
signification. The explanation, which you add, from the case
of Satan, is only in reference to the ordination, as to the
end and the result. If there is not a suitable explanation of
the mode in which "God ordains, as to its causes and
principles, an act, which can not be done by a man without
sin" -- I prefer to use this phraseology rather than the word
sin -- the cause and blame of sin will, by an easy
transition, be charged upon God.
The words of Clemens Alexandrinus can only be understood of
an ordination to an end, and I wish that you and all our
writers would persist in the use of such language. For it is
correct, and explains the action of God, who effects His own
work by the evil deeds of wicked persons. In the words of
Augustine, "there is the most manifest difference between "to
make" and "to ordain," and the word ordain is used in its
second signification, that of disposing and determining
wills, evil by their own fault, to these and those purposes
and to certain actions. But those words of Augustine, "God
works in the hearts of men, inclining their wills
whithersoever He pleases, even to evil things, according to
their demerits," are to be suitably explained, so as not to
impinge upon what follows; that "God does not make the wills
evil." He, therefore, inclines evil wills to evil things,
that is, so that they expend their wickedness upon one
object, rather than upon another. If he is said to impel any
one to will that which is evil, it is to be understood that
He does this by the instrumentality of Satan, and, in such a
way as can be easily reconciled with His justice. Fulgentius
explains the matter most correctly and in a few words. For he
sufficiently acquits Him of sin, when he denies that "God is
the author of evil thoughts." For thoughts are the first
causes in the performance of a work; and he also uses the
word "ordain" in the latter signification, as can be clearly
seen from his subjoined explanation. For he says that "God
works good out of an evil work."
Your third answer denies, and with propriety, that the "Fate
of the Stoics" is introduced by your doctrine, that is, Fate
explained, as the Stoics taught concerning it. But it does
not remove this difficulty, that, on the supposition of that
Divine decree, which you suppose, a necessity is introduced
with which liberty can not be consistent. While, therefore,
the Fate of the Stoics may not be presented in your doctrine,
yet a fate is presented, which places a necessity upon all
things, and takes away freedom. You attempt to explain the
decree of God in a way such as may not, by the divine decree,
take away freedom, though it supposes necessity; to do which
is, in my opinion, wholly impossible. But let us see how you
present the mode of explaining and of disentangling the
matter. First, you distribute that, which is necessary, into
the simply or absolutely necessary, and the hypothetically
necessary. The absolutely necessary -- you correctly say --
"is that which cannot be otherwise, and whose contrary is
impossible," but you do not, in your statement, make any
distinction whether you treat of a thing which is incomplex
and simple, or of a complex being. But let that pass. It is
certain that there is nothing necessary in that sense, but
God, and what pertains to Him. All other things are placed
outside of that necessity. You say "that the necessary, of
hypothesis, is that which can not be otherwise when one, or a
number of things, is supposed." You do not here make a
distinction in the supposition of things, between that, by
which a thing is supposed to be, and that by which a thing is
concluded; which latter necessity is distinguished into that
of the consequent [consequentis], and that of the consequence
[consequentiœ]. The latter is syllogistic, the former is that
of causes, producing effects, or consequents, causes which
neither are necessarily supposed, nor act necessarily as
causes, but if they are supposed, and act as causes, the
effect necessarily exists. For example, God does not,
necessarily, create a world, but if He creates one, then it
exists, necessarily, from that action. You consider that "the
necessary by hypothesis is of nature, of precept, and of
decree." That which is necessary of nature removes freedom
and contingency. So, also, that which is necessary of
precept; for that, which is rendered obligatory by law, is
not left to the freedom of the creature, though, from the
necessity of nature, an act is necessarily produced unless it
be prevented by that which has greater power. But, by the
necessity of precept, the act is not necessarily produced;
there is laid upon the creature a necessity of performing the
act, if it wishes to obey God, and to be accepted by Him. You
badly define necessity of decree, as "that which God has
foreknown and willed either to effect or at least to permit."
For the necessity of prescience, and of the Divine permission
is one thing, and that of efficiency is another. Indeed, we
may allow that there is no necessity of prescience and of
permission, but only of efficiency, or of the divine will.
For, not the prescience of God, but "His will is the
necessity of things," though, the prescience of God being
supposed, it may follow that a thing will be, not from
prescience as an antecedent [causa consequentis],but as
sustaining to prescience the relation of conclusion
[consequentiœ]. We shall hereafter treat of permission, at a
greater length. We remark, also, that what is necessary of
decree, can not at the same time, be called free or
contingent in respect to the will as efficient.
In the second place, you distinguish necessity into that of
coaction, and that of certainty. This is not well, for these
are not opposed, as one and the same thing can be produced,
by the necessity of coaction, and can be certainly foreknown.
Again, they are not of the same genus. For the former belongs
to the will, effecting something, and is prior, in nature, to
the thing effected, while the latter is by prescience, and is
subsequent, in nature, to the thing. The former coincides
with the necessity of consequent, the latter, with that of
the conclusion. Thirdly, there is a necessity which is
nearer, as to relation, cause and genus to the necessity of
coaction, and is the opposite of coaction, and from which, as
its contrary, the necessity of coaction ought to have been
distinguished. It is the necessity of inevitability, which
term, also, indeed, comprehends the idea of coaction, but an
unnamed species may be called by the name of its genus.
That this may be more clearly understood, I explain myself
thus: The necessity of inevitability is two-fold, one
introducing force, in things purely natural, when it is
called violence, and in things voluntary, when it is called
coaction; the other, inwardly moving a thing, whether it be
nature or will, so smoothly and gently, that it cannot but be
inclined in that direction, and will that to which it is
moved. Yet I admit that the will is not carried or moved,
according to the mode of the will, but according to the mode
of nature, as, by the act of moving, freedom is taken away,
but not spontaneous assent, while both are taken away by the
act of impelling. I pass over your definition of coaction.
That of certainty does not please me; for, in that
definition, you conjoin things, which do not belong together.
For a thing is said to happen certainly in respect to
prescience, but immutably in respect to the thing itself; and
immutability does not correspond with certainty. For
certainty is attributed to prescience, which can not be
deceived on account of the infinity of the divine nature and
wisdom. You should, then, expunge that word "immutably" from
your argument. For that which can either happen or not
happen, can not be done immutably, yet it can surely be
foreknown by Him who foreknows with certainty, all things
even those which are contingent. But you rightly add an axiom
to the certainty of necessity; "Every thing which is, so far
as it is, is necessary." Thus far, the distinctions of
necessity. You will now show how they mutually correspond.
"All relations of effects are to their own causes," but
either to separate causes, or to concurrent causes, and to
joint causes, and to causes which act at the same time. If
they are to separate causes, the effects are named from the
mode, in which those effects exist from their causes. If
necessarily, they are called necessary effects, if
contingently, they are called contingent. But if many causes
concur to produce one effect, that effect has relation to,
and connection with, each of its causes, but does not receive
its name, except from the mode, in which it exists and is
produced from those united causes; if that mode is necessary,
the effect is called necessary; if that mode is contingent,
it is called contingent. It can not, however, be that one and
the same effect should exist in part contingently, and in
part necessarily, in any respect whatever. It is, indeed,
true that, if that which is called a second cause, operates
alone and of its own will, the thing might be called
contingent; but, since the first cause moves the second, so
that it can not but be moved, the whole effect is said to be
necessary, since it can not be that the effect should not be
produced, when those first and second causes are in
operation.
The position that "the freedom of second causes is not taken
away by that necessity," is, here, of no importance; as also
your opinion that "an effect can be called free and
contingent in respect to a certain cause, which is said to be
necessary in respect to the first cause." For it is absurd to
wish to harmonize freedom with necessity, and the latter with
the former. All necessity, indeed, is at variance with
freedom, and not the necessity of coaction alone. This is so
true, that even any degree of vehemence can not be successful
in weakening its truth. I grant that it is true, that "the
decree of God ordains second causes, and, among them, the
freedom of human will," but, in such a manner that freedom is
not taken away by that "ordination:" but freedom is taken
away, when God, either by coaction (which cannot be, both on
account of the divine omnipotence, and on account of the
nature of the will), or, by an easy and gentle influence, so
moves the will, that it can not but be moved.
You seem to me not to discriminate between a free movement
and one which is spontaneous. A spontaneous movement is so
different from one that is free, that the former may coincide
with a natural and internal necessity, but the latter can by
no means do so. For a man spontaneously wishes to be happy,
and not freely. Beasts are spontaneously borne towards those
things, which are good for them, by natural instinct, but no
liberty can be attributed to them.
From these considerations, it is apparent that it can, in no
manner, be said that "Adam fell necessarily and at the same
time freely," unless you introduce the necessity of
certainty, which belongs, not to the fall, but to the
prescience of God, on account of His infinity. But freedom is
taken away, if a decree of God is supposed, since "Adam could
not resist the will, that is, the decree of God." Your answer
that "as he could not, so he also would not," is refuted by
the consideration that he could not will otherwise. This you
confess to be true "as to the event," but not true "as to his
power." But it is not the subject of disputation, whether the
will of Adam was deprived of the power, which is called
freedom, which was not necessary to induce the necessity of
the fall, but whether the event itself, that is, the fall,
occurred necessarily. When you admit this, you must admit
also that he did not fall freely. For that power was limited
and determined as to the act and event, so that, in the act,
he could not will otherwise; else the decree of God was made
in vain. Here, also, you unskillfully use spontaneous motion
for free motion..
To elucidate the subject, you "distinguish three periods, --
previous, present, and future to the fall." But the present
and the future are of no importance to this discussion. For
the fall can not have any necessity from present and future
time. Previous time only serves our purpose. You say that a
at the present moment, the fall was necessary, in a two-fold
respect." First, -- "on account of the prescience of God."
But prescience is not a cause of necessity, nor can anything
be said to be done infallibly, on account of prescience, but
prescience is the cause, that a thing "which will occur,
contingently, at its own time," is certainly foreknown by
God. Secondly; -- "on account of the permissive decree of
God." But permission can not be a cause of immutability or of
necessity. For it is a negative act, not a prohibition; and
from it an affirmative necessity can not exist.
The words of honourius, and Hugo do not aid you, for they
treat of something wholly different, and they are not
reliable authorities. But the reason, which you present, is
partly fallacious, partly of no force. The fallacy, a petitio
principii, consists in this sentence, "because an evil, which
is permitted, can not but happen." The reason is of no force,
when you say "because it can not happen otherwise than God
decreed." It does not follow, from this, that it therefore
happens necessarily; since, though evil can not happen
otherwise than God permits it, yet that permission does not
impose a necessity upon the event or sin. For the divine
determination is not in reference to sin, that is, shall be
committed, but in reference to the same thing, which is about
to take place of its own causes, that is, shall not extend
further than seems good to God. I do not accede to your
definition of "permission" that "it is a negative of that
grace, -- which is sufficient for the avoidance of sin." For,
as has often been said, this is not to permit a man to sin
freely, but to effect that he should sin necessarily. I wish
also that you had explained, in what way "the necessity of
the divine decree, by which He determined that Adam should
sin, was evitable in respect to the freedom of the human
will, when it was inevitable in respect to the event." I pass
over the inconsistency of calling necessity evitable.
You do not wish that any one should think that "that
necessity arose from the decree of God." But you have said so
many things, in proof of it, that you now express your
unwillingness in vain. Explain how that necessity follows the
decree, and yet the decree has not the relation of cause, in
respect to that necessity. For the decree is the cause of
necessity, in the relation of consequent, not in that of
consequence. Those are words and phrases, designed to avoid
the force of truth, in which there is no truth, and not even
the semblance of truth. For it will always remain true that
whatever is necessary "of decree" has the cause of its
necessity in and from the decree of God. Is not that
labourious investigation and use of many distinctions a sign
of falsity, when the statement of truth is simple and open?
The assertion that "the predestinate are saved necessarily,
and the reprobate are damned necessarily," is to be correctly
understood. The fact, that any one is predestinate, is at
variance with the fact of damnation, and the fact, that any
one is reprobate, is at variance with the fact of salvation.
But the ability to be saved or damned, is at variance with
neither. For the decree is not in respect to the ability, but
in respect to the fact of salvation or damnation. But those
two acts, which you mention, namely, that of not showing
mercy and that of damning, are subsequent to sin. For mercy
is necessary, only, to the miserable and the sinner, and it
is truly said that "the purpose of damning does not make any
necessity of damnation unless by the intervention of sin,"
but by its intervention, in such a sense, that it is possible
that it should not intervene. If, however, God has decreed to
make and govern men, that he can not but sin, indeed, in
order that He may declare His own righteousness in his
destruction, that purpose introduces a necessity of sin and
of damnation.
It is an absurd assertion that "from prescience that
necessity follows in the same way." For what God foreknows,
He foreknows because it is to take place in the future. But
what He decrees, purposes, and determines in Himself to do,
takes place thus because He decrees it. Also, from prescience
is concluded the certainty of an event, which is a necessity
of the consequence, and from the decree immutability of the
same thing is concluded, which is a necessity of the
consequent.
You make an objection against yourself, -- "They who are
predestinated to death can not, if they will, be freed by
repentance." That objection is not appropriate to this time
and place. But I present you with an objection, that they,
who are predestinated to death, are, also, according to your
doctrine, predestinated to sin; that what God has decreed to
bring upon them, namely, death, He may be able to bring upon
them justly, that is, on account of sin. But indeed, if God
can predestinate to sin, that He may be able to bring death
upon the sinner; He is able also to bring death upon one, who
is not a sinner, because he, who is a sinner in consequence
of the divine predestination, is in fact not a sinner. It is
far worse to predestinate a just man to sin than to
predestinate an innocent man to death. Of this we have also,
previously, spoken.
Your effort to charge the same necessity on the opinion
"which supposes a permission of evil" is futile. I refer,
here, to "permission," when rightly explained, and understood
according to its own nature. But you describe permission in
such a manner, as really to amount to an act of efficiency.
For if "to permit is to will not to hinder," which it is in
fact, and "the will not to hinder is such, that, without that
hindrance, sin can not be avoided," as you assert, then, "to
will not to hinder sin" is to effect sin, by a negation of
the necessary hindrance.
Thus evil also necessarily exists from that permission, but
by no means freely on the part of man. From which, it is
clearly evident that the decree of God is not more evitable
than a permission of the kind, which you have described. But,
unless the distinction of the decree of God into energetic or
efficacious and permissive is without foundation, -- as it
certainly is not -- then it is necessary that permission
should be described so as not to coincide with energetic
decree.
The charge of holding the Stoic and Manichean doctrine, which
is made by some against you, is not made by them with the
idea that your opinions entirely agree with that doctrine,
but that you agree with it in this, that you say that all
things are done necessarily. You ought to remove this charge
from yourself, and free your doctrine from this accusation.
You unite contrary things together when you say that "a man
can not abstain from sinning, and yet he sins not
necessarily, but freely." Nor is it sufficient to constitute
freedom of the will, that it "be capable of being turned in
opposite directions, and to choose spontaneously," if it
shall be "determined to one directions only, by the Deity:"
For that determination takes away the freedom of the will, or
rather the liberty of volition. For though the will, in other
things not determined by Gods may remain capable of change in
any directions and free, yet the volition is not free, since
it is determined precisely to one of two contraries.
The remark of Anselm presents the same idea as we have,
often, presented, that a distinction is to be made between
the necessity of the consequent, and that of the consequence:
the former precedes, the latter follows the action. But your
necessity of decree precedes the act and does not follow,
while that of Anselm follows it, therefore, they are not the
same. In the remark of Gaudentius there is not even a trace
of the doctrine which you defend.
In your brief recapitulation, you fail, as greatly, of
untying the knot. For it will always remain true that a
denial of grace, necessary to the avoidance of sin, is a
cause of sin, by the mode of the non-bestowment of the
necessary hindrance; and it will, always be false, that he
sins freely and voluntarily, who can not but sin, and that
the will acts freely in that direction, to which it is
determined by the certain and inflexible decree of God. It is
false in the sense that freedom and determination are
mutually opposed in the limits of their action. For the
former has respect to two contraries, the latter to one only.
You present the example of the "angels who obey God both
necessarily and freely," on your own authority, and do not at
all prove what you assert. I assert that these two things are
mutually inconsistent, so that, if you affirm that the angels
obey God freely, I shall say, with confidence, that it is
possible that the angels should not obey God. If, on the
other hand, you affirm that they can not but obey God, I
shall thence boldly infer that they do not obey God freely.
For necessity and freedom differ from each other in their
entire essence, and in genus. And I would dare say, without
blasphemy, that not even God Himself, with all His
omnipotence, can not effect that what is necessary may be
contingent or free, and that what is done necessarily, may be
done freely. It implies a contradiction, that a thing should
not be possible not to be done, and yet be possible not to be
done, and it is a contradiction, opposed to the first and
most general idea, divinely infused into our minds, in
reference to whatever subject the truth is affirmed or
denied. And a thing can not, at the same time, be and not be,
at the same time, be and not be of a given character. For the
fact, that God can not do this, is a mark not of impotence
but of invariable power. The fact that a thing exists,
depends on the actual power of God. If it should happen, at
once and at the same time with the previous fact, that the
same thing should not be, then the actual power of God would
be either overcome, or have an equal power opposed to itself,
so that it would happen that a thing, which is by the power
of God, at the same time, is not. Which is the greatest of
all absurdities.
DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT OF PERMISSION
As frequent mention of the permission of sin has been already
made by us, it will be a work, not useless in itself, and not
displeasing to you, if I shall distinctly set forth what I
consider the true view concerning permission, in general,
according to the Scriptures. You will read, weigh, and judge,
freely and with candour, and if I shall, as to any point,
seem to err, you will recall me to the right way, by serious
and friendly admonition. I will treat, first, of permission
in general, then of the permission of sin.
We know that permission pertains to action, in a generic
sense, from the very form of the word, whether in itself or
by reduction as they say in the schools. For cessation from
act may also be reduced or referred back to the act, but it
has, as its proximate and immediate cause, the will, not
knowledge, not capability, not power, though these, also, may
be requisite in the being, who permits. No one is rightly
said to permit, who does not know what and to whom he
permits, and is not capable of permitting or preventing, and
finally has not the right and authority to permit. If
permission is attributed to any one, who is destitute of that
knowledge, or capability, or power, it is in an unusual and
extended sense, which ought not to have a place in an
accurate discussion of a subject.
The object of permission is both the person to whom anything
is permitted, and the act which is permitted, and, under the
act, I would include, also, cessation from the act. In the
person, to whom anything is permitted, two acts are to be
considered in respect to the person, -- first, strength
sufficient to the performance of an act, unless there is some
hindrance; secondly, an inclination to perform the act, for
apart from this, the permission would be useless. Strength is
necessarily requisite for the performance of an act; even if
this is present, unless the person, to whom an act is
permitted, has an inclination to the act, it is permitted to
no purpose, and in vain. Indeed it can not be said,
correctly, that an act is permitted to any one, who is
influenced by no inclination to the performance of the act.
From this it is apparent that permission must be preceded by
the prescience or the knowledge of the fact that both
sufficient strength and an inclination to perform the act,
exist in him, to whom the permission is granted. The mode of
permission is the suspension of efficiency, which efficiency
is also possible to the being, who permits, either according
to right, or according to capability, or in both respects,
and, when used, would restrain, or in fact prevent the act.
We may, hence, define permission in general, thus; -- It is
the act of the will by which the being, who permits, suspends
any efficiency which is possible to him, which, being used,
would restrain, or, in fact, prevent an act in him to whom
the permission is granted, to the performance of which act
the same person has an inclination and sufficient strength.
These conditions being applied to the Divine permission, by
which He permits an act to a rational creature, the
definition may be thus arranged: -- Divine permission is an
act of the divine will by which God suspends any efficiency
possible to Himself, either by right, or by power, or in both
modes, which efficiency, used by God, would either restrain
or really prevent an act of a rational creature, to the
performance of which act, the same creature has an
inclination and sufficient strength. But, since the will of
God is always directed by His wisdom, and tends to good, that
permission can not but be instituted to a certain end and the
best end. There are two modes or species of permission, as is
manifest in the definition, in which, to efficiency, if used,
either the limitation of an act, or its prevention is
ascribed. For the will of God is considered, in a two-fold
respect, either as He prescribes something to His creatures,
by command or prohibition, or as He wills to do or to prevent
anything. Hence the efficiency, which is under discussion, is
two-fold, on one hand, as the prescription or enactment of a
law by which any act of the creature is restrained, by which
restraint or limitation that act is taken away from the
freedom of the creature, so that he can not, without sin,
perform it, if it is forbidden, or omit it, if it is
commanded; and on the other, as the interposition of an
impediment, by which any act of the creature is prevented.
In the first mode, there was a limit as to the eating of the
forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil,
and as to the love due to a wife, the former by prohibition,
the latter by command. In the second mode, Balaam was
prevented from cursing Israel, Ahaziah from the murder of
Elijah, Sennacherib from the capture of Jerusalem, and
Abimelech from sin with Sarah. But since God, if He pleases,
suspends this efficiency, in both modes, when and where it
seems good to Him, permission is also two-fold; on one hand,
as He does not restrain an act by a law, but leaves it to the
decision and freedom of the creature, whether this may be on
account of the simple nature of the act itself, as in that
expression of the apostle "all things are lawful for me" (l
Cor. vi, 12) or, on account of another forbidden evil, an
example of which may be taken from the "bill of divorcement;"
on the other hand, as He does not, by His own action,
interpose an impediment to an act, -- an impediment, by which
the act may be really prevented, not one, by which it can or
ought to be prevented. Thus He permitted Adam to eat of the
forbidden fruit, and Cain to kill his own brother. Though He
used impediments, by which, each of those acts could, and
ought to have been prevented, yet He did not use impediments,
by which the act, in either case, was prevented. We may be
allowed to divide, also, the latter mode of permission which
is by abstaining from the use of an impediment, which would
prevent the act, according to the difference of the modes in
which God is able, and, indeed, accustomed to prevent an act,
to the performance of which a creature is inclined and
sufficient. I do not wish, however, that such sufficiency
should be ever understood apart from the concurrence of the
first cause. That variety arises from the causes by means of
which a rational creature performs an act. Those causes are
"capability, and will, -- we, here, speak of voluntary acts,
to which the permission, of which we now treat, has reference
-- and, therefore, the impediment is placed either upon the
capability or the will of the creature; that is, God effects
that the creature should be either not able, or not willing
to produce that act. In the former mode He prevented the
entrance of Adam into Paradise, in the latter, He prevented
Joseph from polluting himself with adultery with the wife of
his master.
More particularly, we must consider in how many ways God may
prevent the creature from being able or willing to perform
the act, to which he has an inclination and sufficient
strength, that is, apart from this impediment. We consider
prevention as applied, first to the capability, secondly, to
the will. That the creature may be able to effect any thing,
it is necessary that he should have capability; that no
greater or equal power should act against him; finally, that
he should have an object on which his capability can act.
From this it is evident that an impediment may be placed on
the capability in a four-fold manner; -- first, by the taking
away of being and life which are the foundation of
capability; secondly, by the deprivation or diminution of the
capability itself; thirdly, by the opposition of a greater,
or, at least, an equal power; fourthly, by the removal of the
object; either of which ways is sufficient for prevention. We
will adduce examples of each mode.
In the first mode, the capture of Jerusalem attempted by
Sennacherib, was prevented by the slaughter of "an hundred
four score and five thousand" men, made by one angel (2 Kings
xix, 35, 36). Thus, also, the effort to bring Elijah before
Ahaziah was prevented by the fire, twice consuming fifty men,
who were sent to take him.
In the second mode, Samson was prevented from freeing himself
from the hands of the Philistines, after his hair was cut off
(Judges xvi, 19, 20), the strength of the Spirit, by which he
had formerly been so mighty, having been taken away or
diminished.
In the third mode, Uzziah was prevented from burning incense
to the Lord by the resistance of the priests (2 Chron. xxvi,
18), and the carrying of Lot and the Sodomites into captivity
was prevented by Abram with his servants, attacking the
victorious kings (Gen. xiv, 15, 16).
In the fourth mode, Ahab was prevented from injuring Elijah
(1 Kings xix, 3), and the Jews, who had sworn to slay the
apostle Paul, were prevented from effecting their design
(Acts xxiii, 10). God removed Elijah, and Paul was rescued
from the Jews by the chief captain. Thus, also, Christ often
removed himself out of the hands of those, who wished to take
him; of those, also, who wished to make him a king.
The permission, which is contrary to this prevention, also
subsists by four modes, contrary to those just exemplified,
but united together. For a complete cause is required to the
production of an effect, the absence of a single necessary
cause, or element of the cause, being sufficient to prevent
the effect. Thus it is necessary that, when God permits any
act to the capability of a creature, that creature should be
preserved as it is, and should live; that its capability
should remain adapted to the performance of the act; that no
greater or equal power should be placed in opposition;
finally, that the object, to be operated upon, should be left
to that capability. It appears, from this, that this divine
permission is not inactive, as so many actions of the
providence of God are requisite to that permission, -- the
preservation of being, of life, and the capability of the
creature, the administration and government, by which a
greater or an equal power is opposed to the creature, and the
presentation of the object. We may be allowed, also to adduce
similar examples of permission. Thus God gave His Son into
the power of Pilate and of the Jews. "This is your hour and
the power of darkness" (Luke xxii, 53). Thus He gave Job into
the hands of Satan (Job i, 12), Zachariah into the hands of
his murderers (2 Chron. xxiv, 21), and James into the hands
of Herod (Acts xii, 2). Let us now consider how God may
prevent a creature from a volition to perform an act, to
which he has an inclination and sufficient strength. An
impediment is placed by the Deity, upon the propensity and
the will of a rational creature, in a two-fold mode,
according to which God can act on the will. For He acts on
the will either by the mode of nature, or according to the
mode of the will and its freedom. The action, by which He
affects the will, according to the mode of nature, may be
called physical impulse; that, by which He acts on the same,
according to the mode of the will and its freedom, will be
suitably styled suasion. God acts, therefore, preventively on
the will either by physical impulse or by suasion, that it
may not will that, to which it is inclined by any propensity.
He acts preventively on the will, by physical impulse, when
He acts upon it, by the mode of nature, that, from it may
necessarily result the prevention of an act, to which the
creature is inclined by any propensity. Thus the evil
disposition of the Egyptians towards the Israelites seems, in
the judgment of some, to have been prevented from injuring
them. God acts, preventively, on the will by suasion, when He
persuades the will by any argument, that it may not will to
perform an act, to which it tends by its own inclination, and
to effect which the creature has, or seems to himself to
have, sufficient strength. By this, the will is acted upon
preventively, not of necessity, indeed, but of certainty.
But since God, in the infinity of His own wisdom, foresees
that the mind of the rational creature will be persuaded by
the presentation of that argument, and that, from this
persuasion, a prevention of the act will result, He is under
no necessity of using any other kind of prevention. All the
arguments, by which the reason can be persuaded to the
performance of an act, can be reduced to three classes --
that which is easy and practicable; that which is useful,
pleasant, and delightful; and that which is honest, just and
becoming. Hence, also, God, by a three-fold suasion, prevents
a person from the will to perform any act. For He persuades
the mind that the act is either difficult to be performed, or
even altogether impossible; or useless and unpleasant; or
dishonest, unrighteous and indecorous.
By the argument from the difficult and impossible, the
Pharisees and chief priests were, often, prevented from
laying violent hands on Christ: for they knew that he was
considered a prophet by the multitude, who seemed prepared to
defend him against the efforts of his enemies. The
Israelites, pursuing the king of Moab, when they saw that he
had offered his eldest son, as a burnt offering, and, from
this fact, knew that he was strengthened in his own mind,
departed from him, thinking that they could not take the city
without very great difficulty and much slaughter (2 Kings
iii, 23-27). Sanballat and Tobiah, and the other enemies of
God's people, endeavouring to hinder the building of the
walls of Jerusalem, were prevented from accomplishing their
design, when they heard that their plots were known to
Nehemiah (Neh. iv, 15). For they despaired of effecting any
thing, unless they could take the Jews by surprise. By the
argument from the useless, the soldiers, who crucified
Christ, were prevented from breaking his legs (John xix, 33),
because he was already dead, and it would have been useless
to break his legs, as this was designed, and usually done to
hasten death; and, at this time, the Jews desired that their
bodies should be taken down from the cross before sunset. But
God had declared, "a bone of him shall not be broken" (John
xix, 36). By the same argument -- of inutility -- Pilate was
prevented from releasing Christ. "If thou let this man go,
thou art not Caesar's friend" (John xix, 12). Thus, also,
Pharaoh did not wish to let the people of God go (Exod.
chapters 5, 6 and 7). By the argument from the unrighteous or
dishonest, David was prevented from slaying Saul, when he had
fallen into his hands; "The Lord forbid that I should stretch
forth my hand against the anointed of the Lord" (1 Sam. xxiv,
6).
It is sufficient, for the prevention of an act by the
argument of suasion, that the act should seem to be
impossible, useless, or unrighteous to those, by whom God
wills that it should not be performed, even if it is not so
in reality. Thus the Israelites were prevented from going up
into the promised land, when they learned, from the spies,
the strength of the nations, and the defenses of the cities,
thinking that it would not be possible for them to overcome
them (Num. 13 and 14). Thus David was prevented from
fighting, for the Philistines, against Saul and the
Israelites; for the Philistines said to their king -- "let
him not go down with us to battle, lest, in the battle, he be
an adversary to us" (1 Sam. xxii, 4).
Thus Ahaz was prevented from asking a sign of the Lord, at
the suggestion of Isaiah, the prophet; for he said, "I will
not ask, neither will I tempt the Lord (Isa. vii, 12). To
this last argument pertain the revelations of the Divine
will, whether they are truly such, or are falsely so
esteemed. Thus David was prevented from building the temple
of the Lord, by the Divine prohibition in the mouth of Nathan
(2 Sam. vii, 5 &c.), though he had purposed, in his own mind,
to do this for the glory of God. Thus Laban was prevented
from speaking "to Jacob either good or bad," for, he said,
"it was in the power of my hand to do you hurt" (Gen. xxxi,
29). The king of Babylon being prevented by the oracle of his
own gods, which he consulted, from attacking the Ammonites,
marched against the Jews, whom God wished to punish. Each of
these is not always used separately, from the others, by God
to prevent an act which He wishes should not be performed,
but they are some times presented, two or three together, as
God knows may be expedient, to the prevention of an act which
He wishes to prevent.
We do not, in this place, professedly discuss what that
action is, by which God proposes suasory arguments, designed
to act preventively on the will, to the mind of the creature,
inclined to the act and having strength adequate to its
performance. Yet it is certain, whatever that act may be,
that it is efficacious for prevention, and will certainly
prevent, which efficacy and certainty depends, not so much on
the omnipotence of the divine action as, on the prescience of
God, who knows what arguments, in any condition of things or
at any time, will move the mind of man to that, to which God
desires to incline him, whether on account of His mercy or of
His justice. Yet, in my judgment, it is lawful so to
distinguish that action as to say that, on the one hand, it
is that of the gracious and particular providence of God,
illuminating, by His Holy Spirit, the mind of the man who is
regenerate, and inclining his will, that he may will and not
will that which God purposes that he should will and not
will, and that, indeed, of a pure inclination to obey God; on
the other hand, it is that of more general providence, by
which He acts on men as men, or as only morally good, that
they may not will, and may will, as God purposes that they
should not will and should will, though not with this event
and purpose, that they should, in their nolition or volition,
obey God.
We now deduce, from this, the modes of permission, the
opposite of prevention, which are not to be separated like
those of prevention, but are to be united. For, as a single
argument can act preventively on the will, that it may not
will what God purposes to prevent; so it is necessary that
all those arguments should be absent by which the will would
be persuaded to an act of nolition, otherwise, there would be
no permission. Therefore, the permission, by which God
permits a rational creature to perform an act, to the
performance of which he has inclination and adequate
strength, is the suspension of all those impediments, by
which the will was to have been persuaded, and in fact moved
to a nolition. For it can be that God, being about to permit
an act to the will of the creature, should so administer the
whole matter, that not only some arguments of dissuasion, but
all conjoined, may be presented to the will of a rational
creature; yet, as persuasion can but result from that
presentation of arguments, which is also known to God, it is
from this fact that the presentation of arguments, is most
consistent with the permission of that thing to dissuade from
which they were used.
Let us illustrate the subject by examples. God permitted the
brethren of Joseph to think of slaying him; (Gen. xxxvii,
18;) and at length they sold him, not caring that he was
their brother, and that they were forbidden, by the laws of
God, to commit murder, or to sell a free person into slavery.
So, also, He permitted the enemies of His Son to condemn him,
though innocent and unheard, and finally to slay him, setting
at naught their own law, which not only had been imposed on
them by the Deity, but was called to their remembrance, by
Nicodemus, Joseph and others, in the inquiry, "Doth our law
judge any man before it hear him?" They obtained false
witnesses, and found that "their witness agreed not together"
(Mark xiv, 56). Yet they did that, which their envy and
hatred against Christ dictated. Thus God likewise permitted
Saul to persecute David (1 Sam. 23 and 24), making no account
of the fact that he had been taught and convinced of David's
innocence by his own son, and by personal experience. From
this discussion, it is apparent that a difference must be
made between a sufficient and an efficacious impediment, and
that the permission of which we here treat, is a suspension
of efficacious impediment. A sufficient impediment is used,
by God, partly to declare that the act, to prevent which He
takes care that those arguments should be proposed, and
presented, is displeasing to Himself, partly that they may be
more inexcusable, who do not permit themselves to be
prevented; and even that He may the more, on account of their
iniquity, incite them to the act which is so eagerly
performed. Then we have this three-fold permission of the
Deity -- first, that by which God leaves any act to the
decision of a rational creature, not restraining it by any
law; secondly, that by which He permits an act, in respect to
the capability of the creature; third, that by which He
permits the act, in respect to the inclination and will of
the creature. The last two can not be disjoined in a subject,
though they can and ought to be suitably distinguished from
each other. For it is necessary that an act, which God does
not will to prevent, should be permitted both to the
capability and the will of the creature, since, by the sole
inhibition, either of the capability, or of the will, an
impediment is presented to the act such that it is not
performed.
Some may say that the species or modes of prevention are not
sufficiently enumerated; as no act is prevented in its causes
only, but also, in itself. It is necessary to an act, not
only that God should bestow both the power and the will, that
he should produce the effect itself, and without the
intervention of means. It must follow, therefore, that an act
will not be certainly produced, even if God should bestow the
power and the will, and hence, it is possible that an act
should be prevented, even if God does not present an
impediment to the capability or the will, that is, if He
withholds from the creature his own concurrence, either
active or motive, which is immediately necessary to produce
the act. From this, it can be deduced, also, that an act is
not fully permitted, even if it is left by God to the
capability and will of the creature, unless God has
determined to unite immediately to produce the same act, by
his own act, motion, or concurrence. I reply, that I do not
deny the necessity of that concurrence or immediate act of
God to the production of an act; but I say that it has once
been determined by God, not to withhold, from His creatures
His own concurrence, whether general or special, for the
producing those acts, to perform which He has given to His
creatures the power and the will or which He has left to the
power and will of His creatures; otherwise, He has, in vain,
bestowed the power and the will, and He has, without reason,
left the act to the capability and the will of the creature.
I add that an example of an impediment, of that kind, can not
be given, that is, an impediment, placed by God, in the way
of an act permitted to the capability and will of a creature,
by withholding from the creature His own immediate
concurrence.
I, therefore, conclude that the modes or species of
prevention, and therefore, of permission, have been
sufficiently enumerated. I grant that not only much light,
but also completeness, will be added to the doctrine of the
divine permission, if it not only may be shown how God
prevents acts, for which rational creatures have an
inclination and sufficient strength, but may be explained,
with accuracy, how God produces and effects His own acts and
His own works, through His rational creatures, whether good
or bad. In which investigation, many learned and pious men
have toiled, and have performed labour, not to be regretted;
yet I think that so many things remain to be solved and
explained, that no genius, however surpassing, can be
sufficient for all of them, and so it can be truly said that
the mine of this truth is not only deep and profound, but
also inexhaustible. Yet, if we descend into it with
soberness, and, following the thread and guidance of the Holy
Scriptures, there is no doubt that it will be granted unto us
to draw thence so much as God, the only fountain and giver of
the truth, knows will conduce to the salvation of the church,
and to the sanctification of His name in this world, to whom
be glory for ever, through Jesus Christ. Amen.
Having thus discussed the subject of permission in general,
let us now consider the permission of sin. At the outset, it
must be understood that sin is not permitted in the first
mode of permission, for it is sin in that it is forbidden by
the law, therefore, it can not be permitted by the law; else,
the same thing is sin and not sin; sin in that it is
forbidden, and not sin, in that it is permitted, and not
forbidden. Yet, since it is said truly that sin is permitted
by God, it is certain that it is permitted in some way, which
will, generally considered, be a suspension of all those
impediments by the interposition of which sin could not be
committed by the creature. But the impediments by which sin,
so far as it is sin, is prevented, are the revelation of the
divine will, and an act moving or persuading to obedience to
the divine will. From which it is evident that permission of
sin is a suspension of that revelation, or of that suasion,
or of both.
It may be stated, here, from the general definition of
permission, that revelation, motion, or suasion have so much
efficacy, that if they are used and applied, the sin would
not, in fact, be committed. I say this, then: Let no one
think that God performs no act sufficient to prevent sin,
when sin is not, in fact, prevented, and thence conclude that
God wills sin; and again, let no one judge that, when God
perform one or more acts, sufficient to prevent sin, that He
unwillingly permits sin. In the latter of which remarks, we
see that they are frequently mistaken, who do not consider
the subject with sufficient accuracy. For the sole
consideration of efficacious prevention, by the suspension of
which, permission is properly and adequately defined,
effects, in view of the use of some, though inefficacious,
impediments, that we should understand that God does not will
sin, nor yet that he permits it unwillingly, because He has,
in addition to those sufficient impediments, also efficacious
ones in the storehouse of His wisdom and power, by the
production of which, sin would be certainly and infallibly
prevented.
That, what has been thus said by us, in general terms, may be
more evident, let us explain, with a little more
particularity, in reference to differences of sin. Sin is
either of omission or of commission. Sin of omission is a
neglect of an act, prescribed and commanded by law; sin of
commission, is a performance of that, which is forbidden and
prohibited by law. But since, in a preceptive law, not a good
act, only, is enjoined, but its cause, mode and purpose, also
in a prohibitive law, not a bad act, only, is forbidden, but
also the cause and purpose of the omission, it is apparent
that sin, both against a preceptive law, and against a
prohibitive law, is two-fold: against a preceptive law if the
enjoined act is omitted, and if it is performed unlawfully as
to manner and purpose; and against a prohibitive law, by
performing an action, and by not performing, but omitting it
with an unlawful reason and purpose. The examples are plain.
He, who omits to bestow alms on the poor, sins in omitting a
prescribed act. He, who bestows alms on the poor that he may
be seen of men, sins in omitting the due reason, and purpose
of the bestowal. He, who steals, sins in committing a
forbidden act; he, who abstains from theft, that his iniquity
may be covered for the time and may afterwards more deeply
injure his neighbour, sins in omitting the forbidden act with
a wrong purpose. The divine permission is to be accommodated
to each of the modes both of mission and of commission.
Sin is distributed, in respect to its causes, into sin of
ignorance, of infirmity, and of malice; and by some, an
additional distinction is made, namely, sin of negligence or
thoughtlessness, as different and separate from the former,
while others think that this is embraced in the three species
previously mentioned.
The divine permission is also adjusted to these differences.
It would be an endless work to present all the divisions and
differences of sin, and to show how the divine permission is
related to each class. But we must not omit that, in sin, not
it alone but the act also, blended with it, is to be
considered, as in sin there is the transgression of the law,
and the act, that is the act, simply as such, and the act, as
forbidden or prescribed, the omission of which prescript is
sin. But permission can be considered, either in respect to
the act, or to the transgression, for sin is prevented in the
prevention of the act, without which sin can not be
committed. Again, the act is prevented in the prevention of
the sin, which necessarily inheres and adheres to the act, so
that the act itself can not be performed without sin. For one
may abstain from an act, towards which he is borne by his
inclination, because it can not be performed without sin;
another, on the contrary, abstains from sin because he is not
inclined to the act itself. When he abstains from the act
because it is sin, he abstains from sin per se, from the act
incidentally: but when he abstains because the act is not
pleasant to him, he abstains from the act per se, from sin
incidentally. When also an act, is permitted as an act, it is
permitted per se, sin is permitted incidentally. When sin is
permitted as sin, it is permitted per se, the act is
permitted incidentally. All of which things are to be
diligently considered in reference to the subject of
permission, that it may be understood what efficiency God
suspends in that permission, and what efficiency He uses to
no purpose -- to no purpose in relation to the event, in that
sin is not omitted, not to no purpose in relation to the
objects which God has proposed to Himself, the best and the
most wisely intended, and most powerfully obtained. But
though we have already discussed the permission of acts in
general, it will not be superfluous to treat here of the
same, so far as those acts are blended with sin, and sin with
them; though, in the mean time, the principal reference in
this discussion, must be to the permission of sin, as such.
For, as these two are so connected, that they can not be
separated in an individual subject, the very necessity of
their coherence seems to demand that we should speak of the
permission of both in connection, though of the permission of
sin per se, and of the act incidentally. But since the
relation of sin appears, most plainly, in an act committed
against a prohibitive law, as omission of good may be often
comprehended under it by synecdoche, as in the definitions of
sin, -- "it is that which is done contrary to the law," --
also, "a desire, word, or deed against the law," -- it will
not be irrelevant to show, in the first place, how God
permits that sin, whether as it is a sin, or as it is an act,
which He permits, or in both relations.
We will present the modes of permission corresponding to the
contrary modes of prevention, as before. The murder which
Ahab and Ahaziah intended to perpetrate on the prophet
Elijah, was an act, which, being performed would have taken
away the life of Elijah, and it was a sin against the sixth
commandment of God. God prevented that murder, not as a sin,
but as an act. This is apparent from the mode of prevention,
for in one instance, he took Elijah out of the hands of Ahab,
and in another He consumed, with fire sent down from heaven,
those who had been sent to take the prophet (2 Kings 1). The
former case was according to the fourth mode, heretofore
mentioned; the latter was, according to the first mode, in
opposition to the power of Ahaziah and in this case prevented
the effect. David, being instigated by his followers to slay
Saul, his persecutor and enemy, refused, being restrained
from that act, not as an act, but as a sin, for he said "The
Lord forbid that I should stretch forth my hand against him,
seeing he is the anointed of the Lord" (1 Sam. xxiv, 6).
The mode of prevention was by a revelation of the divine
will, and by a persuasion to obedience, and was suitable to
the prevention of sin as such. The defilement of Sarah, the
wife of Abraham when she was brought to Abimelech, would have
been an act, by which, as the violation of Sarah's chastity,
would have caused great grief to Abraham, and would have been
a sin against the seventh precept of the Decalogue. It was
divinely prevented, if you consider the mode of prevention,
as far as it was sin. For God, in a dream, revealed to him
that she was "a man's wife" (Gen. xx, 3), and he could not,
without sin, have carried out his design. If you examine the
design and reason of the prevention, it was both in respect
to the act and to the sin; as an act, because it would have
caused indelible grief to Abraham, and from this God wished
to spare his servant; as sin, because God knew that Abimelech
would have done this "in the integrity of his heart" (6th v.)
and He, therefore, withheld him from sin, in adultery with
the wife of his friend.
Let us look at the opposite modes of permission in examples,
also selected from the Scriptures. The sale of Joseph, made
by his brethren, (Gen. 37), was an act and a sin; also, the
affliction by which Satan tried Job, the man of God (Job. 1 &
2). Both were permitted by God. Was this in respect to the
act or to its sin? This can not be gathered from the mode of
the permission, for God abstains from all modes of restraint
when He permits any thing, and if He did not so abstain, He
would prevent, and then would, consequently, be neither the
act nor sin. But, from the end and the mode of effecting the
permitted act and sin, a judgment may be formed of the
respect according to which God has permitted the act of sin.
From the sale of Joseph resulted his removal to Egypt, his
elevation to the highest dignity, in that land from which,
food, necessary for his father's family, could be procured,
in a time of most direful famine. God declares that He sent
him into Egypt for this purpose. All this resulted from the
sale, not as it was a sin, but as an act. In the affliction
of Job, God desired that the patience and constancy of His
servant should be tried, and it was tried by the affliction
not as a sin but as an act. On the other hand, God permitted
David to number the people (2 Sam. 24), and Ahab to slay
Naboth (1 Kings 21), in which cases the numbering of the
people, and the murder were acts, but were permitted as sin.
For God purposed to punish Israel, and that Ahab should fill
up the measure of his crimes. It is, indeed, true that God
also wished to take pious Naboth from this vale of sorrows to
the heavenly land; this was effected by the murder, not as it
was a sin, but as an act. Yet the proper, immediate, and
adequate reason that God permitted Ahab to perpetrate that
murder, is that of which I have spoken -- the measure of his
crimes was to be filled. For God could, in some other way,
without human sin, have called Naboth to Himself. Again, God
permitted Absalom to pollute, by incest, the wives or
concubines of his father, and this was done in respect to
both. For it was permitted both as an act, and as sin. As an
act, it served for the chastisement of David who had
adulterously polluted the wife of Uriah; as a sin, it was
permitted, because God wished that Absalom, by his crime,
should cut off all hope of reconciliation with his offended
father, and, in this way, hasten his own destruction, the
just punishment of rebellion against his father. In both
respects, also, God permitted Ahab to go up to Ramoth-Gilead
contrary to the word of the Lord; as a sin, because God
wished to punish him; as an act because God wished that he
should be slain in that place, to which he came by the act of
going up. From these examples a judgment may be formed of
similar cases. Thus far in reference to permission of sin,
which consists in the perpetration of an act, prohibited by
law.
Let us now consider sin, as it is committed when an act,
forbidden by law, is not performed, but omitted not from a
due reason and purpose. Here the act is prevented, but sin is
not prevented. There is, then, in this case, the permission
of sin only, as such, and the mode of permission is a
suspension of the revelation of the divine will, or at least
of suasion and motion to obedience to the known will of God.
For the creature omits the act, not because God has forbidden
it, but for some other reason. Thus the brothers of Joseph
omitted to slay him, as they had determined to do, not
because they began to think that this crime would displease
God, but because, from the words of Judah, they thought it
useless, and that it would be better to sell him into bondage
(Gen. 37). Absalom, after thousands of followers had been
collected, omitted to pursue his fleeing father as Ahithophel
counseled him, not because he considered it wrong to pursue
his father, for he was wholly hostile to him, but he followed
the counsel of Hushai, because he considered that the curse,
advised by Ahithophel, would be dangerous for himself and the
people. In this and similar examples, we see that God
restrained an act, which had been forbidden and therefore was
sin, and yet did not prevent sin, which was committed by
those, who omitted that forbidden act; but he permitted them
to sin in the mode of omitting the forbidden act. The reason
is manifest, as by the act, a person, whom God purposes to
spare, would be injured, but no one but the sinner himself is
injured by sin committed in an undue omission of an act, as
is just. Indeed by the prevention of an act, there is
prepared for the persons, who have omitted an act, the
punishment due to them both on account of this sin of undue
omission, and for other reasons, as happened to Absalom.
We now proceed to the permission of sin, which is committed
in the mere omission of an act, which has been commanded.
This is permitted by God, as it is an omission of an act, and
as it is sin. God, I assert, permits that act, which the law
commands to be omitted, either as it is an act, or as it is
sin. God permitted the sons of Eli to disobey the admonitions
of their father, (1 Sam. ii, 25); Saul, to spare the king of
the Amalekites, (1 Sam. xv, 8); the Israelites, when the
statement of the spies had been made, to refuse to go up into
the promised land, (Num. xiv, 4), the citizens of Succoth and
Penuel, to deny bread to the army of Gideon, (Judges viii, 6
& 8); Ahab, to send away Benhadad alive, a man devoted to
death by the Lord, (1 Kings xx, xxxiv, ); Festus, before whom
Paul was accused, not to pronounce sentence against him, and
in favour of the Jews, (Acts xxv, 12); &c. He permitted all
these things partly as they were omissions of acts, partly as
they were sins, that is, omissions contrary to a preceptive
law, which imposed commands, partly in both respects. In
reference to the sons of Eli, the Scripture says -- "they
hearkened not unto the voice of their father, because the
Lord would slay them." The permitted omission of obedience
thus far was sin. The omission by Saul of the slaughter of
those, whom God willed and commanded to be slain, was
permitted as it was a sin, not as it was the omission of an
act, by the performance of which they would have been
deprived of life. For God had determined to take away the
kingdom of Saul from him, and had already denounced this
against him, by the mouth of Samuel, because he had
sacrificed, not waiting for Samuel, (1 Sam. xiii, 9-14).
Agag, also, was afterwards hewed in pieces before the Lord by
the prophet Samuel. The fact that the Israelites omitted to
go up into the promised land, as they had been commanded by
the Lord, occurred because God purposed that their bodies
should fall in the wilderness, as they had so often tempted
God, and murmured against Him. Then that omission was
permitted as a sin. God permitted the citizens of Succoth and
Penuel to withhold bread from the army of Gideon, partly that
He might test the constancy of those, who were "pursuing
after Zebah and Zalmunna," partly that He might prepare
punishment for the citizens of Succoth and Penuel. In this
case then, the omission of the act was permitted as it was
such, and as it was sin. For as, being provided with food,
they would have been strengthened, who were pursuing the
Midianites, so the omission of the act, as such, on their
part, was grievous and to be worthy of punishment. The
sending away of Benhadad, or his release from death was
permitted by God, as a sin -- a sin, committed against an
express command -- for God purposed that Ahab should heap up
wrath against the day of wrath, on account of his heinous
sins; and also as an act, as He purposed that Benhadad, in
the prolongation of his life, by the omission of an act
commanded by God, might fight afterwards with Ahab, and,
after his death, with the Israelites, and besiege Samaria to
the great injury of its inhabitants. Festus was permitted by
God, to refrain from acquitting Paul -- according to law and
right as he could be convicted of no crime -- in respect to
the act as such, and not as sin. For, from that omission
resulted a necessity for the appeal of Paul to Caesar, which
was the occasion of his departure to Rome, where God willed
that he should bear testimony concerning His Son.
In respect to sin, when a prescribed act is performed unduly
as to manner and design, it is certain that it is permitted
as such, for in it nothing is permitted except the omission
of a due mode and purpose, which omission is purely sinful.
This is evident from the mode of permission, which, in this
case, is certain; namely, the suspension of efficiency by
which sin, as sin, is permitted. Joab performed many
distinguished deeds and those prescribed by God, in fighting
bravely, against the enemies of the people of God, in behalf
of Israel, that it might be well for the people of God; but
God did not incline his mind to do this from a right motive.
It is apparent that he sought his own glory, in those deeds,
from the fact that he, by wicked treachery, destroyed men,
equal to himself in bravery and generalship, that he might be
alone in honour. For the man who defends any cause, only that
it may be defended, and for the glory of God, will not be
vexed that as many as possible, endued with skill and
bravery, should be united in its defense; indeed, he would
most deeply rejoice and be glad on this account.
As to the differences of sin in view of its causes --
ignorance, infirmity, malice, negligence -- there is in
respect to these a clear distinction in their permission. For
the permission of a sin of ignorance arises from the
suspension of the revelation of the divine will; of malice,
from the suspension of the act by which the perversity of the
heart is corrected and changed; of infirmity, from the
withholding of strength to resist temptation, of negligence,
from the suspension of the act by which a serious and holy
care and anxiety is produced in us to watch our faculties,
and to walk in the law of the Lord. For God knows, when it
seems good to him to perform a work, by the acts of rational
creatures, which can not be committed by them without sin,
how to suspend His own efficiency, so as to permit His
creatures to perform their own acts. He willed that His
church should be proved and purged by persecutions, and
indeed by the act of Saul, a man zealous for the law, who,
from inconsiderate and preposterous love towards his own
religion, wished that the sect of the Nazarenes, so called
should be extirpated. That this might be effected through
him, He suffered him to be some time in ignorance, without
which, as he was then constituted, he would not have
persecuted the church. For he says that he "did it
ignorantly" (1 Tim. i, 13). In the case of Julian the
apostate, a most foul persecutor of the church, God did not
correct his willful and obstinate hatred of Christ and his
church. For when he was convinced of the truth of the
Christian doctrine, he could have persecuted it only through
willful malice. God's procedure, in not correcting that
hatred, was deserved by him, who, willingly and of his own
fault, had apostatized from Christ. God purposed that Peter,
presuming too much on himself, should come to a knowledge of
himself, and He suffered him to deny his Master, from fear of
death, not affording him such support of His Spirit, as to
move him to dare to profess Christ openly, despising the fear
of death. David, being freed from his enemies, and having
conquered many neighbouring kings and nations, began to guard
his steps with too little care, and heedlessly gave himself
up to negligence, especially because he had Joab, a
distinguished general and skilled in military duties, in
whom, on account of consanguinity, he could trust; from this
it happened that he fell into that shameful adultery with the
wife of Uriah. But God permitted him to fall into that
negligence, and on that occasion to commit sin, that he might
be more diligently watchful over himself, mourn on account of
his own sin for an example to others, afford a distinguished
specimen and example of humility and repentance, and rise
more gloriously from his sin. It would be tedious to remark
the same thing in each kind of sin; but let these suffice, as
exhibiting the means and mode of forming a correct judgment
in reference to permission. But though the whole complex
matter, which is made up of act and transgression, may be
permitted by God, through a suspension of all divine acts, by
the use of which, on the part of God, the act, either as an
act or as sin, would have been prevented, yet it is useful to
consider, distinctly, in what respect that permission may be
given by God, and what efficiencies, and of what kind, He
suspends, that He may not hinder the commission or omission
of an act prescribed or forbidden. For in this the divine
goodness, wisdom and power, and even justice is seen as
distinctly as possible, and it is most clearly proved how
God, in all his own action, restraint and permission, is free
from blame, and without sin, and by no means to be considered
the author of sin. In showing which, it is so much the more
evident how easily they may fall into absurdity and
blasphemy, who refer, indeed, to a providence, acting,
restraining, permitting, but not with sufficient
distinctness, accuracy, and diligence, bringing together and
comparing them, and distinguishing each from the others.
The individual causes of permission, in its variety and in
that of the permitted acts, and of sins, are, at the same
time, various and manifold, and not generally explicable,
which can, perhaps, in some way, be demonstrated by those,
who have their senses exercised in divine things, and are
accustomed to consider them with earnest study. Two general
or universal reasons can be presented for the fact that God
permits events in general, and why He permits any particular
event. One is the freedom of the will, which God bestowed on
rational creatures, and which He designed as the mistress and
the free source of their actions. The other is the
declaration of the divine glory, which is of such a character
as not only to effect and prevent that which can be effected
and prevented, for his own glory, but also so to reduce to
order the acts of rational creatures which are permitted, and
which frequently deviate from the order, prescribed to them,
that from it the praise of the divine goodness, mercy,
patience, wisdom, justice and power may shine forth and be
revealed. To which pertains that, which is beautifully said
by Augustine, "God has judged that it belongs to His own
omnipotent goodness to bring good out of evil rather than not
to permit evil to exist."
The creature is likewise to be considered, to whom is granted
the permission of an act of commission or of omission, which
can not, without sin, be committed or omitted; namely, as to
his character at the time when that act is permitted to him,
-- whether, as only created, and remaining in his primeval
integrity, or as fallen from that state; again, whether made
a partaker of grace, or invited to a participation of grace;
whether brought to that state, or resisting grace, or not
sufficiently solicitous to receive it, and to continue in it,
and the like. For God can deny to any creature, considered as
such, action, motion, efficiency, concurrence, either general
or special, of nature or of grace, of providence or
predestination -- though I do not dare to make a confident
assertion in reference to the act of Predestination -- which
act and concurrence, which motion and efficiency He could
not, without injustice, deny to the same creature considered
in a different relation. But a permission of sin depends, as
we have before seen, on a suspension of the divine act,
motion, efficiency, &c.
He, however, who wishes to discuss fully and thoroughly the
subject of permission must, of necessity, treat of the
general providence of God, and of that special providence,
which preserves, governs, rules, effects, prevents and
permits. For, as permission is opposed to prevention, by the
mode either of privation or of contradiction, so it is
opposed to efficiency by negation; and it is the nature of
permission to have, antecedent to itself, various acts of God
concerning the same creature, to which permission is granted,
and concerning that act which is permitted. If these acts of
God are not accurately explained, it can not be understood
what that efficiency is, in the suspension of which,
permission properly and immediately consists. This, also, is
the reason that many, when they hear any thing concerning
permission, immediately, in their own minds, conceive of
inactive quiet, and abstinence from all effort on the part of
providence; others, considering the power and efficacy of
that providence, which is present in and presides over all
things and acts, either reject the idea of permission, or
acknowledge it only in word, in the mean time, so explaining
it as to resolve it into a certain act of God, and into the
efficiency of providence. But these errors are both to be
avoided, lest we should take away, from the divine
providence, acts which belong to it, or should attribute to
it things foreign to it, and unworthy of His justice. In
reference to the remarks, already made, some one will object
that I attribute to permission not only the illegality and
the irregularity of the act, but also the act itself; and
thus remove from the operation of the divine will and
efficiency, not only the illegality of the act, but the act
itself. He will say that, in this, he perceives a double
error; first, because I attribute sin, simply and taken in
any respect, to permission, and remove it from the divine
efficiency and will; when it ought, in a certain respect, to
be attributed to the divine efficiency and will; secondly,
because I take away, from the efficiency and the will of God,
the act which is the first and supreme cause of all being.
Let us examine a little more closely both objections. We
explain the former by the sentiments of the objector himself.
In sin there are three respects; for there is, first, guilt;
second, punishment; third, the cause of other sins. Indeed
God is not, they say, the cause of sin in respect to its
guilt, but to its punishment, and to its being the cause of
other sins. They affirm that God is, without controversy, the
cause of punishment, because that is an act of justice, by
which sin, deviating from the law of the prescriptive justice
of God, is brought under the rule of divine punitive justice.
That sin is of God, as it is the cause of other sins, they,
also, prove from the acts of blinding, hardening, giving over
to a reprobate mind, which are acts of God and are causes of
sins. I answer; -- to the first, that the objection is not
valid against all sins. For the first sin, committed by a
creature, can not be the punishment of another sin. There are
also many sins which are not, in fact, the causes of other
sins; for God may so administer and dispense the fall and the
sins of His creatures, as that they may result in good, that
is a greater odium against sin, and a more diligent
solicitude and anxiety to guard their own steps. Therefore
many sins, contrary to this objection, come to partake of an
opposite character, by the permission of God, and in no
respect by His efficiency. It will be said, in reply, that
there are, nevertheless, many sins which must be considered
in those three respects: of these at least, it may be proper
to say, that in the last two respects they have God, as their
cause and author. I answer secondly, that there is no act or
sin, which has, at the same time, the relation of guilt, of
punishment, and of the cause of another sin, if these things
may be correctly and strictly considered. I confess that this
is usually said, and is common with many who treat of this
subject.
I will prove my assertion, first by argument, then by
presenting examples of blinding and hardening. That no act at
the same time, sin and punishment, is certain, since sin is
voluntary, punishment is involuntary; sin is action,
punishment is passion; by punishment sin is brought into
subjection, but sin is not brought into subjection by sin;
but by punishment, I say, differing from sin or guilt, not in
relation only, but in the thing and subject which is the act.
When this is said by learned men, a reason ought to be
assigned for this opinion. I acknowledge it; but let us
consider the sense in which this is said and understood by
them. They say that sin is the punishment of sin, because, on
account of previous sin, God permits the sinner to commit
another sin, and, indeed, suspends some of His own acts, and
performs others, in which case the creature will sin of his
own wickedness, and will commit other sins, on account of
which he deserves greater punishment and condemnation, and
thus, as sin deserves greater punishment, it is said to be
the punishment of sin by a metonymy of cause and effect. In
this sense they understand their own declaration, or it can
not be sustained. But that no sin is, at the same time, guilt
and the cause of another sin, is also true, if it may be
rightly understood; that is, a proximate and immediate cause.
It is, indeed, the meritorious cause of another sin, that is,
it deserves that God should afterwards suspend some act, and
perform other acts, which being performed, he will, of his
own wickedness, as said before, commit some sin; it is also
the preparatory cause of the perpetration of other sins: for
by sin the conscience is wounded, desire for prayer, and
confidence in it are destroyed, a habit of sinning is
prepared, a power over the sinner is granted to Satan, from
which an easy lapse into other sins readily follows; yet it
is not the proximate and immediate cause of another sin. "It
is nevertheless a cause," some may say, "though remote and
meritorious." What then? By this very distinction the whole
force of the objection is destroyed. By it, God is made the
cause of some acts, the creature will, of His own wickedness,
deservedly add another sin to the former, and God is absolved
from the charge of being the cause of sin, which deserved
that He should perform those acts of sin, as it is the cause
of another sin. For the action of the Deity intervenes
between the sin, which is the cause of another sin, and that
consequent sin. In that objection, however, it was inferred
that God is the cause of sin, in that He is the occasion of
the second sin. That error arises from the confusion and the
inaccurate consideration of those acts. Sin, in the relation
of guilt, is first in order, then follows demerit or
conviction to punishment, from the justice of God; which is
the act of God, who punishes that sin by merited desertion,
and blindness. But "blindness," you say, "is sin or guilt,
and the punishment of previous sin, and the cause of
subsequent sin, and God is the cause of blindness." The truth
of what has been previously said may be demonstrated in this
example. That blindness, judicially produced by God, is
correctly said to be the punishment of previous sin, and can,
if rightly understood, be said to be the cause of consequent
sins, that is, by a removal of restraining grace, and by the
performance of some acts, from which it will follow that the
creature, thus blinded and left, will, of his own wickedness,
commit sin. But that blindness is not sin or guilt. A
distinction is to be made between the blindness as the act of
God to which man is judicially subjected, and the blindness
of man himself by which he renders his own mind hard and
obstinate against God, which is the act of man, produced by
wickedness and obstinate pertinacity. These acts indeed
concur, but do not coincide, nor are they one single action,
made up of the efficiency of those concurrent actions, which
together make up one total cause of that act, which is called
blindness. Learned men often speak in such a manner, I grant,
but not with sufficient distinctness; and perhaps in a sense
which agrees with my explanation, and is not contrary to it.
For they use the term blindness, in a complex and indistinct
manner, for the act and its result, or the work and its
effect, which is, thereby, produced in the person made blind,
which may be called passive blindness, produced by that
active blindness. Of blindness, thus confusedly and
indistinctly considered, it may be said that it is sin, the
punishment of sin, and the cause of sin, but this is not at
variance with my opinion, for I deny that God is the cause of
that blindness, so far as it is sin and guilt. Active
blindness -- as we now term it, by way of distinction --
which is produced by a man, making himself blind, is sin, for
it is a great crime to harden one's own mind against God.
Active blindness, which proceeds from God, is the punishment
of previous sin, by which the sinner has merited to himself
desertion, and privation of grace. The active blindness,
which is from man, and that, which is from God, concur to the
same effect, which is passive blindness, which is, properly,
punishment. Finally, the active blindness of man, blinding
himself, and that of God, blinding man, is the cause of the
accumulation of other sins with those previously committed,
by the blinded sinner, but in the mode of which I have
spoken. I answer, that if it is true that one and the same
act is sin or guilt, the punishment of sin, and the cause of
subsequent sin, then it can not be true that God is its
cause, according to the last two relations, and not according
to the first, for a twofold reason. First, this distinction
of relation can not effect that God should be the cause of
one thing, and not of another, in fact, joined to it, unless
in that mode, which will be hereafter explained, which they
exclude from this subject, who say that blindness, produced
by God, is sin, and the cause of sin. These respects are
useful to a mind, intelligent and able to discriminate
between things most intimately connected, which constitutes
actually and numerically, one thing, but considered in
different relations, they can not have place in actual
efficiency, the limit of which is real existence. God
inflicts punishment on a person who is a sinner, and His
creature; the act of infliction does not distinguish the
creature from the sinner, but the mind of Him, who punishes,
makes the distinction, for it knows how to punish the
creature, not as such, but as sinful. This error is
frequently committed, that relations are carried further than
their nature may permit. Secondly, because of those three
relations, order, nature, and causality, the former is that
in which sin is considered as guilt, the latter two are those
in which it is considered as punishment, and the cause of
consequent sin. God is the first cause of all effects, which
He produces with or by His creatures; but, in this case, He
will be a subsequent cause, for He will produce, in the
relation of subsequent respects, an act, which the creature
produces in the relation of prior respect, which is absurd,
and inverts the order of causality and efficiency, which
exists between first and second causes. There may, indeed, be
supposed to exist a concurrence, which we shall hereafter
explain; but they, who say that the blindness, inflicted by
the Deity, is the cause of consequent sins, and at the same
time a sin, deny that this concurrence has any place here.
These things, indeed, I have thought, ought to be explained,
somewhat fully, on account of the difficulty of the subject
itself, and of preconceived opinions.
Let us proceed to the second objection, which we thus set
forth, according to the meaning of its authors. "In sin there
are two things, the act and its illegality, or violation of
law. As an act, it is positive; as a violation of law, it is
privative: the latter has the will of the creature for its
cause; the former must necessarily be referred back to the
first cause, and, in this relation, God is the cause of that
act which, in respect to man, or as it proceeds from man, is
sin. Therefore it is wrong to remove the act, which is not
performed by a man without sin, from the divine will and
efficiency, and attribute it to the divine permission, since
that act, as such, belongs to efficiency, but as it violates
law, it belongs to the divine permission. I reply, first,
that it can not be said truly, and universally of all sin,
that in it there are these two things, namely, the act and
the violation. For, sometimes, it is the act itself which is
prohibited, and sometimes, not the act itself, but some
circumstance in reference to the act. Thus the eating of the
fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil was
prohibited, not any circumstance connected with it; and,
therefore, the act of eating, itself, was undue, unlawful and
inordinate; it was, indeed, in itself a deviation from the
rule, that is, from the law which forbade the eating. That
act, of and in itself, apart from the law, is a natural act
and has, in itself, no inordinacy. But after the enactment of
a law which prohibits eating, that act, can not be considered
as good, agreeably to its natural relations, as there is
added to it the fact of inordinacy, on account of which it
ought to be omitted; for it is then to be omitted, of itself
and on its own account, because it is forbidden by the divine
law, and because to eat is to sin, the whole inordinacy
consisting in the fact that the act of eating, referred to,
has a place in the number and series of human actions, which
place it ought not, on any account, to have, and the number
of which ought not to increase, but it ought to be wholly
omitted, and to be kept under restraint, and to be never
carried into effect.
The simile of a lame horse, which very many adduce to
illustrate this matter, is not applicable to an act, which is
prohibited by law. For in lameness there is the gait, and
there is the limping or irregular gait; and a defect is added
to the gait or motion on account of weakness or injury of a
leg, which defect, though it may not, in fact be separated
from the gait itself, can, nevertheless, be readily
distinguished from it; and hence it may occur that the same
horse, after the cure has been effected, can walk properly,
and so lameness will be separated from his gait. But in the
eating of the forbidden fruit, it was not the eating and the
defect of eating, which was forbidden, but the eating itself,
wholly and solely, had the relation of sin, because it was
committed contrary to the law. That simile would be
applicable in sin, which is committed against a law which
prescribes the act itself, but prohibits some circumstance of
the act; which sin consists in the fact that an act, good,
according to, and prescribed by the law, is performed in a
manner, which is not right, as when alms are given to a poor
man, from ambition and pride, that he, who bestows them, may
appear unto men to be liberal and a lover of the poor, and
even religious. That act is good and may be illustrated by
the gait, but the defect in it is like the lameness produced
by disease or injury, and causes the act to limp, and to be
displeasing to God, yet it is not to be omitted, but to be
performed, only in a due and right manner, all defectiveness
being avoided and omitted, which, rightly and in fact, can
and ought to be separated from it. I acknowledge that the
question or objection is not satisfied by that answer; for
some one may affirm, that, "eating is nevertheless, a
positive act, and, therefore, has an existence, though
forbidden, and since all existence has God as its cause, God
also is the cause of that act of eating; and so, also, of
other positive acts, though they may be committed against a
prohibitory law; and consequently, sin, as an act can not be
removed from the efficiency of God."
I reply, that I, by no means, take from the efficiency of God
an act, which is not perpetrated by the creature without sin;
indeed, I openly confess that God is the cause of all acts,
which are perpetrated by His creatures, but I desire this
only that the efficiency of God should be so explained as not
to derogate any thing from the freedom of the creature, and
not to transfer the fault of his sin to God; that is, to show
that God may, indeed, be the effector of the act, but only
the permitter of the sin; and that God may be at once the
effector and permitter of one and the same act. This subject
is of most difficult explanation, yet we may make some effort
towards its elucidation.
I remark, then, that God is, either mediately or immediately,
the cause of an act which proceeds from a creature. He is the
mediate cause, when He exerts an influence upon the cause and
moves it to cause the act. He is the immediate cause, when He
exerts an influence on the act and, with the creature, is the
whole cause of that act. When God moves the creature to cause
anything, since the creature, as the second and subordinate
cause, is determined by the first moving cause to a
particular act, which has its form from the influence and
motion of the Deity, that act, whatever may be its character,
can not be imputed, as a fault to the creature; but if the
act can be called sin, God is necessarily the cause and the
author of that sin. But since the latter idea can never be
true, it is certain that the explanation can not be found in
that mode of the mediate action of the Deity, how God is the
cause of the act, which is not performed by man without sin,
and the permitter of the sin. When God is the immediate cause
of an act, which proceeds from a creature, then the second
cause, if it is free, and we are now treating of free agents
-- has it in its own power either to exert its influence in
the act, or suspend that influence so that the act may not
take place, and to exert its influence so that one act,
rather than another, may be performed. Hence it follows,
that, when a second cause has freely exerted its influence to
produce all act, and when, by its particular influence, it
has determined the general influence of God to this
particular act, and has disposed the form of the act, the
second cause is responsible, and the act may be deservedly
called "sin" in respect to the second cause; but God is free
from responsibility, and, in respect to Him, the act can not
be called sin.
The concurrence and influence of the Deity bestows nothing
upon the free will of the creature, by which he may be either
inclined, or assisted, or strengthened to act, and it does
not in the first act, but in the second, dispose the will,
and therefore it presupposes, in the will, whatever is
necessary for acting, even without the exception of the
concurrence of the Deity itself. Though the will of the free
creature may not, in reality, have that concurrence, except
when he puts forth activity, yet he has it in his own power
before he performs that which is prepared for, and imposed
upon him. If this is not so, the will can not be said to have
the act in its own power, or in its proximate capability; nor
can the cause of that act be called moral but natural only,
and therefore necessary, to which sin can, by no means, be
attributed.
In this way that difficulty is solved, and it is shown how
God can be the cause of an act, which can not be performed by
the creature without sin, so that neither He may be the
author of sin, nor the creature be free from sin; that He,
indeed, may be only the permitter of sin, but the creature
may be the proper cause of sin. For God leaves to the choice
of a free second cause the disposition of its own influence
to effect any act, and when the second cause is in the very
movement and instant of exerting its influence, God, freely
and of His own choice, joins His influence and universal
concurrence to the influence of the creature, knowing that,
without His influence, the act neither could nor would be
produced. Nor is it right that God should deny His
concurrence and influence to the creature, even if He sees
that the influence of the creature, exerted to effect an act,
which he is just ready to perform, is joined to sin, and is
committed contrary to His law. For it is right that the act,
which He left to the freedom of man, when the law had not yet
been enacted by which that act was afterwards forbidden,
should be left to the freedom of the same creature, after the
enactment of the law. A law would be imposed, in vain, on an
act, for the performance of which God should determine to
deny His own concurrence. In that case, it could not be
performed by the creature, and therefore no necessity would
exist that its performance should be forbidden to the
creature by a law. Besides God, in His legislation, designed
to test the obedience of His creature; but this He could not
do, if He determined to deny, to the creature, His
concurrence to an act, forbidden by law; for apart from that
concurrence, the creature can not perform that act. Why
should God, in reference to an act, to which, as naturally
good, determined not to deny His concurrence, deny that same
concurrence, when the act has been made morally evil by the
enactment of law; when He declares and testifies in His own
legislation, that He wills that the creatures should abstain
from that act, in that it is morally evil, and not in that it
is an act, in its natural relations. But He wills that the
creature should abstain from the act, as evil, when He
imposes upon him a prohibitory law, to which he is bound to
yield obedience. When, however, He determines to deny His
concurrence, He wills that, in its natural relations, it
shall not be performed by the creature. For the former is a
kind of moral hindrance, the latter is a natural hindrance;
the former, by the enactment of law; the latter, by the
denial of concurrence; -- by the enactment of law, in view of
which that act can not be committed without sin, and by
denial of concurrence, in view of which the act can not be
committed at all. If the latter impediment, that of the
denial of concurrence, exists, there is no necessity that the
other, that of the enactment of law, should be interposed.
It is apparent, from this explanation, that the creature,
committing sin, commits it in the full freedom of his will,
both as to its exercise, and as to the form of the action, to
which two things the whole freedom of the will is limited.
Freedom, as to its exercise, is that by which the will can
put forth, and suspend volition and action. Freedom, as to
the form of action is that, by which, it wills and performs
this rather than that action. We will show that freedom, in
both respects, exists, in another manner, in the act of sin,
which the creature performs with the general concurrence of
God. In the act of sin, its existence and its essence are to
be considered. The existence of the act depends on the
freedom of the will, as to its exercise. That its essence
should be of this rather than of that character -- that it
should be rather a forbidden act than one not forbidden,
against this precept rather than against that, depends on the
freedom of the will as to the form of action. That the act
should exist, the creature effects by its own free influence,
by which it wills to do rather than not to do, though not
without the influence of the divine concurrence, uniting
itself freely to the influence of the creature at its very
first moment and instant. But that the act should be of one
character rather than of another, the second cause effects,
freely determining its own act to a certain direction, to
this rather -- than to that -- that it should be one thing
rather than another. If any one says that, on this
supposition, the divine concurrence is suspended on the
influence of the creature, I reply, that this does not follow
from my statements. Though God may not concur unless the
creature wills to exert his influence, yet the exertion of
that influence depends purely, on his own freedom; for he can
omit that exertion.
It may be clear from this, how God is both the permitter of
sin, and the effector of an act, without which the creature
can not commit sin; the permitter of sin, in that He leaves
to the creature the free disposition of His own influence;
the effector of an act, in that He joins His own concurrence
to the effort of the creature, without which the act could
not be, at all, performed by the creature.
If any one takes exception to this distinction, on account
either of the difficulty of the subject or of the defect of
my explanation, and so contends that efficiency in sin is in
some respect to be ascribed to God, because He is the
effector of that act, I wish that he would consider that God
can, on the same principle, be called the permitter of the
act, because He is the permitter of the sin, and, indeed, far
more justly, since, in His own prohibition, He declares that
He is unwilling that the act -- already permitted, not only
to the freedom and the ability of the creature, but also to
its right and power -- should be performed by the creature;
by which prohibition, that act is removed from the divine
efficiency, only so far as that ought to avail to deter the
will of the creature from performing that act; and, on the
other hand, the efficiency of that act is, so much the more,
to be ascribed to the freedom of the will, as it can be
understood to have, more vehemently willed that which is
forbidden by the divine law. But, in whatever way that
subject may be explained, it is carefully to be observed,
both that God be not made the author of sin, and that the act
itself be not taken away from the efficiency of God; that is,
that the whole act, both as an act merely, and as sin, may be
rightly made subject to the providence of God -- as an act to
efficient providence, as a sin to permissive providence. If,
however, there shall still be an inclination in the other
direction, there will be less error, if the act is taken away
from the divine efficiency, as an act, than if sin is
attributed to the efficiency of God, as a sin. For it is
better to take away an act from the Deity, which belongs to
Him, than to attribute to Him an evil act, which does not
belong to Him; so that a greater injury is charged on God, if
He is said to be the cause of sin, than if He is regarded as
an unconcerned spectator of an act.
ALLEGATION 4
"WE TEACH THAT THE GREATEST PART OF THE HUMAN RACE ARE LEFT
WITHOUT CHRIST AND WITHOUT ANY SAVING GRACE."
The meaning of this allegation, is that God, by His own
eternal and immutable decree, has determined, of His mere
will to elect some, but to reprobate others, and those the
more numerous. Since the elect can not be brought unto
salvation, as having become sinners in Adam, unless
satisfaction to the justice of God, and expiation for sin
should have been made, therefore, God determined to give his
own Son to them, as Mediator, Reconciler, and Redeemer, who
should assume human nature, for them only, should die for
their sins only, should reconcile them only to the Father,
should meritoriously obtain the Holy Spirit and eternal
redemption for them only, should offer, according to His
purpose, grace to them only, should call them, only, to
faith, and should bestow, by an internal vocation, faith on
them, only, &c., to the exclusion, from all these things, of
those whom He reprobated, so that there should be to them no
hope of salvation in Christ, because God had willed from
eternity that Christ should not be made man for them, or die
for them, apart from any consideration of their unbelief; and
when He arranged that the gospel should be preached also to
them, it was not done for their benefit, but because the
elect were intermingled with them, who, by that preaching,
were according to the decree of God, to be led to faith and
salvation. You should, indeed, have answered whether you
admitted that allegation as made truly against your doctrine,
or whether you think your doctrine to be not amenable to it.
You seem to admit that this is truly your sentiment. It
ought, indeed, to be admitted by you, if you wish to be
consistent with yourself, and to speak in harmony with your
doctrine.
You answer, then, that what is charged against your doctrine
in that allegation, is not a crime, but let us see how you
show and prove this. First, you say that "it is not hard that
they should be left without Christ," because "they might at
the first, in Adam, have received saving grace,
righteousness, and a life of blessedness, together with the
ability to persevere in the same, if they had only willed
it." I affirm that very many persons are absolutely left
without Christ, who never were, and never will be partakers
of the saving grace of Christ. For the grace, bestowed on
Adam and on all his posterity in him, was not the grace of
Christ, which was not, at that time, necessary. But "God
could," you say, "without injustice, at that time, have
condemned all, and not have bestowed, on a single individual,
grace through Christ. Who denies it? The point in dispute is
not -- whether God, when man, with all his posterity, sinned
of his own fault: and became obnoxious to eternal death, was
obligated to give His own Son to the world as a mediator --
but whether it can be truly said that, when God willed that
His own Son should become a man and die for sins, He willed
it with this distinction, that he should assume, for a
certain few only, the human nature which he had in common
with all men; that he should suffer for only a few the death
which could be the price for all the sins of all men, and for
the first sin, which all committed alike in Adam; whether God
purposed to proceed according to the rigor of His justice,
and to the strictness of the law, and the condition made
requisite in the law, with the largest part of the human
race, but according to His mercy and grace with a few,
according to the gospel and the righteousness of faith, and
the condition proposed in the gospel; whether He proposed to
impute, even to a certain few, the sin which they had
personally committed in Adam, without any hope of remission.
This, I assert, is the question: you reply affirmatively to
this question, and, therefore, confess that the allegation is
made, with truth, against your doctrine, nor can you escape
by the plea, that "it is not wonderful that they should be
left without Christ, since they had rejected the grace
offered in Adam." Your answer has reference to the justice of
the act, and the question is concerning the act itself; your
answer has reference to the cause, and the question is
concerning the existence of the thing, the cause of which you
present. That your answer may not, to some, seem too
horrible, you present, secondly, another answer, namely,
"Christ may be said to have died for all," but you subjoin an
explanation of this kind, which perverts the interpretation,
and absolutely nullifies your apparent and verbal confession.
For you add that "he did not die for all and for each equally
in reference to God, in the same sense for the lost and for
the elect, or efficiently on the part of God." Let us linger
here, and weigh well what you say. The Scripture declares
explicitly, and in plain terms, that Christ died even for
those who are lost, (Rom. xiv, 15; 2 Pet. ii, 1). Not
equally, you say, in respect to God. But what is the meaning
of the phrase "in respect to God"? Is it the same as
"according to the decree of God?" Indeed, Christ, "by the
grace of God tasted death for every man" (Heb. ii, 9). By the
command of God, Christ laid down his life "for the life of
the world" (John vi, 51), and "for the sheep" (John x, 15).
He can not, indeed, be said to have died for any man, except
by the decree and the command of the Father. You will say
that you do not now refer to the decree, by which God, the
Father, imposed upon His Son the office and duty of expiating
sins by his own death; but to the decree, by which He
determined to save the elect through Christ. But I assert
that the latter decree is, in its nature, subsequent to the
death of Christ, and to the merit obtained by that death.
You add then, that "he died not equally for the reprobate"
(you ought to use that word, and not the word "lost") "and
for the elect." You consider these things in the wrong order.
For the death of Christ, in the order of causes, precedes the
decree of election and reprobation, from which arises the
difference between the elect and the reprobate. The election
was made in Christ, dead, raised again, and having
meritoriously obtained grace and glory. Therefore, Christ
also died for all, without any distinction of elect and
reprobate. For that two-fold relation of men is subsequent to
the death of Christ, pertaining to the application of the
death and the resurrection of Christ, and of the blessings
obtained by them. The phrase, "Christ died for the elect,"
does not signify that some were elected before Christ
received the command from God to offer his life, as the price
of redemption for the life of the world, or before Christ was
considered as having died, (for how could that be, since
Christ is the head of all the elect, in whom their election
is sure?), but that the death of Christ secures for the elect
only, the blessing which is bestowed through an application
of Christ and his benefits.
Hence, also, the phrase used by the school-men, is to be
understood thus, that "Christ died for all men sufficiently,
but, for the elect and believers only, he died
efficaciously." Your phrase, "efficiently on the part of
God," is, in my judgment, irrelevant. What is the meaning of
the statement -- "Christ died efficiently, on the part of
God. for the elect, and not for the reprobate"? This
phraseology can not be used in any correct sense. I know that
you wished to give the idea that the efficacy of Christ's
death is applied to some and not to others. If you mean this,
you ought to speak so that this might be understood to be
your meaning. If your affirmation and that of the school-men,
be rigidly examined, it will be seen that they can not be
used without injury to the death of Christ and its merit. For
they attribute sufficiency to the death of Christ, but
deprive it of efficacy, when, indeed, the death of Christ is
a sufficient price for the life of the world, and was
efficacious for abolishing sin and satisfying God. We do not
speak, you say, of the efficacy of his death, but of that of
its application. The contrary, however, is clearly manifest;
for you deprive of efficacy that to which you attribute
sufficiency -- and you attribute sufficiency to the death of
Christ. If this, also, is examined rigidly, it will be seen
that you do not even attribute sufficiency to the death of
Christ. For how shall that be a sufficient price which is no
price? That is not a price, which is not offered, not paid,
not reckoned. But Christ did not offer himself, except for a
few only, namely, the elect. Certainly, my friend, those are
words and evasions, sought for the purpose of avoiding the
stroke of truth.
You, then, bring some passages of Scripture to prove your
proposition. "Christ says to the reprobate, 'I never knew
you,' therefore, he never acknowledged them for his own."
What then? Did he, therefore, not die for them? That
certainly, is an inconclusive argument. For it is necessary
that, by his own death, he should redeem unto himself those
whom he was to have for his own: but those whom he has not as
his own, he did not know as his own, or acknowledge for his
own. But, as he acknowledges some for his own, it is not
sufficient that he should die for them, and, by the right of
redemption, prepare them for himself, but also should make
them his own in fact, by an efficacious application of
blessings. Hence, it is apparent that there are, here, the
fallacies of ignoratio elenchi and causa non causa. The other
argument which you adduce is not more valid. "If all and each
are efficaciously redeemed, all and each are also reconciled
to God; -- But all are not reconciled, nor do all receive the
remission of their sins; -- Therefore, not all and each are
efficaciously redeemed." What if I should say that I concede
all this, if it is only correctly understood, and that your
conclusion does not belong to the question? You confound the
result with the action and passion, from which it exists. For
the offering of Christ in death, is the action of Christ, by
which he obtained redemption. You then confound the
obtainment of redemption with its application: for to be
efficaciously redeemed, means to be a partaker of the
redemption, made and obtained by the death of Christ. You
confound, also, reconciliation made with God by the death and
sacrifice of Christ, with the application of the same, which
are plainly different things. For "God was, in Christ,
reconciling the world unto himself, and hath committed unto
us the word of reconciliation" ('2 Corinthians v, 19). We are
said to have been "reconciled to God, when we were enemies"
(Rom. v, 10), which cannot be understood of the application
of reconciliation. But your statement -- "remission of sins
and satisfaction belong together," is not, in all respects
true. For satisfaction precedes, as consisting in the death
and obedience of Christ, but remission of sins consists in
the application of that satisfaction by faith in Christ,
which may possibly, not actually follow the satisfaction
which has been rendered. Christ, indeed, obtained eternal
redemption and the right to remit sins, but sin is not
remitted except to those who really believe in Christ. The
remark of Prosper is entirely in accordance with these
statements. For, by the word redemption, he understands the
act both in its accomplishment and in its application. This
your second argument, therefore, aside from the purpose, and,
on account of confusedness and equivocation, proves nothing.
Your third argument is also inconclusive. For, even if the
antecedent is granted, the consequent does not follow. It is
true that "Christ gave himself, that he might obtain, from
the Father, the right of sanctifying those who should believe
in him," and these are thus immediately joined. But, as he
obtained the right, he also, in fact, used that right, by his
Spirit and the application and sprinkling of his own blood,
sanctifying to himself a peculiar people, and redeeming and
freeing them from their own depraved condition, which right
pertains to the application of the benefits, obtained for us
by the death of Christ. But it does not, thence, follow that,
because all do not, in fact, become partakers of that
sanctification, therefore, Christ did not give himself for
them as the price of redemption; for the action of Christ is
confounded with its result, and the application of benefits
with their obtainment.
The fourth argument labours under the same fault -- that of
confusedness. It is true that "the redemption, which has been
accomplished, and, therefore, sonship, are destined for those
who believe in Christ; "but it is necessary that the act
should precede, by which Christ must obtain for us redemption
and sonship, which act, in the order of causes, precedes the
entire purpose of God in reference to the application of the
redemption. In the fifth argument, you commit the same
fallacy. For the point in dispute, is, "Did Christ die for
all without any distinction of elect and reprobate?" and you
present, as an argument, the assertion -- "his death and the
benefits of his death are not applied to all without
distinction." You say that "we may grant that they are, on
the part of God, freed from condemnation; yet they are not so
far the recipients of grace as that sin no longer reigns in
them." I reply that if you grant the former, the latter must
also be conceded. For these two benefits, obtained for us by
the death and resurrection of Christ -- freedom from the
condemnation of sin, and from its dominion -- are conjoined.
One can not be bestowed without the other, on any person.
You, lastly, produce some testimonies from the old writers,
but they all, it rightly explained, agree with these things
which we have said. For Ambrose plainly speaks of the
advantage resulting from the application of Christ's passion,
when he says "he did not descend for thee, he did not suffer
for thee," that is, "not for thy benefit." Whence, also, I
pray, does faith come to us? Is it not from the gift of the
Spirit which Christ has merited for us? Therefore, the
passion and the descent of Christ must have preceded our
faith, and, therefore, they can not be limited by that faith.
But faith is the instrument of that application. Augustine,
also, treats of "deliverance" not as obtained, but as
applied. Thus, also, Bernard, Haimo, and Thomas Aquinas. If
any of the fathers or school-men seem, at any time, to speak
differently, their words must be so explained as not to
impinge the truth revealed to us in the Scripture.
Let us now look at some of the objections to your doctrine
which you notice. The first is this -- "The Scriptures assert
that Christ redeemed the world." Why did you not use the word
suffer for rather than the word redeem, so as to avoid
ambiguity; especially, when the question has reference not to
the application of Christ's passion, but to that passion
itself, and the death of Christ. But let us consider the
objection, as it is presented by yourself. I say that a
distinction is to be made between redemption obtained and
redemption applied, and I affirm that it was obtained for the
whole world, and for all and each of mankind; but that it was
applied only to believers, and to the elect. First, I show
that if it was not obtained for all, faith in Christ is, by
no right, required of all, and if it was not obtained for
all, no one can be rightly blamed, on account of rejecting
the offer of redemption, for he rejects that which does not
belong to him, and he does it with propriety. If Christ did
not die for all, then he can not be the judge of all. The
latter idea is conceded, on both sides. But I say that, in
the remark of Augustine, the subject discussed is the
application of reconciliation, and actual salvation.
The second objection is -- God "will have all men to be
saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth." But you
do not subjoin the conclusion. It may, indeed, be deduced
from the antecedents. But it is of much importance, how that
conclusion is formed. For one concludes, "therefore all men
universally, will be saved, and will come to the knowledge of
the truth. For who hath resisted his will?" Another infers
"then there is no predestination, according to which God
wills that some should believe and be saved, and that some,
being alien from the faith, should be condemned, and this,
also, from His decree." A third deduces this conclusion:
"Therefore, there can be no will of God by which He
absolutely and without reference to sin in man, wills that
any should be condemned and not come to the knowledge of the
truth." The first conclusion is not legitimate. For they are
not always saved, whom God wills to be saved. The second,
also, can not be deduced from the text. But of the third, I
think that it can be said with truth that it can and must be
deduced from those words. I give a plain and perspicuous
reason. No one can be condemned for rejecting the truth
unless he has been called to it, either in his own person, or
in the person of his parents, grand-parents, great grand-
parents, &c. No one is called to it, if God does not will
that he should come to it; and all men who shall be
condemned, will be condemned because "light has come into the
world, and men loved darkness rather than light" (John iii,
19).
Let us consider your reply. You present this in a four-fold
manner. The first is this: "The word all does not embrace all
the descendants of Adam, but is used in reference to men in
the last age of the world." This, indeed, is truly said, the
circumstance of this passage being considered, which treats
of the amplitude of the grace exhibited, in the New
Testament, in Christ; but the truth of the same words extends
itself even further. For that is the perpetual will of God,
and had its beginning in the first promise of the blessed
Seed, made in paradise. That God did indeed suffer the
Gentiles to walk in their own ways, does not contravene this
declaration. For they were alienated from the covenant of
God, and deprived of the promises by their own fault -- by
their own fault, committed either in themselves or their
ancestors. It ought, then, to have been conceded by you that
God willed, through all ages, that all men, individually,
should come to the knowledge of the truth and be saved, so
far as they were embraced in the divine covenant, not,
indeed, when they had in themselves, or their parents,
departed from it.
Your second answer is -- "God willed that all men should be
saved who are saved," which, indeed, does open violence to
the phraseology, and holds up to ridicule the apostle, who if
that explanation is correct, presents so foolish an argument.
The design of the apostle is to exhort that "prayers should
be made for all men, and for all that are in authority." This
reason is "this is good and acceptable in the sight of God,
who will have all men to be saved, &c." It is here apparent
that the word all is used, in the same sense, in the
statement of the reason, as in the exhortation. Otherwise,
the connection of the parts is destroyed, and there are four
terms in the syllogism. But if it is intended, in the
statement of the reason, to refer to all who will be saved,
then it must be taken in the same sense in the exhortation
also, and then the exhortation of the apostle must be
understood in this sense: "I exhort that prayers and
supplications be made for all who are to be saved, for God
wills that all, who are to be saved, shall be saved." What is
doing violence to the meaning of the apostle, if this is not?
"But Augustine so explains it: "What then? We do not rest in
his authority." Also, we prove this by a collation of a
similar passage: "This I deny. For the passage in 1
Corinthians xv, 22, "in Christ shall all be made alive," is
not similar. For the emphasis may, here, be placed on the
words "in Christ," and then it will read thus: "all, who are
made alive, will be made alive in Christ, and no one out of
Christ." The emphasis, indeed, belongs on those words, as is
apparent from the contrast of the other member, "as in Adam
all die." But in the passage, in the first epistle to
Timothy, there is nothing similar to this. For it says, "God
wills that all men should be saved," in which that repetition
and reduplication can not have any place. Does not the
Scripture teach that we must pray for all, even for those who
are not to be partakers of salvation? So far, at least, as it
is not evident to us whether they have or have not sinned
unto death; for those of the former class, and them only,
prayer is not to be made.
Your third answer is that "the phrase means not single
individuals of classes, but classes of single individuals;"
as if the apostle had said "God wills that some of all
classes, states and conditions of men should be saved." This
answer you defend from the diverse use of the word all, which
is taken, at one time distinctively, at another collectively,
which is, indeed, true, although you have interchanged the
distributive and collective use of the word. For all the
animals were, in a distributive sense, in Noah's ark, and all
men, in a collective sense. Even if the use of that word is
two-fold, it does not thence follow that it is used in one
and not in the other sense, for it can be used in either. In
this passage, however, it is used not for classes of single
individuals, but for single individuals of classes; for the
will of God goes out towards single individuals of classes,
or to single human beings. For he wills that single men
should come to the knowledge of the truth and be saved, that
is, all and each, rich and poor, noble and ignoble, male and
female, &c. As the knowledge of the truth and salvation
belong to single human beings, and is, in fact, prepared, by
predestination, for the salvation of single individuals, not
for classes, and is denied, by reprobation, to single
individuals, not to classes, so, also, in the more general
providence of God, antecedent, in the order of nature, to the
decree of predestination and reprobation, the divine will has
reference to single individuals of classes, not to classes of
single individuals. For providence, having reference to
classes of single individuals, pertains to the preservation
of the species, but that, which refers to single individuals
of classes, pertains to the preservation of individuals. But
that providence which ministers salvation and the means
necessary for salvation, pertains to the preservation and
salvation of individuals. Besides, if this passage is to be
understood to refer to classes, then the apostle would not
have said "for all in authority," but "for some, at least, in
eminent positions," but he openly says "that prayers should
be made for single individuals in that relation." Nor is
there any necessity of any other acceptation of that word,
for there is no need of that plea to avoid this consequence,
"therefore, all and each are saved." For the salvation of all
would not follow from the fact that God wills that any one
should be saved, by his will, approving and desiring the
salvation of all and of each, but it would follow, if He, by
an efficacious volition, saves all and each. To this effect,
also, is the distinction made by Damascenus, which we will
examine at somewhat greater extent.
Your fourth answer is, "Paul here speaks according to the
judgment of charity, not according to the judgment of secret
and infallible certainty." This is really absurd, unless you
refer to the charity of God. For Paul here treats of the will
of God to which he attributes this volition, that He wills
the salvation of all men; not of His will according to which
He earnestly desires the salvation of all. But it is, in the
mean time, true that God does not will this infallibly or
certainly, so that it can not, or at least will not happen
otherwise. This, however, is not said by those, who use this
passage to sustain a positive contrary to your sentiment. It
is settled, then, that from this passage it is a fair
inference that "God can not be said, without reference to sin
in men, to will that any should err from the truth, or should
not come to the truth, and should be condemned."
We may now consider the distinction, made by Damascenus, in
which He regards the will of God, as antecedent and
consequent. It is of special importance to observe, when the
antecedent and consequent wills are spoken of relatively, in
what relation they receive those appellations. This relation
is that of the will to the will, or rather that of the divine
volition, to the divine volition, the former as antecedent,
the latter as consequent -- for God puts forth one volition
before another, in the order of nature, though not of time --
or it is that of the divine volition to the preceding or
subsequent volition or act of the creature. In respect to the
latter, the divine will is called antecedent; in respect to
the former, consequent. But these two relations do not
greatly differ, though I think that the relation to the
volition and act of the creature, either subsequent to or
preceding the divine volition, was the cause of the
distinction. If we consider the order of volitions, which God
wills previous to any act or volition of the creature, we
shall see, in that order, that there are some antecedent,
some consequent volitions, yet all previous to any act and
volition of the creature. And, since that volition, which
exists of some cause in us, may be called consequent, it is
certain that the distinction was understood by Damascenus,
its first author, in the sense that it was in relation to the
act or volition of the creature.
The will of God, then, may be called antecedent, by which He
wills anything in relation to the creature (our discussion, a
rational creature) previous to any act of the creature
whatever, or to any particular act of it. Thus He willed that
all men and each of them should be saved. The consequent will
of God is that, by which He wills any thing in reference to a
rational creature after any act or after many acts of the
creature. Thus He wills that they, who believe and persevere
in faith, shall be saved, but that those, who are unbelieving
and impenitent, shall remain under condemnation. By His
antecedent will, He willed to confirm and establish the
throne of Saul forever; by His consequent will, He willed to
remove him from the kingdom, and to substitute in his place a
man better than he. By his antecedent will Christ willed to
gather the Jews as a hen gathers her chickens; by his
consequent will, he willed to scatter them among all nations.
You, indeed, approve this distinction, but do not approve the
example of antecedent will, presented by Damascenus himself.
Let us examine the reasons, in view of which you form this
decision.
First you say, "It would follow from this that there is in
the Deity weakness and limited power." I deny this sequence;
for the divine power is not the instrument of the divine
inclination, or desire, or velleity, but of free volition,
following the last decision of the divine wisdom, though God
may use His power to obtain what He desires within proper
limits. Nor is it true that, if one desires or seriously
wills any thing, he will effect the same in any way whatever,
but he will do it in those ways, in which it is suitable that
he should effect it. A father may desire and seriously
propose that his son should obey him, but he does not
violently compel him to obedience, for it would not be
obedience. A father seriously wills that his son should
abstain from intoxication, yet he does not confine him in a
chamber, where he can not become intoxicated. A father
seriously wills to give the paternal inheritance to his son;
and by a consequent volition, namely, one that follows the
contumacious and obstinate wickedness of the son, wills to
disinherit him, nor yet does he do all things, within the
scope of his power, that his son may not sin. For, it was
possible for the father to keep his son bound and lettered
with chains, that he might not be able to sin. But it was as
suitable that the father should not use that mode of
restraint, as it was to will the patrimony to his son.
The illustration taken from the merchant desiring to save his
goods, yet throwing them into the sea is well adapted to its
purpose. God seriously wills that all men should be saved,
but compelled by the pertinacious and incorrigible wickedness
of some, He wills that they should suffer the loss of
salvation -- that they should be condemned. If you say that
the analogy fails, because God could correct their
wickedness, but the merchant can not control the winds and
the waves, I reply that it may, indeed, be possible to
absolute omnipotence, but it is not suitable that God should
in that way correct the wickedness of His creatures.
Therefore God wills their condemnation because He does not
will that His own righteousness should perish.
They, who object that this will may be called conditional, do
not say all which might be said, yet they say something. Not
all, because this inclination by which God desires the
salvation of all men and of each, is simple, natural, and
unconditional in God. Yet they say something, since it is
true that God wills the salvation of all men, on the
condition that they believe, for no will can be attributed to
God, by which He may will that any man shall be saved in a
sense, such that salvation will, certainly and infallibly,
come to him, unless he is considered as a believer, and as
persevering in faith even to the end. Since, however, that
conditional volition may be changed into an absolute one, in
this manner -- God wills that all believers should be saved,
and that unbelievers should be condemned, which, being
absolute, is always fulfilled, this volition may be said not
to pertain to this distinction of the will. For, in that
volition, He wills nothing to His creature but He wills that
these two things, faith and salvation, unbelief and
condemnation, should indissolubly cohere. Yet, if it seems
proper for any one to consider this an example of antecedent
volition, I will not contradict him, yet the application is
only by a volition, consequent on the act of faith and
perseverance, of unbelief and impenitence.
Your conclusion that "the will of God must be in suspense
until the condition is fulfilled, and that the first cause is
dependent on second causes," is not valid. For, concerning
the former part, I remark that inclination in God is natural
towards His own creature, whether the man believes or not.
For that inclination does not depend on faith, and
uncertainty can not be attributed to the will of Him who, in
His infinite wisdom; has all things present to himself, and
certainly foreknows all future events, even those most
contingent. Nor is the first cause, consequently, dependent
on second causes, when any effect of the first cause is
placed, in the order of nature, after an effect of the second
cause, as that effect, consequent in order, belongs to the
mere will of the first cause. It is absurd to say that the
condemnation of those, who perish, depends on themselves,
even if they would not perish unless by their own demerit.
For they willed to merit perdition, and not to perish, that
is, they willed to sin and not to be punished. Therefore that
punishment depends on the mere and free will of God, yet it
can inflict it only on sinners, the operation of power being
suspended by justice, agreeably to which that power ought to
be exercised. It is no more a valid conclusion that, by this
distinction, the free choice of faith or unbelief is
attributed to men. For it is in entire harmony with that
condition that no one has faith except by the gift of God,
though there can be no doubt that man has the free choice not
to believe.
You say, secondly -- "this conditional will of God is
inactive because it belongs to infinite power, and because He
can do whatever He will." But it is not suitable that He
should use His infinite power to effect that, to which He is
borne by natural desire, and it is useful for man, that this
will of God should be presented to him as conditional,
indeed, rather than as absolute, as was previously said; for
it seems as an argument to persuade him to believe. For if he
wishes to be saved he must believe, because God has appointed
that men shall be saved only through faith.
Your third reason, referring to angels, can be made doubtful
by the relation of the antecedent, and even if this is
conceded, the consequent does not follow. For the relation of
angels and of men is not the same. I am, indeed, fully of the
opinion that it is most true that God, by antecedent
volition, willed that all and each of the angels should be
saved, but only in a due mode and order. Three divine
volitions in reference to angels may be laid down in order:
the salvation of angels, the obedience of angels, the
condemnation of angels. God wills the first from love for His
creatures; the second from love for righteousness and the
obedience due to Him from His creatures, and, indeed, in such
a sense, that He more strongly wills that the second should
be rendered to Himself, than the first to His creatures; the
third He wills from the same love for justice, whose injury
He can not leave unpunished, since punishment is the sole
mode of correcting disorder.
Your statements, under your fourth reason, are correct, "and
God might will that all sinful men as such should be
condemned," if He had not from love towards men determined to
lay their sins on His Son, to this end that all who should
believe in him, being freed from their sins, should obtain
the reward of righteousness. It may indeed be said that God
willed that all sinners, as such, should be condemned; but
not all sinners are, in fact, condemned, because believers,
though they have sinned, are considered not as sinners, but
as righteous in Christ.
Fifthly, you say that "the antecedent will of God is
absolute." What then? I do not wish to hinder you from
regarding the antecedent will in your own way, different from
the sentiment of Damascenus. You should, however, consider
that you are not then arguing against him. But who has ever
defined absolute will -- "that which can not be resisted"?
Absolute will is that which is unconditional. For example,
God willed absolutely that Adam should not eat of the
forbidden tree; yet he did eat of that tree. The will, which
can not be resisted, is called efficacious. It is not
allowable to arrange things defined, and their definitions,
according to our own choice. "But," you may say, "it is not
possible to resist the antecedent will." I deny it. You
assert, as proof, that "the will, referred to in Romans 9, is
antecedent will, and that it can not be resisted." It is for
you to prove that assertion. The very statement declares,
since the subject, in that passage, is the will of God, by
which He hardens, and has mercy, which are divine effects,
following acts of the creature which are sinful, called sin,
that the will, here spoken of, is consequent not antecedent.
Another method, which you use to prove the same thing, is
equally weak. For, it is not true that "God, simply and
absolutely, wills that some should believe and persevere, and
others be deserted, either not believing or not persevering."
He does not will to desert them, unless they desert
themselves; and He is even gracious to those, who do not
think of Him. The argument from the event is futile. For some
things occur by the will and the efficiency of God, some by
His permission. Therefore it can not be concluded from any
event that God willed it. But it has been previously shown
how an event may take place, not because God may be unwilling
to prevent it; though it would not happen, if God should will
efficaciously to prevent it. Therefore that conclusion can
not be thus deduced. It is, indeed, true that the reason can
not be given why God should afford to one nation the means of
salvation, and not to another, why he should give faith to
one man, and not to another, which facts may not be resolved
into his will. Yet it is not thence concluded, and it is not
true, that the will, in that case, is antecedent, even though
it precedes all causes in men.
Sixthly, you say that the foundation being destroyed, the
edifice falls. But the foundation of that opinion in
reference to the antecedent will, which desires the salvation
of all men and of each, is the passage in 1 Timothy ch. 2,
which has been already discussed by us, and that is
incorrectly understood by Damascenus. I reply, first; -- Not
only that passage, but many others, most clearly sustain that
distinction of the will into antecedent and consequent. "How
often would I have gathered you together," is an example of
antecedent, and "your house is left unto you desolate" of
consequent will (Matt. xxiii, 37-38). "And sent forth his
servants to call them that were bidden to the wedding," is a
case of antecedent will, "they which were bidden were not
worthy" and were destroyed, of consequent will. He, also, was
invited, according to antecedent will, who, being afterwards
found, not having on a wedding garment, was cast out,
according to consequent will (Matt. xxii, 3, 7, 8, 12 and
13). According to antecedent will, the lord commanded his
servants to reckon their talents, and to use them for gain
for their master; by consequent will, the talent, which he
had received, was taken from the wicked and slothful servant
(Matt. 25). By antecedent will, the word of God was first
offered to the Jews; by consequent will, the same word was
taken from them and sent to others (Acts 13). The same
distinction is proved by a consideration of the attributes of
God; for since God is good and just, He can not will eternal
death to His own creature, made in His image, without
reference to sin; He can not but will eternal salvation to
His creature. The immutability of God necessarily requires
the same thing. For since His providence has given to all His
creatures means, necessary and sufficient, by which they can
attain their designed end, but the designed end of man, made
in the image of God, is eternal life, it hence follows that
all men are loved by God unto eternal life by antecedent
will; nor can God, without a change of His own arrangement,
deny eternal life unto men, without reference to sin; which
denial, being consequent on the act of man, pertains to
consequent will.
The views of Augustine are not opposed to Damascenus.
Augustine, indeed, denies that this passage refers to
efficacious will; but Damascenus makes no such assertion; he
even concedes the very same thing with Augustine; -- "God
does not will efficaciously to save all and each of mankind."
The second interpretation of Augustine is rejected by us on
sure grounds. Nor is Prosper opposed to Damascenus. For he,
who says that "God wills antecedently that all men should be
saved," does not deny that He can, by a consequent will, pass
by many men, to whom He does not impart the grace of
vocation. Thomas Aquinas, also, is, no more than the others,
opposed to Damascenus, for he, in commenting on this passage,
speaks of efficacious and of consequent will; and elsewhere
he approves of the distinction of Damascenes, and makes use
of it, in explaining the passage, which is in controversy.
Hugo clearly agrees with Damascenus, if his views are
suitably explained.
The third objection is this: "Whatever any one is bound to
believe is true; -- But every one is bound to believe that he
has been efficaciously redeemed by Christ; -- Therefore, it
is true that every one has been efficaciously redeemed by the
death of Christ; and, therefore, even the reprobate have been
redeemed, since they also are bound to believe this." Since
this objection is of great importance, and alone sufficient,
if it is true, it is necessary that we should examine it with
diligence, and at the same time your answer to it. The truth
of the Major is manifest, for truth is the foundation of
faith, nor can one be, in any way, bound to believe what is
false. But you make a distinction in reference to truth and
say, that "what is true, is either: true, as to the intention
of God, who obligates us to believe, or as to the event." But
that distinction is of no importance. I affirm that what is
true, according to the intention of God, must be believed
according to that intention. What is true, according to the
event, must be believed according to the event; and the
intention of God can not obligate any one to believe any
thing to be true according to the event, which is not true
according to the event. In general, it is true that we are
bound to believe that which is true in that mode in which it
is true, not in any other mode; otherwise, we should be bound
to believe what is false. You see, then, that there is no
need of that distinction in the Major; indeed it is most
clearly evident that you, lest you should say nothing,
wished, by that minute distinction, to avoid this effective
blow.
Let us consider the Minor. Its phraseology is bad, because
the efficacy of redemption pertains to its application, which
is made through faith. Therefore faith is prior to
efficacious application, and the object of faith is prior to
faith itself. We may correct it, and it will read thus, "But
every one is bound to believe in Christ, the saviour, that he
died for his sake, and obtained for him reconciliation and
redemption before God." This is, indeed, most true. For they
can not be condemned, for want of faith, who were not bound
to believe this. But here also you use a distinction, but one
which is irrelevant and ridiculous -- pardon my freedom of
speech -- and you do great injustice to yourself, and your
own genius, when you endeavour to disguise the plain truth,
by so puerile distinctions. You say that the elect are
obligated to believe, so that, by faith, they may be made
partakers of election, the reprobate are obligated to
believe, so that, by neglecting to do so, they may be without
excuse, even in the intention of God. But what is the
difference whether one is bound to believe to this or that
end, provided he is only bound to believe. From which
obligation to believe, the truth of that which any one is
bound to believe may afterwards be inferred. The expression -
- "that they may be made partakers of election," is absurd.
It should be corrected thus -- "that they may be made
partakers of the blessings prepared for them in election,"
or, if we wish to confine ourselves to the limits of the
objection, -- "that they may, in fact, be made partakers of
the redemption prepared for them by Christ." But the
reprobate are also bound to believe for the same reason. If
it be said that they, absolutely, can not be made partakers,
I will say that, for this very reason, the reprobate are not
obligated to believe. For the end of the exercise of faith is
the application of redemption, and of all the blessings,
obtained for us by the merit of Christ. The end of the
command and the requirement of faith is that the application
may be possible. But how absurd is the declaration that the
reprobate are under obligation to believe, so that they may,
by not believing, be rendered inexcusable. Unite, if you can,
these things, so inconsistent, and widely distant as heaven
and earth. This, however, has been before referred to. You
proceed with your distinctions, and say -- "one command has
reference to obedience; another, to trial." But what relation
has this to the present matter? For whether God commands,
with the purpose that man should, in fact, obey, or with the
purpose, only, of testing his obedience in the effort to
execute the command, the man is always obligated to perform
what God commands, as is apparent in the offering of Isaac by
Abraham. Nor has this command, in the relation of that, any
analogy, with what you subjoin, -- "God does not sport with
men, even if He, by the preaching of the word, calls those
whom He does not purpose to save." Indeed we have already
said enough in reference to those and similar evasions. I
will say, in a word, -- that no one can confess that he is
guilty for rejecting a promise made verbally, if the mind of
the promiser has determined that the promise does not belong
to the person addressed; or rather if he, who verbally
promises, has, by a fixed decree, determined that the promise
may not and can not belong to the other person.
You present an objection, as an adversary to yourself, thus -
- "but you will say that it could not belong to him." Not
only may that objection be urged, but also another -- "How do
you confute that statement, so that it may not follow from it
that he is without blame, who could not receive the salvation
offered to him?" You will say that such inability is
voluntary, and born with us, and therefore undeserving
pardon. You err here, and confound inability to keep the law,
propagated in us from Adam, with inability to believe in
Christ, and to accept the grace of the gospel, offered us in
the word. By what deed have we brought this inability upon
ourselves? Not by a deed preceding that promise; then it was
by a deed following it, that is, by a rejection of the
promise of the gospel; which rejection also can not be
imputed to us as a fault, if we were unable to receive it at
the time when the promise was first presented to us. The
answer, then, amounts to nothing, because the two kinds of
inability are confounded, in which is the fallacy of
ignoratia elenchi, also that of equivocal use of terms.
You reply, in the second place, that "what any one is
obligated to believe is true, unless he may have placed
before himself an obstacle by not believing." Is this
correct? Can any one place before himself an obstacle, by his
own unbelief, that what he is bound to believe may not be
true? Absurd. One can, by his own unbelief, place before
himself an obstacle, so as not to be able afterwards to
believe, that is, to deserve hardening in unbelief on account
of rejecting the truth offered to him. One can, also, by his
own unbelief, deserve that God should change that good will,
by which He offered His Son as the redeemer, into wrath, by
which He may will to punish him without remission or pardon.
Thirdly you reply that "the argument twice depends on
assertion, in both parts." But who compelled you to so reduce
that argument into an illogical syllogism, when it might have
been put in a legitimate form and mode, in this way, "That
which every one is bound to believe, is true; -- That Christ
is his redeemer, who, by his own death, meritoriously
obtained the divine grace, and the pardon of his sins, is
what every one, called in the gospel, is bound to believe; --
Therefore it is true, that Christ is the redeemer of all, who
are called by the gospel and commanded to believe. But among
them are many reprobate persons. Therefore it is true that
Christ is the redeemer of many reprobate persons. If we
consider vocation to be that by which any one is called,
either in himself or in his parents, then all men,
universally, are or have been partakers of that vocation, and
therefore all have been redeemed by Christ." But the form,
also, in which you have put it is the same in effect, though
you have so arranged the words, that they seem to have a
different meaning. I see that you wrote those things with a
hurried pen, without an examination of the syllogism as you
have proposed it.
The fourth objection, from the fathers, is valid against you,
nor do you reply in accordance with the terms of the
sentiment hostile to you. The amount of the objection is
this, "Christ died for all sufficiently, both as to the
common nature of the human race, and as to the common cause
and sufficient price of redemption." You have introduced
efficacy into the argument or objection, while they, who make
this objection against you, know that there is the clearest
distinction between the death of Christ itself and its
application. You say, "and thus far in reference to the
extent and efficacy of Christ's death," when the discussion
has been hitherto in reference not to its efficacy, but to
its sufficiency, and its oblation and the universality of
that oblation. You, now, proceed to treat of the amplitude of
grace, but what you present does not much affect the point at
issue. The question is not, whether all and each of the human
race are, in fact, regenerated and renewed, but whether God
has reprobated any man, without respect to sin as a
meritorious cause; or whether He has determined absolutely to
deny to any man the grace of remission and of the renewal of
the Holy Spirit without reference to unworthiness, in that he
has made himself unworthy of that grace -- unworthiness, not
resulting from original sin, but from the rejection and
contempt of that offered grace. The distinction of sufficient
and efficacious grace might have been well adapted to this
subject, as we have also previously demonstrated. Yet there
is one thing of which I may admonish you. You seem to me not
correctly to deprive, of supernatural grace, the image of
God, consisting of righteousness and holiness. For though the
former gift was bestowed on man at his creation and at the
same time with nature itself, for so I now consider it, yet
it is supernatural, and surpasses the nature of man itself,
as I prove from the act of regeneration, which belongs to
supernatural grace. For, since there is need of regeneration
for the recovery of that righteousness and holiness, which
regeneration is a supernatural act, it is necessary that the
same should, originally, have been bestowed on man, by a
supernatural action. I wish, also, to know what those
supernatural things are which man is said to have lost in the
fall, his natural qualities having become corrupt. Thus far,
in reference to these things.
I think, indeed, that it is sufficiently evident from what we
have thus far discussed that the view of Predestination which
you have presented can not be proved by the Scriptures; that
it can not be defended against strong objections; that it can
not be acquitted of manifold absurdity. It ought then to be
abandoned by you, and another should be sought from the
Scriptures, which may harmonize with them, and may be able to
sustain without injury the onset of assailant objections.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE TREATISE OF WILLIAM PERKINS CONCERNING
THE ORDER AND MODE OF PREDESTINATION
PART 2
In the first part of our treatise, we have examined, most
learned Perkins, your sentiment concerning Predestination,
and have proved that it is, by no means, consistent with the
Holy Scriptures. Another labour now remains to us, to
consider how you refute the opinion which you say is
different from yours.
You, briefly, set forth that opinion, diligently gathered
from the writings of others, consisting of four parts --
First, "God created all and each of mankind in Adam unto
eternal life."
Secondly, "He foresaw the fall."
Thirdly, "Since He is good by nature, He seriously wills that
all men, after the fall, should be saved, and come to the
knowledge of the truth; and therefore He wills to bestow, on
all men, all the aids both of nature and of grace that they
might be saved, but indefinitely, that is if they should
believe. This will of God" (they say) "is predestination, and
is the same with that embraced in the gospel. The rule of
this will is -- 'He that believeth shall be saved, but he,
that believeth not, shall be damned.'"
Fourthly, "Election is according to foreknowledge of future
faith -- to fail of which is possible, wholly, as some, or
finally, as others claim, -- and Reprobation is according to
foreknowledge of unbelief or contempt of the gospel."
I can not speak, with certainty, in reference to the
statement of that theory, whether it agrees with the views of
its authors or not, because you are silent concerning the
authors from whom you have taken it: yet, with your
permission, I may say that it does not seem to me to have
been staged by you with sufficient correctness. Omitting the
first two propositions, I think that, in enunciating the
third, you make a frivolous statement, which will, I believe,
be scarcely admitted by those, whose sentiment you profess to
present. For what is the meaning of this -- "God wills that
all men should come to the knowledge of the truth, but
indefinitely, if they should believe"? Is not faith itself
the knowledge of the truth? Therefore the enunciation is
deceptive and ridiculous -- "God wills that all men should
come to the knowledge of the truth, but indefinitely, if they
should come to the knowledge of the truth, or he wills that
all men should come to faith, if they should believe." The
next sentence is of a similar character, -- "God wills to
bestow, on all men, all the aids both of nature and of grace,
that they may be saved, but indefinitely, if they should
believe," when faith itself holds a distinguished place,
among the aids of grace by which salvation is obtained. From
the passage of the gospel, which is quoted, "He that
believeth shall be saved," &c., it is apparent that they,
whose sentiment you present, would, in this third
proposition, have stated not that which you say, but this,
"God determined to save, from the fallen human race, only
those who should believe in His Son, and to condemn
unbelievers."
The fourth proposition is not, I think, expressed
sufficiently in accordance with the views of those authors.
For, if I am not mistaken, their sentiment is this, --
"Election to salvation is according to foreknowledge of
future faith, which God has determined to bestow of His own
grace upon them by the ordinary means ordained by Himself.
But Reprobation is according to foreknowledge of unbelief or
contempt of the gospel, the fault of which remains, entirely,
in the reprobate themselves." I admit that there may be need
of some explanation of that sentiment, but you do not seem to
have explained it correctly. You should have considered not
one view only, adverse to your own view, but the others,
also, which are opposed to it, and you should have refuted
all of them, that, in this way, it might be evident that no
view, other than yours, is true.
We may, now, consider in what way you refute that theory. You
enumerate very many errors which, you think, result from it,
which we will examine in order.
The first error; -- This either is not an error, or can not
be deduced from that theory. It is not an error, if its
hypothesis be correctly understood. For it is universally
true that "God wills that all men should be saved, if they
believe, and be condemned if they do not believe." That is,
God has made a decree for electing only believers, and for
condemning unbelievers. "But this," you say "is an error
because it makes Election universal, and from it universal
Reprobation is inferred, that is, by the added condition."
But that sentiment makes neither Election nor Reprobation
universal, which can not be done, but it establishes the
particular Election of believers, and the particular
Reprobation of unbelievers. Innumerable passages of Scripture
present this Election and Reprobation. "He that believeth on
the Son hath everlasting life," &c. (John iii, 36). "If ye
believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins" (John
viii, 24). "To him give all the prophets witness, &c." (Acts
x, 43). "Seeing that ye put it from you, &c." (Acts xiii,
46). "He, that hath the Son, hath life; and he, that hath not
the Son of God, hath not life." (1 John v, 12). That Election
and Reprobation is, therefore, evidently proved by many
passages of Scripture. It does not follow, from this, that;
"God always acts in the same manner towards all men." For
though He may seriously will the conversion and salvation of
all men, yet He does not equally effect the conversion and
salvation of all. "What nation is there so great, who hath
God so nigh unto them, &c." (Deut. iv, 7.) "The Lord thy God
hath chosen thee to be a special people unto Himself, &c."
(Deut. vii, 6). "He hath not dealt so with any nation" (Psalm
cxlvii, 20). "It is given unto you to know the mysteries of
the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. xiii, 11). "Who, in times past,
suffered all nations to walk in their own ways" (Acts xiv,
16).
But you have not distinguished, as you ought to have done,
between the decree of God, by which He determined to save
those who should believe in His Son, and to condemn
unbelievers, and that by which He arranged with Himself in
reference to the dispensation of means, ordained by Him to
faith and conversion. For those decrees "I will to give life
to him who believes," and "I will to give faith to this man"
are distinct. Faith, in the former, holds the place of
subject, in the latter, that of attribute. If you had made
this distinction, you would not have laid the burden of such
an absurdity on that theory.
The second error; -- I remark that the highest and absolute
design of the counsels of God "is not regarded by the authors
of that theory to be the communication of the divine goodness
in true happiness, to be made to all men." For they say that
God destined salvation for believers alone; and, though He
may not impart his goodness, and life eternal to a large
number of persons, as unbelievers, yet they do not say this
"without reference to the divine purpose." For they assert
that one part of the divine purpose is that, by which He
determined to deny eternal life to unbelievers. Therefore
this is alleged in vain against that opinion. "But" you say
"the ultimate design of the counsels of God either has an
uncertain event, or is proposed in vain," -- which ideas
coincide, and should not have been expressed distinctly -- if
"the theory is received." Its supporters will deny that
conclusion. For the ultimate design of the divine counsels is
not the life of one and the death of another, but the
illustration of the goodness, justice, wisdom and power of
God, which He always secures. Yet allow that the eternal life
of these, and the death of those is the ultimate design of
those counsels: it will not follow that it has an uncertain
event, or is proposed in vain, if the former is bestowed upon
no one, apart from the condition of faith, and the latter
awaits no one, apart from unbelief. For God by His own
prescience, knows who, of His grace, will believe, and who,
of their own fault, will remain in unbelief. I wish that you
would consider, that certainty of an event results properly
from the prescience of God, but its necessity results from
the omnipotent and irresistible action of God; which may,
indeed, be the foundation of the prescience of some events,
but not of this event, because He has determined to save
believers by grace; that is, by a mild and gentle suasion,
convenient or adapted to their free-will, not by an
omnipotent action or motion, which would be subject neither
to their will, nor to their ability either of resistance or
of will. Much less does the damnation of some proceed from an
irresistible necessity, imposed by the Deity.
The third error; -- You ought, here, first to have explained
what is meant when it is said that "the will of God depends
on the will of man." It may be that you extend that phrase
further than is proper. It is, indeed, certain that the will
of God, since He is entirely independent, -- or rather His
volition -- can not depend on the will of man, if that phrase
be correctly understood, as signifying "to receive its law or
rule from the volition of man." On the other hand, it is
certain that God does will some things, which He would not
will, if a certain human volition did not precede. He willed
that Saul should be removed from the throne; He would not
have willed it, if Saul had not willed to be disobedient to
God. God willed that the Sodomites and their neighbours
should be destroyed; He would not have willed it, if they had
not willed to persevere obstinately in their sins. God willed
to give His own Son as the price of redemption for sinners;
He would not have willed it, if men had remained in obedience
to the divine command. God willed to condemn Judas; He would
not have willed it unless Judas had willed to persist in His
own wickedness.
It is not true, indeed, that "the will of God depends on the
will of man." Man would, if he could, effect that the
volition of God should not follow his own antecedent volition
-- that punishment should not follow sin. Indeed God is
purely the author of His own volition. For He has determined
in His own free-will to follow a volition of His creature, by
His own volition of one kind and not of another; the faith of
His creature by the remission of sins and the gift of eternal
life; the unbelief of the same, by eternal damnation. This is
the meaning of that opinion, which you undertake to refute,
and you therefore, with impropriety charge this absurdity
upon it.
You, however, make an allegation of much greater weight,
against this sentiment, that "by it the creature is raised to
the throne of God, the Omnipotent Creator." How do you
sustain that allegation? "It is claimed" you say "that God
wills that all men should be saved through Christ, and that
many of them are not saved because they, of themselves,
refuse." But, good sir, does that doctrine say that "God
wills that all men should be saved through Christ, whether
they will or not? It does, indeed, assert that "God wills
that they should be saved and come to the knowledge of the
truth" which last can not be done, apart from their free-
will. For no one can, if he is reluctant or unwilling, come
to the knowledge of the truth, that is to faith. If God
should will, absolutely and apart from any condition, that
all men should be saved, and yet some should not be saved
because they refused, then it would follow that the divine
will was overcome by the human will, and the creature was
raised to the throne of the Creator. But as God wills that
His own volition, joined, in due order and mode, with the
volition of man, should precede salvation, it is not
wonderful that a man, who should deny his own assent unto
God; should be excluded from salvation, by that same
determination and purpose of the divine will. "But God" you
say "ordains and disposes the action of the second cause; the
divine will is not ordained by the will of the creature." Who
denies these statements? That is not the doctrine which you
here oppose. Therefore, here also, you attempt, in vain, to
overthrow it by this absurdity.
You add another absurdity, as consequent on this opinion. "If
that sentiment is true, then men elect themselves, by
accepting the grace of God, which is offered to them, by the
common aid of grace, and are reprobated by themselves, by
rejecting offered grace." Let us examine this. Even if a man
should, by accepting common grace, through the aid of common
grace, make himself worthy of Election, and another, by
rejecting the same, should make himself worthy of
Reprobation, it would not follow that Election and
Reprobation belong to the man, but to God, who judges and
rewards worthiness and unworthiness. It is also entirely
true, in reference to Reprobation, that man is the
meritorious cause of his own damnation, and therefore of
Reprobation which is the purpose of damnation. Wherefore he
may be called the maker of his own damnation, in reference to
its demerit; although God can, if He will, remit to him this
demerit. But the relation of Election is different; for it is
merely gratuitous, not only unmerited, but even contrary to
the demerit of man. Whether the grace, which is offered to
man, may be also received by him by the aid of grace, which
is common to him with others who reject the same grace, or by
grace peculiar to him, is perhaps in controversy. I do not,
indeed, see that the sentiment, which you have presented, has
given any prejudgment concerning that matter. It is a strange
assertion that "God would not be extolled, if men should
obtain his blessing merely by the aid of common grace." Who
has deserved that a blessing should be offered to him? Who
has deserved that grace of any kind should be bestowed on him
to the obtainment of that blessing? Do not all these things
pertain to gratuitous divine favour? If so, is not God to be
extolled, on account of them, with perpetual praises by
those, who, having been made partakers of that grace, have
received the blessing of God? Of what importance to this
matter is it, whether he may have obtained the offered
blessing by the aid of common or of peculiar grace, if the
former, as well as the latter, has obtained the free assent
of man, and it has been foreknown by God that it certainly
would obtain it? You will say that, if he has apprehended the
offered grace by the aid of peculiar grace, it is, then,
evident that God has manifested greater love towards him than
towards another to whom He has applied only common grace, and
has denied peculiar grace. I admit it, and perhaps the
theory, which you oppose, will not deny it. But it will
assert that peculiar grace is to be so explained as to be
consistent with free-will, and that common grace is to be so
described, that a man may be held worthy of condemnation by
its rejection, and that God may be shown to be free from
injustice.
The fourth error; -- The knowledge of God, as it has relation
to his creatures, may be regarded in two modes. In one, as
God knows that He can make those creatures, and at the same
time that they can be made in this or in that mode, that they
may not only exist, but may also be able to serve this or
that purpose. This knowledge, in the Deity, is natural and
precedes the act or the free determination of the will, by
which God has determined in Himself to make the same
creatures at such a time. In the other mode, as God knows
that those creatures will exist at one time or another; and,
regarded in this light, it depends on the determination of
the divine will. This knowledge can be referred to the acts
of the creatures themselves, which God has determined either
to effect or to permit. Knowledge, considered in the former
mode, refers to all acts in general, which can be performed
by the creatures, whether God is efficient in them, or only
permits them. From this, follows the decree to effect these
and those acts, and to permit them, which decree is followed
by the knowledge, by which God foreknows that those acts will
occur, at any particular time. This latter knowledge, which
is rightly called prescience, is not, properly, the cause of
things or acts. But the former knowledge, with the will, is
the cause of things and acts. For it shows the mode of
operating, and directs the will. The will, however, impels it
to execution. It is, therefore, certain that there is no
determinate or definite prescience in reference to culpable
evil, unless it has been preceded by a decree to permit sin.
For without this, sin will not exist. Prescience has also
reference to things future and certainly future; otherwise,
either it is not prescience or it is uncertain. These things
are rightly said by you, and the order, which you have made
in prescience and decree, is correct; but it is not contrary
to the hypothesis of the doctrine, which you oppose, but so
consistent with it, that it can not be defended without this
order. For it states that God, from eternity, knew that it
was possible that man, assisted by divine grace, should
either receive or reject Christ; also, that God has decreed,
either to permit a man to reject Christ, or to co-operate
with him that he may accept Christ by faith, then, that God
foreknows that one will apprehend Christ by faith, and that
another will reject him by unbelief. From this follows the
execution of that decree, by which he determined to justify
and save believers, and to condemn unbelievers, which is an
actual justification of the former, and a condemnation of the
latter. It is, therefore, apparent that you improperly allege
such absurdity against that doctrine. Your statement that
"God permits evil, always, with respect to or on account of a
conjoined good," deserves notice. Those words can be
understood to mean that God would permit, an evil on account
of a good, conjoined with the evil, which sentiment can not
be tolerated. For the good, which comes out of evil, is not
conjoined with the evil, but is wonderfully brought out of
evil, as its occasion, by the wisdom, goodness and
omnipotence of God. For He knows how to bring light out of
darkness. The knowledge, also, by which God knows that he can
use evil to a good end, is also the cause of the permission
of evil. For, as Augustine well says, "God, in His goodness,
never permits evil unless, in His omnipotence, He can bring
good out of the evil."
The fifth error; -- Here three things must be properly
distinguished. The acts and sufferings of Christ, the fruits
and results of those acts and suffering, and the
communication and application of those fruits, Christ, by the
sacrifice of his own body, by his obedience and passion,
reconciled us unto God, and obtained for us eternal
redemption, without any respect or distinction of elect and
reprobate, of believers and unbelievers; as that distinction
is, in the order of nature, subsequent. That reconciliation
and redemption is applied to us, when we, having faith in the
word of reconciliation, believe in Christ, and in him are
justified, or regarded as righteous, and are, in fact, made
partakers of redemption. Hence it appears, according to that
theory, "that not many of those, to whom reconciliation and
redemption is, in fact, applied, by faith, are lost."
Therefore, it will not follow, from this, that "sin, Satan,
the world, death, hell, are more powerful than Christ the
Redeemer. For, they could not, in the first place, prevent
Christ from offering himself to the Father in sacrifice,
obeying the Father, and suffering death; and, in the second
place, that he should not thereby obtain reconciliation and
eternal redemption before God. In reference to the
application of these blessings, it is true that sin, Satan,
the world, and the flesh, prevent many from believing in
Christ, and being made partakers of them. Yet God is not
overcome by these, both because it has seemed good to God not
to use His omnipotent and irresistible power to cause men to
believe, and because God has determined that no one shall be
a partaker of those blessings, who does not believe in
Christ. It is not true that "God is mutable, according to
this hypothesis." For the theory does not state that God,
absolutely and simply, wills to save all men, but
conditionally: and according to His own prescience, He has
determined to condemn, eternally, those who will not incline
themselves to this counsel. This is also, finally, performed
in fact without any charge. It is not sufficient to charge
absurdity on any doctrine; it must be proved, by fair
inference, to be a consequence of that doctrine.
The sixth error; -- I am very certain, from the Scriptures,
"that saving grace is" not "universal" in the sense that it
can be said to have been bestowed on all and each of mankind
in all ages. But you ought to have said that "saving grace is
stated to be universal" by that doctrine. You neglect to do
that, and are much engaged in proving something else. I do
not, indeed, object to this, but the other thing was equally
necessary to reach the object, which you had proposed to
yourself. But also, at this point, there are some things
deserving consideration. You do not, with sufficient
accuracy, regard the distinction between "the ability to
believe, if one wills," and "the ability to will to believe."
For each of these, the latter, as well as the former, must,
and indeed does pertain to those, who will continue in
unbelief. For unless they have the ability to believe, and,
indeed, the ability to will to believe, they can not rightly
be punished for their unbelief. Besides one includes the
other, for no one can believe, unless he can will to believe.
No one believes, without the exercise of his will. But the
actual exercise of the will to believe is a different thing
from the ability to will to believe; the latter belongs to
all men, the former to the regenerate only, or rather to
those enlightened by the grace of the Holy Spirit. Hence, you
see that you ought to make corrections in many particulars,
and that in place of "the ability to will to believe," should
be substituted "the will to believe," which is most closely
connected with the act of faith, while the other is removed
to the greatest distance from actual faith. The distinction
between the ability, the will, and the act, is here
especially necessary: but not only is it to be suitably
explained, but also the causes are to be referred to, by
which it may be given to men to be able to will, and to act.
In your third argument, in which you prove the speciality of
grace, you use the disjunctive correctly in your expression,
"who had not the knowledge of faith, or did not retain it."
There is a greater emphasis, in that disjunctive, than one
would, perhaps, at first, think. For, if they did not "retain
it," they lost it by their own fault; they rejected it, and
are, therefore, to be punished for the rejection of the
gospel. If they are to be punished for this, they were
destined to punishment, on this account. For the cause of the
decree is not different from that of its execution. You
present an objection to your own doctrine, deduced from the
usual saying of the school-men, "A man can not be excused for
a deficiency of supernatural knowledge, from the fact that he
could, and indeed would, receive it from God, if he would do
so according to his own ability, and since he does not do
this, he is held guilty of that deficiency. You reply to this
objection, but not in a suitable manner. For it is not a
sufficient distinction that "grace is given either of merit
or of promise:" nor, indeed, does it agree with the contrary
or opposite parts. For God can give this, without either
merit (I should have preferred the word debt), or promise,
but of unpromised grace, since He does and gives many things
of grace, which He has not promised. Let us look at that
promise, which was made immediately after the fall; it was
made, neither of debt, nor of promise, but of grace preceding
the promise. For God gives life "to him that worketh," of
promise and of debt (Rom. iv, 3, 4). But consider whether a
promise is not contained in that declaration of Christ, "Unto
every one which hath shall be given," by which God pledges
himself to illuminate, with supernatural grace, him who makes
a right use of natural grace, or at least uses it with as
little wrong as is possible for him.
The argument, from idiots and infants, is wholly puerile. For
who dares to deny that many idiots and infants are saved? Yet
this, indeed, does not happen to them, apart from saving
grace. Some remark is to be made in reference to the passages
which you cite, though it may, perhaps, be irrelevant. In
Romans ix, 16, where it is said "not of him that willeth, nor
of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy," the word
"righteousness" is understood. For the discussion in that
place is in reference to those, to whom righteousness is
properly imputed, not to them that work, but to them that
believe, that is, righteousness is obtained not by him that
willeth or that runneth, but by him to whom "God showeth
mercy," namely, to the believer. Matt. xiii, 11, proves that
grace is not given equally and in the same measure to all,
and, indeed, that the knowledge of "the mysteries of the
kingdom of heaven" is not divinely bestowed on all. In the
other passages, the things which are opposed, do not belong
in this relation. "The Spirit breathes not upon all, but on
whom he wills" (John iii, 8). What if He wills to breathe
upon all? From the statement, "he breathes where he wills,"
it does not follow that he does not breathe on any one,
unless it is proved that he does not will to breathe upon
him. So, also, "The Son revealeth the Father to whom he will"
(Luke i, 29). What if he will to reveal himself to all? Not
all believe, but those who are drawn" (John vi, 44). But,
what if all are drawn? You see that those things are not
rightly placed in opposition, though it may be true that the
Spirit does not breathe upon all; that Christ does not reveal
the Father to all; that all are not drawn by the Father.
I wish, also, that your remarks in reference to the
disparagement of efficacious grace, had been more extended.
First, indeed, the nature of grace itself, and its agreement
with the free-will of man, then its efficacy, and the cause
of that efficacy, ought to have been more fully explained.
For I consider nothing more necessary to the full
investigation of this subject. Augustine, because he saw
this, treats, in very many places, of the agreement of grace
and of free-will, and of the distinction between sufficient
and efficacious grace. I remark here, in a word, that by
efficacious grace is meant, not that grace is necessarily
received and can not be rejected, which certainly is
received, and not rejected, by all, to whom it is applied. I
add that it is not to the disparagement of grace, that the
wickedness and perversity of most men is so great that they
do not suffer themselves to be converted by it unto God. The
author of grace determined not to compel men, by his grace,
to yield assent, but to influence them by a mild and gentle
suasion, which influence, not only, does not take away the
free consent of the free-will, but even establishes it. Why
is this strange, since God, as you admit, does not choose to
repress the perverse will, that is, otherwise than by the
application of grace, which they reject in their perversity.
I do not oppose those things which you present from the
fathers, for I think that most of them can be reconciled with
the theory which you here design to confute.
You also present certain objections, which can be made
against you, and in favour of that doctrine, and you attempt
to confute them. The first is this, "the promise, in
reference to the Seed of the woman, was made to all the
posterity of Adam, and to each of the human race, in Adam
himself." This, indeed, is true, nor do those things, which
are stated by you, avail to destroy its truth. For the idea
that the promise pertained to all men, considered in Adam, is
not at variance with the idea that the Jews were alone the
people of God. These ideas are reconciled by the fact that
the people of other nations were alienated from the promise
by their own fault or that of their parents, as may be seen
from the whole tenor of the Holy Scriptures.
The second and third objections are made by those who do not
think that historical faith in Christ is necessary to
salvation. Your refutation of these pleases me, and those
objections are of no moment. You also meet, with a sufficient
reply, the objection from the fathers. But that objection is
not presented, oppositely to the views of those, whom, in
this treatise, you oppose. For they admit that the grace, by
which any one is enabled to will to be converted, and to will
really to believe in Christ, is not common to all men, which
idea they do not regard as opposed to their own sentiment
concerning the election of believers, and the reprobation of
unbelievers. The seventh error; -- Should I say that this
dogma is falsely charged upon that doctrine, you will be at a
loss, and indeed will not be able to prove your assertion.
For they acknowledge that the rule of predestination is "the
will and the decree of God." This declaration -- "Believers
shall be saved, and unbelievers shall be condemned" -- was
made apart from any prescience of faith or unbelief, by God,
of His own mere will, and they say that in it is comprehended
the definition of Predestination and Reprobation. But when
the Predestination of certain individuals is discussed, then
they premise the foreknowledge of faith and of unbelief, not
as the law and rule, but as properly antecedent. To which
view, the passage in Ephesians 1, is not opposed. For
believers are "predestinated according to the purpose of Him
who worketh all things after the counsel of His own will."
The purpose, according to which Predestination is declared to
have been made, is that of adopting believers in Christ to
sonship and eternal life, as is apparent from many passages
of Scripture, where that purpose is discussed (Rom. 8 and 9).
From this, it is also evident that your first argument
against those who hold that opinion, amounts to nothing.
In the second place, you assert, that "divine Election is
rule of giving or withholding faith. Therefore Election does
not pertain to believers, but faith rather pertains to the
elect, or is from the gift of Election." You will allow me to
deny this, and to ask for the proof, while I plead the cause
of those, whose sentiment you here oppose. Election is made
in Christ. But no one is in Christ, except he is a believer.
Therefore no one is elected in Christ, unless he is a
believer. The passage in Romans xi, 5, does not serve to
prove that thesis. For the point, there discussed, is not the
election of grace, according to which faith is given to some,
but that, according to which, righteousness is imputed to
believers. This may be most easily, proved from the context,
and will be manifest to any one, who will more diligently
inspect and examine it. For the people, "which God foreknew,
(verse 2d,) that is which He foreknew according to His grace,
is the people, which believed, not that which followed after
righteousness by the works of the law (Rom. ix, 31). This
people God "hath not cast away." For thus is to be understood
the fifth verse, "there is a remnant according to the
election of grace," that is, they, only, are to be esteemed
as the remnant of the people of God, who believe in Christ,
as they alone are embraced in the election of grace, the
children of the flesh, who followed after righteousness by
the law, being excluded. That, which follows, teaches the
same thing, "if by grace, then it is no more of works." What
is that which is "by grace "? Is it election to faith? By no
means; but it is election to righteousness, or righteousness
itself. For it is said to be "by grace" not "by works." For
it is not, here, inquired whether faith, but whether
righteousness belongs to any one by works. Consider also the
next verse "What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he
seeketh for, but the election hath obtained, and the rest
were blinded." What is that which Israel had sought for, and
had not obtained? Not faith, but righteousness. See the end
of the 9th and the beginning of the 10th chapters. They
rejected faith in Christ, and endeavoured to obtain
righteousness, by the works of the law, and this is the
reason that they did not attain "to the law of
righteousness." It is the same thing, also, which the elect
are said to have obtained, not faith, but righteousness.
You will ask -- "Is not faith, then, given according to
Election?" I answer faith is not given according to that
election, which is there discussed by the apostle, and
therefore that passage does not conduce to your purpose. But,
is there, then, a two-fold Election on the part of God?
Certainly, if that is Election, by which God chooses to
righteousness and life, that must be different, by which He
chooses some to faith, if indeed he does choose some to
faith: which, indeed, I will not now discuss, because it is
my purpose only to answer your arguments.
Your third argument is equally weak, for prescience of faith
and of unbelief has the same extent as predestination. In the
first place, unbelief is a negative idea, that is, want of
faith, and it was foreseen by God, when He decreed unto
damnation. Secondly, the infants of believers are considered
in their believing parents, and are not to be separated from
the people of believers.
Your fourth argument is answered in the same way as the
second. Faith is not the effect of that election, by which
some are elected to righteousness and life. But it is this
election to which they refer, in the examination of whose
doctrine you are now engaged. The passage, in Ephesians 1,
regards faith, as presupposed to predestination. For no one,
but a believer, is predestinated to adoption through Christ -
- "as many as received him, to them gave he power to become
the sons of God." The passages, adduced from the fathers,
sustain the idea that faith is the effect of election, but,
without doubt, that election is referred to, by which God
makes a distinction among men in the dispensation of means,
by which faith is attained, which will perhaps not be denied
by those, with whom you are now engaged, if it may only be
correctly explained according to the Scriptures.
The fifth argument amounts to this: -- "Election is not
according to the foresight of faith, since the cause of the
divine foresight of faith in one, and not in another, is the
mere will of God, who purposes to give faith to one, and not
to another." Your opponents would reply that faith is, in
such a sense, of the mere will of God, that it does not use
an omnipotent and irresistible influence in producing faith
in men, but a mild suasion and one adapted to incline the
will of man, according to the mode of the human will:
therefore the whole cause of the faith of one, and the
unbelief of another, is the will of God, and the free choice
of man.
To the sixth argument, he, who acknowledges that faith can be
wholly lost, will reply that the rule or rather the
antecedent condition of election is not faith, but final
perseverance in faith: of that election, I mean, by which God
chose to salvation and eternal life.
The eighth error; -- That true and saving faith may be,
totally and finally, lost, I should not at once dare to say:
though many of the fathers frequently seem to affirm this.
Yet the arguments, by which you prove that it can be, neither
wholly nor finally, lost, are to be considered. Your first
proof is deduced from Matt. xvi, 18 -- "upon this rock I will
build," &c., and you argue in favour of your doctrine in a
three-fold manner from that passage. Your first proof is
equivocal on account of the double meaning of the word faith.
For it means either the confession of faith made by Peter
concerning Christ, or trust resting in that confession and
doctrine of faith. Faith, understood in the former sense, is
the rock, which remains unshaken and immovable, and is the
foundation of the church; but faith, understood in the latter
sense, is inspired in the members of the church, by the
spirit and the word, by which they are built upon the rock as
their foundation. Therefore the word faith is used in the
antecedent in a sense, different from that, in which it is
used in the consequent.
Your second proof is this; -- "They, who have been built on
the rock do not wholly fall from it; -- But those, who truly
believe, are built upon the rock; -- Therefore, they do not
utterly fall from it." Answer. The Major of this proposition
is not contained in the words of Christ, for he says not that
"those built on the rock shall not fall from the rock," but
"the gates of hell shall not prevail against it (the rock, or
the church)." It is one thing that the gates of hell should
not prevail against the rock, but another that those who are
built upon the rock shall not fall from it. A stone, built
upon a foundation, may give way, and fall from it, while the
foundation itself remains firm. If Christ referred to the
Church, I say, even then, that to assert that those who are
built upon the rock shall not fall from it, is not the same
as to declare that the gates of hell shall not prevail
against the church. For the act of falling pertains to the
free will of the person who falls; but if the gates of hell
should prevail against the church, this would occur on
account of the weakness of the rock on which the church is
founded. The Minor does not repeat the same idea as was
contained in the Major. For, in the Minor, it is stated that
believers are built, not having been built, completely, on
the rock, on account of the continuation and confirmation of
the work of building, which must, necessarily, continue while
they are in this world. But while that continuation and
confirmation lasts, believers do not seem to be out of danger
of falling. For as any person may be unwilling to be built
upon the rock, so it is possible that the same man, if he
begins to be built, should fall, by resisting the
continuation and confirmation of the building. But, it is not
probable that Christ wished to signify, by those words, that
believers could not fall, as such an assertion would not be
advantageous. Since it is necessary that they should have
their own strength in the rock, and therefore, that they
should always bear upon and cling to the rock, they will give
less earnest heed, in temptations, to adhere firmly to the
rock, if they are taught that they can not fall from it. It
may be sufficient to animate them, if they know that no force
or skill can throw them from the rock, unless they willingly
desert their station.
As to your third proof, even if it should be evident that
Christ declared, that the gates of hell should not prevail
against the church, yet it would not follow that no one could
fall away from the faith. If any one should fall,
nevertheless the church remaineth unshaken against the gates
of hell. The defection of an individual, as was before said,
is not caused by the power of hell, but by the will of him,
who falls, in reference to the inflexibility of whose will
the Scripture says nothing; the use of argument, presenting
such consolation, would not be useful for the confirmation of
the faithful. In reference to the sentiments of the fathers,
you doubtless know that almost all antiquity is of the
opinion, that believers can fall away and perish. But the
passages, which you present from the fathers, either treat of
faith in the abstract, which is unshaken and immutable, or
concerning predestinated believers, on whom God has
determined to bestow perseverance, who are always to be
distinguished, according to the opinion of the fathers, and
especially of Augustine, from those who are faithful and
just, according to present righteousness.
Your second argument proves nothing, for, though it is true
that he that asketh may be confirmed against temptations, and
may not fall away, yet it is possible that he may not ask,
and thus may not receive that strength, so that defection may
follow. Hence arises the constant necessity of prayer, which
does not exist, if one obtains that assistance from God,
without daily prayers, nor is it, here, declared that
believers may not intermit the duty of prayer, which must
necessarily be presupposed to that conclusion, which you wish
to deduce from prayer.
That "Christ undertakes to confess the elect" (Matt. x, 32)
is true. But "elect" and "believers" are not convertible
terms according to the view of the fathers, unless
perseverance be added to faith. Nor is it declared, by
Christ, in Matt. xxiv, 24, that the elect can not depart from
Christ, but that they can not be deceived, by which is meant
that though the power of deception is great, yet it is not so
great as to seduce the elect: which serves as a consolation
to the elect against the power and artifices of false
Christ's, and false prophets.
Your third argument can be invalidated in many ways. First,
"entire defection from true faith would require a second
engrafting, if indeed he, who falls away, shall be saved." It
is not absolutely necessary that he, who falls away, should
be again engrafted; indeed some will say, from Hebrews 6 and
10, that one, who wholly falls away from the true faith, can
not be restored by repentance. Secondly, There is no
absurdity in saying that they may be engrafted a second time,
because in Romans xi, 23, it is said of branches, which had
been cut or broken off, that "God is able to graft them in
again." If you say that the same individuals are not referred
to here, I will ask the proof of that assertion. Thirdly, It
does not follow from the second engrafting that "a repetition
of baptism would be necessary" because baptism, once applied
to an individual, is to him a perpetual pledge of grace and
salvation, as often as he returns to Christ: and the
remission of sins, committed even after baptism, is given
without a repetition of baptism. Hence, if it be conceded
that "baptism is not to be repeated," as they, with whom you
now contend, willingly admit, yet it does not follow that
believers can not wholly fall away, either because those, who
wholly fall away, may not be entirely restored, or because,
if they are restored, they do not need to be baptized a
second time. It does not seem that your fourth argument, from
1 John iii, 9, can be easily answered. Yet Augustine affirms
that, here, they only are referred to who are called
according to the divine purpose and are regenerated according
to the decree of the divine predestination. If you say that
it is here said of all, who are born of God, that they do not
sin, and that the seed of God remains in them, I will reply
that the word "remain" signifies inhabitation, but not a
continuance of inhabitation, and that so long as the seed of
God is in a person, he does not sin unto death, but it is
possible that the seed itself should, by his own fault and
negligence, be removed from his heart, and as his first
creation in the image of God was lost, so the second
communication of it may be lost. I admit, however, that this
argument is the strongest of those which have been hitherto
referred to.
To the fifth, I reply, that the seed of the word of God is
immortal in itself, but it can be removed from the hearts of
those, who have received it (Matt. xiii, 19, etc).
The Sixth argument. So long as the members abide in Christ as
the branches in the vine, so long they can not indeed perish,
as the vivifying power of Christ dwells in them. But if they
do not bear fruit, they shall be cut off (John xv, 2). It is
possible that the branches, even while abiding in the vine,
may not bear fruit, not from defect of the root or of the
vine, but of the branches themselves. Romans 6, is also an
exhortation of the apostle to believers, that they should not
live any longer in sin, because they, in Christ, are dead to
sin. This admonition to Christians would be in vain, if it
were not possible that they should live in sin, even after
their liberation from its dominion. It is to be considered
that the mortification of the flesh is to be effected through
the whole life, and that sin is not, in a single moment, to
be so extinguished in believers that they may not at some
time bear the worst fruit, provoking the wrath of God, and
deserving the destruction of the individual. But, if a person
commit sins, deserving the divine wrath, and destruction, and
God remits them, only on condition of contrition and serious
repentance, it follows that those, who thus sin, can be cut
off, and indeed finally, if they do not return to God. That
they should return, is not made necessary by the efficacy of
their engraftment into Christ, although that return will
certainly occur in those, whom God has determined, by the
immutable decree of His own predestination, to make heirs of
salvation.
The Seventh argument. "All who are members of Christ attain
the stature of a perfect man." This is true, if they do not
depart from Christ. This they can do, but it is not included
in the internal and essential definition of members, that
they should not be able to recede and fall away from their
head. It is declared, in John 15, that the branches which do
not bear fruit are taken away; and in Romans 11, some
branches are said to have been broken off on account of
unbelief.
You, then inquire, as if you had fully proved that faith can
not be wholly lost, -- "What is the reason that faith may not
utterly fail?" and reply -- "It is not from the nature of
faith, but from the gift of grace, which confirms that which
is promised to believers." You, here, incorrectly contrast
faith itself, and confirming grace, when you ought to
contrast a man, endued with faith, on one hand, and the gift
of grace on the other. The reason that faith can not wholly
perish, or rather that the believer can not wholly lose his
faith, is found, either in the believer himself, or in grace,
which confirms or preserves faith, that the believer may not
lose it. It is not in the believer himself, for he, as a
human being obnoxious to error and fall, can lose his faith.
But if God has determined that he should not lose his faith,
it will be preserved through the grace by which He
strengthens him, that he may not fall. "Simon, I have prayed
for thee, that thy faith fail not" (Luke xxii, 32). The
faith, then, of Peter could have failed, if we consider his
strength. But Christ, by his intercession, obtained for him
that grace, by which its preservation was secured. The
covenant of God, of which mention is made in Jer. xxxii, 40,
does not contain in itself an impossibility of departure from
God, but a promise of the gift of His fear, by which, so long
as it shall continue in their hearts, they shall be
restrained from departing from God. But the Scripture nowhere
teaches that it is not possible to shake off that gift of
fear, nor is it profitable that promises of such a character,
should be made to those in covenant with God. It is
sufficient that they should be sustained, by the promises,
against all temptations of the world, the flesh, sin and
Satan, and that they may be made strong against all their
enemies, if they will only be faithful to themselves and to
the grace of God.
You add another question: "How far can believers lose grace
and the Holy Spirit?" You reply that this question can be
solved by a two-fold distinction, both in believers and in
grace. In the distinction, which you make among believers,
those, whom you mention first, do not at all deserve to be
called believers; for hearing and understanding the word, if
approbation of the same is not added, do not constitute a
believer. They, who occupy the second order, are called
believers in an equivocal sense. For true faith can not but
produce fruit, convenient to its own nature, confidence in
Him, love towards Him, fear of Him, who is its object. You
distinguish believers of the second and third order in such a
manner as to make the latter those who "apprehend Christ the
redeemer by a living faith unto salvation" which you deny in
reference to the former; in the mean time conceding to both
not only an approbation of evangelical truth, heard and
understood, but also the production of certain fruits, when
you ought, indeed, to have considered the declaration of
Christ; "without me ye can do nothing; as the branch can not
bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more
can ye, except ye abide in me" (John xv, 4, 5).
Can any one indeed abide in Christ, unless he apprehends him
as a redeemer, by a living faith unto salvation. Therefore
that whole distinction among believers is futile, since the
last class only ought to receive this name. If you can prove
that these can not fall away and perish, you fully accomplish
your purpose. The other classes can not be said to lose grace
and the Holy Spirit, but rather to reject grace and to resist
the Holy Spirit, if they do not make further progress; though
the hearing, understanding and approbation of the word may
tend to this that they should, apprehend Christ Jesus as
their Redeemer, by a living faith unto salvation.
Let us now come to your distinction of grace, and see how you
from this distinction meet the question above presented. You
say that "Grace is of a two-fold character. Primary grace is
the gratuitous favour of God, embracing his own in Christ
unto eternal life." Be it so. You also say that "some fall
from this grace, in a certain manner, that is, according to
some effects of that grace of which they must be destitute
and the contrary of which they must experience, when they
commit any grievous sin; not according to that grace, when
God always preserves His paternal feelings towards them, and
does not change His purpose concerning their adoption, and
the bestowment on them of eternal life." But these things
need more diligent consideration. The effect of grievous sin
committed against the conscience is the wrath of God, the
sting of conscience, and eternal damnation. But the wrath of
God can not be consistent with His grace in reference to the
same thing, at the same time, and in respect to the same
person, so that he should, in reference to him with whom He
is angry, in that very wrath, yet will eternal life. He can
will to bestow on him certain effects of grace, by which he
can be brought back to a sound mind, and, again to bestow on
him, thus restored, that grace of God unto eternal life. An
accusing conscience -- one really accusing, can not be
consistent with grace and the gratuitous favour of God unto
eternal life. For, in that case, the conscience would not
really accuse. God does not will to bestow eternal life on
one, whom His own conscience testifies, and truly, to be
unworthy of eternal life; unless repentance shall intervene,
which, of the gracious mercy of God, removes unworthiness.
God does not will to bestow eternal life on him who has, by
his sin, merited eternal damnation, and has not yet repented,
while he is in that state. Therefore he truly falls from that
grace which is designed to embrace him unto everlasting life.
But, since God knows that such a man wills; by those means,
which He has determined to use for his restoration, rise from
the death of sin, he can not be said to wholly fall from the
Divine grace. But a distinction is to be made here in
relation to the various blessings which God wills to bestow
on such. He wills eternal life only to the believing and
penitent. He wills the means of faith and conversion to
sinners not yet converted, not yet believers. And it does not
seem to be a correct statement that "God regards sin, but not
sinners with hatred," since the sin and the sinner are
equally odious to God. He hates the sinner on account of his
sin, of which he is the author, and which, except by him,
would not be perpetrated.
In the description of that primary grace, there is that,
which weakens the answer itself. "It is the favour by which
God embraces in Christ his own. He embraces no one in Christ,
unless he is in Christ. But no one is in Christ, except by
faith in Christ, which is the necessary means of our union
with Christ. If any one falls from faith, he falls from that
union, and, consequently, from the favour of God by which he
was previously embraced in Christ. From which it is also
apparent, that in this explanation there is a petitio
principii. For the question is this, "Can believers fall from
this primary grace, that is, from the favour of God, by which
he embraces them in Christ?" It is certain that they can not,
while they continue to be believers, because so long they are
in Christ. But if they fall from faith, they also fall from
that primary grace. Hence the question remains -- "Can
believers fall from faith?" But you concede that believers,
do fall, so far as themselves are concerned. I conclude,
then, that God does not remain in them, and that neither the
right of eternal life, nor filiation belongs to them,
according to the declaration, "as many as received him, &c."
(John i, 12). Hence, if you had wished to make your
statements consistent, it was necessary to deny that
believers fall from faith, or, if you concede this, to
concede, at the same time, that they can fall from the favour
of God by which He embraces them in Christ unto eternal life.
But, as I said, this whole subject may be elucidated, if the
grace of God is suitably distinguished from its various
effects.
Let the passages of Scripture, which you cite, be examined.
"Neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand" (John x,
28). Who will deny this? But some say -- "The sheep can not
be taken out of the hands of the shepherd, but can, of their
own accord, depart from him." You affirm that "this is a weak
statement." By what argument? "Because when they fall, they
are taken by the Devil." Truly indeed, they are taken, when
they fall, and it is not possible, that it should be done in
any other way. For unless the sheep are in the hands of the
shepherd, they can not be safe against Satan. But the
question is -- Does not the act of departure and defection in
its nature, precede their seizure by Satan? If this be so,
your answer is vain and futile. You argue again in this
manner, "'If ye continue in my word, ye are my disciples
indeed,' (John viii, 31), therefore, he who continues to be
one of the flock, and does not fall, is truly one of the
flock." Answer. -- In the first place, there is ambiguity in
the word continue. It signifies either present observance of
Christ's word, or continuous observance, without defection
from that word. Present observance, if it is sincere, makes
one a disciple of Christ, or rather proves that one is a true
disciple of Christ, otherwise one can never be truly called a
disciple of Christ, unless when he has passed the limit of
this life, when defection will be no longer to be feared,
which is absurd. In the second place, I affirm that in the
phrase "my disciples indeed" there is a two-fold sense; it
signifies either that one, who at any time falls away from
the word of Christ, was never a disciple indeed, though he
may, at some time, have kept his word in sincerity; or that
one, who at any time has kept the word of Christ and then
obtained the name of disciple, if he yet falls away, is
afterwards unworthy of the name of disciple. Therefore, if
the relation of his present state is considered, He is "a
disciple indeed;" if the relation of his subsequent state, he
is not a disciple indeed, or does not deserve that name,
because he, at some time, deserts it, unless one may say that
no one has ever sincerely observed the word of Christ, who
falls from it. This assertion needs proof. The passage in
Romans 8, "Who shall separate us from the love of God?" is
wholly irrelevant. For it is the consolation by which
believers are strengthened against all present and assailing
evils. None of these can at all effect that God should cease
to love those, whom He has begun to love in Christ. Romans
xi, 29 is not better adapted to your purpose. For though "the
gifts of God are without repentance" yet one can reject the
gifts of God, which he receives. Your quotation from (2 Tim.
ii, 19,) "The Lord knoweth them that are His," does not
favour your design. The Lord knoweth His own, even if some
believers do fall away from faith. For it can be said that
God has never known them as His own, by the knowledge, which
is the handmaid of Predestination now under consideration.
The distinction of Augustine may be applied here;-" some are
children according to present justification, some according
to the foreknowledge and predestination of God."
Secondary grace, you say, is either imputed or inherent. The
phrase imputed grace does not sound well in my ears. I have
heretofore thought that grace is not imputed, but imputes, as
in Romans iv, 4, "the reward is not reckoned of grace, but of
debt." Righteousness is said, in the same chapter, to be
imputed of grace, without works. But, passing by this, let us
examine the subject. The question proposed was -- "How far
may believers lose grace and the Holy Spirit?" You answer --
in respect to imputed grace, which consists in justification,
a part of which is the remission of sins -- "The remission of
sins is not granted in vain." Be it so. But believers may,
after remission of some sins has been obtained, commit sin
and grievously backslide. If, then, they should not repent of
that act, will they obtain remission? You answer in the
negative. I conclude from this, that they can lose that grace
of the remission of their sins. But you reply -- "It can not
be that they should not repent." I know that this is
asserted, but I desire the proof -- not that the elect
indeed, can not depart hence without final repentance, but
that they, who have once been believers, can not die in final
impenitence. When you shall have proved this, it will not be
necessary to recur to this distinction of grace, for then you
would be permitted to say that the believer never finally
loses his faith and dies in impenitence.
You make a distinction in inherent grace, as "faith" and "the
consequent gift of faith." In faith you consider "the act and
the habit of faith." From this distinction, you answer the
proposed question, thus -- "Faith, considered in respect to
habit and ability, can not be lost, on account of confirming
grace, (though it can per se be lost,) but faith, in respect
to any particular act, can be lost." First, I ask proof of
your assertion. "Faith, in respect to habit, can not be lost,
on account of confirming grace." I also inquire -- "Is that
act of faith, in respect to which faith can be lost,
necessary or not, that any one may apprehend Christ? If it
is, then a man can fall from grace, if he loses, as you say,
the act of apprehension of Christ, or, rather, if he does not
apprehend Christ by that act. If it is not necessary, then,
it was indeed, of no importance to have considered that act,
when the loss of grace was under discussion.
You attempt to prove, both by the example of David and by the
opinions of the fathers, that the habit of faith and love can
not be lost. The example of David proves nothing. For, should
it be conceded that David, when he was guilty of adultery and
murder, had not lost the Holy Spirit, it does not follow from
this that the Holy Spirit can not be lost. For another might
sin even more grievously, and thus lose the Holy Spirit. If,
however, I should say that David had lost the Holy Spirit
when he committed that adultery and murder, what would you
answer, You might reply that it is evident that it was not so
from the 51st Psalm. That Psalm, I reply, was composed by
David after he had repented of those crimes, having been
admonished by Nathan. God, at that time, according to the
declaration of Nathan, restored the Holy Spirit to David (2
Sam. xii, 13). In reference to the assertions of the fathers,
I consider that the case of Peter is not to the prejudice of
the opinion, which states that faith can be destroyed. For
Peter sinned through infirmity, which weakens faith, but does
not destroy it. I pass over Gratiaus. It would be proper to
discuss, at some length, the sentiment of Augustine, if it
had been proposed to present it fully. If, however, any one
wishes to know what was the opinion of Augustine concerning
this matter, let him look at the following passages: "De
Predestinatione Sanctorum" (lib 1, cap. 14), and "De Bono
Perseverantiae" (lib. 2, cap. 13, 16, 19, 22, 23). Let some
passages be added from Prosper, who holds and every where
defends the opinions of Augustine, e.g. Ad cap. Gall.
respons. vii, Ad objectiones Vincentinas, respons. 16; De
vocatione Gentium, lib. 2, cap. 8, 9, and 28. From these
passages, it will, in my judgment, be apparent that Augustine
thought that some believers, some justified and regenerate
persons, some, on whom had been bestowed faith, hope and
love, can fall away and be lost, and indeed will fall away
and be lost, the predestinate alone being excepted.
You quote some objections to the foregoing explanation. The
first objection is this: "Sin and the grace of the Holy
Spirit can not subsist together." You reply, that "this is
true of reigning sin, or sin with the full consent of the
will." But you deny that the regenerate sin with the full or
entire consent of the will. I answer, first, that "reigning
sin" is not the same as that which has the full consent of
the will. For the former belongs, generically to quality or
habit, the latter pertains generically to action, and by the
latter is prepared a way for the former. From this, it is
clearly manifest that reigning sin can not subsist with the
grace of the Holy Spirit. It is also true that sin does not
reign in the regenerate. For, before this can take place, it
is necessary that they should reject the grace of the Holy
Spirit, which mortifies sin and restrains its power. We must,
then, examine the other mode of sin, and see whether some of
the regenerate may sin or not with the full consent of the
will. You deny this, and deduce the reason for your denial
from the beginning and successive steps of temptation. You
consider the beginning of temptation to be concupiscence or
native corruption, and you say that "it exists alone in the
unregenerate man, who is entirely carnal. That, in the
renewed man, there is, at the same time, flesh and Spirit,
but in various degrees, so that he is partly carnal, partly
spiritual;" from which you conclude that "concupiscence can
subsist with the grace of the Holy Spirit, but not reign." I
reply that though I have but little objection to that
conclusion, yet I can not altogether approve those things
which precede. For some of them are not true, and the
statement is imperfect.
It is not true that "an unregenerate man is wholly carnal,"
that is, that there is in him only the flesh. For by what
name shall that truth be called which the wicked are said to
"hold in unrighteousness" (Rom. i, 18)? What is that
conscience which accuses and excuses (Rom. ii, 15)? What is
the knowledge of the law by which they are convinced of their
sins (Rom. iii, 20)? All these things can not be comprehended
under the term flesh. For they are blessings, and are adverse
to the flesh. Yet I admit that the Holy Spirit does not dwell
in the unrenewed man. The statement is imperfect, because it
omits the explanation of the proportion, which exists between
the flesh and the Spirit in the renewed man, as the Spirit
predominates in the regenerate person, and because, from the
predominating element, he receives the name of spiritual man,
so that he can not come under the term carnal. But observe,
moreover, that your conclusion has reference to
concupiscence, which is a quality, while the question related
to actual sin, namely -- "Can actual sin consist with the
grace of the Holy Spirit?" You refer to "five steps, of
temptation." You concede that the first step may pertain to
the regenerate, also the second, and it is, indeed, true. But
it can never be proved that Paul, for such a reason,
"complained of his own captivity, because he could delight in
sorrowful meditation in reference to the commission of sin."
For he is treating there, of sin already committed. "The evil
which I would not, that I do."
The third step, which is "the consent of the will to the
perpetration of sin," you attribute also to the regenerate,
"but a more remiss consent, according to which they will, in
such a sense, that they are even unwilling to commit sin,"
and you think that this can be proved from the example of
Paul in Romans 7. I wish you to consider, here, how these
things harmonize together, that, in reference to one and the
same act, the will or volition may be two-fold, and, indeed,
contrary to itself, even at the very moment when the act is
performed. Before the act, while the mind is yet in doubt,
and the flesh is lusting against the Spirit, and the Spirit
against the flesh, this might be affirmed: but, when the
flesh carries out its concupiscence into action, that is,
does that which it has lusted against the Spirit, then,
indeed, the Spirit has ceased to lust. The position must then
be assumed, that the renewed man commits sin from the
concupiscence of the flesh, the Spirit in vain lusting
against it, that is, the flesh is stronger than the Spirit,
and the desire of the Spirit is overcome by the flesh,
contrary to the declaration of Scripture -- "greater is he
that is in you, than he that is in the world" (1 John iv, 4),
and contrary to the condition of the regenerate, in whom the
Spirit predominates over the flesh, nor does it occur that
the flesh should conquer, unless when the Spirit is quiet,
and intermits the contest.
"But the Scripture affirms (Rom. 7) that the renewed man
would do good, yet does it not, and would not do evil, yet
does it." I answer. in that passage, reference is made not to
a regenerate person, but to a man under the law. But, even,
if this point be conceded, I affirm that it is not possible
that there should be volition and nolition, at the same time,
concerning the same act; hence, that volition, which is
followed by an act, is a pure and efficacious volition; the
other is not so much volition as velleity, which is produced,
not by the Holy Spirit striving against the flesh, but by the
conscience, or the law of the mind, existing in man, which
ceases not to struggle against the flesh, until it is seared,
and deprived of all feeling. That struggle of the conscience
does not effect that the man should not sin with his full
consent, but rather aggravates the sin, and declares how
vehement is the consent of the will to a sin, presented by
the concupiscence of the flesh, when not even the conscience,
exclaiming against it, has not power to restrain the will
from that consent.
It is, then, an injurious and most dangerous opinion, which
holds that the renewed man does not sin with full consent,
when he feels the sting of conscience, opposing the sin which
the will is about to perpetrate. As this happens to all, who
are affected by any sense of right and wrong, it will be very
easy for them to persuade themselves that, as they do not sin
with the full consent of the will, they have a certain
indication of their own regeneration. Therefore, if the full
consent of the will to sin can not consist with the grace of
the Holy Spirit, it is certain that the regenerate sometimes
lose the grace of the Holy Spirit, because they sin with the
full consent of the will, when they sin against the
conscience.
You consider the fourth step to be "the carrying out of an
evil work into an act." This is correct, but the distinction
which you make, can not be proved from the Scriptures. When
the regenerate person commits sin, he commits it being
overcome by the concupiscence of the flesh, while the Spirit
of regeneration is quiescent, and not testifying against the
sin, unless before the sin, when the consent of the will has
not yet been gained by the suasion of concupiscence, and
after the sin when the Spirit has begun to revive. But the
"testifying," of which you speak is nothing else than the act
of the conscience accusing the person both before and after
the commission of sin. The whole man, then, sins, but "not
according to that principle by which he is renewed." This was
unnecessarily added; for who would ever call this in
question? This, also, can be said of a man placed under the
law, as he does not sin according to the law of his mind,
that is, of his conscience approving the law, but only
according to the flesh. Hence, you see that the distinction
in this case, ought to have been of another character. Nor
does it seem necessary to concede, "that an action, performed
by a regenerate person, may be less sinful than if performed
by him in whom sin reigns."
For the fault and sinfulness of an action is to be judged
from the strong consent of the will to the sin. But he is
borne more vehemently towards sin, who rejects the act of the
Holy Spirit striving in the contrary direction, and follows
the concupiscence of the flesh, than he, who, opposing the
concupiscence of the flesh by his conscience alone, at length
yields. Thus the sin of David, committing adultery and murder
was far more heinous than that of a heathen man committing
the same sins; the inhabitants of Bethsaida and Chorazin
sinned more grievously than the citizens of Tyre and Sidon,
because the former, committing their sins, resisted more
influences, adapted to restrain from the commission of sin,
than the latter. You say that the last step is "when a sin,
confirmed by frequent repetition, becomes a habit." That step
or degree was called, you remark, by the Greeks to<
ajpotelei~n But you will allow me to deny that the Greeks
used that word, in that sense. For your fourth step was
equivalent to ajpotelei~v the same as to commit sin. But this
last step is a degree, not so much in sin, as in sinners, of
whom some advance further than others. You deny that this
step can happen to the regenerate.
This needs proof. In all those distinctions, there is a
continual assumption of the point to be proved. For they, who
say that the regenerate can lose the grace of the Holy
Spirit, say, also, that the regenerate may not only sin, but
may persevere in sin, and contract the habit of sin.
The second objection, which you adduce, is this: "Adam, being
yet pure, fell wholly, therefore, much more may they fall,
who, having been born and renewed after the fall of Adam,
have believed." The force of the argument depends on the
parity or equality of the conditions of the parties; that of
Adam, in respect to which he was created in righteousness and
true holiness; and that, of his descendants, in respect to
which they have been renewed in righteousness and true
holiness. You attempt to solve the difficulty by showing the
dissimilarity of the cases. But the dissimilarity, which
exists between the two conditions, does not effect that the
regenerate may not be able, altogether, to fall away. Nor,
indeed, is this affirmed, in the passage, which you cite from
Augustine. For, though the regenerate may have the will to do
according to their ability, of which gift Adam was destitute,
according to the sentiment of Augustine, yet it does not
follow that they can not repudiate and willingly reject this
gift. You were permitted to add other things, in which the
condition of believers in Christ differs from the original
state of Adam in righteousness. Among other things, this is
peculiar, that the latter state had not the promise of the
remission of sins, if it should happen that Adam should ever
once commit sin; but that of believers is rendered more
blessed by the promise -- "their sins will I remember no
more" (Heb. viii, 12). Hence it is that the faith of God is
not made "without effect," even if those in covenant with him
do sin (Rom. iii, 3). For the covenant is one of grace and
faith, not of righteousness and works. Yet make whatever
differences you please between the two states, it will be
always necessary to admit that perseverance, voluntary, free,
and liable to change, was necessary to salvation in both
states. Man does not persevere, either in the former or the
latter state, unless freely and willingly. This is so far
true "that God does not take away even from those, who are
about to persevere, that liability to change, by which they
may possibly not choose to persevere," as is affirmed in the
treatise "De vocatione Gentium, lib. 2, cap. 28." You refer
to a third objection, "This member of a harlot is not a
member of Christ -- But the believer, who is a member of
Christ, can become the member of a harlot; -- Therefore, the
believer may cease to be a member of Christ." You reply to
this objection by making distinctions in the term member. But
those distinctions are unnecessary. First, the subject of
discussion is a member not in appearance, but in truth. An
apparent member is, in an equivocal sense, a member, and
therefore, does not belong to the definition; and there would
be four terms to the syllogism. Nor is the subject of
discussion a member, which is such in its destination, for we
know that all men, who are in destination members of Christ,
are, universally, members of Satan, before they are in fact
brought to Christ, and united to him. Since, therefore,
members, which are really such, are referred to in the
objection, to what purpose are these niceties of distinction
sought? "In reference to those who are really members," you
say, "some are living, others are half dead. But both are
members, according to election." If this be so, you attain
your object; for who is so foolish as to say that the elect
may finally be lost? But they whom you consider your
opponents, will deny that all true members of Christ are such
by predestination. They will affirm that some are such
according to their present state, their righteousness and
present engraftment in Christ. Let us however, consider your
answer, in the supposition of the truth of that distinction.
You assert that "a true and actual member, and one that
remains such cannot be a member of a harlot." That, indeed,
is not strange. For it is an identical proposition, and,
therefore, amounts to nothing. The member of Christ, that
remains such, is not a member of a harlot, but this does not
answer the question -- Will a living member of Christ always
remain alive? It was affirmed in the objection that a living
member of Christ may become a member of a harlot, and may,
therefore, not remain a member of Christ. The point, to be
proved, is again assumed in your answer to that argument. But
you say that "the half dead may, as far as they are
concerned, at any time, lose the Holy Spirit." But, from what
state do they become half dead? Is it not from being wholly
alive? You would not indeed say that any one is half dead, at
the time, when he is engrafted in Christ. You see that such
an assertion is absurd. The state of the case, according to
those who argue against you, is like this. At the beginning
of faith in Christ and of conversion to God, the believer
becomes a living member of Christ. If he perseveres in the
faith of Christ and maintains a good conscience, he remains a
living member. But if he becomes indolent, has no care for
himself, gives place to sin, he becomes, by degrees half-
dead: and proceeding in this way he at length wholly dies,
and ceases to be a member of Christ. You ought to have
refuted these statements, which, so far from refuting, you
rather confirm by your distinctions. You have indeed treated
this subject, with less care than its dignity, and your
learning deserved. The ninth error; -- That, which is so
styled by you, is erroneously charged on the sentiment
adverse to you: for they do not say this, nor can it, in any
way, be deduced from their sentiment. This is their opinion.
"A man, by his own freewill, receives the grace, which is
divinely offered to him, whatever it may be." For as grace
preserves, so the free-will is preserved, and the free will
of man is the subject of grace. Hence it is necessary that
the free-will should concur with the grace, which is
bestowed, to its preservation, yet assisted by subsequent
grace, and it always remains in the power of the free-will to
reject the grace bestowed, and to refuse subsequent grace;
because grace is not the omnipotent action of God, which can
not be resisted by the free-will of man. And since the state
of the case is such, those same persons think that a man can
reject grace and fall away. From which you see that you have
undertaken a futile task, when you refute the error which you
charge on that sentiment. Yet we may consider, also, those
same things: perhaps an opportunity will be afforded to note
something, which will not be unworthy of knowledge. "This
sentiment," you affirm, "attributes a free will, flexible in
every direction, of grace, to all men." Do you deny that the
free will is "flexible in all directions" -- I add, even
without grace? It is flexible by its own nature: and as it is
addicted to evil in its sinful state, so it is capable of
good, which capability grace does not bestow upon it; for it
is in it by nature. But it is, in fact, only turned to good
by grace, which is like a mold, forming the ability and
capacity of the material into an act, though it may be, of
itself, sufficiently evil. Augustine (de predestin Sanctorum,
cap. 5) says, "It belongs to the nature of man to be able to
have faith and love, but it pertains to the grace of
believers to actually have them." But you may be dissatisfied
that this is said "to exist in all men," but that
dissatisfaction is without cause. Their meaning is not that
grace is bestowed on all men, by which their free will may be
actually inclined to good; but that in all there exists a
will which may be flexible in every direction by the aid of
grace. But they teach, you say, that "it is in the will of
man to apply itself to the grace which is bestowed by the aid
of universal grace, or to reject the same by the inability of
corrupt nature." What do you desire at this point? You will
answer "that for the phrase 'universal grace' should be
substituted 'particular grace.'" But who has ever said that
"a man can apply himself to particular grace by the force of
universal grace"? I think that no one can be so foolish: for
the man is led to the use of particular grace, offered to
him, by the free-will, assisted by particular grace. The
expression, "to reject the same by the inability," &c., is
ineptly used; for inability does not reject; a passive non-
reception pertains to it, while it is the province of
depravity to reject. When, therefore, you have introduced,
according to your own judgment, the phrase "universal grace,"
you fight against your own shadow. For it is evident that
"the ability to believe is not carried out into action,
unless by the aid of other subsequent grace, which we call
particular or special, since it does not happen to all and to
each of mankind.
The passages of Scripture, which you adduce, do not answer
your purpose. For the former two are adapted to prove that
the faithful do not fall away from Christ; and let it be
remembered that, according to Augustine and the author of the
book, "De vocatione Gentium," that perseverance pertains only
to believers, who are predestinated to life. The passages
from Augustine show that the grace, prepared for the
predestinate, will certainly incline their hearts, and will
not be rejected by them because God uses such persuasions
with them, as He knows to be suitable to them, and adapted to
persuade them. This he calls efficacious grace, and always
distinguishes it from efficient grace. You, however, in
quoting Augustine, with sufficient superciliousness,
repudiate that distinction. But what arguments do you use?
You say that no grace is sufficient for conversion, which is
not efficacious. I deny it, and nature itself exclaims
against your assertion, while she distinguishes sufficiency
from efficacy. God is sufficient for the creation of many
worlds, yet He does not efficaciously perform it. Christ is
sufficient for the salvation of all men, yet he does not
efficaciously accomplish it. But you perhaps understand by
efficacious cause that which can effect any thing, and so
make it identical with efficient cause. But they who
distinguish between sufficient and efficacious define the
latter as that, which really produces the effect.
You do not prove that which you intend, when you say that
"man has not free-will in spiritual things." Granted. But if
grace may restore the freedom of the will, is it not then in
the exercise of free-will, that he either can do
sufficiently, or really does efficaciously? Nor is it to the
purpose to say that "we are dead" (Col. iii, 3), and that
"our sufficiency is of God" (2 Cor. iii, 5). This is not
denied by those, who speak of sufficient grace. Nor does that
three-fold inability do away with sufficient grace. They, who
make the distinction, say that sufficient grace is able to
remove that three-fold inability, and to effect that a man
should receive offered grace, should use it when received,
and should preserve it.
You endeavour to prove, in the next place, as the necessary
consequence of "the five-fold nature of grace, preeminent,
preparative, operative, co-operative, and persevering," that
no single grace can be sufficient, because "no one of those
five kinds of grace is alone sufficient for salvation, since
all joined together are necessary." It is not a sound
conclusion, that there is no sufficient grace because no one
of those five kinds of grace is sufficient alone. The
reasoning here is from a particular case to a general
conclusion, and therefore is not valid; there is here also
the fallacy of Composition. But the first two kinds of grace,
namely, prevenient and preparative, are either sufficient or
efficacious. For God precedes (by His grace) sufficiently and
efficaciously; He also prepares sufficiently and
efficaciously. It may be questioned, also, whether the same
can not be said of operative and co-operative grace. Yet let
us concede that those terms properly pertain to efficacious
grace. Nevertheless they who defend the use of the phrase
"sufficient," will say that these latter kinds of grace are
prepared for and offered to all those, who have suffered
themselves to be moved by prevenient and preparative grace,
which is sufficient in its character, in the direction
intended by that grace; and afterwards the gift of
perseverance is also bestowed. Hence you have not, by that
argument, disproved sufficient grace so far as it is
distinguished from efficacious grace. But we will not examine
the definitions of that five-fold grace, because this does
not pertain to the scope of this discussion. You also
endeavour to refute the same distinction by a simile. But in
it there is a great want of analogy. For an inert mass is
moved, naturally and necessarily, by the application of
forces, which exceed the force of its gravity; but we, as
human beings, are moved according to the mode of freedom,
which God has bestowed on the will, from which it is called
free-will. At this point, the similitude, which Cardinal
Contarenus uses in reference to predestination, and the
opposite of your simile, may be not ineptly mentioned. He
supposes a two-fold gravity in a stone, one natural, the
other adscititious. The strength which is sufficient to raise
a stone, tending downwards by natural gravity alone, will not
be sufficient, if that adscititious gravity shall be added,
and the efficiency of sufficient strength will be hindered by
the adscititious gravity. We see this clearly in athletes,
engaged in wrestling. One endeavours to raise the other from
the earth, and to prostrate him, thus raised up. Either of
them would be able in a moment to effect this in reference to
his antagonist, if the latter should only offer the
resistance of the native weight of his body, but because he
does not wish to be raised, he depresses himself and his
adversary as much as he can, by using the strength of his
nerves and bones, which far exceeds the weight of his body
alone. So there is, in man, by derivation from the first sin
of the first man, a weight, which is, or may be called,
native. There is, in addition to this, another produced in
each person by his own wickedness, which does not so much
exist in him, as is present with him, serving as a hindrance
that the power of that grace, which is sufficient to overcome
the natural tendency, may not effect that which, without the
interposition of that impediment, it would effect. Nor is the
flexibility of our will, nor our power of choice taken away
by the concurrence of those five gifts, but, by that
concurrence, it is effected that the will, which by its own
nature is flexible in every direction, and the choice, which
is able to elect freely between two different things, should
incline certainly and infallibly in that direction, towards
which the motion of the five-fold grace impels it. Hence,
also, I wish that instead of "inflexible inclination," you
had said "certain and infallible inclination." For, if we do
not say that the mind of a man may possibly be inclined in
another direction, even at the time when it is inclined in a
given direction by efficacious grace, it follows that the
will of man acts not according to the mode of liberty, but
according to the mode of nature, and thus not the free-will,
but the nature of man, will be saved. But the free-will, at
least as to its exercise, will be, in that case, destroyed by
grace, while it belongs to grace not to take away, but to
correct nature itself, wherein it has become corrupt.
Nor is what is said concerning the promised Spirit opposed to
these views. For the "Spirit, who effects that, in fact, we
may walk," does not take away the freedom of the will and of
human choice, but he acts upon the flee-will, in such a
manner, as he knows will be suitable and adapted to it, that
it may be, certainly and infallibly, inclined. I wish that
the same thing may be understood of the phrase, "the Father
draweth." Those things, which follow, have not the effect of
weakening this doctrine. For, by the supposition of
"efficacious grace acting in those, concerning whom God,
certainly and infallibly, wills their conversion and
salvation," the existence of sufficient grace is not denied:
nor indeed is that, which you infer, included in that
supposition, namely, that they, who are truly believers, can
not but persevere. We may be permitted to infer from it the
certain, but not the necessary existence of an effect.
Ignorance of this distinction is the cause of your idea that
you must deny sufficient grace.
Next follows the explanation of some passages of Scripture,
which they who hold to sufficient grace are accustomed to use
in proof of it. You seem to have selected them from
Bellarmine, who presents them, in the same order, as you use.
We will consider your refutation.
The first passage is from Isaiah 5. Bellarmine deduces from
that passage a two-fold argument in proof of sufficient
grace. The first is like this, when put in a syllogistic
form: "He, who did all things for his vineyard which were
necessary that it might be able to bear fruit, used
sufficient culture for its productiveness; -- But God, &c.; -
- Therefore, &c." The truth of the Major is plain from its
very terms. It consists in a definition, and is itself a
definition. For sufficient culture is that in which all
things necessary for fruitfulness are used." The truth of the
Minor is contained in the text. For he, who has done all
things which he might do for fruitfulness, has used all
necessary means.
God could not, with justice, speak in such terms if He had
not used all necessary means. Therefore the conclusion is a
correct one. You reply by making a two-fold distinction in
sufficiency, and in the nature of the vineyard; the
sufficiency of external means, and that of internal grace;
also of a good and bad vineyard. In the first part of this
reply, you concede what is proved in the passage under
consideration. For, if the external means are of such a
character, that men would be sufficiently invited and led by
them unto salvation, unless their minds were so perverse and
depraved, as you say, then it follows that those means would
have been sufficient. For is it necessary, in order that
sufficiency, by those means, may be attributed to grace, that
internal grace, certainly changing the bad vine into a good
one, should be added. Indeed it can be said that so much
internal grace, as would be sufficient for a change of heart,
was not wanting, or at least would not have been wanting, if
they had not, in their perversity, rejected the external
means. The distinction between the good and the bad vineyard
is of no importance in this place. For this is the very
thing, concerning which God complains that His vineyard was
so perverse that it would not respond to the sufficient
culture which had been bestowed upon it.
The second argument of Bellarmine is like this. If God had
not bestowed on that vineyard all things necessary for the
production of grapes, then He would have said absurdly that
He "looked that it should bring forth grapes;" -- But He
said, well and justly, that He "looked that it should bring
forth grapes;" -- Therefore he had bestowed on it all things
necessary for the production of grapes. The truth of the
Major is certain. For God knew that a vineyard could not
produce fruit, which was destitute of any of the means
necessary for fructification, and if He knew this, He knew,
also, that it would be futile, nay, foolish to look for
grapes from a vineyard, which could not bear grapes. The
Minor is contained in the text. Therefore the conclusion is
valid, that sufficient grace was not wanting to the vineyard.
It is worth the while to consider what is the meaning of that
divine looking for or expectation, and how it may be
correctly attributed to the Deity. An expectation, by which
an act is looked for from any one, depends on a proper
knowledge of the sufficiency, necessary for the performance
of the act, which either exists in Him or is present with
Him, on whom the act is incumbent, else, the expectation
would be unreasonable. No one looks for figs from thistles,
or roses from a thorn-bush. This divine expectation,
therefore, if we do not wish to call it unreasonable, which
would be blasphemy, depends on the same knowledge. Nor does
the fact that, in the infinity of His knowledge, God knows
that no effect will follow, from the sufficiency of those
forces, to prevent us from attributing that expectation to
Him. For that knowledge does not at all interfere with the
sufficiency of causes on which depends the justness and
reasonableness of the expectation. It is, indeed, true that
the divine knowledge effects that God can not be deceived.
But he, who looks for fruit in vain, and to whose expectation
the event does not correspond, is deceived. From this, it is
easy to infer that expectation is attributed to God only by
anthropopathy. But, if even this be conceded, it will
nevertheless follow from the consideration that expectation
is attributed, with this appropriate qualification, to the
Deity, that sufficient strength was present with the
individual from whom something was expected. But if, in that
expectation, we consider not only the knowledge referred to,
but also the highest desire, with which, he, to whom
expectation is attributed, demands the production of fruits,
in that respect expectation is most properly attributed to
God. For he desires nothing so much from men; in nothing is
He equally delighted. This also is most plainly expressed in
that parable. Let us now return from this digression.
To that second argument you make no reply, but propose
another case which you think will be more easily managed. But
let us examine this, also, with your answer. The case is
this: "If he did not bestow grace to bear fruit, which could
not be had, except by His gift, then God had no just cause of
expostulating with the Jews." The reply consists in a denial
of the consequence, for the denial of which, a three-fold
reason is assigned. The first is this; "as He did not owe
that grace, He was under obligation to no one." Secondly,
"because they rejected it when offered to them in their
parents." Thirdly, "because they did not, after having
rejected it, seek it anew, or have any care concerning it."
Indeed to one, who carefully considers the matter, the reason
is a single one, though consisting of three parts. For the
reason assigned that God could rightly expostulate with
those, who do not bear fruit in this, that "they had grace
sufficient for this purpose but rejected it." To confirm and
strengthen this reason, it is added that God would not be
obligated to give grace a second time, and that, even should
He be obligated, He would not deny it to those desiring it,
but He would not give it to those not desiring it, and not
having any care whatever concerning that grace. That reason
for just expostulation is to be examined, and even so much
more diligently, as it is more frequently used. It is asked,
then, "Could God rightly expostulate with them because they
do not bear good fruit, who have rejected the grace received
in their first parents, which is necessary for the production
of those fruits, or rather who have lost it, by a judicial
removal of it, on the part of God?"
For the discussion of this question, it is necessary to
consider, first, "whether God could demand fruit from those
who have, as a punishment from God, lost the grace necessary
for that production, which was received in their first
parents," that is, who are destitute of necessary grace,
though by their own demerit. From this will readily follow
the answer of the question "whether He can justly expostulate
with such persons, if they do not produce fruit. We remark,
then, -- every divine demand, by which He requires any thing
from a creature, is prescribed by law. But a law consists of
two parts, command and sanction. The command, by which an act
is prescribed or forbidden, ought not to exceed the strength
of him, on whom the command is laid. The sanction contains a
promise of reward to the obedient, a denunciation of
punishment against the transgressor. Hence it is evident that
the demand of the law is two-fold, of obedience and of
punishment. That of obedience is prior and absolute; that of
punishment is subsequent, and has no place except when
obedience is not yielded. Hence, also, there is a two-fold
satisfaction of the law; one, in which the obedience,
prescribed by the law, is rendered; the other, in which the
punishment, required by the law is inflicted. He, who
satisfies the claim of the law in one way, is free from its
demands, in the other. He, therefore, who pays the penalty
laid down in the law, is entirely free from obligation to
render obedience. This is true, universally, of every kind of
punishment. If the punishment of disobedience comprehends
within itself a privation of that grace, without which the
law can not be obeyed, then, indeed, by a two-fold right, he
seems to be entirely free from obligation to obedience, both
because he has suffered due punishment, and because he is
deprived of that strength without which the law can not be
obeyed, and deprived, punitively, by God Himself, the enacter
of the law, which fact is of much importance. For thus is
excluded that argument, which some present, saying, that the
servant is bound to render obedience or servitude, even if he
has cut off his own hands, without which he can not render
it. The case is not analogous. For the fault and sin of the
servant consists in the fact that he has cut off his hands,
but in the other case, God himself the lawgiver, takes away
the strength, because it has not been used by him, who had
received, according to the declaration, "to him that hath
shall be given, &c." That servant, indeed, deserved
punishment by that crime, and if he should suffer it, his
master could not afterwards demand from him service which he
could not render without hands. Therefore it seems necessary
to conclude that God can not demand fruit from those, whom he
has deprived, though on account of their own demerit, if the
strength necessary for producing fruit. Let us take the
illustration of a tree. The tree, which does not bear fruit,
deserves to die, but when that punishment has been inflicted
upon it, no one can, by any right demand fruit from it.
Hence, therefore it follows secondly "God can not justly
expostulate with those, who do not bear fruit if they are
destitute of grace necessary for this, even by the punishment
of God. It is of no consequence that God is not obligated to
restore grace to them. For as He is not obligated to bestow
grace, so He can not demand the act of obedience; and, if He
wills to demand an act, He is obligated to restore that
grace, without which the act can not be performed. Thus also
it is not to the purpose that they do not seek the grace,
which they have lost. For thus they twice deserve not to
receive grace, both because they have lost it, of their own
fault, and because they do not seek it when lost. On this
very account, God has not the right to demand an act, not
susceptible of performance. These things are in reply to your
answer to the case proposed.
The second passage is in (Matt. xxiii, 37). "How often would
I have gathered thy children together, and ye would not."
From this passage Bellarmine, to prove that there is
sufficient grace, thus argues, "If Christ did not desire that
the Jews should be able to will, then he could not, justly
complain that they would not. But he did justly complain that
they would not. Therefore he desired that they might be able
to will." This reasoning is based on the supposition that no
one can justly complain of any person that he has not
performed an act, for the performance of which he had not
sufficient strength.
Your reply to that argument is two-fold. The former part,
which refers to the distinction of the will into that of
good-pleasure, and that of sign or revelation has nothing
whatever to do with the subject of the argument. For
Bellarmine does not say that Christ wished to gather them
according to his good-pleasure, but he openly denies it, and
affirms that he can sustain that position from the passage
itself. For a gathering, which is made according to the will
of good-pleasure is not only sufficient but also efficacious.
Let the gathering together here referred to, be according to
the will, which is styled that of sign or revelation, and
from it follows that, which is deduced by Bellarmine. For, in
no mode of the will, does he wish to gather them unless he
assists or is ready to assist, that they also, whom he wishes
to gather, may be able to will; and thus it is a false
assertion, that "God can, by the will of sign, will to gather
the Jews together, though He may not aid them to be able to
will." For the necessary consequences or effect of this will
is sufficient aid, by which also the Jews themselves might be
able to will. It is a contradiction in terms, though
indirectly, to assert that "He wills to gather, and wills not
to give sufficient aid by which the Jews may be able to will
to be gathered, who can not, except by their own will, be
gathered." You add, to this reply, that which has also been
said in reference to the first argument, and its repetition
is unnecessary. The latter part of your reply is, "Christ
does not here speak as God, but as the minister of the
circumcision." Granted. Then he wished to gather them
together as the minister of the circumcision, and as a
minister who had power to baptize with the Holy Ghost.
Therefore, in that declaration of his will he showed that he
either had given or was ready to give sufficient grace to
them, without which they could not be gathered together. But
in the passage in Isaiah 5, God Himself speaks, who is able
efficaciously to soften and convert hearts, and says -- "What
could have been done more to my vineyard?" Who would reply,
according to the meaning of your answer, "Thou mightest have
softened their hearts and have converted them and it was
suitable that thou shouldst do this. For thou art God, and
speakest there as God." Therefore that distinction is absurd
and not adapted to solve that objection. We see indeed on how
weak foundations, that opinion rests, which can not present
other answers to meet those arguments.
The third argument is from the 7th chapter of the acts, 51st
verse. "Ye do always resist the Holy Ghost." From this
passage Bellarmine argues in a two-fold manner. First, --
"Those, in whom good desires are not inspired, can not be
said to resist the Holy Spirit, -- But the Jews are said to
have resisted; Therefore good desires were inspired in them,
by which they could have been converted." Secondly -- "They,
who can not but resist, can not be justly accused on account
of their resistance; -- But the Jews were justly accused by
Stephen; -- Therefore they were able to resist." From these
two syllogisms can be deduced as a consequence, -- "They had
grace sufficient to enable them not to resist and even to
yield to the Holy Spirit." The latter argument is the
stronger. Though something may be said against the former,
yet a small addition may give to it also strength to
withstand any opposition.
Let us examine your reply. It seems to us, not at all
pertinent, and in part very ridiculous. For Bellarmine
concedes that this is not said of "the efficacious operation
of the Spirit." For he clearly distinguishes between
sufficient and efficacious grace or operation. Indeed he does
this very thing by quoting passages to show that there must
be a division of special grace into sufficient and
efficacious. "But this passage," (Acts vii, 51), you say
"refers to the external ministration of the prophets." True;
-- but that ministration was one, by which the Spirit chose
to work; otherwise the man, who opposed that ministration,
could not be said to resist the Holy Ghost. These things are
co-ordinate and conjoined so far that the Spirit wills to
work at least sufficiently through that ministration. The
interpretation of Peter Lombardus is truly worthy of the
parent of the Scholastic Theology, and unworthy of an
introduction to the light by you, without stern reprehension.
I do not add a refutation of it, because its perversity
appears, on its very front, to those who examine it. The
fourth passage, which you have made third in order, is from
the 3d chapter of Rev. 20th verse. "I stand at the door and
knock." On this Bellarmine remarks -- "He, who knocks at a
door, knowing with certainty that there is no one within, who
can open, he knocks in vain, and indeed is a foolish person.
Far from us be such an idea in reference to the Deity.
Therefore when God knocks, it is certain that the man can
open, and consequently he has sufficient grace." Your answer
does not touch this argument of Bellarmine, for he does not
wish to infer the universality of grace but that there is
such a thing as sufficient grace, and this you do not, in
your answer, contradict. Whether, indeed, that sufficient
grace is universal, that is, is bestowed on all and each of
mankind universally, is discussed, in another place, by
Bellarmine, whose defense, indeed, I have not undertaken, and
I am not desirous to do so, yet it is necessary to love the
truth, by whatever person it may be spoken.
The tenth error; -- This, in your estimation, is that "the
hypothesis, which you oppose, is at variance with itself."
This is indeed a valid mode of confutation. But how do you
prove the liability of that theory to the charge of self-
contradiction? You very injuriously charge it with the
opinion that "God determined to bestow all natural and
gracious aids upon all men." Who can hold such an opinion,
when he acknowledges that there is an "efficacious grace
which God does not impart to all?" Indeed you are not
consistent with yourself in the statement of their doctrine.
For you say that it affirms that "God bestows all aids upon
all men," and afterwards say that it asserts that "God does
grant to all not actual perseverance, but the ability to
persevere or to will to persevere." Is not the gift of actual
perseverance one among all aids? How shall both these
assertions be made without contradiction? Correct your error,
and when you have corrected it, you will see that you ought
to have made the remark "without which no one actually
obtains salvation," as explanatory of efficacious grace. Yet
God is not wanting to those to whom He gives the grace, by
which they can be saved, though He may not give the grace by
which they will actually be saved. Those words "by
persevering, to obtain salvation," should have been arranged
thus "to persevere and obtain salvation." You erroneously
confound act with ability and efficacy with sufficiency.
The eleventh error; -- In this, you allege against this
doctrine that "it introduces heresies long condemned,"
namely, those of the Pelagians. This assertion you indeed
afterwards seem to soften down, because the Pelagians
attribute the faculty of doing well either wholly to nature,
or only in part to grace, while the doctrine attributes it
wholly to grace. You, however, find fault with it because "it
makes grace universal, and thus involves itself in yet
greater difficulty." Something has been heretofore said on
this point. Yet of what weight is your refutation? For what
if any one should say that all men universally, have the
power of believing and obtaining salvation, if they will, and
that this very power is bestowed, divinely, upon the nature
of mankind, by what argument will you disprove the assertion?
It does not follow, from this statement, that nature and
grace have an equally wide extent. For the ability to believe
pertains to nature, actual belief is of grace. So with the
ability to will, and actual volition, "It is God, which
worketh in you, &c." (Phil. ii, 13). "Unto you it is given to
believe, &c." (Phil. i, 29). You seem to do injury to the
truth, when you say that it is a Pelagian idea that "a man
can, by the opposition of his will, resist grace." There is
no page in Scripture, where this is denied. Is a man a mere
log that, by pure necessity of nature, he must yield to
grace? If this is not true, then a man consents freely, and
therefore has the ability not to consent, that is, to resist.
Otherwise to what purpose are threats and promises? The
opinion that "a man has ability in the exercise of the will,
to yield to the grace of God, when explained to refer to
remote ability, and which may, otherwise, be called capacity
to receive active and immediate ability, by which any one can
will to yield to grace," is not Pelagian. Would that they,
who, at this day, hold the dogma of Predestination, might
prove that it does not introduce, by fair inference, the idea
of fatal necessity. You say also that the Papists formerly
held these views. The fact that a similar crime is charged on
both does not prove a similarity in other respects. It is
possible that they, when you oppose, may differ from the
Papists, and that the latter defend a doctrine which is
obnoxious to your objections.
The twelfth error; -- You affirm that "this doctrine is in
harmony with the Papish view of predestination. If that
should be conceded, is the doctrine therefore false? You,
indeed, present a statement of it, but do not refute it. You
think that it is so absurd that it may be sufficient to have
presented it -- that the statement itself will be a
sufficient refutation. But, if some one should undertake to
defend that doctrine, how would you refute it? We may make
the attempt, "God foresaw from eternity the natures and the
sins of men; this foresight preceded the decree by which he
gave Christ to be the saviour of the world." I should say --
"The foresight of most sins," for He did not foresee the sin
of the crucifixion of Christ, until after that decree was
made. You have given a careless statement of that doctrine,
as you have not made that necessary distinction. Then God
decreed "to give, for the sake of Christ, sufficient grace,
by which men might be saved." To all? The Papists do not
assert this. Then, "He predestinated to life those who, He
foresaw, would finish their life in the state of grace, which
was prepared for them by the predestination of God;" this is
indeed not very far from the doctrine of Augustine.
Your theory is "God did not reveal Christ for all and each of
mankind." This theorem is not of much service to you in
proving the speciality of predestination and of grace, since
those, with whom you contend, even on the supposition of its
truth, meet you with a two-fold argument. First, -- the
reason that God did not reveal Christ to all and to each of
mankind was the fact that their parents rejected the word of
the gospel; -- on which account He permitted both the parents
and their posterity to go on in their own ways, and this, for
so long a time, as the divine justice and their sins seemed
to demand.
The second argument is, that, in the mean time, while they
were destitute of the knowledge of Christ, God "left not
himself without witness" (Acts xiv, 17) but even then
revealed to them some truth concerning His power and
goodness, and the law also, which He kept inscribed on their
minds. If they had made a right use of those blessings, even
according to their own conscience, He would have bestowed
upon them greater grace, according to that declaration, "to
him that hath shall be given." But by abusing, or not using,
those blessings, they made themselves unworthy even of the
mercy of God, and therefore were without excuse, and not
having the law they were condemned, their own thoughts
accusing them (Rom. ii, 14, 15). But that God concealed the
promise of the Messiah from any man, before that, rejection
can not be proved from the Scriptures. Indeed, the contrary
can be proved from those things which are narrated of Adam
and his posterity, and of Noah and his children in the
Scriptures. The defection from the right way gradually
progressed, and God is not bound at any particular time to
send a new revelation to men, who do not rightly use the
revelation which they already have.
From this, it is manifest what judgment must be passed on
those consectaries.
To the first; -- The reason that the promise of the blessed
seed was not revealed to all men is both the fault of their
parents in rejecting it, and of themselves in holding the
truth, which they now have, in unrighteousness.
To the second; -- The answer is the same.
To the third; -- All men are called by some vocation, namely,
by that witness of God, by which they may be led to feel
after God that they may find him (Acts xxvii, 27); and by
that truth, which they hold in unrighteousness, that is,
whose effect, in themselves, they hinder; and by that
inscription of the law on their hearts, according to which
their thoughts accuse one another. But this vocation,
although it is not saving in the sense that salvation can be
obtained immediately from it, yet it may be said to be
antecedently saving, as Christ is offered for them; and
salvation will, of the divine mercy, follow that vocation, if
it is rightly used. To the fourth; -- It is stated that "no
one has said that the prescience of faith or unbelief is the
rule of predestination," and this charge is futile. But that
some may be condemned, by the law alone, is most true, and on
account of their impenitence, though not on account of their
rejection of Christ.
ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CHAPTER OF THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS
This Analysis was prepared by ARMINIUS in 1593, and was sent
to Gellius SNECANUS, a Minister in West Friesland, who
entertained views of Christian doctrine similar to those of
Arminius. It was published in the Latin editions of the works
of Arminius, as an appendix to the foregoing treatise, as
illustrative of many points therein discussed.
TO THE DISTINGUISHED MAN OF GOD, GELLIUS SNECANUS, MY FELLOW
MINISTER, MOST BELOVED IN CHRIST, JAMES ARMINIUS WISHES
HEALTH AND SUCCESS THROUGH CHRIST
I can not easily describe, most excellent sir, with how much
delight I was affected by reading and seriously considering
your commentary on the 9th chapter of the Epistle to the
Romans. For when I saw that your idea of the scope of the
Apostle, and of the use of his principle arguments, was the
same, as I had recently presented to my congregation, in
explaining the same chapter, I was greatly confirmed in that
opinion, both because I have great confidence in your
judgment, and because I found proofs in the arguments, which
you advanced. I could not, therefore, do less than to write,
in return, to you to present my thanks, and to inform you how
I have proceeded in explaining this chapter, and what
impelled me to take this course; not to prove our mutual
agreement only, but to confirm it as much as is in my power.
I candidly confess that this chapter has always seemed to me
to be involved in the greatest obscurity, and its explanation
has appeared most difficult, until light, introduced in this
way, dispelled the shades, and placed the subject,
illustrated by its own clearness, before my mind, so as to be
plainly understood.
I come to the subject itself. In the first place, the scope
of the chapter is the same with that of the whole epistle:
That the Gospel, not the law, is the power of God unto
salvation, not to him that worketh, but to him that
believeth, since, in the Gospel the righteousness of God is
manifested in the obtainment of salvation by faith in Christ.
This chapter performs its part, and indeed is peculiarly
engaged in the support of that proposition. It defends the
proposition against the objections of the Jews, who, with all
their power endeavour to overturn it as hostile and
destructive to their own views, and so defends it as to
confirm its truth more and more, and, by refuting those
objections, adds strength and stability to the foundation
already laid, in that very divine word and purpose, which the
Jews were strenuously wresting, in their own favour, to the
overthrow of Paul's doctrine.
That such is the design of the chapter, the connection shows,
the relation of which may be sought, partly from this
antecedent proposition. Many of the Jews are cast off, which
is included, also, in the introduction of this chapter -- "I
could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my
brethren," partly from the negation contained in the sixth
verse -- "Not as though the word of God hath taken none
effect." Both of which, being embraced in one enunciation,
may be suitably rendered thus -- Though most of the Jews are
rejected, yet the word of God does not therefore fail. Hence
it appears, most clearly, that the Jews had made an
assertion, against Paul, opposed to this negation, that, by
the interposition of that antecedent, (which was,
immediately, deduced from the doctrine of Paul) they might
convict that doctrine, from which a consequence so absurd
might be deduced, of falsity, and refute it as absurd, in
this manner: -- "If most of the Jews are rejected, the word
of God must fail; -- But it can not be that the word of God
should fail; -- Therefore, most of the Jews are not
rejected." How does this operate against the apostle? He had
proposed a doctrine, which necessarily included the rejection
of the Jews to a very considerable extent, namely,
righteousness and salvation are to be obtained by faith in
Christ, not by the works of the law. It was easy for the Jews
to deduce from this, -- "If righteousness and salvation
consist in faith in Christ, whom Paul preaches, it follows
that the Jews, for the most part, are rejected from the
covenant." The reason of this conclusion is this. "Because
most of the Jews do not believe in Christ." But it is false
that most of the Jews are rejected by God; for then the word
of God would fail. Therefore, the doctrine of the apostle
Paul, from which that consequence is deduced, is absurd. The
apostle considered that it was necessary for them to refute
this objection, which threatened overthrow and destruction to
his doctrine, by showing that the undoubted principle, which
the Jews used as the prop of their objection, was not only
not injurious to his cause, but even very favourable to it.
It is necessary to properly settle the state of the question
in controversy between the apostle and the Jews. For this
will be of great importance to the whole matter. It is not --
"are most of the Jews rejected?" or -- "Is the word of God of
none effect?" For the apostle confesses that it would be
impious even to admit the latter thought. The former he will
afterwards prove by the clear testimony of the Scripture. But
the question embraces both these; -- "Will the word of God
fail, even if most of the Jews are rejected?" Even this is
not sufficient. The answer of this question does not settle
the whole dispute, or exhaust all the difficulties. For, if
the apostle, by the force of his arguments, should gain this
point, that some, and indeed most of the Jews, are rejected,
and yet the word of God remains sure, would not this question
remain: "Does not the word of God fail, if those of the Jews
are rejected, who, with the greatest zeal, seek the
righteousness of the Law?" That question must still remain,
as it would be easy for the Jews to make an exception to the
solution of that question -- "Though the word of God may
remain sure, if many of the Jews are rejected, yet we can not
be included in the number, else the word of God would fail."
This element, therefore, having been added, will complete the
entire statement of the question, thus: "Does not the word
God become of none effect, if those of the Jews, who seek
righteousness, not of faith, but of the law, are rejected by
God."
This question is suited to his design; the solution of this
finishes the discussion, and exhausts all the difficulties;
of this the apostle treats, as is evident from his arguments,
which all bear upon its solution. Nor indeed is that, which
gave rise to the question, to be separated from the question,
and to refute which that principle having reference to the
certainty of the word of God, was adduced by the Jews, and
which the apostle also endeavoured, as strongly as possible,
to assert against them. In this question, therefore, this is
to be chiefly attended to, -- "would the word of the
covenant, entered into with the Jews, be in vain, if the
doctrine of the apostle in reference to the attainment of
righteousness and salvation by faith alone in Christ, not by
the law, or the works of the law, should find a place, and
should be regarded as the fundamental principle of
salvation?" How much difference exists between those two
conditions of the question, and of how much importance that
difference is, you readily see. For the question, proposed in
this mode, "would not the word of God be vain, if most of the
Jews are rejected?" could be answered in this way. "God
indeed, in the word of promise, invited all the Jews and
called them to a participation of the covenant, but yet, by
His eternal decree and purpose, He determined in fact to make
only some of the Jews partakers, passing by the rest, and
leaving them in their former state." Some indeed say that
this is the sum of the answer of the apostle to the proposed
question. But the question, proposed in this last manner, --
"Would not the word of God fail, if those of the Jews, who
seek righteousness, not of faith, but of the law, are
rejected by God?" -- can only be answered in this way. "God,
in His word, and in the declaration of His promise, signified
that He considered, in the relation of children, only, those
of the Jews, who should seek righteousness and salvation by
faith, but in the relation of foreigners, those who should
seek the same by the law." But the two answers are very
different. In the former, the decree of Predestination is
defined according to the sentiment of Beza and others; in the
latter, according to your sentiment. Far be it from me,
however, to make a statement such as to confirm your view or
my own concerning the decree of Predestination by the answer,
which I see to be alone adapted to the question so stated.
The passage itself will, indeed, declare, if examined, that
the state of the question is that, which I have presented, if
a right judgment can really be formed, concerning the state
of the question, from the. arguments adduced in its
discussion, and from the conclusion arrived at, which no one
will deny, who has ever saluted the threshold of knowledge.
Let us, then, consider these points, in the answer of the
apostle. First, he denies that the consequence -- "the word
of God fails" -- can, in any way, be deduced from the
antecedent, which the Jews proposed: in these words -- "Not
as though the word of God hath taken none effect." Then he
subjoins the reason of the denial, and the Scriptural proof,
interwoven with the reason by means of allegories, dictated
by God, and explained by the apostle. The reason consists in
the distinction of the Jews, and their two-fold
classification, in respect to this divine word and purpose,
or from the two-fold seed of Abraham, of which only one was
comprehended in that word and purpose. "For," he says, "they
are not all Israel which are of Israel: Neither because they
are the seed of Abraham, are they all children:" but there
are, among them, some "children of the flesh" and others
"children of the promise;" whence it is concluded -- If the
word of God does not embrace all the Israelites in one
character, it does not fail, even if some, from their number,
may be rejected; and much less, if they are rejected of whom
it is evident, from the word itself, that they never were
comprehended in it. This indeed ought altogether to be added,
or the question can in no way be satisfied. It was, indeed,
added, as is apparent from the apostle. Nor, indeed, does he
only say that not all are comprehended under that word, but
he describes those, who are considered as children by God,
and who are not included in that term. For the children of
the flesh are considered, by the apostle, alien from the
covenant, and the children of the promise are considered
partakers of the covenant. Hence this argument, refuting
Jewish objection, may be constructed. If the word of God
comprehends only the children of the promise, to the
exclusion of the children of the flesh, then it follows that
the word of God does not fail, even if the children of the
flesh are rejected: it, indeed, would fail if they should be
received, who are excluded by the very condition of the
covenant; -- But the word of God comprehends only the
children of the promise, to the exclusion of the children of
the flesh; -- Therefore, the word of God does not fail, even
if the children of the flesh are rejected. By consequence,
also; -- The word of God does not fail, even if most of the
Jews are rejected, provided they are embraced in the number
of the children of the flesh, and that they are so included
is evident from the description of the children of the flesh.
The children of the flesh are said, in this place, by the
apostle, to be those who, by the works of the law, follow
after righteousness and salvation. In this way, also, the
consequent is sustained, being deduced from his doctrine
concerning justification and salvation by faith in Christ.
For it does not follow from this, that some of the Jews are
rejected, unless by this distinguishing mark, namely, that
they do not believe in Christ, but follow after the
righteousness of the law. But the children of the promise are
they, who seek righteousness and salvation by faith in
Christ. This description of the children of the flesh and of
the promise is so plain from the Scriptures, as not to need
further argument. But the foundations of the proofs can be
sought from the 4th, 9th, and 10th chapters of this epistle,
and from the 3d and 4th chapters of the Epistle to the
Galatians, as you have observed, and as I presented to my
congregation, when I treated this subject.
From this discussion of the question it is evident, that it
must be proposed in the second manner, with reference to the
character of those rejected. We must now, indeed, consider
the proof of that reason, which is assumed in the refutatory
syllogism. For the consequence, deduced from it, is, in
itself, clear and manifest. The apostle, then, proves that
the word of the promise and covenant comprehends only the
children of the promise, to the exclusion of the children of
the flesh, and this by a two-fold type, one, taken from the
family of Abraham, and the other from the family of Isaac.
But two things are to be presupposed to the argument in both
cases, both supported by the authority of the apostle, which
ought to be held sacred by us. One, that Ishmael and Isaac,
Esau and Jacob, are to be considered, not in themselves, but
as types in those passages, which he presents. The other,
that they are types of the children of the flesh and of the
promise. The apostle proves neither, but assumes both and
correctly. For it is most certain, from an inspection of the
passages themselves, that this is so, for the apostle says,
in Gal. iv, 24, "which things are an allegory," and that the
first sense, which God wished to give in those passages, is
not literal, but allegorical. These things being presupposed,
the force of the apostle's argument consists in the agreement
between the types and antitypes, which is as great as is the
immutability and constancy of Him, who willed that these
should be the types, corresponding to those antitypes. But it
is to be observed that this agreement consists, not in their
exact resemblance, but in their mutual connection and
relation, the proper difference of type and antitype being
preserved. I give this admonition that no one may think it
necessary that he, who represents the children of the flesh,
should himself be a child of the flesh, by the mode of the
same definition. Now, to the particular cases. The proof from
the first type depends on these two passages of Scripture
(verses 7 and 9). "In Isaac shall thy seed be called," and
"at this time will I come, and Sarah shall have a son." From
which this argument is deduced, that agreement being
presupposed; -- In the seed, reference is made to Isaac; --
But Isaac is the type of all the children of the promise; --
Therefore, all the children of the promise are regarded in
the seed. The Major is embraced in these words -- "In Isaac
shall thy seed be called." The Minor, partly in these words -
- "For this is the word of promise, At this time will I come,
and Sarah shall have a son;" partly in that agreement, of
which mention was made.
But not only may we infer that all the children of the
promise are reckoned in the seed, but that they alone are so
reckoned. For those things, which are spoken of Isaac, are
effectual to the exclusion of Ishmael, as the apostle
signifies by the adversative particle "but" (7th verse),
joined to the member of the sentence, opposed to the former
negations, "but, In Isaac shall thy seed be called;" from
which this conclusion is deduced; -- Ishmael is not reckoned
in the seed; -- But Ishmael is the type of all the children
of the flesh; -- Therefore, none of the children of the flesh
are reckoned in the seed. I know that in that figure, the
conclusion is deduced only in a particular case, but the
strength of the conclusion depends on the agreement, which
subsists between the type, and that which is adumbrated by
the type, in accordance with the immutable will of God. We
know, also, that a conclusion may be drawn from the necessity
of the subject, which can not be drawn from the particular
form of the syllogism. Here we might say many things
concerning the consequent mode of the mutual relation of
Ishmael and the children of the flesh, and of Isaac, and the
children of the promise; and how this was aptly signified by
the birth of each, as the apostle declares was prefigured by
that type. But I think that it is unnecessary to repeat those
things, because they serve only to explain that sentiment,
not to confirm it, as it is sufficiently proved to us by the
authority of the apostle, namely, that the children of the
flesh are signified by Ishmael, but the children of the
promise, by Isaac.
Now another type is introduced, taken from the family of
Isaac, in which the apostle affirms that the same thing is
declared, as in the former, when he says (10th verse) "and
not only this, but when Rebecca, also, &c." That passage,
therefore, adduced for the same purpose, is to be explained
in accordance with the same design. But three things are to
be considered here, in order. First -- some circumstances,
peculiar to this type, which add much weight to the proof of
the apostle, and by which the apostle anticipates whatever he
foresees can be brought forward by the Jews against the
former type in opposition to his cause. Secondly -- the word
of God, which was addressed to Rebecca, which the typical
argument embraces, is illustrated from another passage, taken
from one of the prophets. Thirdly -- the explanation which
Paul, the divinely inspired, gives of the object and scope of
that divine declaration.
As to the first, the Jews could object against the former
type, that it is not wonderful that Ishmael, being rejected,
Isaac should be adopted as a son by God, both because Ishmael
was the child of a bond woman, and Isaac of the free woman,
and because, before God announced the word of promise to
Sarah, Ishmael was born and could have perpetrated those
things which made him unworthy of that honour and felicity.
The apostle meets these objections, and replies to the first,
that, in the case of Esau and Jacob, the circumstances were
entirely different, as they had both the same father and the
same mother, and were born at the same birth. In reply to the
second objection, he refers to the words, addressed to
Rebecca, when she was yet carrying the twins in her womb, and
therefore, the children were not yet born, and could not have
done any good or evil, by which one deserved to be rejected
and the other adopted. By these circumstances, the Jews were
deprived of any objection, which they could make against the
previous type, namely, that they, being born of the free
woman, and seeking their salvation from the law, could, in no
way whatever, be reckoned among those who were rejected.
Those words, addressed to Rebecca, are to be considered,
which were briefly these: "The elder shall serve the
younger." They are explained by a passage from Mal. i, 2, 3.
"Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated," and this is
said, that it may be evident that the servitude of the elder
is united with the divine hatred, and the dominion of the
younger with the divine love.
Here we must repeat what was said before, as a general
remark, that Esau and Jacob are to be considered, not in
themselves, but as types, and so that which is attributed to
them, is to be accommodated to the antitypes, or rather to
the things signified. Hence, also, the antitypes are to be
considered, before a conclusion, similar to the former, can
be deduced from them, to the refutation of the sentiment of
the Jews and to the confirmation of that of the apostle. But
what those antitypes are, may be gathered from the end or
design which the apostle has added, in these words: "that the
purpose of God, according to election, might stand, not of
works, but of Him that calleth." That is, God, in those
words, "the elder shall serve the younger," addressed to
Rebecca, "the children being not yet born, neither having
done any good or evil," designed to indicate nothing else
than that He had formed, in His own mind, from eternity, a
purpose to communicate righteousness and salvation, not one
which should embrace all the posterity of Abraham
universally, but which should be according to election, by
which He would distinguish between these and those, not
considered simply in their own nature, as pure or corrupt,
but in respect to the condition, by which righteousness and
salvation were to be applied, as the apostle shows in the
following words -- that this purpose, according to election,
might stand not of works, but of him who calleth, in which
words is contained a description of the antitypes, which had
before been given in the phrases "children of the flesh" and
"children of the promise." Here it is more clear, for the
children of the flesh and those of the promise are, such, by
their own peculiarity, defined by the apostle, in this
passage, since the former are "of works," the latter of
faith, by which obedience is rendered unto God, who
"calleth." Therefore, the apostle says that the purpose of
God, which is according to election, has reference to those
who have faith in God who calleth, and who trust in Christ,
not to those who seek salvation by the works of the law. The
conclusion can be drawn from these things against the
objection of the Jews in favour of the doctrine of the
apostle concerning justification by faith, in this way: "If
the word of God and His purpose is according to election, by
which the former is rejected, and the latter accepted, then
it follows, even if some of the Jews are rejected, yet that
word and purpose is not in vain; rather indeed, if that
purpose, which is according to election, should be said to
embrace all without any election, it would be in vain; -- But
this word and purpose is according to election; Therefore,
even if some of the Jews should be rejected, yet that word
and purpose does not, on that account, fail; it is, indeed,
rather confirmed from that fact, because it is its nature to
exclude some, as it is according to election, by which one is
rejected and another accepted."
An indefinite proof of this kind, however, is not sufficient
for this subject: for it remains to be proved that those same
persons are excluded by the purpose according to election,
who are properly considered to be excluded and rejected,
according to the doctrine of the apostle concerning
justification by faith, namely, those who sought to obtain
righteousness and salvation, not from faith in Christ, but
from the works of the law. This, therefore, the apostle adds.
Hence to exhaust the whole objection, the conclusion is drawn
thus: If the purpose, according to election, stands, not of
works, but of Him that calleth, then it follows that they,
who seek after righteousness and salvation from the works of
the law, and by the law, are not included in that purpose,
but they, only, who by faith obey God, who promiseth and
calleth; -- But the purpose, according to election, stands,
not of works, but of Him that calleth; -- Therefore, in that
purpose, they are not embraced, who are of the law, but only
they who are of the faith of Jesus Christ. The Major is, in
itself, plain from its phraseology, if rightly understood,
which signifies that the firmness of the purpose, which is
according to election, depends, not on works, but on Him that
calleth. Therefore, to them who are of the works of the law,
this purpose can not be firm and sure, but to those who are
of faith.
From this idea, I seem to myself to perceive the reason that
God placed the condition of the covenant of grace, not in a
perfect obedience to the law, as previously, but in faith in
Christ. The minor depends on the declaration "the elder shall
serve the younger," and on the agreement of the type and
antitype, which consists in this -- that what is presignified
by the type should correspond to the antitype. But, by the
type of Esau and Jacob, is presignified, first, that the
purpose of God is according to election; then, that this
purpose stands, not of works, but of Him that calleth. The
former, indeed, because one was loved and the other hated;
one was preferred to and placed over the other, which is a
sign of "the purpose according to election;" the latter,
because Esau, the elder, was hated and made subject, and
Jacob, the younger, was loved, and placed over him, which is
a sign that this purpose stands, "not of works, but of Him
that calleth;" that is, that God loves them, who seek
righteousness, and salvation by faith in Christ, but hates
them who seek the same by the works of the law. It follows
that they are not embraced in that purpose, who are of the
works of the law, but only they who are of the faith of Jesus
Christ, and consequently that those of the Jews are rejected,
who followed the righteousness of the law, and they are
elected and loved, who sought participation in righteousness
by faith in Christ. Therefore, so far from the truth is it
that this doctrine of justification by faith is overthrown by
the word of the covenant and the divine purpose, that, by
this, alone, it is established.
At this point, I have also explained to many, how the Jews
were signified by Esau, the elder, who were seeking, in their
zeal for the law, justification and life by the law, and
that, by Jacob, the younger, they were signified, who sought
the same things by faith in Christ. It is not necessary to
repeat these things here; the authority of the apostle is
sufficient, who thus explains those types, and who, briefly,
from the agreement of the type and antitype, or that which is
signified by the type, deduces this argument. Esau, the
elder, was condemned to be the servant of his brother, by
God, and was hated by him; -- But Esau, the elder, is the
type of all those who seek justification and salvation by the
works of the law; -- Therefore, all they who seek salvation
by the works of the law, are condemned to servitude, and are
hated by God. Again; -- Jacob, the younger, obtained dominion
over his brother, and was loved by God; -- Jacob, the
younger, is the type of all those who, according to the grace
of vocation, by faith seek justification. Therefore, they
who, according to the grace of vocation, by faith seek
justification, obtain dominion, and are loved by God. Both
Majors are included in the declarations "The elder shall
serve the younger" and "Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I
hated" The Minors are contained in these words, "that the
purpose of God, according to election, might stand, not of
works, but of Him that calleth," and depend on the authority
of the apostle, who thus explains those types.
Hence it is apparent that the question referred not only to
the rejection of some and the acceptance of others, but to
the rejection or acceptance of those of certain characters,
that is, those distinguished by certain qualities. Therefore
the apostle, here, treats not of the decree or the divine
purpose, by which some are elected and others are reprobated,
considered absolutely in their own nature, whether pure or
corrupt; but of a purpose such as includes that description
of elect and reprobate, which is here clearly observed in
that purpose by the apostle: in which consists, in fact, the
controversy between Beza with his followers, who strenuously
defend the former and yourself, who urge a purpose of
salvation such as to embrace the characters of those, who are
to be saved and those who are to be damned.
But they will say that it is indeed true that Ishmael and
Esau, Isaac and Jacob are to be considered typically, that
is, the former, in each case, representing the character of
the children of the flesh, and of those who ale of the works
of the law, and the latter, the children of the promise, and
those who are of faith, but that they also, for themselves,
belong, in the same manner, to those classes, which they
typify, and this of the eternal purpose of God, by which He
determined to make Isaac and Jacob children of the promise,
and to bestow on them faith in Christ, but to leave Ishmael
and Esau in the carnal nature, in which they were born.
They affirm that we must go further back and inquire why one
is the child of the flesh, another of the promise, why one
should believe in Christ, and another should not believe, but
seek salvation of the works of the law. I answer -- It can
not be proved from this passage that they, who are types,
pertain to the antitypes: and if it may, perhaps, be true
that Ishmael and Esau belong to the children of the flesh, as
thus described, yet that they are such, of any divine
purpose, is not taught in this place. In this purpose, as we
have explained it, something is determined concerning the
children of the flesh and of the promise, but with the
explanation which they prefer, something is determined
concerning individuals, that these should be children of the
flesh, those of the promise. They can not, therefore, be the
same purposes, the subject of one being changed into the
attribute of the other. Concerning the adequate subject,
there is not, as yet, harmony even among the Coryphaei of
that view. And since the question -- "why do some believe and
others not?" has the same change of subject and attribute, I
affirm that it is not here discussed by the apostle, nor has
it even the least connection with his design. They must
therefore, consult other passages of Scripture and see
whether they can, from them, obtain proof for that decree. It
is sufficient for us that, here, the purpose is described, by
which our justification and salvation through grace, may be
self consistent, and by which we can be made more certain, in
ourselves, concerning the same things. But this purpose is
that which God determined, after the former condition added
to the legal covenant had not been performed, and man had by
the fall been made unable to perform it, to enter into a
covenant of grace with us through Christ; and of grace to
change the condition of the former covenant into faith in
Christ, by which we, believing in Christ, might obtain the
same thing as we should have previously obtained by plenary
obedience to the law, rendered by ourselves. On this purpose,
as it appears, depends the certainty of our salvation, and at
the same time the assurance of it in ourselves. For we inter
that assurance from this Enthymene, "I am a believer," or "I
believe in Christ; -- therefore I shall be saved," or "I am
elect." The strength of which depends on this proposition:
"God has immutably determined from eternity to save those,
who believe Christ;" in which words is contained the sum of
that purpose.
If any one should inquire, "Why did God wish that Ishmael and
Esau should be the types of the children of the flesh, but
Isaac and Jacob the types of the children of the promise?" I
answer -- Because it was suitable for the sake of
significancy, and of agreement between the type and the
antitype; in relation to the former type that he who was born
of the bond woman and of the flesh should be the type of the
children of the flesh, but that he, who was born of the free
woman, and of the promise, when the flesh had now become
unfruitful, should be the type of the children of the
promise; but in relation to the latter type, that he, who was
born first, should prefigure the children of the flesh, and
he, who was born last, the children of the promise. The
reason will be manifest to those who consider the agreement
of types and antitypes.
It may be asked further, "Why did God will that Ishmael
should be born of the bond woman and of the flesh, and that
Esau should be born first; but that Isaac should be born of
the free woman, and of the promise, and Jacob last?" I reply
that the same question would be asked, if Isaac and Jacob had
been substituted for Ishmael and Esau. In this matter, the
Divine freedom is complete, circumscribed by no necessity of
the Divine attributes, or of His revealed will. This will be
seen of the attributes of the divine nature and His own
revealed will are subject to God, in the determination of
that purpose, for which your opponents contend.
Let us, now, come to another objection, which is of this
character: "What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness
with God." The nature of this question, and of this objection
is manifest, but it is not equally clear, what the antecedent
is from which that objection is deduced. Some state it thus:
-- "If God, without any respect of works, regards Ishmael and
Esau with hatred and excludes them from the number of His
children, but loves Isaac and Jacob, and considers them as
His children, is He not unjust? It seems to be a kind of
injustice not to bestow the same things on those of the same
character." It is true that, if the apostle was considering
them in themselves, and not as types of certain characters --
as has been remarked -- there would be an occasion for such
an objection. For it is certain that from those antecedents
arises an occasion for the objection. Such, however, was not
the antecedent of the apostle, but this: "God in the word of
the covenant, and in the purpose, which is according to
election, embraced only those, who might be the children of
the promise, who should believe in Christ, to the exclusion
of the children of the flesh and of those who sought the
righteousness of the law." Whence it followed "that those of
the Jews were rejected who, in their zeal for the
righteousness of the law, did not believe in Christ, and,
moreover, those of the Gentiles, who sought a participation
in justification and salvation by faith in Christ, were
received into the covenant." There is besides another
antecedent of that objection, namely, this: "If God hates the
children of the flesh, and excludes them from the covenant,
but loves the children of the promise, and reckons them in
the seed, embraced in the covenant, and this, indeed, of His
mere purpose, without respect to works, then it follows that
He is unjust;" or this: "If God rejects the Jews, and accepts
the Gentiles in their place, then He is unjust." But these
two amount to almost the same thing. I think that the
reasoning of the former is the more conclusive. The reasoning
of this objection seems sufficient to prove injustice in the
Deity, because He made this decree of the mere good pleasure
of His will, without any reference to merit.
Let us, however, examine the answer of the apostle. He first
denies the inference. Then he gives the reason for his
denial. He denies the inference, when He says, "God forbid,"
that is, we ought by no means to admit the thought that there
is injustice in God, who is just in Himself, and, indeed, is
essential justice, and does nothing, and can do nothing,
unless it most perfectly agrees with His nature.
The reason of this denial of the inference is two-fold;
first, from the liberty of the divine mercy; secondly, from
the due illustration of the divine power and glory. That,
which is inferred from the liberty of the divine mercy, is
comprehended in these words, "For He saith to Moses, I will
have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have
compassion on whom I will have compassion" (15th verse). In
these words is expressed, according to the Hebrew idiom, this
idea: "In the choice and liberty of my will is placed the
power of having mercy on whom I will:" as is also indicated
by the deduction, "Therefore hath He mercy on whom He will
have mercy" (verse 18th). But in what way this answer is
effectual to the overthrow of that inference, the word Mercy
declares, which word embraces in itself the whole weight of
the refutation. For the only sufficient reason for charging
injustice on God on account of that purpose was this: that
God could not, without injustice, make of none effect "His
purpose of creation, by which He made justification and life
dependent on obedience to the law, but condemnation and death
in the transgression of the same law; especially so far as to
exclude, from justification and life, those, who should
endeavour, by the law, to attain to justification and life,
but to make others, who should not indeed do this, but should
believe in Christ, partakers of justification and life." This
charge of injustice can be removed from the Deity, only by
the word mercy, here used, which, as it presupposes misery
and sin, by this very fact indicates that a change of the
purpose is not made with any blame on God, but because the
condition of that purpose had been violated by a
transgression of the law, and, thus, an inability to keep the
law had been brought upon man. Hence we see that, by the
fault of man, the covenant, entered into at the creation, was
made void, and therefore God, free from its obligation, could
have either punished man according to his demerit, or
instituted another purpose in His own mind. That this might
be for the good of man, it was necessary that mercy should
intervene, which should remit sin, and arrange a condition,
which He might, by the aid of mercy itself, be able to
perform. The apostle affirms that God formed within Himself a
purpose of this character, and this indeed of His mere mercy,
which was free (yet under the guidance of justice) to
determine on whom He might will to have mercy, and on whom He
might will not to have mercy; whom He might will to make
partakers of justification and life, and whom to exclude from
the same blessing. Whence it follows that God, on account of
a decree of this kind, and a purpose according to election,
by which He determined to receive the children of the promise
into the covenant, and exclude from it the children of the
flesh, and which He purposed should stand "not of works, but
of Him that calleth," can not be charged with injustice;
because, moved by mercy alone, He made this decree in His own
mind. God would, therefore, be unjust, if He should deprive
any one of justification and life, or should require a
condition contrary to the covenant entered into at the
creation: but when, on account of the violation of the
condition, and of inability to perform it, it was either for
mercy to make a covenant of grace with man, or for severity
to punish man without hope of pardon; it is apparent that God
was not less free, that indeed He was much more free, to
arrange whatever conditions might seem good to Him, in that
covenant, than in the covenant of creation. Consequently He
could not be charged with injustice in one case more than in
the other.
This whole matter may be treated syllogistically: -- If the
purpose of God according to election to reject the children
of the flesh, but to consider as seed, the children of the
promise has for its cause the mercy and compassion of God
alone; then it follows that God can, by no means, on this
account be charged with injustice; -- But the cause of that
purpose is the mercy of God alone; -- Therefore God can not,
on account of it, be charged with injustice. That this is the
meaning of the answer of the apostle is evident from the
subjoined inferential answer -- "So then it is not of him
that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God, that
showeth mercy," (verse 16) supply here "the purpose according
to election," which is effectual so far as he had before said
-- "that the purpose of God, according to election, might
stand, not of works, but of Him that calleth," and "the
children of the promise are counted for seed," the children
of the flesh being excluded. For, when the will and the
course of men are opposed to the mercy of God, it is certain
that the reference is to the effort and the course of a man,
by which he hopes that he will obtain justification and
salvation apart from the mercy of God. Such, however, is the
effort and the course of those, who seek justification and
salvation by the works of the law. When, also, mercy is, on
the other hand, placed in opposition to the will and course
of men, it is evident that the condition of justification and
life, which is most nearly related to mercy, namely, faith in
Christ, the Mediator, is ordained, the other being opposed to
mercy.
The other reason of the denial of the inference consists in
the just illustration of the divine power and glory, in
those, on whom He wills not to have mercy: which, also, is
set forth, in the particular example of Pharaoh. It is
comprehended in these words: "For the Scripture saith unto
Pharaoh, Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up,
that I might shew my power in thee, and that my name might be
declared in all the earth" (verse 17.) From which passage,
the apostle answers that part of the objection, in which God
was charged with injustice because He rejected and regarded
with hatred the children of the flesh, of His purpose
according to election, in an argument, susceptible of the
following form: -- If God is free, for the just declaration
of His own power and the illustration of His own name, to
raise up, harden and punish Pharaoh, then injustice can not
be attributed to God, because, in His purpose according to
election, He decrees to illustrate His own power and glory in
the just hardening and punishment of the children of the
flesh; -- But God was free to do the former, as is apparent
from this passage; -- Therefore also He is free to do the
latter, and hence He can not, on this account, be accused of
injustice. The argument of the Major is valid. For, either
God will be free, in no case, to illustrate the power and
glory of His name in the just punishment of any person, or He
will be, also, free to decree to do this, according to any
purpose, in the condemnation of those, by whose just
condemnation He may will to declare His own power and the
glory of His name.
It is, also, true that to take away the right and power from
God of making a decree, which is according to election, is
nothing else than to be unwilling that He should exhibit His
own power, and the glory of His own name, in the just
hardening and punishment of some men. For these things are
conjoined, to punish any man and to decree that the same man
is obnoxious to punishment. Punishment can be, with justice,
inflicted on no one, unless the same thing was destined for
him by a just purpose or decree. How God was free to raise up
and harden Pharaoh, &c., will be shown hereafter, in the
refutation of a subsequent objection. That this is the whole
meaning of the answer of the apostle appears from the
conclusion, subjoined to the whole answer -- "Therefore hath
He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He
hardeneth" (verse 18).
For, by that conclusion, the whole objection of the Jews is
most fully refuted in this way: -- If God can have mercy on
whom He will, and harden whom He will, then He is also free
to form a purpose according to election, by which He may
determine to have mercy on the children of the promise, but
to harden and punish the children of the flesh; -- But God
can have mercy on whom He will, and harden whom He will; --
Therefore He is free to make a decree, according to election,
by which He may determine to have mercy on the children of
the promise, but to harden and punish the children of the
flesh. By consequence, also, if He should do this which He is
free to do, He can not be, at all deservedly, accused of
injustice. Thus the justice of God, in that purpose according
to election, is sustained and proved by the apostle by the
strongest testimonies from the Mosaic Scriptures.
Another objection of the Jews is next presented (19th verse),
arising from the latter part of the conclusion immediately
preceding; in the refutation of which, they who contend for
that absolute decree of God to save certain particular
individuals and to damn others, think that they have strong
support for their cause. On which account, also, we must
diligently examine both the objection and its refutation,
that we may not, by negligence, pass over it, as though it
were unseen: for it is, to them, the club of Hercules, for
conquering all the monsters of objection, or rather the sword
of Alexander, to cut any knot which can not be untied. The
objection is this: "Why doeth he yet find fault?" The reason
of this objection is added: "for who hath resisted his will?"
Which things, proposed in the form of an interrogation, may
be stated thus: "Therefore, He can not justly find fault,
since no one can resist His will." The objection will be
filled up, by the addition of the antecedent, from which this
consequent is deduced: "God hardeneth whom He will."
Therefore, He can not justly find fault with those, who are
hardened. The connective reason between these two is this:
"Since no one has resisted His will." Hence, exists a
continual proposition of this kind -- If no one can resist
the will of God, then He can not justly find fault with
those, whom He hardeneth according to that will.
Let this conditional proposition be converted into a simple
or categorical statement, "God can not justly find fault with
those who are hardened by His own omnipotent will." Such is
the objection. Let us now consider what force it has; that
from the examination, it may be evident how it can be
refuted, and the way for its suitable refutation, may be
prepared. These two things, then, are to be considered.
First, "God can not justly find fault with the hardened."
Second, "Because He has hardened them by His omnipotent will,
which can not be resisted." The examination of the former
consists in the discussion of this question. "Who are they
with whom God can justly find fault?" The examination of the
second consists in the discussion of this: "Whether and in
what manner, they, who are hardened by the omnipotent will of
God, may be exempted from the number of those with whom God
can justly find fault?" The former question will be solved,
if it may be explained, what that is, on account of which God
can justly find fault, that is, what is the proper cause of
the divine anger. The proper cause of the divine anger, and
that, on account of which God can justly find fault with any
one, is sin. But sin is the transgression of a law, that is,
of one which is just, for, if a law be not just, it is not a
law, and therefore, its transgression is not a sin. That a
law may be just, it necessarily requires these two
conditions, that it be enacted by him who has authority to
command, and that it be enacted for him who has the power or
rather ability to obey, not only dunamei but ejnergeia| that
is, has ability of such a character as is hindered by no
intervening decree, from doing that which he can do. Whence
it is apparent that "sin is a voluntary transgression of the
law," which the sinner, since he could avoid it (I speak now
of the act), commits, of his own fault. On account of sin of
this kind, and with a sinner of this kind, God can justly
find fault. This condition being removed, God can not justly
find fault with a man on account of sin, and, indeed, the man
can not commit sin. I say this, for the sake of those, who
think, though erroneously, that God can justly be angry with
transgressors of the law, even if they can not, on account of
an intervening decree, really obey it. An act, which is
inevitable on account of the determination of any decree,
does not deserve the name of sin. I doubt not that this is
most certain; it shall be proved, when it is necessary. From
this, therefore, it is clear who they are "with whom God can
justly find fault." Now let us consider whether and how they,
who are hardened by the omnipotent will of God, may be
exempted from that number; that is, whether the omnipotent
will of God, hardening a person, may remove the cause of just
accusation, complaint and wrath. But let us premise what that
means, "For who hath resisted his will?" Here omnipotence is
attributed to the will of God, universally able to subject
all things to itself, and actually subjecting them, when the
will accompanies it, and it accompanies the will. But
omnipotence does not accompany the will, considered in every
respect, for God wills that His law should be obeyed by all,
which is not always done. Nor yet are there, in God, two
wills mutually contrary, one of which wills that His law
should be obeyed by all, the other, that it should not be
obeyed; for in that case, it would not be wonderful that the
law should not be obeyed by many, when the latter will, armed
by omnipotence, prevents obedience to it. But some, when they
endeavour to explain how it may be possible that those wills
should not be contrary, say that the will of God is to be
considered, in a two-fold relation, as secret and revealed.
The revealed will has reference to those things which are
pleasing or displeasing to God, the secret to those things
which he simply and absolutely wills should be done, or not
done; and that it is entirely consistent that, in His
revealed will, He should will that one and the same action
should be done, and, in His secret will, that it should not
be done, since He wills, in a different mode, in the two
cases. But there may be dispute whether a secret will can be
supposed in God, by which He might will, absolutely, that a
thing should be done or not done, which, by His revealed
will, He might will should be done or not done. Others say
that this will of God is that of good-pleasure, or that of
sign, which amounts to the same thing. But is not the will of
God, in relation to His good-pleasure, signified in the word?
It is also said that the divine will is, in one respect,
efficacious, in another, not efficacious. But this is the
same thing as to say -- one is resisted, the other can not be
resisted. It is wonderful in what labyrinths they involve
themselves, being blinded either by unskillfulness or
prejudice, or by both. To those who rightly consider the
subject, the will of God will appear to be one and the same
thing in itself -- distinct in its objects.
What then? "Is not the will a faculty, free according to
reason, or at least the appearance of reason, extended to the
act of doing or having?" So, also, in God. We may be
permitted, in our obscure phraseology, to delineate those
things, which exist in that clearest light. He wills to do,
and He wills to have. The former wills something from
Himself, the latter wills something from us; by the former He
wills that something should be done by Himself, and invokes
omnipotence, which always accompanies it. By the latter, He
wills that something should be done by us agreeably to
justice, the pattern of which He presents us, in His own law.
But it is necessary that He should reveal unto us, and indeed
command that, which He wills from us, that he may obtain from
us that which He wills. He does not, however, always disclose
to us that which He wills to be done by Himself, or that
which He wills to do, but only sometimes as He judges may
tend to His own glory, and to our salvation.
You ask whether the subject of discussion is any secret will
of God, and you, indeed, add your opinion that such is not
the subject. You, already know my sentiments in reference to
the secret will of God. I think, with you, that the subject
of discussion, here, is not that secret will, in whatever way
it may be taken. Let them say what that secret will is. Is it
that God can not be resisted, so that He should not harden
those whom He wills to harden? The truth of this is manifest,
from the declaration itself. Is it secret who they are whom
God wills to harden? By no means. Nothing is more plain in
the Scripture, than that sinners, persevering in their sins
against the long suffering of God, who invites them to
repentance, are those whom God wills to harden. It is,
however, not evident, but hidden, who those sinners are. This
is true; but what relation has it to the will, that it
should, therefore, be called hidden. The knowledge of God in
this place, will rather be called hidden from us. Of many
such sinners, God wills to harden this one and not that one,
and it is hidden from us which He wills to harden rather than
others. I do not, now, discuss that point; but I affirm that
this is not discussed in this passage. Therefore, since it
will not be discussed in this place what that object of the
will is, which is considered hidden by us, neither is the
secret will of God in any way treated of in this place. But
to return; that omnipotent will removes the cause of just
anger, if, by it, a man may be moved to the commission of
sin, and by that power which ye can not resist, and so the
hardened will be, by that will, excluded from the number of
those with whom God can be justly angry, if they did that, on
account of which they are hardened, being moved by that
omnipotent will, which no one can resist. I do not speak,
here, concerning compulsion. For "God can not compel, nor can
the will be compelled," but it is sufficient to excuse the
man, and to exempt him from the just wrath of God, if there
exist any force of divine impulse, which is followed by the
inevitable necessity of doing that to which he is moved. If,
indeed, the man commits that which deserves hardening of
free-will, he is subjected to blame, and is worthy of wrath,
even if he may be hardened by that will, which can not be
resisted. For resisting and that freely, the divine will,
revealed in the word, which can be resisted, he is brought
into that necessity of the divine decree, also revealed in
the word, which can not be resisted, and so the will of God
is done in reference to him, by whom the will of God is not
done. From these things, I think that a solution to that
question can easily be formed.
But let us examine the answer of the apostle, and with that
diligence, which the gravity and difficulty of the subject
deserves, yet according to our measure. At the outset,
however, it is not to be supposed that the apostle sought
evasions, when he could not refute the objection itself, nor
did he involve the subject in difficulties, that he might
coerce and restrain the objector, terrified by the difficulty
of the subject, but he most aptly and effectually refuted the
whole objection. I would dare to affirm that no objection in
the whole Scripture is more sufficiently refuted.
Let this objection be placed before the eyes, with all its
fundamental principles contracted into a small space, that it
may be inspected, as it were, in a single moment, in the
following form -- "Can God be justly angry with those, who
are hardened by his irresistible will?" We may be permitted
to use that form of expression for the sake of compendious
significance. The answer of the apostle is two-fold. In one
part, reproving the objector on account of his own
unworthiness, and that of the objection; in the other,
refuting the objection. That which has the nature of reproof
has three parts, the reproof, its reason, and the proof of
its reason. The reproof is proposed in the form of an
interrogation in these words: "Nay but, O man, who art thou
that repliest against God?" That is, Consider, O man, who
thou art and who God is, and thou wilt understand that thou
art unworthy to answer God in that manner. To slander so
excellent a doctrine in a manner such as to charge unjust
wrath upon God, and to wholly exculpate man, was resistance
of God to His very face, and the most direct opposition to
Him. Hence it is not wonderful that the apostle, excited by
the indignity of the thing, should have determined sternly to
reprehend the man, who should make an objection.
The reason consists in a comparison of man and God, in the
like unworthy answer, adapted to that comparison. For as
there are three things contained in that proposition, The man
replying, God to whom the reply is made, and the reply
itself. The reason of that proposition refers to those three
things, in these words, "Shall the thing formed say to Him
that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Here man is
compared to "the thing formed," God to "Him that formed it,"
and the reply to this, "why hast thou made me thus?" In this
comparison the apostle gives the reason why it is not
suitable for man, as "the thing formed," to reply thus to
God, as "to Him that formed it," as if he should say, "as it
is not permitted to the thing formed to say to Him that
formed it, 'Why hast thou made me thus?' so also, it is not
permitted to thee, O man, to reply to God in this way. For
thou art nothing else than clay and a worm of the earth, a
thing made by God, but God is He who made and formed thee."
We considered next what is the answer to this reply, which is
reproved in the thing formed, though we must, first, examine
the third part of the reproof; that is, the proof of the
reason. That is deduced from the right and power, or from a
comparison of the right and power, which the potter has over
the clay, to the right and power, which God has over that
which He has formed, or rather over that from which He formed
it. The right and power of the potter goes to prove the
unworthiness of that objection and therefore to its
refutation.
The comparison, also, has the effect of demonstrating that
God has the same right over His own creature, which the
potter has over that, which he makes. In the first place, the
conclusion is like this -- "If the potter hath power, of the
same lump, to make one vessel unto honour and another unto
dishonour, it is not for thee, the thing formed, to say to
Him that formed thee, 'Why hast thou made me thus?' -- But
the potter hath that power; -- Therefore, &c." In the second
place: "If the potter hath that power over the clay, then
also God hath the same over men, or rather over that from
which He was about to form or make men; -- But the former is
true; -- Therefore, the latter, also, is true." Therefore,
also, "it is not for man to reply against God, 'Why hast thou
made me thus?'" or to make this objection, on account of
which the apostle reproves and rebukes the objector. Thus
much in reference to the arrangement and the sum of the
objurgatory answer, in which, also, it is shown how that can
tend to the refutation of the objection itself, if, indeed,
an addition, suitable to the comparison, had been made. We
must now treat, in a right and legitimate manner, of the
application of the things compared. This will consist,
wholly, in an explanation of the right and power of God over
the man, either already created or to be created. First, in
reference to the comparison used in the reason, "shall the
thing formed say to Him, that formed it, Why hast thou made
me thus?" The explanation of this will be, according to the
comparison, -- "so it is not lawful for a man to answer God,
as you do in that objection." In any case, it is necessary
that the objection of the man should have congruity with this
of "the thing formed." But the former was this: "if thou
hardened a man by thy irresistible will, there is no reason
that thou shouldst find fault with him:" This objection,
harmonized with that of "the thing formed" will be like this,
"Why hast thou made me, to be hardened by thy irresistible
will?" What Beza says, here, of the mutability of human
condition, seems to me to have little adaptation to the
purpose.
If, likewise, we should consider the argument from the power
of the potter, it will be apparent that some such application
of that comparison was to be made. For what resemblance has
the power of making to honour or to dishonour to the power of
making something changeable. But it has much resemblance to
the power of making a person, to be hardened or to receive
mercy. Let us now see what is the explanation of the
comparison which is used in that argument. "Hath not the
potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one
vessel unto honour, and another to dishonour?" The
explanation, strictly set forth, will be thus, "thus God hath
power from the same lump to make some men to honour, others
to dishonour; or some to wrath, others to mercy," in a manner
adapted to the subject of discussion, as appears from the
following verses: from which the conclusion is deduced. "If
God hath power, from the same mass of the human race, to make
one vessel to wrath, and another to mercy, then man can not,
justly, reply against Him, Why hast thou by thy irresistible
will, made me to be hardened, that is, a vessel to wrath?" He
adds, however, in reference to the vessels to honour and
mercy, though the question was only in reference to the
hardened, since the subject of discussion is the power of God
which has reference to both. You will observe that I have
presented these things, most rigidly, according to the sense
of my opponents, because I wish to concede to them whatever
can, in any way, be accommodated to the scope of the apostle.
We must now see how those things are to be understood which
we attribute to God in those applications; namely, that "He
hath power, from the mass of the human race, to make one
vessel to honour and another to dishonour, one man to obtain
mercy, and another to be hardened by His irresistible will."
The word "power" used here signifies not ability but right
and authority. It is ejxousia not dunamiv The subject,
therefore, in this passage, is not that absolute power by
which He is able to do any thing, but the right by which it
is lawful that He should do any thing. In the word "lump,"
Beza understands the reference to be to "the human race, as
not yet created, and not yet corrupt." We know that Augustine
was of a different opinion, and that he considered the "lump"
as referring to the fallen human race; if any one wishes to
deny the latter view, the argument, which Beza presents, will
not be sufficient, namely, that "the apostle must, then, have
said that God left some vessels in dishonour, and transferred
others from that state to honour." But I am willing to
concede this to him, that unformed matter is signified by the
word "lump." For it does not seem to me to be sufficiently
safe, to say that God hath not power from one lump to make
one vessel to wrath, and another vessel to mercy, -- to make
one man to be hardened by his irresistible will, and another
to obtain mercy. When we see daily that God makes vessels of
mercy and vessels of wrath, and that He hardens some men, and
has mercy on others, it is indeed apparent that He hath the
right to do that which He really does. But I add that He hath
the right to do this, in the same mode, in which He does it,
and to determine to do it for the same reasons, in view of
which He really does it. The subject, indeed, would be plain
in itself, if it had not been involved in difficulties, by a
preposterous mode of explanation. This I will not here
disprove, lest I may be too prolix: for I have not designed
to do this now, but only to show that this chapter, by which,
as by a firm foundation, they say that their theory is
supported, is not in their favour.
I will, however, endeavour to throw some light on this
subject. When God is said to make vessels of wrath or vessels
of mercy, to harden a man or to have mercy on him, then
necessarily three things are to be considered, two
explicitly, one implicitly, being interposed between the
other two as a medium or means. First it is necessary that a
man should exist, and be a vessel. Secondly, it is necessary
that before he can be a vessel of wrath or of mercy, he
should be a vessel of sin, that is, a sinner. Thirdly, that
he should be a vessel of wrath or of mercy.
Let us now consider what is the work of God in this matter.
First, then, it is the work of God by which He makes man,
that he may exist, not only that he may exist, but that he
may exist to a certain end, which is signified in the term
"vessel," which is equivalent to "instrument." But an
instrument is made to some end. The Scripture declares that
this end is the glory of God. Therefore, God made man for His
own glory, that is, not that He should receive glory from
man, but that He might illustrate His own glory in a much
more distinguished manner, by man than by His other
creatures. But the glory of God is illustrated, by a
manifestation of His own natural attributes, especially of
those which are considered as being of secondary importance,
such as goodness, justice, wisdom and power. There are others
which belong more intimately to His essence, as simplicity,
infinity, eternity, immutability, &c.
It is now to be considered what the attributes are, in the
manifestation of which the glory of God was, first of all, to
be displayed. I affirm, that they were His goodness, justice,
wisdom and power. It belonged to goodness that He should
communicate Himself; to justice, to prescribe the rule of
that communication; to wisdom, to know how it might suitably
and possibly be done; to power, that He should be able, in
fact to communicate Himself. Goodness, therefore, impelled
God, to make not only other things, but man also, that is, to
so communicate Himself to Nothing, by His own image, that out
of Nothing and that communication there should exist that
being, which is man. Justice prescribed the mode, in which it
was suitable that this communication should be made: for it
is the arbitrator of goodness, or as Tertullian says, the
arbitrator of the works of God. Wisdom knew how it might be
proper that God should communicate Himself to that which was
to be made man, and how God could do this. Power, the
instrument of the others, was at hand to perform. God could
communicate His own image to Nothing. But man was made, only,
that he might be a vessel of that goodness, justice, wisdom
and power, and thus He was a vessel to illustrate the divine
glory. It must, however, be also considered in what manner he
should be a vessel to illustrate the glory of God.
This is indeed true. -- God did not make man, that he might
only be that which he was made, but that he might tend to
greater perfection. Nor did God think that His own goodness
was satisfied, when He had once communicated Himself to man,
as his creator, but his own glorified, but He wished to
communicate Himself further to man, as also "the glorifier of
man;" and that this might be possible He endowed him, not
only with natural, but also with supernatural gifts. But
justice prescribed the rule and measure of this
communication, namely, that it ought to be made only on the
condition that man should live, in accordance with the divine
image, in obedience to the commands of God, and, since he
could be exalted, he could also be cast down, -- and nothing
was more just than that he should be cast down, if he should
abuse the gifts, by the right use of which he could be
exalted to the highest dignity. Man was, therefore, in that
respect, a vessel to illustrate the just goodness and wrath
of God, by which God might declare His own great goodness in
blessing him, if he should live righteously, and His severe
wrath in punishing him, if he should transgress the command.
Thus God made man originally, and in him the rest of mankind,
vessels to illustrate His just goodness and wrath, that is,
instruments fit for this. But He did not, in fact, do this,
without the intervention of that, which is here considered in
the second place. -- Man, originally placed in this
condition, by the Deity, by transgressing the command, made
himself an evil vessel, that is, a sinner: with the
concurrence of no co-operation of the Deity to this result,
except such as was suitable to His goodness, justice, wisdom,
and indeed to His constancy, by which nothing was taken away
from the freedom of man or the actual mode of freewill would
be restrained or would be impelled in this or that direction.
Man, existing in this state, with all his posterity, whom God
had determined to produce, of his blood, by the ordinary
means, was worthy to receive, in view of his demerits,
punishment and wrath, that is, to be made, in fact, a vessel
of wrath. That same goodness (which I may be allowed here to
call the source mercy), did not however permit this, and this
is true even of the justice of God, the arbitrator of
goodness and mercy. The wisdom of God indeed knew that
punishment was due to that cause -- sin, and justice wished
that what was due to that cause should be rendered to it; but
the former also knew that still more was due to goodness, and
the latter according to its nature, that what was due to
goodness should also be rendered to it, namely, that highest
demonstration of itself, and its advancement to the place of
mercy, which is the inclination of goodness towards the
wretched, and the ill-deserving. It was suitable that the
goodness of God should communicate itself, not only to the
non-existing, and those existing without any merit, and to
the well-deserving (if they had obeyed the commandment), but
also to the ill-deserving, and to the transgressors of the
law, that He might give to him who had not, give again and
with addition to him that had, and spare him that abused his
gifts; thus being victorious over sin by its own remission,
as triumphant over Nothing, by the act of creation.
Therefore, wisdom discovered a mode by which what was due to
the cause might be rendered to it, and what was due to
goodness might be rendered to it, namely, Jesus Christ the
Mediator, on whom the cause of the human race might be laid,
to be borne and carried through before the tribunal of
justice by whom man might become a vessel to illustrate the
divine justice and goodness, in the highest and most
excellent way.
Here also justice interposed itself, mindful of its duty, and
showed that such a communication of goodness, by means of
mercy, could not be made without a condition in this case
more suitably than in the former; but it was just that a
condition should be fixed upon, in accordance with which that
good should be communicated, of mercy, or not communicated at
all, and, instead of it, the contrary evil should be
inflicted. Hence, also, it was determined to make some men
vessels of wrath and others vessels of mercy, that is, fitted
to wrath or to mercy; of mercy, those who should perform the
condition; of wrath, those who should violate it and not
cease to violate it; and this irrevocably and of necessity,
so that those who should have violated the condition,
persisting in that violation, should be made, by that act,
vessels of wrath, and they, who should perform the same,
should be made, by that act, vessels of mercy: which same
mercy, nevertheless, bestowed the power of obedience in that
mode in which it is suitable that mercy, mingled with
justice, should bestow it. Briefly, God makes man a vessel;
Man makes himself an evil vessel, or a sinner; God determines
to make man, according to conditions, satisfactory to
himself, a vessel of wrath or of mercy, and this He in fact
does, when the condition is either fulfilled, or
perseveringly neglected.
From this it is apparent what is the true sense of those
things, which are here proposed by the apostle, namely, that
God has the power to make men from unformed matter, and to
establish a decree concerning them, of the pure choice and
pleasure of His will, sanctioned by certain conditions,
according to which He makes some vessels to dishonour, other
vessels to honour; and therefore man has no just reason for
replying against God because He has, by His irresistible
will, made him to be hardened, since obstinacy in sin
intervenes between that determination of the will and the
actual hardening; on account of which obstinacy God wills
according to the same pleasure of His will, to harden the man
by His irresistible will. If any one shall say that God has
power absolutely or unconditionally to make a man a vessel to
dishonour and wrath, he will do the greatest injustice to the
Deity, and will contradict the plain declaration of
Scripture. Therefore, Beza himself does not dare absolutely
to affirm this, but he affirms that the decree is to be so
understood, that its execution does not take place until
after man, having become sinful, has made himself worthy of
wrath. But he so subjoins the execution of the decree as to
make the proximate cause of its execution depend on the
decree itself, which is equivalent to the absolute statement,
that God determined to make some men vessels to honour,
others to dishonour; some vessels of wrath, others vessels of
mercy; and that he might be able to do this, to make all, in
the first place, sinners, that afterwards He might make, of
His justice, some, vessels of wrath and to dishonour, and, of
His mercy, others, vessels of mercy and to honour. Whatever
absurdity can be deduced from that comparison of the apostle,
by introducing a wrong interpretation, it may be detected
only by the distinction, which exists between men and the
vessels of the potter, when that distinction is rightly
understood.
I have thus treated these matters; not as if there could be
no other explanation of that comparison, but that, conceding
their own explanation to our opponents, I might show that
even it, when rightly understood according to the analogy of
faith, does not favour any purpose, such as they wished to
conclude from it, but indeed agrees, most fully, with the
other view, which you describe. But what if I should say, and
I surely have this right, that the true explanation is not
that, which they give, but what the apostle presents in the
next two verses -- "What if God, willing to, &c." -- and that
he uses the reference to the power of the potter over the
clay both to confirm the reason of the reproof, and to refute
the objection. These very things are also of a kindred
nature. For to demonstrate the unworthiness of an objection
is, in some measure, to refute it, as we also see in the
former cases. I do not see, in what respect, this explanation
may not be fitly accommodated to that proposition: "For, as
the potter hath power over the clay of the same lump to make
one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour, so God has
power, and indeed with much greater justice, to endure with
much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to
destruction, and to prepare the vessels of mercy into glory."
This justice is illustrated by the ends, which God has
proposed to Himself in both cases. It will be said "there is
want of agreement between the expressions, 'to make vessels
to dishonour,' and 'to endure with much long suffering the
vessels of wrath fitted to destruction' that is 'to
dishonour;' but that, with the former, this expression is
more in agreement 'to fit the vessels of wrath to
destruction;' as, 'to prepare the vessels of mercy unto
glory' is in agreement with 'to make vessels to honour."' But
who shall prescribe to the apostle the mode of applying his
own comparison? Is it not allowable for him to show the
purity of the divine power in that, which God really does in
reference to the vessels of wrath and of mercy, although it
may be less than what the potter does concerning the vessels
unto honour and dishonour, that in this way the force of the
argument may be stronger, from the less to the greater, than
from an equal to an equal? There is, however, something
wanting to that application of the apostle, and it is clear
that it is of this character. "Shall He not then have power
to do this?" or "shall He not therefore be able to find fault
justly with the hardened?"
Let us, now, consider, finally, how fully the objection is
refuted by those words, in whatever sense they may be taken,
whether as an explanation of the comparison, or absolutely
and in their simple meaning. I said, and still say, that no
objection, in the whole Scripture, seems to me more
thoroughly refuted, and that no answer more sufficiently
exhausts all the difficulties of any objection. The objection
had three parts, The antecedent "God hardeneth when he will;"
The consequent, which contains the chief force of the
objection, "Therefore he can not justly find fault with the
hardened;" The proof of this conclusion from an adjunct of
the divine will, "because the will of God can not be
resisted. The antecedent, and the argument of the conclusion
or consequence, may be connected thus -- "God hardens, when
he wills, by His irresistible will." The consequent is added
thus, "With them God can not justly find fault." Four simple
ideas are contained in that objection. The divine wrath, the
persons hardened, irresistible will, deservedly or
unreservedly, which fourth I would prefer to call "the mode
of composition by affirmation or of division by negation."
The relation between these is proposed by the objector thus,
-- "The wrath of God is an attribute, by which God deals with
the hardened, who therefore constitute the object of wrath,
and, in this case, also its cause; as frequently objects have
the relation of cause to certain attributes, not in the
essential nature of the attributes themselves, but so far as
they are exercised with those objects, that is not in the
primary, but in a secondary act. The hardened, and the
irresistible will of God are placed as cause and effect. The
hardening is the effect of the irresistible will of God. Now
it is inquired whether, that relation being supposed to exist
between the hardening and the irresistible will, there is the
same relation between the divine wrath and the hardened, that
is, whether God can be angry with those thus hardened, which
is signified by the expression deservedly and undeservedly.
To these things, thus explained, the answer of the apostle
may be applied.
First, the apostle declares that such a relation does not
subsist between the wrath of God and the hardened, but rather
the opposite relation. For the hardened are the object of the
divine wrath, nor is their hardening the cause of that wrath,
but the divine wrath is rather the cause of their hardening.
God also, in the act of hardening is occupied with those,
with whom He is already angry, that is with those, who are
already, in fact, vessels of wrath. This the apostle
signifies when he declares that God hardeneth "the vessels of
wrath, fitted to destruction." There is then in those
arguments not only the fallacy of causa non causa, subjecto
non subjecto, but also that of the inversion of cause and
effect, of subject and adjunct, hence their refutation is
most complete. So far from the truth is it that God can not
find fault with those, whom He has hardened, that, on the
contrary, He may not harden them, unless they have already,
by their own fault, been made vessels of the most just wrath
of God. The whole Scripture teaches that hardening is the
effect and the sign of the divine wrath. Hence the question
"Can God be angry with the hardened?" is a foolish one. It
should be inquired "Can God harden those with whom He is
angry?"
In the second place, the apostle replies to the relation
between "hardening and irresistible will," in these words
"endured with much long suffering the vessels of wrath;" in
which He signifies that the mode of hardening is "patience
and mildness" not the omnipotent action of the will which can
not be resisted. Therefore, there is here also the fallacy of
causa non causa. It will, however, be asked, "Does not the
decree, by which God determined to harden the vessels of
wrath, pertain to the will, which can not be resisted?" This
is indeed true. But it is one thing for God to use the
omnipotent act of His own will to effect hardening, and
another thing for Him to determine by that will that He will
harden the vessels of wrath. For in that case, the exercise
of the will is attributed to the decree of hardening not to
the act; between which the difference is so great that it is
possible that God should, by His irresistible will, make a
decree in reference to hardening the vessels of wrath by His
patience and long suffering. If it shall be said that "this
hardening will nevertheless, more surely follow by means of
that patience, on account of the decree by which He not only
determined to use patience, but also to use it for the
purpose of hardening, and that this is equivalent to that
omnipotent act of the will which can not be resisted," I
shall deny that it is equivalent. But to the proof of this
denial many things pertain, which it would be tedious to
present here; I will, on that account, omit any reply,
because this objection does not militate against my design.
For should we concede that the vessels of wrath are hardened
by the force of the omnipotent will, would this take away
even the least particle from the justice of the divine wrath,
when they have themselves merited hardening, while it is for
God to decide to inflict the punishment, in whatever way may
seem good to Him? The third part of the reply refers to the
equity of that divine act, which the apostle now explains,
deduced from its design. What then; is it not just that God
should in some way, demonstrate His wrath and power? Most
just. But against whom, if not against "the vessels of wrath,
fitted to destruction" which God "endured with much long
suffering?" Either it is just that God should declare His
power and wrath against persons of this character, or He
will, in no case, be free to do it, and thus it will be in
vain that God is armed with power and wrath, since He can
never exercise them, in whatever way He may be provoked. From
this, it is manifest, that this is here set forth by the
apostle, more clearly than the refutation of that objection
demanded. For whatever could be presented, not only as
apology, but also as defense, and even as declaration of the
divine wrath against the hardened, is here presented; and
thus they are described in whom God would show His wrath and
power that they all might together embrace, in themselves the
just causes of the divine wrath. For He is not angry with
them, unless they have already become vessels of wrath; nor
does He, when, by their own merit, they have been fitted for
destruction, immediately, in accordance with His own right,
carry out His wrath in their destruction, but He endures
them, with much long-suffering and patience, inviting them to
penitence and waiting for their repentance; but when, with a
heart, hardened and knowing not how to repent, they contemn
the long suffering and patience of God, it is not wonderful
that even the most merciful goodness of God should not be
able to restrain Him from the exercise of His wrath, lest,
when that anger is demanding that justice should render to it
its own highest right, He should seem to give it no place.
We shall, however, set forth the answer with greater
conciseness, if we adapt it to the several parts of the
syllogism in the objection. The syllogism was as follows --
"He, who hardens by His own irresistible will, can not justly
'find fault' with those, who are hardened; -- But God hardens
by His own irresistible will; -- Therefore, He can not justly
find fault with those hardened." The apostle replies to the
Major by denial; both because it is absolutely false, since
they, whom God hardens, have merited that hardening, and God
is free to inflict upon them, according to their merits, in
whatever way it may seem good to Him; and because a false
cause of anger is alleged, namely, hardening, while they,
even before they are hardened, were vessels of wrath, and,
therefore, the cause of the hardening. The Major, then,
should be corrected thus: "He, who, by His own irresistible
will, hardens those who, because they are vessels of wrath,
have deserved hardening, can moreover 'find fault' with those
justly hardened." To the Minor, the apostle replies, by
proposing another mode of hardening, by which is removed that
mode, which is assumed in the Minor; for He "endured, with
much long suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to
destruction." Why should any imputation be made against God,
if they have been hardened on account of their own
wickedness. The Minor, then, should also be corrected; "But
God, using patience and long suffering towards the vessels of
wrath, hardens them." The Major also must then be further
amended, by introducing this mode of hardening, which will
greatly favour its truth and equity. From this it follows
that the conclusion is false; its contrary follows of
necessity from the correction made in its antecedents, and it
is most fully true, not only on account of the antecedent
truth, but also on account of the just design of the divine
hardening, which is the illustration and exhibition of the
wrath and power of God. What pertains to that phrase,
"vessels of wrath fitted to destruction," can be easily
understood from the preceding remarks. As to what is said in
addition in reference to "the vessels of mercy," it has been
explained for what purpose the apostle did this. As there is
no dispute on this point, I will omit further explanation.
In this discussion, I seem to myself to have demonstrated
that this passage, from the Apostle, does not serve to
confirm that doctrine, which may think to be built on this
chapter as a foundation. I have not, however, thought proper
to treat the subjects themselves, embraced in this chapter,
more extendly, because this will be done more fitly at
another time, when we consider them, abstractly, and not as
depending on the authority of this or that passage.
If any one will show me that these things are not in
accordance with the sentiment of Paul, I will be ready to
yield the point; and, if any one will prove that they are
inconsistent with the analogy of faith, I will be prompt to
acknowledge the fault and forsake the error.