THE WORKS OF

JAMES ARMINIUS

VOL. 3

A FRIENDLY DISCUSSION

BETWEEN

JAMES ARMINIUS & FRANCIS JUNIUS,

CONCERNING PREDESTINATION,

CONDUCTED BY MEANS OF LETTERS

The origin of this discussion is thus stated by the elder

Brandt: "On the subject of Predestination, he [Junius]

endeavoured to defend the opinion of Calvin, by rendering it

a little more palatable. For he did not maintain that the

divine predestination had respect to mankind either

ANTECEDENT TO THE DECREE OF THEIR CREATION, or SUBSEQUENT TO

THEIR CREATION, ON A FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THEIR FALL, but that it

had respect only to MAN ALREADY CREATED, so far as BEING

ENDOWED BY GOD WITH NATURAL GIFTS, HE WAS CALLED TO A

SUPERNATURAL GOOD. On that account James Arminius, then one

of the ministers of the church at Amsterdam, entered into an

epistolary conference with him, and tried to prove that the

opinion of Junius, as well as that of Calvin, inferred the

NECESSITY OF SIN, and that he must therefore, have recourse

to a third opinion, which supposed man, not only AS CREATED

but AS FALLEN, to have been the object of predestination.

Junius answered his first letter with that good temper, which

was peculiar to him, but seemed to fabricate out of the

various opinions concerning predestination one of his own,

which, Arminius thought contradicted all those which it was

his endeavour to defend. Arminius was induced to compose a

rejoinder to the answer of Junius, which he transmitted to

the Professor, who retained it full six years, to the time of

his death, without attempting to reply."

The letter of Arminius was divided by Junius into twenty-

seven propositions in answering it, and each of them is here

presented, with the answer of Junius, and the reply of

Arminius, corresponding to it.

TO THE

MOST DISTINGUISHED MAN,

FRANCIS JUNIUS, D.D.,

A BROTHER IN CHRIST, WORTHY OF MY MOST PROFOUND REGARD, JAMES

ARMINIUS WISHES YOU HEALTH.

MOST DISTINGUISHED AND VENERATED SIR:

They who do not give their assent to the sentiments of

others, seem to themselves, and wish to seem to others, to

be, in this, under the influence of sound judgment; but

sometimes, ignorance of the sentiments of others is the cause

of this, which, nevertheless, they by no means acknowledge. I

have not hitherto been able to agree, in the full persuasion

of my mind, with the views of some learned men, both of our

own and of former ages, concerning the decrees of

predestination and of reprobation.

Consciousness of my own lack of talents does not permit me to

ascribe the cause of this disagreement to sound judgment:

that I should ascribe it to ignorance is hardly allowed by my

own opinion, which seems to me to be based on an adequate

knowledge of their sentiments. On this account I have been

till this time in doubt; fearing to assent to an opinion of

another, without a full persuasion in my own mind; and not

daring to affirm that which I consider more true, but not in

accordance with the sentiments of most learned men. I have,

therefore, thought it necessary for the tranquillity of my

mind, to confer with learned men concerning that decree, that

I might try whether their erudite labours might be able to

remove my doubt and ignorance, and produce in my mind

knowledge and certainty. I have already done this with some

of my brethren; and with others, whose opinions have

authority, but thus far, (to confess the truth,) with a

result useless, or even injurious to me. I thought that I

must have recourse to you, who, partly from your published

works, and partly from the statements of others, I know to be

a person such that I may, without fear, be permitted to hope

from you some certain result.

REPLY OF FRANCIS JUNIUS TO THE MOST LEARNED MAN, AND MY VERY

DEAR BROTHER, JAMES ARMINIUS GREETING:

TERTULLIAN, On whose works, as you know, I have now been long

engaged, has been the cause of my long silence, respected

brother. In the mean time, I placed your letter on a shelf

plainly in my view, that I might be reminded of my obligation

to you, and might attend, at the earliest possible

opportunity, to your request. You desire from me an

explication of a question of a truly grave character, in

which the truth is fully known to God: that which is

sufficient He had expressed in His written word, which we

both consult with the divine help. You may set forth openly

what you think and do not think. You desire that I should

present my views, that from this mutual interchange and

communication of sentiments, we may illustrate the truth of

divine grace. I will do what I can according to the measure,

which the Lord has admeasured to me; and whatever I may

perceive of this most august mystery, I will indicate it,

whether I regard it as truth or as a merely speculative

opinion, that you with me may hold that which belongs to the

Deity. Whatever pertains to my opinion, if you have a more

correct sentiment, you may, in a kind and brotherly manner,

unfold it, and by a salutary admonition recall me into the

way of truth. I will here say nothing by way of introduction,

because I prefer to pass at once to the subject itself, which

may rather be "good to the use of edifying," as the apostle

teaches. I judge that all desire the truth in righteousness:

but all do not therefore see the truth in righteousness. "We

know in part, and we prophesy in part," (1 Cor. xiii, 9,) and

"when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you

into all truth." (John xvi, 13.) We perceive a part of the

truth: and present a part; the rest will be given in his own

time, by the Spirit of truth to those who seek. May he

therefore grant to both of us that we may receive and may

present the truth.

That we may both realize greater advantage from this

brotherly discussion, and that nothing may carelessly fall

from me, I will follow the path marked out in your letters,

writing word for word, and distinguishing the topics of your

discussion into propositions; and will subjoin to them, in

the same order, my own opinion concerning each point, that in

reference to all things you may be able to see clearly, and

according to the Divine will, determine from the mode of my

answer, what I think and what I do not think. The following

is your first proposition, in which you may recognize

yourself as speaking.

FIRST PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

I see, then, most renowned sir, that there are three views in

reference to that subject, [predestination] which have their

defenders among the doctors of our church. The first is that

of Calvin to Beza; the second that of Thomas Aquinas and his

followers; the third that of Augustine and those who agree

with him. They all agree in this, that they alike hold that

God, by an eternal and immutable decree, determined to bestow

upon certain men, the rest being passed by, supernatural and

eternal life, and those means which are the necessary and

efficacious preparation for the attainment of that life.

THE REPLY OF FRANCIS JUNIUS TO THE FIRST PROPOSITION OF

ARMINIUS

If one should wish to accumulate a variety of opinions, he

would in appearance have a large number of them; but let

these be the views of men to whom will readily be assigned

the first place in relation to this doctrine. But in

reference to the points of agreement among them all, of which

you speak, there are, unless I am deceived, two things most

worthy of explanation and notice. First, that what you say is

indeed true, that "God, by an eternal and immutable decree,

determined to give eternal, supernatural life to certain

men;" but that eternal life is not here primarily, or per se

the work of that divine predestination, but rather in a

secondary manner, and dependent, by consequence, on adoption

th~v uiJoqesiav The apostle demonstrates this in Ephes. i, 5.

"Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by

Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of

his will." And in verse 11, "which He hath purposed in

Himself; that in the dispensation of the fullness of time, He

might gather together in one all things in Christ," &c.

Also, Romans viii, 17, "if children, then heirs; heirs of

God, and joint-heirs with Christ," &c. We must not, however,

forget that if an effect is substituted for the

distinguishing part of the essence the definition of the

thing is defective. Predestination, if we regard its peculiar

and distinguishing quality, is, according to the testimony of

the Scripture, to filiation, (so to speak,) or the adoption

of children, the effect and sequence of which is eternal

life. It is thus true that we are predestinated to life, but,

accurately speaking, we are predestinated to adoption by the

special grace of our heavenly Father. He who proposes one,

supposes the other; but it is necessary that the former

should be always set forth distinctly in the general

discussion. Hence it seems that the arrangement of this whole

argument will be less encumbered, if we consider that saving

decree of the divine predestination in this order; that God

has predestinated us to the adoption of children of God in

Christ "to himself," and that he has pre-arranged by his own

eternal decree the way and the end of that adoption; the way

of that grace, leading us in the discharge of duty, by our

vocation and justification, but its end, that of life, which

we shall obtain when our glorification is perfected, (Rom.

8,) which are the effects of that grace, and the most certain

consequences of our adoption. The statement that God has

predestinated certain persons to life, is a general one; but

it is not sufficiently clear or convenient for the purpose of

instruction, unless gratuitous adoption in Christ is

supposed, prior to justification and life and glory.

There is still another statement, made by you, which seems to

me to need consideration, that "God has bestowed on certain

men those means which are the necessary and efficacious

preparation for the attainment of that life." For though that

assertion is true, yet it must be received with cautious

discrimination and religious scrupulousness. Our filiation is

(so to speak) the work of the divine predestination, because

God is our father, and by His grace unites us to himself as

sons. But whatever God has ordained for the consummation of

this adoption in us, it is, in respect to that adoption, not

a means but a necessary adjunct or consectary. That eternal

life, bestowed on us, is a consectary of our adoption "to

himself." But in respect to the adjuncts and consequence,

they may be called mutually, the means one of another; as

calling is said to be the means of justification, and

justification of glorification, (Rom. 8.) Yet though they are

means, most of them are necessary and efficacious in certain

respects, not per se and absolutely. For if they were, per se

and absolutely necessary and efficacious, they would be

equally necessary and efficacious in all the pious and elect.

Yet most of them are not of this character; since even

infants and they who come in their last hours, being called

by the Lord, will obtain eternal life without those means.

These things have been said, the opportunity being presented.

We agree generally in reference to the other matters.

THE REPLY OF JAMES ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF FRANCIS JUNIUS

To that most distinguished person, Doctor Francis Junius, and

my brother in Christ, to be regarded with due veneration.

REVEREND SIR:

I have read and reviewed your reply, and used all the

diligence of which I was capable, considering it according to

the measure of my strength, that I might be able to judge

with greater certainty concerning the truth of the matter

which is under discussion between us. But while I consider

everything in the light of my judgment, it seems to me that

most of my propositions and arguments are not answered in

your reply. I venture, therefore, to take my pen and to make

some comments in order to show wherein I perceive a

deficiency in your answer, and to defend my own arguments. I

am fully persuaded that you will receive it with as much

kindness as you received the liberty used in my former

letter, and if any thing shall seem to need correction and to

be worthy of refutation, you will indicate it to me with the

same charity; that, by your faithful assistance, may be able

to understand the truth which I seek with simplicity of

heart, and explain it to others to the glory of God and their

salvation, as occasion shall demand. May that Spirit of truth

be present with me, and so direct my mind and hand, that it

may in no respect err from the truth. If however any thing

should fall from me not in harmony with its meaning, I shall

wish that it had been unsaid, unwritten.

THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO HIS FIRST PROPOSITION

In my former letter I laid down three views held by our

doctors in reference to the decree of Predestination and

Reprobation, diverse, not contrary. Others might perhaps have

been adduced, but not equally diverse among themselves or

from others. For each of these are distinguished by marks

which are manifest and have reference to the essence and

nature of the subject itself, which is under discussion.

First, they give the object of the decree (man) a different

mode or form, since the first presents him to the Deity as an

object to be created, the second as created, the third as

fallen.

Secondly, they adapt to that decree attributes of the Deity,

either different or considered in a different relation. For

the first presents mercy and justice as preparing an object

for themselves; the third introduces the same attributes as

finding their object prepared; the second places grace, which

holds the relation of genus to mercy, over predestination;

and liberty of grace over non-election or the preparation of

preterition, and justice over punishment.

Thirdly, they differ in certain acts. The first view

attributes the act of creation to that decree, and makes the

fall of man subordinate to the same decree; the second and

the third premises creation; the third also supposes the fall

of man to be antecedent in the order of nature to the decree,

regarding the decree of election which flows from mercy and

that of reprobation which is administered by justice, as

having no possible place except in reference to man

considered as a sinner, and on that account meriting misery.

It is hence apparent that I have not improperly separated

those views which are themselves separated and discriminated

by some marked distinction. But you will perhaps persuade me

that our doctors differ only in their mode of presenting the

same truth, more easily than you will persuade them or their

adherents. For Beza in many places sharply contends that God,

when predestinating and reprobating man, considers him, not

as created, not as fallen, but as to be created, and he

claims that this is indicated by the term "lump," used in

Rom. ix, 21, and he charges great absurdities on those who

hold different views. For example, he says that they "who

present man as created to God decreeing, consider the Deity

as imprudent, creating man before he had his own mind

arranged any thing in reference to his final condition. He

accuses those who present man as fallen, of denying, divine

providence, without the decree or arrangement of which sin

entered into the world, according to their view. But I can

readily endure, indeed I can praise any one who may desire to

harmonize the views of the doctors, rather than to separate

them more widely, only let this be done by a suitable

explanation of views, apparently diverse, not by change in

statement, or by any addition, differing from the views

themselves. He, who acts otherwise, does not obtain the

desired fruit of reconciliation, and he gains the emolument

of an erroneously stated sentiment, the displeasure of its

authors.

As to those two respects in which you think that my

explanation of the agreement of those views needs

animadversion, in the former I agree, in the latter I do not

much disagree with you. For Predestination is, immediately,

to adoption, and, through it, to life; but when I propose the

sentiments of others, I do not think that they should be

corrected by me. Yet I cheerfully receive the correction;

though I consider that it has little or nothing to do with

this controversy. Indeed I think that it tends to confirm my

view. For adoption in Christ not only requires the

supposition of sin as a condition requisite in the object,

but of a certain other thing also, of which I did not in my

former letter think it best to treat. That thing is faith in

Jesus Christ, without which adoption is in fact bestowed on

no man, and, apart from the consideration of which, adoption

is prepared for no one by the divine predestination. (John i,

12.) For they who believe are adopted, not they who are

adopted receive the gift of faith: adoption is prepared for

those who shall believe, not faith is prepared for those who

are to be adopted, just as justification is prepared for

believers, not faith is prepared for the justified. The

Scripture demonstrates that this is the order in innumerable

passages. But I do not fully understand in what sense you

style vocation and justification the way of adoption. That

may be called the way of adoption which will lead to

adoption, and that also by which adoption tends to its own

end. You seem to me to understand the term way in the latter

sense, from the fact that you make justification subsequent

to adoption, and you speak of the way of grace leading us in

the discharge of duty, by our vocation and justification.

Here are two things not unworthy of notice. The first is that

you connect vocation with adoption as antecedent to it, which

I think can scarcely be said of vocation as a whole. For the

vocation of sinners and unbelievers is to faith in Christ;

the vocation of believers is to conformity to Christ and to

communion with him. The Scripture makes the former antecedent

to adoption. The latter is to adoption itself, which is

included in conformity and communion with Christ. The second

is that you made adoption prior to justification; both of

which I regard as bestowed on believers at the same time,

while in the order of nature, justification is prior to

adoption. For the justified person is adopted, not the

adopted person is justified. This is proved by the order both

of the attainment of those blessings made by Christ, and that

of the imputation of the same blessings made by God in

Christ. For Christ obtained the remission of sins, before he

obtained adoption, before in the order of nature: and

righteousness is imputed before sonship. For "when we were

enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son,"

(Rev. v, 10,) but being reconciled, we are adopted as sons.

Let us consider also what are opposed to these, namely,

imputation of sins and non-adoption. From these it is clearly

seen that such is the order. Sin is the cause of exclusion

from filiation by the mode of demerit. Imputation of sin is

the cause of the same exclusion by the mode of justice,

punishing sin according to its demerit. In reference to your

remarks concerning means, I observe that this term is applied

by the authors to whose sentiments I refer, to those things

which God makes subordinate to the decree of Predestination,

but antecedent to the execution of that decree, not those by

which or in respect to which Predestination itself is made,

whether to adoption or to life. But I think it may be most

useful to consider whether these, either as adjuncts, or

consectaries, or means, or by whatever other name they may be

called, are only effective to consummate the adoption already

ordained for certain individuals, or whether they were

considered by the Deity in the very act of predestination to

sonship, as necessary adjuncts of those to be predestinated.

SECOND PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

They differ in this, that the first presents men as not yet

created, but to be created, to God, electing and

predestinating, also passing by and reprobating, (though, in

the latter case, it does not so clearly make the

distinction): the second presents them created, but

considered in a natural state, to God electing and

predestinating, "to be raised from that natural state above

it; it presents them to Him in the act of preterition, as

considered in the same natural state, and to Him in that of

reprobation, as involved in sin by their own fault: the third

presents them to Him both electing and predestinating, and

passing by and reprobating as fallen in Adam, and as lying in

the mass of corruption and perdition.

THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SECOND PROPOSITION

That, in this statement of views (which are apparently, not

really, contradictory) you have, in some manner, fallen into

error, we shall, in its own place, demonstrate. I could wish

that in this case an ambiguity, in the verb reprobate, and

the verbal reprobation, had been avoided. This word is used

in three ways; one general, two particular. The general use

is when non-election, or preterition and damnation, is

comprehended in the word, in which way Calvin and Beza

frequently understood it, yet so as to make some distinction.

A particular mode or signification is when it is opposed to

election, and designates non-election or preterition (a Latin

phrase derived from forensic use) in which sense the fathers

used it according to the common use of the Latins. There is

also a particular use of the word, when reprobation is taken

for damnation, as I perceive that it is used by you in this

whole letter. The first mode is synecdochical, the second

common, the third metonymical; I add that the third might

properly be called catachrestic if we attend to the just

distinction of these members. I wholly approve the second

meaning and shall adhere to it in this whole discussion.

THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SECOND PROPOSITION

I have made a difference, not a contrariety between those

views, and have already explained that difference according

to my judgment. I do not, however, wish to be tedious in the

proof of this point. For, in this matter, it is my aim that

of a number of positions, any one being established, others,

perhaps before unsettled, may be demonstrated.

The word reprobation may be sometimes used ambiguously, but

it was not so used by me: and, if it had been, blame for that

thing ought not to be laid on me, who have used that word in

the sense and according to the use of those, whose views I

presented, but especially according to the sense in which it

has been used by yourself, with whom I have begun this

discussion. For I had examined various passages in your

writings, and in them I found that the word was used by you

in the last sense, which you here call catachrestic. I will

adduce some of those passages, from which you will see that I

have used the word in accordance with your perpetual usage.

In your Notes on Jude, (fol 27-6,) "The proper cause of

reprobation is man himself; of his own sin, dying in sins."

So in your Sacred Axioms concerning Nature and Grace,

prefaced to the Refutation of the Pamphlet of Puccius, Axioms

xliv, xlv, xlvi, xlvii, xlviii, and especially xlix and l,

the words of which I here quote. Axiom xlix, "Nor is

preterition indeed the cause of reprobation or damnation, but

only its antecedent. But the peculiar and internal efficient

cause of this is the sin of the creature, while the

accidental and external cause is the justice of God." Axiom

i, "Therefore Reprobation (that we may clearly distinguish

the matter) is understood either in a wider sense, or in one

which is more narrow and peculiar to itself. In a wider

sense, if you consider the whole subject of the divine

counsel from preterition, as the antecedent and commencement,

to damnation, as the end and consequent, with the

intervention of the peculiar cause of damnation, namely, sin;

in a more narrow and appropriate sense, if you consider only

the effects of sin." We might add, also, what is said in the

51st axiom. Of the theses concerning Predestination,

discussed by Coddaeus under you, the 14th has this remark:

"Preterition is the opposite of preparation of grace and

reprobation or preparation of punishment is the opposite of

preparation of glory. But preparation of punishment is the

act in which God determines to punish his creatures, &c." In

theses 17 and 18, "reprobate on account of sins, from the

necessity of justice." Here you seem to have wished to use

those words properly: which you also signify more plainly in

the Theses concerning election discussed by the younger

Trelcatius under your direction. Thesis xii, "But if

reprobation is made the opposite of election, (as it really

is,) it is a figurative expression, that is either by

synecdoche, or by catachresis. By synecdoche, if it refers to

the whole series of acts opposed to Predestination; by

catachresis, if it refers to non-election. For non-election

is the first limit of the divine purpose, dependent on his

will alone. Reprobation is the ultimate limit, next to the

execution, dependent on the supposition of antecedent

causes." Hence it is apparent that I have used that word in

the sense which you have styled "appropriate." I will state,

in a few words, what I think in reference to the same word,

and its use. I am wholly of the opinion that the word

reprobation, according to the use of the Latin language,

properly signifies non-election, if election does not consist

without reprobation. But I think that it is never used in the

Scripture for an act which is merely negative, and never for

an act which has reference to those who are not sinners. If

at any time Augustine and others of the fathers use it for

preterition, non-election, or any negative act, they consider

it as having reference to a reelection in sin, and in the

mass of corruption, or for a purpose to withhold mercy, the

latter term being used for a deliverance from sin and actual

misery. Calvin and Beza use it in almost every case, for the

mere preparation of punishment, or for both acts.

THIRD PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

The first theory is this, that God determined from eternity

to illustrate his own glory by mercy and justice: and as

these could be exercised in fact only in reference to

sinners, that he decreed to make man holy and innocent, that

is, after his own images yet, good in such a sense as to be

liable to a change in this condition, and able to fall and to

commit sin: that he ordained also that man should fall and

become depraved, that He might thus prepare the way for the

fulfillment of his own eternal counsels, that he might be

able mercifully to save some and justly to condemn others,

according to his own eternal purpose, to the declaration of

his mercy in the former, and of his justice in the latter.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE THIRD PROPOSITION

This view seems to have been stated not with sufficient

fullness; for Calvin in his Institutes, (lib. 3,) eloquently

refers to the words of Paul in Ephes. i, "He predestinated

us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself,

&c.," and explains them, preserving the order which we

noticed under Proposition I. God therefore from eternity

determined to illustrate most wisely his own glory by the

adoption of these and the preterition or non-adoption of

those with the introduction also of mercy and justice. This

being settled, that statement may be very well conceded, that

"God determined to illustrate his own glory by mercy and

justice, if it is rightly understood. But this will be

hereafter explained in a summary manner. But it cannot be

conceded, nor can I think that Calvin or Beza would have said

simply that "mercy and justice cannot in fact be exercised

except in reference to sinners. For in the first place (that

we may sooner or later explain these things), sinners are

such in act, in habit, or in capability. We are sinners in

act when the depravity of our nature has carried out its own

operations; we were sinners in habit in the womb and from the

womb, before we wrought the works of the flesh. Adam was such

in capability in some sense before the fall, when he had the

power to lay aside his holy habits of life, and make himself

the bond-slave of sin. So also they are miserable, in act, in

habit, or in capability, who now endure miseries or have put

on the habit of them, are capable of falling into them. The

latter, however, are sinners and miserable, not absolutely

but relatively; not fully but in a certain sense (kata ti)

and only in a comparative mode of speaking as Job iv, 18,

"Behold He put no trust in his servants; and his angels he

charged with folly." Augustine refers to this (Lib. contra.

Priscill et Origen, cap 10) concluding his remarks with this

most elegant sentence: "for by participation in whom they are

righteous, by comparison with Him they are unrighteous."

But in the second place it is not true that "mercy cannot be

exercised except in reference to sinners," for all creatures,

even the angels from heaven, when compared, according to

their own nature, with the Deity, are wretched, since in

comparison with Him they are not righteous, and because, by

their own nature, they can sink into misery, (which is

certainly the capability of misery; as, on the contrary, not

to be capable of misery, is the highest happiness), they are

miserable by capability. Therefore, He who has freed them

from possible misery by His own election, has bestowed mercy

on them; in reference to which they are called "elect angels"

by Paul. (1 Tim. v, 21.) We may here merely refer to the fact

that the word mercy (the Latin term misericordia being used

in a more contracted sense) does not necessarily suppose

misery, as will be seen by a reference to the original

languages, the Hebrew and Greek, in which the men of God

wrote. The Hebrews expressed that idea by two words dsj and

symjr neither of which had reference properly and necessarily

to misery e]leov of the Greeks does not necessarily suppose

misery, if we regard the common usage of the Scriptures; for

parents exercise it towards their children, though happy and

free from misery. In the third place, it is by no means more

true that "he can exercise justice only in reference to

sinners." For he who renders to each his due, exercises

justice: but God would clearly not be just if he did not

render their due to the righteous as well as to the

unrighteous. For even towards Adam, if he had remained

righteous, God would have exercised justice both by the

bestowment of his own reward upon him, analogous to his

righteousness, and by that supernatural gift, analogous to

his own power and grace, which He adumbrated to man by the

symbol of the tree of life. It was possible that God should

exercise justice in reference even to those who were not

sinners. But concerning judgment to death, the case is

different. From what has already been said, we readily

conclude in reference to the rest. In reference to the word

ordain, we shall speak under the sixth proposition.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO HIS THIRD PROPOSITION

I might show that the sentiments of Calvin and Beza were well

and fully set forth by me in those words, by many passages

selected from their writings. For though sometimes, when they

make mention of adoption, and non-adoption, which is its

contrary by logical division and opposition, yet they do not

set forth their views, as it was explained by you in answer

to my first proposition, and as you have just explained it in

these words: "God, therefore, from eternity, determined to

illustrate most wisely his own glory by the adoption of

these, and the preterition or non-adoption of those, with the

introduction of mercy and justice." For in two respects there

is a departure in those words from their sentiment.

In the first place, because they do not consider that the

illustration of the glory of God is effected immediately by

the adoption of these and the non-adoption or preterition of

those, but by a declaration of mercy and justice, which are

unfolded in the acts of adoption or election, and of non-

adoption or reprobation. It seems proper, according to the

rule of demonstration, that this order should be preserved;

the glory of God consists in the declaration of the

attributes of God; the attributes of God are illustrated by

acts suitable to those attributes.

Secondly, mercy and justice are not said by them to be

introduced into the decree of predestination and reprobation.

For those words signify that God, according to other

attributes of his nature, decreed the adoption of these and

the non-adoption of those, to the illustration of his own

glory, in which deed he used also mercy and justice for the

execution of that decree, and indeed with the condition of a

change in the object. But this was not their view, but it was

as I have already set it forth, namely, "God determined from

eternity to illustrate his own glory by mercy and justice:

since the glory of God can be neither acknowledged nor

celebrated, unless it be declared by his mercy and his

justice. But they consider mercy the appropriate cause of

adoption, but justice the cause of non-adoption or

reprobation, and they regard his purpose of illustrating both

as the whole cause of predestination, that is, of election

and reprobation; for they divide predestination into these

parts or species. Therefore in my statement less was ascribed

to mercy and justice in that decree than those authors think

ought to be ascribed to those attributes, and than they do

ascribe to them in the explanation of their entire view. Nor

is it with justice denied that it is a part of their

sentiment that mercy and justice can only be exercised in

fact in reference to actual sinners. For they assert this

most clearly, not indeed restricting the word justice to

punitive justice, which, indeed, is my view, as is evident

from my sixth proposition, and I think that this can be

understood from them. I will adduce a few passages from many.

Beza (adversus calumnias Nebulonis, ad art. 2) "God, having

in view the creation of man, to declare the glory both of his

mercy and of his justice, as the result showed, made Adam in

his own image, that is, holy and innocent; since as he is

good, nothing depraved can be created by him. But they must

be depraved on whom he determines to have mercy, and they

also whom he justly determines to condemn." From this passage

I quoted the words in which I stated this view. The same Beza

again says (lib. 1, quest. et reap. fol. 126, in 8,) "Since

God had decreed from eternity, as can be learned from events,

to manifest in the highest degree his own glory in the human

race, which manifestation might consist partly in the

exercise of mercy, partly in the demonstration of hatred

against sin, he made a man inwardly and outwardly pure, and

endowed with right understanding and will, but susceptible of

change. He, as supremely good, could not and would not indeed

create any evil thing, and yet unless evil had entered into

the world, there would have been no place for mercy or

judgment." He expresses himself, in the plainest manner

possible, in his conference with Mombelgartes; "Let us," says

Beza "lay down these principles. God, an infinitely wise

architect, and whose wisdom is unlimited, when He determined

to create the world, and especially the human race had a

certain proposed end, &c. For the eternal and immutable

purpose of God was antecedent to all causes, because He

decreed in Himself from eternity to create all men for His

own glory. But the glory of God is neither acknowledged nor

celebrated, unless his mercy and justice is declared.

Therefore, He made an eternal and immutable decree by which

He destined some particular individuals, of mere grace, to

eternal life, and some, by an act of judgment, to eternal

damnation, that He might declare His mercy in the former, but

His justice in the latter. Since God had proposed this end to

Himself in the creation of men, it was necessary that He

should also devise the way and the means by which He could

attain that end, that His mercy and His justice might be

equally manifested. For since mercy presupposes misery, it

can neither have place nor be declared where misery does not

exist, it was then necessary that man should be created, that

in him there might be a place for the mercy of God. This

could not be found without preceding misery. So also, since

justice presupposes crime, without which justice cannot be

exercised, (for where there is no crime, there justice has no

place,) it was necessary that man should be so created that,

without the destruction of his nature, he might be a fit

subject, that in him God might declare His own justice. For

He could not declare His own justice in man unless He should

have destined him to eternal damnation. Therefore, God

proposed, &c." These things were published by James Andreas,

but acknowledged by Beza, for in his answer to that

discussion he does not say that views, not his own, are

attributed to him. You see, therefore, that I have adapted

the proper object to those attributes according to their

opinion, which sentiment they without doubt think that they

have derived from the Scripture; in which this is fixed that

God cannot justly punish one who is not a sinner; in which

also the same author will deny that the word mercy is so used

that, when attributed to God, it may signify salvation from

possible misery; since, in their view, it every where

designates salvation from the misery which the sinner has

merited, and which either has been or can be justly inflicted

by the Deity. But I shall not wish to contend strenuously

that it is not possible that mercy should be exercised

towards those not actually miserable, and I can easily assent

to those things which you have said concerning that subject,

if they may have the meaning which I will give in my own

words, namely, that all creatures, even angels and men, when

compared with God, are miserable, misery being here taken for

non felicity, not for that which is opposed to felicity in a

privative sense, but for that which is opposed to it in a

contradictory sense; as nothing more is proved by the reason

from analogy. In comparison with God they are not just,

therefore, in comparison with him they are not happy. For

there are three antecedents, each of which has its

consequent; just, unjust, not just; happy, unhappy or

miserable, not happy. From justice results happiness, from

injustice misery, from non-justice non-felicity.

But creatures as such can be compared with God, both in

relation of the limit whence they proceed, and in relation to

the limit to which they advanced by the Deity. In relation to

the latter, angels and men exist, are just, are happy; in

relation to the former, they do not exist, are not just, are

not happy, since they come from nothing and can therefore be

returned to nothing. But in this relation they cannot be

called unjust or unhappy, since the limit, from which they

were brought forward, is opposed, by contradiction, not by

privation, to the limit to which they are borne by the divine

goodness, or more briefly, since they are brought from

possibility to actuality, which possibility and actuality are

contradictory not privative, one of the other. Now, since

they consist of possibility and actuality, it is not possible

that they, if deserted by divine support, should return to

nothing, but it is necessary that they, if thus deserted,

should return to nothing. It is moreover possible that,

continuing to exist by the divine power, yet being left to

themselves and having power to decide their own course, they

should, in their second action, not live according to the

dictates of justice, by which they were governed in their

first action, but do something contrary to it, and by this

act become unrighteous and sinners, and, having become such,

should put on the habit of unrighteousness, the habit of

righteousness having been removed, either as an effect or on

the ground of demerit, so that they would become miserable

first by desert, next by act, and finally by habit. But if

God should hinder them from deserving that misery that is

from sinning and becoming actually miserable, I do not see

why that act may not be ascribed to mercy since it originates

in the desire to prevent misery, which desire pertains to

mercy. I concede, indeed, that this is so, and that it is not

therefore absolutely true that mercy can only be exercised

towards actual sinners. But I wish that it should be observed

that mercy is not used, in that sense, by Calvin and Beza,

and indeed if mercy, thus understood, should be substituted

for the same affection, as it is used by Calvin and Beza, the

whole relation and description of the decree would be

changed. I remark also that mercy, understood as you present

it, does not come under consideration when the subject

treated of is the predestination of men: for it is not

exercised by God towards man, as one who has not been saved

from possible misery by the divine predestination. Finally,

it should also be considered that the relation between mercy

understood in the latter, and mercy understood in the former

sense is such that both cannot concur to the salvation of a

man. For if there be occasion for the mercy, which saves from

possible misery, there can be no place for that which

delivers from actual misery, as the opportunity for the

exercise of its peculiar functions is taken away, or, rather,

precluded by the former; if on the contrary the mercy, which

frees from actual misery, is necessary, the other does not

act, and so the former excludes the latter in the relation of

both cause and effect, and the latter consequently excludes

the former, not succeeding after the fulfillment of its

office, but existing by the necessity of its own action, as

the man has failed of the former.

We remark in reference to justice that it is indeed very true

that it can have place, and can be exercised towards those

who are not sinners. For it is the rewarder not only of

sinful, but of righteous conduct. But why may it not be

deduced from these things, so considered by you, that the

necessary existence of sin cannot be inferred even from the

necessary declaration of the mercy and justice of God, since

both, considered in a certain light, can be exercised towards

those who are not sinners. In this way the order of

predestination established by Calvin and Beza is wholly

overthrown. But as mercy, saving from possible misery, and

justice, rewarding virtue do not need the pre-existence of

actual misery and sin, yet it is certain that mercy, freeing

from actual misery and justice, punishing sin, can only be

exercised towards the actually miserable and sinful. But

Calvin and Beza every where use the terms, mercy and justice,

in this sense, when they discuss the decree of predestination

and probation. Since, also, mercy and justice, understood in

the former sense, have no place in the predestination and

reprobation of men, but only as they are received in the

former signification, mercy, saving from possible misery and

justice, rewarding good deeds, might be properly omitted in

the discussion of the predestination and reprobation of men,

though I do not deny that such a consideration may have its

appropriate and by no means small advantages. Since we have

entered on the consideration of mercy and justice, we may, if

you have leisure and are so disposed, continue it for a short

time, comparing each with the other, for the illustration of

the subject which we now discuss, in reference first to the

object of both, then to the order in which each acts on its

own object.

Mercy and justice, the former saving from possible misery,

the latter rewarding good conduct can be exercised towards

one and the same object, as is manifest in the case of the

elect angels, who are saved from possible misery, and have

obtained from the divine goodness the reward of right

conduct. But that same mercy cannot be exercised in reference

to the same object with punitive justice. For whatever is

worthy of the act of punitive justice is not saved from

possible misery. The mercy, also which saves from actual

misery is in this respect similar to the other kind of mercy,

that it cannot concur in respect to the same object with

punitive justice; but it is to be considered whether and how,

like the other mercy, it can be exercised at the same time

with the justice which rewards goodness. We, indeed see, that

in the Scriptures the reward of a good deed is promised to

those who have obtained mercy in Christ, and is in fact

bestowed upon them, but the reward, though it may be of

justice, is yet not of justice, understood in that sense in

which justice is regarded, when rewarding a good deed,

according to the promise of the law, and of debt; for the

former remuneration is the grace of God in Jesus Christ, who

is made unto us of God, righteousness, (justice) and

sanctification. Justice, in one case bestowing a remuneration

of debt, may be called legal, but, in the other, of grace,

may not inappropriately be called evangelical, the union of

which with the mercy saving from actual misery has been

effected in a wonderful manner by God in Jesus Christ, our

High Priest, and expiatory sacrifice. The object, then, of

punitive justice is essentially and materially different from

the object of mercy considered in either light, and of

justice remunerating right conduct.

But the object of mercy, saving from possible misery, is

different in its formal relation from the object of mercy,

saving from actual misery, for the former is a creature,

righteous and considered in his state as it was by creation,

but the latter is a sinful creature, and fallen from his

original state into misery by transgression. Of those two

classes both of mercy and justice, the former in each case is

to be excluded from the decree of the predestination and

reprobation of men, namely, mercy-saving from possible misery

and justice, rewarding goodness from a legal promise, but the

latter, preside over that decree, namely, mercy-saving from

actual misery, over predestination, and punitive justice over

reprobation. Now let us examine the order, according to which

each, compared by themselves and among themselves, tends to

its own object. Mercy preventing misery and justice rewarding

goodness according to law, tending towards one subject, take

this order, that mercy should first perform its office, and

then justice discharge its functions. For the prevention of

sin, and therefore of misery, precedes any good deed, and

therefore precedes the reward of that good deed, therefore,

also, the misery which saves from actual misery precedes the

justice which rewards a good deed, of grace. For that mercy

not only takes away the guilt and dominion of sin, but

creates in the believer a habit of righteousness, by which a

good deed is produced, to be compensated of grace by the

reward. But concerning mercy-saving from actual misery, which

is the administration of predestination, and punitive justice

which is the cause of reprobation, what judgment shall we

form? We will say that both tend, at the same moment, to

their own object, but we will [make] consider the former as

an antecedent in the order of nature. For though he, who

elects, in the very fact that he elects, reprobates also the

non-elect, yet the act of election is antecedent in the order

of nature, just as an affirmative is in the order of nature

prior to negation. From which we infer (of this we will speak

hereafter) that the decree to leave man to the decision of

his own destiny, and to permit the fall, does not belong to

the decree of reprobation, since it is prior to and more

ancient than the decree of predestination.

I wish that this order may be considered with somewhat more

diligence and at greater length, for it will open before us a

way of knowing some other things, different from and yet by

no means wholly foreign to the subject now under discussion.

If the mercy, which bestows grace and life, holds the prior

relation to this decree, and the justice, which denies grace

and inflicts death, the posterior relation in the order of

nature, though not of time, then it is still more to be

considered, whether the object of this decree is adequately

and with sufficient accuracy described by the term sinner; or

whether something else ought not also to be added, which may

so limit the object, that it may be made adequate to the

decree which originated in such mercy and justice, and may be

in harmony with it, namely the nature of the object thus made

adequate, and, in its own capability, tending to its own

peculiar and appropriate object. If any one thinks that the

functions of justice towards sin and the sinner are prior to

those of mercy and that the rendering of it's due punishment

to sin is prior by nature to the remission of the same to the

sinner, I wish he would attend diligently to two points.

First, that a two-fold action is attributed, by those who

discuss this matter, to justice, so far as it premises over

the decree of reprobation, or preterition and predamnation,

and this in harmony with the nature of the subject; the

former is negative, the latter affirmative, and in this order

that the negative precedes the affirmative. From this it

follows that if that negative act is posterior, in the order

of nature, to the affirmative act of predestination, as is

the case, then the functions of mercy must be prior; for from

mercy originates the affirmative act of predestination, which

is antecedent to the negative act of reprobation. SECONDLY,

that the punishment, due to sin, is by this decree destined

for no one, unless so as it is not removed by mercy; and in

this respect, though justice may in its own right claim the

punishment of the sinner, yet it exacts that punishment,

according to the decree of predomination which is made by

justice, in view not of the fact that it is due to the

sinner, but of the fact that it has not been remitted to him

of mercy; else all men universally would be predamned, since

they all have deserved punishment. Hence, this ought also to

be considered whether the justice, which is the

administratrix of the decree of reprobation or predamnation

is revealed according to the Law or the Gospel, of legal

rigor or softened by some mercy and forbearance. If mercy,

the administratrix of predestination is revealed according to

the Gospel, as is true, it seems from what has already been

said, that justice the opposite of mercy, which is prior to

it, in the order of nature, should be also revealed according

to the Gospel. If any one thinks that these views are vain

and useless, let him consider that what is said in the

Scripture concerning legal righteousness is not useless --

"The man which doeth those things shall live by them," (Rom.

x, 5,) and "cursed is every one that continueth not in all

things which are written in the book of the law to do them."

(Gal. iii, 10.)

Let him also consider what is said concerning Evangelical

righteousness, "He that believeth in the Son hath everlasting

life, (John iii, 36,) and "He that believeth not is

condemned. (John iii, 18.) I wish that these things may be

considered thoroughly by the thoughtful, and I ask a

suspension of their decision until they have accurately

weighed the matter.

FOURTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

The second theory is this -- God, from eternity, considering

men in their original native condition determined to raise

some to supernatural felicity and ordained for the same

persons supernatural means which are necessary, sufficient

and efficacious to secure that felicity to them, to the

praise of his glorious grace; and to pass by others, and to

have them in their natural state, and not to bestow on them

those supernatural and efficacious means, to declare the

liberty of his own goodness; and that he reprobated the same

individuals, so passed by, whom he foresaw as not continuing

in their original condition, but falling from it of their own

fault, that is, he prepared punishment for them to the

declaration of his own justice.

THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FOURTH PROPOSITION

This theory is stated, in these words, not more nearly in

accordance with the sentiment of its authors than the

preceding. For in the first place, I do not remember that I

have read these words in Thomas Aquinas, or others: in the

second place, if any have used this phraseology, they have

not used it in that sense, as shall be proved under the sixth

proposition. But in the phrase supernatural felicity,

understand th<n uiJoqesian, the adoption of the sons of God

with all its adjuncts and consectaries. After the words

"declare the liberty of his own goodness," add, if you

please, "and the perfection of his manifold wisdom." The word

reprobation is to be taken catachrestically, as we have

before observed. I should prefer that words should be

variously distinguished in referring to matters which are

distinct.

THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE FOURTH PROPOSITION

If I have stated this second theory as nearly in accordance

with the sentiments of its authors as in the preceding case,

it is well; but I fear on this point since I do not, with

equal confidence claim a knowledge of the second. Yet I think

that I have derived the explanation of this from the Theses

discussed under your direction in which I recognize your

style and mode of discussion. Thus in Thesis 10 of those

which were discussed, Coddaeus being the respondent, is this

statement. "Human beings" (that is, one part of the material

of predestination, as is stated in Thesis 7, of the same

disputation concerning predestination) "are creatures in a

condition of nature (which can effect nothing natural,

nothing divine) to be exalted above nature, and to be

transmitted to a participation of divine things by the

supernatural energy of the Deity." The same assertion is

found in the Thesis 4 of your tenth theological disputation,

in which the subject of the predestination of human beings

alone is discussed, as is the case with the first Thesis,

that no one may think that things, said in common concerning

the predestination of angels and of men, ought to be

expressed in general terms. which might afterwards be

attributed specially to each of these classes, according to

their different condition to the elect angels, an exaltation

from that nature, in which they were created by the Deity,

but to elect human beings on elevation from their corrupt

nature into which they fell, of their own fault. If, however,

this matter is thus understood, there is now no discrepancy

between us in this respect.

But I think that it is evident from those words of your

Theses that human beings, considered in their original

condition are the material of predestination, or its adequate

object. Human beings I say in their original condition, both

in the fact that nothing supernatural or divine has been

bestowed upon them, and that they have not yet fallen into

sin.

Considered in their original condition, I say again, in view

of the fact that even if they have either supernatural and

divine gifts or sin, they are not considered with reference

to these by Him who determined to perform any certain act

concerning them, which is equivalent to an assertion that

neither supernatural or divine gifts, nor sin, held, in the

mind of Him who considered them the position of a formal

cause in the object, From these words I deduce this

conclusion:

Human beings, considered in their natural state which can

admit nothing supernatural or divine, are the object or

material of predestination;-But human beings, considered in

their natural condition, are here as beings considered in

that natural state, which can do nothing supernatural or

divine, or rather they are the same in definition;-

Therefore, human beings in their natural state are the object

and material of predestination, that is, according to the

views embraced in your Theses. The Major Proposition is

contained in the Thesis. For if the will or decree of God in

reference to the exaltation of men from such a state of

nature to a state above nature is predestination, then men,

considered in that natural state, are the true material of

predestination; since the acts of God, both the internal,

which is the decree concerning the exaltation of certain

human beings, and the external, which is the exaltation

itself, (as it ought to be, if we wish to consider the mere

object) leave to us man in his mere natural state which can

do nothing supernatural or divine.

If it is said that, in these words, the condition of sin is

not excluded, since even sinners may be raised from their

corrupt nature, I reply, in the first place, that this cannot

be the meaning of those words, both because it is not

necessary that it should be said of such a nature that can do

nothing supernatural or divine, for this is understood from

the qualifying term, when it is spoken of as "corrupt," and

because, in the definition of preterition, Thesis 15, that

act, by which the pure nature of some creatures is not

confirmed, is attributed to preterition, which preterition is

the leaving of some created beings in their natural

condition. I reply, in the second place, that there is here

an equivocation in the definition, and that the decree is

equivocal and only true on the condition of its division, of

which I will say more hereafter. The Minor is true, for this

is evident from the reciprocal and equivalent relation of the

antecedent and consequent to each other. But what pertains to

predestination is enunciated in these words, "to be exalted

above nature, and to be transferred to a participation of

divine things by the supernatural energy of the Deity, which

divine things pertain to grace and glory," as in your Thesis

9. It is not doubtful that my words, in which I have

described the second theory, are in harmony with these

statements, but if any one thinks that there is a discrepancy

because, in your Theses, grace and glory are united, and that

it can be understood from my words that I designed to

indicate that glory first, and grace afterwards, are prepared

for men in predestination, I would inform him that I did not

wish to indicate such an idea, but that I wished to set

forth, in those words, what the predestinate obtain from

predestination.

I come now to the second part, which refers to preterition,

and in reference to this, your Theses make this statement

"Preterition is the act of the divine will, by which God,

from eternity, determined to leave some of his creatures in

their natural state, and not to communicate to them that

supernatural grace by which their nature might be preserved

uncorrupt, or, having become corrupt, might be restored to

the declaration of the freedom of his own goodness." Also in

your theological axioms Concerning Nature and Grace, axiom

44. "To this purpose of election in Christ is opposed the

eternal purpose of non-election or preterition, according to

which some are passed by as to be left in their own natural

state." These are my words: "but he determined to pass by

some and to leave them in their natural state, and not to

impart to them those supernatural and especially those

efficacious means, to declare the freedom of his own

goodness." He, who compares our statements, will see that one

and the same sentiment is expressed in different words. For

"supernatural grace" and "supernatural means" signify the

same thing, "the grace by which nature, when uncorrupt, might

be strengthened, and when corrupt, might be restored," is

what I have described in the phrase "efficacious means." For

"efficacious means" either confirm nature when uncorrupt or

restore it when corrupt; as sufficient means are those which

have the power to confirm or restore. Moreover the end, which

I have proposed, is expressed in your second Thesis, "to the

praise of his glorious grace," and again, in the second

Thesis of the tenth disputation, "to the praise of his most

glorious grace," and in Thesis 15 of the disputation

concerning predestination, in which Coddaeus is the

respondent, you have stated the end of preterition to be "the

declaration of the freedom of the divine goodness, with no

additional remark; yet I do not object to what you wish to

add in this place, "the perfection of his manifold wisdom."

However, the freedom of goodness and the perfection of wisdom

cannot be at the same moment engaged in the acts of

predestination and preterition. For the office of wisdom

takes precedence, in pointing out all possible methods of

illustrating the glory of God, and that which may especially

conduce to the glory of God. But the freedom of his goodness

is subsequent in its operation, in making choice of the mode

of illustration, and in carrying it out into the action, in

the exercise (so to speak) of power. In reference to the

third part, I make the same remark, namely, concerning

reprobation, or the preparation of punishment, that I have

also explained it correctly according to your view, for thus

is reprobation or the preparation for punishment defined in

Thesis seventeen. "It is the act of the divine pleasure, by

which God from eternity determined for the declaration of his

own justice to punish his creatures, who should not continue

in their original state, but should depart from God, the

author of their origin, by their own deed and depravity. But

I have used the same words with only this addition, "the same

individuals, so passed by," by which addition I have only

done that which was made requisite by the arrangement and

distinction in character which I have adopted; for those, for

whom punishment is prepared, are not different from those who

are passed by, though punishment was prepared for them, not

because they are included in the latter class, the passed by,

but because they were foreseen as those who would be sinners.

I cannot, therefore, yet persuade myself that this sentiment

has been incorrectly set forth by me. If I shall see it

hereafter, I will freely acknowledge it, though this may not

be of so much importance.

This indeed I desire, that whether the first view, or the

second, or any other view whatever be presented, it may be

clearly and strongly proved from the Scriptures, and be

defended, with accuracy, from all objections. In reference to

the word "reprobate," I have spoken before in reply to your

second answer, and I am prepared to use it hereafter

according to your later explanation, as you have given it in

your last answer. I should perhaps have so used it, in my

former letter, if I had found it so used by yourself in your

own writings, for I know that equivocal meaning has always

been the mother of error, and that it ought to be carefully

avoided in all serious discussions.

FIFTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

The third theory is that God determined of his grace to free

some of the human race, fallen, and lying in the "lump" (Rom.

ix, 21 ) of perdition and corruption, to the declaration of

his Mercy; but to leave in the same "lump," or at least to

damn, on account of final impenitence, others, to the

illustration both of the freedom of his gratuitous grace

towards the vessels of glory and mercy, and of his justice

towards the vessels of dishonour and wrath. I do not state

these views, that I may instruct you in reference to them,

but that you may see whether I have correctly understood

them, and may direct and guide me, if I am, in any respect,

in error.

THE REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE FIFTH PROPOSITION

This theory agrees with the first and second in all respects,

if you make this one exception, that, in the latter case, the

election and reprobation of men is said to have been made

after the condition of the fall and of our sin, in the former

case without reference to the fall, and to our sin. But

neither of them seems properly and absolutely to pertain

altogether to the relation of election and reprobation since

all admit that the cause of election and reprobation is

placed in the consent only of the Being, who alone

predestinates. For, whether it is affirmed that election and

reprobation are made from among human beings in their

original state, or from those, who are fallen and sinful,

there was not any cause in them, who, in either state, were

equal in all respects, according to nature, but only in the

will and liberty of God electing, who separated these from

those, and adopted them unto himself "of his own will"

boulhqeiv as James says (ch. 1, vers. 18,) or according to

the counsel of his will. But yet this circumstance is worthy

of notice, and we will, hereafter in its own place, give our

opinion concerning it, according to the Scriptures, as there

will be an appropriate place for speaking of this subject.

THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE FIFTH PROPOSITION

The circumstance of sin and of the fall is of very great

importance in this whole subject, not indeed as a cause but

as a quality, requisite in the object, without a

consideration of which I do not think that election or

reprobation was or could have been made by the Deity, which

matter we will hereafter more fully discuss. There are also

many men learned, and not unversed in the sacred Scriptures,

who say that God could not be defended from the charge of

sin, if he had not in that decree, considered, man as a

sinful being. But I cannot, for a two-fold reason, assent to

your denial that the formal cause of the object properly

pertains to the subject of that decree, because all fully

agree in admitting that the cause of the decree is placed in

Him, who predestinates. First, because the formal cause of

the object, and not the cause of the act only, is necessarily

required for the definition of that act. Secondly, because it

is possible that the cause of the act may be of such a

nature, that, in its own act, it cannot exert influence on

the object which is presented to it, unless it be furnished

with that formal relation, which I think is the fact in this

case, and will prove it. Nor is there any reason why it

should be said that the freedom of God, in the act of

predestination, is limited though the circumstance of sin may

be stated to be of necessity presupposed to that decree.

But since frequent mention has been made, in this whole

discussion of divine freedom, it will not be out of place to

refer to it at somewhat greater length, and to affix to it

its limits from the Scripture, according to the declaration

of God himself. The subject of freedom is the will, its

object is an act. In respect to the former, it is an

affection of the will, according to which it freely tends

towards its one object; in respect to the latter, it is the

power and authority over its own act. This freedom is, in the

first place and chiefly, in God, and it is in rational

creatures by a communication made by God. But freedom is

limited, or, which is the same thing, it is effected that any

act should not be in the power of the agent in three ways, by

natural and internal necessity, by external force and

coaction, and by the interposition of law. God can be

compelled by no one to an act, he can be hindered by no one

in an act, hence, this freedom is not limited by that kind of

restriction. Law also cannot be imposed on God, as He is the

highest, the Supreme Lawgiver. But He can limit Himself, by

His own act. There are, then, but two causes which effect

that any act should not be in the power of God; the former is

the nature of God, and whatever is repugnant to it is

absolutely impossible; the latter is any previous act of God,

to which another act is opposed. Examples of the former are

such as these; God cannot lie, because He is, by nature,

true. He cannot sin or commit injustice, because he is

justice itself. Examples of the latter are these; God cannot

effect that what has previously occurred may not have

occurred, for, by an antecedent act, he has effected that it

should be; if now can effect that it may not have been, He

will destroy his own power and will. God could not but grant

to David that his seed should sit on his throne, for this was

promised to David, and confirmed by an oath. He cannot forget

the labour of love, performed by the saints, so as not to

bestow upon it a reward, for He has promised that reward. If,

then, any one wishes to inquire whether any act belongs to

the free will and the power of God, he must see whether the

nature of God may restrict that act, and if it is not so

restricted, whether the freedom of God is limited by any

antecedent act, if he shall find that the act is not

restricted in either mode, then he may conclude that the act

pertains to the divine power; but it is not to be immediately

inferred that it has been or will be performed by God, since

any act which depends on His free will, can be suspended by

Him, so as not to be performed. It is also to be observed

here that many things are possible for God, in respect to

this absolute power, which are not possible in respect to

justice. It is possible in respect to His power that He

should punish one who has not sinned, for who could resist

Him, but it is not possible, in respect to justice, for it

would be at variance with the Divine justice. God can do

whatever He wills with His own, but He cannot will to do with

His own that which he cannot do of right. For His will is

restricted by the limits of justice. Nor is the creature, in

such a sense, in the power of God, the Creator, that he can

do, of right, in reference to it, whatever he might do of His

absolute power, for the power of God over the creature

depends, not on the infinity of the Divine essence, but on

that communication by which he has communicated to us our

limited essence. This permits that God should deprive us of

that being which he has given us without merit on our part,

but does not permit that He should inflict misery upon us

without our demerit. For to be miserable is worse than not to

be, as happiness is better than mere existence. And,

therefore, there is not the same liberty to inflict misery on

the creature without demerit, as to take away being without

previous sin. God takes away that which He gave, and He can

do as He wills, with His own, but He cannot inflict misery,

because the creature does not so far belong to God. The

potter cannot, from the unformed lump, make a man to

dishonour and condemnation, unless the man has previously

made himself worthy of punishment and dishonour by his own

transgression.

SIXTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

I am not pleased with the first theory because God could not,

in his purpose of illustrating his glory by mercy and

punitive justice, have reference to man as not yet made, nor

indeed to man as made, and considered in his natural

condition. In which sentiment I think that I have yourself as

my precedent, for, in discussing predestination, you no where

make mention of mercy, but every where of grace, which

transcends mercy, as exercised towards creatures, continuing

in their original, natural state, while it coincides with

mercy in being occupied with the sinner, but when you treat

of the passed by and the reprobate, you mention justice, and

only in the case of such. Besides, according to that opinion,

God is, by necessary consequence, made the author of the fall

of Adam and of sin, from which imputation he is not freed by

the distinctions of the act and the evil in the act, of

necessity and coaction, of the decree and its execution, of

efficacious and permissive decree, as the latter is explained

by the authors of this view, in harmony with it, nor a

different relation of the divine decree and of human nature,

nor by the addition of the proposed end, namely that the

whole might redound to the divine glory, &c.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SIXTH PROPOSITION

There are three things to be laid down in order, before I

come to the argumentation itself. First, in reference to the

meaning of the first view; secondly, in reference to its

agreement with the second and third; thirdly, in reference to

a few fundamental principles necessary to the clearness of

this question. In the first place, then, if that view be

fully examined, we shall perceive with certainty that its

authors did not regard man absolutely and only before his

creation, &c., but in a general view and with a universal

reference to that and to all times. For though they make the

act of election and predestination, (as one which exists in

the Deity,) as from eternity, in reference to the creation of

man, yet they teach that its object, namely mankind, was

predestinated without discrimination, and in common, and that

God, in the act of predestination, considered the whole human

race as various parts inwrought by the eternal decree into

its execution. Thus Beza, very clearly on Ephes. i, 4, says,

"Christ is presented to us as mediator. Therefore, the fall

must, in the order of causes, necessarily precede in the

purpose of God, but previous to the fall there must be a

creation in righteousness and holiness." So afterwards, on

ch. iv, 24, "As God has made for Himself a way both for

saving, by his mercy, those whom He had elected in Christ,

and for justly punishing those who, having been conceived in

sin, should remain in their depravity," &c.

This view he also learnedly presents in a note on verses 4

and 5. Thus those authors embrace the first, and, at the same

time, the second and third theories.

But this first theory has an agreement with the second and

also with the third, indeed it is altogether the stone,

though in appearance it seems otherwise, if you attend to the

various objects of these theories. For while the authors of

the first regard man universally, in the argument of

predestination, election and reprobation, the authors of the

second have made a restriction to the case of man before

transgression only, and this with the design to show that, in

predestination, the cause of election and of reprobation was

only in the being predestinating, which is very true. When

they assert, therefore, that the election of man was made

before his fall, they do not exclude the idea of the eternity

of that decree, but consider this to be sufficient if they

may establish the fact that eternal predestination, that is,

election and reprobation, was made by God, without reference

to sin, which the apostle has demonstrated in the example, by

no means obscure, of Jacob and Esau. (Rom. 9) The first,

therefore, differs from the second less in substance than in

the manner of speaking. But those, who adhere to the third

theory, have looked, properly speaking, not so much to the

cause of election and reprobation, as to the order of causes,

of which damnation is the consequence; which damnation, many

in former times, confounding with reprobation, that is, non-

election or predestination, exclaimed that the doctrine of

predestination was impious, and accused the servants of God,

as is most clearly evident from the writings of Augustine and

Fulgentius. The little book of Augustine, which he wrote in

answer to the twelve articles falsely charged against him,

most opportunely explains the matter. Neither those who

favour the second theory, therefore, nor those who favour the

third, have attacked the first, but have rather presented in

a different mode, parts of the same argument, distinct in

certain respects. It seems then that, as to the sum of the

whole matter, they do not differ so much as some suppose, but

have attributed to parts of its execution, (to all of which

the decree has reference,) certain circumstances, not indeed

ineptly in respect to the decree.

Let us now come to certain fundamental principles necessary

to this doctrine, by the application of which its truth may

be confirmed, and those things which seem to operate against

it, may be removed. These seem to me capable of being

included under four heads, the essence of God, His knowledge,

His actions, and their causes, to each of which we will here

briefly refer. We quote first from Mal. iii, 6, "I am the

Lord, I change not;" also from James i, 17, "with whom is no

variableness, neither shadow of turning," and many similar

passages. The truth of this fundamental principle is very

certain; from it is deduced the inevitable necessity of this

conclusion, that in the Deity nothing is added, nothing is

taken away, nothing is changed in fact or relation; for such

have philosophers themselves decided to be the nature of

eternity; but God is eternal. Also that God is destitute of

all movement in His essence, because He is immortal; in His

power because He is pure and simple action; and in intellect,

because "all things are naked and opened unto His eyes," and

He sees all and each of them eternally, by a single glance;

in His will and purpose, for He "is not a man that he should

lie, neither the son of a man that He should repent," (Num.

xxiii, 19,) but He is always the same; and lastly in

operation, for the things which vary are created, while the

Lord remains without Variation, and has in Himself the form

of immutable conception of all those things which exist and

are done mutably in time. The second fundamental principle is

that the knowledge of the eternal, immutable and infinite

mind is eternal, immutable and infinite and knows things to

be known as such, and those to be done as such, (gwstw~v)

eternally, immutably and infinitely. God has a knowledge

practically (praktikw~v) of all evil as a matter of mere

knowledge and finally of all things of all classes, (which

consist of things the highest, the intermediate, and the

lowest of things good and evil,) energetically

(ejnerghtikw~v) according to his own divine mode. There is a

three-fold relation in all science, if comparison is made

with the thing known according to the measure of the being

who knows or takes cognizance of it; inferior, equal, and

superior, or supereminent, which may be made clear by an

illustration from sight. I see the sun, but the light of my

vision is inferior to its light; I take cognizance of natural

objects, but as owls do of the light of the sun, as Aristotle

says. Here is the inferior mode of knowledge, which never

exists in God. In him alone exists equal knowledge, and that

knowledge which is supereminent after the divine mode, for He

has equal knowledge of Himself; He is that which He knows

Himself to be, and he knows adequately what He is. All other

things He knows in the supereminent mode, and has them

present to himself from eternity; if not, there would be two

very grievous absurdities, not to mention others; one, that

something might be added to the Deity, but that nothing can

be added to eternity; the other, that knowledge could not

belong to God univocally as the source of all knowledge. But

nature herself teaches that in every class of objects there

is some one thing which they call univocal, from which are

other things in an equivocal sense; as, for example, things

which are hot, are made so by fire. Here the fire is hot

univocally, other things equivocally. God has knowledge

univocally, other beings equivocally; unless perhaps some may

be so foolish as to place a possessor of knowledge above the

Deity, which would be blasphemy. The third point is that the

actions of God in Himself are eternal, whether they pertain

to His knowledge or His essence, to His intellect, will or

power, and whatever else there may be of this nature; but

from Himself they flow, as it were, out of himself according

to His own mode, or according to that of the creature

according to his eternal decree, yet in an order which is his

own, but adapted to time. According to the mode of the Deity,

action is three-fold; that of creation, that of providence,

so far as it is immediate, and that of saving grace.

For many things proceed from the Deity without the work of

the creature, but they are things which He condescends to

accomplish mediately in nature and in grace. He does, as a

universal principle according to the mode of the creature,

and, as Augustine says, (lib. 7, de. civit. Dei. cap. 30) "He

so administers all things which He has created, as to permit

them also to exercise and to perform their own motions." But

"their own motions" pertain, some of them to nature and to

natural instinct and are directed invariably to one certain

and destined end, and others to the will in the rational

nature, which are directed to various objects either good or

evil, to those which are good, by the influence of the Deity,

to those which are evil by His influence only so far as they

are natural, and by his permission so far as they are

voluntary. From which it can be established in the best and

most sacred manner that all effects and defects in nature and

in the will of all kinds, depend on the providence of God;

yet in such a manner that, as Plato says, the creature is in

fault as the proximate cause, and "God is wholly without

blame."

The fourth point is that the first and supreme cause is so

far universal, that nothing else can be supposed or devised

to be its cause, since if it should depend on any other

cause, it could be neither the first nor the supreme cause,

but there must be another, either prior or superior, or equal

to it, so that neither would be absolutely first or supreme.

In the next place, all causes exist, either as principles or

derived from a principle; "as principles" nature and the will

exist; "from a principle" are mediate causes, from nature,

natural causes, and from the will voluntary causes. The mode

of the latter has been made two-fold by the Deity, necessary

and contingent. The necessary mode is that which cannot be

otherwise, and this is always good, in that it is necessary;

but the contingent is that which is as it happens to be,

whether good or bad. But here a three-fold caution is to be

carefully observed; first, that we hold these modes of the

causes to be from the things themselves and in themselves,

according to the relation of the principles from which they

proceed, for we speak now not of the immediate actions of

God, which are above these principles, as we have before

noticed, the natural causes, naturally, and the voluntary

causes, voluntarily; secondly, that we make both these modes

to be from God, but not in God; for mode in God is only

divine, that is, it surpasses the necessary and contingent in

all their modes; since there can occur to the Deity neither

necessity from any source, nor any contingency, but all

things in the Deity are essential, and in a divine mode;

thirdly, that we should consider those modes as flowing from

God to created things, in such a manner that none of them

should be reciprocated, and, as it were, flow back to God.

For God is the universal principle; and if any of these

should flow back to Him, He would from that fact cease to be

the principle. The reason, indeed, of this is manifest from a

comparison of natural examples, since this whole thing

proceeds not from natural power simply, in so far as it is

natural, but from the rational power of God. For it is a

condition of natural power, that it always produces one and

the same thing in its own kind, and that if it should produce

any thing, out of itself, it must produce something like

itself from the necessity of nature, or something unlike from

contingency. A pear tree produces a pear tree, a bull begets

one of its own species, and a human being begets a human

being; that is, in accordance with the distinct form which

exists in the nature of each thing.

But the operation of rational power, which is capable of all

forms, is of all kinds; to which three things must concur in

the agent, knowledge, power, and will. But the mode of those

things, which rational power effects, is not constituted

according to the mode of knowledge or power, but to the mode

of the will which actually forms the works, which virtually

are formed in the knowledge and power, as in a root; and this

from the freedom of the will and not from the necessity of

nature. If we would illustrate this by an example in divine

things, let it be this: the person of the Father begat the

person of the Son by nature, not by the will; God begat his

creatures by the will, not by nature. Therefore, the Son is

one with the Father, but created things are diverse from the

Deity, and are of all classes, degrees, and conditions, made

by His rational power voluntarily to demonstrate His manifold

wisdom. It is indeed nothing new that those things which are

of nature should be reciprocated and refluent, since many of

them are adequate, while many indeed are essential. But it is

a new idea that those things which are of the will should be

either reciprocated or made adequate. But if this is true in

nature, as it surely is, how much more must it be believed in

reference to God, if He be compared with created things. It

was necessary that these should be laid down by me, my

brother, rather copiously, that the sequence might be more

easily determined by certain limits.

You say that the first opinion does not please you, because

you think that God cannot, in his purpose to illustrate his

glory by mercy and punitive justice, have had reference to

the human race, considered as not yet made. You add, in

amplifying the idea, that God did not have reference even to

the human race, considered as created, and in his natural

condition. That we may each understand the other, I remark

that I understand by your phrase, "have reference to the

human race," to have man as the object or instead of the

object of action. But let us consider, if you please, or

rather, because it does please you and you request it, how

far your view is correct. Indeed, from the first fundamental

principle, which I have before laid down, (from which I trust

that you do not dissent,) I consider man as not yet created,

as created, as fallen, and, in fine, man in general, in

whatever light he may be viewed, to be the object of the

power, knowledge, will, mercy and justice of God; for if this

is granted, it will then be a complete sequence that there is

something, aside from common providence and the special

predestination of the sons of God, not an object of the

action of the Deity. Then there can be some addition to God,

if something can be added to His power, knowledge, will, &c.,

since the power, knowledge, will, &c., of God, is either God,

or a divine, that is, an infinite act. Whatever eternity

looks upon, if it does not look upon it eternally, it ceases

to be eternity; it loses the nature of eternity. If infinity

does not look on infinite things, in an infinite manner, if

it is limited by parts, it ceases to be infinity. To God and

His eternity, it is not is, was or shall be, but permanent

and enduring being, all at once, and without bounds. The

creature exists indeed in time, but is present to God, in a

peculiar, that is, a divine mode, which is above all

consideration of time, and from eternity to eternity; and

this is true not only of the creature itself, but of all its

feelings, whatever may be their origin. You will perhaps say

that this principle is acknowledged in the abstract, but that

here, as it is considered in the concrete, it has a different

relation, in that it has reference to mercy and punishment,

which can really be supposed only in view of antecedent

misery and sin. But these also, my brother, are present with

God as really as those; I do not say in the mode of nature,

which is fleeting, but in that of the Deity, which is

eternal, and in all respects surpasses nature. They, who

think differently, are in danger of denying the most absolute

and eternal essence of the Deity itself. We said also, under

proposition three, that in created things misery and sin may

be considered in relation to the act, the habit, or the

capability also in an absolute and in a relative sense. But

in God, (whom also Aristotle acknowledges to be "energy in

its most simple form," mercy and judgment exist by an eternal

act, and not by a temporal one; and contemplates the misery

and sin of man in all their modes, previous to all time, and

does not merely take cognizance of them as they occur in

time.

Lastly, that we may disclose the fountain of the matter, this

whole idea originates in the fact that the third fundamental

principle which, we before laid down, has not been

sufficiently regarded by those who so think. For since all

action is either internal or external, or both united

together. The internal is in God, as the maker: the external

is in the creature in its own time and place, and in the

thing made just as the house is formed in the mind of the

builder, before it is built materially (as it is said). But

when both acts are united and from them is produced a work,

numerically a unit, which they style a result, then the

internal act is the formal cause; the external act is the

material cause. Nothing in God is temporary; action in God is

alone eternal, for it is internal, it is therefore not

temporary; so, on the contrary, all things out of God are

temporary, therefore the external act is temporary, for it is

out of God. "What, then, do you prove?" you will ask. "That

God in his mercy and punitive justice acts with reference to

man as not yet created, or indeed as created, but considered

in his natural condition?" I indeed admit that whatever it

may be, which can be predicated of man, it can sacredly and

in truth be predicated of him. Yet I see that two statements

may be made of a milder character, and in harmony with the

words of Christ and the apostles, which are clearly

intimated, if not fully expressed by them; the former, that,

in this question, we must consider, not only the mode and the

consequent event (which some call, catechrestically, the

end), namely, mercy and punitive justice, also life and

eternal death, but the fountain and the genus from which

these result, and to which they hold the relation of species,

namely, grace and non-grace, adoption or filiation, and non-

adoption, which is reprobation, as we have said above (Prop.

2), the latter, that, in the argument of election, we must

propose not any particular relation of the human race, but

the common or universal relation so that we may consider him

as not yet created, as created, as fallen &c., yet present in

all respects in the conception of God, so that in this

election, grace towards mankind in the abstract, and mercy

towards man as fallen and sinful, which is of grace, concur,

but in reprobation, the absence of the grace of adoption and

the absence of mercy concur. If these statements are correct,

I do not see in what respect a pious mind can be offended.

For Christ says that they are blessed of God, the Father who

"inherit the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of

the world." (Matt. xxv, 34.)

And Paul says that God "hath blessed us with all spiritual

blessings in heavenly places in Christ, according as he hath

chosen us in him, before the foundation of the world, that we

should be holy and without blame before him in love, having

predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus

Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure, to the

praise, &c." (Ephes. i, 3-6.) "What then? is there no special

reference?" I answer that properly in the argument of

election and reprobation (for the matter of damnation is a

different one) there is no particular reference to men as a

cause, but our separation from the reprobate is wholly of the

mere will of God: in that God has separated and made a

distinction among men, whether not yet created, created or

fallen, and indeed among all things, present alike to Him,

yet equal in all respects by nature and condition, by

electing and predestinating some to the adoption of the sons

of God, and by leaving others to themselves and to their own

nature, not calling them to the adoption of the sons of God,

which is gratuitous and can be ascribed only to grace. This

grace, also, unique in itself only, may be two-fold in the

elect, for either it is grace simply, if you look even from

eternity on man without reference to the fall, which grace is

communicated to the elect, both angels and men, or it is

grace joined to mercy, or gracious mercy, when you come down

to the special matter of the fall and of sin. God dealt with

the angels according to His grace, with us according to His

grace and mercy, if you do not also have reference to

possible misery (of which we spoke, Prop. 3, and misery.) For

in this sense mercy is, and can, with propriety, be called a

divine work of grace. But what is there here which can be

reprehended in God? What is there, which can be denied by us?

God has bestowed human nature on all; it is a good gift; on

certain individuals he has bestowed mercy and the grace of

adoption; this is a better gift. He was not under obligation

to bestow either; He bestowed both, the former on all, the

latter on some men. But it may perhaps be said that

reprobation is one thing, and punitive justice and damnation,

which is under discussion, is another. Let that be conceded;

then there is agreement between us in reference to

reprobation, let us then consider punitive justice and

damnation. It is certain that, as the vessels of mercy which

God has prepared for His glory that He might demonstrate the

riches of His glory, are from eternity fully present to Him

in a divine and incomprehensible manner, without any motion

or change in Himself, so also "the vessels of wrath fitted to

destruction" that he might "show His wrath and make His power

known," (Rom. ix, 22,) are eternally presented to his eyes,

according to the mode of Deity. As vessels, therefore, they

are of God, for He is the maker of all things: as vessels of

wrath, they are of themselves and of their own sin, into

which they rush of their own will, for we all are by this

nature the children of wrath, (Ephes. ii, 3,) but not in our

original constitution. Moses affirms in Gen. i, 31, that "God

saw every thing that He had made, and, behold, it was very

good."

God, who is good, does not hate that which is good. All

things, at their creation, were good, therefore at their

creation, God did not hate any one of all created things: He

hates that which is alien from Himself, but not that which is

His own: He is angry with our fall and sin, not with His own

creation. By creation they are vessels; by the fall, they are

vessels of wrath, and fitted to destruction, as the most just

consequence of the fall and of depravity: for "neither shall

evil dwell with God." (Psalm v, 4.) As in the knowledge of

God is the good of the elect, with whom he deals in mercy, so

in the knowledge of God, as Isaiah says, chapter xlviii, 4

and 8, is the evil of others: the latter He hated and damned

from the period of His knowledge of it. But He knew and

foreknew from eternity; therefore, He hates and damns, and

even pre-damns from eternity.

As this is the relation of the former proposition, the

relation of the other also, added by way of amplification,

"nor indeed to man as made and considered in his original

condition," is also the same. For the consequence is plainly

deduced in the same mode, in reference to the latter as in

reference to the former; and you are not ignorant that

universal affirmations follow by fair deduction from that

which is general to that which is particular. God has

reference from eternity in election and reprobation to

mankind in general; therefore He had reference to man as not

created, created and fallen, and if there is any other term,

by which we can express our ideas. In the case of election,

and of reprobation, I say, He regarded man abstractly, with

whatever relation you may invest him. In the case of

damnation, He regarded the sinner, whom He had not given to

Christ in the election of grace, and whom He from eternity

saw as a sinner. Those holy men, therefore rightly stated

that the election and reprobation of man was made from

eternity: some considered them as having reference to man,

not yet created, others to man as not yet fallen, and yet

others to man as fallen: since in whatever condition you

regard him, a man is elected or reprobated without

consideration of his good or evil deeds. Nor indeed can it be

proved that they are at variance in this matter, unless a

denial of other conditions is shown in plain terms. For such

is the common statement by universal consent. In which, if

any one affirms that the supposition of one involves the

disavowal of the other he opposes the truth of natural logic

and common usage. But if such is the relation of election and

reprobation in a general sense, it is a complete sequence

that they who say that men, as not created, were elected,

speak very truly, since God elected them by the internal act,

before He did by the external act; and that they who affirm

that the election was of man, as created, have reference to

the principle of the external act; and so with the rest. But

all these things are not in reference to His act per se, but

in reference to the condition of the act, which does not

affect its substance. You say that in this opinion you have

me as a precedent since, in the discussion of predestination,

I "no where make mention of mercy, but every where of grace,

which transcends mercy." Indeed, my brother, I have never

thought that I should seem to exclude the other parts when I

might use the term grace, nor do I see how that inference can

be made from the phrase itself. Grace is the genus; it does

not exclude mercy, the species. Grace includes, so to speak,

the path for all times; therefore it includes that of mercy.

Nor do they, who mention mercy, in presenting the species,

exclude the genus, nor, in presenting a part, do they exclude

all which remains. And we, in presenting the genus, do not

deny the species, nor in presenting the whole, do we disavow

a part. Both are found in the Scriptures, which speak of

grace in respect to the whole and its single parts, and in a

certain respect, of mercy: but they take away neither by the

affirmation of the other. I would demonstrate this by

quotations, did I not think that you with me, according to

your skill and intelligence would acknowledge this.

Predestination is of grace: the same grace, which has

effected the predestination of the saints, also includes

mercy: this I sufficiently declared a little while since. I

mentioned grace simply, in the case of simple predestination,

that is, predestination expressed in simple and universal

terms. I speak of mercy, also, in relation to a man who is

miserable, spoken of absolutely, or relatively. You add that

when I treat of the passed by and the reprobate, I mention

justice, and only in the case of such. Let us, if you please,

remove the homonymy; then we shall expedite the matter in a

few words. We exposed the homonymy in the second proposition;

we speak of the reprobate either generally or particularly.

If you understand it generally, the mention of justice is

correctly made, as we shall soon show. If particularly,

either reprobates and those passed by refer to the same,

which is the appropriate signification, or the term reprobate

is applied to the damned, which is catachrestic. I do not

think that you understand it in the former sense, if you

understand it in the latter (as you do), what you say is

certainly very true, that I spoke of justice only when

treating of the damned. However, I do not approve that you

write copulatively of the passed by and the reprobate, that

is, the damned. For although they are the same in subject,

and all the passed by are damned, and all the damned are

passed by, yet their relation as passed by or reprobate is

one thing, and their relation as damned is another.

Preterition or reprobation is not without justice, but it is

not of justice, as its cause: damnation is with justice and

of justice. Election and reprobation or preterition are the

work of free will according to the wisdom of God; but

damnation is the work of necessary will according to the

justice of God; for God "cannot deny Himself" (2 Tim. ii,

13.) As a just judge, it is necessary that He should punish

unrighteousness, and execute judgment. This, I say, is the

work of the manifold wisdom of God, which in those creatures,

in whom he has implanted the principle of their own ways,

namely, a free will, He might exhibit its two-fold use, good

and bad, and the consequent result of its use in both

directions. Hence he has, in His own wisdom, ordained, both

in angels and in men, the way of both modes of its use,

without any fault or sin on His own part. But it is a work of

justice to damn the unrighteous. Therefore also it is said

truly that the passed by are damned by the Deity, but because

they were to be damned, not because they were passed by or

reprobated.

Now I come to your argumentation, in which you affirm that,

"according to that theory, God is, by necessary consequence,

made the author of the fall of Adam, and of sin &c." I do

not, indeed, perceive the argument from which this conclusion

is necessarily deduced, if you correctly understand that

theory. Though I do not doubt that you had reference to your

own words, used in stating the first theory, "that he

ordained also that man should fall and become depraved, that

he might thus prepare the way for the fulfillment of his own

eternal counsels, that he might be able mercifully to save

some, &c." This, then, if I am not mistaken, is your

reasoning. He, who has ordained that man should fall and

become depraved, is the author of the fall and of sin; God

ordained that man should fall and become depraved; therefore,

God is the author of sin. But the Major of this syllogism is

denied, because it is ambiguous; for the word ordain is

commonly, though in a catachrestical sense, used to mean

simply and absolutely to decree, the will determining and

approving an act; which catachresis is very frequent in

forensic use. But to us, who are bound to observe

religiously, in this argument, the propriety of terms, to

ordain is nothing else than to arrange the order in acts, and

in each thing according to its mode. It is one thing to

decree acts absolutely, and another to decree the order of

acts, in each thing, according to its mode. The former is

immediate, the latter, from the beginning to the end, regards

the means, which in all things, pertain to the order of

events. In the former signification, the Minor is denied; for

it is entirely at variance with the truth, since God is never

the author of evil (that is, of evil involving guilt). In the

latter signification the Major is denied, for it is not

according to the truth, nor is it necessary in any respect

that the same person who disposes the order of actions and,

in each thing, according to its mode: should be the author of

those actions. The actor is one thing, the action is

another,-and the arranger of the action is yet another. He

who performs an evil deed is the author of evil. He, who

disposes the order in the doer and in the evil deed, is not

the author of evil, but the disposer of an evil act to a good

end. But that this may be understood, let us use the fourth

fundamental principle, which we have previously stated,

according to this, we shall circumscribe this whole case

within this limit; every fault must always be ascribed to the

proximate, not to the remote or to the highest cause. In a

chain, the link, which breaks, is in fault; in a machine, the

wheel, which deviates from its proper course, is in fault,

not any superior or inferior one. But as all causes are

either principles, or from principles, (in this case,

however, principles are like wheels, by which the causes,

originating from the principles, are moved), God is the

universal principle of all good, nature is the principle of

natural things, and the rational will, turning freely to good

or evil, is the principle of moral actions. These three

principles, in their own appropriate movement, perform their

own actions, and produce mediate causes, act in their own

relations, and dispose them; God in a divine mode, nature in

a natural mode, and the will in an elective mode. God, in a

divine mode, originates nature; nature, in its own mode,

produces man; the will, in its own appropriate mode, produces

its own moral and voluntary actions. If, now, the will

produces a moral action, whether good or evil, it produces

it, of its own energy, and this cannot be attributed to

nature itself as a cause, though nature may implant the will

in man, since the will, (though from nature) is the peculiar

and special principle of moral actions, instituted by the

Deity in nature. But if the blame of this cannot be

attributed to nature as a cause, by what right, I pray, can

it be attributed to God, who, by the mode and medium of

nature, has placed the will in man? I answer then, with

Augustine, in his book against articles falsely imputed to

him, artic. 10.

"The predestination of God neither excited, nor persuaded,

nor impelled, the fall of those who fell, or the iniquity of

the wicked, or the evil passions of sinners, but it clearly

predestinated His own judgment, by which He should recompense

each one according to his deeds, whether good or bad, which

judgment would not be inflicted, if men should sin by the

will of God." He proceeds to the same purpose in art. 11,

remarking, "If it should be charged against the devil, that

he was the author of certain sins, and the inciter to them, I

think he would be able to exonerate himself from that odium

in some way, and that he would convict the perpetrators of

such sins from their own will, since, although he might have

been delighted in the madness of those sinners, yet he could

prove that he did not force them to crime. With what folly,

what madness, then, is that referred to the counsel of God,

which cannot at all be ascribed to the devil, since he, in

the sins of wicked men, aids by enticements, but is not to be

considered the director of their wills. Therefore God

predestinated none of these things that they should take

place, nor did He prepare that soul, which was about to live

basely and in sin, that it should live in such a manner; but

He was not ignorant that such would be its character, and He

foreknew that He should judge justly concerning a soul of

such character."

But if this could be imputed neither to nature, nor to the

devil, how much less to God, the most holy and wise Creator?

God, (as St. Augustine says again, book 6) "does not

predestinate all which he foreknows. For He only foreknows

evil. He does not predestinate it, but He both foreknows and

predestinates good." But it is a good, derived from God,

that, in His own ordination, He disposes the order in things

good and evil; if not, the providence of God would be, for

the most part, indifferent (may that be far from our

thoughts). God does not will evil, but He wills, and

preserves a certain order even in evil. Evil comes from the

will of man; from God is the general and special arrangement

of His own providence, disposing and most wisely keeping in

order even those things which are, in the highest degree,

evil.

Here a two-fold question will perhaps be urged upon me:

first, how can these be said, in reference to the will, to be

its own motions, when we acknowledge that the will itself,

that is, the fountain of voluntary motions, is from nature,

and nature is from God? Secondly, why did God place in human

beings this will, constituted in the image of liberty? I will

reply to both in a few words. To the first; the will is

certainly from nature, and nature is from God, but the will

is not, on that account, the less to be called the principle

of those motions, than nature is called the principle of

natural motions. Each is the principle of its own action,

though both are from the supreme principle, God. It is one

thing to describe the essence of a thing, another to refer to

its source. What is essential to nature and the will? That

the former should be the principle of natural motions, the

latter, of spontaneous motions. What is their source? God is

the only and universal source of all things. Nor is it absurd

that a principle should be derived from another principle:

for although a principle, which originates in another, should

not be called a principle in the relation of origin or

source, yet, in the relation of the act it does not on that

account, cease to be an essential principle. God is, per se,

a principle. Nature and our wills are principles derived from

a principle. Yet each of them has its own appropriate

motions. Nor is there any reason, indeed, why any should

think that these are philosophical niceties: they are natural

distinctions, and that, which is of nature, is from God. But

if we are unwilling to hear nature, let us listen to the

truth of God, to Christ speaking of the devil (John viii,

44), "when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he

is a liar and the father of it." Here he is called "the

father of a lie," and is said "to speak of his own."

According to Christ's words, then, we have the origin and the

act of sin in the devil. For the act has a resemblance to

himself, for he speaks of his own. What, I pray, can be more

conclusive than these words? Hence Augustine, in the answer

already quoted, very properly deduces this conclusion. "As

God did not, in the angels who fell, induce that will, by

which they did not continue in the truth; so he did not

produce in men that inclination by which they imitate the

devil. For he speaketh a lie of his own; and he will not be

free from that charge, unless the truth shall free him." He

indeed gave free will, namely, that essential power to Adam:

but its motion is, in reference to Adam, his own, and, in

reference to all of us, our own. In what sense is it our own,

when it is given to us by God? Whatever is bestowed on us by

God, is either by the law of common right, or of personal and

private property. He gave the will to angels and men by the

law of personal possession. It is therefore, one's own and

its motion belong to the individual. "This," says Augustine,

(lib. de Genes. ad litt. in perf. cap. 5,) "He both makes and

disposes species and natures themselves, but the privations

of species and the defects of natures he does not make, He

only ordains." Therefore God is always righteous, but we are

unrighteous.

To the second question, namely, why did God create in us this

will, and with such a character? I reply; -- it was the work

of the highest goodness and wisdom in the universe. Why

should we, with our ungrateful minds, who have already made

an ill use of those minds, obstruct the fountain of goodness

and wisdom? It was the work of goodness to impress his own

image on both natures, in the superior, on that of angels,

and in the inferior, on that of men: since, while other

things in nature are moved by instinct, or feeling, as with a

dim trace of the Deity, these alone, in the freedom of their

own will, have the principle of their own ways in their own

power by the mere goodness of God. It was the work of wisdom

to make these very species, endued with His own image,

together with so many other objects, and above the others, as

the most perfect mirror of His own glory, so far as is

possible in created things. But why did he make them of such

a character, with mutable freedom? He made His own image, not

himself.

The only essential image of God, the Father, is the Lord

Jesus Christ, one God, eternal and immutable, with the Father

and the Holy Spirit. Whoever thou mayest be, who makest

objections to this, thou hearest the serpent whispering to

thee, as he whispered once to Eve, to the ruin of our race.

Let it suffice thee that thou wast made in the image of God,

not possessing the divine perfection. Immutability is

peculiar to the divine perfection. This pertains by nature to

God. The creature had in himself His image, communicated by

God, and placed in his will: but he, whether angel or man,

who fell, rejected it of his own will. Not to say more, this

whole question was presented by Marcion, and Tertullian, with

the utmost fluency and vigour, discussed it in its whole

extent, in a considerable part of his second book against

Marcion, the perusal of which will, I trust, be satisfactory

to you.

You remark, finally, that they are not freed from the

necessity of that conclusion "by the distinctions of the act,

and the evil in the act, of necessity and creation, of the

decree and its execution, &c." Indeed, my brother, I think

that, from those things, which have just been said, you will

sufficiently perceive in what respects your reasoning is

fallacious. For God does not make, but ordains the sinner, as

I say, with Augustine, that is, He ordains the iniquity of

the sinner not by commanding or decreeing particularly and

absolutely that he should commit sin, but by most wisely

vindicating His own order, and the right of His infinite

providence, even in evil which is peculiar to the creature.

For it was necessary that the wisdom of God should triumph in

this manner, when He exhibited His own order in the peculiar

and voluntary disorder of His own creature. This disorder and

alienation from good the creature prepared for himself by the

appropriate motion of free-will, not by the impulse of the

Deity. But that freedom of the will, says Tertullian against

Marcion (lib. 2, cap. 9) "does not fix the blame on Him by

whom it was bestowed, but on him by whom it was not directed,

as it ought to have been." Since this is so, it is not at all

necessary that I should speak of those particular

distinctions, which, in their proper place, may perhaps be

valid; they do not seem to me to pertain properly to this

argument, unless other arguments are introduced, which I

cannot find in your writings. Besides all those distinctions

pertain generally to the subject of providence, not

particularly to this topic. I am not pleased that the

discussion should extend beyond its appropriate range. But

here some may perhaps say; "Therefore, the judgments of God

depend on contingencies, and are based on contingencies, if

they have respect to man as a sinner, and to his sin." That

consequence is denied: for, on the contrary, those very

things which are contingencies to us, depend on the

ordination of God, according to their origin and action. To

their origin, for God has established the contingency equally

with the necessity: To their action, for He acts in the case

of that which is good, fails to act in that which is evil, in

that it is evil, not in that it is ordained by His special

providence. They are not, therefore, contingencies to the

Deity, whatever they may be to us; just as those things,

which are contingent to an inferior cause, can by no means be

justly ascribed to a superior cause. But I have already

stated this matter with sufficient clearness, in the

discussion of the fourth fundamental principle. Let us,

therefore, pass to other matters.

THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SIXTH PROPOSITION

The meaning of the first theory is that which I have set

forth in the third proposition. But it is of little

importance to me, whether the object, generally and without

distinction, or with a certain distinction, and invested with

certain circumstances, is presented to God, when

predestinating and reprobating, for that is not, now, the

point before me. If, however, it may be proper to discuss

this also in a few words, I should say that it cannot seem to

one who weighs this matter with accuracy, that the object is

considered in general and without any distinction by God, in

the act of decreeing, according to the sentiment of the

authors of the first theory. For the object was considered by

God, in the act of decreeing, in the relation which it had at

the time. when it had, as yet, been affected by no external

act of God, executing that decree; for this, in a pure and

abstract sense, is an object, free from every other

consideration, which can pertain to an object, through the

action of a cause operating in reference to it. But since,

according to the authors of the first theory, the act of

creation pertains to the execution of the decree, of which we

now treat, it is, therefore, most certainly evident, that

man, in that he was to be made, was the object of

predestination and reprobation. If any one considers the

various and manifold sets of that decree, it is not doubtful

that some of these must be accommodated and applied to this

and others to that condition of man, and in this sense, I

would admit the common and general consideration of the

object. But all those acts, according to the authors of that

first theory, depend on one primary act, namely, that in

which God determined to declare, in one part of that unformed

"lump," from which the human race was to be made, the glory

of his mercy, and, in another part, the glory of his justice,

and it is this very thing which I stated to be displeasing to

me in that first theory; nor can I yet persuade myself that

there exists, in the whole Scripture, any decree, by which

God has determined to illustrate his own glory, in the

salvation of these and in the condemnation of those, apart

from foresight of the fall.

The passage which you quote from Beza, on Ephes. i, 4,

plainly proves that I have done no injustice to those authors

in explaining their doctrine. He says, in that passage, that

God, by the creation and corruption of man, opened a way for

himself to the execution of that which he had before

decreed."

In reference to the harmony of those theories, I grant that

all agree in this, that this decree of God was made from

eternity, before any actual existence of the object, whatever

might be its character, and however it might be considered.

For "known unto God are all his works from the beginning of

the world." (Acts xv, 18.)

It is necessary also that all the internal acts of God should

universally be eternal, unless we wish to make God mutable;

yet in such a sense that some are antecedent to others in

order and nature. I admit also that they agree in this, that

there exists, in the predestinate or the reprobate, no cause

why the former should be predestinated, the latter

reprobated; and that the cause exists only in the mere will

of God. But I affirm that some ascend to a greater height

than others, and extend the act of decree farther. For the

advocates of the third theory deny that God, in any act of

predestination and reprobation, has reference to man,

considered as not yet fallen, and those of the second theory

say that God, in the act of that decree, did not have

reference to man as not yet created. The advocates of the

first, however, openly assert and contend that God, in the

first act of the decree, had reference to man, not as

created, but as to be created. I, therefore, distinguished

those theories according to their objects, as each one

presented man to God, at the first moment of the act of

predestination and reprobation, as free from any divine act

predestinating and reprobating, either internal, by which he

might decree something concerning man, or external, by which

He might effect something in man; this may be called pure

object, having as yet received no relation from the act of

God, decreeing from eternity, and no form from the external

act. But when it has received any relation or form from any

act of God, it is no longer pure object, but an object having

some action of God concerning it, or in it, by which it is

prepared for receiving some further action, as was also a

short time since affirmed. We will hereafter examine your

idea that they substantiate their theory by the example of

Jacob and Esau in Romans 9.

I may be permitted to make some observations or inquiries

concerning what you lay down as fundamental principles of

this doctrine, and of your reply to my arguments. In

reference to the first, concerning the essence of the Deity,

God is in such a sense immutable in essence, power,

intellect, will, counsel and work, that, nevertheless, if the

creature is changed, he becomes to that creature in will, the

application of power, and in work, another than that which he

was to the same creature continuing in his primitive state;

bestowing upon a cause that which is due to it, but without

any change in Himself. Again if God is immutable, He has, for

that very reason, not circumscribed or determined to one

direction, by any decree, the motion of free-will, the

enjoyment and use of which He has once freely bestowed on

man, so that it should incline, of necessity, to one

direction, and should not be able, in fact, to incline to

another direction, while that decree remains. Thirdly, God

has the form and an eternal and immutable conception of all

those things which are done mutably by men, but following, in

the order of nature, many other conceptions, which God has

concerning those things which He wills both to do Himself,

and to permit to men.

In reference to the second, concerning the knowledge of God;

I am most fully persuaded that the knowledge of God is

eternal, immutable and infinite, and that it extends to all

things, both necessary and contingent, to all things which He

does of Himself, either mediately or immediately, and which

He permits to be done by others. But I do not understand the

mode in which He knows future contingencies, and especially

those which belong to the free-will of creature, and which He

has decreed to permit, but not to do of Himself, not, indeed,

in that measure, in which I think that it is understood by

others more learned than myself. I know that there are those

who say that all things are, from eternity, presented to God,

and that the mode, in which God certainly and infallibly

knows future contingencies, is this, that those contingent

events coexist with God in the Now of eternity, and therefore

they are in Him indivisibly, and in the infinite Now of

eternity, which embraces all time. If this is so, it is not

difficult to understand how God may certainly and infallibly

know future contingent events. For contingencies are not

opposed to certainty of knowledge, except as they are future,

but not as they are present. That reasoning, however, does

not exhaust all the difficulties which may arise in the

consideration of these matters. For God knows, also, those

things which may happen, but never do happen, and

consequently do not co-exist with God in the Now of eternity,

which would be events unless they should be hindered, as is

evident from 1 Samuel xxiii, 12, in reference to the citizens

of Keilah, who would have delivered David into the hands of

Saul, which event, nevertheless, did not happen. The

knowledge, also, of future events, which depend on contingent

causes, seems to be certain, if those causes may be complete

and not hindered in their operation. But how shall the causes

of those events, which depend on the freedom of the will, be

complete, among which, even at that very moment in which it

chose one, it was free not to choose it, or to choose another

in preference to it? If indeed at any time your leisure may

permit, I could wish that you would accurately discuss, in

your own manner, these things and whatever else may pertain

to that question. I know that this would be agreeable and

acceptable to many, and that the labour would not be useless.

The knowledge of God is called eternal, but not equally so in

reference to all objects of knowledge. For that knowledge of

God is absolutely eternal, by which God knows Himself, and in

Himself all possible things. That, by which He knows beings

which will exist, is eternal indeed as to duration, but, in

nature, subsequent to some act of the divine will concerning

them, and, in some cases, even subsequent to some foreseen

act of the human will. In general, the following seems to me

to be the order of the divine knowledge, in reference to its

various objects. God knows

1. Himself what He, of Himself is able to do.

2. All things possible what can be done by those beings which

He can make.

3. All things which shall exist by the act of creation.

4. All things which shall exist by the act of creatures and

especially of rational creatures. Whether moved by those

actions of His creatures and

5. What He Himself especially of His rational shall do.

creatures; Or at least receiving occasion from them.

From this, it is apparent that the eternity of the knowledge

of God is not denied by those, who propose, as a foundation

for that knowledge, something dependent on the human will, as

foreseen.

But I do not understand in what way it can be true that, in

every genus, there must be one thing univocal, and from this,

other things in an equivocal sense. I have hitherto supposed

that those things which are under the same genus are univocal

or at least analogous; but, that things equivocal are not

comprehended with those which are univocal, under the same

genus, either in logic, or metaphysics, and still less in

physics. Then I have not thought that the univocal could be

the cause of the equivocal. For there is no similarity

between them. But if there exists a similarity as between

cause and effect, they are no longer equivocal. Thus those

things, which are heated by the fire as I should say, are

heated neither univocally, nor equivocally, but analogically.

God exists univocally, we, analogically. This they admit, who

state that certain attributes of the divine nature are

communicable to us according to analogy, among which they

also mention knowledge.

In reference to the third, concerning the actions of the

Deity; the actions of God are, in Himself, indeed eternal,

but they preserve a certain order; some are prior to others

by nature, and indeed necessarily precede them, whether in

the same order, in which they proceed from Him, I could not

easily say; but I know that there are those who have thus

stated, among whom some mention George Sohnius. Some also of

the internal actions in God, are subsequent in nature to the

foresight of some act dependent on the will of the creature.

Thus the decree concerning the mission of His Son for the

redemption of the human race is subsequent to the foresight

of the fall of man. For although God might have arranged to

prevent the fall, if he had not known that He could use an

easy remedy to effect a restoration, (as some think,) yet the

sure decree for the introduction of a remedy for the fall by

the mission of His Son, was not effected by God except on the

foresight of the disease, namely, the fall.

The mode in which God, as the universal principle, is said to

flow into His creatures, and especially his rational

creatures, and concurs with their nature and will, in

reference to an action, has my approbation, whatever it may

be, if it does not bring in a determination of the will of

the creature to one or two things which are contrary, or

contradictory. If any mode introduces such a determination, I

do not see how it can be consistent with the declaration of

Augustine, quoted by yourself, that God so governs all things

which He has created as also "to permit them to exercise and

put forth their own motions," or with the saying of Plato, in

which God is declared to be free from all blame.

I could wish that it might be plainly and decisively

explained how all effects and defects in nature, and the

will, of all kinds universally, are of the providence of God,

and yet God is free from fault, the whole fault, (if any

exists,) residing in the proximate cause. If any one thinks

that God is exempted from fault because He is the remote

cause, but that the creature, as the proximate cause, is

culpable, (if there is any sin,) he does not seem to me to

present a correct reason why any cause may be in fault, or

free from fault, but, concerning this also, I will hereafter

speak at greater length. In reference to the fourth,

concerning the causes of the actions of God; the universal

cause has no cause above itself, and the first and supreme

cause does not depend on any other cause, for the very terms

include that idea; but it is possible that there may be

afforded to the universal, first and supreme cause, by

another cause, an occasion for the production of some certain

effect, which, without that occasion, the first cause would

neither propose to be produced in itself, nor in fact produce

out of itself, and indeed could neither produce nor propose

or decree to be produced. Such is the decree to damn certain

persons, and their damnation according to that decree.

I readily assent to what you have said in reference to the

modes of necessary and contingent causes, as also those

things which you have remarked in reference to the

distinction between natural and rational power. I am,

however, certain that nothing can be deduced from them

against my opinion, or against those things, which have been

presented by me for the refutation of the first theory.

Having made these remarks, I come to the consideration of

your answer to my arguments. In my former argument, I denied

that man, considered as not yet created, is the object of

mercy rescuing from sin and misery, and of punitive justice,

and I persist in that sentiment; for I do not see that any

thing has been presented, which overthrows it, or drives me

from that position. For man is not, by that consideration,

removed from under the common providence or the special

predestination of God, but providence must, in this case, be

considered as according to mercy and justice thus

administered, and predestination, as decreed according to

them. But the reasoning from the relative to the absolute is

not valid; and the removal, in this case, is from under the

providence of God, considered relatively, not absolutely; so

also with predestination. You foresaw that I would make this

reply, and consequently you have presented a three-fold

answer; but, in no respect, injurious to my reasoning. For as

to the first, I admit that sin and misery were, in the most

complete sense, present with God from eternity, and, as they

were present, so also there was, in reference to them, a

place for mercy and justice. But the theory, which I oppose,

does not make them, (as foreseen,) present to mercy and

justice, but, according to the decree for illustrating mercy

and justice, it presents a necessity for the existence of sin

and misery, as, in their actual existence, there could be in

fact, a place, for the decree, made according to mercy and

justice. As to the second, I grant also that there could be,

in one who was in fact neither a sinner, nor miserable, a

place for mercy saving from sin and possible misery, but we

are not here treating of mercy so considered: and it is

certain that mercy and judgment exist in the Deity, by an

eternal act, but it is in the first action of those

attributes. In a second act, God cannot exercise those

attributes, understood according to the mind of the authors

of that theory, except in reference to a sinful and actually

miserable being. Lastly, what you say concerning the

internal, and external action of the Deity, and these

conjoined, does not disturb, in any greater degree, my

argument. For neither the internal action, which is the

decree of God in reference to the illustration of his glory,

by mercy and punitive justice, nor the external action, which

is the actual declaration of that same glory through mercy

and justice, nor both conjoined can have any place in

reference to a man who is neither sinful, nor miserable. I

know, indeed, that, to those who advocate this theory, there

is so much difference between internal and external action,

that is, as they say, between the decree and its execution,

that God may decree salvation according to mercy and death

according to justice to a person who is not a sinner, but may

not really save, according to mercy, any one, unless, He is a

sinner, or damn, according to justice, any except sinners.

But I deny that distinction; indeed I say that God, can

neither will nor decree, by internal act, that which He

cannot do, by external act, and thus the object of internal

and external action is the same, and invested with the same

circumstances: whether it be present to God, in respect to

his eternal intelligence and be the object of His decree, or

be, in fact, in its actual existence, present to Him and the

object of the execution of the decree. Hence, I cannot yet

decide otherwise concerning that theory, than that it cannot

be approved by those, who think and desire to speak according

to the Scriptures.

The "two statements" which you think "may be made, of a

milder character, and in harmony with the words of Christ and

the apostles," do not serve to explain that first theory, but

are additions, by which it is very much changed, and which

its advocates would by no means acknowledge, as, in my

opinion, was made sufficiently manifest in my statement of

the same theory in reply to your third answer, and may be, at

this time, again demonstrated in a single word. For those

very things, which you make the mode and the consequent event

of predestination and reprobation, are styled, by the authors

of that first theory, the cause, and the principle of that

same decree, and also the end, though not the final one,

which, they affirm, is his glory, to be declared by mercy and

justice. Again they acknowledge no grace in predestination

which is not mercy, and correctly so, for the grace, which is

towards man considered absolutely, is not of election: also

they do not acknowledge any non-grace, or non-mercy, which is

not comprehended in punitive justice. Here I do not argue

against that theory thus explained, not because I approve it

in all respects, but because I have, this time, undertaken to

examine what I affirm to be the view of Calvin and Beza;

other matters will be hereafter considered. I will notice

separately what things are here brought forward, agreeing

with that view, thus explained. The passages of Scripture

quoted from Matthew 25, and Ephesians 1, in which it is

taught that "God, from all eternity, of the good pleasure of

his will, elected some to adoption, sanctification, and a

participation of his kingdom," so far fail to prove the

common view that on the contrary there may be inferred from

them a reference to sin, as a condition requisite in the

object of benediction and election. In the former passage,

the blessed are called to a participation of the kingdom,

which God has prepared for them from eternity; but in whom

and by whom? Is it not in Christ and by Christ? Certainly;

then it was prepared for sinners, not for men considered in

general, and apart from any respect to sin. For "thou shall

call his name Jesus; for he shall save his people from their

sins." (Matt. i, 2.)

The passage from Ephesians 1, much more plainly affirms the

same thing, as will be hereafter proved in a more extended

manner, when I shall use that passage, avowedly to sustain

the theory which makes sin a condition requisite in the

object. I did not present a particular reference to men, as a

cause, which I wished to have kept in mind, but according to

a condition, requisite in the object, namely, misery and sin.

This I still require. The distinction, which you make between

grace and mercy, is according to fact and the signification

of terms, but in this place is unnecessary. For no grace,

bestowed upon man, originates in predestination, as there is

no grace, previous to predestination, not joined with mercy.

God deals with angels according to grace, not according to

mercy saving from sin and misery. He deals with us according

to mercy, not according to grace in contradistinction to

mercy. I speak here of predestination. According to that

mercy, also, is our adoption; it is not, then, of men,

considered in their original state, but of sinners. This is

also apparent from the phraseology of the apostle, who calls

the elect and the reprobate "vessels," not of grace and non-

grace but of "mercy" and "wrath." The relation of "vessels"

they have equally and in common from their divine creation,

sustainment, and government. That they are vessels worthy of

wrath, deserving it, and the "children of wrath," (Ephes. ii,

3), in this also there is no distinction among them. But that

some are "vessels of wrath," that is, destined to wrath, of

their own merit, indeed, but also of the righteous judgment

of God, which determines to bring wrath upon them; while

others are "vessels" not "of wrath" but "of mercy" according

to the grace of God, which determines to pardon their sin,

and to spare them, though worthy of wrath, this is of the

will of God, making a distinction between the two classes;

which discrimination has its beginning after the act of sin,

whether we consider the internal or the external act of God.

From this it is apparent that they are not on this account

vessels of wrath because they have become depraved, the just

consequence of which is wrath, if the will of God did not

intervene, which determines that this, which would be a just

consequence in respect to all the depraved, should be a

necessary consequence in respect to those, whom alone He

refuses to pardon, as He can justly punish all and had

decreed to pardon some. That which is "added by way of

amplification" is confirmed by the same arguments. For there

is no place for punitive justice except in reference to the

sinner; there can be no act of that mercy, of which we treat,

except towards the miserable. But man, considered in his

natural condition is neither sinful nor miserable, therefore

that justice and mercy have no place in reference to him.

Hence, you, my brother, will see that the object of

predestination, made according to those attributes and so

understood, cannot be man, considered in general, since it

requires, in its object, the circumstance of sin and misery,

by which circumstance man is restricted to a determinate

condition, and is separated from a general consideration. I

know, indeed, that, if the general consideration is admitted,

no one of those particular considerations is excluded, but

you also know that if any particular relation is precisely

laid down, that universal relation is excluded. I do not

think that it is to be altogether conceded that, in the case

of election and reprobation, there is no consideration of

well-doing or of sin. There is no consideration of well-

doing, it is true, for there is none to be considered; there

is no consideration of sin as a cause why one, and not

another, should be reprobated, but there is a consideration

of sin as a meritorious cause of the possibility of the

reprobation of any individual, and as a condition requisite

in the object, as I have often remarked, and shall,

hereafter, often remark, as occasion may require. In what

respects, those theories differ was briefly noticed in reply

to your first answer. When God is said to have elected

persons, as not created, as created but not fallen, or as

fallen, all know that it is understood, not that they are in

fact such, but that they are considered as such, for all

admit that God elected human beings from eternity, before

they were created, that is, by the internal act; but no one

says, that man was elected by the external act before he was

created; therefore a reconciliation of those theories was

unnecessary, since the object of both acts is one and the

same, and considered in the same manner. Besides the

questions, when the election was made, and in what sense it

was considered, are different. I wished to confirm my words

by the authority of your consent; whether ignorantly, will be

proved from these statements. You make man, considered as a

sinner, the subject of the preparation of punishment

according to justice, which I, agreeably to your Theses, have

called reprobation, and you, according to your opinion,

presuppose sin in him; but, in the first theory, they make

sin subordinate to that same decree. The preterition, which

the same theory attributes to punitive justice, you attribute

to the freedom of the divine goodness, and you exclude

punitive justice from it, when you make man, not yet a

sinner, the subject of preterition. Predestination, which the

first theory ascribes to mercy, in contra-distinction to

grace, your Theses, already cited (answers 2 and 4) assign to

grace, spoken of absolutely, since they consider man in the

state of nature in which he was created; but you make man, as

a sinner, the subject of grace, as conjoined with mercy, and

you presuppose sin. That first theory, on the other hand,

makes sin subordinate to that predestination, both of which

cannot, at the same time, be true, therefore, in this you

seem to agree with me, as you ascribe election to mercy, only

so far as man is considered miserable, and preparation of

punishment to justice, only so far as man is considered

sinful. You reply, that, when grace is presented, as the

genus, mercy, as the species, is not excluded, and mercy

being presented, as the species, grace, as the genus, is not

excluded. I grant it, but affirm, first, that grace cannot be

supposed here as the genus, for grace, spoken of generally,

cannot be supposed to be the cause of any act, that is, any

special act, such as predestination. Again, the relation of

grace and mercy in this case, is different from that of genus

and species: for they are spoken of, in an opposite manner,

as two different species of grace, the term grace, having the

same appellation with that of the genus, referring to that

grace which regards man as created, the term mercy, receiving

its appellation from its object, referring to that grace

which regards man as sinful and miserable. If man is said to

be predestinated according to the former, the latter can have

no place; if according to the latter, then it is certain that

the former can have no place, otherwise the latter would be

unnecessary. Predestination cannot be said to have been made

conjointly according to both. My conclusion was, therefore,

correct, when I excluded one species by the supposition of

the other. If man is to be exalted to supernatural glory from

a natural state, this work belongs to grace, simply

considered, and in contra-distinction to mercy; if from a

corrupt state, it belongs to grace conjoined with mercy, that

is, it is the appropriate work of mercy. Grace, simply

considered and opposed to mercy, cannot effect the latter,

mercy is not necessary for the former. But predestination is

of such grace as is both able and necessary to effect that

which is proposed in predestination.

What I wrote copulatively, in reference to the passed by and

the reprobate, was written thus, because they are one

subject. But that they are not the same in relation, is

admitted: and I expressed this when I remarked that you

referred to justice only in the case of the latter, namely,

the reprobate, that is, the damned. In my second proposition,

however, I signified that, according to the view of those to

whom I ascribed the second theory, the relation of

preterition was different from that of predamnation, which I

there called reprobation. The homonymy of the term

reprobation is explained in my second answer, and all fault

is removed from me, who have used that word every where

according to your own idea. But it is very apparent, from

what follows, that you dissent from the authors of the first

theory. For you assert that "predestination is of justice,"

but that preterition or reprobation is according to justice,

but not "of justice;" while the authors of the first theory

ascribe to justice the cause of reprobation, however

understood, whether synecdochically, or properly, or

catachrestically, that is, they affirm that both preterition

and predamnation are of justice.

But how are election and preterition "the work of flee-will

according to the wisdom of God and damnation, the work of

necessary will according to the justice of God? I have

hitherto thought, with our theologians, that this whole

decree was instituted by God, in the exercise of most

complete freedom of will, and I yet think that the same idea

is true, according to the declaration, "I will have mercy on

whom I will have mercy," and "He hath mercy on whom He will

have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth." (Rom. ix, 15 &

18.)

In each of these acts God exercises equal freedom. For, if

God necessarily wills in any case to punish sin, how is it

that He does not punish it in all sinners? If he punishes it

in some, but not in others, how is that the act of necessary

will? Who, indeed, does not ascribe the distinction which is

made among persons, equally meriting the punishment, to the

freewill of God? Justice may demand punishment on account of

sin, but it demands it equally in reference to all sinners

without distinction; and, if there is any discrimination, it

is of free-will, demanding punishment as to these, but

remitting sin to those. But it was necessary that punishment

should be at least inflicted on some. If I should deny that

this was so after the satisfaction made by Christ, how will

it be proved? I know that Aquinas, and other of the School-

men, affirm that the relation of the divine goodness and

providence demands that some should be elected to life, and

that others should be permitted to fall into sin and then to

suffer the punishment of eternal death, and that God was free

to decree to whom life, and to whom death should appertain,

according to his will, but their arguments seem to me

susceptible of refutation from their own statements,

elsewhere made concerning the price of our redemption paid by

Christ. For they say the price was sufficient for the sins of

all, but if the necessity of divine justice demands that some

sinners should be damned, then the price was not sufficient

for all. For if justice, in him who receives that price,

necessarily demands that some should be destitute of

redemption, then it must have been offered by the redeemer

with the condition that there must always remain to the

necessity of justice, some satisfaction, to be sought

elsewhere and to be rendered by others. Let no one think that

the last affirmation of the school-men (that concerning the

sufficiency of the price), which, however, they borrowed from

the fathers, is to be rejected, for it could be proved, if

necessary, by plain and express testimonies from the

Scripture.

Let us now come to my second argument, which was this. A

theory, by which God is necessarily made the author of sin,

is to be repudiated by all Christians, and indeed by all men;

for no man thinks that the being, whom he considers divine,

is evil; -- But according to the theory of Calvin and Beza

God is necessarily made the author of sin; -- Therefore it is

to be repudiated. The proof of the Minor, is evident from

these words, in which they say that "God ordained that man

should fall and become corrupt, that in this way he might

open a way for His eternal counsels." For he, who ordains

that man should fall and sin, is the author of sin This, my

argument, is firm, nor is it weakened by your answer. The

word ordain is indeed ambiguous, for it properly signifies to

arrange the order of events or deeds, and in each thing

according to its own mode, in which sense it is almost always

used by the school-men. But it is also applied to a simple

and absolute decree of the will determining an action. What

then? Does it follow, because I have used a word, which is

ambiguous and susceptible of various meanings that I am

chargeable with ambiguity? I think not; unless it is proved

that, in my argument, I have used that word in different

senses. Otherwise sound reasoning would be exceedingly rare,

since, on account of the multitude of things and the paucity

of words, we are very frequently compelled to use words,

which have a variety of meanings. Ambiguity may be charged

when a word is used in different senses in the same argument.

But I used that word, in the same sense in the Major and in

the Minor, and so my argument is free from ambiguity. I

affirm that this is evident from the argument itself. For the

added phrase "that man should fall" signifies that the word

ordain, in both propositions, is to be applied to the simple

decree in reference to an action, or rather to a simple

decree that something should be done. It cannot, on account

of that phrase, be referred to a decree disposing the order

of actions.

Let us now state the syllogism in a few words, that we may be

able to compare your answer with the argument.

He who ordained that man should fall and become depraved, is

the author of the fall and of sin; God ordained that man

should fall and become depraved; Therefore, God is the author

of sin.

You deny the Major, if the word ordain is understood to mean

the disposal of the order of actions. You deny the Minor if

the same word is used to mean a simple decree as to actions,

or things to be done. This is true, and, in it, I agree with

you. But what if the same word in the Minor signifies a

simple decree, &c.? Then, indeed, even by your own admission,

the Major will be true. Else your distinction in the word is

uselessly made, if the Major is false, however the word may

be understood. But that the word is used in the Major in this

sense, is proved by the phraseology, "He who ordained that

man should fall." Then you say that the Minor is false if the

word is used in the same sense in which we have shown that it

is used in the Major, and so the conclusion does not follow.

I reply, that the question between us is not whether that

Minor is true or false, the word ordain being used for the

decreeing of things to be done, but whether they affirm it,

to whom the first theory is attributed. If, then, they affirm

this, and the Major is true, then it follows (and in this you

agree with me,) that God is the author of sin. For you admit

that he is the author of sin, who, by the simple decree and

determination of the will, ordains that sin shall be

committed. Calvin and Beza assert this in plain and most

manifest declarations, needing no explanation, and by no

means admitting that explanation of the word ordain, which,

as you say and I acknowledge, is proper. I wish also that it

might be shown in what way the necessity of the commission of

sin, can depend on the ordination and decree of God otherwise

than by the mode of cause, either efficient or deficient,

which deficiency is reduced to efficiency, when the

efficiency of that which is deficient is necessary to the

avoidance of sin. Beza himself concedes that it is

incomprehensible how God can be free from and man be

obnoxious to guilt, if man fell by the ordination of God, and

of necessity.

This, then, was to be done: their theory was to be freed from

the consequence of that absurdity, which, in my argument, I

ascribe to it. It was not, however, necessary to show how God

ordained sin, and that He is not indeed the author of sin. I

agree with you, both in the explanation of that ordination,

and in the assertion that God is not the author of sin.

Calvin himself, and Beza also, openly deny that God is the

author of sin, although they define ordination as we have

seen, but they do not show how these two things can be

reconciled. I wish, then, that it might be shown plainly, and

with perspicuity, that God is not made the author of sin by

that decree, or that the theory might be changed, since it is

a stumbling block to many, indeed to some a cause of

separating from us, and to very many a cause of not uniting

with us. But I am altogether persuaded that you also perceive

that consequence, but prefer to free the theory of those men

from an absurd and blasphemous consequence, by a fit

explanation, than to charge that consequence to it. This is

certainly the part of candour and good will, but used to no

good purpose, since the gloss, as they say, is contrary to

the text, which is manifest to any one who examines and

compares the text with the gloss. Those two questions, which

you present to yourself, do not affect my argument, when the

matter is thus explained.

Yet I am delighted with your beautiful and elegant discussion

of those questions. But I would ask, in opposition to the

theory of Calvin and Beza, "How can these movements of the

will be called its own and free, when the act of the will is

determined to one direction by the decree of God?" Then, "Why

did God place the will in man, if He was unwilling that he

should enjoy the liberty of its use?" For these questions are

necessarily to be answered by those authors, if they do not

wish to leave their theory without defense. It is therefore,

apparent from these things that my argument does not fail,

but remains firm and unmoved, since all things which you have

adduced, are aside from that argument, which did not seek to

conclude, as my own views, that God is the author of sin (far

from me be even the thought of that abominable blasphemy),

but to prove that this is a necessary consequence of the

theory of Calvin and Beza: which (I confidently say) has not

been confuted by you: nor can it be at all confuted, since

you use the word ordain in a sense different from that in

which they use it, and from that sense, according to which if

God should be said to have ordained sin, nothing less could

be inferred than that He is the author of sin.

I said, moreover, that the theory of Calvin and Beza, in

which they state that God ordained that man should fall and

become depraved, could not be explained so that God should

not be made by it the author of sin, by the distinctions of

the act, and the evil in the act, of necessity and coaction,

of the decree and its execution, of efficacious and

permissive decree, as the latter is explained by the authors

of that theory agreeably to it, nor by the different relation

of the divine decree and of human nature or of man, nor by

the addition of the end, namely, that the whole ordination

was designed for the illustration of the glory of God. You

seem to me, reverend sir, not to have perceived for what

purpose I presented these things, for I did not wish to

present any new course of reasoning against that first

theory, but to confirm my previous objection by a refutation

of those answers, which are usually presented by the

defenders of that theory, to the objection which I made,

that, by it, God is made the author of sin. For they, in

order to repel the charge from their theory, never make the

reply which has been presented by you, for, should they do

this, they would necessarily depart from their own theory,

which is wholly changed, if the word ordain, which they use,

signifies not to decree that sin should be committed, but to

arrange the order of its commission, as you explain that

word. But to show that it does not follow from their theory,

that God is the author of sin, they adduce the distinctions

to which I have referred, and have diligently gathered from

their various writings; which ought to be done before that

accusation should be made against their theory. For, if I

could find any explanation of that theory, any distinction,

by which it could be relieved of that charge, it would have

pertained to my conscience, not to place upon it the load of

such a consequence. Your distinction in the word ordain

indeed removes the difficulty, but, in such a way, that, by

one and the same effort, it removes the theory from which I

proved that the difficulty followed. Prove that the authors

of that theory assert that God ordained sin in no other sense

than that, in which you have shown that the word is properly

used, and I shall obtain that which I wish, and I will

concede that those distinctions were unnecessary for the

defense of that theory. For the word ordain used in your

sense, presupposes the perpetration of sin; in their sense,

it precedes and proposes its perpetration, for "God ordained

that man should fall and become depraved," not that from a

being, fallen and depraved, He should make whatever the order

of the divine wisdom, goodness, and justice might demand.

There is here, then, no wandering beyond the appropriate

range of the discussion. You say that all those distinctions

pertain in common to the question of providence, and

therefore the ordination of sin pertains in common to the

question of providence. If, however, the authors of the first

theory have ascribed the ordination of sin to the divine

predestination, why should it cause surprise, that those

distinctions should also be referred to the same

predestination? There is, in this case, then, no blame to be

attached to me, that I have mentioned these distinctions. On

the contrary, I should have been in fault, if, omitting

reference to those distinctions, I should have made an

accusation against their theory, which they are accustomed to

defend against this accusation by means of those

distinctions. But since you do not, by your explanation,

relieve their theory from that objection, and I have said

that those distinctions do not avail for its relief and

defense, it will not be useless that I should prove my

assertion, not for your sake, but for the sake of those, who

hold that opinion, since they think that it can be suitably

defended by these distinctions.

They use the first distinction thus: "In sin there are two

things, the act and its sinfulness." God, by his own

ordination, is the author of the act, not of the sinfulness

in the act. I will first consider the distinction, then the

answer which they deduce from it. This distinction is very

commonly made, and seems to have some truth, but to one

examining, with diligence, its falsity, in most respects,

will be apparent. For it is not, in general or universally,

applicable to all sin. All sins, especially, which are

committed against prohibitory laws, styled sins of

commission, reject this distinction. For the acts themselves

are forbidden by the law, and therefore, if perpetrated, they

are sins. This is the formal relation of sin, that it is

something done contrary to law. It is true that the act in

that it is such, would not be sin, if the law had not been

enacted, but then it is not an act, having evil or

sinfulness. Let the law be absent, the act is naturally good:

introduce the law, and the act itself is evil, as forbidden,

not that there is any thing in the act which can be called

unlawfulness or sin. I will make the matter clear by an

example. The eating of the forbidden fruit, if it had been

permitted to the human will as right, would, in no way, be

sin, nor any part of sin, it would not contain any element of

sin; but the same act, forbidden by law, could not be

otherwise than sinful, if perpetrated; I refer to the act

itself, and not to any thing in the act to which the term

evil can be applied. For that act was simply made illicit by

the enactment of the law. I shall have attained my object

here in a single word, by simply asking that the sinfulness

in that act may be shown separately from the act itself. That

distinction, however, had a place in acts which are performed

according to a perceptive law, but not according to a due

mode, order, or motive. Thus he, who gives alms, that he may

be praised does a good act badly, and there is, in that deed

both the act and the evil of the act according to which it is

called sin. But the sin which man perpetrated at the

beginning, of the ordination of God, was a sin of commission;

it therefore affords no place for that distinction. This

fundamental principle having been established, the answer,

deduced from that distinction, is at once refuted. Yet let us

look at it. "God," they say, "is, by ordination, the author

of the act, not of the evil in the act." I affirm, on the

contrary, that God ordained that act, not as an act, but as

it is an evil act. He ordained that the glory of His mercy

and justice should be illustrated, of his pardoning mercy,

and His punitive justice; but that glory is illustrated not

by the act as such, but as it is sinful, and as an evil act.

For the act needs remission, not as such, but as evil; it

deserves punishment, not as such, but as evil. The

declaration, then, of His glory by mercy and justice, is by

the act as it is evil, not as it is an act; therefore that

ordination which had its end, the illustration of that glory,

was not of the act as such, but as evil, and of sin, as sin

and transgression. That distinction, therefore, is useless in

repelling the objection, which I have urged against that

theory. I add, for the elucidation of the subject, that if

God efficaciously determines the will to the material of sin,

or to depraved objects, though it may be affirmed that He

does not determine the will to an evil decision, in respect

to the evil, He is still made the author of sin, since man

himself does not will the evil in respect to the evil and the

devil does not solicit to evil in respect to the evil, but in

respect to that which is delectable, and yet he is said to

induce persons to sin.

The second distinction is that of necessity and coaction.

They use it in this way. If the decree of God, in which he

ordained that man should fall, compelled him to sin, then

would God, by that decree, become the author of sin, and man

would be free from guilt: but that decree did not compel man.

It only imposed a necessity upon him so that he could not but

sin; which necessity does not take away his liberty.

Therefore, man, since he sins freely, the decree being in

force, is the cause of his own fall, and God is free from the

responsibility. Let us now consider this distinction, and the

use made of it.

Necessity and coaction differ as genus and species. For

necessity comprehends coaction in itself. Necessity also is

twofold, one from an internal, the other from an external

cause; the one, natural, the other, violent. Necessity, from

an external cause and violent, is also called coaction,

whether it be used contrary to nature, or against the will,

as when a stone is projected upwards, and a strong man makes

use of the hand of a weaker person to strike a third person.

The former has the name of the genus, necessity, but is

referred to a specific idea, by a contraction of the mental

conception. There is, then, between these two species, some

agreement, as they belong to the same genus, and some

discrepancy, since each has its own form. But it is now to be

considered whether they so differ that coaction alone, and

not that other species of necessity, is contrary to freedom;

and whether he who compels to sin is the cause of sin, and

not he who necessitates without compulsion. They indeed

affirm this, who use this distinction. First, in reference to

freedom; it is opposed directly to necessity, considered in

general, whether natural or compulsive, for each of these

species causes the inevitability of the act. For a cause acts

freely when it has the power to suspend its action. Some say

that freedom is fully consistent with natural necessity, and

refer to the example of the Deity, who is, by nature and

freely, good. But is God freely good? Such an affirmation is

not very far from blasphemy. His own goodness exists in God,

naturally and most intimately; it does not then exist in Him

freely. I know that a kind of freedom of complacency is

spoken of by the School-men, but contrary to the very nature

and definition of freedom. We say, in reference to sin, that

he is the cause of sin, who necessitates to the commission of

sin, by any act whatever of necessitation, whether internal

or external, whether by internal suasion, motion, or leading,

which the will necessarily obeys, or by an application of

external violence, which the will is not able, though it may

desire, to resist; though, in that case, the act would not be

voluntary. He, indeed sins more grievously, who uses the

former act, than he, who uses the latter. For the former has

this effect, that the will may consent to the sin, but the

latter has no such effect, though that consent is not

according to the mode of free-will, but according to that of

nature, in which mode only, God can so move the will, that it

may be moved necessarily, that is, that it cannot but be

moved. And in this relation, the will, as it consents by

nature to sin, is free from guilt; for sin, as such, is of

free-will, and tend towards its object, according to the mode

of its own freedom. The law is enacted not for nature but for

the will, for the will as it acts not according to the mode

of nature, but according to the mode of freedom. That

distinction is, therefore, vain, and does not relieve the

first theory from the objection made against it. If any one

wishes, with greater pertinacity, still to defend the idea,

that one and the same act can be performed freely and

necessarily, in different respects, necessarily in respect to

the first cause, which ordains it, but freely and

contingently in respect to the second cause, let him consider

that contingency and necessity differ not in certain

respects, but in their entire essence, and that they divide

the whole extent of being, and cannot, therefore, be

coincident. That is necessary which cannot fail to be done;

that is contingent which can fail to be done. These are

contradictions which can in no way be attributed to the same

act. The will tends freely to its own object, when it is not

determined, to a single direction, by a superior power; but,

when that determination is made by any decree of God, it can

no longer be said to tend freely to its own object; for it is

no longer a principle, having dominion and power over its own

acts. Did it not pertain to the nature of the bones of

Christ, (which they present as an example,) to be broken? Yet

they could not be broken on account of the decree of God. I

reply, that the divine determination being removed, they

could be broken; but, that determination, being presented by

the decree of God, they could not at all be broken, that is,

it was necessary, not contingent, that they should remain

unbroken. Did God, therefore, change the nature of the bones?

That was not necessary. He only prevented the act of breaking

the bones, which were liable by their nature to be broken,

which act could have been performed, and would have been, if

God had not anticipated it by His decree, and by an act

according to that decree. For our Lord gave up the ghost when

the soldiers were approaching the cross to break his bones,

and were about to use the breaking of his legs to accelerate

his death. That I may not be tedious, I will not refute all

the objections; but I am persuaded, from what has been

presented, that they are all susceptible of refutation. The

third distinction is that of the decree and its execution.

They use it thus; though God may have decreed from eternity

to devote certain persons to death, and, that this may be

possible, may have ordained that they should fall into sin,

yet he does not execute that decree, by their actual

condemnation, until after the persons themselves have become

sinful by their own act, and, therefore, He is free from

responsibility. I answer that the fact that the execution of

the decree is subsequent to the act of sin, does not free

from responsibility him, who, by his own decree, has ordained

that sin should occur, that he might afterwards punish it;

indeed he, who has ordained and decreed that sin should be

committed, cannot justly punish sin after its commission; he

cannot justly punish a deed, the doing of which he has

ordained; he cannot be the ordainer of the punishment, who

was the ordainer of the crime. Augustine rightly says, "God

can ordain the punishment of crimes, not the crimes

themselves," that is, He can ordain that they should take

place. I have already demonstrated that man does not become

depraved of his own fault, if God has ordained that he should

fall and become depraved.

The fourth distinction is that of efficacious and permissive

decree: which distinction, rightly explained, removes the

whole difficulty, but it removes also the theory, by which

God is affirmed to have ordained that sin should take place.

The authors, however, of the first theory endeavour to

sustain that theory by reference to permissive decree. They

affirm that God does not effect, but decrees and ordains sin,

and that this is done not by an efficacious, but by a

permissive decree; and they so explain a permissive decree,

that it coincides with one, which is efficacious. For they

explain permission to be an act of the divine will, by which

God does not bestow, on a rational creature, that grace,

which is necessary for the avoidance of sin. This action,

joined with the enactment of a law, embraces in itself the

whole cause of sin. For he, who imposes a law which cannot be

observed without grace, and denies grace to him, on whom the

law is imposed, is the cause of sin by the removal of the

necessary hindrance. But more on this point hereafter.

On the contrary, if permissive decree be rightly explained,

it is certain that he, who has decreed to permit sin, is by

no means the cause of sin; for the action of his will has

reference to its own permission, not to sin. Nor are these

two things, God, in the exercise of His will, permits sin,

and, God wills sin, equivalent. For, the object of the will

is, in the former case, permission, in the latter, sin. On

the contrary rather, the conclusion, God permits, therefore,

He does not will, a sinful act, is valid, for he who wills

any thing does not permit the same thing. Permission is a

sign of want of action in the will. That distinction, then,

does not relieve the first theory. The fifth distinction is

that of the divine decree and human nature, which they use

thus: -- sin, if you consider the divine decree, is

necessary; but if you have reference to human nature, which

is equally free and flexible in every direction, it is freely

and contingently committed; and, therefore, the whole

responsibility is to be placed on human nature, as the

proximate cause. We have discussed this, previously, in

reference to the second distinction, and have sufficiently

refuted it. They make another use of the same distinction, by

a diverse respect of the ends, which God has proposed to

Himself in His decree, and which are proposed to man in the

commission of sin. "For," they say, "God intends, in His

decree, to illustrate His own glory, but man intends to

gratify his own desire; and though man does the very thing,

which is divinely decreed, he does not do it because it is

decreed, but because his will so inclines him. I reply,

first; a good end does not approve, or make good, an action

which is unlawful in itself; for "we are not to do evil that

good may come;" but it is evil to ordain that sin shall be

committed. Secondly, that man, to satisfy his own desire,

should do that which God has forbidden, also results from the

decree of God, and, therefore, man is relieved from

responsibility. Thirdly, though the fulfillment of the divine

decree is not the end which moves man to the commission of

sin, yet that same thing is the cause which, by a gentle,

silent, and imperceptible, yet efficacious, movement effects

that man should sin, or, rather, commit that act which God

had decreed should be committed, which, then, in respect to

man, cannot be called sin. Finally, the last defense consists

in a reference to the end, of which they make this use: "We

are accustomed to state the decree of God, not in these

terms, that 'God has determined to adjudge some men to

eternal death and condemnation,' but we add, ' that His

justice may be illustrated to the glory of his name.'"

I answer, that the addition does not deny the previous

statement, (for this is confirmed by the rendering of the

cause,) and the addition, even of the best end, does not

justify an action which is not in itself formally good, as

has before been stated. From these things, then, it is

apparent, that these grounds of defense are insufficient, and

avail nothing for the defense of that theory which states

that God ordained that men should fall and become depraved,

in order to open to Himself, in that manner, a way for the

execution of the decree which He had, from eternity,

determined and proposed to Himself, for the illustration of

His own glory by mercy and justice. If any one may think that

any other distinction or explanation can be presented, by

which that theory may be defended and vindicated, I shall be,

in the highest degree, pleased, if this is done. But let him

be cautious not to change the theory or add to it any thing

inconsistent with it. You mention, at the end of your sixth

answer, an objection to your view; -- "Then the judgments of

God depend on contingency, and are based on things

contingent, if they have reference to man as a sinner, and to

his sin." I must examine this with diligence, since it also

lies against my view, in that I think that sin must be

presupposed in the object of the divine decree. It is most

manifest, from the Scriptures, that many of the judgments of

God are based on sin, which, yet, cannot be said, to depend

on sin. It is one thing to make sin the object and occasion

of the divine judgments, and another to make it the cause of

the same. The judgment, which God pronounces in reference to

sin, He pronounces freely, nor does this depend on sin, for

He can suspend it, or substitute another in its place; yet it

is based on sin, because, apart from sin, He could not thus

judge. But sin is contingent, or contingently committed.

Therefore, the judgments of God are based on things

contingent. I deny the consequence. The judgments of God are

based on sin, not as it is committed contingently, but as it

is certainly and infallibly foreseen by God. Therefore, the

sight of God intervenes between sin and judgment, and thus,

judgment is based on the certain and infallible vision of

God. Then that which exists, so far as it exists, is

necessary. But the judgments of God are based on sin, already

committed and in existence. In your answer, however, I could

wish that it might be explained to me how those things, which

are contingent, depend on the ordination of God, whether

according to the source or the act, the word ordination

having reference to a decree that certain things shall be

done, not to the disposal of the order in which they shall be

done, for so the word is to be understood in this place. For,

though God has appointed the mode of contingency in nature,

yet it does not follow from this that contingencies have

their source in the ordination of God. For a cause, which is

free and governs its own action, can suspend or carry forward

a contingent act, according to its own will; so also in

reference to the act. I do not, therefore, understand in what

way contingencies, which are such in themselves, are not

contingencies to God, from the fact that He has established

the mode of contingency in nature. Sin is not, in any mode

and in respect to anything, necessary. Therefore, sin is also

contingent to God, that is, it is considered by God as done

contingently, though in His certain and infallible sight, on

account of the infinity of the divine knowledge. Nor is it

the same idea, that a thing should be really contingent to

the supreme cause, and that a thing, truly contingent in

itself, should be considered as contingent by that supreme

cause. For it is understood that nothing can be accidental or

contingent to God, for He is immutable, He is entirely

uncompounded, and, as Being and Essence, belongs to Himself

alone. But the knowledge of God considers things as they are,

though with vision far exceeding the nature of all things.

SEVENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

I will not now adduce other reasons why that theory is not

satisfactory to me, since I perceive that you treat it in a

mode and respect different from mine. I come then to the

theory of Thomas Aquinas, to which, I think, you also gave

your assent, and presented proofs from the Scriptures, and I

will openly state that, of which I complain. I would pray you

not to be displeased with the liberty, which I take, if your

good will towards me was not most manifest.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SEVENTH PROPOSITION

I should prefer that those "other reasons," whatever they

might be, had been presented, that I might dispose of the

whole matter, (if possible,) at the same time, for I desire

that my opinion should be known to you without any

dissimulation, and that your expectation should be satisfied.

Nevertheless, I hope, that, in your wisdom, you will

perceive, from what I have already said, and shall yet say,

either what my opinion is concerning those reasons, or what

there may be, according to my view, in which your mind may

rest, (which may the Lord grant). The theory of Thomas

Aquinas I unite with the other, I do not follow it. But I

will, briefly and in a few words, explain what I shall state

in this argument, and in what mode, from the word of God, and

what does not please me in that theory, noticing the words of

your writing in the same order.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SEVENTH PROPOSITION

If I thought, indeed, that you considered that first theory,

as it is explained by its authors, to be in accordance with

the Scriptures, I would, in every way, attempt to divest you

of that idea, but I see that you so explain it, as greatly to

change it; on which account I am persuaded that you judge

that, unless it be explained according to your

interpretation, it is, by no means, in accordance with the

Scriptures. You will also allow me, my brother, to repeat,

that, in your entire answer, you have not relieved that

theory from any objection. For it remains valid, that "God is

made the author of sin, if He is said to have ordained that

man should fall and become depraved that He might open to

Himself a way for the declaration of His own glory, in the

way in which He had already determined by eternal decree."

Yet, that no one may think that my promise was vain, I will

attempt by other arguments also the refutation of that

theory, which presents, as an object to God, in the act of

predestination, man not yet created or to be created. I used

two arguments, one a priore, the other, a posteriore or by

absurdity of consequence. The argument a priore was as

follows; -- Predestination is the will of God in reference to

the illustration of His glory by mercy and justice; but that

will has no opportunity for exercise in a being not yet

created. The argument a posteriore was as follows; If God

ordained that man should fall and become depraved, that He

might open to Himself a way for the execution of that purpose

of His will (predestination,) then it follows that He is the

author of sin by that ordination. These arguments have been

already dwelt upon at sufficient length.

I adduce my third argument. Predestination is a part of

providence, administering and governing the human race;

therefore, it was subsequent to the act of creation or to the

purpose of creating man. If it is subsequent to the act of

creation, or to the purpose of creating man, then man,

considered as not yet created, is not the object of

predestination. I will add a fourth. Predestination is a

preparation of supernatural benefits, it is, therefore,

preceded by the communication of natural gifts, and,

therefore, by creation, in nature, or act, or in the decree

of God. Also a fifth. The illustration of the wisdom of God

in creation, is prior to that illustration of the wisdom of

God, which is the business of predestination. (1 Cor. i, 21.)

Therefore, creation is prior to predestination, in the

purpose of God. If creation is prior, man is considered by

God, in the act of predestination, as existing, not as to be

created.

So also in reference to goodness and mercy, the former of

which, in the act of creation, was illustrated in reference

to Nothing, the latter, in the act of predestination,

concerning that which was subsequent to Nothing. To the same

purpose can all the arguments be used, by which it was proved

that "sin is a condition requisite in the object of

predestination."

EIGHTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

I shall, therefore, consider three things in that theory.

1. Did God elect from eternity, of human beings, considered

in their natural condition, some to supernatural felicity and

glory, and non-elect or pass by others?

2. Did God prepare for those whom He elected, that is, for

human beings to be raised from a natural to a supernatural

state, and to be translated to a participation of divine

things, according to the purpose of election, those means

which are necessary, sufficient, and efficacious to the

attainment of that supernatural felicity, but passed by

others, that is, determine not to communicate those means to

them, but to leave them in their natural state?

3. Did God, foreseeing that those persons, thus passed by,

would fall into sin, reprobate them, that is, decree to

subject them to eternal punishment?

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE EIGHTH PROPOSITION

Let this be the rule which shall guide us in our future

discussion. If any use the term, "in their natural

condition," they do not exclude supernatural endowments,

which God communicated to Adam, but use it in opposition to

sin, (which afterwards supervened,) and to native depravity.

They, who use these words otherwise, seem to me to be

deceived by a diversity of relation. The word reprobation is

here used, (as we have before observed,) in its third

signification, which we have called catachrestic; but

sufficient on that point. We will come to those three points

in their order.

THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE EIGHTH PROPOSITION

Natural condition I have opposed both to supernatural

endowments, and to sin and native depravity, for I have

supposed the former term to be used, to the exclusion of the

latter; -- not incorrectly, whether we consider the force of

the terms themselves, or their use by the school-men. Natural

condition has a relation to supernatural endowments, which

they exclude as transcending it, and to sin and depravity

which they, in like manner, exclude, as corrupting it. Though

I have used the term reprobation in the sense in which it is

used in your Theses and other writings, yet I shall desist

from it hereafter, (if I can keep this in my mind,) and use,

in its place, the words preterition and non-election, except

when I wish to include both acts, by Synecdoche, in one word.

For the term reprobation, as it is used by me, I will

substitute preparation of punishment or predamnation.

NINTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

In the first question, I do not present as a matter of doubt,

the fact that God has elected some to salvation, and not

elected or passed by others for I think that this is certain

from the plain words of Scripture; but I place the emphasis

on the subject of election and non election; -- Did God, in

electing and not electing, have reference to men, considered

in their natural condition. I have not been able hitherto to

receive this as truth.

THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE NINTH PROPOSITION

We remarked, in the sixth proposition, that, though the mode

of regarding man can and ought to be distinguished by certain

respects or relations, yet the authors of the first theory

have stated that mankind was considered in common by the

Deity in the case of election and reprobation; but the

authors of the second have not excluded that common relation

of the human race, which they have referred to a special

relation; but they have only desired that the contemplation

of supervenient sin should not affect the case of election

and reprobation, according to the declaration of the apostle,

"neither having done any good or evil," (Rom. ix, 11,) and

according to those words "natural condition," mean only the

exclusion of any reference to supervenient sin from the case

of election. If this observation is correct, the latter state

of the question, properly considered, will not be at variance

with the former. For he, who states that man, as not yet

created, as not yet fallen, and as fallen, was considered by

the Deity in the case of election and reprobation, he

certainly affirms the latter, and both the former. The

question, therefore, is, properly, not whether God, in

electing and in passing by or reprobating, had reference to

men in their natural condition, that is, apart from the

contemplation of sin, as sin, but the question should be,

whether God had reference, in this case, to man, apart from

any contemplation of sin as a cause. We deny this, on time

authority of the word of God. Nor did Augustine, to whom the

third theory is ascribed, mean any thing else, as he has most

abundantly set forth (lib. 1, quaes. ad Simplicianum), for

what he asserts concerning Jacob and Esau is either to be

understood, in the same manner, in the ease of Adam and Eve,

or the rule of election and reprobation will be different in

different cases, which is certainly absurd. Before, then,

Adam and Eve were made, or had any thing good or evil, the

Divine election, as we have plainly stated in the same

argument, was already made according to the purpose of grace,

which election preceded both persons, and all causes

originating from, or situated in, persons. The truth of this

is proved from authority, reason, and example. From

authority, in Romans 9, Ephesians 1, and elsewhere. From

reason; for, in the first place, election is made in Christ,

not in the creatures, or in any condition in them; secondly,

it is admitted by all, (which you afterwards acknowledge in

part, though in a different sense,) that predestination and

reprobation suppose nothing in the predestinate or the

reprobate, but only in Him who predestinates, as the apostle

affirms "not of works, but of Him that calleth." (Rom. ix,

11.) Augustine presents a most luminous exposition of that

passage, showing, from the reasoning of the apostle, that

neither works, nor faith, nor will, was foreseen in the case.

The procreation of the child depends, in nature, on the

parent only; much more does the adoption of His children

originate in God alone (to whom it peculiarly pertains to be

the cause and principle of all good), not in any

consideration of them. Finally the example of angels

demonstrates the same thing, of whom some are called elect,

others are non-elect. Of the angels, the elect were such

apart from any consideration of their works, and those, who

are non-elect, passed-by; or reprobate, are non-elect, apart

from the consideration of their works. For, as Augustine

conclusively argues in reference to men, "if, because God

foresaw that the works of Esau would be evil, He, therefore,

predestinated him to serve the younger, and, because God

foresaw that the works of Jacob would be good, He, therefore,

predestinated him to have rule over the elder, that which is

affirmed by the apostle, would be false, 'not of works,'" &c.

The state of the case is the same in reference to angels. For

God provided against the possible misery of these, by the

blessing of election; He did not provide against the possible

misery of those, in the work of reprobation and preterition.

But how? by predestinating the elect angels, to the adoption

of sons, who are so styled in Job 1, 2 & 38, and not

predestinating the others. God begat them as sons, not by

nature, but by will, which will is eternal, and preceded from

eternity their existence, which belongs to time. What does

the child contribute towards his procreation? He does not

indeed exist. What does an angel contribute towards his

sonship? If nothing, what does man contribute? In reply to

both these, Augustine, in the place already cited, surely

with equal justice, thunders forth that inquiry of St. Paul,

"who maketh thee to differ from another? and what hast thou

that thou didst not receive?" &c. (1 Cor. iv, 7.)

God, therefore, regards man in general; He does not find any

cause in man; for the cause of that adoption or filiation is

from His sole will and grace. But if any one should say that

sin is the cause of reprobation or preterition, He will not

establish that point. For, in the first place, the reasoning

of Augustine, which we have just adduced, remains unshaken,

based on a comparison of works foreknown; in the second

place, since we are, by nature, equally sinners before God,

one of these three things must be true; -- either all are

rejected on account of sin, as a common reason, or it is

remitted to all, or a cause must be found elsewhere than in

sin, as we have found it. Lastly, "who makes us to differ,"

if it be not God, according to the purpose of His own

election? Therefore, the affirmation stands, that God, in the

case of election and reprobation made from eternity,

considered man in general, so that He has in Himself, not in

man, the cause of both acts. Yet let us accurately weigh the

arguments, which are advanced here, though, properly, they

are not opposed to this theory.

THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE NINTH PROPOSITION

I think it is sufficiently evident how the authors of the

first theory considered man, from what was said in reply to

your answer to Prop. 6. But that the authors of the second

theory, by the addition of that special relation, did not

exclude the universal relation, seems hardly probable to me.

For he, who says that sin supervened to election and

preterition originating in their own causes, excluding sin

not only from the cause of election and preterition, but from

the subject and the condition requisite in it, he denies that

man, universally, considered as fallen, is presented to him

who elects and passes by, and if he denies this, he denies

also that man is considered in general, by God, in the act of

decree. In other respects I assent to what you affirm. Sin is

not the cause of election and preterition, yet this statement

must be rightly understood, as I think that it is here

understood, namely, that sin is not the cause that God should

elect some, and pass by others: let it be only stated that

sin is the cause that God may be able to pass by some

individuals of the human race made in His own image. In the

former statement there is agreement between us, in the latter

we disagree, if at all. It is not, then, the question, "Did

God have reference, in His own decree, to men apart from any

consideration of sin, as a cause, that is, as a cause that He

should elect these, and pass by those." For this is admitted

even by Augustine, who, nevertheless, presupposes to that

decree sin, as a requisite condition in its object. But the

question is this; "Is sin a condition requisite in the

object, which God has reference in the acts of election and

preterition, or not?" This is apparent by the arguments

presented by myself, which prove, not that sin is a cause of

that decree, but a condition, requisite in the object.

Augustine affirms this, and I agree with him. Let us look at

some passages from his works. In Book 1, to Simplicianus, he

excludes sin as a cause that God should elect or reprobate,

but includes it as a cause that He might have the power to

pass by or reprobate, or as a condition requisite in the

object of election and reprobation. The latter, I prove by

his own words, (there is no necessity of proof as to the

former, for in reference to that, there is agreement between

us). "God did not hate Esau, the man, but He did hate Esau,

the sinner," and again, "Was not Jacob, therefore, a sinner,

because God loved him? He loved in him not sin, of which he

was guilty, but the grace which Himself had bestowed, &c.,

and again, "God hates iniquity, therefore He punishes it in

some by damnation, and removes it from others by

justification." Again, "The whole race from Adam is one mass

of sinful and wicked being, among whom both Jews and

Gentiles, apart from the grace of God, belong to one lump."

If you say that Augustine was here discussing, not

preterition, but predamnation, I reply that Augustine knew no

preterition which was not predamnation, for he prefixes to

preterition hatred as its cause, as he prefixes love to

election. Then, I conclude, according to the theory of

Augustine, that what is affirmed in the case of Esau and

Jacob, is not to be understood in that of Adam and Eve, and

it does not, hence, follow that there would be a diverse mode

of election and reprobation, unless it be first proved that

God, in election, had reference to Adam and Eve, considered

in their primitive state, which, throughout this discussion,

I wholly deny. But there is a manifest difference between

Esau and Jacob, and Adam and Eve. For the former, though not

yet born, could be considered as sinners, for both had been

already conceived in sin; if they had not been created, they

could not be considered as such, for they were such in no

possible sense; not even when they had been created by God,

and remained yet in their original integrity. It cannot be

inferred from this, that "persons, and all causes originating

from, or situated in persons" preceded the act of election.

For sin, in which Jacob and Esau were then already conceived,

did not precede. Yet I admit that sin was not the cause that

God should love one and hate the other, should elect one and

reprobate the other, but it was a condition requisite in the

object of that decree. Those arguments, however, which you

present, do not injure my case. For they do not exclude sin

from the object of that decree as a requisite condition, nor

as a cause without which that decree could not be made, but

only as a cause, on account of which one is reprobated,

another elected.

This is apparent from Romans 9. For Esau had been conceived

in sin when those words were addressed by God to Rebecca. In

the same chapter also, the elect and the reprobate are said

to be "vessels of mercy" and "of wrath," which terms could

not be applied to them apart from a consideration of sin. I

will not now affirm, as I might do with truth, that Jacob and

Esau are to be considered, not in themselves, but as types,

the former being the type of the children of the promise, who

seek the righteousness which is of faith in Christ, the

latter, the type of the children of the flesh, who followed

after the righteousness of the law, which subject requires a

more extended explanation, but here not so necessary. The

first chapter to the Ephesians clearly affirms the same

thing, as it asserts that the election is made in Christ,

because it is of the grace, by which we have redemption in

the blood of Christ, &c.

Your arguments "from reason" do not militate against the

position, which I have assumed, they rather strengthen it.

For in the first place, "the election is made in Christ,"

therefore, it is of sinners, as will be hereafter proved at

greater length. Secondly, "predestination and reprobation

suppose nothing in their subject." Therefore, whatever

character the subject may have, which receives grace, for

such a character, and considered in the same relation, is the

grace prepared. But the sinner receives, and he only, the

grace prepared in predestination. Therefore, also for the

sinner alone, is grace prepared in predestination, but of

this, also, more largely hereafter. Thirdly, men are the sons

of God, not by generation, but by regeneration; the latter,

presupposes sin, therefore, adoption is made from sinners.

The example of angels in this case proves nothing. Their

election and reprobation and those of men are unlike, as you

in many places acknowledge, for their salvation is secured by

the grace of preservation and confirmation, that of men by

the grace of restoration. He begat angels, as sons to

Himself, according to the former grace; He regenerated men as

sons to Himself by the latter grace. Therefore, God regarded

man not in general, but as sinful, in reference to which

point is this question between us, though he might find in

man no cause that He should adopt one and pass by another, in

reference to which we have no controversy. The question then

remains between us, did God, in His decree of predestination

and reprobation, have reference to man considered in his

natural purity, or to man considered as in his sins? I assert

the latter, and deny the former, and I have presented many

arguments in support of my opinion; but I will now consider,

in their order, those things, which you have presented

against it.

TENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS.

First, in general. 1. Since no man was ever created by God in

a merely natural state; whence also no man could ever be

considered in the decree of God, since that, which exists in

the mind, is the material of action and exists in the

relation of capability of action, but takes its form from the

will and decree by which God determined actually to exert His

power, at any time, in reference to man. Hence, whatever

distinction may be made, in the mind, between nature, and a

supernatural gift, bestowed on man at the creation, that is

not to be considered in this place. For the creation of the

first man, and, in him, of all men, was in the image of God,

which image of God in man is not nature, but supernatural

grace, having reference not to natural felicity, but to

supernatural life. It is evident, from the description of the

image of God, that supernatural grace in man is that divine

image. For, according to the Scripture, it is "knowledge

after the image of Him that created him," (Col. iii, 10,) and

"righteousness and true holiness" pertaining to the new man

which is created after" (according to) "God." (Ephes. iv,

24.) In addition to this, all the fathers, seem, without

exception, to be of the sentiment that man was created in a

gracious state. So, also, our Catechism, ques. 62. Since

there is found, in the Scriptures, no reference to the love

of God according to election, no divine volition and no act

of God concerning men, referring to them in different

respects, until after the entrance of sin into the world, or

after it was considered as having entered.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TENTH PROPOSITION

Before I refer to arguments, an ambiguity must be removed,

which is introduced here, and which will be frequently

introduced whenever reference is made to a "merely natural

state." Things are called natural from the term "nature." But

nature is two-fold, therefore, natural things are also two-

fold. I affirm that nature is two-fold, as it is considered,

first in relation to this physical world, situated nearer and

lower in elementary and material things, which is described

by Philosophers in the science of Physics, secondly, in

relation to that spiritual world, namely, that which is more

remote and higher, consisting in spiritual and immaterial

things, which is treated of in Metaphysics, rightly so

called. From the former nature we have our bodies, and by it

we are animals; from the latter, we have our spirits, and by

it we are rational beings, which is also observed by

Aristotle (lib. 2, de gener. animalium cap. 3) in his

statement that the mind alone "enters from without" into the

natural body, and is alone divine; for there is no communion

between its action and that of the body. Hence, it is, that

natural things must, in general, be considered in three

modes; physically, in relation to the body according to its

essence, capability, actions and passions; metaphysically, in

relation to the intelligent mind, according to its essence

and being; and conjointly in relation to that personal union,

which exists in man, as a being composed of both natures. But

particularly, a distinction must be made in these same

natural things, in respect to nature as pure and as corrupt.

Therefore, all those things, which pertain to the nature of

man in these different modes, are said to belong to the mere

natural state of man, sin being excluded.

Now, I come to the particular members of your Proposition.

First, you affirm, "that no man was ever created in a merely

natural state." If you mean that he was created without

supernatural endowments, I do not see how this can be proved,

(though many make this assertion). The Scripture does not any

where make this statement. But you are not ignorant that it

is said in the schools, that a negative argument from

authority, as, "it is not written, therefore, it is not true"

is not valid. Again, the order of creation, in a certain

respect, proves the contrary, since the body was first made

from the dust, and afterwards the soul was breathed into it.

Which, then, is more probable, that the soul was, at the

moment of its creation, endowed with supernatural gifts, or

that they were superadded after its creation? I would rather

affirm that, as the soul was added to the body, so the

supernatural endowments were added to the soul. If God did

this in relation to nature, why may He not have done it, in

the case of grace, which is more peculiar. Lastly, I do not

think that it follows, if man was not made in a merely

natural state, but with supernatural endowments, that grace,

therefore, pertains to creation, and also that supernatural

gifts would therefore, pertain, in common, to the whole race.

That this consequence is false, is proved by the definition

of nature, and the relation of supernatural things. For what

else is nature than the principle of motion and rest,

ordained by God? If, then, supernatural things are ordained

on this principle, they cease to be supernatural and become

natural. Besides the relation of supernatural things is such

that they are not natural, as they are not common; for those

things which are common to all men belong to nature, but

supernatural things are personal, and do not pass to heirs. I

acknowledge that Adam and Eve received supernatural gifts,

but for themselves not for their heirs; nor could they

transmit them to their heirs, except by a general arrangement

or special grace. If this be so, then man is without

supernatural endowments, though, as you claim, the first man

may not have been made without them; and he is justly

considered by us as not possessing them, and much more would

he have been so considered by the Deity. Indeed, my brother,

God contemplated man, in a merely natural state, and

determined in His own decree to bestow upon him supernatural

endowments. He could then be so considered in the decree of

God. He contemplated nature, on which He would bestow grace;

the natural man, on whom He would bestow, by His own decree,

supernatural gifts. Was it not, indeed, a special act of the

will, to create man, and another special act of the will to

endow Him with supernatural gifts? Which acts, even though

they might have occurred at the same time (which does not

seem to me necessary, for the reasons which have been just

advanced) cannot be together in the order of nature, since

one may be styled natural, and the other supernatural. I know

that you afterwards speak of the image of God, but we shall

soon see that this has no bearing, (as you think), on this

case. Meanwhile, I wish that you would always keep in view

the fact, that, though all these things should be true, yet

they are not opposed to that doctrine which asserts that in

this decree, God considered man in general.

I will leave without discussion those subsequent remarks on

the material and the formal relation of the decree of God,

since the force of the argument does not depend on them, and

pass to the proof. "The creation of the first man," you

affirm, "and, in him, of all men, was in the image of God,"

(I concede and believe it,) "which image of God in man is not

nature but supernatural grace, having reference not to

natural felicity but to supernatural life." What is this,

your statement, my brother? Origen formerly affirmed the same

thing, and on this account received the reprehension of the

ancient church in its constant testimony and harmonious

declarations, as is attested by Epiphanius, Jerome and other

witnesses. I do not, however, believe that you agree in

sentiment with Origen, in opposition to the united and wise

declaration of that church, but some ambiguity, which you

have not observed, has led you into this mistake. Let us then

expose and free from its obscurity this subject, by the light

of truth.

The first ambiguity is in the word nature, the second in the

term supernatural. We have just spoken in reference to the

former, affirming that this term may refer to the lower

nature of elementary bodies, or to that higher nature of

spiritual beings, or finally to our human nature, composed of

both natures in one compound subject; and that this latter

nature is itself two-fold, pure and depraved.

The latter ambiguity consists in the fact, that the term

supernatural is applied, at one time, to those things which

are above this inferior nature, and pertain to the superior,

spiritual, or metaphysical nature; at another, to those

things which are above even that higher and metaphysical

nature, that is, to those which are properly and immediately

divine; and at another, to those things which are above the

condition of this our corrupt nature, as they are bestowed

upon us only of supernatural grace, though they might have

pertained to that pure nature. The body, for example, is of

this lower nature, and in comparison with it, the soul is

supernatural. Again, our souls are of the higher nature,

which pertains to angels. In reference to both the soul and

the body, all divine things are supernatural as they are

superior to all corporeal and mental nature. How you say that

"the image of God in man is not nature but supernatural

grace;" that is, as I think, it is not of nature, but of

grace, or not from nature, but from grace. Here consider, my

brother, the former ambiguity. "The image of God is not of

nature," if the lower or corporeal nature is referred to, is

a true statement, but if the higher nature is referred to, it

is not a true statement. For what is nature? It is the

principle, ordained of God, of motion and rest in its own

natural subject, according to its own mode. Place before your

mind the kinds of motion, which occur in the lower nature,

generation, corruption, increase, diminution, alteration,

local transition, which they style fora &c. You will find

this difference, that the subjects of this lower nature

experience these motions according to their own essence and

all other matters, that is, according to their material,

form, and accidents, but the subjects of that higher nature

are moved by no means according to their essence, but only

according to their being; but that divine things surpass both

natures, in an infinite and divine mode, because they are, in

all respects, destitute of all motion. The body is mortal;

whence, if not from this inferior nature? The soul is

immortal; whence, if not from that superior nature? But both

natures are ordained of God, and so perform their work,

immediately, that God performs, by both mediately, all things

which pertain to nature. But the image of God is from that

superior nature, by which God performs mediately in the

children of Adam, as He instituted our common nature in Adam,

our first parent. It is indeed true, that it was supernatural

grace by which God impressed His own image on Adam; just as

he also performed the work of creation by the same grace. God

bestowed its principle not on nature, of nature, but of

Himself; but when nature has received its existence, that

which existed by nature, was produced by nature in the

species and individuals. Though, in its first origin, it is

of grace, yet it is now, in its own essence, of nature, and

is to be called natural. But the image of God is produced, in

the species and in the individuals, by nature. Therefore, it

must be called natural We shall hereafter consider its

definition, for it is necessary first to elucidate the

statement that "the image of God has reference, not to

felicity, but to supernatural life." Let us remove the

ambiguity, as we shall thus speak more correctly of these

matters. Natural felicity pertains either to the nature from

which we have the body, or to that from which we have the

spirit, or to both natures united in a compound being. To

this latter felicity the image of God has, naturally, its

reference; to that of the body as its essential and

intimately associated instrument; to that of the spirit, as

its essential subject; to that of the man, as the entire

personal subject. If you deny this, what is there, I pray

you, in all nature, which does not seek its own good? But, to

every thing, its own good is its felicity. If, in this lower

nature, a stone, the herds, an animal, and, in that higher

nature, spirits and intelligent forms do this, surely it

cannot be justly denied to man, and to the image of God in

man. You add that "it has reference to supernatural life."

This, however, is a life dependent on grace, as all the

adjuncts show. If you understand that it has reference to

that life only, we deny such exclusive reference. If to this

(natural) life, and to that life conjointly, we indeed affirm

this, and assent to your assertion that the image of God in

man has respect to both kinds of felicity, both natural and

supernatural; by means of nature, in a natural mode, and of

grace, in a supernatural mode.

I would now explain this, in a more extended manner, if it

was not necessary that a statement should first be made of

the subject under discussion. Perceiving this very clearly,

you pass to a definition of that image, in proof of your

sentiment. "It is evident," you say, "from the description of

the image of God, that supernatural grace, in man, is that

divine image." You will permit me to deny this, since you ask

not my opinion. You add, "According to the Scripture, it is

'knowledge after the image of Him that created him,' (Col.

iii, 10,) and righteousness and true holiness pertaining 'to

the new man which is created after God.' (Ephes. v, 25)". I

acknowledge that these are the words of the apostle, and I

believe them, but I fear my brother, that you wander from his

words and sentiment.

In the former passage, he does not assert that the image of

God is "knowledge after the image etc," but that the "new man

is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created

him." The subject of the proposition is man, one in

substance, but once "old," now "new." In this subject there

was old knowledge, there is new knowledge. According to the

subject, the knowledge is one, but it differs in mode; for

the old man and the new man understand with the same

intellect, in the previous case as the old, afterwards as the

new man. What, therefore, is the mode of that knowledge!

"After the image of God." This is the mode of our knowledge

and intelligence. The former (that which is old) according to

the image of the first Adam who "begat a son in his own

likeness;" (Gen. v, 3;) the latter according to the image of

the second Adam, Christ and God, our Creator. The image of

God is not said to be knowledge, but knowledge is said to be

renewed in us after the image of God. What, then, is

knowledge? An act of the image of God. What is the image of

God? The fountain and principle of action, fashioning in a

formal manner, the action, or the habit of that image. The

mode, in which this may be understood, is a matter of no

interest to me. Consider, I pray you, and I appeal to

yourself as a judge, whether this can be justly called a

suitable description; -- "The image of God is knowledge

according to the image of God." This description, indeed,

denies that the image of God is either one thing or another;

either knowledge or the image of God, if, indeed, knowledge

is according to the image of God. You will, however,

understand these things better, from your own skill, than

they can be stated by me in writing. I now consider the other

passage. "The image of God is ' righteousness and true

holiness' pertaining 'to the new man, which is created after

God."' Here you affirm something more than in the previous

case, yet without sufficient truth. That knowledge, of which

you had previously spoken, is a part of truth, for it is the

truth, as it exists in our minds. Here you state that it is

truth, and righteousness and holiness. But let us examine the

words of the apostle. He asserts, indeed, that the new man is

one "which after God is created in righteousness and true

holiness." I will not plead the fact that many explain the

phrase "after God," as though the apostle would say "by the

power of God working in us." I assent to your opinion that

the words kata< Qeon mean simply the same as would be implied

in the phrase "to the image," or "according to the image of

God." Yet do you not perceive that the same order, which we

have just indicated, is preserved by Paul; and that the

subject, the principle, and the acts or habits, thereby

inwrought, are most suitably distinguished? The subject is

man, who is the same person, whether as the old; or the new

man. The principle is the image of God, which is the same,

whether old or new, and purified from corruption. The acts or

habits, inwrought by that principle, are righteousness,

holiness, and truth. Righteousness, holiness, and truth are

not the image, but pertain to the image. Let us return, if

you please, to that principle, which the Fathers laid down

"natural things are corrupt, supernatural things are

removed." You may certainly, hence, deduce with ease this

conclusion; -- righteousness, holiness and truth are not

removed, therefore, they are not supernatural. Again, they

have become corrupt, therefore, they are natural. If they had

been removed, none of their elementary principles would exist

in us by nature. But they do exist; therefore, they are by

nature, and are themselves corrupt, and, with them, whatever

originates in them. The same is the fact with the image of

God. The image of God is not removed; it is not, therefore,

supernatural; and, on the other hand, it has become corrupt;

it is, therefore, natural. For it is nowhere, in the

Scriptures, said to be bestowed, but only to be renewed. I

shall offer proof, on this point, from the Scriptures, when I

have made a single remark. Righteousness, holiness, truth,

exist only in the image of God; there is, in man, some

righteousness, holiness and truth; therefore, there is in man

somewhat of the image of God. Moses, in Genesis 1, certainly

relates nothing else than the first constitution of nature,

as made in reference to every subject and species. But he

relates that man was made in the image of God. This, then,

was the constitution of human nature. But, if it is of

nature, then the image of God pertains universally to the

human race, since natural things differ from personal things

in this, that they are common. The same is evident from Gen.

v, 3. Adam begat Seth "in his own likeness," in his own

image; but Adam was made in the image of God; therefore he

begat Seth in the image of God. It may be said, however, that

the image of God, and the image of Adam differ, and that a

distinction is made between them by Moses. They indeed

differ, but in mode, not in their essence; for the image of

God in Adam was uncorrupted, in Seth it was corrupted through

Adam; yet in both cases it was the image. In the same

respect, this image, in the rest of the human race, is called

according to its corruption, the image of the earthy,

according to its renewal, the image of the heavenly. But

since the image of God is diverse in mode only, and not in

essence, it is said to be renewed, and restored, and not to

be implanted or created, as we have before observed, as that

which differs not in essence, but in mode or degree. The same

thing is taught in Gen. ix, 6. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood,

by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made

he man." If the image of God did not exist in the descendants

of Adam, who are slain, the argument of Moses would be

impertinent and absurd. But the argument, either of Moses or

of God, is just and conclusive; for if you say, -- "The

slayer of him, whom God has made in His own image, ought to

be slain by man; God made the man who is slain in his own

image; therefore, let the murderer be slain by man." the

argument is valid. For since man was made in the image of

God, it is just that his murderer should be slain, and indeed

that he should be slain by man. But if you explain the

passage "for in the image of God made He man," so that "He"

shall refer to man, my interpretation of the argument will be

even more confirmed. I do not, however, remember that it is

affirmed any where in the Scriptures that man made man, nor

can it be proved to me. These things, I think will be

sufficient that you may see, my brother, that the image of

God is naturally in man.

What, then, is the image of God? For it is now time that we

pass from destructive to constructive reasoning. I will state

it, in the words of the orthodox Fathers. Let Tertullian, of

the Latins, first speak (lib. 2 advers. Marcion, cap. 9.)

"The distinction is especially to be noticed, which the Greek

Scriptures make, when they speak of the afflatus, not of the

Spirit, (pnohn non pneu~ma) for some, translating from the

Greek, not considering the difference or regarding the proper

use of words, substitute Spirit for afflatus, and afford

heretics an occasion of charging fault on the Spirit of God,

that is, on God Himself; and it is even now a vexed question.

Observe, then, that the afflatus is inferior to the Spirit,

though it comes from the Spirit, as its breath, yet it is not

the Spirit. For the breeze is lighter than the wind, and if

the breeze is of the wind, the wind is not therefore, of the

breeze. It is usual also, to call the afflatus the image of

the Spirit; for thus also, man is the image of God, that is

of the Spirit, for God is Spirit, therefore, the image of the

Spirit is the afflatus. Moreover the image will never in all

respects equal the reality; for to be according to the truth

is one thing, to be the truth itself is another. Thus, also,

the afflatus cannot, in such a sense, be equal to the Spirit,

that, because the truth -- that is the Spirit, or God -- is

without sin, therefore the image, of truth also, must be

without sin. In this respect the image will be inferior to

the truth, and the afflatus will be inferior to the Spirit,

having some lineaments of the Deity, in the fact that the

soul is immortal, free, capable of choice, prescient to a

considerable degree, rational, and capable of understanding

and knowledge. Yet, in these particulars, it is only an

image, and does not extend to the full power of divinity, and

so, likewise, it does not extend to sinless integrity, since

this belongs alone to God, that is to truth, and can not

pertain to the mere image; for as the image, while it

expresses all the lineaments and outlines of the truth, yet

is destitute of force, not having motion, so the soul, the

image of the Spirit, is not able to exhibit its full power,

that is, the felicity of freedom from sin, otherwise it would

be not the soul, but the Spirit, not man, endowed with mind,

but God, &c." Ambrose (hexaemeri lib. 6, cap. 7), after many

arguments, concludes in this way; "for 'what will a man give

in exchange for his soul?' in which there is, not merely a

small portion of himself, but the substance of the entire

human race. It is this by which thou hast dominion over other

living creatures, whether beasts or birds. This is the image

of God, but the body is in the likeness of beasts; in one

there is the sacred mark of divine resemblance, in the other

the vile fellowship with the herds and wild beasts, &c."

Also, in Psalm 118, sermon 10, "Likeness to the image of God

consists, not in the body, or in the material parts of our

nature, but in the rational soul; in respect to which man was

made after the likeness and image of God, and in which the

form of righteousness, wisdom, and every virtue is found."

To the same purpose are the words of Augustine, in his first

Book "De Genes. contra Manich," chap. 17th, and in many other

places. I mention also Jerome, because he evidently has the

same view, and, in writing against Origen, he uses the same

argument with that of Epiphanius and the Greek Fathers. I

would refer to Basil, if you did not know that Ambrose quotes

from him. Why should I speak of Chrysostom, the two

Gregories, Cyril, Theodouret? Damascenus, an epitomist of all

those writers, presents this subject, with the greatest

accuracy, in the book which he has inscribed "Concerning the

respect in which we were made in the image of God." Also, in

another, which has reference to "The two wills in Christ," in

which he uses the following words, "as to the rational, and

intellectual, and voluntary powers, they belong to the mind

at birth, and the Spirit is superadded, as having princely

prerogative, and in these respects both angels and men are

after the image of God, and this is abundantly true of men,

&c.," in which passage he has, with the utmost diligence,

introduced those things which are essential and those which

are adjunct.

I conclude with a single argument from Augustine against the

Manichees. "Those men," he says, "do not know that it is not

possible that nature should use any action, or produce any

effect, the faculty for which has not been received according

to nature. For example, no bird can fly, unless it has

received the faculty of flying, according to nature, and no

beast of the earth can walk, unless it has received the

faculty of walking, according to nature. So, likewise, man

cannot act or will, unless he has received, according to

nature, that faculty, which is called the "voluntary," and

the "energetic;" and he cannot understand if he has not

received from nature the intellectual faculty, and he cannot

see, or perform any other action, and, therefore, in every

kind of nature, natural actions find place, and they exist at

once and together, but those which depend on the will and

activity, do not exist together." From which reasoning he

infers that man understands, reasons, wills, and, above other

creatures, does many things which savour of divinity;

therefore, many faculties exist in man, in respect to which

he is said, in the Scriptures, to have been made in the image

and likeness of God.

Here then is that image of God, in our soul; its essential

parts not only show, of themselves, some resemblance, by

nature, to divinity, but are, by nature and grace together,

adapted to the perception of supernatural grace, as we shall

soon show. You add that "all the fathers, seem, without

exception, to be of the sentiment that man was created in a

gracious state. So also our Catechism, ques. 6." I have,

indeed, known no one among orthodox divines, who holds any

different opinion; nor is there any other correct explanation

of our catechism.

But you seem to fall into an error from a statement, which is

susceptible of a two-fold interpretation, and to unite things

really distinct. For it is not meant that the first man was

created with grace, that is, that he received, in the act of

creation, nature and supernatural grace; but this is their

meaning: the man who was first created, received grace, that

is, supernatural grace, as an additional gift -- which idea

we have before presented in this answer. What then? Did he

not have supernatural grace in creation? If you understand,

by grace, the good will of God, he had grace; if you

understand supernatural gifts, bestowed upon him, then he did

not have those things, which are supernatural, from creation,

or by the force of creation, since creation is the principle

of nature, or its first term, but supernatural things

entirely differ from it; but he had them in creation, that

is, in that first state of creation in which Adam was until

he fell into sin. That you may more easily understand the

subject, let us use the illustration of the sun and moon, to

explain the divine image. The moon has an essential image,

and one which is relative and accidental. As its image is

essential, it has its own light in some degree; yet it would

be darkened, unless it should look towards the sun; as its

image is relative, it has light borrowed from the sun, while

it is looked upon by it, and looks to it. So, there was, in

man, a two-fold relation of the image of God, even from the

creation. For man had his own essential light fixed in the

soul, which shines as the image of God among created things;

he had also a relative light, as he was looked upon by God,

and looked back to God. The essential image is natural; the

relative image was, so to speak, supernatural, for it looked

to God, through nature joined to grace, by a peculiar and

free motion of the will; God looked upon it, of grace, (for,

what action of God towards us is natural?) We have that

essential light, corrupted by sin; it is plain that we have

not lost it. We have lost the relative light; but Christ

restores this, that we may be renewed, after God, in his own

image, and that the essential light may be purified, since

natural things are corrupted, the supernatural are lost, as

we have previously said.

Your second argument is stated thus: "Since there is found,

in the Scriptures, no reference to the love of God according

to election, no divine volition, and no act of God,

concerning men, referring to them in different respects,

until after the entrance of sin into the world, or after it

was considered as having entered." If I should concede this,

yet the sentiment of those, who say that man is considered,

in general, by the Deity, would not, therefore, be confuted,

as we have before shown. But I may, perhaps, be able to

disprove this assertion by authority, by reason, and by

example. You have authority in Romans ix, 11-13. "For the

children being not yet born, neither having done any good or

evil, that the purpose of God, according to election, might

stand, not of works, but of Him that calleth; it was said

unto her, The elder shall serve the younger; as it is

written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated." What do

those three phrases indicate "the children being not yet

born;" again, "neither having done any good or evil;" and

"according to election, not of works, but of Him that

calleth." You will say, "these expressions are according to

truth; but they have reference to fallen and sinful nature."

But they exclude, with the utmost care, all reference to sin

and refer all blessing to the sole vocation of God, who

calleth, as even yourself, my brother, if you are willing to

observe it, (and you certainly are thus willing,) may easily

deduce from that proposition. To this authority you will

certainly submit every semblance of reasoning. (Ephes. i, 4,

5,) "He hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of the

world, having predestinated us unto the adoption of children,

by Jesus Christ to Himself."

Election originates in special love; and when He is said to

have chosen us in Christ, all reference to ourselves is

excluded; predestination also precedes both persons and cases

relating to them. Indeed this is indicated by the words

"foreknow" and "predestinate," (Rom. 8). Christ himself

attributes to the blessing of the Father only that they were

made possessors of the kingdom, "from the foundation of the

world," (Matt. 30). In sin, or previous to sin? In view of

sin, or without reference to it? Why should the former be

true, I ask, rather than the latter? Why indeed, should not

the latter rather, since all things are said to depend on

God, who calleth? To these, let the following considerations

be added:

1. Whatever absurdity may be connected with this subject, you

will perceive, (if you examine it closely,) that it pertains

as much to the former interpretation, and rather more to it

than to the latter. This absurdity is not to be passed by,

but rather to be religiously and suitably removed.

2. I deny that a reference to sin belongs to the matter of

filial adoption. I call nature as a witness: Does not a

father beget sons, before he investigates or observes what

shall be their condition? But this generation, (namely that

of the children of God), is of will and not of nature. True:

yet it is attributed to the will of God alone, not to any

condition in us. Every condition in us is excluded, even that

of sin; the will of God, alone, His purpose, alone, is

considered in the matter. God distinguishes by His mere will

among those equal in nature, equal in sin; whom, considered

in their natural condition simply, not in that of sin, but

generally in Christ, He adopts as His children. As in nature,

children are begotten without reference to their future

condition, so God, of His own will, adopted from eternity His

own children.

3. Whatever is more consistent with the wisdom and grace of

God, would be performed by the Deity, and is to be believed

by us, rather than that which is less consistent. But it is

more consistent with His wisdom and grace that He should

adopt unto Himself children without any consideration of

character, than that He should do so on the supposition of

such consideration; otherwise nature would act more perfectly

than God, as according to nature, fathers beget children,

without such consideration. Therefore, the former view is

more consistent with the character of God, and rather to be

received with faith by us.

As an example, for the confirmation of this matter, we will

take, if you please, that of the Angels. Whoever are the sons

of God, are sons by election. Angels are the sons of God,

(Job 1, 2, & 37,) therefore, they are such by election, as

Paul affirms (1 Tim. v, 21,) when he calls them "the elect."

But they are elect without consideration of their sins, as

they did not sin, but remained in their original condition.

Therefore, the love of God is with election, without

reference to sin, or consideration of it, which you seem to

deny in your assertion. Perhaps you will say that your

assertion had reference only to men. But I reply, that love

and election are spoken of in relation both to angels and

men, and in the same manner, since God placed, in both, his

own image, in reference to which election is made. The most

decisive proof of this is found in the principle that, if any

act which apparently exists in reference to two things, which

have the same relation, does not really exist in reference to

one, it does not exist in reference to the other. In the

election of Angels, there is no reference to their condition

or their works; therefore, in the election of men there is no

such reference. If the condition of Angels and of men is, in

some respects, different, it does not follow that the mode of

their election is different; especially when the relation of

that thing, in reference to which they are chosen, is the

same in both cases. This is the image of God, which,

preserved or restored according to His own will, he has

called and united to Himself, which will remain immutably in

Christ, "gathering together in one all things," (Ephes. i,

10,) and which he had placed on the common basis of his own

nature, from which, those, who were to be damned according to

His judgment, fell of their own will.

It is not possible to adduce any other example; because all

other things are created in a different relation. For they

are destitute of the image of God, in which consists, with

suitable limitations, the object of election. Therefore, the

nature of the divine election, made concerning men, can be

illustrated by the example of angels, and by no other

example. But the divine election was such, not that it

separated, at first, the Angels who sinned from those who did

not sin, but that, of His own will and grace, he

distinguished those who were not about to sin, as previously

elected and predestinated to adoption, from others who were

about to sin of their own free will. What reason, then, is

there that we should think that another mode of the divine

election must be devised in reference to men?

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TENTH PROPOSITION

I apply the term natural to whatever pertains to the

substance and existence of man, without which man cannot

exist. Such are the soul and the body, and the whole system

compounded of them, with all natural attributes, affections,

passions, &c. I apply the term supernatural to whatever God

has bestowed on man above and in addition to those natural

characteristics, which indeed pertain to the perfection of

man, not in respect to his animal nature, but in respect to

his spiritual nature, to the acquisition not of natural, but

of supernatural good. I apply the phrase "merely natural," in

this place, to that which has nothing supernatural added to

it. The sense then of my words is that man is not made in a

merely natural state, without supernatural endowments.

I do not here contend, with much strenuousness, whether he

has those supernatural endowments from the act of creation or

from another act of superinfusion, but leave this without

decision, as neither useful or injurious to my cause. But I

decidedly state and affirm, that God decreed to make man such

by nature, as he in fact did make him; but such, that He

might add to him some supernatural endowments, as He not only

wished that he might be such as he was by nature, but He

wished also to advance him further to a happier state,

namely, to a participation of Himself, to which he could not

attain, unless endowed with supernatural gifts. But when I

deny that man was made in a merely natural state, and,

therefore, was created with supernatural gifts, I wish not to

indicate that the act, by which supernatural endowments are

communicated, was creation, (for in my 26th proposition I

have called that act superinfused Grace,) but that God was

unwilling to cease from the act of communicating His blessing

to that part of primitive matter or Nothing from which He

created man, and that of His own decree, until he should also

have bestowed those supernatural gifts upon him. I thought

that I ought to observe the mode of expression, used in the

Scripture, which declares that man was created "in the image

and likeness of God," which image and likeness of God

comprehends in itself also supernatural gifts. If this is

true, as I contend, then man was created with supernatural

endowments. For he was made in the image of God, and the word

"made" is attributed, without distinction, to all parts of

the image, without separating that, in the image, which is

natural from that which is supernatural to man. I am glad to

quote here the words of Jerome Zanchius, who, in his first

book concerning the creation of man, chapter 1, speaks

concerning this same matter in these terms;" I am pleased

with the sentiment of those, who say that with the

inbreathing of life, there was also inbreathed and infused by

the Deity whatever Adam possessed of celestial light, wisdom,

rectitude, and other heavenly gifts; in which he reflects the

Deity, as His true image. For he was created such as the

Scripture teaches, affirming that he was made in the image of

God, and Solomon in Eccl. vii, 29, "God made man upright."

But he was not such when his body only was formed. When, with

a soul placed in him, he became a living soul, that is a

living man, that he was made upright, just, &c., and thus, at

the same time with his soul, rays also of divine wisdom,

righteousness, and goodness were infused." Thus Zanchius, who

clearly decides what I left without decision in either

direction, and this for a twofold reason; I knew that it was

a matter of dispute among the learned, and I perceived that

nothing could be deduced from it either of advantage or

disadvantage to my cause.

Those supernatural gifts, which were bestowed on man, he

received for transmission to posterity, on the terms, on

which he received them, namely, of grace, not as this word

denotes the principle of natural endowments, for from grace,

understood in its widest sense, we have received even our

nature, as that to which we had no claim, but as it is used

in contra-distinction to nature, and as it is the principle

of supernatural gifts. I can then concede that God had

reference to man in nature, as the subject of grace, the

natural man as the subject of supernatural gifts; but that He

had reference to him, contemplated in the administrative

decree of creation, not in the decree of predestination,

which we have now under discussion; as the subject of grace

sufficient for supernatural felicity, not of effectual grace,

of which we now dispute; as the subject of supernatural

gifts, to be transmitted to his posterity, without exception,

according to the arrangement of grace, and without any

condition, not of such gifts as are peculiar to those, who

are predestinated, and to be bestowed, with certainty and

infallibly, upon them, in reference to which is the

controversy between us.

Hence, these things are not opposed to my sentiment, for in

them the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi is committed. I wish,

however, that you would always remember that I speak

constantly concerning the grace, prepared in the decree of

predestination, and in no other decree. But I have proved

that man was not made in a merely natural state, in the

sense, as I have already stated, of a destitution of

supernatural endowments, whether he is said to have them by

the act of creation, or by the act of superinfusion; and I

have proved it by an argument, deduced from the image and

likeness of God in which man was created. Which argument is

valid, whether the image of God signifies only supernatural

gifts, bestowed on man by the Deity, as our Catechism and

Confession, and some of our theologians affirm in reference

to the image of God, or nature itself, together with those

supernatural gifts, which is my opinion; according to which I

wish that my affirmation, that "the image of God in man is

not nature, but supernatural grace," should be understood,

that is, that it is not nature alone, apart from supernatural

endowments, which is sufficient for any argument. For the

question is not concerning natural qualities, and therefore,

the decision of the point whether they belong to the image of

God, according to my opinion, or not, does not affect the

subject of inquiry. Let supernatural qualities be embraced in

the definition of the image of God, in which man was made,

and I have obtained what I desire.

I also wish that my subsequent remarks should be understood

in the same manner, namely, that the image of God, has

respect, not to natural felicity only, but to supernatural,

and if that is true, as you seem to concede, I have attained

my object. I did not wish to define with accuracy the image

of God in which man was made, since this was not necessary to

my purpose: it was sufficient to have shown that "knowledge,

righteousness, and holiness" pertained also to the image of

God, whether that image consisted wholly or only in part in

them. For either of these statements would be equally

available for my purpose, as I had undertaken to prove that

man was not created without supernatural endowments, and

therefore that he could not have been considered, in the

decree of predestination, as created in a merely natural

state, without supernatural endowments. But, before I come to

the defense of my argument on this point, I must speak, at

somewhat greater length, of three things, in considering

which, a considerable part of your answer is occupied. First.

I will explain more fully than I have before done, what I

call natural, and what, supernatural qualities. Secondly. I

will speak of the image of God, and what things, whether

natural or supernatural, are embraced in it, and in its

definition. Thirdly, by what action of the Deity, man has

both the former, and the latter qualities.

First; I call those qualities natural which pertain to the

nature of man, without which man cannot be man, and which

have their source in the principles of nature, and are

prepared, by their own nature, for natural felicity, as their

end and limit: such are the body, the soul, the union of

both, and that which is made up of both, and their natural

attributes, affections, functions, and passions; under which

I also comprehend moral feelings, which are sometimes spoken

of in contradistinction to those which are natural. I call

those qualities supernatural which are not a part of man, and

do not originate in natural principles, but are superadded to

natural principles, for the increase and perfection of

nature, designed for supernatural felicity, and for a

supernatural communion with God, our Creator, in which that

felicity consists.

Between these, exists a natural relation of this character,

that natural qualities may receive the addition of

supernatural, by the arrangement of God, and that

supernatural qualities are adapted for adding to, adorning

and perfecting nature, and are therefore ordained for

exalting it above itself. Hence, without ambiguity, under the

term natural, I have comprehended nature both corporeal and

spiritual, and that which is composed of both. It is,

however, to be carefully observed -- that ambiguities of

words are to be noticed and explained, in a discussion, when,

if taken in one sense, they favour any view, and, if in the

other, they do not, when, according to one sense, a statement

is true, and, according to the other, is false. But when the

statement is true, and pertinent to the subject, in whatever

sense a word is taken, there is no need of an explanation of

the ambiguity. Thus, in this case, you observe that I

understand, by natural qualities, both those which pertain to

the inferior nature, that is, to the body, and those which

pertain to the superior nature, that is, to the soul, and in

whatever mode you take it, my argument is equally strong and

valid. We shall hereafter notice examples of equally

unnecessary reference to ambiguity.

Secondly; two things must be considered in reference to the

image of God in man, in what things does it consist, and

which of them may be called material, and which supernatural?

I affirm that the image of God in man embraces all those

things which represent in man any thing of the divine nature,

which are partly essential: yet God did not wish that the

images of all of them should be essential to man, whom He

wished to create, in such a condition, not only that he might

be that which he was, but that he might have the capability

of becoming that which he was not, and of failing to be that

which he was. I call essential the soul, and in it the

intellect, and will, and the freedom of the will, and other

affections, actions, and passions, which necessarily result

from them. I call accidental both the moral virtues, and the

knowledge of God, righteousness and true holiness, and

whatever other attributes of the Deity exist, to be

considered in Him as essential to his own nature, but in man

as an express image, of which under the term "divine nature,"

Peter says, that believers are "partakers." 2. I do not think

that all these things can be comprehended under the term

natural, but I think that "knowledge, righteousness and true

holiness," are supernatural, and are to be called by that

name. I am in doubt whether I have your assent to this

affirmation. For in one part of your answer, you say that

those are natural qualities, and present arguments in support

of that view, and in another place, in the same answer, you

acknowledge that Adam had supernatural gifts though not from

the act of creation: by which supernatural qualities, I know

not what you can understand, except those things which are

mentioned by the apostle in Colossians 3, and Ephesians

4. Yet you seem to set forth under the term reflexive image,

those very things which you acknowledge to be supernatural.

But, whether I rightly understand your sentiment or not, I

will speak of those things which, I think, tend to confirm my

sentiment, and to refute your view, as I understand it.

I prove, then, that those qualities are supernatural. First,

from Colossians 3, and Ephesians 4. Whatever things we have,

from regeneration, by the spirit of Christ, are supernatural.

But we have, from regeneration, by the Spirit of Christ, "the

knowledge of God, righteousness and true holiness."

Therefore, they are supernatural. If any one says that we do

not have them, in substance, from regeneration, but only a

renewal of the same qualities, which had previously been made

corrupt, I do not see how that assertion can be proved. For

the phrases of the apostle teach another doctrine. For he who

must "put on the new man," is not clothed with the "new man,"

or with any part of him. But to the new man, pertain

"righteousness and true holiness." Then, in the case of him,

who must be "renewed in knowledge," it is not his knowledge

which has become corrupt and must be renewed, but his

intelligence, which must be enlightened with new knowledge,

which has been utterly expelled by the darkness of the old

man. I designed this, only, in my argument, and not to define

the image of God in man. But I cannot see that I differ from

the view of the apostle in my explanation. For the knowledge

of God, in the passage quoted by me, is the "image of God"

itself, and "after the image of God." Nor are these

expressions at variance with each other, nor are they so

absurd as you wish them to appear. You say "the image of God

is knowledge, according to the image of God, therefore, the

image of God is denied to be either knowledge or image." I

deny this sequence if the definition is rightly understood,

namely, in the following manner. The image of God, renewed in

us by the regenerating Spirit, is the knowledge of God,

according to the image of God, in which, at the beginning, we

were created. This image has a two-fold relation, in that it

is created anew in us by the Spirit of Christ, and that it

was formerly created in us by the Spirit of God. That

knowledge differs not only in mode, but in its whole nature,

from the knowledge of the old man: nor is it said to be

renewed, but the man is said to be renewed in it. But I

confess that I cannot understand how knowledge is an act of

the image of God, and how that image is the fountain or

principle of that act, that is of knowledge. For I have

hitherto thought that man was said to be created in or to the

image of God, that is, because, in mind, will, knowledge of

God, righteousness and finally holiness, he refers to God

Himself, as the archetype. In the other passage from

Ephesians 4, I do not find the three characteristics, "truth,

righteousness and holiness," but only two, righteousness and

holiness, to which is ascribed truth, that is, sincerity,

purity, simplicity. Knowledge, also, is not a member or

portion of that truth, but a gift, created in the intellect

or mind of man, as righteousness and holiness are ingenerated

in the will, or rather the affections of man.

Secondly, I prove that the same qualities are supernatural in

this way. Those things, according to which we are, and are

said to be, partakers of the divine nature, and the children

of God, are supernatural: but we are, and are said to be

partakers of the divine nature, and children of God,

according to knowledge, righteousness and holiness;

therefore, these are supernatural. The Major does not need

proof. The Minor is evident from a comparison of the first,

second, third, and fourth verses of 2 Peter 1. Thirdly, those

things which have their limit in supernatural felicity, are

supernatural; but the knowledge of God, righteousness and

holiness are such; therefore, they are supernatural.

Fourthly, the immediate causes of supernatural acts are

supernatural. But the knowledge of God, righteousness and

holiness, are the immediate causes of supernatural acts:

therefore they are supernatural. I now come to your

arguments, in which you attempt to show that the image of God

in man is natural, and that those qualities, knowledge,

righteousness and holiness, are natural, not supernatural.

Your first argument is this: Supernatural qualities were

removed, natural qualities were corrupted. But truth,

righteousness, holiness, were not removed, they were

corrupted; therefore, they are not supernatural, but natural.

Your first argument is this: Supernatural qualities were

removed, natural qualities were corrupted. But truth,

righteousness, holiness, were not removed, they were

corrupted; therefore, they are not supernatural, but natural.

Your Minor is defended thus. The principles of these

qualities are in us by nature; they would not be, if they had

been removed. I reply -- that I admit the Major; but the

Minor does not seem at all probable to me, not even by the

addition of that reason. For, I affirm that the knowledge

which is according to piety, the righteousness and the

holiness, of which the apostle speaks, were not corrupted,

but removed, and that none of the principles of those

qualities remain in us after the fall. I acknowledge that the

principles and seeds of the moral virtues, which have some

analogy and resemblance to those spiritual virtues, and that,

even those moral virtues themselves, though corrupted by sin,

remained in us after the fall. It is possible that this

resemblance may mislead him who does not accurately

discriminate between these moral and those spiritual virtues.

In support of this sentiment, in which I state that those

gifts were taken away, I have the declaration of the

Catechism, in the answer to question nine, in these words:

"Man deprived himself and all his posterity, of those divine

gifts." But an explanation of the nature of those divine

gifts is given in the sixth question, namely, "righteousness

and holiness." I know not but that I have the support of your

own declaration on this point. For in the eighteenth of your

Theses, Concerning Original Sin, discussed in 1594, are these

words: "For, as in Adam the form of human integrity was

original righteousness, in which he was made by God, so the

form of corruption, or rather of deformity, was a deprivation

of that righteousness."

In the nineteenth Thesis, "The Scripture calls the form,

first mentioned, the image and likeness of God." In the

twentieth Thesis, "The Scripture calls the latter form, the

image and likeness of Adam." If I rightly understand these

expressions, I think that it plainly follows from them that

original righteousness was removed, and that it is,

therefore, supernatural, according to the rule "supernatural

qualities were removed; natural qualities were corrupted." I

have also, in my favour, most, perhaps all, of the Fathers.

Ambrose, in reference to Elijah and his fasting, chap. 4th,

says, "Adam was clothed with a vesture of virtues before his

transgression, but, as if denuded by sin, he saw himself

naked, because the clothing, which he previously had, was

lost," and again in the seventh book of his commentary on the

10th chapter of that gospel, marking, more clearly, the

distinction between the loss of supernatural qualities and

the corruption of natural ones, he speaks thus: "Who are

thieves if not the angels of night and of darkness? They

first despoil us of the garments of spiritual grace, and then

inflict on us wounds." Augustine, (De Trinitate, lib. 14,

cap. 16,) says, "Man, by sinning, lost righteousness and true

holiness, on which account, this image became deformed and

discoloured; he receives them again when he is reformed and

renewed." Again, (De civit. Dei, lib. 14, cap. 11) he affirms

that "free-will was lost." To conclude this part of the

discussion, I ask what were those spiritual qualities, which

were renewed or lost, if not the knowledge of God,

righteousness and holiness.

Another argument, adduced by you, is this: "Whatever belongs

to the species is natural; But the image of God belongs to

the species; Therefore it is natural." I answer, the Major is

not, in every case, true. For a quality may pertain to the

species either by a communication through nature or natural

principles, or by an arrangement of grace. That, which, in

the former, not in the latter, pertains to the species, is

natural. In reference to the Minor, I affirm that the image

of God pertains to the species, partly through nature, partly

of grace; therefore the image of God in man is partly through

nature, partly of grace; therefore, the image of God in man

is partly natural, partly supernatural. If you make any other

inference, you deduce a general conclusion from a particular

proposition, which is not valid. If an addition be made to

your Major, so that, in its full form, it should stand thus:

"Whatever is produced in the species, and its individuals, by

nature, is natural," I will admit it as a whole. But in that

case, the Minor would not be wholly true. For the image of

God is not promised in us wholly by nature, for that part of

it which is in truth and righteousness, and holiness, is

produced in us by nature, but is communicated by an act of

grace, according to the arrangement of grace. But it is

objected that the image cannot be common, if it is not

natural. For natural qualities differ, in that they are

common, from those which are personal, (the question refers

not to supernatural qualities). I answer a thing is common in

a two-fold sense, either absolutely, according to nature, or

conditionally, according to the arrangement of grace. The

image of God is common in part according to nature and

absolutely, in those things which belong to man according to

his essence, and which cannot be separated from his nature,

and in part conditionally, according to the arrangement of

grace, in those things which pertain not to the essence but

to the supernatural perfection of man. The former are

produced in all men absolutely, the latter conditionally,

namely that he should preserve those principles, which are

universal to the species, and particular to the individual,

uncorrupted. Therefore, the whole image is common, but partly

by nature, and partly of the arrangement of grace; by nature,

that part, which is called natural; according to the

arrangement of grace, that part which I call supernatural.

This, also, is according to the declaration of the Scripture

that Seth was begotten in the image and likeness of Adam, not

in the image of God. He was indeed begotten in the image of

God, not as God communicated it, in its integrity, to Adam,

but as Adam maintained it for himself. But Adam maintained it

for himself not in its integrity, therefore, he communicated

it in that condition. But that, which is in its integrity,

and that, which is not in its integrity, differ, not only in

mode and degree, but also in some of the essential parts of

that image, which are possessed by the image, in its

integrity, and are wanting to the image, not in its

integrity, which Adam had originally, by a complete

communication from God, and of which Seth was destitute on

account of the defective communication from Adam.

Your third argument is this: "The image of God is not said to

be produced or created in us, but to be renewed or restored,

therefore, it was not lost or removed, but corrupted."

I answer -- Neither part of your assumption is, in a strict

sense, true; with suitable explanation, both parts are true,

but neither of them is against my sentiment. I will prove the

former assertion, namely, that neither part of the assertion

is true. We are said to be "new creatures in Christ" and "to

be created to good works." David prayed that God would

"create" within him "a clean heart." The image of God is

nowhere said to be restored and renewed within us, but as we

are said to be "renewed in knowledge after the image of God,"

"to be renewed in the spirit of our mind," and "to be

transformed by the renewing of our mind." Yet, with suitable

explanation, both parts of the assumption are true, but they

are very favourable to my sentiment, as I will show. There

are in us, in respect to ourselves, two parts of the image of

God, one essential, the other accidental to us. The essential

part is the soul, endowed with mind, affection and will. The

accidental is the knowledge of God, righteousness, true

holiness, and similar gifts of spiritual grace. The former

are not said to be produced or created in us, because it was

deformed and corrupt. The latter is not said to be restored

or renewed in us, because, from a defect in the subject, it

has no place in us and not because it was not corrupt and

deformed, but it is said to be produced and created in us,

(for we are called, on its access, new creatures,) because it

resembles a mold, by the use of which, that essential part is

restored and renewed. The words of the apostle plainly set

forth this idea, in which it is affirmed not that the

knowledge, referred to, is renewed, but that we, as partakers

of the image of God so far as it is essential to us, are said

to be renewed in knowledge, as in a new mold, according to

the image of God, so far as it is accidental to us. Both

parts, then, of the antecedent are true. For the image of God

is restored and renewed in us, namely, our mind and will, and

the affections of the soul; and the image of God is produced

and created in us, namely, the knowledge of God,

righteousness, and true holiness. The former is the subject

of the latter; the latter is the form, divinely given to the

former. Therefore, also, the argument of Moses in commanding

the murderer to be slain, is valid. For in man, even after

transgression, the image of God remained, so far as it was

essential to him, or that part remained, which pertained to

the essence of man, though the part, which was accidental, is

removed through sin.

We now discuss the action of the Deity, by which we have both

the natural and the supernatural part of the image of God. I

have not made any distinction in the act, both because I

wished to use the phraseology of Scripture, according to

which the word creation signifies the act by which man has in

himself, the image and likeness of God, for it speaks thus:

"Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," and "so

God created man in his own image," and because both parts

equally well answered my purpose. But, if the subject is

considered with accuracy, I think that a distinction is to be

made in those acts, and that one is rightly termed creation,

by which man received natural qualities, the other,

superinfusion, by which he received the supernatural. For

life in man is two-fold, animal and spiritual; animal, by

which he lives according to man, spiritual, by which he lives

according to God. Of the former, the principle is the soul in

man, endowed with intellect and will; of the latter, the

principle is the Spirit of God, communicating to the soul

those excellent gifts of knowledge, righteousness, and

holiness. It is probable that the principles of these kinds

of life, each so diverse from the other, were bestowed on

man, not by the same, but by a different act. But it is not

important to my sentiment to decide in what mode, whether by

a two-fold or a single act of God, man had these qualities,

only let it be understood that he had both the former and the

latter, before God was employed concerning him in the act of

predestination; that is, he had them in respect to the divine

consideration. I make the statement in general terms, because

those things, both natural and supernatural, were conferred

on the whole species, the former absolutely, the latter on

the condition that the species should preserve to itself that

principle. Hence, I conclude, if it was conferred on the

species, then it was conferred by a decree of providence, in

contra-distinction to predestination; if it was conferred

conditionally, it was not conferred by a decree of

predestination, by which no gift is conditionally conferred.

It is now evident from this that my argument is valid. For if

man was created by God, under this condition, that he should

have, not only natural, but also supernatural gifts, either

by the same act of creation, or by the additional act of

superinfusion, (in reference to which I have never

contended,) it follows, then, that God, in the acts of

predestination and reprobation, which separate men, could not

have reference to men, as considered in a merely natural

state. You also seem, afterwards, to concede this, that man

had supernatural endowments, even in his primitive state, but

as an increment to nature, and not from the act of creation,

which is the principle of nature. This I concede, and from it

make this inference, since those things, which the first man

had, were possessed by all his posterity in him, (for all

which he was, we also were in him, according to the 40th

Thesis of your disputation concerning Original Sin,

previously cited,) the former, of nature, the latter, of the

arrangement of grace, it follows that God could not, in the

decree under discussion, have reference to man, considered in

a merely natural state, nor indeed, to man, considered with

supernatural endowments, for a being of such character could

not be passed by, or at least was not passed by, except from

the fact that it was foreseen that he would lose those

supernatural endowments by transgression and sin.

Your assertion that these statements, however true they may

be, are not opposed to that sentiment, which considers man in

general, is valid, if it is proved that man was, or could be

considered universally by God in the act of decree. But I

think that my arguments are valid, also, against that

sentiment. For if God could not consider man in a merely

natural state, if not with supernatural endowments, if not

without sin, regarding him as the object of the acts of

predestination and reprobation, then also he could not

consider the same being in a general sense. For a general

consideration is excluded by the necessary consideration of

any particular circumstance, which becomes the formal

relation (ratio) of the object, apart from which formal

relation God could not consider man, when He was acting in

reference to man in that decree. Besides, how can the general

consideration yet have place, when a circumstance, which that

general consideration comprehends within itself, is excluded.

If what you say concerning "the essential and the relative

image" has this meaning, that the essential image comprehends

truth and righteousness, and holiness, and yet is entirely

natural to man, as may be deduced from some things alleged by

you, then I affirm distinctly, that I cannot oppose it;

indeed, I think that I can prove the contrary. But if you

apply the phrase "essential image" to all which man has,

essential to himself, according to the image of God, I admit

it. Then the "respective" image will embrace what I call

supernatural and accidental. But, as these things, with the

premises which I have laid down, do not tend to refute my

sentiment, I proceed to the remainder of my argument.

My second argument is this, that no love of God according to

election, or divine volition regarding human beings

variously, or divine actions varying in reference to them, is

found after sin entered into the world, or after it was

considered as having entered. But if this argument is valid,

it also refutes the sentiment, which states that man was

considered "in general." For if there is no divine election

and reprobation of men except after the entrance of sin into

the world, then man is considered, not "in general," but

particularly, in reference to the circumstance of sin. But

you plead "authority, reason, and example." You plead

"authority" from three passages of Scripture, Romans 9,

Ephesians 1, and Matthew 25. Neither of these is opposed to

my view, since I do not deny that election and reprobation

were made from eternity, and do not say that sin was the

cause of the decree, but a condition requisite in its object.

The passage in Romans 9, is not adverse to me; first, because

Jacob and Esau had been already conceived in sin, when those

words were addressed to Rebecca, as is evident from the text.

The affirmative, that they had done neither good nor evil, is

to be understood in reference to the distinction which might

be made between them, as is explained by Augustine in many

places. The apostle then denies all reference to sin, namely,

to that by which any distinction might be made between them,

not to that, of which they were both equally guilty.

Secondly, because he attributes all things to the vocation of

God, who calleth, which is of mercy, and has reference only

to sinners. Thirdly, because the "purpose of God, according

to election" which states, "not of works," is a gracious

purpose in Christ, to the promise of which reference is made

in Romans iv, 16 "it is of fruit, that it might be by grace,

to the end the promise might be sure to all the seed," that

is, of faith of, or in Christ, which pertains only to

sinners, for he, who has not sinned, does not need faith in

Christ, since he obtains righteousness, and thereby life, by

the laws. Let this, then, be the answer in reference to this

passage, if it is to be understood of Esau and Jacob in their

own persons, without any typical meaning. But the meaning of

that passage is far different, as could be proved, if it were

necessary.

I come, now, to the passage cited from Ephesians 1. That

passage is so far from being opposed to my sentiment that I

shall hereafter use it as a strong argument in my favour.

Election is here said to be "from eternity;" I grant it. It

is said to have been made "in Christ;" I acknowledge it. It

is said to be "unto the adoption of children by Jesus

Christ;" I consent to it. I do not, however, see that either

of these statements is opposed to the idea, that sin is a

condition, requisite in the object of election and

reprobation. It is true that any reference to ourselves, as a

cause of our own election, is denied. Predestination precedes

persons, in respect to their actual existence, not as they

are considered by the Deity. It refers to causes, before they

actually exist, but not before they are foreseen by God from

eternity, though, in the foresight of God, they exist, not as

the causes of predestination, but as a condition requisite in

the object. In Matthew 25, the blessed of the Father, who

shall possess the kingdom prepared for them of the mere

benediction of God, are spoken of. But that benediction is in

Christ, by which the malediction is removed, which even the

blessed themselves had deserved according to the prescience

of God, before they were blessed in Christ; and the kingdom,

which was prepared for them, by the blood of Christ, is a

kingdom, to which they are raised from the ignominy and

slavery of sin. If you had thoroughly considered that, which

is really in controversy, you would not have thought that

those passages could be used effectually against me.

The reasons, adduced by you, are not more adverse to my

opinion, for they oppose the sentiment which makes sin the

cause of the decree, not that which makes it a condition,

requisite in the object. I will examine them. To the first, I

answer that my sentiment, either as antecedent or consequent,

is not absurd, until it is proved to be so. Your second and

third reasons change the state of the question. For they

exclude from that decree sin, as a cause, on account of which

God adopted children unto Himself, or in view of which He

made the decree; in reference to which there is no question.

To the second, I say, that the subject of discussion, here,

is the adoption made in Christ, which pertains to no one

except by faith in Christ, to which we are not begotten but

begotten again by God. From this it is proved, that the

adoption is of sinners, and of sinners equally involved in

sin, not of men equal in nature. To the third, I answer; --

In the first place, we must judge from the word of God, what

may be more, and what may be less in accordance with the

wisdom and grace of God. In the second place, I affirm that

it is equally in accordance with the wisdom and grace of God,

that He should adopt unto Himself sons from those who are not

sinners as from those who are sinners, and vice versa, if

such should be His choice. What you say in reference to "the

supposition of such consideration" is aside from the subject.

In the third place, the wisdom and grace, according to which

God adopted children unto Himself from among men in that

"hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world unto our

glory, which none of the princes of this world knew," which

wisdom is "Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling-

block," -- and that grace, is that which is joined with

mercy, bestowed on the sinner, and is in Christ. The latter

tends far more illustriously to the glory of God than grace,

as used in contradistinction to mercy, and so much the more,

as he, who has deserved evil, is more unworthy than he, who

has deserved nothing, either good or evil. It has been shown

before, that the example of angels is not analogous, but the

reverse. For God determined to secure the salvation of men

and of angels in different modes. The relations, therefore,

of predestination, in the former, and in the latter case, are

diverse. God stamped His own image on both, but with a

different condition, namely, that it should be preserved in

none, but restored in some, among men. God so tempered, as

Augustine says, the natures of angels and of men, that He

might first show, in them, what their own freewill could

effect, then what should be the beneficial influence of His

grace, preserving in the case of angels, and restoring, in

the case of men. He showed in the case of angels, namely,

grace in contradistinction to mercy. He showed in men, the

power of the latter grace, namely, grace joined to mercy, and

both of his own eternal purpose. Since, then, He did, in men,

what He did not in angels, and, in angels, what He did not in

men, and this from the decree of predestination, I conclude

that there is one relation of divine predestination in the

case of angels, and another in the case of men. Therefore,

there is no love of God towards men, according to election,

without the consideration of sin. There was no discussion

between us in reference to angels, and, in my argument,

express mention was made of men; whatever, then, is proved

concerning angels, has no weight in the refutation of my

argument.

ELEVENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

Secondly, of Election.

1. Election is said to have been made in Christ, who was

ordained as mediator for sinners, and was called Jesus,

because He should save, not certain individuals, considered

merely in their nature, but "His people from their sins." He

is said to have been foreordained, and we in Him, and He, in

the order of nature and causes, before us. He was ordained as

saviour, we, as those to be saved. But in Christ, having such

a character, and being considered such as the Scripture

describes him to us, man could not be considered in a merely

natural state. Much less, therefore, could he be elected in

Him.

2. Election is said to have been made of grace, which is

distinguished from nature in a two fold manner, both as the

latter is pure and considered abstractly, and as it is guilty

and corrupt. In the former sense, it signifies the progress

of goodness towards supernatural good, to be imparted to a

creature naturally capable of it; in the latter sense, it

signifies the ulterior progress towards supernatural good to

be communicated to man, as corrupt and guilty, which is also,

in the Scriptures, called mercy. In my judgment, the term

grace is used, in the latter sense, in the writings of the

apostles, especially when the subject of discussion is

election, justification, sanctification, &c. If this is true,

then election of grace was made of men considered, not in a

"merely natural state, but in sin."

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE ELEVENTH PROPOSITION

It is true, that election is made by God the Father in Christ

the Mediator; but that the Mediator was ordained, only for

sinners, is not absolutely true. Therefore, the inference is

not valid. Indeed, should its truth be conceded, yet it has

no weight against those, who state that, in election,

reference was to man in general. But that the Mediator was

ordained, not for sinners alone -- to say nothing of that

Mediation, which is attributed to Christ in creation and

nature, "all things were made by Him; and without him was not

any thing made that was made. In Him was life; and the life

was the light of men." (John i, 3, 4,) "by whom also He made

the worlds." (Heb. i, 2, &c.) -- I demonstrate most

completely by a single argument.

Christ is Mediator for those, to whom He was, from eternity,

given as Head by the Father; -- He was given as Head by the

Father to Angels and men; therefore, he is the Mediator for

both the latter and the former. But angels did not sin; he

was not, then, ordained Mediator for sinners only. Let us

discuss each point, if you please, separately, that we may

more fully understand the subject.

When we speak of the Head, we consider three things,

according to the analogy of nature; its position, by which,

in fact, dignity, and authority, it holds the first place in

the whole body; its perfection, by which it contains all the

inward and outward senses, in itself, as their fountain and

the principle of motion; finally its power, by which all

power, feeling, motion and government is accustomed to flow

from it to the other members.

According to this idea, Christ is indeed the Head, in common,

of all created things; the Head, I say, of superior nature,

and of interior nature, and of all those things which are in

nature. We transcend this universal relation, when we

contemplate the Head, as appointed from eternity. Angels and

men are, after God, capable of eternity; and to both Christ

was given eternally, by the Father, as the Head, not only

that they should exist forever, (which is the attribute of

spiritual nature) but also, and this is specially of grace,

that they should be forever heirs of eternal glory, as sons

of God, heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ. The latter

were ordained of God, by the adoption of grace in Christ

Jesus, all to one end, namely, to the sight, the enjoyment,

and announcement of the glory of God, and of them was

constituted the mystical body of Christ, the celestial

church. Finally, as in all this life, that is the head of a

living creature, from which power, feeling and motion flow

into the members of the body, so in all that eternal life,

the body grows by the influence of Christ, its Head, and each

of the members obtain immutability of life, that is, eternity

from this fact, that they subsist in Christ, their Head,

apart from whom they would be dissolved. But Christ, is the

Mediator by the relation in which he is the Head of angels

and men, for, as Head, he' joins them to Himself; as

Mediator, he joins them to the Father. That Christ is Head

and Mediator, is in fact, one and the same thing, only that

the divinity intervenes in the relation, since He is called

the Head, as to our relation to Himself; and Mediator as to

our relation to the Father. "But," it may be said, "he did

not redeem the angels as he redeemed us. This indeed is true;

but Mediator and Redeemer differ from each other, as genus

and species. To angels, Christ is Mediator of preservation

and confirmation; but to us, he is Mediator, also, of

redemption and of preservation from that from which we have

been redeemed. So he is styled Mediator for both, though in a

different mode. The Major, then, of my syllogism is true,

that "Christ is the Mediator of those to whom he was

appointed from eternity as their Head." But that He was

appointed, both to angels and men, as their Head, and

therefore, as Mediator, is taught by the apostle in

Colossians 1, when he affirms of Christ that he "is the image

of the invisible God," that is, He represents God the Father,

in his word and work, chiefly to those whom the Father has

given to him, as their Head and Mediator; "the first born of

every creature," namely, every one whom God has, of His

grace, predestinated to adoption, and begotten then, that

they might be His children; for there is a comparison of

things which are homogeneous, and so the passage is to be

understood. Then, explaining both those attributes, he

subjoins, first, in general terms, "For by Him were all

things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth

visible, and invisible," (but he explains these things, to

take away the plea of the angel worshipers, whom he assails

in this epistle,) "whether thrones or dominions, or

principalities, or powers; all things were created by Him and

for Him, and He is before all things, and by Him all things

consist;" and then, with particular reference to the glorious

body of which He is precisely the Head and Mediator, "and He

is the Head of the body, the church," who, in the

confirmation of grace is "the beginning," but in redemption,

is "the first-born from the dead," the common end of all,

which is "that in all things he might have the pre-eminence."

The cause, is the decree of the Father, predestinating His

Son for the adoption of His children, "for it pleased the

Father that, in Him, should all fullness dwell, and having

made peace through the blood of His cross to reconcile all

things to Himself;" &c. He sets forth this idea still more

clearly, when, warning them from the worship of angels under

the pretense of philosophy, he says, "for in Him dwelleth all

the fullness of the Godhead bodily. And ye are complete in

Him, which is the Head of all principality and power," that

is, of angels to the worship of whom, they were solicited.

For, of every one soliciting them to the worshipping of

angels, he afterwards affirms that they do not hold the

"Head, from which all the body, by joints and bands having

nourishment ministered and knit together, increaseth with the

increase of God." To the same purpose is Ephesians 1.

It is then to be stated, generally, that he was ordained to

be Mediator for sinners, but not for them only, since he is

also Mediator for the angels, who have maintained their

original purity, but he is ordained as Redeemer for sinners

only. We may be able to express this very idea in another

mode, if we say that he was ordained Mediator, both for

those, who could sin, that they might not sin, and for those,

who had sinned, that they might be saved from their sins.

Both modes of interpretation tend to the same result. The

same is the case with the name Jesus. But what need is there

of many words? We say that he was ordained as Mediator both

for those who stood and for those who fell, as Redeemer only

for those who fell; for those who stood, that they might

remain, standing, and for those who fell, that they might

rise again, and remain standing. From which it follows, a

mode of argumentation, plainly the same, being preserved,

that when election is said to have been made in Christ, God

had reference to man, considered generally, as not yet

created as created in a natural state, as standing and as

having fallen, but this is the same thing as being considered

in a merely natural state, which you deny. The same argument

applies to what follows.

I come to your second argument. You say "Election is said to

have been made of grace," and further, that "grace is spoken

of in a two-fold sense, when it is used in opposition to

nature, and that it is to be taken, in the latter sense, in

this argument," and you conclude that, "the election of grace

was made of men, considered not in a natural state, &c." Do

you not see, my brother, that your conclusion is unsound,

involving the fallacy of division, and that it is also

equivocal? For, in the Major, grace is used collectively or

generally, but in the Minor distributively; in the former, it

is used simply, as to its essence, in the latter, an accident

is taken into account, namely, the different modes of the

object, which do not affect the essence of grace. Why shall

we not rather argue in this manner? Election is of grace; --

grace has reference to those, whom it establishes in good,

and to those whom, saved from evil, it restores to good;

election, then, has reference to the same. That, which is

stated in general terms, should be applied in general terms,

for this, both nature and reason demand, unless there is a

positive restriction in the necessity of the subject, or

there be some limitation by an adjunct. That election is used

in a general sense, is most clearly evident from a comparison

of angels and men. You say, that grace is used, in the latter

signification, in the writings of the Apostles in this and

similar arguments. This may be correct, but this is not

affected by a restriction of the term grace, which in God and

of God, embraces all things, but by a restriction of the

object kata ti the restriction is in the object, that is, in

man, not in that which is added or granted to him. What, if a

farmer should command his servant to cultivate a field, which

field needed first to be cleared, then plowed, and lastly to

be sowed, &c., would you, then, restrict the word cultivate

to one of these processes? That, which is general or common,

remains general or common, and its generality may not be

narrowed down by any particular relations of the object.

Therefore, as you see, this consequence, deduced from faulty

reasoning, is not valid, nor is that, which is stated in

general terms, to be restricted to particular circumstances.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF THE ELEVENTH PROPOSITION

The two arguments advanced by me, as they are most

conclusive, so they remain unaffected by your answers. I

prove this, in reference to the first. Its strength and force

consists in this, that the election of men is said to have

been made in Christ, as the Mediator between God and sinful

men, that is as Reconciler and Redeemer, from which I argued

thus: Whoever are elect in Christ, as Mediator between God

and sinful men, that is, as Reconciler and Redeemer, they are

considered by God, electing them, as sinners; -- But all men,

who are elect in Christ, are elect in Christ, as Mediator

between God and sinful men, that is, as Reconciler and

Redeemer; Therefore, all men, who are elect in Christ, are

considered by God, electing them, as sinners.

The Major is plain. For, in the first place, they, who are

not sinners, do not need a Reconciler and Redeemer. But

election is an act, altogether necessary to those who are

elected. In the second place, Christ himself is not

considered by God as Mediator of Redemption, unless in view

of the fact, that he is ordained as such for those who have

sinned. For the divine foresight of sin preceded, in the

order of nature, the decree by which its ordained that His

Son should be the Mediator, appointed to offer in the

presence of God, in behalf of men, a sacrifice for sins. In

the third place, the election of men by God is made only in

the Mediator, as having obtained, by his own blood, eternal

redemption.

The Minor is evident. For since Christ is the Mediator

between men and God, only as Reconciler, Redeemer, and the

advocate of sinners; Mediator, I say, who, by the act of His

Mediation, affords salvation to those, for whom he is

Mediator. (1 Tim. ii, 5 & 6; Heb. viii, 6 &c.; ix, 15; xii,

24.) Hence follows the conclusion, since the premises are

true, and consist of three terms, and are arranged in a

legitimate form.

Let us now examine your arguments in opposition to what I

have adduced. You affirm that Christ is not ordained as

Mediator for sinners only, and therefore, my conclusion is

not valid. Let it be conceded that your antecedent is true,

yet it does not follow that my conclusion is not valid. For,

in my premises, I did not assert that Christ was ordained

Mediator only for sinners, nor are the questions discussed

between us, -- of what beings is Christ the Mediator -- when

spoken of universally -- and in what modes. But I spoke of

Christ, as ordained a Mediator for men in particular, and

affirmed that he was ordained Mediator for them, only as

sinners; for he was ordained Mediator to take away the sins

of the world. The subject of discussion, then, in the mode in

which he is the Mediator for men. Here, you commit two

fallacies, that of Irrelevant conclusion [ignoratio elenchi],

and that of reasoning from a particular case to a general

conclusion, [a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter]. I

speak of Christ's Mediation as pertaining to a particular

case, namely, as undertaken for man, you treat of his

Mediation, as simply and generally considered. But you

rightly separate the consideration of the mediation, which is

attributed to Christ, in creation and nature, for the latter

is, entirely, of another kind and mode. According to this, he

is the Mediator of God to creatures; according to that, of

creatures to God. The one, refers to all creatures, the

other, only to those, made in the image of God. The one tends

to the communication of all natural and created good to all

creatures, the other, to the bestowment, on rational

creatures, of a participation in infinite and supernatural

good. You, indeed, prove that he was ordained Mediator, not

for sinners only, but without any necessity. For this is not

the question between us. The point to be proved by you, was

that he is the Mediator of men, not of sinners, which I know

that you would not wish to attempt, as a different doctrine

is taught in the Scriptures. Yet, let us examine the

argument. He was ordained as Mediator also for the angels; --

But the angels did not sin; -- Therefore, he was not

constituted Mediator only for sinners. I may concede all

this, for it weighs nothing against my argument, since I have

not said in general terms, that Christ was ordained only for

sinners. I restricted his Mediation to men, to the work of

their salvation, to the mode in which salvation was obtained

for them. Hence, if this be true, I conclude that my argument

remains firm and unmoved, in which I proved that, in Christ

as the Mediator of men before God, only sinners were elected.

I wish that we might always remember that there is no

controversy between us concerning the election of angels or

the mediation, by which they are saved, and that we are

treating only of the election and reprobation of men, and of

the mode of mediation by which they obtain salvation, for it

will be perceived that statements, which, taken generally,

are not true, may be, in the highest degree, true, when

applied to the particular case of mankind. There is, then, no

need of considering those things, which are said concerning

Christ as the Mediator of angels. If, however, I may be

permitted to discuss even this point, I may ask for the proof

of your Major, in which you affirm that "Christ is Mediator

for those to whom he was given, as Head, by the Father." I

think that I have good reason for denying your postulate.

For, in Philemon 2, Christ is said to have received "a name

which is above every name, that, at the name of Jesus, every

knee should bow, of things in heaven, because he, "being in

the form of God, humbled himself and became obedient unto

death, even the death of the cross." Here we see that the

reason of his being constituted the Head, even of heavenly

things, was this, that, by his own blood and death, he might

perform the functions of Mediator for men before God. If he

was the Mediator for angels, then this fact, and not the

former reason, should have been alleged, in this passage, for

his appointment as Head, even of angels.

These two terms, Head and Mediator, seem to me to have an

order and relation, such that the appellation of Mediator

pertains to Christ in a prior relation, and that of had in a

posterior relation, and the latter, indeed, on account of the

former. For, by the act of Mediation, he acquires for himself

the right of dominion, the possession of which the Father

delivers to him, when He bestows the title of Head upon him.

This is implied, also, in the distinction used in schools of

Divinity, Christ is Mediator by merit and by efficacy. By

merit first, then by efficacy. For by his merit, he prepares

for himself a people, the blessings necessary for their

happiness, and the right and power of imparting those

blessings to his own people; from which are derived the

titles Head, saviour, Leader, Prince, and Lord; in accordance

with which titles, there flows, of his own efficacy, to his

own people, an actual communication of those blessings, which

he obtained by the merit of his death. For in Hebrews ii, 16,

it is said that Christ: "took not on him the nature of

angels; but he took on him the seed of Abraham." Now, if the

statement, made by our divines, is true -- that this

assumption of nature was made that he might be able to

perform the functions of Mediator for those whose nature he

assumed, you perceive that the conclusion is valid, that

since "he took not on him the nature of angels," he did not

perform the functions of Mediator for them. To this add, that

it is very frequently said, by our Theologians that Christ is

Mediator only as he stands between God and men, which

assertion they refer to his human nature, taken into a

personal union by the Word, that he might, in this way, stand

between both, partaking, with the Father, of the Divine

nature, and with us, of human nature. Hence, also, he is

called Emmanuel in a twofold sense, first, because he is God

and man in the unity of his person, and secondly, because,

being such, he has united God and men in the office of

Mediation. But he does not stand between God and angels.

Consider, also, the declaration of Heb. v, 1, "every high

priest taken from among men is ordained for men in things

pertaining to God." But Christ was not taken from among

angels, therefore, he was not ordained for angels in things

pertaining to God. Indeed, I affirm, with confidence, that

there was nothing to be done, by the way of any mediation

for, or in behalf of angels before God. I add, also, that a

Mediator should not be inferior in nature to those for whom

he acts in that capacity. But Christ, in his human nature,

was made "a little lower than the angels, for the suffering

of death. (Heb. ii, 9.) Therefore, he is not Mediator for

angels. Finally, I remark, angels are "ministering Spirits

sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of

salvation." (Heb. i, 14.) "Unto the angels hath He not put in

subjection the world to come," but unto Christ Jesus

primarily, and unto all his brethren, secondarily, whose

nature he sanctified in himself, and exalted with himself to

that dignity. Therefore, Christ is not the Mediator of

angels. But the inquiry may be made, Cannot Christ, then, be

said in any manner to be Mediator for angels? I answer; --

The term mediator may be applied in a two fold manner, either

in behalf of creatures to the Deity, or of the Deity to

creatures. I deny that Christ is Mediator in behalf of the

angels before God, but I do not deny he is Mediator for God

to angels. For this coincides with the appellation of Head,

which I confess belong to Christ, in respect to angels,

though in a relation different from that, by which he is the

Head of believers. For the union, which exists between Christ

and believers of the human race, is more strict and close,

than that which exists between him and angels, on account of

the consubstantiality of his human nature with that of men,

from which angels are alien. But enough on these points.

Whether they are, as I have stated them, or not, it affects,

neither favourably nor unfavourably, my argument, but you

entirely agree with me when you say that he was ordained as

Redeemer only for the fallen. From this, also, I infer the

truth of my sentiment. Men are elected in the Redeemer, only

as fallen; for they are not elected that they should remain

standing, but that they should rise again, and then remain

standing, as you have rightly observed. But how can you

infer, that, since election is made in Christ, the election,

I say, of men, in Christ, the Redeemer, (for those words are

to be supplied), it follows that God had respect to men, in

general, considered generally as not yet created, as created

in their natural state, as yet standing and as fallen. I

think that the contrary can, and must be inferred. Therefore,

God, in election, had reference to man, only as fallen. For,

in election, He regarded man in the Redeemer, and the

Redeemer is such only of the fallen.

As to the latter argument, the form of the answer is the

same. I do not use the word grace equivocally; I do not use

it at the same time collectively and distributively. I admit

that it is used in a two-fold sense, for the grace of

preservation and restoration; I admit that it is used

collectively, and absolutely, particularly and concretely,

that is, the grace of preservation and restoration. But, what

then? If I use a word, which has a general and equivocal

sense, is equivocation, therefore, at once, to be laid to my

charge? But I have used that word, at all times in this

discussion, in the same way, namely, as referring to the

grace by which some men are elected. It is that grace by

which restoration and its means are prepared, not that by

which preservation and its means are appointed. For the

latter grace was not bestowed on human beings.

From the former grace alone, all they, who are saved, obtain

their salvation. In the Major of my syllogism, grace is

spoken of in a particular relation, and in the Minor, it is

used in the same way, and, neither in the former nor in the

latter, is it used in a general sense, as the following

syllogism will show. They who are elected according to the

grace of restoration, which is joined with mercy, having

place only in reference to sinners, are considered by Him,

who elects, as sinners; But all men, who are elected, are

elected according to the grace of restoration, which is

joined to mercy, having place only in reference to sinners; -

- Therefore, all men, who are elected, are considered by Him,

who elects, as sinners. Grace is spoken of, throughout,

particularly and relatively in respect to men, and in no

case, is it used generally or absolutely. Indeed, it cannot

be used generally or absolutely when it has reference

relatively and particularly to election, whether of angels or

of men. For neither these nor those are elected or saved by

grace, taken absolutely, but both by grace used relatively,

angels by the grace of preservation, men by the grace of

restoration.

When, however, we treat of election universally and

abstractly, we must discuss the subject of grace, as its

cause, universally, absolutely and abstractly; for, to a

genus, general attributes are to be ascribed, which may be

afterwards applied to the species after their several modes.

Your argumentation, then, is aside from our controversy.

Election is of grace; grace respects those, whom it

establishes, and those whom, saved from evil, it restores to

good. Therefore, election has reference to the same persons.

For we do not now discuss election in general, and

absolutely, if so, the word grace, according to correct

usage, must be understood in a general sense. But we discuss

the election of men; therefore, the general term grace must

be restricted to that grace, according to which men are

elected. It is not, therefore, proper to say that "grace has

reference to those whom it establishes in good," for the

grace, of which we here treat, does not refer to those whom

it establishes in good, for grace established no one of the

human race, it only restored those, to whom it had reference.

But you say that the grace, which establishes in good, and

that, which restores, are one in essence, and only

distinguished and restricted in relation to the object. What

if I should concede this? My conclusion will still be valid.

The question between us has reference to the object and its

formal relations by which relation you say that grace is

distinguished and restricted. But that restriction of the

object has only this force, that the grace, which, according

to your assertion, is one in essence, must unfold itself and

be applied to a sinner, and to one not a sinner, in a

different mode; and indeed must use acts of a different

character in the two cases. There is, then, a restriction in

"that which is added or granted," but it is a necessary

consequence of the restriction of the object. This

distinction, then, is sufficient for the conclusion which I

desire.

The question is not concerning objects of election,

essentially different from each other, but concerning

different modes of considering an object, which is one and

the same in essence, and concerning a different formal

relation. I will illustrate it by a simile. Justice in God is

one in essence, namely, giving to each one that which is due

to him; to him who is obedient, what pertains to him,

according to the divine promise, and to the sinner that which

pertains to him, according to the divine threatening. But

from the fact that justice renders the retribution of

punishment an object, it is necessarily inferred that the

object is worthy of punishment, and was, therefore, liable to

sin; so likewise with grace. Grace then is one in essence,

but varies in its mode; one in principle and end, but varied

in its progress, steps and means: one, when taken absolutely

and in general, but two-fold, when taken relatively and

particularly, at least in respect to opposite and distinct

matters. But in the whole of this course of reasoning, I have

used the term grace, in a particular relation, as it is

varied in mode, progress, steps and means, and as it is taken

relatively and distributively. No equivocation, then, has

been used in this; there is no reasoning from general to

particular, from the abstract to the concrete.

But, though, all these statements be true, they avail

nothing, you affirm, against those who state that mankind in

general were regarded in election. These arguments, indeed,

prove that mankind in general could not have been regarded in

election, or at least that such was not the case. For if man

was considered in general, then he was elected by grace,

taken in a general sense. For a general effect requires a

general cause. But man was elected, not by grace considered

generally, but by grace considered particularly, relatively,

and distributively, with reference to the circumstance of

sin. If man was considered in general, then he was elected in

the Mediator not considered generally, but considered

particularly as Redeemer. Therefore, in election, man was not

considered in general, but with restriction to the

circumstance of sin, which was to be proved. The illustration

of the field to be cultivated, is not against this view,

indeed it is in its favour. For if a farmer should command

his son to cultivate a field, which was overrun with briars,

and, therefore, required culture joined with clearing, then

the word cultivate, though, when taken in a general sense, it

is not restricted to clearing, yet, when applied to that

particular field, it necessarily includes that act. Hence we

infer, that, if a field cannot be cultivated without the act

of clearing, it is, therefore, overrun with briars and weeds,

and, by analogy, if a man can not be saved without the act of

restoration, he is, therefore, a sinner; for a sinner only is

capable of restoration, and restoring grace is adapted only

to his case.

TWELFTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

Thirdly, of Non-Election or Preterition. Non-election or

preterition is an act of the divine pleasure, by which God

from eternity determined not to communicate to some men

supernatural happiness, but to bestow on them only natural or

animal happiness, if they should live agreeably to nature; --

But, in an act of this kind, God has not to do with men

considered in a merely natural state; -- Therefore, God does

not pass by certain men, considered in a merely natural

state. The truth of the Minor is proved; --

1. Because there is no natural happiness of this kind, which

is the end of man, and his ultimate neither in fact, for

there has not been, and there is not a man happy in this

sense, nor in possibility, derived from the decree of God

considered, either absolutely, for no man will ever be thus

happy naturally, or conditionally, for God did not design

happiness of this kind for any man on a condition, as the

condition must be that of obedience, which God remunerates by

supernatural happiness.

2. Because sin is the meritorious cause of that act of the

divine pleasure, by which He determined to deny, to some,

spiritual or supernatural happiness, resulting from union

with Himself and from His dwelling in man. "Your iniquities

have separated between you and your God." (Isa. lix, 2.) Nor

can that denial of happiness to man be considered otherwise

than as punishment, which is necessarily preceded by the act

of sin, and its appointment by the foresight of future sin.

These arguments may be useful also in the discussion of other

questions.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWELFTH PROPOSITION

Your definition of non-election or preterition, (which

Augustine calls also reelection,) is by no means just, -- and

this in three respects.

1. Since that, which is made a difference, is not merely an

accident. For if the difference of the things defined is only

an accident, the definition is not a good one. The essential

difference between election and reprobation consists in

adoption by Jesus Christ unto God the Father, the accidental

consectary of which is supernatural happiness. Ephesians 1,

and Romans 8.

2. Because the thing defined is referred, not to its primary

end, but to one which is secondary, which is erroneous. The

primary end of election is union with God by adoption, but a

secondary, and, as we have said, accidental end, is

happiness.

3. Because the definition is redundant; for an addition is

made of something positive, when you insert, in parentheses,

"but to be bestowed," &c., while the definition itself is

purely negative. There is also a fault, and even an error in

that which is added. For non-election or preterition does not

bestow natural happiness, but rather supposes it; God does

not, in that act, bestow a gift on those on whom it already

has been bestowed. This we remark concerning the Major.

The Minor is denied. God, in this act, has reference to man

in general, therefore also, in this mode, He has respect to

the same general reference. Thus you perceive that your whole

reasoning is false. To sustain your Minor you use two

arguments. The first is designed to confirm that part of the

definition, which does not, as we have asserted, belong to

definition; therefore, I need not notice it. Yet since you

afford the occasion, I shall be permitted to make certain

suggestions. The argument denies that there is any "natural

happiness of this kind, which is the end of man, and his

ultimate." If you speak here of the depraved nature of man, I

admit it; for "an evil tree does not bring forth good fruit,"

much less does it acquire any goodness of itself. If you

speak of nature, in its purity, as it was, originally, in

Adam, I deny it. For, to undepraved nature, pertained its own

future natural happiness, though it was afterwards, so to

speak, to be absorbed, by the grace of God, in supernatural

happiness. This happiness was the natural design of man and

his natural end. Do not all things in nature seek their own

good? But since nature seeks not any thing which may not

exist, (it is foolish to seek that, which does not exist,

even in possibility, and nature, the work of an infinitely

wise Architect, is not foolish,) it follows that the good of

each thing exists by nature, in possibility, if the thing

does not attain to it, and in fact, if the thing does attain

to it. But if the condition of natural things is such,

consider, I pray you, my brother, how it can be truly said of

man that he is deprived of natural felicity, and his natural

end, when all things, in nature, are in a different

situation. Surely, nature could not be blind, in her most

excellent work, and see so clearly in all her other works.

But you say that this fact never existed. I admit it, for

Adam fell out by the way; but it was to exist in the future.

You say that it did not exist "in possibility." This is an

error, for God designed it for Adam, on the condition of his

remaining in the right way. I prove this from the words of

God himself; "in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt

surely die." (Gen. ii, 17.) What is death? Is it not

privation? What is privation? Is it not of some natural

attribute or habit? Adam, then, was deprived of natural life,

and of that happy constitution of life, which he obtained in

Eden, otherwise he would have remained happy in it, if he had

continued in the discharge of duty, until God had fulfilled

in him the promise of supernatural life, which was adumbrated

to him by the tree of life in the garden of Eden. For, on the

contrary, it follows that, if he had not eaten the forbidden

fruit, he would not have become mortal, but, with life and

sight, he would have been prepared for translation to a

higher life.

You affirm that God "remunerates obedience by supernatural

happiness." He indeed remunerates obedience in that way, but

not in that way alone. Conjunctively, it is true;

exclusively, it is false. He remunerates obedience in both

ways. For even at the present time, when we are very far

removed from the natural condition of Adam, godliness has the

"promise of the life that now is and of that which is to

come." (1 Tim. iv, 8.) I judge that a two-fold idea, namely,

of the end and of the mode, has led you into error. You have

thought that the only end of man is that which is

supernatural. It is very true, that things subordinate are

not at variance. There is a natural end. As nature is

subordinate to God, so natural ends are subordinate to those

which are supernatural and divine. The end of our nature, so

far as it is natural, is this, that it should approach very

near to the Divine; so far as it is supernatural, it is that

man may be united to God. To the former, Adam could attain by

nature; to the latter, he could be exalted from the former,

by grace. You indeed judged that there could be no mode, in

which both kinds of happiness should concur. But two things

must be observed in this case, one, that natural happiness is

a previous preparation, the other that it is a foundation to

the supernatural. It is prepared for and previous to it.

Unless he had been already happy in nature, even it he had

remained without falling, he would not have attained the

other happiness, there must have been in him that natural

happiness by which he could approach the supernatural. But

when he should have in fact, entered into that supernatural

felicity, then natural happiness would be the foundation and

upon it the consummation would be in supernatural happiness.

If perfection is added to perfection, the less is not

destroyed, but the increase is made upon the less, as fire is

increased by fire, the vegetative faculty by the sentient,

and both by the rational. The less rests in the greater as in

its own principle, and is more fully perfected by it, as it

more fully ceases to be its own, and partakes of the

perfection of another. Thus it will be, in the resurrection

of the dead and in eternal life. The nature of man will be

both perfected and glorified above the mode of nature. It

will so obtain the perfection of nature, as to rest in that

divine and supernatural perfection; and nature will not be

abolished, but be clothed in a supernatural mode, as the

apostle says of the body, in 1 Corinthians 15. These things,

however, are merely incidental.

Your second argument may be stated thus: -- Sin is the

meritorious cause of that negative act; -- Man, in a merely

natural state, has no sin; -- There is not then, in him any

meritorious cause. By consequence God has not any cause of

that negative act. The whole prosyllogism is admitted, but

the inference is denied, because it is made from a particular

case. It would indeed be true if the negative act of the

Deity resulted only from a meritorious cause, but this

position is very far removed from the truth. The cause of

every negative act is either in God or in the creature. The

same is true of this act. But the cause of this act is not in

the creature. Therefore, it is in God. This prosyllogism will

be denied by none. In the will of God alone, exists the cause

that you are not an apostle, and that you may not live to the

age of Adam or Methuselah. Iniquity in man is the cause that

he is far from God, and that God is far from him; namely, in

that respect, of which Isaiah spoke. (Isa. lix, 2.) For, in

other respects, not only is iniquity a cause, but also the

will of God; who, if he would, might remove their iniquity as

a cloud, and bring man near to Himself: I prove that the

cause of this act is not in the creature, as was said before

in the 10th proposition; first, by the authority of Christ in

Matthew 25, and of Paul in Romans 8 & 9, and Ephesians 1;

secondly, by reason, since even that first sin did not take

place, except from the negative act of God, of which negative

act sin cannot be the cause, for the same thing cannot be

both cause and consequence of another thing. But election and

non-election were prior even to the first sin, as we have

before demonstrated. A positive and a negative act of God

also precede every act of the creature, whether good or bad.

For there is no evil act which has not been preceded also by

a negative act of the Deity, permitting the evil. Adam and

Eve sinned, certainly not without a negative act of God,

though there had been committed by them no previous sin,

deserving that negation. What, then, was the cause of that

negative act if it was not the free will of God? In

subsequent sins, however, it may be admitted that sin is,

indeed, the meritorious cause, and the free will of God is

also a cause; for He destroys even sins, when He wills. He

has that power, and if He does not destroy them, it is

because He does not will to do it. But those sins which He

destroys, can not, though a meritorious cause, produce the

negative act of God. You see then, my brother, that sin may

be indeed a meritorious cause of that negative act, but not

singly or alone or always; therefore, it is not the necessary

cause.

Thirdly, by the example of the Angels? What has restrained

the holy Angels from evil and confirmed them in good? The

positive act of God, that is, the manifestation of Himself in

election; for they are elect. What did not restrain the

fallen Angels from evil, into which they rushed of their own

will? The negative act of God, in non-election or preterition

which Augustine also calls reelection. It also belongs to

this act of election, that the former were confirmed in good

against evil, and to reprobation, that the latter were left,

who (as Christ says in John 8.) speak a lie of their own, and

commit sin. However, I wish that you would always remember,

in this case and in subsequent arguments, that it is not

suitable to substitute, for the proper and proximate end, a

remote consequence, or event (which is also called in its own

mode, an end), namely, supernatural happiness. That it is

appropriate and proximate to assert that sin is the

meritorious cause of that divine negative act, by which He

does not adopt certain men as children unto Himself by

Christ, the consectary of which adoption is happiness, is

denied, my brother, by nature herself. God begets sons unto

Himself according to His own will, not according to their

character, whether good as in the case of the elect angels,

or bad as in our own case. He looks upon all, in Christ, not

in themselves, that Christ "might be the first-born among

many brethren." (Rom. viii, 29.) In nature, children are

begotten by parents, without reference to their future

character, and may not God beget his adopted children,

without reference to their character? Nature claims the whole

for itself in those about to be begotten; may grace claim but

a very small part? God forbid.

Of the same nature is the position that "denial of happiness

to man cannot be considered otherwise than as punishment."

For in the first place, "denial of happiness" is not suitably

introduced into the discussion, the subject of which is the

denial of adoption, which, as we have said, is the

appropriate and proximate end of election. This, then, is

not, primarily and per se, the proposition. Again, if the

subject of discussion is adoption, the statement is not true;

for a denial of adoption is not properly punishment; it is,

indeed, previous to punishment, since it is even previous to

sin, but it is not, therefore, punishment. Who, indeed, can

affirm that the antecedent is the same with its consequent,

and that a most remote one? But if, as you think, the

statement is made in reference to happiness, it is not, even

in that case universally true; for a denial of happiness, on

account of sin, is considered as punishment of sin, but a

denial of happiness on account of a voluntary arrangement, or

of the will only, is not punishment. To Adam, in his

primitive state of holiness, God denied supernatural

happiness, until he should fulfill his appointed course. That

was not punishment to Adam. To a private individual it is not

a punishment that he is not an emperor. The denial of

happiness, is not punishment, then, of itself alone, but of

some accident, as a final consequence, (as they say), of the

sin of the creature.

The same consideration is fatal to your statement, that

"denial of happiness is necessarily preceded by the act of

sin." That is true, indeed, of the denial of final happiness,

as they style it; but we are now discussing the denial of the

principle of happiness, that is, of grace and gratuitous

adoption in Christ Jesus. Therefore, though it may be

conceded to you, that sin precedes, in fact, that denial, yet

this also should be added, that antecedent to sin is

particular reelection by God in the beginning and progress of

sin, but that the foundation of that particular reelection is

non-election, or preterition and reprobation, which we

acknowledge to be, not the cause, but the antecedent of sin.

So, likewise, your statement is not universally true, that

"the appointment of that act is preceded by the foresight of

future sin." For that foresight of future sin is both the

consequent, and the antecedent of that divine denial; since

the divine negative act, (as they call it), precedes the

commission of sin, but, as has been before shown, follows

that commission by imposing final unhappiness on the sins of

men. These answers may also be adapted, in the most complete

manner possible, to the arguments which follow.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWELFTH PROPOSITION

Definition and demonstration are distinguished by their

objects. The former, is used for explanation, the latter, for

proof: the former, for the discussion of a single question,

the latter, for that of a compound question. But in this

case, I did not undertake to explain, but to prove. I

therefore, thought I must make use, in my argument, of

definition so far as would tend to prove that which I had

undertaken to prove, which was the reason that I did not use

special effort to adapt my definition of election or

preterition to the rules of art. For if what I lay down is on

the whole kata< pantov true, even if it do not reach the

truth in all respects, kaq o[lou it will be sufficient for

me, for the proof which I have proposed to myself. Hence,

even with those substitutions, which you have considered

important, my proof remains valid, and therefore, that

correction does not seem to be necessary for our purpose.

Yet, I must say something concerning that matter. In general,

I remark, that you could see that I was treating distinctly

of that predestination which is unto glory, not of that which

is unto grace, and of that preterition, by which glory was

not prepared for some, not of that by which God determined

not to communicate grace. This is evident from my eighth

proposition. I must then abstain from matters which belong in

general to grace and glory. Among those general matters is

adoption as children, for the beginning and progress of

which, grace is prepared, and glory for its consummation.

Thus you also remark elsewhere in this answer.

I remark particularly, in reference to your corrections to

the first; -- in adoption and non-adoption consists the

essential difference of election at once to grace and to

glory, and of reprobation from both. Therefore, that the

former difference pertains not to election to glory alone,

and the latter, is not of reprobation from glory alone. For a

difference of genus can not be a difference of species.

Therefore, I ought not in this case to have mentioned

adoption unless I wished, in discussing a species, to set

forth the genus contrary to the law, referred to above kaq

o[lou.

To the second; -- I mentioned no end in my definition of

election, or rather in the part of the definition which I

presented. I did not, indeed, desire to present it in full.

For supernatural happiness or glory is not the end, but the

material or subject of election, which material, embraced in

your Theses in the term blessing, you divide into grace and

glory. I know, indeed, that supernatural happiness is not

communicated to us, except by an antecedent union of

ourselves with God, which is implied in these words from the

same proposition, "to deny supernatural happiness, and

resulting from the union with Himself, and from His

indwelling in man." But let us notice the definition of

preterition contained in your Theses. "Preterition is an act

of the divine pleasure by which God determined, from

eternity, to leave certain of His creatures in their own

natural state, and not to communicate to them supernatural

grace, by which their nature, if unfallen, might be

confirmed, and, if fallen, might be restored; for the

declaration of the freedom of His goodness." In the phrase

"to leave in their own natural state," is comprehended, also,

exclusion from supernatural happiness, or it is not. If not,

the definition is incomplete. I think, however, that you

designed to include, also, that idea, otherwise your Theses

are imperfect, as they treat of the predestination by which

grace and glory are prepared for the elect, but nowhere of

the negative act by which God does not appoint glory for the

non-elect, if not in those words. Yet, even in those words,

according to your idea, that preterition, by which God does

not determine to bestow glory on any one, can not be

included. For you define preterition (Thesis 14) to be

"contrary to the preparation of grace." But the preparation

of punishment is an affirmative act, by which He appoints

punishment for the sinner, opposed, not negatively, but

affirmatively to the preparation of glory. When, therefore, I

wished to describe preterition or non-election, so far as it

is an act by which God does not determine to bestow glory on

some persons, it seemed proper that I should, in some

measure, keep in your track, in that, you nowhere, in your

definition of preterition, mention exclusion from adoption

and union with God.

To the third; -- It is manifest that what is inserted, in

parenthesis, was added for the sake of explanation, and does

not come within the order or relation of the definition, like

the other statements. I do not, however see, that even those

statements are false or faulty, though they may be related,

in the mode which you consider them, to that definition. For

they mark, not an affirmation, but a negative act, and there

is emphasis in the word (tantum) which marks the negative. To

will the bestowment of natural happiness is an affirmative

act, but to will only that bestowment is a negative act, for

it excludes all other happiness, which He does not determine

to bestow. Also, what is that act by which God determines to

bestow only natural happiness, if not preterition or neglect.

If to leave in a natural state is a negative act, and

otherwise your definition of non-election, which considers it

as opposed negatively to predestination, is erroneous, I do

not see how those words "to bestow only supernatural

happiness," do not designate a negative act. If you explain

it so as to distinguish, in this case, the two acts, one,

that by which God determined to bestow natural happiness, the

other, that by which He determined to bestow only that, and

not some other kind of happiness, then I acknowledge that the

former, as an affirmative act, does not pertain to this

decree of preterition. But we have never discussed that kind

of happiness. It might, then, have been easily understood

that I used those words so as to note a negative act, that of

the non-bestowment of any happiness other than natural. When

I was writing those words, I thought of using the phrase "to

leave" in imitation of you, but judged that it would be

unsuitable as presupposing that the bestowment was already

made, and I considered that supernatural happiness was not

yet bestowed, but to be bestowed, if man should live in

obedience. In which I have also your assent, as is manifest

from your answer to my third proposition, at the end. The

definition, therefore, remains, and there is nothing in it to

be blamed, for which there can not be found apology in the

example of your Theses, which I have constantly had before my

eyes in this discussion. That this may be made more plain, I

will compare your definition with mine. You thus define the

preterition by which grace is denied: "Preterition is an act

of the divine pleasure, by which God, from eternity,

determined to leave some of His creatures in their natural

state, and not to communicate to them supernatural grace, by

which their nature, if unfallen, may be confirmed, and, if

fallen, may be restored, to the declaration of the freedom of

His own goodness." If I define the preterition by which glory

is denied, analogically according to the form of your

definition, it will be like this. "Preterition is an act of

the divine pleasure, by which God, from eternity, determined

to leave some of His creatures in their natural state and not

to communicate to them supernatural happiness, or glory, by

which their natural happiness may be absorbed, or into which

their ignominy may be changed, to the declaration of the

freedom of His own goodness." In this definition, I have

proposed that which was sufficient for my purpose; with no

evasion, since, the other adjuncts are neither to the

advantage, nor to the disadvantage of my argument. Therefore,

the Major of my syllogism is true, even if it would not be

true, as a complete definition and reciprocally. For a

conclusion can be proved from a Major, which is on the whole

kata< pantov true.

I come now to the Minor, which I proved by two arguments. The

first is not refuted by you, as it is proposed in a mutilated

condition, and so it is changed into something else. For I

did not deny that natural happiness was prepared for man, but

I added "which is, the design and end of man," in which

words, I meant not that it alone, but that it also was

prepared, but on this condition that it would be absorbed by

the supernatural happiness, which should follow. I wish that

the explanation, which I add, may be thus understood; namely,

that natural happiness, could, neither in fact nor in

possibility, occur to man, as the design of man and his end.

For God promised to man, on condition of obedience, not only

natural but also supernatural happiness. In which, since, I

have also your assent, I conclude my proposition thus. God

does not will to bestow upon any man, considered in his

original natural state, natural happiness alone, as the end

and design of man, to the exclusion of supernatural

happiness. Therefore, God passed by no one, considered in his

original natural state. For whether preterition is the act by

which God does not determine to bestow supernatural happiness

on any one, or that by which He determines to bestow natural

happiness, which I think that you concede, it is equally to

my purpose.

I prove the antecedent in this way. All men are considered in

Adam, on equal terms, whether in their original natural sate,

or in a state of sin, unless some difference is introduced by

the will of God. But I deny that any difference was made in

respect to man's original state, and you confirm the first

reason for that denial, when you say that both kinds of

happiness were prepared for man. Again, that, which God, by

His providence, has prepared for man, is not denied to him by

preterition, the opposite of election, unless from the

foresight that he would not attain to it, under the guidance

of providence, but would turn aside freely, and of his own

accord. But God prepared for the first man, and in him, for

all men, supernatural felicity, for He bestowed on him means

sufficient for its attainment; with the additional aid of

divine grace, (if this was also necessary in that state,)

which is not denied to any man unless he first forsakes God.

Your opinion that I have been led into an error, by a two

fold idea, namely, that of the end and the mode, and that I

thought that a single end only was before mankind, is

incorrect, for my words do not, of themselves, imply this. I

made a plain distinction between the subordinate ends, when I

mentioned natural felicity, which I denied was the end of man

and his ultimate. I, therefore, conceded that natural

happiness belongs to man, otherwise there would have been no

necessity of the addition of the statement that this does not

belong to him as the end of man, and his ultimate, that is,

as that, beyond which nothing further can happen to man. Does

not he, who admits that natural happiness pertains to man,

but not as the end of man and his ultimate, acknowledge a two

fold end of man, one subordinate, namely, natural happiness,

and the other final, which is the end and ultimate of man,

namely, supernatural happiness? I do not, however, think that

it can be said truly that happiness is the end and ultimate

of man. Your additional remarks, concerning the order of

natural and supernatural happiness, I approve, as truthful

and learned; but they are, as you admit, "merely incidental,"

and do not affect the substance of my argument.

My second argument is also valid, but it should be arranged

correctly, thus; -- An act of the divine pleasure by which

God determined to deny to any man spiritual or supernatural

blessedness, depends on a meritorious cause, which is sin;

Preterition is such an act; -- Therefore preterition depends

on sin as its meritorious cause. The reason for the Major is

contained in these words, "that denial of happiness can not

be considered otherwise than as punishment," but it is

necessarily preceded by sin, as its proper cause, according

to the mode of merit. From this it follows that God can not

have reference in that act to men, considered in a merely

natural state, without reference to sin.

I will briefly sustain the Major, and the reason assigned for

it, and then examine your answer. I prove the Major thus:

That which the Providence of God has prepared for man, under

a condition, is not denied to him, except on the non-

performance or the violation of the condition. But God, by

His Providence, prepared supernatural happiness for man, &c.

Again, the passage from Isaiah plainly shows that God would

not have deserted the Jews, if they had not merited it by

their "iniquities." The reason, assigned for the Major, I

sustain in this manner: Whatever is contrary to the blessing

of happiness, prepared, promised, and therefore conditionally

due to man, as made in the image of God, cannot be considered

otherwise than as punishment. A denial of supernatural

happiness is contrary to the blessing of happiness, prepared

for man, as such, for even supernatural happiness was

prepared for him as such. Therefore its denial is punishment.

Again, there is no passage of Scripture, I assert it

confidently, from which it can be shown that such denial is

or can be considered otherwise than in the relation of

punishment, than as it is prepared only for sinners. For we

have stated, with truth, that punitive justice has place only

in reference to sinners.

I proceed to examine your answer. In my syllogism the

inference is not "made from a particular case." For that

negative act of God, now under discussion, only exists in

view of a meritorious cause, that is, it does not exist

except in view of that cause, and that act of God would not

exist, if that cause did not exist. The particle "only" does

not amount to an exclusion of the will of God. For it is

certain that sin is not, in fact the cause of punishment,

except as the will of God, who wills to punish sin according

to its merit, otherwise he can remove sin, and remit its

punishment. How indeed could you suppose that he, who made

sin the meritorious cause of punishment, wished to exclude

the will of God, when the very nature of meritorious cause

requires another cause also, which may estimate merit, and

inflict punishment in proportion as it is merited. I

acknowledge that the cause of every negative act does not

exist in man, nor have I made that statement, for why should

I needlessly enter into the general discussion of this

matter. My subject is the act of preterition or non-election,

by which God denies supernatural happiness to man, and I

affirm that the cause of this is in and of man, so far, that

without the existence of this cause, that act would never be

performed. But you argue that the cause of this act does not

exist in man. First, by authority, then by reason, finally by

example. I deny that proof is contained in the passages,

cited as authority. Let it be shown in what sense, these are

the antecedents, from which this consequence may be deduced.

We have previously examined those passages, so far as the

necessity of the subject required.

Your argument from reason is not more conclusive. You say

that the "first sin did not take place, except from the

negative act of God," also "a positive and a negative act of

God also precede every act of the creature," and "there is no

evil act, which has not been preceded also by a negative act

of the Deity, permitting the evil. I concede all those

points, if rightly understood. But an affirmative statement,

reasoning from the general to the specific, is not valid,

unless a mark of universality is added. Many negative acts of

the Deity precede the act of sin; therefore, also the

negative act of preterition precedes sin. I deny the

sequence. The controversy concerns that very act. The first

sin results from a negative act of God, but not from the act

of preterition. A positive and a negative act precede every

act of the creature, but not the act of election and that of

preterition. You affirm that election and non-election are

prior to sin. To sin, as existing in fact, I admit, but not

to sin, as foreseen. That point, however, has been previously

discussed. But you affirm that the free will of God is the

cause also of this negative act. Who denies it? It is indeed

within the scope of God's free will, either to punish or to

remit sin, but neither is necessary, even though sin has been

committed, (that is, since God is "in Christ reconciling the

world unto Himself,") but neither is possible unless sin has

been committed. The will of God is, in the most complete

sense, free, as the cause of creation, the cause of

glorification, the cause of condemnation. But He creates

those non-existing; He glorifies those created and existing,

and, indeed, called and justified; He condemns only sinners,

and those, who die in their sins. There is, then, no

limitation placed on the freedom of God, even if we consider

sin as antecedent, and necessarily so, to that negative act

of God. You see, then, that sin is the meritorious, cause,

which necessarily precedes that negative act of God; and that

I have reasoned correctly from that cause, necessarily

antecedent, that God, in that negative act of preterition,

has reference only to sinners.

That the example of the angels, in this case, is not

analogous, I show in a word. You say that "the negative act

of God, in non-election or preterition, which Augustine also

calls reelection, did not restrain the fallen angels from

evil." But I affirm that the negative act of God, by which

man is not restrained from evil, but permitted to fall into

sin, is not the act of preterition, but a negative act of

providence, and I prove, by two arguments, that this is

distinguished from predestination. If it is by the negative

act of preterition, then all are passed by, for all have

sinned. Also, if it is the negative act of preterition, then

all men have sinned irretrievably, and without hope of pardon

and remission, as in the case of the angels who sinned. I add

a third consideration, that an act of election, opposed at

the same time to preterition, must have place here, in

respect to certain individuals; but there is not and can not

be such an act, in this case, since all men are comprehended

under that preterition. There is a great difference between

the negative act, by which God left man to his own counsel,

and the negative act of preterition, which is to be here

considered. Nor do I think that it is of much importance to

this subject that, for non-adoption, as the proper and

proximate end, I have substituted, the remote consequence,

the absence of supernatural happiness. For, in addition to

the fact that adoption, in your Theses already often cited,

occupies the place of form not of end, I affirm that, in the

negative act, by which He did not will adoption for any man,

God could not, or, at least, did not have reference to any

except sinners.

But you say that "God begets sons unto Himself according to

His own will." He does this, however, from among sinful men.

"He looks," you say, "upon all in Christ, not in themselves."

Therefore, I affirm, He considers them as sinners, not in

themselves, as having, in themselves, any reason that He

should regard them, but in themselves, as in need of being

considered in Christ as Mediator of such character. "May not

God," you ask, "beget His adopted children without reference

to their character?" I admit that He may, without such

reference to them as may influence God to beget them, not

without such reference to them, that, not generation, but

regeneration may be necessary to them. Grace claims for

itself the whole in generation, but more strongly claims the

whole in regeneration. But that God begets sons to Himself

from among men, the word generation being used in any other

sense than that of regeneration, I consider contrary both to

theology and to Scripture. The subject, however, of

discussion is adoption according to the decree of God.

Let us now consider the position, by which I strengthened my

argument. I said that the "denial of happiness to man can not

be considered otherwise than as punishment. I said "denial of

happiness" not "of adoption." For I am, here, discussing the

denial of glory, not of grace; but non-adoption, either alone

or also, pertains to the latter. I wish, however, that it

might be shown in what mode a denial of adoption to a man,

made in the image of God, has not the nature of punishment,

and is not caused by sin. You indeed affirm that it is

previous to punishment, since it is previous even to sin. I

deny both parts of the assertion. It belongs to him, who

makes an assertion, to prove it, but I, though denying the

assertion, will give the reason of my denial, to show the

strength of my cause. He, who is made in the image of God, as

Luke says of Adam, "which was the Son of God," (chap. iii,

38,) is, by the grace of creation, the son of God. But Adam

was, not begotten, but created, "the son of God," as said in

the marginal note of Beza's Testament. That, which any one

has by the gift of creation, is not taken from him, unless

the demerit of sin precedes, according to the justice of God.

Supernatural happiness, whether it is bestowed on condition

of obedience to law, or according to the condition of the

covenant of grace, is always to be considered in the relation

of an inheritance; but it was promised to Adam, on the

condition of obedience; therefore, Adam was then considered

as the Son of God. Filiation, then, could not be denied to

him except on account of sin and disobedience. But the

subject, of which I was treating, was denial of happiness.

You assert, that denial of happiness, considered in general,

is not punishment, since that, which exists on account of a

voluntary arrangement of God, is not punishment. I wish that

you would show that any denial of supernatural happiness is

according to voluntary arrangement of God, apart from the

consideration of sin. You remark, in proof of your assertion,

that "to Adam God denied supernatural happiness, until he

should fulfill his appointed course. That was not punishment

to Adam." I reply, the term, denial of supernatural happiness

is ambiguous; it may be either final or temporary. The former

is peremptory, the latter is conditional. That, of which we

treat, is final and peremptory. The decree of predestination

and preterition is peremptory, and that, which is prepared

for or denied to any one, according to that decree, he will

finally enjoy, or want. But you treat of temporary denial,

"until he should fulfill his appointed course," according to

the rule of divine justice, and of denial, on the

consideration that he should not live according to the

requirement of God, -- which denial belongs to the just

providence of God, in contra-distinction to predestination

and preterition. Indeed what you call a denial, can not be so

called except in catachrestic sense. For how shall he be said

to deny happiness to any one, who has promised it on a

certain condition? You concede, however, that sin is

antecedent to the denial of final happiness. But preterition

or non-election is a denial of final happiness. Therefore,

sin is antecedent to preterition. You say that it should be

stated in addition "that antecedent to sin is particular

abandonment by God, in the beginning and progress of sin, the

foundation of which abandonment is non-election, or

preterition and reprobation." I concede that abandonment by

God was antecedent to sin, so far that God left man in the

power of his own purposes; but it is not particular, but

universal, in respect to the beginning of sin, for in that

abandonment he left Adam, and, in him, all men; hence

preterition can not be the foundation of that abandonment.

For all mankind were left, in the beginning of sin. In

respect to its progress, it may be called particular, for He

freed some from sin and left others in sin; and non-election

or preterition may be called the foundation of this

abandonment, since some were left in the progress of sin,

others being freed from sin by the gratuitous election of

God, which is the direct opposite of preterition. Hence it

follows that it can not be rightly said that preterition or

non-election is the antecedent of sin, since it is only the

antecedent of the progress of that which has already been

perpetrated, and, indeed, its cause, by a denial of that

which prevents the progress of sin, namely, grace. I affirm

that it is universally true that the foresight of sin

precedes the appointment of that negative act by which he

does not determine to bestow felicity on an individual. For

the act of preterition does not precede commission of sin, as

has been already frequently shown. Sin, which is common to

all men, does not result from that negative act which

discriminates among men, but from a negative act common to

all men. Preterition is a negative act, not common to all

men, but discriminating among them. Therefore, preterition is

not an act antecedent to sin. So my arguments are confirmed

against your answers; they may, therefore, also be available

for the decision of the other questions.

THIRTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

The second question, referring to the preparation of grace,

and its opposite, preterition, is not, whether God designed

to bestow saving grace only on some persons, and those

considered in certain relations, and did not design to bestow

it on others, for this is very manifest from the Scriptures,

in many passages. But the question is, whether God, in the

act of predestination and its opposite, preterition, had

reference to men, considered in a natural condition. I have

not been able to persuade myself, either from the writings of

Thomas Aquinas, or from those of the advocates of his views,

that this question is to be answered affirmatively. My

reasons for answering it negatively, are these: --

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE THIRTEENTH PROPOSITION

I have previously stated that divine election and non-

election have reference to men in general, and this is very

true. The phrase, "merely natural state," is ambiguous. The

question before us, then, is not, whether election has

reference only to men, considered in a natural condition, (as

you understand that phrase,) if one attends closely to the

subject. This is rather the question, whether it also has

reference to men, so considered. We answer this

affirmatively. Indeed, though it differs, in phraseology,

from the first theory, yet we think that, in fact, it is very

much in harmony with it, since this particular relation was

added neither by Thomas Aquinas, nor by others, that the

relations, previously noticed, might be excluded, but only

that, in this argument, a consideration of sin, as a cause,

might be excluded. Yet, let us examine your arguments as they

are presented.

THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE THIRTEENTH

PROPOSITION

That man, considered in general, is the object of the decree

of which we treat, has not yet been made clear to me from

your answers. Indeed I have proved from many arguments,

adduced, as opportunity has been offered, that a general

consideration of man has no place in that decree, and I shall

prove the same by other arguments, as there may be occasion.

Concerning the state of the question, as you propose it, I

will not contend with you. Let the question be as you state

it, whether God, in the decree of predestination and

reprobation, has reference also to men, considered in a

merely natural state. I maintain the negative. Not only does

the affirmative of this question please you, but, from your

Theses and other writings, you seem to me to incline to it so

strongly that you seem even to have proposed the affirmative

of the former theory. For if He, who predestinates and passes

by, did not consider man as a sinner, then He did consider

him as created among those things, on which He imposed

certain conditions, or as not created, or as to be created.

But let these remarks suffice. I have every where denied, and

still deny, that God, in the act of predestination and of

preterition, had reference also to men, considered in a

merely natural state; but I assert that He had reference only

to men, as considered in their sins. Concerning the

difference between the first and second theory, we have

already spoken.

FOURTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

First, because Adam and, in him, all men were created in a

state of supernatural grace, hence no one could be considered

in a merely natural state. The antecedent is proved, because

all were created in Adam after the image and likeness of God;

but that is supernatural grace, as has been said: secondly,

the law, which was given to Adam, was enacted for all, which

is evident from the fact that all sinned in Adam, and became

guilty of transgression. But that law could not be obeyed

without supernatural grace, which I prove from the subject of

the law, from the appendix of the law, from the instigator of

transaction, and from the mode of instigation. The law

required obedience towards God, that man should live, not

according to man, but according to God, which life is not

animal, but spiritual, and its cause in man is supernatural

grace. The appendix of the law consisted in the threatening

of temporal and spiritual death, that of the body and of the

soul. Punishment, which is spiritual and opposed, not only to

animal, but also to spiritual good, ought not to be annexed,

in equity, to a law which can be observed without

supernatural grace; especially when the same law, if

observed, could not afford supernatural or spiritual good,

since it can be observed without supernatural grace. It seems

unjust that the transgression of a law should deserve eternal

and spiritual death, but its observance could not obtain

eternal and spiritual life from God, on the terms of divine

goodness and justice. The instigator was Satan, whose design

was to cast down man, by transgression, to death, not only of

the body, but of the soul, and when man could only resist

through supernatural grace. The mode of temptation was such

that it could not be successfully resisted by man, if

destitute of supernatural grace.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FOURTEENTH PROPOSITION

Your antecedent, namely, "Adam and in him all men were

created in a state of supernatural grace," is ambiguous.

Again, it can not be proved, as we have shown, in answer to

the tenth proposition. The consequent is denied, and is also

ambiguous. Since I have previously discussed both of these

points, I come now to the arguments. The proof from the image

of God, was related in the same answer, and it was shown that

it was not supernatural of itself; but that it had relation

and adjustment to supernatural grace, not of nature or its

own essence, but by the arrangement of grace. This argument,

therefore, now, as before, is denied. The first position in

the second argument, is not to be admitted without some

distinction, for one law, given to Adam, was general; the

other particular. The general law, namely, that which is

natural and joined to the natural, was enacted for all. This

was by no means true of the particular law. The latter was

that he should not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and

evil. It is not credible that this law, which was one of

particular requisition should have been enacted for all; it

is not credible that, if all had remained unfallen, they

would have come into Eden to that tree, that their obedience

should be tested.

The Scripture, also, does not make this statement. We concede

the second position in reference to the universal law, not in

that the law was natural, but in that the nature of man

itself and the natural law, was adjusted to grace. The

natural, as such, was within the capability of man; as it was

related and adjusted to grace, it could not be observed

without supernatural grace. In reference to the special law,

the second position is erroneous. For the mere act of eating

or not eating of any fruit, is natural. The power to eat or

abstain from that fruit, was, in fact, possessed by man,

though these acts were not both left with him by the

requisition and arrangement of the special law declared by

God. Therefore the second point is, in this case, erroneous,

for it was possible for him not to choose, not to touch, not

to eat the fruit, as it was to do the contrary. This was of

natural power (which possessed full vigour) in a natural

subject. To establish this point, you adduce four arguments,

all pertaining to the mode of general law. I will briefly

examine each in order. The first argument pertains to general

law, both as it is natural and as it is adjusted to grace. We

concede, then, that the affirmative is true of general law,

but deny it as to the particular law, by which God required

obedience in a particular matter, and in one merely natural

or animal. It pertained to natural power to abstain from or

to eat that fruit; it pertained to natural will to avoid the

experiment of sin and death, of which God had forewarned

them. God tested the obedience of man in a matter merely

natural, and in the same thing he miserably renounced

obedience to God, of his own will, not by any necessity. He

had then no just ground of complaint that God should hold him

responsible, because, in a matter of no difficulty, and

according to nature, he did not willingly render due

obedience unto the Lord, but preferred, to His word, the word

of the serpent in the case of Eve, and that of his wife in

the case of Adam.

You will perhaps say that he would not have committed that

transgression, if grace had been bestowed upon him. Must you,

then, always require grace, and make it ground of accusation,

if it is not bestowed, even in a matter which is natural,

and, indeed, merely natural? God bestowed a natural

constitution on Adam, for this very reason, that in a matter

merely natural, he might use his natural powers. He gave that

which was sufficient. Do you demand more? I quote, on this

point, the words of Tertullian (lib. 2 advers. Marcion, cap.

7.) "If God bestowed upon man the freedom of the will and

power to act, and bestowed it suitably, He undoubtedly,

according to His authority as Creator, bestowed them to be

enjoyed, but to be enjoyed, so far as depended upon Himself;

in accordance with His own character, that is 'after God,'

that is according to goodness, (for who would grant any

permission against himself,); but so far as depended upon

man, according to the motions of his freedom. Who, indeed,

bestowing on a person any thing to be enjoyed, does not so

bestow it, that it may be enjoyed according to his mind and

will? It was, therefore, a consequence that God should not

interfere with the liberty once granted to man, that is, that

He should retain in Himself the action of His prescience and

prepotency, by which He could have intervened, so that man

should not fall into danger, in attempting to enjoy his own

freedom, in an evil mode. For had He thus intervened, He

would have rescinded the freedom of the will, which, in

reason and goodness, He had bestowed. Then let it be supposed

that he had intervened, that He had destroyed the freedom of

the will, by calling him back from the tree by not permitting

the tempting serpent to converse with the woman, would not

Marcion exclaim, O futile, unstable, unfaithful Lord,

rescinding that which He had established! Why did he bestow

the freedom of the will, if He must interfere with it? Why

did He interfere, if He bestowed it? Let Him then choose the

point in which He shall charge Himself with error, whether in

its bestowment, or in its rescission, &c."

Your statement, that "supernatural grace is the cause of

spiritual life in man," we believe to be most certainly true,

and we avow the same thing. Yet there was one mode of

spiritual life in Adam, and there is another mode in us, in

whom supernatural grace alone produces this life, while Adam

had, together with this grace, the image of God unimpaired

and uncorrupted, and therefore had spiritual life in both

modes, the natural and supernatural. But these things will be

introduced, appropriately, in another place.

Your second argument, from the appendix of the law, is

plainly in the same condition. This seems to be its scope. If

God, in the case of election and reprobation, had reference

to men considered in a merely natural state, (that is, with

the same ambiguity, and on the supposition which we have

denied above,) He would not have ordained spiritual

punishment, opposed not only to animal, but is spiritual

good, for transgression of a law, which might be observed

without supernatural grace; for it is in accordance with

equity (which point was also regarded in the law of the

twelve tables) that the punishment should be adapted to the

crime; -- But God ordained punishment of this kind; --

Therefore, He did not have reference to men, considered in a

natural condition. In reference to the antecedent of the

Major, I will say nothing; I have already spoken often on

that point. The consequent is denied. It would be true, if

both sins or evil deeds and their punishments were estimated

only from the deed (which the law forbids), and according to

its kind. But there are many other things, by which the

gravity of offenses is usually, and most justly estimated;

the author of the law, the author of the crime, its object,

end, and circumstances. We must consider the author of the

law, for the authority of a law, enacted by an emperor, is

greater than that of one, enacted by a tribune, of one

imposed by God, than of one imposed by man. The author of the

crime, whether he commands it, or personally commits it. For

a crime is greater which is committed through the persuasion

of an enemy, than one committed through that of a master or

father. The same distinction may be applied to the personal

commission of sin. The object, for an offense, against a

parent, is more heinous than against a stranger, against

one's self and family, than against a person not thus

connected, against God than against man. The end, for it is a

greater sin, if you transgress a law with an unimportant end

or no end in view, than if the same thing is done of

necessity, if with all unworthy and wicked design than if

with a worthy and good design.

What shall I say in reference to circumstances? What I have

already said is, in my judgment, sufficient. But he, who

transgresses the law of God, is guilty of these aggravating

particulars, of which even the first, alone, is sufficient

for the infliction, with the utmost justice, of spiritual

punishment. Should he regard lightly the legislator, God?

Adding the second, should he listen to an enemy, the enemy of

God, and of his race, and of the universe, Should he, the

recent workmanship of God, and the tenant of Paradise,

transgress the recent commandment of God, Adding the third

particular, should he rush forward against himself, his

family, and God, not ignorantly, but with due warning? Do not

these, my brother, seem to you to be cases of the greatest

aggravation? Are they not worthy of bodily and spiritual

punishment? As in general, so in special or particular law,

the same rule is to be observed. The law was particular, and

that in a natural requirement, which man could perform

naturally, as we have before said. Here perhaps, you will

say, that it is improper that supernatural punishment should

be imposed in reference to a natural offense. But consider

all those things which I have just said. Man transgressed the

law of God, from which he has just received the blessings of

nature and of grace, and to whom he owed all things as his

Supreme Ruler. He transgressed by the persuasion of the

Devil, the public and sworn enemy of God, of the universe,

and of the human race, to listen to whom, once only, is to

renounce God. At the time of his transgression, he was the

recent work of God, the heir of all natural and supernatural

good, the inhabitant of Paradise, the foster-child of heaven,

the lord of all things, servant of God alone. Man

transgressed, using violence against himself, and bringing

sin and death, and all evils upon himself and his posterity,

dishonouring God in himself, though forewarned by the God of

truth, and prescient, in his own mind, of coming evil. He

transgressed in a matter, most trivial, entirely unnecessary,

of the least importance, when he really abounded in the

blessings of the whole world, and this with a most unworthy

and plainly impious design, that he might be like God,

"knowing good and evil." How could he, who was not faithful

and obedient in a matter of the least importance, be faithful

in one of great importance, He transgressed in a beastly

manner, served his belly and appetite, blind to all things

belonging to heaven and earth, except the flame of lust,

wickedly placed before his eyes, deaf to all things except

the voice of the devil. Here, if we please to glance at other

circumstances, how many and how strong arguments exist for

most just though most severe damnation! Truly, was that, in

many respects, an infinite fall, which brought infinite ruin.

But should any one affirm, that it was an unworthy thing that

man should be condemned for so small a matter, let him

consider these two things; first, it was an unworthy thing

that man, in "so small a matter," should disobey the mandate

of his Supreme Ruler, of the author of nature, of grace, and

of his salvation; secondly, it is not a small matter, which

was ordained for the manifestation of due obedience in

natural things, and as a just method of the perception of

supernatural blessings. God willed that Adam should, by this

sign, manifest his religious and voluntary obedience in

natural things, and in this way suitably exert himself to

attain supernatural blessings. Does this seem a small matter,

when he acted contrary to the will of God, and to all natural

and supernatural blessings in a thing of so little

importance? But, to proceed; do you think, my brother, that

this punishment can be inflicted on man more justly, if

considered in his fallen state, than if considered in his

natural condition, This is the amount of your argument. I

have not indeed hesitated to affirm the contrary. I say that

the sin of Adam was more heinous, because he sinned when

unfallen, than if he had sinned, as a fallen being. Consider

the simple fact in the case of man. You will, I know, declare

that it was a more unworthy thing that man, in a state of

integrity, should become the slave of sin, than if, in a

sinful state, he should fall into sin. It is, therefore, more

just that Adam, at the time of that transgression, should be

considered as unfallen, than in reference to the fall which

afterwards supervened. This illustrates the truth of the

righteousness of God. As to your statement, "it seems unjust

that the transgression could deserve eternal and spiritual

death, &c." I wonder, indeed, that it could have been made by

you. For you are not ignorant that the law of God, whether

general or particular, is the appointment of the present

course according to which we both worship God in the

discharge of duty, and reach the goal of supernatural grace.

As a traveler, to whom his Lord has prescribed the mode of

his journey, if he departs from the prescribed path, by the

same act renounces both his journey and its goal, by his own

sin, but if he remains in the path, he performs his duty,

thus I judge that it was necessary that Adam should be

treated. The unhappy traveler left the right path. Did he

not, therefore, also renounce the good which God had

graciously set before him? If he had remained in the path he

certainly would have attained the goal, of grace, not of

merit. How, not of merit? Because, by not keeping the path,

the servant loses both his way and his life, as the proper

cause of his own evil, but by keeping the way, he obtains

life, as the result of his journey. Life is proposed, of

grace, not of merit, both to the obedient and to the

disobedient, as the result of pursuing the right path. In

this way the obedient obtains grace, and the disobedient is

the cause to himself that he does not obtain grace, and, by

his own act, forfeit the life, which depends on that grace.

The third argument, from the instigator of the transgression,

and the fourth, from the mode of temptation, are disposed of

in the same answer. The third argument is this; "man could

resist the Devil only through supernatural grace; therefore

the law could not be observed without supernatural grace" --

and the fourth; "the mode of temptation was such that it

could not be successfully resisted by man, if destitute of

supernatural grace; therefore, the law could not be observed

without supernatural grace."

In the first place, though I should admit both arguments, in

reference to general law according to our previous

distinction, yet we might, with propriety, deny their

validity in reference to that particular law, which enjoined

a natural act, situated properly and absolutely within the

capability of nature, for it is as truly natural not to eat

that which is bad in its nature or effect, as it is to eat

that which is good. It was then within the capability of man

not to sin, for the refusal or neglect to eat was in the

capability of man, of his own natural power.

In the second place, we must make a distinction in reference

to both those arguments, even when referred to the general

law of God, concerning that which is called supernatural

grace. For, as in nature, the work of Providence is

threefold, to sustain a thing as to its existence, to govern

it as to its action, and to protect or preserve it as it may

be liable to destruction, so also in the pious, the work of

grace is threefold, for it is accustomed to sustain, and to

govern, and to protect them. It always sustains, because

inherent and common grace is permanent, but it rules and

protects, or preserves when and as it chooses; for this act,

as it is assisting and not inherent, is particular, and the

free act of variable grace. This distinction having been

stated, we thus judge concerning these arguments. Man was

never without supernatural grace, either inherent or

habitual: he was not without assisting grace, except in that

particular act, in which God did not govern, did not

preserve, because it was an act of nature, which must be

tested in its own mode, which has been allotted to it by the

infinite wisdom of God. For, as Tertullian says -- God

retired, from the administration not of all grace, but of

supernatural grace from the time when he said to man, "Of

every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat. But of the

tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat of it,"

(Gen. ii, 16 and 17,) and committed the whole matter, of

compact and solely, to the nature of man." Indeed he wholly

transferred to the will of man, according to the law of his

nature, the power to render or not to render obedience in all

matters pertaining to nature. But "he could not resist the

devil, and the mode of the temptation was irresistible." This

is denied; for if he could, according to his nature, refrain

from eating of the forbidden fruit, he could, in this, resist

the devil, and the mode of the temptation was not

irresistible. He could refrain from eating, because that was,

in the simplest sense, natural, and, by compact, as we have

just said, was placed in the power of man. But he did not

refrain from eating, certainly, because he did not wish to do

so, but he willingly consented to the temptation, concerning

which point, we have already under Prop. 9 noticed the

opinion of Augustine.

In the observance of general law, the case is different,

cause, as we have before said, the law operates on nature and

adjusts nature to the supernatural, and it could not be

observed, nor indeed could the devil be resisted, without

supernatural grace.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FOURTEENTH

PROPOSITION

My object, in the arguments which I now present, is to prove

that Adam, and in him, all the human race, were created in a

state of supernatural grace, that is, that in their original

condition they had, not only natural attributes, but also

supernatural grace, either by the act of creation or

superinfusion. From which I conclude, that God, in the act of

predestination, and preterition or reprobation, could

consider no one in a merely natural state. My first argument

is taken from the nature of the divine image, to which or in

which man was created. Another argument is deduced from the

law, which was imposed on Adam, and on all men in him, which

I assert, was not to be observed without supernatural grace.

The former argument was discussed in my reply to the answer

to the tenth Proposition, and I refer to what was then

stated.

We will now consider the latter, and, in the first place, its

Major, which supposes that the law, given to Adam, was

enacted for all men, with the addition, as proof, of the fact

that all men have sinned in Adam, and become partakers of his

transgression. You discuss this Major Proposition, without

reference to the proof. I notice the mode in which you assail

the former, and what force is possessed by the latter for its

confirmation. You make a distinction in the law, imposed on

Adam, and regard it as having a two-fold relation, first, as

common and natural; second, as particular. You say that the

former was enacted for all men, the latter, not for all men.

I agree with what you say concerning common or general law,

and shall hereafter make use of it to confirm my own

proposition. I do not, in all respects, assent to what you

say concerning particular law. The law, concerning the

forbidden tree, had, in part, a particular reference, and in

part, a general one. For it is symbolical, and consists,

therefore, of two parts, the symbol and that signified by it.

The symbol was abstinence from the forbidden tree; the thing

signified was abstinence from disobedience and evil, and the

trial of obedience. So far as abstinence from disobedience

and evil was prescribed by that law, it was a general law.

But as the law required an observance of a symbolical

character, it must be considered in a two fold light, either

as prescribing symbolical observance in general, or the

observance of that particular symbol. So far as the law

should prescribe the observance of any symbol, in general, to

test the obedience of man, it would, to that extent, be

general. For God would have determined to test the obedience

of all men by some symbol, either this one or some other, if

it had been their lot to be born in a state of integrity. I

prove this first from the fact that He purposed that the

condition of all men should be the same with that of Adam, if

they should be born in the state in which Adam was created,

in respect to the image of God. Secondly, it was most

suitable that the experiment of obedience should be made in a

matter which was indifferent; but a law, which commands or

forbids any thing indifferent is symbolical and ceremonial.

But, so far as the observance, prescribed by the law, had

reference to that particular symbol, namely, abstinence from

the fruit of the forbidden tree, it can, in one sense, be

called general, and in another, it may be particular. It was

general as prescribed to Adam and Eve, the parents and social

head of the human race, in whom, as in its origin and root,

was then contained the whole human race. It was particular,

as prescribed to the same persons as individuals, and as it,

perhaps, would not have been imposed on other human beings,

if they had, at that time, been born, and considered in

themselves, and not in their first parents. I say perhaps;

for you know that there are those who think, that if the

first human beings had maintained their integrity, that their

descendants would have been born and would have dwelt in

Paradise, and this idea has some probability. For if that

earthly paradise was a symbol of the heavenly kingdom, as

seems probable from the fact that the third heaven, the

residence of the blessed, is called, in the Scripture,

paradise, it is most probable that no one of the human race

would have been excluded from that paradise on earth, if he

had not first rendered himself worthy of the heavenly

paradise. This point may, however, be left without decision.

That the law (to come to the argument of my Major) which Adam

transgressed, was enacted for all men, I proved by an

irrefragable argument, which you passed by. "Sin is the

transgression of the law." (1 John iii, 4.) The law can not

be transgressed by him for whom it was not enacted. Hence

that law, which Adam transgressed, was enacted for all who

are said to have sinned in him. But that law was the same

which is called particular by you. More briefly; the law,

which all men transgressed in Adam was enacted for all men.

But all men transgressed, in Adam, the law concerning the

forbidden tree. For against no other law is Adam said to have

sinned, and, indeed, we are all said to be guilty of the sin

committed against that law. Therefore that law was enacted

for all men. In whatever respect, then, it is considered, it

is equally in my favour, and is equally adapted to sustain my

sentiment.

I come now to the Minor. "But that law could not be obeyed

without supernatural grace." You grant this in reference to

the general law, you deny it concerning that in which the

eating of the fruit of that tree was forbidden. I may assent

to your position for the sake of the argument, and from that

position sustain my proposition. A law which can not be

observed without supernatural grace, should be imposed only

on those to whom supernatural grace has been given by God; --

But that general law could not be observed without

supernatural grace; -- Therefore, it should be imposed only

on those to whom supernatural grace was given by God. It was

imposed on Adam, and, in him, upon all men. Therefore, Adam,

and, in him, all men, had supernatural grace. Therefore, they

could not be considered in their natural condition by God in

the act of predestination and reprobation. This might suffice

for my purpose. I affirm, however, that even the particular

law concerning the forbidden tree could not be obeyed without

supernatural grace, not indeed so far as the external act of

abstinence from the fruit of that tree was prescribed, but

as, under that symbol, obedience was commanded, and it was

enjoined on man to live not according to man, but according

to God. This you acknowledge when you say that "these acts"

(eating and abstaining), "were not both left with him by the

requisition and arrangement of the special law declared by

God, though the power to eat is to abstain from that fruit

was in fact absolutely possessed by man. That law, however,

was to be observed, not according to fact only, but according

to the arrangement of that particular law. You say that my

argument "pertains to the mode of general law." Let that be

admitted, and still sustain my proposition, as I have before

demonstrated, and I have also shown that, in the law which

you call particular, there is something of the nature of

general law. Those arguments are, therefore, in this respect

valid. The first also is sustained, as is apparent from our

previous statements. For as the law required obedience which

should consist, not only in the external deed, but in the

external disposition of the mind, for that reason it could

not be obeyed without supernatural grace.

My second argument does not seem to have been understood by

you in accordance with my meaning. The design of the argument

was -- and in this consists its force -- that spiritual

punishment could not be inflicted for the transgression of

that law, to the observance of which spiritual good was not

promised. But spiritual good was not promised to the

observance of this law, if, indeed, it could be observed

without supernatural grace. For supernatural grace and

supernatural happiness are analogous. Hence it follows, that

if spiritual punishment was the penalty of the transgression

of that law, then, also spiritual good was promised to the

observance of the same, and, therefore, it could be observed

only by supernatural grace; otherwise nature could, by its

own fact, obtain supernatural good. Here we must consider a

three-fold distinction in the transgression and observance of

law. First, a single transgression of law deserves

punishment, but reward pertains only to those who observe the

law even to the end; secondly, the violation of one precept

deserves punishment, but reward is bestowed only on those who

have kept all its precepts; thirdly, the violation of a

precept may be estimated from the omission either of an

external act or of an internal feeling, or of both at once,

also, from the intention, so that he, who fails in one of

these points, may be considered a transgressor, but

observance is judged of from all these united, nor can it be

regarded as perfect if it is not complete in all these

points. I acknowledge that what you say concerning the

heinousness of the sin perpetrated by our first parents is

very true, nor do I think that its heinousness can be

declared in words. But how do you infer that my argument is

designed to set forth that punishment would be inflicted more

justly, on a man, if he should violate the law, when he was

corrupt and sinful by nature, than if he should do the same

thing, when he was pure by nature, These states of human

nature were placed in opposition by me, but I contrasted man

in a natural condition with one endued with supernatural

grace. Punishment is inflicted with greater justice on the

latter than on the former; indeed it would be inflicted

unjustly on the former, if the law could not be observed

without supernatural grace; and if the observance of the law

had not the promise of spiritual good, spiritual punishment

is inflicted unjustly on the transgression of that law.

I will not now speak of my last two arguments and your

answers to them, both because so much has been said on the

preceding points, and because you concede to me that man was

not without habitual, supernatural grace. I conclude then

that man could not be considered in a merely natural

condition by God in the act of predestination, since he was

not in that state. In this, then, we agree. But you say,

"these arguments have no weight against the opinion which

considers man in general." I answer, that these arguments

prove that man could not have been considered in general, for

he could not have been considered in a merely natural

condition. But in the state of supernatural grace, he was not

considered as reprobate or passed by. For, in reprobation or

preterition, man is left in the state of nature, which can

have nothing supernatural or divine, as is stated in your

Theses. Also, that state of supernatural grace has its

measure and proportion to supernatural felicity according to

the providence of God. Moreover as to those, on whom God

wills to bestow supernatural happiness, by the affirmative

act of His providence, on them he cannot, by the negative act

of preterition, will not to bestow the same happiness, unless

he has considered them as failing to attain, by those

supernatural means, to that happiness, but as either about to

sin, or as having already in fact transgressed, of their own

free will. Otherwise there would be two contrary acts of God

in reference to one subject, considered in the same relation,

and performed at the same time.

FIFTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

Secondly, because the grace of predestination, or that

prepared for man in predestination, is Evangelical, not

Legal; but that grace was prepared only for man considered as

a sinner. That it is Evangelical is clear, because the decree

of predestination is peremptory. It has reference, then, not

to Legal grace, of which a man may not make use, as in the

case of transgression of law, and yet be saved, but to

Evangelical grace, by which he must be saved, or excluded

from salvation.

Again, the grace, prepared in predestination, is that of the

remission of sins, and of regeneration, that is, of the

turning of sin and to God, by the mortification of the old,

and the vivification of the new man.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FIFTEENTH PROPOSITION

I accede to your first statement, if it be correctly

understood, but some explanation may be necessary concerning

the second. In the assumption which you make, there should be

a distinction, for it is false, if referred to Evangelical

grace, understood with a general reference to nature; if that

grace be understood with reference to ourselves, it is very

true. But, as you know, it is fallacious to argue from the

concrete to the abstract. I will explain the subject in a few

words. In supernatural Evangelical grace there are two parts,

one to preserve those who are now in a state of grace; the

other to gain those who are not in that state. The order of

this grace, considered according to nature, is one thing;

considered according to ourselves it is another. The order of

nature is that they, who are in a state of grace, should be

preserved (as in the election and predestination of angels),

and afterwards that they, who are not in that state, should

be brought into it, as is done for men. Considered according

to ourselves, who have fallen from grace, the order is

different. It is necessary that they, who have fallen, should

first be raised up, as Christ does in the gospel, and then be

kept, as He will do for us eternally, in heaven, when we

shall be like the angels. Your second statement, then, is

false in the abstract, if you say that Evangelical grace, in

general, is not prepared for man, except as he is considered

sinful, for it was prepared for man in the abstract and in

common, as God also testified to man, in the symbol of the

tree of life, placed in Eden. But if you speak of Evangelical

grace, in the latter sense, that is considered in this mode

and order, then indeed I accede to your statement. But then

the conclusion will not be valid, as we have just said. For

the Evangelical grace of God is one in its substance, but

two-fold in its mode and order, which mode and order does not

change the substance of the thing. Hence it was not at all to

the purpose that your first statement might be sustained,

which we also, if it is rightly understood, strongly affirm.

Your statement that "a man may not make use of Legal grace

and yet be saved," is a doubtful one, unless it be fully

explained, and as I know that you understand it; but this

does not relate to the question. Finally, Evangelical grace,

by your limitation to the remission of sins, regeneration,

&c., is, as you also, my brother, perceive from what we have

now said, rendered incomplete, because you pass over

preservation, which is one essential part of it. In other

respects we accede to your proposition.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE FIFTEENTH PROPOSITION

My argument may be stated thus: -- Evangelical grace is

prepared only for man, considered as a sinner; -- But the

grace of predestination, or that prepared for man in

predestination, is Evangelical; -- Therefore, the grace of

predestination is prepared only for man, considered as a

sinner. This is a syllogism in form, mode, and its three

terms. Hence it includes nothing else and nothing more than

is in the premises. Though Evangelical grace, considered in

general, might have two parts, yet I have restricted the

Evangelical grace, which was prepared for man. But grace,

considered in the abstract, was not prepared for man, but

only one part of it; that is, the acquisition of those who

are not in a state of grace, not the preservation of those

who are in a state of grace, for no one of men has been kept

in that state of grace, which he obtained at his creation,

all have fallen. There is, therefore, in this case no fallacy

from the concrete to the abstract. I use the term Evangelical

grace in my first and second statements in entirely the same

manner; not in one case "according to nature" and, in the

other, "according to ourselves" or vice versa, but in both

cases "according to ourselves," namely, as that which was

prepared, for men, not angels. Therefore, by your own

acknowledgment, both my statements are true. You say that "it

is false, in the abstract, that Evangelical grace is not

prepared for man, except as he is considered as sinful, for

it was prepared for man in the abstract and in common, as God

also testified to man in the symbol of the tree of life

placed in Eden." I reply -- there is an equivocation in the

word "prepared," and when that is removed, the truth of my

view will be manifest. The preparation of grace is either

that of predestination or of providence, as used in contra-

distinction to the former. In providence, sufficient grace is

prepared, and if it is efficacious, as some think, it is not

finally efficacious. In predestination, grace, which is

efficacious, and indeed finally efficacious, is prepared.

Predestination superadds to providence, as the School-men

say, fire certainty of the event. In providence is prepared

that general grace, which pertains promiscuously to all men;

in predestination is prepared that particular grace, which is

peculiar to the elect. In providence is prepared both Legal

and Evangelical grace; in predestination only Evangelical

grace. In providence is prepared grace communicable both in

and out of paradise; in predestination is prepared grace,

communicable only out of paradise. It is true that God

symbolized, by the tree of life, general not particular

grace, Legal not Evangelical grace, grace communicable in

paradise, and, finally, sufficient, not efficacious, grace.

Therefore, the grace, which God symbolized by the tree of

life, is that of providence, not of predestination. But

Evangelical grace, which is finally efficacious, particular

not general, only communicable out of paradise, and which is

prepared for man in predestination, is no other than that

which is adapted only to man considered as a sinner. I refer,

then, in my first and second statement, to Evangelical grace,

in this mode and order. Therefore, my conclusion is valid.

And, though grace is the same, in substance, and varies only

in its mode and relation, yet that variation of mode, is a

reason that grace, constituted in that mode and order, can

certainly be prepared only for the sinner. The whole matter

will be more manifestly evident, if I conclude by the

addition of proofs of the Minor of the preceding syllogism.

Evangelical grace, by which man is in fact saved, which

consists in the remission of sins and in regeneration,

belongs only to man considered as a sinner; -- But the grace,

prepared in predestination for man, is Evangelical grace, by

which man is in fact saved, consisting in remission of sins

and in regeneration; -- Therefore, the grace, prepared for

man in predestination, does not belong to man except as he is

considered as a sinner. Consequently man was not considered

by God, in the act of predestination, in his natural

condition.

If any one should argue thus, "Evangelical grace was prepared

for man in the abstract and in common; -- But the grace,

prepared for man in predestination, is Evangelical grace;

Therefore, grace was prepared in predestination for man,

considered in the abstract and in common," he will, on more

than one account, be chargeable with fallacy. In the first

place, the Major, considered in the abstract, is false. For

that grace, which preserves its subjects in their primitive

state, which you call, also, Evangelical in respect to the

angels, was not prepared for man. Again, there are four terms

in the syllogism. For, in the Major, Evangelical grace is

spoken of in the abstract; in the Minor, it is spoken of in

the concrete. If it be said that it is understood in the

Minor in the same manner as in the Major, then the Minor,

also, is false. For the grace prepared for man in

predestination is Evangelical grace, in the concrete, and

understood in respect to us. I use your phraseology. But what

if I should deny that the grace which is bestowed on angels,

in election and predestination can be called Evangelical, and

should ask for the proof of your statement? This I could do

with propriety and justice. For it is certain, especially as

the gospel is explained to us in the Holy Scriptures, that

the grace bestowed on angels can not be called Evangelical.

The sum of the gospel is this, "Repent and believe the

gospel" or "believe in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and your

sins shall be remitted unto you, and ye shall receive the

gift of the Holy Ghost, and afterwards, eternal life." These

expressions are by no means adapted to the elect angels.

If you say that it is not Evangelical in the mode in which

the gospel is adapted to sinful men, yet, it can be called

Evangelical as, according to it, they are preserved in their

own state, you will permit me to ask the proof of that

statement. In the weakness of my capacity, I can conceive of

no other reason for that sentiment than that Christ is also

called the Mediator of angels, and that they are said to be

elect in him. You know, however, that this is in controversy

among the learned, and we have already presented some

thoughts concerning it. But, even with the concession that

Christ can be called the Mediator of angels, I can not

persuade myself that the grace, which was bestowed on the

angels, was prepared or obtained for them by any merit of

Christ, or any work which he performed, in their behalf,

before God. Grace, which Christ did not obtain, can not, in

my opinion, be called Evangelical. Again, I think that, in

general, there is a two-fold mode and way of obtaining

supernatural and eternal happiness. One of strict justice and

Legal, the other of mercy and Evangelical, as there is, also,

a two-fold covenant with God, of works and of faith, of

justice and of grace, Legal and Evangelical. In the former

mode and relation, happiness is obtained by perfect obedience

to the law, given to the creature by God; in the latter,

happiness is obtained by remission of disobedience and the

imputation of righteousness. The human mind can not conceive

any other mode; at least, no other is revealed in the

Scriptures. These two modes have, to each other, this

relation, that the former precedes, as is required by the

justice of God, by the condition presented to the creature,

and by the very nature of the case; the other follows, if, in

the former way, happiness can not be allotted to the

creature, and it seems good to the Deity, also, to propose

the latter, which depends on the mere will of God. For He can

punish or pardon disobedience. Both modes are used in

reference to man, as the Scriptures declare in many places,

and briefly in Rom. viii, 3.

"For what the Law could not do, in that it was weak through

the flesh, God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful

flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh."

I think that the former mode only was used in reference to

the angels, and that God determined to treat the angels

according to the Legal covenant strictly of justice and

works; but to display all His goodness in the salvation of

men. This is apparent from the fact that the angels, who

fell, sinned irremediably and without hope of pardon, and the

other angels did not obtain pardon for sins, for they had not

committed them, but were preserved and confirmed in their own

state, through the grace, it may be, which they received

through the mediation of Christ, and which he communicated to

them, not, in a correct sense, by that which Christ either

merited or obtained for them by any work performed in their

behalf, before God. These things, however, are irrelevant.

In my statement that it is possible for man not to use Legal

grace, and yet be saved, I intended to convey the same idea

which you also have expressed, that God can, if he will, move

iniquity "as a cloud;" and I think that the apostle says the

same in Romans iv, 5. "To him that worketh not," (that is,

who does not fulfill the law, and therefore, does not use

Legal grace,) "but believeth on Him that justifieth the

ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness."

In limiting Evangelical grace to the remission of sins and

regeneration, I committed no fault. For I explained it, not

in the abstract, (if it is ever so used), but in the

concrete. But, thus explained, it excludes that part which

you call "the grace of preservation" (unless that phrase is

applied to perseverance in a state of restoration). We were

not saved, in the primitive state, by that grace, for it was

not prepared for in that state, by predestination. For we all

fell and sinned. Here, again, there is need of the admonition

that we are not now treating of angels, therefore those

things which may be common to angels and men, are here,

according to the law of general and specific relations kaq

o[lou, to be so restricted as to apply only to men,

otherwise, in discussing the species, we shall treat of the

genus.

SIXTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

Thirdly, because the reelection of a creature, in his natural

state, of a creature, on whom is imposed a law only to be

performed by grace, is a cause of sin by the removal or the

non-bestowment of that which alone can restrain from sin.

This is grace. According to which view this sentiment is

equivalent to the former, which ascribes the ordination of

sin to a decree, from which sin necessarily exists.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SIXTEENTH PROPOSITION

The proposition can not be predicated of man in his primitive

integrity, for the law, to Adam in his integrity, was not

only his glory, but it was to be performed both by nature and

grace, since his nature was rightly adjusted to grace, but he

fell in a matter pertaining to nature, and capable of

performance by nature, which did not belong to general law,

which is here the subject of discussion, but to that

particular law, which had reference only to nature, and

absolutely pertained to it, and was to be observed by its

power alone, as was declared to Adam by God, as shown in the

answer to the fourteenth proposition. In reference to

ourselves, however, as we now are, it can be stated, with the

utmost propriety, that the law can be observed only by grace.

Indeed, it can not be observed at all by us, but its

observance is imputed of grace and is apprehended by faith in

Christ. The statement, also, is erroneous that "the

reelection of a creature, in his natural state, is a cause of

sin by the removal or non-bestowment of restraining grace,"

if it is understood in a universal sense. It is a partial

cause of sin, when removed or not bestowed, if there was

obligation to bestow it, but if there was no such obligation,

it can not, with propriety, be called a partial cause of sin.

If there was obligation to bestow it, there is

responsibility, it there was no such obligation, there is no

responsibility for the sin, even if that grace should be

wanting. This is taught by nature itself, and it is very

fitly illustrated by Clemens Alexandrinus, in two places.

But, in the law, there was something natural, which Adam

could perform by nature, and something adjusted to grace, for

which he could not, by nature alone, be sufficient.

Therefore, though Adam sinned against natural law, if he did

sin in a matter pertaining to nature, (in which grace was not

due), his own will alone was in fault, not destitution of

grace, as evidently happened to him in the particular law,

given to him in Adam. The conclusion, then, is unsound.

Of the ordination of sin, and the decree of God, and what is

signified by ordination, properly understood, we have spoken,

in answer to the sixth proposition. Your argument, that sin,

therefore, necessarily exists, is inconclusive; since the

Divine ordination would perform nothing unobligatory upon it,

but that is done by him who commits sin; and it omits nothing

obligatory upon it, but must perform and most wisely perfect

all thing. But there has been, in the answer to the sixth

proposition, a sufficient discussion of this whole subject.

THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SIXTEENTH

PROPOSITION

When I speak of grace, I do not exclude nature, for the

former presupposes the latter. The phrase "only to be

performed by grace" is equivalent to this, "not to be

performed without grace," the word "only" referring, not to

the exclusion of nature, but to the necessary inclusion of

grace. But these antecedents being supposed -- a law was

given to man, which he could not perform without grace -- and

-- grace was not bestowed -- the conclusion follows that the

cause of sin was not man, but he, who imposed such a law and

did not give the means of its observance, or, to speak more

correctly, a transgression of a law cannot be called sin,

when the law is unjust, as that of God, reaping where He has

not sown, which is far from a good and a just God, and its

transgression is necessary, not voluntary, on account of an

inability not to transgress. It is, then, in all respects,

true, that he, who does not bestow that without which sin can

not be avoided, or removes that without which the law can not

be observed, is truly the author of sin, or rather the cause

that the law is not observed, which non-observance, can not

have the relation of sin. The condition, "if there was

obligation to bestow restraining grace," is added, in this

case, in vain. For God is, necessarily, under obligation to

bestow on man the power to keep that law, which He imposes on

him, unless, indeed, man has deprived himself of that power,

by his own fault, in which case, God is not under obligation

to restore it. That, however, was not the case in the

primitive state of man, before his sin. In this sense, I

grant that he, who is not under obligation to bestow the

power, to observe the law and to avoid sin, is not the author

of sin, if he does not bestow it; but this statement should

be added, that God is under obligation to give that power, if

He gave the law, the observance of which necessarily implies

the power. God does not, indeed, owe any thing to any person,

in an absolute sense, for no one has given that to Him which

should be repaid, but God can, by His own act, place Himself

under obligation to man, either by promise, or by requiring

an act of him. By promise, if He has made it absolutely or on

a condition, then He is a debtor, absolutely or

conditionally; "God is not unrighteous to forget your work."

(Heb. vii, 10.) By requiring an act, He is placed under

obligation to bestow the power necessary for the performance

of the act. If He does not bestow it, and yet, by an

enactment of a law, requires the performance of the act, then

He, not man, is the cause of the transgression of that law.

In reference to those antecedents, whether a law was imposed

on man, to be observed without grace, or not, and whether man

received, in his primitive state, supernatural grace, there

has been sufficient discussion under propositions tenth and

fourteenth. Nor is it to the purpose to say that "if he

sinned in a matter pertaining to nature, (in which grace was

not due,) his own will alone was in fault, not destitution of

grace"; who denies that statement, if that law could be

observed by the powers of nature? But I deny that such was

the case in that particular law given to Adam, and the

reasons for this denial have been already given in my review

of your answer to the fourteenth proposition. We have also

remarked, at sufficient length, in the sixth proposition,

concerning the ordination of sin, and how it is made,

according to the view of Calvin and Beza, the basis of the

divine decree. I grant that the ordination of God does

nothing unduly, but as an ordination of sin, such as they

attribute to the Deity, is not in harmony with the character

of God, it is not wonderful that, from it, something undue

should he attributed to God.

SEVENTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

In reference to the third question, it is not in controversy

whether God, foreseeing the sins of some, prepared for their

deserved punishment, but whether, foreseeing the sins of

those thus passed by and left in their natural state, He

prepared punishment for them from eternity. The latter does

not seem to me to be true.

REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE SEVENTEENTH PROPOSITION

They, for whose sins God prepared merited punishment, are not

the elect: therefore they are passed by and reprobate. It has

been before demonstrated that they were passed by, in a mode

in harmony with the wisdom of God.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SEVENTEENTH

PROPOSITION

It is not true, universally, that "they, for whose sins God

prepared merited punishment, are not the elect," for He

prepared merited punishment even for the sins of the elect,

both by laying them upon Christ, that he might expiate them,

and by sometimes inflicting the consequences of sin even on

the elect, that they may learn how they have deserved to be

treated forever, and how they would have been treated, if God

had not determined to have mercy upon them. It is true,

however, if it is understood with reference to the

preparation of punishment by the decree now under discussion.

For by that decree, the merited punishment of sin, is not

only prepared, but it is, in fact and forever, inflicted on

sinners. It is indeed true, rather, that, by the decree,

punishment is prepared for sin, not as merited and due, but

as not remitted by mercy, which forgives the debt to some.

This distinction is required by the order of election, and of

predamnation, its opposite. For election remits merited and

due punishment. Its opposite, preordination, does not remit

merited and due punishment. This then is inflicted, by

damnation, which is the execution of predamnation, not as

merited or due, but as not remitted.

Again, a distinction is to be made between the preparation of

punishment, made by the just Providence of God, and that made

by the decree of divine predamnation, which is the opposite

of election. For the former is avoided by all who repent and

believe in the Son. The latter is avoided by none, since the

decree of predamnation is irrevocable and peremptory. The

question is not whether God prepared punishment for those

passed by in a mode in harmony with the wisdom of God"; for

who denies that, if any are passed by, they are passed by in

a manner in harmony with the wisdom of God? But the question

is, whether God, foreseeing the sin of those, so passed by

and left in their natural state, as has been explained,

prepared punishment for them by the decree of predamnation,

which does not seem very probable to me. I have presented

arguments for this opinion, which we will now consider.

EIGHTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

In the first place, from what has been already stated: since

punishment can not be justly prepared, of the mere act of the

divine pleasure, for those passed by on account of foreseen

sin, which must be committed, as the necessary result of that

preterition and reelection in a state of nature. Secondly,

the punishment ordained for them is spiritual, but spiritual

punishment can not be ordained for those falling from their

original state, if spiritual reward, on the contrary, is not

prepared for those who should remain in their original state.

But a reward of this kind was not prepared for such, since

they could, by mere natural power, remain in their original

state, and spiritual happiness could not be acquired by them.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE EIGHTEENTH PROPOSITION

In reference to the first argument, I deny:

1. that Adam was, to speak in general terms, passed by and

left in a state of nature by God, but, according to the mode

of nature, he was left to himself only in reference to a

particular and natural act, which was in the power of mere

nature, and that he was carefully forewarned by God, and that

he received information from God, as by compact.

2. It is denied that sin was committed by him, of necessity,

in view of that preterition. For, if it was necessarily

committed, it would have been a habit, or passive quality in

the nature of man; but it pertained to capability, his will

being free, and borne contingently in this or that direction.

It was not then perpetrated necessarily; therefore he

committed it contingently, (as the Scripture and the

agreement of the church have always declared,) according to

the free natural power, which is that of the will. The wise

man rightly says in Eccl. vii, 27, "Lo, this only have I

found, that God hath made man upright; but they have sought

out many inventions."

Concerning the second argument, I remark that the word "also"

should be added to your proposition in this manner: "the

punishment ordained for them is also spiritual." For

punishment of both kinds, of the body and of the spirit, was

ordained for them, by the testimony of Scripture. Your

assumption is denied, which states that a reward of this kind

was not prepared for them, in general, if they had remained

in their original state. For it is entirely evident that it

was proposed to them in the covenant of nature, and in the

ordination to grace, if they should remain in their original

state, as was also signified in the symbol of the tree of

life, and declared in the denunciation of death. For what is

death but the privation of this and of the future life? What

privation could there be, if man did not possess life, on the

one hand by nature, and on the other by the ordination of

grace to be consummated after the natural course of this

life. But to prove this statement, you add, "for they could,

by mere natural power, remain in their original state." This

also is denied. They could do so only in natural things, but

by no means in things pertaining to grace, as we have already

frequently showed. The whole argumentation, then, is

erroneous. "But," you will say, "my reasoning is valid on the

hypothesis of Aquinas, who held that man, in the matter of

election, was considered in his natural condition." I reply

in this manner:

1. This does not affect us, who affirm that God, in election,

has reference to man in general.

2. Though Aquinas uses that form of expression, yet it must

be correctly understood, since there may be ambiguity here,

for the relation of election: concerning which we have

already presented the sentiment of Aquinas, in my answer to

the sixth proposition, is one thing, and that of the

condition of Adam, when he fell into sin, is another. It is

evident from all his writings, that it did not, even in a

dream, enter into his mind, that Adam was then merely in his

natural condition. Could he, indeed, entertain such an idea,

who every where openly avows that man was made in a state of

supernatural grace, and expressly asserts this in his

controversy with the Master of Sentences. Therefore the

hypothesis is false, and is erroneously ascribed to Aquinas.

If that is false, the argument also is without force. Man

also could not, by natural power alone, continue in his

primitive condition and state, (for I prefer these

expressions to "origin," as more clearly conveying the idea,)

or by its means acquire spiritual happiness. For that

happiness is not the reward of labourers, but the inheritance

of children in Christ, bestowed by grace, not obtained by

labour.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE EIGHTEENTH PROPOSITION

My first argument rests on the hypothesis of the definition

by which preterition is described in your Theses. That

definition is in these words: "Preterition is the act of the

divine pleasure, by which God, from eternity, determined to

leave certain of His creatures in their natural state, and

not to communicate to them the supernatural grace by which

their pure nature might be strengthened, or their corrupt

nature might be restored, to the declaration of the freedom

of His own goodness, but a natural state is that in which

there can be nothing supernatural or divine," according to

Thesis 10, of the same disputation. For those, who are passed

by, are left in the same natural state and condition in the

same manner, as that from which they, who are predestinated,

are raised up. Being left in such a natural state, "in which

there can be nothing supernatural or divine," they can not

keep the law, which is not to be kept without supernatural

grace. Hence punishment can not be justly prepared for them

on account of sin, committed against a law which can not be

kept by them. Therefore your first negation seems to me to be

irrelevant.

We are not treating of the mode in which Adam was left to his

own nature and given up to his own direction. The reelection

of Adam to himself belongs, not to the decree of

predestination, but to that providence, in which God, without

the distinction of predestinate and reprobate, had reference

to man, newly created, and this, indeed, of necessity,

according to the hypothesis that He purposed to create man

free. But we are treating of his reelection in a natural

state, which belongs to the decree of preterition. If you

should say that they who are passed by are considered by the

Deity in Adam, as partakers of the same things, which Adam

had in his primitive state, I answer that, thus considered,

they were not left in that natural state, which can effect

nothing supernatural or divine. Hence the hypothesis will be

false, which seems only to rest on the definition of

preterition given in your Theses.

To your second negation, I reply -- from the reelection in a

natural state "which can effect nothing supernatural or

divine," (that is, neither of itself, as I admit, nor by any

thing superinfused, so that nothing supernatural may be added

to it, according to the hypothesis of your definition,) sin

must of necessity be committed by the person left, and it can

not be avoided without supernatural grace. The will is,

indeed, free, but not in respect to that act which can not be

performed or omitted without supernatural grace, just as it

is not free in respect to that act by which it wills the good

of the universe and of itself. The reason of this is -- there

is in man a passive quality, inclining him to that forbidden

act, and impelling the will to a consent to and commission of

that act; and necessarily impelling it, unless the will is

endued with some power to resist that motion, which power is

supernatural grace, according to our hypothesis. To explain

this subject more fully, I add a few thoughts. The negative

act of the Deity, which preceded the sin of man, pertained

either to providence, or to reprobation, or to preterition,

as distinct from providence. In the first place, it did not

pertain to reprobation.

1. Because the act of reprobation has reference to some men,

not to all, for not all are reprobates.

2. If sin exists from the act of reprobation, or not without

it, then only some men commit sin, and the rest do not commit

it, that is, they sin, to whom God had reference in the

negative act of preterition, and they do not sin, to whom He

had no such reference. But all have sinned. It is not then

from that act.

3. If sin exists from the negative act of reprobation, it

then follows that Adam and all men in him are reprobates, for

Adam, and, in him, all men have sinned. This consequence is

false, therefore the antecedent is also false.

4. By converse reasoning, if the sin of man resulted from the

negative act of preterition, then, from the affirmative act

of predestination, which exists at the same moment with the

opposite of the act previously referred to, for neither of

these acts exists without the other, and they are oppositely

spoken of, results the perseverance of man in goodness, at

least in reference to this single act. But no man perseveres

in the good in which he was created, according to the

affirmative act of predestination. Therefore, also, the sin

of man is not from the negative act of reprobation or

preterition.

5. To those, to whom God once, by the negative act of

reprobation, denies efficacious aid, He finally denies

efficacious aid, otherwise the reprobate are not reprobate.

He does not deny, finally, to all men, efficacious aid, for

then all would be reprobate. Therefore, that act, by which

efficacious aid was denied once to all men, is not an act of

reprobation. But some negative act of the Deity preceded the

sin of man, for otherwise man would not have sinned.

Therefore that is an act of providence.

Here, however, two things are to be considered. First, sin

did not exist of necessity from that negative act, but, in

view of that act, it might or might not be committed. For

providence ordained man to eternal life, and conferred means

sufficient and necessary for the attainment of that life,

leaving, (as was suitable at the beginning), to the choice of

man, the free use of those means, and refusing to impede that

liberty, lest it might rescind that which it had established,

as Tertullian happily remarks in the passage quoted by you,

(Advers. Marcion, lib. 2, resp. 14). From which act of God,

refusing to prevent sin efficaciously, (the opposite of

which, the affirmative act of determining to prevent it

efficaciously, would be inconsistent with the first

institution of the human race, and the affirmative act of

determining to prevent a sin, finally, would have pertained

to predestination,) results the fact that man could commit

sin, not that he did commit it, but because God, in His

infinite wisdom, saw, from eternity, that man would fall at a

certain time, that fall occurred infallibly, only in respect

to His prescience, not in respect to any act of the divine

will, either affirmative or negative. Whatever happens

infallibly in respect to an act of the divine will, the same

also happens necessarily, not only by the necessity of

consequence but by that, also, of the consequent. It may be

proper, here, to mark the difference between what is done

infallibly and what is done necessarily. The former depends

on the infinity of the knowledge of God, the latter on the

act of His will. The former has respect only to the knowledge

of God, to which it pertains to know, infallibly and with

certainty, contingent things; the latter belong to the

existence of the thing itself, the necessity for which

resulted from the will of God.

In the second place, the providence of God does not

discriminate definitely between the classes of men, as elect

and reprobate. Therefore, that negative act of God has

reference to all men in general, and universally, without any

distinction of elect and reprobate. From these thing, I

conclude, since that negative act, which preceded sin, was

not of reprobation or preterition, but of providence as

distinct from the former, it follows that God, in the act of

preterition, had not reference to men apart from sin or

considered as not yet sinners. For no negative act of

preterition preceded, either in order or in time, this

negative act of providence. Likewise no other act of

preterition intervened between this act of providence and

sin. If any act of preterition intervened, an act of

predestination also intervened. There was no intervention of

the latter, and, therefore, there was not of the former. This

act of predestination would be the preservation of some in

goodness, and their deliverance from possible sin. No one of

mankind has been preserved in goodness and delivered from

possible sin, for all have sinned. It was not, however,

necessary to prove here that man sinned, not necessarily but

freely, for that point is not in controversy, but it was to

be shown, that, if preterition is supposed, man,

nevertheless, sinned freely, and not of necessity.

My second argument is also based on a hypothesis, which, in

my opinion, whether incorrect or correct your wisdom will

decide, I have taken from your Theses. The hypothesis

consists of two parts; -- first, supernatural happiness

cannot be acquired by the powers of nature alone; secondly,

the law, given to Adam, could be observed by the powers of

nature alone. The first part is true. The second is contained

in your Theses. Man is left in a state of nature, which can

effect nothing supernatural or divine. But yet he was able to

keep the law, otherwise God is unjust, who imposes a law,

which cannot be obeyed by the creature. Hence I concluded

that spiritual punishment ought not to be inflicted for the

transgression of that law, to the observance of which

spiritual or supernatural reward is not promised. But

supernatural reward is not promised to the observance of a

law, which can be obeyed by the powers of nature alone,

otherwise nature could acquire that which is supernatural,

therefore, spiritual punishment ought not to be the penalty

of the violation of the same law. Further, the law, imposed

on Adam, could be performed by the powers of nature alone,

according to your view, as I have understood it; therefore,

spiritual punishment ought not to be its penalty. But its

penalty is spiritual; therefore it is unjust.

I will not, at this time, inquire whether such may or may not

be the consequence of your Theses, since you now say

distinctly that a supernatural reward was prepared for our

first parents, if they should remain in their original

integrity. Therefore, I claim that my reasoning is valid,

though the hypothesis, on which it was based, is removed.

From your own statement, indeed, I deduced an inference in

favour of my sentiment. That which was prepared for all men

on condition of the obedience, which they could render the

gift of divine grace, bestowed or to be bestowed on them,

could not be denied to some men by the sure and definite

decree of God, except on account of their foreseen

disobedience. Eternal life was prepared for all men, on

condition of that obedience which they could render.

Therefore, eternal life could not be denied to some men, by

the sure and definite decree of God, that is, by preterition,

except on account of their foreseen disobedience. Therefore,

also, men are considered by God, in the act of preterition,

as sinners; they are not, then, considered in general.

I do not touch the sentiment of Aquinas, except as it is

explained in your Theses. I might, however, require him to

prove that God passed by man, considered in a state of

integrity, in which he had, not only natural, but also

supernatural endowments. I grant that supernatural happiness

is that inheritance of the children of God, but it would have

been given to those, who should remain in their primitive

integrity, though in a different mode from that in which it

is bestowed on believers in Christ. It would have been given

to the former "of the works of the law;" it is given to the

latter "of faith;" to the former the reward would have been

reckoned not "of grace, but of debt;" (Rom. iv, 4), to the

latter, as believers, it is "reckoned of grace;" to the

former, it would have been given by "the righteousness which

is of the law," which saith "that the man which doeth these

things shall live by them," to the latter by "the

righteousness of faith, which speaketh in this wise, if thou

shalt believe in thine heart," &c. (Rom. x, 6, 9.) We have

already spoken in reference to that primitive state, and to

perseverance in it.

NINETEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

In addition to all that has been said, it is proper to

consider that, since predestination, preterition, and

reprobation, really produce no effect on the predestinate,

passed by, and reprobate, the subject of the actual

execution, and that of the decree in the divine mind, are

entirely the same and are considered in the same mode. Hence,

since God does not, in fact, communicate grace, except to one

who is a sinner, that is, the grace prepared in

predestination, since he does not, in fact, pass by, does not

condemn or punish any one, unless he is a sinner, it seems to

follow that God did not decree to impart grace, to pass by,

to reprobate any one, unless considered as a sinner.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE NINETEENTH PROPOSITION

Before I treat of the subject itself, it is necessary to

refer to the ambiguity which was alluded to, in my answer to

the second proposition. In the whole of your letter, to

reprobate is to damn, and reprobation is damnation. But in my

usage, reprobation, and preterition or non-election are the

same. Hence that the subject may be made more plain, you will

not complain if I should substitute the word damnation for

the word reprobation. You say that "predestination,

preterition and damnation, have no reference to action in the

predestinate etc," that is, that the predestinate or elect,

the passed by, and the damned, are elected, passed by, and

damned by God without any consideration of quality which

exists in the individual. I think, indeed, that the relation

of these things is different according to the Scriptures.

Election and non-election have reference to nothing in the

elect and the passed-by: but damnation supposes sin, in view

of which the sinner is damned, otherwise the entire work of

predestination, is limited to eternity.

I readily acknowledge that, in these matters, the subject

must be considered in the same light whether existing in fact

or only in the mind. For the elect is elected, and the

reprobate is passed by as a man; he is damned as a sinner.

He, who is, in fact, elected or passed by as a man, is so

elected or passed by in the mind of the Deity. He who is

damned as a sinner, is so predamned. Else, the internal and

the external acts of God would be at variance, which is never

to be admitted. This being fully understood, you see, my

brother, that whatever things you construct on this

foundation, they can, in no way, be consistent.

You say that" God does not, in fact, communicate the grace

prepared in predestination," that is, saving grace, "except

to one who is a sinner, he does not, in fact, pass by any

one, unless he is a sinner." If you affirm this of saving

grace, in an absolute and universal sense, it is shown to be

false by the salvation of the elect angels, and the

preterition of others. Did God elect and pass by the angels

as sinners. Origen may hold this view. We hold an entirely

different one. If, however, you say that you are speaking of

grace towards man, then it follows, from this statement, that

the first man, in that primitive integrity, had not the

communication of saving grace. This, indeed, I think that you

will not affirm. Therefore, this grace is communicated to man

as man, though not as a sinner, and not to man only, but to

the angels. If you say that it was communicated to man, in

his present sinful character, we do not deny it. Indeed, we

believe that it is now communicated to none except he is a

sinner, since no one of the human race is not a sinner. We

readily concede to you that no one is damned or punished

unless he is a sinner. Thus, a part of your conclusion is

denied, namely, that which has reference to election, and a

part is conceded, namely, that which refers to damnation.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE NINETEENTH PROPOSITION

I used the word reprobation in the sense in which you use it,

as I have several times already stated and proved. I do not,

however, object to your substitution, in its place, of the

word damnation. But you do not take my argument in its true

sense. I do not, indeed, consider that the predestinate, the

passed-by, the damned are elected, passed by, damned by the

Deity without reference to any quality, which may exist in

them. Is it possible that I should do so, when I, always and

every where, endeavour to prove that sin is a condition or

quality requisite in the object of the divine decree, My real

meaning is this. Predestination, preterition, pre-damnation,

as acts remaining in the agent, or as internal acts, produce

no feeling in an external object, but the execution of those

internal acts, which consists in external acts, passes over

to external things, and produces an effect on them, as is

explained by Thomas Aquinas (Summa prima quaest. 23, artic.

2), from which passage it is apparent that, in the scholastic

phraseology, it is one thing to produce an effect and another

thing to suppose or have reference to something in the elect,

the passed-by, the damned. But if those internal acts have no

effect on the object, then it follows that the object is the

same in every respect, and is considered in the same mode by

the Deity, both in the act of decree and in that of

execution. Hence, I conclude that, since it is certain that

God, in the external act, communicates the grace, which is

prepared in predestination, to man, only as a sinner, and, in

the external act, passes by man only as a sinner, and, in the

external act, damns man only as a sinner, it follows that

God, in the internal act, prepared grace only for a sinner,

determined to pass by only the sinner, and predamned only the

sinner, that is, in the internal acts of predestination,

preterition, and predamnation, had reference only to man

considered as a sinner. That God communicates the grace,

prepared in predestination, only to the sinner, passes by

only the sinner, (concerning damnation, we agree), is, I

think, most evident. Your two-fold argument does not at all

affect this truth. To the first part, I make the answer,

which your foresight has anticipated that we are discussing,

not the predestination and reprobation of angels, but those

of men, the term grace being restricted to that which was

prepared for man, in the act of predestination.

To the second part of your argument, which charges my

proposition with absurdity, I reply, that there is an

ambiguity in the phrase, saving grace. It may refer to that

grace which is sufficient and able to confer salvation, or to

that which is efficacious, and does, certainly, and in fact,

bestow salvation. Again, it may refer to the grace, which God

bestowed on man in his primitive state, or to that which is

now bestowed in his sinful state, that, being made free in

Christ, he may, through Him, obtain life from the dead. My

proposition concedes that man possessed the former in his

state of innocence, and so avoids absurdity. It also denies

that he possessed the latter before the fall, and, at the

same time, denies that this is absurd. This latter grace, and

not the former, was prepared in predestination, and so my

argument remains firm and immovable.

For these reasons, Reverend Sir, I can not yet persuade

myself that man, considered as a sinner by the Deity, is not

the adequate object of predestination, preterition and

predamnation.

TWENTIETH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

It does not seem to me that this sentiment is established by

the argument from the necessary declaration of the freedom of

grace and of the divine goodness. For though I might concede

that the declaration of that freedom was necessary, yet I

might say that it is declared in the very creation and

arrangement of things, and moreover that it could, and indeed

ought to be declared in another way.

The argument, from the necessary declaration of the divine

justice, has no more weight with me, both because justice in

God, as His nature, is equally directed towards the whole

object and all its parts, unless, there be some diversity,

dependent on His will, and because God has declared Himself,

in Scripture, to be of such character that it was not

necessary for Him to punish the sinner, according to strict

legal justice, in order to the manifestation of His justice,

but that He knew another, more noble, way for the revelation

of His own justice. Nor, does the argument, deduced from the

nature of providence, seem to have weight, since it pertains

to providence to permit that some should fail of the highest

good, and of a supernatural end, and that permission,

understood in harmony with this sentiment, is to be

attributed not so much to a sustaining and governing, as to a

creating providence.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTIETH PROPOSITION

After the discussion of election and reprobation, we come in

this place to the consideration of the design, according to

which, the good or evil of an action is often to be decided.

But here a three-fold design is presented; having reference

to the divine freedom in grace and goodness, and to the

divine justice, and to the divine providence. Other

attributes, might indeed, be considered, but from these a

decision may be made concerning others. In reference to the

first design, you present two arguments.

1. You affirm that this freedom "is declared in the very

creation and arrangement of things." You would infer then,

that it was unnecessary that it should be also declared in

this way. This inference is denial. For it was not sufficient

that such declaration should be made in the creation and

arrangement of things, if it should not be declared also in

their progress and result. Nor, indeed, if it has been

sufficiently declared in our present nature and life, does it

follow, of consequence, that there is no necessity of any

declaration in the life of the future world. For, on the

contrary, if God should have declared His liberty in matters

of an inferior nature only, and not in those, which are

superior and pertain to the future world, it would seem that

he, through want either of knowledge or of power, had omitted

the more worthy declaration of His own freedom. For the

nobler manifestation of that freedom is made in things of a

nobler nature; and that good is better and more noble, the

consequences of which are better and more noble. Who can

believe that God lacked either knowledge, power, or will in

this matter.

2. You affirm that this liberty "could, and indeed ought to

be, declared in another way." I grant it. It could and ought

to be, declared in this, and in other modes, as has been done

by the Deity. But if you use the phrase another, in an

exclusive sense, as having reference to some particular mode

and not to this one, it is denied, and, in the preceding

argument, is sufficiently confuted.

The second design is, in like manner, opposed by two

arguments. Your first argument, contained in these words,

"because justice in God, as His nature is equally directed,

&c.," is, in the very same sentence, refuted by the addition

of the words, "unless there be some diversity, dependent on

His will." For justice in us is regarded in two aspects, as a

habit and as an act proceeding from that habit, and diffusing

itself first inwardly and then outwardly. In God, it is also,

considered in two modes, as nature, and as an act of nature

through the will, flowing from the nature and according to

the nature of God. In the former mode, it is the very essence

of God; in the latter, it is the work of that essence. Of the

former, you rightly affirm that "justice in God as nature is

equally directed towards the whole object, and all its

parts." The phrase "as nature" is susceptible of a two-fold

reference, as equivalent either to w[sper fusiv and imply a

similarity of operation to that of nature, (in which sense I

understand you to use it), or to kaqw<v fusiv and implying

that the nature of God or His essence is justice itself. For

since the essence of God is entirely simple, justice, nature,

essence, and His other attributes are, in fact, one, though a

distinction is made in them in our usage. In reference to the

latter mode of justices the expression "unless there be some

diversity dependent on His will," is subjoined most suitably,

and yet with some ambiguity. For in the justice of God, as

His nature, there is never diversity, not even as the result

of His will. What? Can a change in His essence, in His own

nature result from the will of God, whose attribute, I do not

say in all respects, yet absolutely, and pertaining to Him

alone, and always, is immutability? But that justice, which

is the work of the divine essence, emanating from that will,

whether outwardly or inwardly, may indeed be diversified in

an infinite number of modes, according to His wisdom and

will.

Your second argument, to speak in a few words and with

directness, is faulty in two respects. First, though your

statement is true, if properly understood, namely, "God has

declared Himself, in Scripture, to be of such character that

it is not necessary for Him to punish the sinner, according

to strict legal justice, in order to the manifestation of His

justice," since His justice, in all respects and infinitely,

surpasses legal justice, as, in the nature of things, the

reality exceeds the type, and the substance exceeds the

shade. Yet it, by no means, follows from this, that God must

not so punish the sinner for the manifestation of His own

justice, or that it is from legal justice that He so punishes

him. But, on the contrary, it follows rather that God must so

punish the sinner for the manifestation of His own justice,

and that the fact of such punishment is dependent on His

justice, which exceeds and in a most excellent, that is, in a

divine method, surpasses legal justice, and which, in His

word, to us, according to our measure, takes the form of

legal justice, as the shadow of that most excellent justice.

There is no element of justice, expressed to us in the law,

which does not exist in the justice of God, and flow from it

in a most excellent manner. In the law, He has both expressed

the justice due from us, and shadowed forth His own. Consider

only this, that God is justice in an absolute sense, or (if

you prefer), that He is the absolute principle and cause of

all justice, as of all good, you at once destroy your own

argument. For if He is, absolutely, justice, or the absolute

principle and cause of all justice, then He is the principle

of this justice also, and the cause and effector of it, as

not only mediately shadowed forth in the law, but also,

immediately effected by His own work. For whence is that

legal justice, if not from God, expressing by His own

infinitely wise will, what He is, and what He does, as it is?

Besides, if God is, absolutely, justice, and the principle of

justice, he punishes not according to the justice of the law,

but according to His own justice, which the law adumbrates to

human comprehension, and which He cannot but set forth in His

creatures, both in the present and the future worlds as he

has declared in His word. I am still less satisfied with your

second statement, in which you affirm that "He knew another,

more noble way for the revelation of His own justice." God

certainly knew and thoroughly understood both that and the

other, and every possible way, according to the divine mode.

But it is necessary, my brother, that you should, in this

case, consider that God always contemplates all things,

according to their individual relations, and according to

their relations to the universe, over which He presides. If

it should be denied that God, in respect to its individual

relation, knew another more noble way for the manifestation

of His justice, how, I pray, would you prove it? Would it

not, indeed, on the contrary, seem, to the pious to be

altogether more probable, since God is infinitely wise, that

He most wisely adopted the noblest way to manifest (which is

the work of the divine wisdom) His justice, to His own glory,

to our instruction, and to the perfection of the universe,

Let it, however, be conceded that God, since He has all

knowledge, knew another more noble way for accomplishing this

thing, yet I deny, that with reference to the relations of

the universe there existed another more noble way, in which

God could obtain this object, since it would have been better

that He should use that other nobler way. For it concerns the

wisdom of God, that every variety of way should be adopted in

manifesting His justice, and should be set forth before the

eyes of all in the universe. For example, let the more noble

way of displaying that wonderful justice of God, be that

which has punished and shall forever punish the wicked

angels. Should I grant this, do you not see that it would

pertain to divine wisdom to vary in this case also, the mode

of the divine justice? This is sufficient in reference to the

second argument. The third design, which has reference to the

Providence of God, is excluded in your argument, in a

peculiar manner, by limitation, as it is called, "since that

permission is to be attributed, not so much to a sustaining

and governing, as to a creating Providence." By your

permission, this whole limitation is denied. It is indeed

destroyed by the very definition of the terms, without any

argument on my part. Describe the course of the divine

Providence. Its principle, or first step, is called creation,

that is the production of existence from non-existence. Its

middle step is government, containing ordination and

sustainment. Its third or last step is consummation.

Consider, now, to which part permission shall be ascribed.

Creation is an act of God alone, the glory of which He, by no

means, communicates to the creature, for it is created, not

creating. In the act of creation, existence is bestowed on

some thing, that it may become what it is not, essentially,

in nature. By creation, then, it is given to man that he

should be a man, and that there should be in him whatever

belongs to him as a creature. Thus freedom of the will was

bestowed on man.

What is permission? Not an act of God, but a cessation of

action. It does not bestow existence, but gives to that,

which already exists, power over its own life. Nature itself

affirms that creation differs in kind and characteristic from

permission. Creation is not a part of ordination, but it is

the principle, point, first term. Permission belongs to

ordination, consequent on that principle. It does not then

pertain to creation.

It is true, that freedom of the will in man pertains to

creation, but as an essential faculty, not as developed in

action; which action, without doubt, after the creation of

the faculty and its endowment with its qualities, depends on

the divine ordination, and that ordination on providence. I

do not, indeed, see how that permission could be bestowed on

our first parents at their creation, which, in our case, must

be referred to ordination. It is necessary that there should

be correspondence in both cases. But, finally, though I

should concede that permission pertains to creation, this

also, even on your authority, would be the work of

providence, since you say that providence is creating, as

well as sustaining and governing. Permission, then, by your

consent, belongs to providence. It belong, according to our

argument, and, as I hope, with your assent, to governing or

ordaining providence. Therefore, whatever may be said

concerning the relation of providence, permission, by

necessary consequence, pertains to it.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTIETH

PROPOSITION

I have now discussed the theory, which considers man as the

object of predestination and preterition, either in a purely

natural state, or also with some supernatural endowments, yet

apart from the consideration of sin as a condition requisite

in the object. And I think that I have proved that man is

considered by God, in His decree, not otherwise than as a

sinner. I proceed to answer the three arguments usually urged

in favour of this theory; and I only show that a theory, like

this, is not sustained by those arguments. It seems,

therefore, to be requisite, not only that my reasoning should

be refuted, but also that the force of those arguments should

be established. The latter has been entirely neglected by

you. We will now consider in what respects my reasoning has

been invalidated.

The first argument from the necessary declaration of the

freedom of grace and of the divine goodness, I answer, first,

by simply denying that such necessity exists, and then, if

that necessity is conceded, by denying that mode, which is

preterition, such as is described in the theory which I

oppose. This denial is confirmed, partly from the fact that

God has declared the liberty of His own goodness in the

creation and various circumstances of material things; partly

because he could, and indeed must declare that same liberty

also in a mode other than that of preterition. For the better

understanding of these things, I will make a few illustrative

remarks.

First, since no external act of the Deity is absolutely

necessary, no declaration of the freedom of the divine

goodness is absolutely necessary. For God is happy by the

internal and essential knowledge of Himself, and is glorious

in Himself. Secondly, since, nevertheless, it seemed good to

the Deity, to communicate, by the free act of His will, His

own good, to the declaration of His goodness, it was suitable

that there should be a declaration, not only of His goodness,

but also of the freedom of that goodness, that it might be

manifest that God communicated good to His creatures, not by

any necessity, but of His mere will; not to the increase of

His own good, which was already perfect, but to the

perfection of Nothing, and of the beings created out of it,

according to the mode of communication, adopted by the

internal act of His will, both to the single parts of

Nothing, and to the individual creatures. The good which God

purposed to communicate, is two-fold in respect to the

subject, on which He determined to bestow it, natural and

supernatural. In the communication of both, it was just that

He should declare, not only His goodness, but also the

liberty of His goodness and grace. In the communication of

natural good, He declared the freedom of His goodness in the

creation and various condition of material things. For when

He communicated to that part of original nature, which is

purely nothing or chaos, this entity and form, He declared

His own liberty to communicate an entity and form which

should be different.

In the communication of supernatural good, He manifested the

same freedom, when He made a great part of His creatures

without a capacity to receive supernatural blessings, and

made angels and men alone capable of those blessings, and

actually partakers of some of them. In respect to those

blessings of which He made all the angels, and the first

human beings, and in them all, conditionally, who should be

born from them, partakers, there is no place for preterition

of this kind, as this pertains to a portion either of angels

or of men, but only for that preterition, which has reference

to other creatures, who were passed by, in the communication

of supernatural blessings. But in the communication of

blessings, of which he made angels and men not actual

partakers, but only capable, the freedom of the divine

goodness and grace was also to be declared, that it might, in

this way, be evident both that those things, which they all

received, were bestowed, and that those things, of which they

were made capable, would be bestowed on angels and men, not

according to the excellence of their nature and of merit, but

of grace.

I thus acknowledge and concede this, but I deny that the mode

of declaring the divine freedom in the communication of these

blessings is the preterition now under discussion; and I deny

that this preterition was used by the Deity for the display

of that freedom, and this was my meaning when I said "it

could and indeed ought to be declared in another way," by the

word "another," excluding that mode which is contained in

that preterition.

If it should be asked in what other way the freedom of the

divine goodness "could and indeed ought to be declared," I

reply that, in reference to men, (I have always excluded

angels from the discussion), it was possible to declare that

freedom, if God should prescribe the condition on which He

would communicate good; that it was declared by his eternal

decree, when he prescribed to man the condition on which he

might obtain eternal life, and those gifts of grace, which,

in addition to what had already been bestowed, might be

necessary for its attainment. I reply also that it ought to

be declared in some other way, if declared at all, since it

ought not to be in that way, for that one is in accordance

neither with the wisdom of God nor with His justice, since,

by it, to creatures, capable of certain blessing from the

divine goodness and grace, the same blessings are, absolutely

and apart from any condition, denied. Therefore, it ought to

be declared in some other way, and, indeed, in that way of

which I have spoken. For God can not decree not to give to

any creature that of which it is capable and for which it was

made, except on condition that it has made itself incapable

of receiving the blessings of which it was made capable by

its Creator. But whatever may be true in reference to this,

you should have shown in what manner the argument from the

freedom of the divine goodness and grace proves the

preterition or non-election which is described in your

Theses. The second argument is from the necessary display of

the divine justice. I impugn it in two ways. That it may be

seen how my reasoning avails against this argument, it is to

be considered that I design to assail it, in the form in

which it is presented in your Theses. These are your words: -

- (Thesis 17.) "The preparation of punishment is an act of

the divine good-pleasure, in which God purposed, from

eternity, for the display of His grace, to punish His

creatures, who should not continue in their original

integrity," &c., and (Thesis 18) "God prepares punishment for

His creatures, who, sin contrary to His law, to be reprobated

on account of sin, according to the necessity of His

justice." Since reprobation and preparation of punishment,

which are here used as synonymous, are in these words said to

have originated in "the necessity of the divine justice," I

wished to confute it, as, for two reasons, not in harmony

with the truth. The first reason is this; -- If God prepares

punishment for sinners from the necessity of His own justice,

then He prepares punishment for all sinners universally, that

is, by the decree of predamnation. But the consequent is

false; therefore, the antecedent is also false. The reasoning

is certainly valid. For, since justice in God is considered

as a natural attribute, it acts in the same manner towards

its whole object and all its parts. Sinners are the objects

of justice in this case. Therefore, it acts equally on all

sinners, that is, it prepares punishment for all. This is

plainly signified in the word "necessity" in connection with

"justice." For, if He necessarily prepares punishment for

sinners or for those about to sin, He prepares it for all

without distinction, and that word added to "justice"

indicates that justice is to be considered as a natural

attribute in God, and it can not, for the reason already

mentioned, superintend predamnation. I added, however, the

qualifying remark "unless there be some diversity dependent

on His will," my meaning, in which, was that it is dependent

on the will of God whether that attribute should act in an

absolute manner or respectively, in reference to all sinners,

or in reference only to some. In this way I refute not that

which I previously said, but that necessity, which is

considered as laid on predamning justice. For if, by the will

of God directing that justice, it occurs that God prepares

punishment for some sinners, and does not prepare it for

others but remits it to them, then that predamnation, or

reprobation (as it is here called), was decreed by God, not

by the necessity of His justice.

Let me more briefly state this idea. Justice in God tends to

the punishment of sin, as mercy or grace tends to its

remission, without any distinction in those who have

committed sin. If justice should administer its own act, all

sinners would be punished; if mercy should administer its own

act, all sinners would be pardoned. These acts could not be

performed at the same time, and, in this case, the one would

oppose the manifestation of the other, which could not with

propriety occur.

Therefore, the wisdom, appointed over them, for the direction

of both, judged that its own sphere of action should be

assigned to each. In accordance with this decision, the will

of God directs His justice in such manner, that there can be

opportunity for mercy, and His mercy, that the honour of His

justice may also, in the mean time, be maintained. But it can

not, in my opinion, be affirmed that what is decreed by the

divine will, was done by the necessity either of justice or

of mercy.

The second reason is this. If God knew a more noble way for

the manifestation of His justice than that by which,

according to the law, punishment was prepared for those who

should sin, then the display of justice, according to the

law, was not necessary. But the former is true, therefore the

latter is also true. The reasoning is conclusive. If two ways

were open for the illustration of the divine justice, then it

is not absolutely necessary that God should make use of one

to the complete conclusion of the other. The justice of God

may be displayed in the exaction of punishment from the

individuals who have sinned; the same justice may also be

displayed in the exaction of the same punishment from him,

who has, according to the will of God, offered himself as the

pledge and surety for those sinners. He is "the Lamb of God,

which taketh away the sin of the world," (John i, 29.) "He

hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin," (2 Cor. v,

21). This is that "other more noble and more excellent way."

In it there is a more vivid display of the Divine execration

of sin, than in that, which demands punishment from the

sinners, in their own persons, both from the fact that, in

the latter case, the infliction of punishment could be

ascribed, by His enemies, to the vindictive passion of the

Deity, and not to His justice, alone, which would be

impossible in the former case, since the punishment is

inflicted on one, who has not personally sinned, and from the

fact that in this way, the inflexible rigor of divine justice

is displayed, which could not grant, even to the intercession

of His Son, the pardon of sin: unless punishment had been

inflicted; according to which, indeed, that Son could not

even intercede, if his own blood had not been shed, and

atonement had not, by it, been made for sin. I conclude,

then, that the display of justice, according to the law, was

not necessary, and consequently that punishment was not, from

any necessity of the divine justice, prepared for these, who

should sin, since God was free to impose on His own Son, to

be received and suffered, their due punishment, removed from

the individual sinners.

That, which you adduce in opposition to these ideas, does not

seem to me to be valid. For God, of His own justice, punishes

either sinners or their surety. The former mode of its

manifestation is according to the law, the latter mode

transcends, the former is revealed to us in the gospel. It

may be said, however, that both modes were necessary. I deny

it. The latter, depended on the mere good pleasure of God;

the former could be changed to it. Otherwise it would have

been necessary, for "without shedding of blood there is no

remission." (Heb. ix, 22.) These things which are said

concerning the justice of God, as exceeding the justice of

the law, are not to the purpose; for it was not my meaning

that the justice, which actuates God in the punishment of

sin, and by which He punishes sin, is legal justice, but that

He should punish it according to the letter of the law, "In

the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die,"

(Gen. ii, 17) and "Cursed is every one that continueth not in

all things which are written in the book of the law to do

them." (Gal. iii, 10.) It should also have been shown in this

place how this argument, from the necessary display of the

divine justice, proves this preparation of punishment.

The third argument, deduced from the nature of providence, is

of this nature, in the view of Thomas Aquinas, (summa prima,

quæs. 23, act 3.) "To permit some to come short of the

highest good, pertains to the providence of God;" -- "But to

reprobate is to permit some to come short of the highest

good; -- Therefore, the reprobation of some pertains to the

providence of God." I affirmed that this argument possessed

no weight in favour of the theory, which I now oppose;

against that which makes sin a requisite condition in the

object of reprobation or preterition. I proved it from the

fact that permission, understood in accordance with that

theory, is to be attributed not so much to sustaining and

governing providence, as to creating providence. I will first

explain my meaning, and then show the force of that argument.

I make three sets of providence -- creation, sustainment, or

preservation of the creature, and its government, and

according to those acts, I say that providence is creating,

sustaining and governing, and I attribute to each of these

modes its own particular acts, which are appropriate to each

of them. I also say that there are some acts, which so

pertain to one of these, as, at the same time, to depend on

another preceding act, so that they may not be entirely under

the control of that providence from which they proceed, but

may be limited and determined by the act of some preceding

providence. These acts, being mixed in their nature, can be

referred both to this and to that providence, to one as

immediately flowing from it, to the other as determined by

it, and necessarily dependent on its previous set. Such acts

seem to be attributed not so justly to that providence from

which they immediately flow, as to that, which prescribed

their form and mode, to which mode and form that immediate

providence was bound, and in reference to those acts was a

servant to the other as principal. I now apply these

thoughts. The permission, by which God left man to his own

counsels, pertains immediately to governing providence, but

it is government uncontrolled, determined by a preceding act

of creation. For it could not choose between leaving and not

leaving man to himself, for then, that, which had been

already divinely instituted, would be rescinded; it was bound

by that condition of creation, by which freedom of the will

was bestowed on man, and he was left to his own counsel.

This was my meaning, when I said that this permission

pertained, not so much to governing or sustaining, as, to

creating providence. We may now consider the validity of my

argument in sustaining my view. We must here consider a two-

fold permission, that by which man is left to his own counsel

and permitted to sin, and that by which the sinner is left in

his sins and permitted finally to fail of the highest good.

The former, pertains to governing providence as was said, but

determined by the act of creation; the latter, pertains to

governing and uncontrolled providence. The former, pertains

to providence, the latter, to preterition in

contradistinction to providence. For all men, represented in

Adam, have been left to themselves, and to their own counsel,

yet all are not reprobates or passed-by. But all, who are

finally left in their sins, and given up to their own

counsel, after the commission of sin, are reprobate and

passed by, and they who are passed by, are all left finally

in their sins, and are permitted to fail of the highest good.

Now I grant that, if by permission is understood a final

reelection in sin, the whole syllogism is sound and valid,

but, in that case, it sustains the theory, which makes sin a

requisite condition in the object of reprobation or

preterition. For that permission has reference to sinners.

But, if it is referred to the leaving of men to their own

choice before the commission of sin, I deny that reprobation

can be defined by that kind of permission. It is apparent,

then, that no conclusion can be drawn from that syllogism in

favour of the second theory, and against the view which I

advocate. For the second theory presents man, apart from any

reference to sin, as the object of preterition and

reelection. That syllogism, however, is unintelligible, if it

does not refer to permission and reprobation of sinners. For,

in the permission by which the first men were permitted to

sin, no one failed of the highest good, unless there was also

a dereliction in sin; and reprobation is not that permission

by which men were permitted to sin. It should also have been

shown, in this place, how that argument from providence and

permission is adapted to the confirmation of the second

theory.

This might be sufficient for my purpose, but I am disposed to

add some thoughts concerning providence, in view of your

remarks in reference to it. Far be it from me, indeed, to

disapprove them. They, however, omit the mutual arrangement

and connection of the particular parts of providence. I made

the distinction of providence into creating, sustaining and

governing, not so much from my own idea, as from that of Dr.

Francis Gomarus, who, in many passages of his writings,

comprehends creation in the term providence. In the Theses on

The Providence of God, discussed under his direction as the

presiding professor, by Hadrian Cornelius Drogius, in the

year 1596, it is said (Thesis nine) "The parts of this

execution" (that, by which God executes the decree of

providence) "are two, creation and government, &c., under

which government are comprehended continuation, and

preservation, and legitimate ordination." (Libre de

provdentia Dei, cap. 1, ex Cicerone) "I affirm, then, that

the world and all its parts were constituted at the

beginning, and are administered through all time by the

providence of God." (Ex Lactantio) "There is, then, a

providence, by the force and energy of which, all things,

which we see, were made, and are ruled." (Ejusdem, libro 7)

"That execution is distributed into the creation and the

government of this world. The parts of this government are

two, the preservation and ordination of the world, thus

constituted." Your view is also the same, as presented in

your disputation. On the providence of God, discussed in the

year 1598, for, in the first Thesis, are these words: "The

word providence, taken in a wider sense, embraces the eternal

decree of creation, government, and ordination, and its

execution." I am not very solicitous in reference to the

distinction of these words, government, preservation,

ordination; whether government embraces both preservation and

ordination, or only the latter, and there is a

contradistinction between it and the former.

As to the arrangement and mutual connection of those parts, I

affirm that it is possible that the act of the latter should

depend on some act of the former, and in such a manner that

the act of the latter should be determined to one direction

by the former. I showed this in the example of the

permission, by which God let, man to his own counsel. That

act originated in the government of God, or in His governing

providence, but it was determined by His creating providence,

which made man free and self controlling, so far as pertained

to that freedom, but, in other respects, responsible to the

law of God. I here do no injustice to the providence of God,

nor do I deny to Him universal liberty in His own action. I

acknowledge that the providence of God is absolutely free. In

the creation of man, He acted freely; in bestowing free will

on man, He acted freely. But, if one action of the Deity,

through the providence of God itself, be supposed, the

necessity of another act of the divine providence can be

deduced from it, which necessity is dependent on the free

dispensation of the antecedent act of providence.

I will present another example, by which the same may be

demonstrated. God has created angels with this condition,

that they, who should not continue in their original

innocence, should be punished forever without pardon. Some

sinned. God, in the act of his governing providence,

inflicted punishment on them by an act determined by previous

creation, so that, if he did not wish to change that which

was established in creation, he could not remit their

punishment. This was my meaning in what I presented in answer

to the third argument, which you do not refute, even though

it be conceded that permission pertains to governing or

ordaining providence, which I freely concede to you in the

sense in which I have explained it. It should have been

proved that the permission, by which man was left to his own

control, pertains to reprobation or preterition, or that the

permission, by which he was permitted to fail of the highest

good, has place in reference to man, not a sinner, or

considered as a sinner. Hence, also, those words of Thomas

Aquinas (prima sum, quaes. 23, art. 3, in respons.

generali), "For as predestination includes the purpose to

bestow grace and glory, so reprobation includes the purpose

to permit some to fall into transgression, and to inflict the

punishment of damnation for that transgression," if

diligently examined, are not accurately true. For the purpose

to permit some to fall into transgression, does not belong to

reprobation, since God permitted all men to fall into

transgression. This is also susceptible of proof from the

acts which he attributes to predestination. The purpose of

bestowing grace and glory is attributed to predestination.

What grace? That by which some are not permitted to fall into

transgression, but are preserved in their original state of

integrity? By no means; but that grace by which some are

delivered from that sin into which all were permitted to

fall. The act of reprobation, then, should have been directly

opposed to that act of predestination. But that is a

permission to remain in sin, or an abandonment in sin, which

is a negative act, and a purpose to inflict punishment for

the sin, which is an affirmative act. The former is the

opposite of grace, the latter, of glory. But it is not

strange that a man who has written so many most erudite

volumes, should not have been able to examine accurately each

and every subject.

TWENTY-FIRST PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

In a comparison of these two theories, the latter seems not

more probable than the former, since it involves the same

absurd consequence. This I will briefly prove. In the former

theory, the following order may be observed. God decreed to

illustrate His own glory by mercy and punitive justice. He

could not effect this without the introduction of sin. Hence,

sin must, of necessity, and with certainty, have been

committed. It could only be committed by him who, being

accountable to the law, was able to fulfill its requirements,

but it could not be committed, of necessity and with

certainty, by a free and contingent cause, (which could

commit sin or refrain from it,) if it was not circumscribed

and determined by a more powerful agent, surely and with

certainty moving or impelling the cause, in its own nature,

free and contingent, to the act of sin, or else withholding

or withdrawing that which was necessary to the avoidance of

sin, on which conditions the necessity and certain existence

of sin, committed by the creature, depend. The chief

advocates of the first theory disapprove of the former mode

of action in the more powerful agent (that which moves and

impels), and incline to the latter mode (that which withholds

or withdraws). This mode is also stated in the second theory.

For the creature, left to his own nature, necessarily sins,

if a law is imposed upon him, which can not be observed by

the natural powers alone. God determined to leave the

creature in his natural state. He, therefore, determined also

that the creature should sin, since that was the necessary

sequence. But the reason of that determination can not be

given, if it is not that which is proposed in the former

theory. Indeed the former theory seems even more probable

than the latter.

ANSWER OF JULIUS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST PROPOSITION

We have previously shown that those, which are called two

theories, are not, in fact or substance, two, but differ only

in their relations and mode of explanations; that there is,

therefore, one, I say not probable, but true theory, founded

on the truth of God, and the authority of the Scriptures. We

have, also, in the appropriate place, shown that the charge

of absurdity which is made against this theory is futile.

Since, however, this objection is repeated, we may also

briefly repeat in what respects and on what grounds we demur

to it. The first position -- "God decreed to illustrate His

own glory by mercy and punitive justice," we have, in answer

to the third proposition, shown to be expressed in too narrow

terms.

The second, "He could not effect this without the

introduction of sin," we thus proved to be an erroneous

statement; for if the creature had remained righteous, there

would have been an opportunity for mercy and justice, though

the latter would not have been punitive in its character.

Punitive justice, even, might have been displayed in respect

to those things, which were unsuitable, on account, not of

guilt, but of imprudence, for any just person is liable to

this without sin or guilt.

In the third place, we deny that" sin must of necessity have

been committed," as dependent on the energy of a cause,

universally or in some measure, efficient. That it must

certainly have been committed, we acknowledge, since it

existed certainly in the knowledge of God, as knowledge, not

as a cause of sin. If, then, the word certainly is

explanatory of the word necessarily, and the latter word

means no more than the former, we assent to its use; but if

otherwise, we deny the latter (necessity), and assent to the

former (certainty). The first man was not under the necessity

of committing sin, either from an internal, or an external

cause. He did it of his own free-will, not of any necessity.

Again, this conclusion is not valid, since it is deduced from

incomplete and erroneous antecedents, as we have just shown.

Therefore, it is true, that sin could have been committed

with certainty, by a free and contingent cause, which sinned

(as was the case in the will of devils and of men), and could

have been avoided with certainty by a free and contingent

cause, which did not sin, (as in the case of the good and

elect angels), and, on the contrary, it is false, that it

could have been committed of necessity, if you refer to the

necessity of any sufficient cause, that is, an external and

internal cause, for the will was the cause or rather the

principle -- the attribute of which is freedom at that time

free from all necessity, now bound by its own necessity, but

nevertheless free, and thus producing contingent, not

absolutely necessary effects as is the case in nature. When

it is said that it could have been committed necessarily,

there is an opposition in terms. For the word "could," which

in this sentence is used in its legal sense, supposes

contingency, to which the adverb necessarily is directly

opposed.

In the fourth place, two conditions, are presented for the

existence of sin, neither of which is probable. The former is

that "sin could not be committed by a contingent cause, if it

was not circumscribed and determined by a more powerful

agent, surely and with certainty, moving or impelling the

cause, in its own nature, free and contingent to the act of

sin." This condition is denied; for, in the first place, it

is contrary to nature, which per se can do or not do;

otherwise it indeed has no power. Reference may, perhaps be

made to partial power. This, certainly, is inapplicable to

the human will, for it is a principle of action, and no wise

man would ever place principles of action among partial

powers. Again, if it is limited and determined by a more

powerful agent, that agent must hold the relation of

principle or cause. If the latter, the will must cease to be

a principle, for principle pertains to the cause, it does not

originate in the cause, of which it is the principle; the

same thing can not at the same time, be the cause and the

effect of itself. If the former is true, and the will is

determined by a superior principle, there is this difficulty,

that no superior principle so acts on an inferior one as to

take away its peculiar mode of action, as we have before

quoted from Augustine. But freedom is the peculiar mode of

the will, and its appropriate adjunct is contingency, since

it is freely per se inclinable in this or that direction.

Besides, if it is "circumscribed and determined by a more

powerful agent," that agent, either acts efficiently in each

particular case, or ordains generally according to an

established order in the universe. We have before, in answer

to the sixth proposition, admitted that such an ordination

occurred. You say that it is affirmed that the will is

determined by an agent, absolutely efficient in particular

cases. I deny that this can, with propriety, be attributed to

our writers, whom it is unjust to charge so abruptly with

that sentiment, if some of their expressions seem to savour

of this, since it is contrary to their view, as they explain

themselves in other passages. I will not argue this point

further, but repeat the simple denial that it can be

absolutely effected by a more powerful agent, operating

efficiently, that a principle and contingent cause should

sin. Here, my brother, you present two modes, one efficient,

the other deficient, yet each, in its own way, efficient. For

that which acts efficiently, is present with the work, and

effects it; that, which is deficient, abstains from the work,

and in itself effects that abstinence. You refer to the

former mode in these words, "by a more powerful agent, surely

and with certainty moving or impelling the cause in its own

nature, free and contingent, to the act of sin." This we

deny, and you, indeed, acknowledge that it is denied by our

writers.

Let us, then, consider the other mode which you express, in

these words, "or else withholding or withdrawing that which

was necessary to the avoidance of sin, on which conditions

the necessity and certain existence of sin, committed by the

creature, depend." Here, also, the mode is two-fold, namely,

that the "more powerful agent" withholds that which is

necessary to the cause, if it is absent, and removes it if it

is present; either of which would be a cause for the

production of sin. Here three things are to be considered,

the necessity of the avoidance of sin; -- the withholding or

even the removal of what is necessary; -- and the

consequence.

Concerning the first, it may be observed that every sin, that

is, every inordinate act contrary to law, whether it is

regarded in a universal or particular relation, is a habit or

act of the individual, for genera or species do not act per

se. It is, therefore, primarily and per se inordinate in the

individual agent, and pertains, in a secondary sense, to that

which is common and universal. Indeed, it does not at all

concern the constitution of the universe that sin should be

prevented, not only because sin could not disturb the

relations of the universe, and the Ruler of the universe

maintains its order, but also, because sin might,

incidentally, be of advantage even to the constitution of the

universe, and illustrate the wisdom, goodness, grace, mercy,

justice, patience, power, and all the beneficent attributes

of the Ruler of the universe. It was, then, plainly not

necessary, in the abstract, to the constitution of the

universe that sin should be avoided, and, therefore, nothing

was necessary for the avoidance of sin. If it had been

necessary to the constitution of the universe, God would have

provided for it, in the most complete manner, as Augustine

(Enchiridio ad Laurentium ) proves.

It may be said that it was necessary to the constitution of

the individual agent. It is true that if we regard the good

of the individual only, the avoidance of sin seems to be

necessary. But since the common good of the universe must be

preferred to the good of the individual, and even sin itself,

though incidentally, may be to the advantage of the

constitution of the universe, and sin is committed only by

the individual, it should be stated that the constitution of

the universe does not allow the assertion that it is

necessary that sin should not occur. If, however, the

creature knows that it is necessary, not for the universe,

but for himself, that he should not commit sin, the

prevention of sin must be sought, neither from the universe,

nor from its ruler, but from the individual agent, especially

when the ruler of the universe bestowed on that same agent

the unrestrained power to sin or not to sin, publicly and in

the very condition of his nature, and when He made him the

master of his own course, informed him of his power in that

respect, and most carefully admonished him of the necessary

result of his conduct in view of his individual end, with the

addition, even, of threatening. What then? Should God resume

that which He had bestowed. That would have been the act of

an imprudent, inconstant or impotent being, neither of which

qualities can be attributed to the Deity. Should He not have

made the original bestowment. In that case He would not have

displayed all the modes of His own wisdom, and man would have

desired that, which had not been bestowed upon him, for he

desired that which was far higher, and indeed impossible --

to be like God. If we have suitably considered these points,

which Tertullian discussed at length in his second book

against Marcion, we see, at once, that it was necessary,

neither to the constitution of the universe nor to the

relations of the individual agent, that sin should be

prevented by an external influence, since man himself

possessed, within his own power, the means of preventing it,

and had in the strongest possible mode, received from the

Deity, the knowledge of the necessity existing in his case in

view of his end. God infused into him the principle of

freedom. We, forsooth, wise in view of the result, judge that

that this was badly done by the Lord, that it would have been

better that He had not infused that principle, or, at least,

that it would have been better to have restrained that

freedom.

Concerning the second, we have shown that it was not

necessary that sin should be prevented. It belonged to man to

avoid it, not to another being to prevent man. This being

proved, we need not refer to the withholding and the removal

of that which was necessary for the avoidance of sin. But

that the truth may be presented, we remark, further, that it

did not pertain to the Deity to bestow that, which was

necessary to the avoidance of sin, in that particular act of

Adam; first, because He had already bestowed it; secondly,

because He could not bestow it, unless He should resume what

He had already bestowed. That He had already bestowed it is

evident from the gift of the free-will to man, which was a

principle, in the highest sense, free, and sufficient for

either course, either for the commission or the avoidance of

that sin. Nor, indeed, could He bestow any other hindrance,

unless He should resume that which He had already bestowed;

for that was a natural principle, namely, the free-will,

constituted, by the Deity, without any exception or

modification, the pure and absolute mistress in natural

things. If He had prevented it, either the will must have

wholly ceased to be a principle of action, or, in that

particular act, the condition of that principle, which God

had given to man by nature, and which He had, in that very

act, pledged to keep unviolated by Himself, would have been

violated. Why should God use such precaution with the man to

whom He had given full power over himself, and whom He had

already cautioned by an admonitory precept. Then, you will

say, He should, at least, not have withdrawn that which He

had bestowed; for He bestowed grace, and then withdrew it. I

deny that He withdrew any thing, previously bestowed, except

on account of sin, when man rejected it. Grace, that is, the

gift of grace, had been bestowed on man for the work of

grace, that is, according to which nature was ordained to

supernatural glory. For the work of nature, He bestowed, not

grace, but nature and the will. It was the office of nature

that the man should eat or not eat; it was the office of the

will, according to the command of God, that he should not eat

of the forbidden fruit. This was purely and merely the office

of the will, to which it was not necessary that grace should

be added, since it was bestowed in reference to things of a

gracious, not of a natural character.

Concerning the third, it may be observed that the remark "on

which conditions the necessity and certain existence of sin,

committed by the creature, depend," is wholly erroneous in

reference to the act of Adam. For Adam was under no

necessity, from any source, of committing sin; he was endowed

with pure freedom, as we have now, and frequently at other

times, affirmed. Indeed that assertion is not absolutely and

properly true in the present condition of the human race.

For, on the will of the creature, that is, on our will,

depends the necessity of the commission of sin, which

necessity the infinitely wise will of God permits and

ordains; but, on the contrary, the necessity of the non-

commission of sin, by the communication of grace, depends on

that infinitely wise will of God. It is hardly correct to say

that the necessity of the commission of sin depends on the

will of God, withholding or withdrawing His grace. Yet that

statement, in a certain sense, may be allowed.

In the fifth place, we admit your proposition "the creature,

left to his own nature, necessarily sins, if a law is imposed

on him, which cannot be observed by the natural powers

alone." But that particular law, imposed on Adam, was

observable by the natural powers alone, as we have proved in

answer to the fourteenth and sixteenth propositions. This

whole argument, therefore, and whatever depends on it, is

destroyed. Adam was prepared, by nature and grace, for the

observance of natural law. He was prepared for the observance

of this particular command, because the requisition was only

of a natural character, and of the utmost facility. Your

assumption is ambiguous and improper. The proper form would

be "God placed the creature in his natural state." It is

improperly affirmed that He "determined to leave the

creature, &c." Man left God, before God left man, as we have

before shown. The conclusion is, therefore, false. Your

assumption is ambiguous on account of the various use of the

verb, statuit, which is used in this place. We referred to

that ambiguity in our answer to the sixth proposition.

Finally, it is unsuitably affirmed that "the former theory

seems more probable than the latter." Since in fact or

substance and in their relation they are but one theory,

differing only in the mode of discussion and language. Let

us, however, see wherein one is more probable than the other.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-FIRST

PROPOSITION

The respects, in which those theories differ, have been

already stated in the reply to your answer to the first

proposition. We now inquire whether the first or the second

theory is founded on the truth of God and the authority of

the Scripture. I have already showed that the absurdity,

which I alleged against the first theory, is its necessary

consequence. You have not vindicated it, as it is explained

by those authors, from that charge, but have explained it

differently from the view of its authors, and have proved

that, so explained, it can be, in various ways, defended from

the allegation of absurdity, but this is irrelevant to our

present discussion. There has never been any question between

us concerning that theory, explained, as you think that it

ought to be explained. In this proposition, however, I do not

repeat this allegation, but show that the second theory is

liable to the same objection, and prove it by a comparison of

the first and second theories. This is the plan and scope of

the twenty first proposition. It will, therefore, be

necessary that we consider, first, the grounds of the correct

and deserved allegation of absurdity against the first

theory; secondly, the same allegation against the second

theory, and, at the same time, what you have said in defense

of both.

As to the first theory, I will show by certain syllogisms,

that it is a legitimate inference from it that God is the

author of sin. Then I will examine what you say in its

behalf.

The declaration of mercy, saving from actual misery, and of

justice, punishing sin is necessary, according to the decree

of God; -- But such mercy and justice cannot be declared

without the existence of sin and misery; -- Therefore, the

existence of sin and misery is necessary from the decree of

God, or -- therefore, sin must necessarily be committed from

the decree of God. All the points of this syllogism are taken

from the first theory, rightly understood according to the

sentiments of the authors themselves, as I proved in my reply

to your answers to propositions third and sixth.

Again; -- Sin cannot be committed necessarily by a free and

contingent cause, unless it be circumscribed and determined

by a more powerful cause, which it can not resist; -- But the

will of man is a free and contingent cause; -- Therefore, sin

cannot be necessarily committed by the will of man (which

must be the proximate cause of sin,) unless it be

circumscribed and determined by a more powerful cause which

it cannot resist. I add, that the mode of that determination

is two-fold.

Lastly; -- the cause, which determines the will, in its own

nature free and contingent, to the commission of sin, is, by

that determination, the cause of sin; -- But, according to

the first theory, God is the cause, which determines the will

to the necessary commission of sin; -- Therefore, God is, by

that determination, the cause of sin.

Now let us proceed to those things which you adduce in

apology and defense of that first theory. First, you affirm

that "the first position, 'God decreed to illustrate His own

glory by mercy and punitive justice,' we have, in answer to

the third proposition, shown to be expressed in too narrow

terms." I reply that the question is not whether the position

is true or false, or whether it is expressed in too wide or

too narrow terms, but whether it is assumed by those against

whose theory I have alleged absurdity, as its consequence.

And I showed in my reply to that answer that they, in so many

words, assume this position.

In the second place, you say that "the second, -- 'He could

not effect this without the introduction of sin' we thus

proved to be an erroneous statement." I reply, that it is not

the question whether the statement is erroneous or not, but

whether it is made by those, whose theory I charge with

absurdity. That they do assert this, and in plain language, I

proved in the reply just mentioned. The error is, then, to be

charged on them, not on me. Their assertion, however, is

true, that "mercy and justice -- as understood by them --

could only be declared by the entrance of sin into the

world." For sin is the formal cause in the object of that

justice, and of that mercy, as having consequent misery, as

its adjunct.

In the third place you "deny that 'sin must, of necessity and

with certainty, have been committed.'" This is not the point

in controversy. For I, also, admit that it is not true that

sin must necessarily be committed, and affirm that they, who

take the opposite ground, blaspheme the goodness and justice

of God, though I grant that the advocates of this theory do

not perceive this consequence, and the concession is due to

them, that in other places they teach that which is precisely

the contrary. But if those two premises are granted, I affirm

that it is a legitimate consequence that sin must of

necessity have been committed. You concede that it "must

certainly have been committed," but "certainly" in the

knowledge of God, not "certainly" in the relation of the

divine decree, which is dependent on the will of God, with

foreknowledge, as its antecedent. Those authors of the first

theory, of whom I have spoken, say that sin "must have been

committed certainly and necessarily in the relation of the

decree, and that it could only have been a subject of certain

foreknowledge, because it was decreed and ordained by God to

be committed." But I denied and still deny that sin could

necessarily have been committed by a free and contingent

cause. The cause of a necessary effect is necessary, that of

a contingent effect is contingent. But the will of man is a

free and contingent cause. Sin, therefore, could not have

been committed necessarily by it.

The "opposition in terms" is in your words, not in mine. I

did not say that sin "could have been committed necessarily"

but that it "could not have been committed necessarily."

There is here no contradiction in terms, as will be evident

by an examination of the statement in the following form; --

It could not occur that sin should be committed necessarily

by a free and contingent cause. Is it an absurd statement

that it can occur that a necessary cause should produce a

necessary effect, or its effect necessarily? Indeed it must

occur. I admit that the distinction which you make between

the words certainly and necessarily, is founded in truth;

certainty pertains to the knowledge of God; the necessity of

an event, to the will and decree of God. If this distinction

had been correctly observed by many, it might serve greatly

to the solution of many grave questions connected with this

matter; this you have illustrated, in a very learned manner,

in your book Concerning the fall of Adam.

In the fourth place you say that "two conditions, neither of

which is probable, are presented for the existence of sin."

Let us examine both. The former is not fully stated by you,

for the word which is the whole subject of controversy, is

omitted. Its insertion strengthens what I have affirmed; if

it is taken away, my statement is weakened. That word is

necessarily, and the condition should have been stated thus,

"The former is 'that sin could not have been committed

necessarily by a contingent cause, &c.'" Those things, which

you adduce, do not affect this condition. You indeed proved

that the will of man, as principle and complete power, could

have, freely and contingently, committed sin, but who denies

that statement? I add that if it did not freely sin, it did

not, at all, sin; and there is a contradiction in terms, if

it is asserted that the will sins necessarily, and this, not

in a single, but in a two-fold mode. For it pertains to the

will to do freely that which it does, and sin, if it is

necessary, is no longer sin. We are here speaking on the

hypothesis of the first theory, which we have undertaken to

refute.

You deny that the will is determined by a more powerful

agent; since it is not determined by a cause for then "the

will must cease to be a principle;" not by a principle, for,

as opposed to partial power, a superior principle so acts on

an inferior one as not to take away its peculiar mode of

action." I readily concede that this is truly and learnedly

affirmed. But did I say that the will was determined by a

more powerful agent? By no means. I affirmed that it could

not occur that the will should sin necessarily, unless it was

determined by a more powerful agent. That conclusion was to

be refuted by you, if, indeed, you wished to speak against me

in these things, not the antecedent or the consequent,

concerning which there is no controversy between us. I grant

that if the will is determined by a cause, it ceases to be a

principle; if by a principle, there is, in fact, no

determination, for, if its peculiar mode, which is freedom,

is not taken away, then it is not determined. If, then, it is

determined, it is by a cause; -- But it is determined, for

thence results the necessity of sin; -- Therefore, it is

determined by a cause. But if it is determined by a cause,

then, you say, the will must cease to be a principle, which

is absurd. I assent to this, and, therefore, affirm that the

first theory which involves this absurdity, is deservedly

disapproved. In your addition that in that determination, the

superior agent "either acts efficiently in each particular

case, or ordains generally," you do not, in my opinion,

correctly separate and distinguish between these two things,

if you do not previously show how that, which acts

efficiently, can be separated from that which ordains, (the

latter word being used, in the sense of Calvin and Beza in

the first theory, for the ordination, not of a thing already

done for a certain end, but of a thing to be done to secure a

fixed and prescribed result). If the same word is used

according to your idea, and as it should be used, I admit

that the distinction is a valid one, but this is not the

point in controversy, for it is in reference to the theory of

Calvin and Beza, who do not, at any time, so speak, but whose

meaning and sentiment is, invariably, that which I have

presented.

I concur, then, in your denial that it can be absolutely

effected, by a superior, efficient cause, that a principle

and a contingent cause should sin. Your denial, however,

should have been that the necessity of sin is a legitimate

sequence of that theory, and this denial should have been

sustained. Indeed, you should not have said that it can not

"be absolutely effected by a more powerful agent, operating

efficiently, that a principle and a contingent cause should

sin," but that it can not be so effected that a man should

necessarily sin, for, in the case supposed, a man ceases to

be a principle and contingent cause. I stated that "the chief

advocates of the first theory disapprove of the former mode

of action in the more powerful agent (that which moves or

impels) &c.," but they do this only in word, and do not show

how that mode has not an appropriate place in their theory.

Let us now examine the second mode, which I did not lay down

as absolutely necessary; but because I saw that the necessity

of the commission of sin could only be made out in one of

these two modes, therefore, I separately presented both. It

seems, however, to have belonged to your duty in this case,

in the first place, to show that it was possible that sin

should be committed, apart from either of these modes; in the

second place, set forth that other mode in which this could

be, and, in fact, was done; and in the third place, to prove

that this mode was such as not to make God the author of sin.

You do neither of these things: and I could, therefore, have

passed over all these things, as not within the scope of our

discussion, and as having no weight against my arguments. We

will, however, consider your answer.

In the first place, you show, by prolix argument, "that it

was necessary, neither to the constitution of the universe,

nor to the relations of the individual agent, that sin should

be prevented." No one denies this; no one affirms the

contrary. In that case, sin would not have been committed;

but it was committed. How could you have supposed that I had

any affinity for that sentiment, when I have at all times

contended that God made man of free-will, and of self control

that he might be able, of his own accord, and freely, to

avoid sin, or to commit it of his own choice, to which divine

constitution is directly opposed this idea of the necessary

prevention of sin. I, therefore, concede that it was not

absolutely necessary that sin should be prevented, that is,

that sin should not occur. If, however, I may be permitted

briefly to consider this point, though it may be a

digression, I will note some things which do not seem to me

to be said, with sufficient correctness. You say that it was

not necessary to the universe that sin should be prevented,

that is, as I interpret your meaning, it did not pertain to

the good of the universe that sin should be prevented. I may,

with your permission, deny this. For it pertained to the good

of the universe that the creature should remain in the

perfection of that state, in which the universe was created,

and established in the economy of the creation, by the Deity.

But by sin, it fell from that perfection of the universe, and

"was made subject to vanity" (Rom. viii, 20), whence results

the desire of deliverance from that vanity (v, 21 and 22). If

this does not pertain to the good of the universe, it would

not desire it. If it were not necessary, the whole universe

would not desire it. For its desire is for every good thing,

and its natural desire is for necessary good.

You prove your affirmation by a two-fold argument, first,

"because sin could not disturb the relations of the

universe," and secondly, "because sin might, incidentally, be

of advantage even to the constitution of the universe, and

illustrate the wisdom, goodness, grace, mercy, justice,

patience, power, and all the beneficent attributes of the

Ruler of the universe." To the first, I reply that it does

not seem to me to be very probable. The constitution of the

universe was such, by the creation and ordination of God,

that man was made in the image and likeness of God, and other

creatures were made subject to man, and subservient to his

use and advantage, because he was made in the image of God.

Sin has very greatly disturbed this relation and order. By

it, man became a rebel against God, and the whole creation

was not only removed from under his authority, but armed for

his destruction, except so far as there has been a

restoration in Christ. (See Heb. ii, 6-9.) There are those

who explain the word ajnakefalaiwsasqai used in Ephes. i, 10,

as referring to the restoration of all things to that

original condition from which they had fallen, on account of

human sin. The relation of divine providence in which it

sustains and governs all things, is far different from that

which would have existed, if sin had not entered into the

world, as may be very clearly proved from many passages of

the Bible. "But," you will say, "sin could not so disturb the

constitution of this universe, that God could not reduce it

to order." This, I acknowledge; but that order is not one,

which prevented that disturbance, but followed and corrected

it.

In the second argument, I think that there are two things to

be observed and corrected. First, that you say that "sin

might incidentally be of advantage, even to the constitution

of the universe," for neither per se nor incidentally, could

sin be of advantage to the constitution of the universe. Not

per se, for it resulted not from the intention of the Creator

of the universe, but from the disobedience of the rational

creature. Not incidentally, for, since this whole universe is

finite, its constitution is also finite; and, therefore, the

good, which pertains to its natural perfection, is finite;

the opposite of which finite good, that is, evil or defect,

erring from it, could be incidentally to the advantage of the

universe, that is, could be reduced to the good of the

universe. But sin is an evil, opposed not to finite but to

infinite good, to the justice and will of God. Hence, it

could not, incidentally, be to the advantage of the

constitution of the universe, determined and circumscribed by

its own limits. It could contribute, incidentally, to the

glory of the infinite good, because that infinite good, more

powerful than it, could, according to its own choice, turn it

out of its natural course, and, in this way, reduce to order

that, which is most disorderly; to the order, not of this

universe, but to one far transcending this whole universe,

and only circumscribed by the limits of infinite good. It can

not occur that any creature should so pass out of its own

appropriate order, or that of the whole universe, as not to

be under the control of the Infinite Author. I know, indeed,

that sin is, in a certain respect, opposed to finite good,

namely, to man, with whose happiness it interferes, but it

does not primarily prevent it, unless it is previously

regarded as opposed to the justice and will of God.

Secondly, I think that your statement, -- "Sin might,

incidentally, illustrate the wisdom, goodness, etc, of the

Ruler of the universe," is worthy of notice. This

illustration of the divine attributes is not the effect of

sin, but of the action of God, which makes use of sin to the

illustration of those divine attributes. Sin, in itself, or

abstractly, disgraces and dishonours God. Sin is said to do

this incidentally, for this is the common phraseology, but,

in my opinion, it will be more correctly affirmed of sin that

it is, incidentally, an occasion of illustrating the divine

glory by the exercise of those attributes. Indeed, if God had

not been able to triumph over sin, and to reduce it to order,

He would, by no means, have permitted it to be committed.

To return from this digression, I affirm that the subject of

discussion is not the necessity of avoiding sin, but what is

necessary for such avoidance, namely, that without which sin

can not be avoided by a man on whom the law is imposed.

Concerning this, indeed, you acknowledge that God gave to man

those things, which were necessary to the avoidance of sin,

which He neither resumed nor withdrew until man had, by his

own sin, rejected them. In this, I agree with you. This,

however, was not the point in controversy. It was to be

explained how, if a man could, avoid sin, the same man must

necessarily sin, which is the inference from the hypothesis

of the theory, which I impugn. It has been, previously,

discussed, at sufficient length, to what extent and in what

respects, grace was necessary for the observance of this or

that law. I readily admit that, with the explanation, which

you make, the inference is that Adam was under no necessity

to commit sin; but this is irrelevant to the controversy, and

indeed, is contrary to the view of Calvin and Beza. As we

have just affirmed, it was to be explained how it could be

true that Adam was under no necessity to commit sin, and yet

that he did necessarily commit sin, and how, if there was

imposed on him any necessity, either in this or that mode, or

in any mode whatever, God is not made the author of sin. Far

be it from me to make such a charge against the Deity, but I

affirm that it is a legitimate inference from that first

theory, and that the theory is, therefore, to be disapproved.

I come, now, to the second theory, of which I affirm that the

same absurdity can be inferred from it, in the following way.

My argument may be stated in the following syllogism, -- That

creature sins necessarily, on whom, left to his own nature, a

law is imposed, to the observance of which, the powers of

that nature are not adequate; -- But on man, left to his own

nature, a law was imposed, to the observance of which, the

powers of that nature were not adequate; -- Therefore, man,

left to his own nature, necessarily sinned. By consequence,

God, who imposed that law, and determined to leave man in a

state of nature, is the cause of the sin of man.

You admit the truth of the Major, but deny that of the Minor,

and then refer to your answer to the fourteenth and sixteenth

propositions. To these answers, we replied, -- We remark

further that if man has the ability to observe that law, and

God neither takes it away, nor prevents its free use, then it

must be conceded that it does not follow that man necessarily

commits sin. The phrase, which I use in the Minor, if

improper and ambiguous, is not to be imputed to me, who, in

explaining and impugning the theory of others, have used

their phraseology. For, in your disputation, already

frequently cited, Thesis fifteen, I find the following

statement. "Preterition is an act of the divine pleasure, by

which God, from eternity, determined to leave some of His

creatures in their natural condition." But, though I may not

be able to prove by that syllogism, the Minor of which I have

thought to be laid down by yourself in your Thesis -- in view

of the denial of that Minor -- that the necessity of sin may

be deduced from that theory, and that God is, therefore, as a

consequence of the same theory, made the author of sin, yet I

do not see how that denial of the Minor is consistent with

the sentiment set forth in your thesis, and how the necessity

of sin is not deducible from the same sentiment, and I will

give the reasons of my difficulty in both cases.

In the former case, you affirm that man could, by those

powers, which he has received from God, whether of nature or

of grace, observe the law which was enacted for them. Also,

in your Theses, you affirm that God passed by men, of such

character and capability, without the condition of sin, or

any foresight of the same. I deny that these two things are

mutually consistent, and prove it thus; -- "To him who is

made, from the condition of his nature, capable of any grace,

that is, of grace without which he can not obtain the end for

which he was made, that grace can be considered to be denied

only in view of the foresight of some act by which he may

have made himself incapable and unworthy of receiving it. But

such an act could only be sinful." In proof of this Major, I

remark that, otherwise God in vain bestowed on man the

capacity for that grace, which is absurd. I add that, if

nature does not fail to bestow that which is necessary, much

less is this true of God, the author and finisher of nature.

But God does not fail in things which are necessary, if He

denies to man that grace, without which he is unable to

attain the end for which he was made, which is also absurd. I

proceed with the syllogism: "But all men, not only the first

pair, but, in them, their posterity, considered in respect to

the primitive state, were capable of that grace, and were

created for an end, which was attainable only through that

grace; -- Therefore, that grace could be denied, or could be

considered as denied to man apart from the fact that he was

considered as a sinner." I sustain this consequent, namely,

that all men were capable of that grace, first, because all

men were created in the image of God. Secondly, if they were

not thus capable, they, who are to receive that grace, must

be made capable by some act on His part, which act could not

be that of predestination. For it is reasoning in a circle,

to argue that any act of predestination should make a person

capable of receiving the grace of predestination. Again, it

does not pertain to predestination to render any one capable

of receiving grace, but simply to bestow grace. The act must,

then, be one common to all men. If it is such, then by it all

men were made capable of that grace, which coincides with my

assertion that all were capable. I wish, on this account,

that it might be shown, in this place, how God could justly

deny, by a mere act of His pleasure, to any man that grace,

the capability of which He bestowed on him, and without which

he could not attain the end for which he was made, unless the

man had made himself, by his own demerit, unworthy of that

grace, and unable to receive it.

In the latter case, namely, that the necessity of sin is not

excluded from the theory, which is set forth in your Theses,

but may be fairly deduced from them, I show in the following

manner; -- The denial of grace, necessary to confirm the pure

nature of man, is a cause of the fall of man, that is, of his

sin, by the withdrawal or the non-bestowment of the necessary

preventive; -- But preterition, as defined in your Theses, is

a denial of grace, necessary to confirm the pure nature of

man; -- Therefore, preterition, thus defined, is a cause of

the fall of man, that is, of his sin, by the non-bestowment

of the necessary preventive. The truth of the Major is self-

evident; nor is it affected by the exception, "if that grace

was due to man, for it was due to him, if it was necessary to

the confirmation of his nature, without which he could not

attain the end for which he was made. The Minor is sustained

by your Thesis. "Preterition is an act of the divine

pleasure, by which God determined not to communicate to some

of His creatures that supernatural grace, by which their pure

nature might be confirmed, &c." But that grace is either

necessary or not necessary for the confirmation of the pure

nature of man. If it was not necessary, that pure nature

could have remained unfallen, without that grace. If it could

have remained unfallen without that grace, then those who

maintained their integrity, would have been partakers of

eternal life, and then, those, to whom, He had determined to

deny His grace, could have been among those not passed-by.

This is at variance with the definition, considered both in

itself and in relation to the other Theses. The necessity of

that grace, therefore, follows from that definition, and

consequently the denial of the same is the cause of the fall

by the non-bestowment of the necessary preventive.

Again, the final denial of supernatural happiness, of

necessity, either supposes or induces sin, for supernatural

happiness is denied, and can be denied only to sinners.

Preterition is the denial of final supernatural happiness.

Therefore, it necessarily either presupposes or induces sin.

But preterition, as defined in your Theses, does not

presuppose sin; it must then induce it. I do not see how it

can do this in any way, other than that of which I have

spoken. Let another way be presented, and one which may not

charge the Deity with the responsibility of sin, and this

theory may be freed from the allegation of absurdity.

You say that the Minor is improper and ambiguous. If this is

true, the responsibility is not on me, but on yourself, who

have thus spoken in the Theses so frequently cited, for in

them are the words "God determined to leave, &c." This

phraseology, however, is neither improper nor ambiguous. It

is not improper; for if He forsakes either the men who have

not already forsaken Him, or those who have forsaken Him, the

words "determined to leave" are properly used. It is not

ambiguous, since the word "determined" is used in the same

sense, in all parts of the syllogism, as we demonstrated

concerning the word "ordain" in the sixth proposition. We

spoke of the difference between this theory and the first, in

reply to your answer to the first proposition.

TWENTY-SECOND PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

First, it presents to the Deity, in the act of election, of

non-election, of predestination, and of preterition, man as

created, and created of such a character as did not in fact

pertain to him, while the first theory presents to the Deity,

in the act of predestination and of reprobation, man as to be

created, and to be created such as he was, in fact,

afterwards created.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND PROPOSITION

That this difference is not real, we have sufficiently

demonstrated in answering the sixth and tenth propositions.

The decree has reference to man to be created, considered

generally; and its execution to man as created according to

his various relations.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-SECOND

PROPOSITION

I affirmed that the second theory was less probable than the

first, and proved it by five reasons. We proceed to a more

extended consideration of them, and, in the first place, we

examine the first, that is, the one presented in this

proposition.

The theory of Calvin regards the Deity, as engaged, in the

decree of predestination, with an object identical with the

object of the execution of that decree, but the second theory

regards the Deity as having reference, in the decree of

predestination, to man as he is considered in a purely

natural state, which can effect nothing supernatural or

divine, while, in its execution, He can not have reference to

man in such a condition, since no man ever existed wholly

without a participation of supernatural endowments, either by

creation or superinfusion. It should be observed that

predestination does not intervene between creation and

superinfusion, and that superinfusion is not the work of

predestination, as was previously demonstrated. The answer

which you present does not seem to be relevant. For though

the decree was made before the creation of man, yet

predestination, explained according to the second theory, had

reference only to man considered as created. Creation is not

a result of the execution of the decree of predestination,

understood in that sense, and though the execution of the

decree may, according to this theory, refer only to man as

created, yet the question is to be answered -- whence did the

first act of execution take its origin? Let those things be

examined which are said in reply to your answer to the 6th

and 8th propositions.

TWENTY-THIRD PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

Secondly, because it does not unite decrees between which

there is a just coherence. For it unites the decree in

reference to leaving some in their natural state with the

decree of reprobation by the mode of the foresight of sin,

which foresight, or which sin it considers as contingent;

while from the decree of preterition sin results of

necessity, and therefore, the reprobation, according to the

justice of God, of those on whom He has determined not to

have mercy, should have been united to that decree, not by a

conditional, but by a necessary copula. Those things, which

have, to each other the relation of necessary sequence, are

decreed, by the Deity, in decrees which necessarily cohere; -

- Preterition and sin necessarily cohere; -- Therefore,

decrees concerning them should be conjoined by a closer bond.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-THIRD PROPOSITION

We affirm, on the contrary, that, according to this theory,

there is a just copula of the decrees which mutually cohere.

For it is necessary that any transition from one decree to

the other must be in harmony with its own execution. But the

transition has not reference properly and per se to the

necessity of that decree, but it pertains to contingency. As

in the predestination of the saints, the decree is two-fold,

first, that of election and the preparation of grace,

secondly, that of glory; and the transition of the former to

the latter, is by death which is contingent, as the wages of

sin, so also in the predestination of the reprobate is

contained a two-fold decree, first, that of non-election, or

preterition, or reprobation and alienation from grace,

secondly, that of damnation; and the transition from the

former to the latter, is by sin and death, the consectary of

sin, between which God graciously leaves a space that there

may be even in sinners and the reprobate themselves, a proof

of the divine forbearance, calling them to repentance. In

this case, then, the copula should have been stated to be not

necessary, but contingent. For everywhere in the Scriptures

God disavows sin, and the saints commit it, "for the

righteous Lord loveth righteousness; His countenance doth

behold the upright." (Psalm xi, 7.)

We concede that "from the decree of preterition sin results

of necessity," that is, certainly; since the inference from

that which is true is necessarily true? But we most firmly

deny that sin is, universally or in part, of necessity, in an

efficient sense, the result of that decree, by the necessity

of the consequent or the conclusion. We by no means deny that

sin is the consequent of that decree, though not as caused by

it, or as its necessary effect.

A syllogistic argument is added for the proof of assertion,

but we can not absolutely or simply approve the Minor. We

deny that "preterition and sin necessarily cohere," per se,

for if they necessarily cohere, it would be as true that all

are passed by who have sinned, as that some are passed by who

have sinned; that is, all sinners would be passed by as all

the passed by are sinners. But the consequent is false,

therefore, the antecedent is also false. It is not necessary,

indeed, that there should be a reciprocal coherence between

those things, which differ in mode, one being necessary and

the other contingent; if it were so, nothing would be

contingent. There are many things which are necessary; yet

without a cohering contingency. But on the contrary, nothing

is so contingent, as not to have, with it, something of a

necessary character. Such is the connection of preterition

and sin, in relation to themselves. But, in relation to man,

in the case of those who are descended from Adam, and

involved in his corruption and fall, and who are passed by of

God, we confess that preterition and sin cohere necessarily,

that is immutably, since, though it is committed

contingently, yet that necessity of the connection of sin

with preterition and reprobation becomes absolute and

immutable, as he who contracts a debt, if he is not able to

pay, necessarily remains a debtor. The other points have been

previously discussed.

THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY THIRD

PROPOSITION

Those decrees, neither of which can exist or not exist

without the other, are said to be united by a necessary

copula. By this copula the decree of the preparation of grace

should be connected with the decree of the preparation of

glory. For neither exists without the other, and neither can

exist without the other. If preterition and predamnation are

to be connected by the same copula, I have already obtained

what I desired. But the transition by which one passes from

grace to glory is not the copula by which one decree is

united to the other, but that copula is the will of God,

which wills to bestow, upon no person, one without the other,

and which wills to bestow both where it wills to bestow

either. The transition to glory is death; to which sin does

not hold a corresponding relation in the decree of

preterition and predamnation. For predamnation is on account

of sin; glory is not account of death. With reference to sin

and its merit, God determined to damn some, for sin alone is

the meritorious cause on account of which God can damn a

person. Death has no such relation to glory, which, after

death, follows of the divine predestination and grace. That

death is not the copula is apparent from the fact that it is

the transition both from grace to glory, and from non-grace

to damnation or punishment by the intervention of sin. For

the copula of those opposite decrees can not be the same, and

without any modification.

I accede to what is said concerning death and transition, and

I wish that the consequence may be considered. If death is

the transition from the decree of the preparation of grace to

glory, it follows that the decree of preparation of grace and

glory has reference to sinners. For death can not be the

transition from one decree to another, or from execution to

execution, apart from the relation of sin, as a condition

requisite in the object. I concede that death, as a

transition, depends not, per se and properly, on the

necessity of the decree, by which God determined to bestow

grace and glory on any creature. It does, however, depend on

the necessity of that decree by which God ordained to lead

man to glory only by the intervention of death. This decree

supposes sin. It has been proved that sin necessarily results

from the decree of preterition, that is, of preterition,

defined according your Theses.

In the Minor of my syllogism there was a verbal mistake, and

the word reprobation should be substituted for the word sin,

and the syllogism should be read with this correction.

Preterition and reprobation (the latter referring to

preparation of punishment,) necessarily cohere, as is

apparent from the previous statement, in which I said that

"it unites the decree in reference to leaving some in their

natural state, with the decree of reprobation by the mode of

the foresight of sin, &c." The Minor, thus corrected, is

true, and, when I wrote it, I satisfied myself of its truth

by that very argument, which you use. For all the passed-by

are predamned (to substitute that word according to the view

which you have set forth in this answer,) and all the

predamned are passed by. Therefore, the decree concerning the

passing-by of some must be connected, by a necessary copula,

with the decree concerning the damnation of some. But, in

this case, they are united, not by a necessary, but by a

contingent copula; for they are connected by the mode of the

prevision of sin, which is made contingent. But preterition

and predamnation have a necessary mutual coherence;

preterition and sin also necessarily cohere. For predamnation

is decreed only on account of sin.

Let us now consider your answer to my Minor as it was

erroneously stated by me. You "deny that preterition and sin

necessarily cohere," as asserted in my Minor. Your reason for

denying it, is that "all sinners would be passed by, as all

the passed-by are sinners," and this is not true, for all the

passed-by are indeed sinners, but not all sinners are passed-

by. I concede the antecedent, and yet deny the consequent. It

is not, of necessity, true that every case in which a copula

is necessary, that it should be so in a reciprocal sense. Sin

and preterition can cohere by a necessary copula, even if

this is not reciprocally true. Man and animal are connected

by a necessary copula, but this is not reciprocally true. We

may say that every man is necessarily an animal, but we may

not say, reciprocally, that every animal is a man. Here let

us consider the reason on account of which it can be truly

said that all the passed-by are sinners, but it cannot be

truly said that all sinners are passed by. It is not this,

that sin is a wider term than preterition, and sinners a

wider term than the passed-by, whence also it seems to me to

be a very probable conclusion that sin was prior to

preterition, since things, which are generic in their

character, are naturally prior to those which are specific.

It also seems to me to be deducible from this reciprocation

and inversion, (namely, all the passed-by are damned, and all

the damned are passed by, and all the passed-by and damned

are sinners, and, indeed, only sinners are passed by and

damned), that, consequently, preterition and predamnation

pertain to sinners, and, therefore, to men considered in

their sins, which I designed to argue, and have especially

undertaken to prove. In this way also, sin precedes both

preterition and predamnation, and if its natural efficiency

is considered, all sinners, not some merely, will be passed

by and damned. But since the natural efficiency of sin is

hindered in some, by the force of a superior cause, which is

the will of God, it hence occurs that those sinners are

passed by and damned on whom God has determined not to have

mercy, those are not passed by or predamned, on whom He has

determined to have mercy.

Your observations concerning the mode of coherence between

the necessary and the contingent, are not opposed to my view,

even if they are true, which I do not think to be beyond

controversy. The necessary and the contingent differ in their

entire essence, so that no thing, whatever it may be, can be

said, at the same time, to be necessary and contingent, that

is, (to preserve the phraseology,) to be done necessarily and

contingently. Yet I think that it can not, without an

exception necessary to be considered in this place, be said

that he necessarily remains a debtor, who has contracted a

debt, and is not able to pay it. There should have been the

addition of the exception "unless a remission of the debt is

granted by the creditor," for without that exception, there

would be a reciprocal relation between sin and damnation, so

that all sinners would be damned, and all the damned would be

sinners. For sin is a debt in which all sinners are involved,

and not only does it deserve punishment, but it will also be

certainly punished, unless it shall be pardoned and remitted.

From what you here say, I think that it is possible to deduce

an argument in favour of my theory. For you make an analogy

between the contingent act of sin and the contraction of

debt; also between the being necessarily a sinner, the being

necessarily passed by, and the remaining necessarily in debt,

unless there is ability to pay. There is between the first

terms in each, an analogy, and also, between the second

terms, such a relation that in each case the former naturally

precedes the latter; hence sin was committed contingently by

man before he was necessarily constituted a sinner, also,

before he was passed by of God. And who does not know that

man, since he freely sinned, made himself the bond-slave of

sin, and, therefore, is necessarily subject to sin, until his

deliverance is effected through Christ, the Mediator,

according to the words of Scripture, "Whosoever committeth

sin, is the servant of sin. If the Son, therefore, shall make

you free, ye shall be free indeed." (John viii, 34-36.)

TWENTY-FOURTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

Thirdly, because it leaves a hiatus in the decrees, not

introducing, between the decree of preterition and that of

reprobation, the decree concerning the certain and necessary

existence of sin; for, sin, in my judgment, necessarily

results from preterition itself, by the removal, as they say,

of the hindrance

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH PROPOSITION

We deny that any intermediate decree is necessary between the

decree of preterition and that of damnation, (for so you

understand the word reprobation), or that any decree is

interposed, and claim that this is so from the very nature of

the decrees. For these decrees are of the divine efficiency,

and they are effected by the Deity, immediately of His own

will, and justly of His own wisdom. But the decree concerning

the existence of sin pertains to the mediate work of nature,

and is effected in that mode, in which God decreed, that is,

contingently, from a contingent cause, for the will is, in

this case, the principle of contingent causes, and that

particular motion of Adam towards the fall was the contingent

cause of the fall and of sin, which befell our race.

Therefore, it is necessary that a distinction should be made,

in this mode, in what is said concerning the certain and

necessary existence of sin. The existence of sin, if you

regard its origin, was certain in the knowledge of God, but

not necessary by the power of the decree as a cause, because

God, as absolutely as possible and without any exception, by

the order of nature in natural things, bestowed on the will

of Adam, the free power of committing or avoiding sin. Thus,

by the power of that decree, it was necessary that man should

sin or should not sin; by the power of the will, it was

contingent that man should sin; finally sin was committed

contingently by the motion of the will, because it was

decreed contingently.

But the existence of sin, if you have respect to the act in

which our first parents fell, though contingent in its

origin, is yet certain and necessary in the order of nature,

by which it occurs that the leprosy of that sin, which

infected them, is transmitted to their posterity. For an evil

cause produces an evil effect, "a corrupt tree bringeth forth

evil fruit," (Matt. vii, 17), a serpent begets a serpent, a

leper begets a leper. That, which pertains to nature, can,

with no probable reason, be ascribed to a decree concerning

supernatural things. The existence is, in every mode, of

nature. It can not then be ascribed to supernatural decrees.

You present, as the reason of your affirmation, that sin

necessarily results from preterition itself, by the removal

of the hindrance. This was, in my judgment, refuted with

sufficient clearness, in the answer to your twenty-second

proposition.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH

PROPOSITION

The mode should have been pointed out here, in which it could

occur that the decree of preterition should necessarily

cohere with the decree of predamnation, without a necessary

copula. The foresight of contingent sin is not a necessary

copula. That they may necessarily cohere, since the decree of

preterition considers man, not as a sinner, and that of

predamnation considers him only as a sinner, there must, of

necessity, be the necessary existence of sin, either by the

force of the decree of preterition, or of some other divine

decree, such, for example, as Beza describes. We speak here

of the existence of sin, in respect to the act of Adam, not

of its necessary existence in respect to our corrupt

conception and birth. For the latter is the effect of the

former, by the mode of merit, by the intervention of the

judgment and sentence of God, imputing the guilt of the first

sin to all the posterity of Adam, not less than to Adam

himself and to Eve, because they also sinned in Adam.

I concede the truth of what you say, at the end of your

answer, that those things, which are natural, are not to be

ascribed to supernatural decrees. But sin, if it is

necessary, that is, if it is necessarily committed, and is

not a natural act, namely, an act dependent on the will of

man, as the principle of his own action; and if sin is

natural, then its necessity would not have been ascribed, by

Calvin and Beza, to the decree of predestination. We do not

here discuss the thing considered in itself, but considered

on the hypothesis of that theory which unites preterition

with predamnation, by a necessary copula, not by sin,

existing previously both to preterition and predamnation.

Whether that, which I said concerning the necessary existence

of sin as a result of the decree of preterition, by the mode

of the removal of the hindrance, was refuted by you, may,

perhaps, be decided by a reference to my reply to your answer

to the twenty-second proposition.

TWENTY-FIFTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

Fourthly, because it is not consistent with the condition of

the creation and perpetuation of the human race, which was

that all should be considered in one, and that all should

come from one. It regards men, either as not considered in

Adam, or as considered in various modes in Adam, that is, in

him as just created, not yet fallen.

REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-FIFTH PROPOSITION

Those things, which are distinct in their whole genus, are

distinct also in their mode. The condition of the creation

and the perpetuation of the human race, is natural (for

creation is natural by reduction, as unity is ascribed to

number, a point to a line,) but the condition of election and

predestination is wholly supernatural. They differ,

therefore, in mode. A consequence, from things which lack

analogy and equality, is not valid. All things, indeed, in

nature are considered in one thing, and all come from one,

but in the case of predestination, all are not considered in

one, but each is considered in himself, nor do all come

naturally from one, but all are supernaturally distinguished,

by God, in Christ. Man, according to nature, is considered

universally and individually in Adam; according to grace, he

is considered only individually in Christ, for this is not

the order of nature, but the benefit of grace. Therefore, the

predestinate are considered, not in nature and according to

nature, but of nature according to grace, which is personal

and not natural. Law pertains to nature; privilege to grace.

Consequently, what is presented in reference to the

consideration of men in Adam, is irrelevant.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-FIFTH

PROPOSITION

The force of my argument is sustained. For though creation

and predestination differ in mode and genus, as natural and

supernatural, yet predestination and reprobation, which

impinge on the conditions of creation, can not be true. I

should have used a more correct phraseology, if I had said

inconsistent instead of not consistent. For a supernatural

action can add something to created nature, and exceed the

order of nature, but can do nothing contrary to creation. But

predestination and reprobation, as set forth in your Theses,

ordain something contrary to the conditions of creation; they

cannot, then, have place among true doctrines. I will prove

my assumption. You state that some are passed by apart from

the consideration of sin. But a man can be considered apart

from sin, only as he was in his primitive state, but the

theory under consideration regards some as passed-by,

considered in their primitive state, which can not be true,

because, in their primitive state, they had the power to

persevere in good, and in the avoidance of sin, and,

therefore, they could be saved by obedience to the law, and,

by consequence, they were not passed by, considered in that

state, since the passed-by, according to the definition of

your Theses, necessarily fail of salvation, and are even

necessarily damned, though with the intervention of sin. If

you say that they were necessarily damned after they were

foreseen as sinners, I reply that they were also passed by

after they were foreseen as about to sin, indeed, seen as

sinners. We notice, also, your two-fold distinction in that

consideration. Men are considered in one, and they are

considered also, each in himself, but all are considered in

one such as they are in him, and each is considered in

himself, such as he is in himself, else the distinction is

false. This consideration is two-fold in reference to a two-

fold condition. They are considered in the condition of

primitive integrity, and in that of fallen, sinful creatures.

In the primitive state, all are considered in one, as in

their origin and stock, and while this stands, they stand.

Each is considered in himself as standing, and as having,

from the arrangement of nature and grace, every thing which

the original stock had, whether of nature or of grace -- the

term grace being used in contradistinction to nature,

otherwise whatever a man has may be regarded as of gracious

bestowal. Therefore, all are considered as true, just, and

holy. In the state of sin, all are considered in one who

sinned, and all are considered to have sinned in him. Each is

considered in himself as deficient in those things, which he

would have had of grace, if the first man had remained pure,

and as involved in sin and in the demerit of sin. Now, so far

as all are considered in one, whether as a pure or as a

fallen being, there is no predestination, no preterition or

reprobation, no predamnation. For then all would be

predestinate and none reprobate, or all would be reprobate

and none predestinate. Therefore, predestination and

reprobation have place in reference to them, as they are each

considered in themselves. Concerning this, then, there is no

question between us. But the point at issue, is this -- In

what state are they each considered by God, in the act of

predestination and of preterition? You answer, that they are

considered in the primitive state, or rather that they are

considered in general; I affirm that they are considered,

individually and definitely, in the state of sin. Otherwise,

I say that this decree impinges on the conditions of

creation, as I have demonstrated. This is absurd, for

supernatural things can and indeed must be superior to

natural, but by no means contrary to them.

TWENTY-SIXTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

Fifthly, because, according to it, the decree is equivocal,

and true only on condition of a distribution of its terms. It

is equivocal because glory and grace, which are prepared in

election and reprobation, are equivocal; for it is the glory

which follows the ignominy of sin through the grace of

remission and regeneration, or it is glory bestowed on

nature, as originally created, by supernatural grace

superinfused into that nature. It is true only on the

condition of a distribution of its terms, because it

absolutely ordains neither kind of grace to its subject; not

the grace, superinfused upon nature, and glory by means of

it, because it is not that grace by which a man is saved and

glorified; not the grace of remission and removal, because it

can ordain that grace only to the sinner. The decree must,

then, be understood with this distribution; -- I will to this

man glory and grace, certainly indeed, yet of the former or

latter kind, as one or the other may be necessary for him,

according to the diversity of his condition.

REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-SIXTH PROPOSITION

We deny that "the decree is equivocal and true only on

condition of a distribution of the terms." It is not

equivocal for it is expressed in general terms and refers to

grace and glory in a general sense. That which is thus stated

is not equivocal. Neither grace nor glory, in the decree, is

two-fold, but both are one in substance, in fact, and in

relation, but different in degrees in relation to their

object. As life in man is not two-fold in its nature, though

it may increase of itself, by the law of nature, so neither

grace nor glory is two-fold, though each may progress in us

by its own degrees. Grace, in both cases, is supernatural,

both when it graciously renews nature, and when it raises a

person above the mode of nature. Whatever may be said of it,

it is supernatural and in fact one. Glory, also, in both

cases, is universally supernatural, both that which is

adequate to the mode of nature, and that which is above

nature. The latter embraces and absorbs the former, as the

greater light does the less; yet, in both cases, it is light,

and is supernatural, since nature lost and grace may restore

it. Nor, indeed, is that decree to be considered as certain

only on condition of a distribution of terms; for God

absolutely ordains His whole grace, that is, every mode of

it, to His own elect, without modification or any exception.

Therefore, also, He ordains and bestows upon them the grace

of remission and renewal, as its antecedent mode, and the

grace of that celestial glory, as its consequent mode.

Indeed, if it was possible that any thing of a supernatural

character, in addition to the antecedent grace or consequent

glory pertaining to nature, should be desired, and if there

is any thing else to which I might wish to refer, God will

fully bestow it, because He has universally decreed to His

own, that grace and glory which is, indeed, communicable. But

God can ordain the grace of remission and renewal only to the

sinner and in relation to sin, but He had respect to the

whole man, generally, on whom He could bestow His whole grace

and apply it in a supernatural mode. The decree, then, of

grace and of glory is to be understood absolutely, because it

was ordained absolutely and generally, without restriction,

exception or modification of the grace and glory which God

communicates to His own. There is variety in the object and

in its mode, but the fact that grace and glory is absolutely

and generally decreed and bestowed on various objects, does

not evince that the grace and glory are diverse in

themselves; as the light of the Sun is not various, if it

comes to us variously, or is variously perceived by us.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-SIXTH

PROPOSITION

You seem not to have fully understood my proposition. -- That

you may understand it according to my meaning, I will, so far

as I am able, state it in phraseology, used by yourself in

this matter. I say that this decree is equivocal, because

grace and glory, prepared in this decree, are equivocal, that

is each of them is equivocal. For the grace, which preserves

and confirms in original integrity, is one thing; that, which

restores from a sinful state is another. Also, glory, in

respect to the mode of the object, which, being above nature,

is superadded to that which is adequate to the mode of

nature, is one thing, and that, which is bestowed on nature,

freed from the ignominy of sin and misery, is another.

This decree is true only on condition of a distribution of

its terms, because it does not ordain to man either this

grace or that, or glory of this or that mode, absolutely, but

one only, in the case of grace or of glory, and on a certain

condition. It does not ordain to man, absolutely, the grace

of preservation in his original integrity, and glory from or

through that grace, because that is not the grace and glory,

by which man is saved and glorified. It does not ordain to

man, absolutely, the grace of restoration from a state of

sin, and of glory from a state of ignominy, because it can

absolutely ordain that grace and glory only to a sinner.

Therefore the decree must be understood with the following

distribution of its terms: -I ordained to this man grace or

glory, certainly indeed, but either of this or of that mode

as the former or the latter shall be necessary for him,

according to his different state of integrity or of sin.

I will now consider your answer. You deny that this decree is

equivocal: I affirm it. To sustain your denial, you add, "it

is expressed in general terms, and refers to grace and glory

in a general sense. That, which is thus stated, is not

equivocal." I concede the latter, and deny the former. I

affirm that grace and glory are spoken of, indeed in general

terms, but they are not understood in a general sense, which

is equivocation. I prove that they are not understood in a

general sense, because grace and glory are prepared for man,

in predestination, not understood in a general sense, but as

they are spoken of particularly. Examine your remarks in

answer to Proposition 11th. That cannot be said to be

prepared generally, which is not prepared in some particular

part or species. Much less can that be said to be so

prepared, which is of a nature, such that, if it is prepared,

in one part or species, of itself, it can not be prepared in

another. But this is the state of the case. Grace, taken

generally, comprehends the grace of preservation in the state

of integrity, and of restoration from the state of sin.

Glory, taken generally, comprehends glory superadded to

primitive nature and glory bestowed on fallen nature, raised

from a state of ignominy. Neither grace nor glory, generally,

is prepared for man. If, indeed, the grace of preservation in

a state of integrity, and glory, superadded to nature, was

prepared for man, then the grace of restoration from a state

of sin, and glory, from a state of ignominy, could not be

prepared for him, since he did not need this latter grace and

glory, if he obtained the former, and there could be no place

for the latter, if the former had a place. But, if there is

any place for the grace of restoration from a state of sin

and of glory from one of ignominy, a place was not made, in

the predestination of God, for the grace of preservation and

for glory by means of that grace. Hence it is apparent that

my proposition was not clearly understood by you, who have

thought that there is such a relation of two-fold grace and

glory, that one grace embraces and absorbs the other, and one

glory has the same relation to the other, according to the

illustration of light. Grace, renewing the nature, and grace,

exalting, above the mode of nature, the same renewed nature,

sustain this relation, for one embraces and perfects the

other. I did not, however, refer to that two-fold grace, but

to the grace of preservation in the primitive state, and to

that of restoration from a state of sin. These are not

mutually dependent; one does not comprehend the other, but

one excludes the other. But glory, adequate to the mode of

nature, and glory, above nature, sustain such a relation,

that one perfects and embraces the other. I did not, however,

refer to this two-fold glory, but to glory, in both modes

supernatural, in one superadded to primitive nature, in the

other bestowed on fallen nature, restored from its ignominy.

In this sense, therefore, that decree is equivocal, since, in

it, the words, grace and glory, are spoken of, generally and

in a universal sense, but they are not prepared, generally

and in a universal sense, in predestination, but separately,

distinctly and particularly.

You also deny that "this decree is true only on condition of

a distribution of its terms," but you deny it in the sense,

which was really intended by them. Your denial is true in the

former sense. For the grace of remission and that of

renovation, as an antecedent mode, are simply and truly

prepared for man. But that was not my meaning, as is most

clearly apparent from the words themselves. For I placed the

grace of remission and of renewal in contrast not to the

grace of celestial glory, but to the grace of preservation in

a state of integrity. God, in predestination, did not

absolutely ordain grace in those two modes, or those two

parts or species of grace for man, or either of them

absolutely; but one only, and that on the condition of

distribution, according to the decree of which we treat. He

did not ordain both parts absolutely, since both parts can

not have place at the same time. The former excludes the

latter as unnecessary, and, indeed, as not being able to have

place at the same time; the latter excludes the former, as

not having been applied, from which want of application in

the case of the former, namely, the grace of preservation in

the primitive state, the latter, namely, that of restoration

from a sinful state, became necessary, if indeed man was to

be saved of grace. He did not ordain either of these, simply

and absolutely without any condition; not that of

preservation, for it was not bestowed on man, and it would

have been bestowed, if it had been prepared absolutely and of

predestination; not that of remission of sins and of renewal,

that is, of renewal from a state of sin, because He could

ordain that grace absolutely only to a sinner, and that

decree did not regard man as a sinner. But it ordained, on

condition of the distribution of the terms, either this or

that, as the condition of man demanded one or the other.

That a decree of this kind is true only on condition of the

distribution of its terms is clear from the terms, if

correctly understood. I will illustrate it by an example.

Every statement is necessarily true or false; -- But this is

a statement; Therefore it is necessarily true or necessarily

false. This does not follow. For on condition of a

distribution of the terms, it is true that every statement is

necessarily true or false, and neither part is, abstractly

and separately, necessary. The nature of the decree of

predestination demands that it should be absolutely certain

and true that God ordained for a man the grace of

preservation in a state of integrity, or absolutely certain

and true that God ordained for a man the grace of renewal

from a state of sin. But God does not ordain, on condition of

the distribution of terms, for a man either the grace of

preservation or the grace of renewal.

But since predestination, as it is defined by you, refers to

the last mode, I affirmed correctly that it is only certain

on condition of the distribution of terms. I conclude, by a

fair deduction, that it is, therefore, not predestination. If

it truly pertains to predestination to ordain, absolutely and

definitely, the grace of preservation and, if it does not

ordain that, to ordain, absolutely and definitely, the grace

of restoration, then it follows that God did not and could

not regard man in general. For the ordination of the former

grace definitely excludes sin, that of the latter definitely

includes the consideration of sin, and, in both modes, that

general consideration is equally refuted. For the general

consideration of an object neither excludes any circumstance,

nor is united to any certain and special circumstance. That

predestination of grace, however, which preserves in a state

of integrity, excludes the circumstance of sin, and this

predestination of grace restoring from a state of sin, is

definitely united to the circumstance of sin. Therefore the

decree of predestination was not made abstractly and

universally or generally, without any restriction or

modification of grace and glory, but it was, and necessarily

must have been, made with a restriction and modification of

grace and glory. For the decree of predestination is that, by

which is prepared the grace, through which a man is certainly

saved, not that, by which salvation would be possible, if

indeed any state of man might require the application of such

grace, nor that, by which he would be saved, if it should be

applied to any state of man. But that grace, by which a man

is certainly saved, must be modified and restricted. For he

is saved either by the grace of preservation, or by that of

restoration, by one or the other, of necessity. If he is

saved by one, he does not need to be saved and he can not be

saved, by the other; if he is not saved by one, he must be

saved by the other, or excluded from salvation, and that, by

which he is saved, is prepared in predestination, and the

other, by which he is not saved, is absolutely excluded.

You affirm that "there is variety in the object and in its

mode." But we here treat of that variety in the object and

its mode, which variety is so great that grace and glory must

be modified and restricted to this or that variety of the

object; the grace of preservation in the state of integrity

and glory, by means of it, are suitable to the object,

considered in its original state; the grace of restoration

and glory, by means of it, are suitable to the object,

considered in sin and misery. Grace and glory, considered

absolutely and universally, can not be decreed or bestowed,

in predestination, upon various objects. For predestination

has reference, necessarily, to a uniform and univocal object,

that is either to one absolutely not a sinner, or to a

sinner, and it bestows grace only on a subject, of one mode

and univocal. It saves one, absolutely not a sinner or

absolutely a sinner; it does not adapt itself to this one or

that one, of this or of that character, but it adapts itself

absolutely to an object of this character, and not otherwise

considered. The grace of preservation saves, absolutely, the

angels, for the grace of restoration was never ordained

concerning them or bestowed upon them. The grace of

restoration absolutely saves human beings, for the grace of

preservation, in their original state of integrity, was never

ordained for them or bestowed upon them. Grace is, indeed, as

you say, one in itself, and in its essence, as, also, is

glory, but each is variously applied according to the mode

and relation of the object; and, between the application of

grace and the mode and relation of the object, there is this

reciprocity that, from the application of grace, the relation

of the object may be inferred, and from the mode of the

object, reciprocally may be deduced what grace it may be

necessary to apply to that object. The same is true of glory.

The illustration of the light of the Sun, introduced at the

end of your answer, may also serve my purpose. The light of

the Sun is one and the same, whether it is shed upon and

renders more luminous a body already illuminated, or it is

shed on a dark body and drives away the darkness, and renders

that light which was before dark. If only the same difference

existed between an illuminated and a dark body, as exists

between a man in his original state and a sinner, then rays

of the Sun, sufficient to illuminate the body already light,

would not suffice to illuminate the dark body, unless they

were greatly increased and multiplied.

TWENTY-SEVENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

I will not now touch the theory of Augustine, because that

would be a futile task, if the theory of Aquinas, of prior

consideration, can be sustained to my satisfaction. These,

then, are the matters which I would present to your

consideration.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-SEVENTH PROPOSITION

I have always thought, and yet think, that the theory of

Augustine was substantially consistent with the two theories

which have been considered. You will see that this is the

fact, if you make allowance for certain modes of expression

used by him, and for a single diverse circumstance.

I have thus, my brother, in this subject, used the diligence

and promptitude which was possible, in view of the duties

which have, not rarely, interrupted me. Receive my effort

with kindness, if it may not answer your expectation. May the

God of truth and peace seal on your mind that saving peace,

more and more, and graciously guide both of us and all His

servants in the way of truth to His own glory, and to the

edification of His church in Christ Jesus our saviour. Amen.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-SEVENTH

PROPOSITION

The theory of Augustine is very different from both the

preceding theories, as may be seen from this whole

discussion, on account of the circumstance, added by him to

the object of the decree, concerning which we treat. For, if

the circumstance of sin was, of necessity, to be considered

by the Deity, in the act of decree, and was definitely

considered in that very act, then it must be true that those

discussions and explanations of the same decree, err greatly

from the truth, which state that there was no necessity of

the consideration of sin, and no actual consideration of it

by God, when He ordained the decree. The remark may be added,

with propriety, that, by the mere addition to the object of

the decree and right explanation of the circumstance of sin,

all the absurdities and blasphemies, which are usually

alleged against the decree of predestination and reprobation

may be repelled and clearly refuted, not being logical

consequences of that decree.

I have thus presented my objections to your answers to my

propositions, not so much with the thought of refuting them,

as with a desire to elicit from you more extended answers and

explanations, by which I might perhaps be satisfied and my

mind might be freed from its difficulties on this subject. I,

therefore, beseech God, that, if I have written any thing

contrary to the truth, He may pardon me concerning it, and

may reveal the truth unto me; if I have advanced any thing

agreeable to the truth, that He will confirm me in it, and

that he will grant to me yourself, assenting to my views, and

aiding me, that, by means of you, the truth may daily gain

greater authority, and may be more and more propagated to the

glory of the divine name, to the advantage and increase of

the church, in our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen.

APPENDIX

THESES OF

DR. FRANCIS JUNIUS

CONCERNING DIVINE PREDESTINATION,

COMPOSED, IN THESE VERY WORDS, BY HIMSELF, AND PUBLICLY

DISCUSSED, UNDER HIS DIRECTION, BY WILLIAM CODDAEUS,

IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LEYDEN, IN THE YEAR 1593 -- ALSO SOME

BRIEF ANNOTATIONS OF JAMES ARMINIUS.

As we have frequently referred to the Theses of Doctor

Francis Junias concerning Predestination, we will here insert

them, and make some brief annotations upon them.

THESIS 1

Predestination is properly, according to the etymology of the

word, a determination to an end, but in common usage, it is

equivalent to the Greek word protagh and signifies the

relation of the whole arrangement to the end, and thus we use

it.

Destination is a determination of an existing object to its

end; the particle prae, prefixed to the word, denotes that

the act of destination is antecedent to the actual existence

of the object.

THESIS 2

Predestination, therefore, is an act of the divine good-

pleasure, by which God, from eternity, prepared the plenitude

of His blessings, in Christ, for those, who should be heirs

of salvation, to the praise of His glorious grace. The word

eujokia or good-pleasure, is here used, correctly, according

to the Scriptural sense, for the particle eu+ refers to the

favourable and benevolent inclination of God towards its

object, not to the precise and determinate will of God in

reference to any of His own purposes, as the word good-

pleasure is used by the school-men, when they distinguish the

will of God into his revealed will and the will of His good-

pleasure. Prepared in Christ.] No blessings are prepared in

Christ for men, except those which are adapted to sinners.

Christ himself; the saviour of men, is called Jesus only

because "He shall save His people from their sins," (Matt. i,

21). No one is blessed in Christ, if he is not a believer;

"So then, they, which be of faith, are blessed with faithful

Abraham" (Gal. iii, 9.)

For those who should be heirs of salvation]. Salvation

itself; and the inheritance of eternal life, are comprehended

in the fullness of those blessings, which God has prepared in

Christ. Therefore those, for whom that fullness was prepared,

should have been otherwise described. For there is an

absurdity in the statement, -- "predestination is an act, by

which God has prepared salvation for those who shall be heirs

of salvation." For they are made heirs of salvation according

to which, the inheritance, comprehended in the fullness of

those blessings, was prepared. Persons, as one part of the

material or object of predestination, are not to be described

by the divine things, which were prepared for them in that

predestination, and which constitute the other part of the

material or object of predestination. The persons are more

correctly described by Sohnius, thus: "Predestination unto

life, or election, is that by which God decreed, from

eternity, to justify and to accept unto eternal life,

believers, or the faithful, to whom he decreed to teach

faith." To the praise of His glorious grace]. The Scriptures

recognize the grace of God as the cause and end of

predestination, only as mercy is united with it, and as it is

exercised towards sinners and the miserable.

THESIS 3

It is an act (for God is simple energy) proceeding not from

any external cause, but purely from Him who predestinates;

otherwise it would not be, purely, predestination, preceding

all things and causes.

The divine predestination, indeed, precedes all things and

causes, so far as their actual existence is considered; or it

was decreed from eternity. It, however, follows, in the mind

and prescience of God, the pre-existence of some things and

causes; that of sin, for example, without which neither

grace, as it is described above, nor Christ, in his true

character, nor those blessings could have any adaptation to

men. Therefore, although this predestination may not depend

on an extrinsic cause, yet it was occasioned, as they say, by

sin.

THESIS 4

Its cause is eujdokia good-pleasure, by which He was

favourably disposed towards those, whom He pleased to adopt

as sons, through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of

His election.

By that same good pleasure, by which God was favourably

disposed towards some. He also was pleased to adopt the same

persons as sons. Therefore, this is not a correct description

of the persons towards whom God was favourably disposed.

Indeed, it was because He was favourably disposed towards

them, that He adopted them as sons.

To adopt as sons]. Observe here that adoption is not placed

among the prepared blessing, but that it is used to describe

the persons for whom blessings are prepared. Compare this

with your answer to my first proposition.

But, that the inappropriateness of that definition may be

more manifest, let it be put in this form; -- Predestination

is an act of the divine good-pleasure, by which God, from

eternity, prepared filial adoption, and its consequent,

eternal life, in Christ, for those whom He pleased to adopt

as sons, and who should be heirs of salvation.

To adopt as sons through Jesus Christ]. Christ Jesus is here

to be considered not only as the foundation on which is based

the execution of the decree, but also as the foundation on

which the decree itself is based. For we are adopted in him

as in our head, therefore he is, in the order of causes,

first constituted and predestinated to be our head, then we

are predestinated in him as his members. This admonition I

present, not because I think that you understand that

expression differently, but because I perceive that Beza on

the first chapter to the Ephesians, adopts an order entirely

different, and which seems to me to invert the correct order

of predestination.

According to the purpose of his election]. This purpose of

election is nothing else than the good-pleasure of God, by

which he is favourably disposed towards some, and by which He

pleases to adopt some, in Christ, as sons. But your words are

so arranged as to convey the idea that this purpose is

something different from that good-pleasure.

THESIS 5

It is, therefore, God alone, who predestinates, the cause of

His own predestination, and of that preparation which He

proposed to Himself, according to that good pleasure of His

will.

THESIS 6

Therefore, this act is said to be from eternity, that is,

before all things and causes, in things or of things, which

He predestinated to exist.

If this Thesis excludes also the sin of man as a condition

requisite in the object of that predestination, it is not

correctly said that predestination precedes the provision of

sin; for, though sin did not move God to the act of

predestination, (for it is the appropriate effect of sin to

move the wrath of God), yet this predestination was made in

view of sin, the occurrence of which in time, God foresaw in

the infinity of His knowledge.

THESIS 7

The material of predestination is twofold; divine things, and

persons to be partakers of them.

Divine things and persons, to be partakers of them, have a

mutual relation to each other, so that a conclusion

concerning the character of the persons can be formed from

the nature of those things, and conversely, the nature of

those divine things may be inferred from the character of the

persons. The things are adapted to the persons, and such

persons need such things for salvation. Thus, from the grace

of the remission of sins and the renewal of the Holy Ghost,

we infer that the men, for whom those things are prepared,

are sinners; also, if men are sinners, it is inferred that

such grace is necessary for them.

THESIS 8

The genus of the divine things, which are communicable

through Predestination, is blessing, which the Apostle

circumscribes within these modes; it is complete, not

partial; spiritual, not carnal; "in heavenly places," not

natural, but surpassing all nature; finally, in Christ, that

is, divine in its principle and foundation, that Christ may

be the eternal head of the predestinate.

The expression, in which divine things are said to be

communicable through predestination, does not seem to me to

be in harmony with the nature of predestination. For

predestination does not cause that those things should be

communicable, but does in fact communicate them. They are

made communicable by the blood and death and resurrection of

Christ, by which those blessings were acquired and obtained

from the Father. Since any thing is communicable before it

is, in fact, communicated, it follows that predestination is

posterior, in the prescience and preordination of God, to the

death and resurrection of Christ. I leave the inference for

the consideration of the intelligent.

Spiritual, not carnal]. spiritual is contrasted in the

Scriptures not only with carnal, but, also, with natural; as

in 1 Corinthians ii, 14, also, in 1 Corinthians xv, 44, 45,

46. Carnal, however, may sometimes also comprehend in itself

the natural.

"In heavenly places," not natural]. Heavenly things are, in

the Scriptures, contrasted with mundane and earthly good,

adapted to nature as such, and, thus, heavenly and natural

are indirectly opposed.

Finally, in Christ]. Christ obtained those blessings by his

death; he has received the same from his Father to be

communicated to his followers; in him believers are

predestinated to a participation in the same.

Divine in principle and foundation]. Blessing is divine in

principle, for its principle is God, the Father, who confers

it; but it is not said, in the same sense to be divine in its

foundation. For Christ is the foundation of that blessing,

not as he is God, but as he is God-man, Qeanqrwpov Mediator,

saviour and Head of the church. This consideration of Christ

is, everywhere in the Scriptures, distinguished from that, in

which Christ is regarded as God, as in John xvii, 3; xiv, 1;

1 Tim. ii, 5, 6; 1 Pet. i, 18, 19, 20, 21; 1 Cor. v, 19, &c.

That Christ might be the eternal head of the Predestinate].

Whether Christ was constituted the head of those who were to

be predestinated, or of those who had been already

predestinated, has been a point in dispute among Theologians.

It is my opinion that, in the order of nature, the decree by

which Christ was constituted the head of those to be saved,

was prior to that decree by which some are ordained in Christ

to a participation in salvation. For Christ, as our mediator

before God and our High Priest, merited those blessings,

which were to be communicated by predestination, and, at the

same time, the dignity of head, and the power to communicate

those blessings. Then he actually received those blessings

from the Father, and obtained the titles of Head, King and

Prince. "Having been made perfect, or consecrated, he became

the author of eternal salvation to all who obey him."

Finally, in him believers are predestinated, that they should

be partakers of those blessings, by union with him. For God

loves, in Christ, those whom He has determined to make

partakers of eternal life, but this love is the cause of

predestination. It was, indeed, in Christ born, dead, raised

again, and constituted the head of the church. "But," some

will say, "God so loved the world that He gave His only-

begotten Son." -- I answer, that the love, referred to in

this passage, differs in degree from that which is the cause

of predestination, and is prior to it. For that love, which

sent His Son, did not, with certainty, ordain eternal life to

any one, and, indeed, it could not do so, for Christ had not

merited it by his death. Indeed, by making Christ the

foundation and Head of the predestinate, you seem to declare

that Christ was made the Head of them who were to be

predestinated in him unto life.

THESIS 9

Of these blessings, the chief points are two, grace and

glory; the former, acting on men in the present life, the

latter to be consummated in them in the future life.

THESIS 10

Human beings are creatures, in a condition of nature -- which

can effect nothing supernatural or divine -- to be exalted

above nature, and to be transferred to a participation of

divine things by the supernatural energy of the Deity.

It is here most manifestly evident that the object of

predestination is considered by you to be men in their

natural state, which can effect nothing supernatural or

divine, that is, as I have said, considered, in a merely

natural state, apart from supernatural endowments, and from

the corruption which afterwards supervened. But this is not

an adequate object of this decree. For the exaltation, which

is according to predestination, is not from nature, but from

sin beginning. The divine things, a participation in which is

prepared by predestination, are not adapted to man in his

natural state, but to man involved in sin and misery. That

supernatural power belongs to God, which He exercises in

Christ, "the power of God and the wisdom of God," 1

Corinthians i, 24, the Jews and Gentiles being called to

salvation. Therefore, it was applied to man, considered not

in his primitive natural state, but in sin and misery.

THESIS 11

The form is adoption, as sons, through Jesus Christ, that is,

that real relation and ordination, in which we are blessed of

God, by the communication of "all spiritual blessings in

heavenly places" in Christ. Predestination is unto adoption,

therefore adoption is not the form of predestination. For

"the form gives being to the thing," and adoption does not

give being to predestination, but receives its own being from

predestination; and it is the first per se and immediate work

of divine predestination, and its consequent is life and the

heavenly inheritance. Nor is that real relation and

ordination, in which we are blessed, "the form of

predestination;" for that ordination, in which we are

blessed; is the execution of the divine predestination. But

the preparation of those blessings is the form of

predestination, for, by it, predestination has its being.

That preparation is internal and eternal, and that is true

also of predestination. Or -- to speak with greater accuracy

-- the preparation of those blessings is not the form of

predestination, for that preparation was made by the death of

Christ, the Mediator, but the form consists in the

preparation of the communication of those blessings to

believers in Christ. We might add that the preparation is

certain, and that, according to it, a communion in the

benefits of Christ is certainly bestowed on those for whom

the participation is prepared.

THESIS 12

The order of this form is placed in the preparation, of

persons, by election, vocation, and "gathering together in

Christ" (Ephes. i, 10); but of things, by a gracious

beginning, progress, and glorious consummation of blessings,

in a perfect union with Christ.

The order of that preparation, as the form, can, indeed, be

declared, in respect both to persons and to things. Persons

are prepared in the minds of God, when election from the

world, vocation to a union with Christ, and the gathering

together in Christ, are ordained for them. Things are

prepared in this order, that their gracious communication

should he ordained, in reference to its beginning, progress,

and final consummation; the beginning, in Christ; the

progress, in the same; but the consummation, in the perfect

union with God. For this is the consummation of a

supernatural felicity "that God may be all in all." If,

however, the subject of discussion be the mediatorial

consummation, I concede that this is effected in Christ, but

this tends to that chief consummation, which is union with

God, to which we come by a perfect union with Christ. For

Christ shall deliver up his own kingdom "to God even the

Father, that God may be all in all." (1 Cor. xv, 24, 28.)

THESIS 13

The end is the praise of the glorious grace of God, by which

He has freely made us acceptable unto Himself, in the Son of

His love.

The grace, by which God "has freely made us acceptable unto

Himself, in the Son of His love, is grace only adapted to

sinners." The praise of that grace is sung to God and the

Lamb, who died and lives again, "who was delivered for our

offenses, and was raised again for our justification." (Rom.

iv, 25.) That praise is ascribed to God by sinners, whom God

has redeemed by the blood of His Son, "out of every kindred,

tongue, and people, and nation." (Rev. v, 9.)

THESIS 14

What is contrary to this predestination can not, with

propriety, be expressed in a single term, since the relation

of predestination is single, that of its contraries is

various. For preterition is contrary to the preparation of

grace, and reprobation or preparation of punishment is

contrary to the preparation of glory.

Grace and glory are prepared in predestination. To this

preparation, as an affirmative act, is opposed the negative

act of the non-preparation of grace and glory, and the

affirmative act of the preparation of those things, which are

affirmatively contrary to grace and glory. But here, to the

preparation of grace, is opposed only the negative act of

preterition, and, to the preparation of glory, only the

affirmative act of reprobation or the preparation of

punishment. Hence it seems to me to be a correct conclusion

that this discussion is not absolutely consistent in all its

parts, unless, perhaps, there is no affirmative act, which

can be opposed to the preparation of grace. There is,

however, such an act, namely, hardening, blinding, and the

delivering to a reprobate mind, which can be fitly and fully

explained only by negative acts. Also, the denial of

celestial glory is a negative act opposed to the preparation

of glory. It is to be observed, here, that the word

reprobation is used for the preparation of punishment, while,

in your answers to my propositions, you affirm that it

properly signifies non-election or preterition.

THESIS 15

Preterition is the act of the divine will, by which God, from

eternity, determined to leave some of His creatures in their

natural state, and not to communicate to them that

supernatural grace, by which their nature might be preserved

uncorrupt, or, having become corrupt, might be restored, to

the declaration of the freedom of His own goodness.

Preterition is defined to be a denial of grace only, not of

glory, while, nevertheless, glory is denied to the same

persons. It is rightly called an act of the divine pleasure,

not good-pleasure; for pleasure is the general term, applied

to any purpose or decree of God; good-pleasure, as has been

remarked, includes a favourable and benevolent disposition in

the Deity. To leave in their natural condition]. From this

also it is evident that the object of predestination is, in

your view, men considered in a merely natural state.

Supernatural grace, by which their nature might be preserved

uncorrupt, or, having become corrupt, might be restored]. If

the e words are to be understood to have reference to the

particular predestination of men, then that distinction is

not correctly used. For the grace by which nature is

"preserved uncorrupt," is not denied by the decree of

preterition. For that grace was denied to all men without

distinction. But the denial of grace, by which nature, having

become corrupt, is restored, is peculiar to the decree of

preterition, and, therefore the object of preterition is

fallen man, and to one who needs renewing grace.

To the declaration of the freedom of His own goodness.] The

freedom of the goodness of God is declared not only when God

communicates to one, and denies to another, His own goodness,

but also when He communicates it only on the condition, which

He has been pleased to impose; I concede, however, that the

freedom of the divine goodness is also declared in the former

mode. But there is a declaration in preterition, as described

to us in the Scriptures, not only of the freedom of the

goodness of God, but of His justice. For God, according to

justice also, uses preterition, by which He determines to

deny His grace to some on account of their sins. Sin, indeed,

is the only meritorious cause of the denial of grace, which

is here discussed. Therefore, the statement of the end of

that preterition was not sufficiently complete.

THESIS 16

This preterition is without blame: for God bestowed on man

the perfection of human nature, He was not under obligation

to bestow grace upon any one. It is grace; therefore, there

is no obligation.

God, in the abstract and absolutely, was not under obligation

to bestow grace on any one, but He could place Himself under

that obligation in two ways, by promise, and by making

certain requisitions. By promise, if He should promise to

bestow grace, either with or without condition. By

requisition, if He should require, from a man, an act, such

that it could not be performed. without His grace, for then

He would be under obligation to bestow it, otherwise He would

reap where He had not sowed.

THESIS 17

The preparation of punishment is the act of the divine

pleasure, by which God, from eternity, determined, for the

declaration of His own justice, to punish His creatures, who

should not continue in their original state, but should

depart from God, the author of their origin, by their own

deed and depravity, You call the preparation of punishment an

affirmative act, opposed to predestination; but it is

opposed, affirmatively, to the preparation of glory. That,

which is opposed affirmatively, to the communication of grace

is not here stated. I think that it should be called

hardening and blinding, and that it should have been also

treated in this Thesis.

To punish His creatures who should not maintain their

original integrity]. This decree was ordained by God, not

until after the certain foresight of future sin, lest any one

should think that sin is necessarily inferred from that

decree, as some of our Doctors believe.

Should full away from God by their own act and

transgression]. It should be explained how he can, by his own

act, fall away from God, who has, already, been passed by of

God, in the communication of that grace, which is necessary

for the avoidance of defection from God. And since all the

passed-by are also predamned, I could wish that it might be

explained how preterition and predamnation necessarily

cohere, if preterition existed apart from any consideration

of sin, but predamnation, only on account of sin.

The declaration of the justice of God, also, as has been

previously remarked, has a place in preterition.

THESIS 18

Therefore, in the predestinate, God does all things according

to the good-pleasure of His own predestination. In those who

are not predestinate, He uses preterition according to the

pleasure of His will, and prepares punishment for His

creatures who transgress against His order, and who must be

reprobated, on account of their sins, from the necessity of

His justice.

In predestination, God provides only for the salvation of the

elect; yet, in such a manner, that many acts of the divine

Providence concur to the same effect, which acts are so

administered by the Deity, that from them salvation certainly

results, which is the proper work of predestination. God uses

many acts of His providence towards those, who are not

predestinated, sufficient, indeed, for salvation, yet not

efficacious, since this pertains to predestination. It is not

absurd nor irrelevant, then, to observe, here, this

distinction between providence and predestination. Who must

be reprobated on account of their sins]. You here, also, use

the word reprobation for the preparation of punishment.

THESIS 19

If reprobation is made the opposite of predestination, the

statement is figurative, and synecdochical: wherefore, it

either should not be made, because it is improper, dangerous,

and liable to give offense, or it should be distinctly

explained, as pious and learned men have done.

In your answer to my second proposition, you use this

language: "Reprobation is used in three senses, one common

and two special. In its common use, it comprehends

preterition and damnation. Its second mode is special, when

it is opposed to election, and signifies non-election or

preterition. The third is also special, when it is used for

pre-damnation. The first mode is by synecdoche, the second

proper, the third metonymical, and it may also be called

catachrestic." Here, you call that meaning of reprobation

common, which, in your Theses, and elsewhere, you call

figurative. We are not to abstain from the use of the term,

for it is Scriptural, but we are to be careful that it be

also used in the sense in which it is used in the Scriptures.

THESIS 20

The presentation of this doctrine is especially necessary, if

it is treated skillfully, soberly, and reverently, that is,

that not any thing else be treated, not otherwise, not to

another end than as the Holy Scriptures teach, both in

explanation and in application, according to the advice of

St. Paul: "not to think of himself more highly than he ought

to think, but to think soberly." Rom. xii, 3.

That, which is taught, and inculcated in the Holy Scriptures,

can not but be esteemed useful and necessary for salvation,

though there may be different degrees of necessity. But the

doctrine of predestination, and its opposite, that of

reprobation, is taught and inculcated in the Scriptures; it

is, therefore, also necessary. It should, however, be

considered what that predestination is, and what is its

character, which is discussed in the Scriptures as necessary,

and which is called the foundation of our salvation. Your

admonition is altogether proper and necessary, by which you

enjoin that the doctrine should be set forth entirely in

accordance with the Scriptures -- "not any thing else, not

otherwise, not to another end than as the Holy Scriptures

teach." But there is a practical difficulty in this matter,

because each one desires to appear to present his own

doctrines according to the Scripture. I am satisfied that, in

your discussion of this doctrine, you are not, in every case,

sustained by the Scripture, but in some parts you err, and I

have treated this more fully in the discussion held between

us.

AN EXAMINATION

BY

REV. JAMES ARMINIUS, D. D.

OF A TREATISE; CONCERNING THE ORDER AND MODE OF

PREDESTINATION AND THE AMPLITUDE OF DIVINE GRACE BY REV.

WILLIAM PERKINS, D.D., A THEOLOGICAL WRITER IN ENGLAND ALSO,

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CHAPTER OF THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS

AN EXAMINATION OF THE TREATISE OF WILLIAM PERKINS CONCERNING

THE ORDER AND MODE OF PREDESTINATION

PART 1

William Perkins,. D. D., Fellow of Christ' s College,

Cambridge, was a Theological writer at the close of the

sixteenth century. As will be seen from the following

strictures on one of his treatises, he advocated views highly

Calvinistic. The following "Examination, etc," was written by

Arminius, in 1602.

Reverend Sir, and Beloved Brother in Christ, -- While I was

lately, and with eagerness, examining a certain library,

abundantly supplied with recently published books, a pamphlet

presented itself to me, entitled "A Christian and Perspicuous

Discourse concerning the Order and Mode of Predestination,

and the extent of Divine Grace." When I observed that it bore

your name, which was already well known to me by previously

published works of a high character, I thought that I must

diligently read and consider it, and see whether you, who are

devoted to the most accurate learning, could remove, in that

work, the difficulties which have long disquieted my mind. I,

therefore, read it once and again, with impartiality, as far

as I could, and with candour, as you desire. But, in reading,

I perceived that all my difficulties were not removed by your

work, while I thought that some things, written by you,

deserved to be examined in the light of truth. Accordingly, I

judged it not improper to commence a friendly discussion with

you concerning your treatise. This I do, with the greater

freedom and confidence, because, in the second page of your

pamphlet, you say, to the encouragement of my mind, that you

"have written these things, that, by those devoted to

theological investigation" -- among whom I willingly reckon

myself -- "they may be read without prejudice or acerbity of

mind, duly weighed, and judged by the pure word of God." This

I undertake, and pledge myself to do according to my ability;

asking of you that in return, you will, with the same

disposition, read my remarks, weigh them, and examine and

judge them by the rule of the same Scriptures. May God grant

that we all may fully agree, in those things which are

necessary to His glory, and to the salvation of the church;

and that, in other things, if there can not be harmony of

opinions, there may at least be harmony of feelings, and that

we may "keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace."

With this desire, then, expressed at the beginning of our

discussion, I enter on the subject itself, following in the

track, which, in your writing, you have pursued before me. I

will commence with your "Epistle to the Reader," and then

proceed, with the divine help, to the treatise itself.

EXAMINATION OF THE EPISTLE

In your Epistle to the Reader, you lay down two fundamental

principles, on which this doctrine of Predestination and

Divine Grace, can and must be built. The first is "the

written word of God;" the second "the common ideas, and the

principles which God has infused into the minds of men," I

have no opposition to make at this point, only let this be

added, that, when, on account of the darkness of our minds,

and the weakness and diversity of the human judgment (which

you regret), it is not possible for us to agree concerning

these matters, we must recur, for definite and final

decision, to that which is first and equivalent to all other

things -- the word of God.

Of the first principle, laid down by you, I remark that it is

true; but care must be used, lest any thing, which is not in

accordance with human judgment, should be attributed to God,

and defended as just, on the consideration that it is

declared to be unjust by corrupt human judgment; unless it

can be made clear, by a conclusive argument, that it is

suitably ascribed to the Deity. For, it is sufficient, for

the sake of referring any action or work to God, to say that

He has justly performed it; though, from the antecedent, God

has done this, will follow, of necessity, the consequent,

therefore, it is just.

Of the second; -- I concede that it is true. For He is the

first cause, and the cause of causes, who, from the foreseen

free act of rational creatures, takes occasion to make any

decree, and to establish a certain order in events; which

decree He would not have made, and which order He would not

have established, if the free second causes had acted

otherwise. The Apostle says, "the creature was made subject

to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of Him who hath

subjected the same," (Rom. viii, 20.) To this vanity the

creature would not have been subjected, if he, for whose sake

it was created by God, had remained in his original

integrity. The decree, in reference to sending Christ into

the world, depends on the foresight of the fall; for he is

"the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world,"

(John i, 29.) He "was made a little lower than the angels,

for the suffering of death," (Heb. ii, 9); "as the children

are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise

took part of the same; that through death he might destroy

him that had the power of death, that is, the devil," (Heb.

ii, 14.) He was constituted a "high priest, ordained for men,

that he might offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins,"

(Heb. v, 1.) The decrees of God, by which He ordains to

punish His creatures, are universally on this principle,

according to the Scriptures: "That be far from thee to do

after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked:

shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" (Gen. xviii,

25.) "Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out

of my book," (Exod. xxxii, 33.) "I said, indeed, that thy

house, and the house of thy father, should walk before me

forever, but now the Lord saith, be it far from me; for them

that honour me I will honour, and they that despise me shall

be lightly esteemed," (1 Sam. ii, 30.)

But it is not therefore to be supposed that the imposing of

penalties depends on second causes; so far from it, they

would put forth every effort to escape punishment, if they

could do so either by reason or force. I could wish also that

the word "ordaining" were used in its proper sense: from

which they seem to me to depart, who interpret it -- to

decree that something shall be done. For its true meaning is

to establish the order of things done, not to appoint things

to be done that they may be done; though it is used sometimes

by the fathers in the latter sense. But then God is denied,

by the fathers, to be the ordainer of evils. Thus says

Augustine: "God knows how to ordain, not crime, but the

punishment of crimes."

Of the third; -- It is characteristic of a wise being to do

nothing in vain. But he does something in vain, who does it

not to attain some end. But God is infinitely wise. Let me

caution you, then, not to extend the phrase, "to regard with

indifference," farther, or to interpret it otherwise than is

suitable. There is a real distinction between doing and

permitting. He, who permits any thing, that he may attain

some end, does not regard it with indifference. From this it

is clear that not to regard with indifference is not the same

as to do or to make. Of this also I remind you for a certain

reason. Then consider whether the phrase, which you use, is

correct. The word "prudently" seems to be too feeble to be

applied to so great wisdom. And it is not a usual form of

expression to say that an action is performed "in view of a

certain end," but for the sake of that end. The statement, He

does not will or decree that which He can not, is ambiguous,

and not sufficiently full. It is ambiguous, because it may be

understood to mean that He can not will or decree, or that He

can not do. It is not sufficiently full, because there should

be an addition, so that the statement would be this: "He does

not will or decree to do or permit that which He can not do

or permit." For which reason also your conclusion is likewise

imperfect, and, to the expression, "He has decreed thus to

do," add, "or permit."

Of the fourth; -- The decree of God is two-fold; that of

efficacious action and that of permission. Both are

immutable. The creature, however free, can not change himself

by his own act, or receive any change from another, contrary

to either of these decrees, and without the certain and fixed

determination of the former or the latter. But it is not

merely necessary that God should fix these, and not other,

limits of the change, as if the creature -- if this was

possible without the divine superintendence of the change --

might be able either to change himself, or to receive change

from another, to such an extent that God could not bring it

into order, and have occasion for the illustration of his

glory. For to Him even NOTHING ought to be material for the

declaration of His glory: and any change from Nothing to

Something, produced by Him, ought to serve the same purpose.

Of the fifth; -- All the judgments of God, "whatever they may

be, whether hidden or partly known to us, are to be honoured,

and to be adorned with the praise of righteousness, provided,

however, that it be manifest that they are the judgments of

God. But under this pretense, no judgments are to be

attributed to God which the Scripture does not assign to Him;

much less those which are contrary to the righteousness of

God revealed in the Scriptures. Thus Augustine says: "As man

becomes more like God, so the more does the damnation of

perishing men move him: it moves also our saviour himself,

and caused his tears, not once only, to flow. It moves also

God Himself; who says: "What could have been done more to my

vineyard that I have not done in it?" (Isa. v, 4.) "O that my

people had hearkened unto me." (Psalm lxxxi, 13.) "Have I any

pleasure at all that the wicked should die," (Ezek. xviii,

23.) But it so moves God, that He is yet delighted in the

destruction of His enemies, who are refractory and refuse to

repent. For His righteousness demands this. It moves Him, I

say, because they are unwilling to be saved, not because,

when they are unwilling to be saved, He may devote them to

just destruction. It so moves Christ, the saviour, that he

shall yet, willingly, banish, from his presence, unbelievers

and evil doers, and adjudge them to eternal fire. For this is

demanded by the office of Judge. It so moves a pious man,

that he may not utter any objection against God in reference

to His various decrees, and the execrations of His righteous

judgments on the obstinate. This is required by the obedience

which the creature owes to his Creator and Redeemer."

Concerning that objection, I may be allowed, with the leave

of Augustine, to say that it is not the offspring of infirm

and weak human nature, but of the refractory disposition of

the Jews and of those like them, of whom the apostle speaks,

(Rom. ix, 20.) It is indeed true that we, when compared with

God, "are as grass-hoppers," yea, and "are counted to Him as

less than nothing," (Isa. xl, 17, 22.) But, in such

exaggerations of human insignificance, we are to be careful

not to do injustice to the creation of God. For man was made

in the image of God, and therefore, even to God Himself, man,

not any beast, is the noblest creature, with whom, as the

wisdom of God declares, are His delights, (Prov. viii, 31.)

Of the sixth; -- The concurrence of God with second causes to

perform any act, or produce any work, is two-fold, of the

general, and the special aid of His grace. It is most certain

that nothing good can be performed by any rational creature

without this special aid of His grace. But whether it is the

province of the divine will, absolutely willing it, to

communicate this gracious aid, and by this communication, to

absolutely work good in us, is in controversy among

Theologians. This is not improperly so, since the word

absolutely can not be found in the Scriptures, and it has not

yet been proved that its equivalent is found in the

Scriptures.

Of the seventh; -- So also it is certain that "no evil can be

avoided if God does not prevent it." But there is dispute

concerning the mode of prevention; -- whether it is by the

omnipotent action of the Deity operating on the human will

according to the mode of nature, from which there exists a

necessity of prevention, or by such an action as operates on

the will, according to the mode of the will as respects its

freedom, from which the certainty of prevention exists.

Of the eighth; -- It can not be concluded from an event that

God has willed something, but we may know either this fact,

that He was unwilling to hinder an event which He foresaw

would occur. -- Otherwise the distinction, which exists

between the action and the permission of God, is destroyed.

For some things occur, because God produces them, but others,

because He permits them to occur, according to Augustine and

to truth itself. But to will that any thing should occur, and

to be unwilling to prevent its occurrence, are not the same

things. For, in the former case, the event is resolved into

the will of God as its first and special cause; in the

latter, it is resolved affirmatively into a second cause, and

negatively into the divine will, which has not prevented it,

which prevention also is produced either by power according

to the mode of nature, or by persuasion according to the mode

of free-will. But concerning permission and prevention we

shall treat more fully hereafter in their own place. Of the

ninth; -- But let us examine this idea; "to be able to

perform," "to will to do," and "actually to do," are divine

gifts and effects on men. But there should be this additional

remark, that God gives to no one the power of doing right,

unless He is ready also to give the will and the act itself,

that is, by the further aid of grace, to concur with man in

willing and in actually doing that good, for which He has

received sufficient strength, unless the man on his part may

interpose, or, as the school-men say, may have interposed

some obstacle. "For unto every one that hath shall be given;

but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that

which he hath." (Matt. xxv, 29). Were this not so, the power

would have been given in vain. But the all-wise God doth

nothing in vain. Thus He gave to Adam the faculty of

observing the law which He had enacted, and He was prepared

to give him whatever else was needed, in addition to that

faculty, for actual obedience, namely, both to will and to

do, unless Adam willingly and by voluntary motion turned

himself away from God, and from His grace. I see here a

labyrinth which I will not now enter, because I should not be

permitted to make my egress from it, except by the thread and

guidance of an accurate explication of the mode of the

concurrence of God with man in the performance of any good

thing; which explication does not belong to this place, or,

as I indeed, acknowledge, to my abilities.

Of the tenth; -- That "God presides over the whole world, and

all things created by Himself, and administers and governs

all and each of them" is certain. But this is not only in

justice, but also in mercy, even so far as He, in His

infinite wisdom, knows what place ought to be assigned to

each. But, indeed, do all those axioms seem to you to be

natural and common notions, They, indeed, belong to nature,

as it was when it come from the hand of its Creator, surely

not to it, as it has been darkened by sin. For to few among

men is it given to know and understand those things. The

whole troop of Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians in the church

itself, do not know them. What the opinion of many of the

Greek and Latin philosophers was concerning most of them, is

apparent from an expression used by not one of them only:

"What we are, is given to us by the Gods; what of good we

are, we have from ourselves." To this notorious falsity,

Augustine in more than one passage, sharply opposes himself.

On these principles in part, as a foundation, you build up a

doctrine of Predestination, which is, indeed, beset with

difficulties. This is caused by the fact, that men do not

fear to add to the Scriptures, whatever they think proper,

and are accustomed to attribute as much as possible to their

own conceptions, which they style natural ideas. I can not

but praise your effort. For light ought, by all means, to be

thrown upon truth by all, to the utmost of their ability.

Calumnies and accusations, by which the truth is assailed and

beset, are to be refuted. Minds, embittered against it, are

not only to be softened and soothed, but also, to be induced

to embrace it. It can not be made an objection against you,

that you adduce the opinions of the ancient Theologians,

especially those whom you quote, some caution being observed,

lest we go too far in that direction. For the Fathers are

themselves also liable to diverse interpretations, and,

indeed, more than the divine and inspired writers, as they

were endued with knowledge of the truth, which was less in

degree and in clearness, and they could express the thoughts

of their minds only with less accuracy and fitness. When I

consider this, I doubt whether they have consulted the best

interests of the church, who have thought that, in this age,

the opinions of the Fathers are to be considered by them as

authority in matters of religion. But the die is cast, and we

must advance, whithersoever the fates of the Church bear us.

In reference to your declaration, that you present the

testimony of the ancient Doctors and School-men, for the sake

of exhibiting an agreement in that part of doctrine, I do not

see how that is so. For I am quite persuaded that nothing can

be thought of, more adapted to bring that whole doctrine of

Predestination and the grace of God into confusion, and to

overwhelm it with darkness, than the effort on the part of

any one to bring forward and unite together all the opinions

of the Fathers and the School-men, in reference to it. But I

desire that you may not at once pronounce him an unjust

estimator or judge, who dares to assert that the dogmas,

which you present in this treatise, are found neither in the

Scriptures nor in the Fathers. For if you shall, after

reasons have been adduced by that estimator, arbiter or

judge, be able to sustain your statement, you will find him

not struggling against it, with an unfair and obstinate mind,

but ready to yield to what is proved to be the truth with

becoming equanimity. Nor will it be an easier matter to

persuade me that the dogmas of which you here treat, are, in

that same mode and sense, proposed and set forth in all the

Reformed Churches. I say this, lest you should think that you

can bear down one thinking differently by the prejudgment of

those churches.

EXAMINATION OF THE TREATISE

I come now to the treatise itself, which I will examine with

somewhat more care and diligence. You will not complain if,

in some places, I may with the closest criticism also subject

some of the nicer points to the most rigid scrutiny. For who

would not consent that a serious and solid discussion should

be, as it were, spiced by a friendly diversity and a pleasant

contest concerning the more accurate handling of a subject.

You begin and rightly with a definition of Predestination.

But that definition does not seem to be adapted to the

Predestination, which is set forth in the Scriptures. For the

Predestination, of which the Scriptures treat, is of men in

their relation as sinners; it is made in Christ; it is to

blessings which concern, not this animal life, but the

spiritual life, of which a part also are communicated in this

animal life, as is clearly evident from Ephesians 1, where,

among the spiritual blessings to which we have been

predestinated in Christ are enumerated "adoption of children

(verse 5), "redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of

sins," (verse 7th), "having made known unto us the mystery of

his will," (verse 9th), which blessings are given to the

predestinated in this life. The apostle well say "the life,

which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son

of God," (Gal. ii, 20)

signifying that he, in this animal life, was a partaker of

spiritual gifts, and from them lived a spiritual life. But

perhaps you did not wish to give an accurate definition, but

only by some description to give us an idea of

predestination. I may concede this, yet in that description

there seem to be many things which ought to be noticed. For

the word "counsel," by which you have desired to explain one

kind of Predestination is not a kind of Predestination, but

pertains to its efficient cause; for a decree is made by

"counsel," which decree can be fitly considered a kind of

Predestination -- if indeed counsel can be attributed to God,

by which He may decree anything, as in the Scripture, -- e.g.

Acts iv, 28, and Ephes. i, 11. This I say, is apparent from

the passages quoted. For in the former (Acts iv, 28),

"counsel" is said to determine before or predestinate things

to be done; in the latter (Ephes. i, 11), it is said that God

"worketh all things," -- even institutes predestination-after

the counsel of His own will.

There is, in this life, an equality of the pious and the

wicked as to external blessings, but they are to be

considered generally. For in individual cases there is a

great difference both among the pious and the wicked, and so

great indeed is it that, to those, who are dissatisfied with

that inequality, it may need a defense by an argument for

reducing it, hereafter, to an equality. Indeed it is said of

the pious and the faithful "if in this life, only, we have

hope in Christ, we are, of all men, most miserable." (1 Cor.

xv, 19.)

I approve what you say concerning "the final cause of

Predestination," when rightly understood, that is, if a

declaration of the glory of God through mercy and justice is

attributed to Predestination, so long as it is the

foreordination of sinners who shall believe in Christ to

eternal life, and on the contrary, the predamnation of

sinners who shall persevere in sins to eternal death; who

shall believe, through the gracious gift of God, and who

shall persevere in sins through their own wickedness and the

just desertion of God. But if you think that God, from

eternity, without any pre-existence of sin, in His

prescience, determined to illustrate His own glory by mercy

and punitive justice, and, that He might be able to secure

this object, decreed to create man good but mutable, and

ordained farther that he should fall, that in this way there

might be a place for that decree, I say that such an opinion

can, in my judgment, be established by no passage of the word

of God.

That this may be made plainer, a few things must be said

concerning the glory of God and the modes of its

manifestation. No one can doubt that God, since He is the

first and Supreme Efficient Cause of all His own acts and

works, and the single and sole cause of many of them, has

always the manifestation of His own perfection, that is, His

own glory, proposed to Himself, as His chief and highest

object. For the first and supreme cause is moved to produce

any effect, by nothing, out of itself otherwise it would not

be the first and supreme cause. Therefore, not only the act

of Predestination, but also every other divine act has "the

illustration of the glory of God" as its final cause. Now it

is equally certain and known to all, who have even approached

the threshold of sacred letters, that the manifestation of

the divine perfection and the illustration of his glory

consists in the unfolding of His essential attributes by acts

and works comparable to them: but an inquiry is necessary

concerning those attributes, by the unfolding of which He

determined to illustrate His own glory, first, by which, in

the second place, and so on, by successive steps. It is

certain that He could not, first of all, have done this by

means of mercy and punitive justice. For the former could be

exercised only towards the miserable, the latter only towards

sinners. But since, first of all, the external action of God

both was and must be taken up, so to speak, with Nothing, it

is, therefore, evident that goodness, wisdom, and omnipotence

were, first of all, to be unfolded, and that by them the

glory of God was to be illustrated. These, therefore, were

unfolded in the creation, by which God appeared to be

supremely good and wise, and omnipotent.

But, as God made all His creatures with this difference that

some were capable of nothing more than they were at their

creation, and others were capable of greater perfection, He

was concerned, as to the former, only with their preservation

and government, accomplished by goodness, wisdom and power of

the same kind and measure, since preservation is only a

continuance of creation, as the latter is the beginning of

the former, and government may not go beyond the natural

condition of the creatures, unless when it seems good to God

to use them, for the sake of men for supernatural purposes,

as in the bread and wine used, in the Lord's Supper, to

signify and seal unto us the communion of the body and the

blood of Christ; as to the latter, which He made capable of

greater perfection, as angels and men, the same attributes

were to be unfolded, but in a far greater measure. In the

former case, the good communicated is limited, as each

creature receives that which is appropriate to itself,

according to the diversity of their natures, but, in the

latter, there is a communication of supreme and infinite

good, which is God, in the union with whom consists the

happiness of rational creatures. Reason demanded that this

communication should be made contrary to justice, wherefore

He gave a law to His creatures, obedience to which was made

the condition on which that communication should be made.

Therefore, this was the first decree concerning the final

cause of rational creatures, and the glory of God to be

illustrated by justice and the highest goodness -- highest as

to the good to be communicated, not absolutely; by goodness

joined to justice, in the case of those who should be made

partakers of the highest good, through steadfastness in the

truth; by punitive justice, in the case of those who should

make themselves unworthy of it by their disobedience. Then we

see that justice, rewarding obedience, which was its office,

according to the gracious promise of God, and punishing

disobedience as it deserves, according to the just

threatenings of God, holds the first place; in the former

case, justice joined to goodness, in the latter, punitive

justice opposed to the gracious communication of the highest

good, without any mention of mercy, unless it may be

considered as preserving the creature from possible misery,

which could, by its own fault, fall into misery; as mercy is

not considered when it is predetermined by the decree of

Predestination. That decree was peremptory in respect to the

angels, as in accordance with it, they are condemned:

wherefore the predestination and reprobation of angels was

comprehended in this. But what grace was prepared for the

former in Predestination and was denied to the latter in

Reprobation, and in what respects, I do not now argue. But it

was not peremptory in reference to men, whom God did not

decree to treat according to that highest rigor of the law,

but in the salvation of whom He decreed to exhibit all His

goodness, which Jehovah showed to Moses in these, His

attributes, "The Lord, Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-

suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth" (Exod. xxvi,

6). Therefore, the Predestination and Reprobation of men were

not considered in that decree. For since Adam sinned, and in

him all who were to be his descendants by natural

propagation, all would have been devoted to eternal

condemnation without hope of pardon. For the decree of

Predestination and Reprobation is peremptory. So far, then,

no predestination of men unto life, and no reprobation unto

death had any place. And since there could be no

Predestination and Reprobation, except in accordance with

those attributes by which men are at once saved or damned --

but the predestinated may be saved at once by mercy, and the

reprobate may be damned at once by justice opposed to that

mercy -- it follows that there was no fixed predestination

and reprobation of men, in reference to whom there could be

no place for mercy and justice opposed to it. But there could

be no place for them in reference to men who were not

miserable, and not sinners. Then, since Predestination

includes the means by which the predestinated will certainly

and infallibly come to salvation, and Reprobation includes

the denial of those same means, but those means are the

remission of sins and the renewing of the Holy Ghost, and its

perpetual assistance even to the end, which are necessary and

communicable to none, except sinners, I conclude that there

was no Predestination and Reprobation in reference to men, in

whose case these means were neither necessary nor

communicable.

Finally, since God can love no sinner unto salvation, unless

he be reconciled to Himself in Christ, hence it is, that

there could be no place for Predestination, except in Christ.

And since Christ was ordained and given for sinners, it is

certain that Predestination and its opposite, Reprobation,

could have no place before human sin -- its existence as

foreseen by God -- and the appointment of Christ as Mediator,

and indeed his performance, in the prescience of God, of the

functions of the office of Mediator, which pertains to

reconciliation. Nor does it follow from this, that God either

made man with an uncertain design, or failed of the end at

which He aimed. For He prescribed to Himself, both in the act

of creation, and in that of glorification, and its opposite,

condemnation, the illustration of His own glory as an end,

and He obtained it; by goodness, wisdom and power in

creation, and He obtained it; by the same, but in a greater

measure, and joined with justice in glorification and

condemnation, and He obtained it. But, though the mode of

illustrating His glory by mercy, which is a certain method of

communicating goodness and the approach of the same to a

miserable creature, and by justice, opposed to that mercy,

could have no place except from the occasion of human sin,

yet the decree of God is not, therefore, dependent on the

man, for He foresaw from eternity what would be in the

future, and in ordaining, concerning the future, to that end,

He freely arranged it according to His own choice, not

compelled by any necessity as if He could not, in some other

way, have secured glory to Himself from the sin of man. But

that the glory of God does not consist merely in the

illustration of mercy and, its opposite justice, is evident

from the fact that, then, He would not have obtained glory

from the act of creation, nor from the predestination and

reprobation of angels. It is to be understood, that mercy is

not an essential attribute of the Deity distinct from

goodness itself, as in the womb and the offspring of

goodness; indeed, it is goodness itself extending to the

sinful creature and to misery. It can for this reason be

said, in simple terms, that, in all His eternal acts, God

determined to declare His own glory by goodness, wisdom, and

omnipotence, with the addition of justice when equity

demanded it at the prescription of wisdom, but that He

adapted the mode to the state, or rather to the change of the

object, in reference to which He had determined to unfold

those attributes. In reference to this thing Tertullian says,

in a beautiful and erudite manner, "God must, of necessity

use all things in reference to all being, He must have as

many feelings, as there are causes of them; anger for the

wicked. and wrath for the ungrateful, and jealousy for the

proud, and whatever else would not be for the advantage of

the evil; so also, mercy for the erring, and patience for

those not yet repentant, and honour for the deserving, and

whatever is necessary for the good. All these feelings He has

in His own mode, in which it is fit that He should feel them,

just as man has the same, equally after his own manner."

(Adversus Marcion, Lib. 2, cap 16.)

Predestination does not arise merely from goodness simply

considered, the province of which is, indeed, to communicate

itself to the creature, but also from that mode of mercy,

which goes out from that goodness to the miserable to remove

their misery, of grace in Christ, which goes out from it to

sinners to pardon their sins, of patience and long-suffering,

going forth from the same goodness towards those who, for a

long time, struggle against it, and do not at once obey the

call, thus prolonging the delay of conversion. So also

reprobation is not merely fixed by justice, the opposite of

that goodness, simply considered, but by justice tempered by

some mercy and patience. For God "endured with much long-

suffering the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction." (Rom.

ix, 22.)

From these things, thus considered, I may be allowed, with

your kind permission, to conclude that Predestination has not

been sufficiently well defined or described by you. If any

one is inclined to consider the series and order of the

objects of the knowledge and the will of God, he will be more

and more confirmed in the truth of the things briefly set

forth by me. The passage from Augustine, is in agreement with

these views, if one wishes to gather his complete opinion

from other passages. Fulgentius and Gregory most clearly

support me in the passages quoted by you. For, if the act of

predestination is the preparation for the remission of sins

or the punishment of the same, then it is certain that there

is place for predestination only in reference to sinners. If

also the act of Predestination is the pre-election of some

who are to be redeemed from their depravity, and the leaving

of others in their depravity, from this also it is evident

that predestination has to do with men considered as sinners.

That sentiment of the School-men agrees most fully with the

same views. For it openly declares that Predestination

depends on the foresight of the fall, when they say that the

perfection and goodness of God, who predestinates, is

represented by the mode of mercy and punitive justice, which

mode, as I have now frequently said, can have place only in

reference to sinners. If any one acknowledges that this is

indeed true, but says that God has arranged this, as an

occasion for Himself, by decreeing that man should fall, and

by carrying forward that decree to its end or limit, we ask

the proof of that assertion, which, in my judgment, he will

be unable to give. For that sentiment is at variance with the

justice of God, as it makes God the author of sin, and

introduces an inevitable necessity for sin. This I will

prove. For if that decree existed, man could not abstain from

sin, otherwise the decree would have been made in vain, which

is an impious supposition. For "the counsel of the Lord

standeth forever." (Psalm xxxiii, 11). We remark also that

the human will would have been circumscribed and determined

by that decree, so that it could not turn itself except in

one direction, in which there would be sin; by that act its

freedom would be lost, because it would move the will, not

according to the mode of free-will, but according to the mode

of nature. Such an act it could not resist, nor would there

be any volition in that direction, indeed, there would not be

the power to put forth that volition on account of the

determination of the decree. Consider, also, that, by that

sentiment, mercy and justice are considered as means

resulting from Predestination, while they are the primary

causes of Predestination, as is evident from the fact that

the final cause of Predestination may be resolved into the

manifestation of mercy and justice.

Here, observe, also, in what way you make the creation and

the fall of man the means in common lying at the foundation

of the counsel, or rather the decree of predestination, I

think, indeed, that both the creation, and the fall preceded

every external act of predestination, as also the decree

concerning the creation of man, and the permission of his

fall preceded, in the Divine mind, the decree of

Predestination. I think, also, that I have partly proved

this, in my preceding remarks. But it will be well to look at

this with a little more diligence.

Every act, which has reference to an object, is posterior in

nature, to its object. It is called an object relatively.

Therefore, it has an absolute existence prior to the

existence of its relation to the act. The object, then,

exists in itself, before it can be under the influence of the

act which tends towards it. But man is the object of

Predestination. Therefore, man is prior to the act of

Predestination. But man is what he is by creation. therefore,

creation is prior to Predestination -- that is, in the divine

mind, or the decree concerning the creation of man is prior

to the decree of Predestination, and the act of creation is

prior to the execution of the decree of Predestination. If

any one should reply that God, in the internal act of

Predestination, is employed with man considered as not

created, but as to be made, I answer that this could neither

take place, nor be so understood by a mind judging rightly.

For Predestination is a decree, not only to illustrate the

divine glory, but to illustrate it in man, by the mode of

mercy and justice. From this, it follows that man must also

exist in the divine mind before the act of Predestination,

and the fall of man must itself, also, be previously

foreseen. The attributes of God, by which creation is

affected, are, therefore, considered as prior, in the divine

nature, to those in which predestination originates.

Goodness, simply considered, wisdom, and power, operating

upon Nothing, are, therefore, prior to mercy and punitive

justice. Add, also, that since predestination originates, on

the one hand, in mercy, and on the other, in justice, in the

former case having reference to salvation -- in the latter,

to damnation -- it cannot be that any means exist pertaining,

in common, to the execution of election and of reprobation.

For they are provided neither in mercy nor in justice. There

exist, then, no means of Predestination, common to both parts

of the decree.

Whether the definition of the creation of man is correct. If

you wished to define the creation of man that should have

been done with greater accuracy. But if you wished only to

describe it, there is yet, in that description, something

which I may note. "Man was made mutable," as was demanded by

the very condition of that Nothing from which he was made,

and of the creature itself. which neither could nor ought to

be raised, by creation, to the state of the Creator, which is

immutability. But he was made mutable in such a sense that

actual change from good to evil would follow that possible

mutability, only by the voluntary and free act of man. But

the act of the creature does not remain free when it is so

determined in one direction, that, if that determination

continues, there cannot but be a change.

Whether the permission of the fall, is rightly defined. But

of the "permission of the fall," we must treat at somewhat

greater length: for very much depends on this for the

expediting of this whole matter. It is certain that God can

by the act of His own absolute power prevent all things

whatever, which can be done by the creature, and it is

equally certain that He is not absolutely under obligation to

any one to hinder him from evil. But He can not, in His

justice, do all that He can in His absolute power. He cannot,

in His justice (or righteousness), forget the "work and

labour of love" of the pious (Heb. vi, 10). The absolute

power of God is limited by the decree of God, by which He

determined to do any thing in a particular direction, And

though God is not absolutely under obligation to any one, He

can yet obligate Himself by His own act, as, for instance, by

a promise, or by requiring some act from man. He is obligated

to perform what He promises, for He owes to Himself the

immutability of His own truth, whether He has promised it

absolutely or conditionally. By requiring an act, He places

Himself under obligation to give ability and the strength

without which that act can not be performed; otherwise, He

would reap where He had not sown. It is plain, from these

positions, that God, since He conceded the freedom of the

will, and the use of that freedom, ought not, and indeed

could not, prevent the fall in any mode which would infringe

on the use of that freedom; and farther, that He was not

obligated to prevent it in any other way than by the

bestowment of the ability which should be necessary and

sufficient to the avoidance of the fall. Permission is not,

therefore, a "cessation from the act of illuminating and that

of inclining" to such an extent that, without those acts, a

man could not avoid sin. For, in that case, the fault could

be justly and deservedly charged upon God, who would be the

cause of sin, by way of removing or not bestowing that which

is necessary for the performance of an act which Himself has

prescribed by His own law. From which it also follows that

the law is unjust, as it is not in proportion to the strength

of the creature on which it is imposed, whether that

deficiency of strength arises from the nonbestowal or the

removal of it before any fault has been committed by the

creature.

Permission is, indeed, a cessation of the act of hindrance,

but that cessation is to be so explained that it may not be

reduced to an efficient cause of sin, either directly, or by

way of the denial or removal of that, without which sin can

not be avoided. In reference to this permission, if it be

fitly explained, it can be doubtless said that "God not only

foreknows it, but He even wills it by an act of volition"

affirmatively and immediately directed to the permission

itself, not to that which is permitted. As it can not be said

concerning this, that God wills that it should not be done,

for He permits it, and not unwillingly, so, also, it can not

be truly said that God wills it. For permission is an act

intermediate between volition and nolition, the will being

inactive.

But the cause, in view of which He permits sin, is to be

found, not only in the consequent, but in the antecedent. In

the antecedent, because God constituted man so that he might

have a free will, and might, according to the freedom of his

will, either accord obedience or refuse it. He could not

rescind this constitution, which Himself had established, in

view of His own immutability, as Tertullian clearly shows, in

his argument against Marcion (Lib. 2, cap. 5, 6 and 7). In

the consequent, because He saw that He could use sin as an

occasion for demonstrating the glory of His own grace and

justice. But this consequent does not naturally result from

that sin. From this, it follows that even from the highest

evil, (if there be any highest,) evil, only, could result per

se, or there would be an injury to the divine majesty,

opposed to the divine good; but that consequent is an

incidental result of sin, because God knows and wills to

elicit, by His wisdom, goodness and power, His own glory from

it, as light from darkness. As, then, evil is not good, per

se, so it is not absolutely good that evil should occur. For

if this be true. then God not only permits it, but is its

author and effector. But it is incidentally good that evil

should occur, in view of that wisdom, goodness, and power of

God, of which I have spoken, by which God takes from sin the

material for illustrating his own glory. Therefore, sin is

not, in this respect, the means per se, for illustrating the

glory of God, but only the occasion not made for this

purpose, nor adapted to it by its own nature, but seized by

God and used in this direction with wonderful skill, and

praiseworthy perversion. No absolute good in the universe

would be prevented, even if God should prevent evil, provided

that prevention should not be affected in a manner not

adapted to the primitive constitution of man; and God is free

to prevent sin, but in a way not at variance with the freedom

of the will. Any other method of prevention would be

absolutely contrary to the good of the universe, inasmuch as

one good of the universe consists even in this, that there

should be a creature endued with free will, and that the use

of his own free will should be conceded to the creature

without any divine interference. But if the existence of evil

or sin should absolutely contribute to the good and the

perfection of the universe, then God ought not only not to

hinder sin, but even to promote it, else He would fail in His

duty to His own work, and do injury to His own perfection. I

admit that, without the existence of sin, there would not be

that place for the patience of the martyrs, or for the

sacrifice of Christ; but the patience of the martyrs and the

sacrifice of Christ are not necessary results of the

existence of sin. Indeed we shall see, by considering the

natural effect of sin, that from it would result impatience

in those who are afflicted, and by it the wrath, of God would

be kindled, which not only could, but in fact, would, prevent

the bestowment of any good, even the least, and much more

that of his Son, unless God should be, at the same time,

merciful, and could, in His wisdom, find a way by which He

might prevent the natural effect of sin, and using sin as the

occasion, might promote other effects, contrary to the very

nature of sin.

The passages cited from Augustine and Gregory, are not only

not opposed to, but actually in favour of this opinion. For

they do not say that it would have been good absolutely that

evils should occur, but that God judged it better to bring

good out of evils than to prevent them; thus comparing two

acts of the Deity, and esteeming the one better than the

other. I may be allowed to observe, in reference to the

remark of Gregory, that he is not sufficiently accurate, when

he compares the evils which we suffer on account of sins with

the blessing of redemption as something greater: for he ought

to compare our sins and faults, not the evils which we suffer

on their account, with the blessing of redemption. If he had

done this, and had carefully considered the words of the

apostle, "and not rather (as we be slanderously reported, and

as some affirm that we say), Let us do evil that good may

come," (Rom. iii, 8), he would have judged otherwise, or, at

least, would have expressed his views more fitly, without

making such a transition, and without substituting the

punishment of sin for sin itself. It is indeed right, for men

and for any believer, to say with entire confidence, that

there can be no redemption so excellent and no method of

redemption so glorious that, for the sake of obtaining

either, any sin, however small, is to be committed. For the

Redeemer "was manifested that he might destroy the works of

the devil," (1 John iii, 8,) i.e., sins; they are not,

therefore, to be committed in order that the Son of God, the

Redeemer, might come. For that circular form of reasoning,

the Son of God came that he might destroy the works of the

devil, and sin was committed that it might be destroyed by

the Son, is not only contrary to the Scriptures, but also

hostile to all truth, as it leads infinitely astray.

From this it is also easily proved that the fall can not be

called a happy transgression, except by a catachrestic

hyperbole, which, while it may be adapted to declamations,

panegyric orations, and rhetorical embellishments, should be

far removed from the solid investigation of truth. To these

is always to be added the remark, which I have made,

frequently and with reiteration, that redemption could not

have resulted from transgression, except as the latter might

afford an occasion for it, by the arrangement of God, in

accordance with His will, that the transgression should be

expiated, and washed away by a Redeemer of such character and

dignity.

But the distinction which you make between "the permission of

the fall" and "the permitted fall" seems to me to be of no

force. For the permission of the fall is not less by the

Divine arrangement than the permitted fall. For God ordained

His own permission for a certain end. But consider whether it

is not absurd to distinguish between "the permission of the

fall" and "the permitted fall." In the latter case, I speak

of the fall, not considered in that it is a fall, but in that

it is a permitted fall: as you must, of necessity, consider,

when you style it "the means of the decree," which

appellation is not appropriate to the fall except on account

of the adjunct "permitted." For not the fall but the

permission of the fall, tended to the glory of God; not the

act of many which is the fall, but the act of God, which is

permission, having immediate reference to that act of man

according to the prescript of the Divine arrangement, tended

to His glory. But I acknowledge that permission is the means

of the decree, not of predestination, but of providence, as

the latter is distinguished from the former. I speak now of

providence, as governing and administrative, which is not

only not prior, in nature and order, to predestination, but

is also the cause of the mission of the Son as the Redeemer,

who is our head, in whom predestination is made, as the

apostle teaches, (Ephes. 1.)

But how can it be true that the fall is permitted by God, and

yet that "it would not have occurred unless God had willed

it" I wish that it might be explained how God could, at once,

will that the fall should occur, and permit the same; how God

could be concerned, by His volition, with the fall both

mediately and immediately -- mediately by willing the

permission, and immediately by willing the fall itself. I

wish also that these things may be harmonized, how the fall

could occur by the will of God, and yet the will of God not

be the cause of the fall, which is contrary to the express

declaration of God's word, "Our God is in the heavens; He

hath done whatever He pleased," (Psalm cxv, 3.) Also, in what

way could God will the fall, and yet be "a God that hath no

pleasure in wickedness," (Psalm v, 4,) since the fall was

wickedness. The distinctions which are presented are not

sufficient to untie the knot, as I shall show in the case of

each of them separately. For they distinguish between the

fall and the event of the fall; between the will of open

intimation and that of His good-pleasure, revealed or hidden;

between the fall as it was sin, and as it was the means of

illustrating the divine glory. They say that God willed that

the fall should occur, but did not will the fall; that He

willed the fall according to His good-pleasure and His hidden

will, not according to His will, of open intimation, revealed

and approving; that He willed the fall, not as it was sin,

but as it was the means of illustrating His own glory.

The first distinction is verbal, and not real. He, who willed

that the fall should occur, willed also the fall. He who

willed that the fall should occur, willed the event of the

fall, and He, who willed the event of the fall, willed the

fall. For the event of the fall is the fall, as the event of

an action is the action itself. But if He willed the fall, He

was the cause of the fall. For "He hath done whatsoever He

pleased," (Psalm cxv, 3.) If any one replies, that He willed

that the fall should occur by the act of another, not by His

own act, I answer -- it could not be that God should will

that the fall should occur by the act of another, and not by

His own act: for it would not happen by the act of another,

unless He should interpose with His own act, and, indeed,

with an act, such that, from it, the act of another should

necessarily exist; otherwise that, which He wished should

occur by the act of another, would not be effected or occur

by that act of another. The force of the argument is not

increased: whether God willed that the fall should occur,

mediately, by the act of another, or, immediately, by His own

act. These are mediately connected -- the act of God and the

act of another, that is, of man, or the fall. The fall

proceeded from the act of man, but that depends of necessity

on the act of God; otherwise it could happen that the act of

another should not be performed, and thus it could happen

that the fall should not occur, which, nevertheless, God

willed should occur. It is not, therefore, denied that God is

the cause of the fall, except immediately; it is conceded

that He is so, mediately. No one, indeed, ever wished to

deduce, from the declaration of any one, that God is the

immediate cause of the sin perpetrated by man, for he would

deduce a contradiction in terms, as they say in the schools,

unless, indeed, the subject might be the general concurrence

of God with man, in producing an act which can not be

produced by man without sin.

The distinction of the will into that of hidden and revealed,

while it may have place elsewhere, can not avail here. For

the hidden will of God is said to be efficacious; but if, in

its exercise, God willed that the fall should occur, it is

certainly a necessary conclusion, also, that He effected the

fall, that is, He must be the cause of the fall; for whatever

God wills, even by His hidden will, the same, also, He does

both in heaven and on the earth; and no one can resist His

will, namely, that which is hidden. But I may remark

concerning that distinction in the will, that I think that it

may be said, that neither of these can be so contrary, or

opposed to the other, that God, by one, wills that to be

done, which, by the other, He wills not to be done, and vice

versa. God wills by His revealed and approving will, that man

should not fall, it can not, therefore, be true that God, by

any will, considered in any way whatever, can will that man

should fall; for though there may be distinction in the will

of God, yet no contradiction can exist in it. But it is a

contradiction, if God, by any act of His own will, should

tend towards an object, and at the same time towards its

contrary.

The third distinction, in which it is said that God wills

sin, not as such, but as the means of illustrating His own

glory, defends God from the charge of efficiency in sin no

more than the two preceding. For that assertion remains true

-- God doeth whatsoever He wills, but He wills sin,

therefore, He effects sin, not indeed as it is such, but as

it is the means of illustrating His own glory. But if God

effects sin, as it is the means to such an end, it can not be

effected, unless man commits sin as such. For sin can not be

made a means, unless it is committed. There exists, indeed,

that distinction of sin into separate and diverse respects,

not really, and in fact, but in the mode of considering it.

But that we may make that distinction correctly, as it is

indeed of some use, it must be said that God permits sin as

such, but for this reason, because He had the knowledge and

the power to make it the means, yea, rather, to use it as the

means of illustrating His own glory. So that the

consideration of sin as such was presented to the Divine

permission, the permission itself being, in the mean time,

caused both by the consideration that the sin could be the

means of illustrating the Divine glory, and by the

arrangement that the sin, permitted, should be, in fact, the

means for illustrating that same glory.

The simile, which you present, of the mutable decaying house

is not apposite for many reasons. For in the first place, in

its fall, the house is passive; but in the fall of man he is

active, for he sins. Secondly, that house is, not only

mutable, that is, capable of decay, but subject to decay; but

man, though capable of sinning, was still not subject to sin.

Thirdly, that house could not stand if attacked by the winds;

but man could preserve his position, even though tempted by

Satan. Fourthly, the necessary props were not placed under

that house; but man received strength from God, sufficient

for steadfastness against the onset of Satan, and was

supported by the assistance of divinity itself. Fifthly, the

builder anticipated the ruin of the house, and in part willed

it, because he was unwilling to prevent the fall when he

could have done it; God, indeed, foresaw sin, but He did not

will it; indeed, He endeavoured to prevent it by precept and

the bestowment of grace, necessary and sufficient for the

avoidance of sin. Farther than this, He must not prevent,

lest He should destroy the constitution which He had

established. The ideas, I will the ruin, and I will it, so

far as I will not to prevent it, do not agree. For the ruin

and the permission of the ruin can not be at the same time

the immediate object of the will. For God can not be

concerned in the fall, at the same time, both by an

affirmative and by a negative act of the will. The act of

willing the fall was affirmative, the act of not willing to

prevent is negative, intermediate between two opposite

affirmative acts, namely, between the act of volition and

that of nolition concerning the fall. It is altogether true,

that so much causality or efficiency is to be attributed to

the builder as there is of will, directed to the ruin of the

house, attributed to him. Let us now consider the application

of the similitude. God left Adam to himself, but yet Adam was

not deserted by God; for He placed under him as it were a

triple prop, lest he might sin or fall. He gave him a

precept, that he might, in obedience, not choose to sin; He

added a threat that he might fear to sin on account of the

annexed and following punishment; He bestowed grace that he

might be able in fact to fulfill the precept, and avoid the

threatened punishment. It may be lawful, also, to call the

promise, which was placed in opposition to the threatening,

and which was sealed by the symbol of the tree of life, a

fourth prop. The reason, in view of which, God left man to

himself, was not that his ability might be tested by

temptation, for from the actual occurrence of the fall, his

inability to stand could be neither proved nor disproved; but

because it was suitable that there should be such a trial of

the obedience of him whom God had made the ruler of his own

will, the lord and the head of his own voluntary sets. Nor

was permission instituted to this end, that it might be seen

what the creature could do, if the Divine aid and government

over him, should cease for a time, both because the Divine

aid and government was not deficient, and because it was

already certain that man could do nothing without the

government and general aid of God, and nothing good without

the special aid of His grace.

That "God was not the cause of that defection" is a

Theological axiom. But you, by removing those acts, do not

remove the cause of the defection from the Deity. For God can

be regarded as the cause of sin, either by affirmative or

negative acts. You, indeed, take from Him the affirmative

acts, namely, the inclining of the mind to sin, the infusion

of wickedness, and the deprivation of the gift, already

bestowed, but you attributed to Him a negative act, the

denial or non-bestowal of strengthening grace. If this

strengthening grace was necessary to the avoidance of sin,

then, by that act of denial, God became the Author of sin and

of Adam's fall. But if you attribute the denial or the non-

bestowal of strengthening grace to God, not absolutely, but

on account of the transgression of Adam, because he did not

seek the Divine aid, I approve what you say, if you concede

that it was in the power of Adam to seek that aid; otherwise

it was denied to him to seek that also, and so we go on

without end.

You say -- "There are two parts or species of predestination,

the decree of Election and that of Reprobation," concerning

which it must be stated that one can not exist without the

other, and that, one being supposed, the other must be also.

This is signified by the word election, otherwise,

predestination may be considered per se and without an

opposite, and so all men universally would be predestinated

unto life. In that case, there would be no election, which

includes the idea of reprobation, as united to it by a

necessary consequence and copula. Election and Reprobation

are opposed to each other both affirmatively and negatively.

Negatively, because election refers to the act of the will by

which grace and glory are conferred, reprobation, that by

which they are not conferred. Affirmatively, since

reprobation refers to the act of the will, which inflicts

punishment on account of sin.

It is worthy of consideration that God, both in the decree of

Election and in that of Reprobation, was concerned with men

considered as sinners. For the grace which was provided by

election or predestination, is the grace of the remission of

sins, and the renewal of the Holy Ghost; and the glory which

He has prepared by the same decree, is out of the ignominy to

which man was liable on account of sin. Reprobation, also, is

a denial of that grace and a preparation of the punishment

due to sin, not in that it was due, but that it was, through

mercy, not taken away. Isidorus and Angelomus, quoted by you,

express this condition of the object both of Election and

Reprobation. The former, when be says -- "the reprobate are

left, and predestinated to death," the latter, when he says

that -- of "the unbelieving people some are predestinated to

everlasting freedom, but others are left in their own

impiety, and condemned to perpetual death by occult

dispensation, and occult judgment."

Your definition of Election is obscure from the want of some

word. It seems that the phrase to be illustrated ought to

have been added, thus: "The decree of election is that by

which God destines certain men to His glorious grace to be

illustrated in their salvation and heavenly life, obtained

through Christ," otherwise the phraseology is not

sufficiently complete. But the definition, even when

completed, in that way, seems to me to have been, ineptly

arranged, as the parts are not arranged according to their

mutual relations. For "salvation" and "heavenly life" hold

the relation of the material prepared for the decree of

election; "certain men" hold the place of the object or

subject for which that salvation is prepared; the

"illustration of His glorious grace" is the end of election;

"Christ" is here made the means of obtaining that salvation

and life. The order of all these in the definition according

to their mutual relations, ought to be, -- "The decree of

election is that, by which God destined certain men to

salvation and heavenly life, to be obtained through Christ,

to the praise of His glorious grace." In this definition,

however, Christ does not seem to me to obtain that place,

which he deserves, and which the Apostle assigns to him. For

Christ according to the Apostle is not only the means by

which the salvation, already prepared by election, but, so to

speak, the meritorious cause, in respect to which the

election was made, and on whose account that grace was

prepared. For the apostle says that we are chosen in Christ

(Ephes. i, 4), as in a mediator, in whose blood salvation and

life is obtained for us, and as in our "head," (Ephes. i, 22)

from whom those blessings flow to us. For God chooses no one

unto eternal life except in Christ, who prepared it by his

own blood for them who should believe on his name. From this

it seems to follow that, since God regards no one in Christ

unless they are engrafted in him by faith, election is

peculiar to believers, and the phrase "certain men," in the

definition, refers to believers. For Christ is a means of

salvation to no one unless he is apprehended by faith.

Therefore, that phrase "in Christ" marks the meritorious

cause by which grace and glory are prepared, and the

existence of the elect in him, without which they could not

be elected in him. The definition, then, is susceptible of

this form. "Election is the decree of God, by which, of

Himself, from eternity, He decreed to justify in (or through)

Christ, believers, and to accept them unto eternal life, to

the praise of His glorious grace." But you will say, "Then

faith is made dependent on the human will, and is not a gift

of divine grace." I deny that sequence, for there was no such

statement in the definition. I acknowledge that the cause of

faith was not expressed, but that was unnecessary. If any one

denies it, there may be added after "believers" the phrase

"to whom He determined to give faith." But we should observe

whether, in our method of consideration, the decree, by which

God determined to justify believers and adopt them as sons,

is the same with that by which He determined to bestow faith

on some, but to deny the same to others. This seems to me not

very probable. For there are, here, two purposes, each

determined by the certain decree of God; their subjects are

also diverse, and different attributes are assigned to them.

I think that this ought to have been noticed in treating

correctly of the Order and Mode of Predestination. I do not

much object to your statement that "the act of the divine

mind is two-fold, regarding the end, and the means to the

end, or to salvation," but that remark does not seem correct

to me, in which you say that "the former is commonly called

the decree, and the latter the execution of the decree" --

for such is your marginal annotation -- each of these is an

act of the decree, as you acknowledge; but an act of the

decree is internal, and precedes its execution whether it is

in reference to the end or the means. The passage in Romans

9, does not favour your idea as you claim. For it not

distinguish the purpose from election, nor does it make the

election prior to the purpose of damning of conferring

salvation, but it says that the purpose is "according to

election," not without election or apart from election, as is

clearly evident from the words of the apostle. For they are

as follows -- "i[na hJ kat ejklogh<n tou~ Qeou~ proqesiv

menh| " that the purpose of God according to election might

stand," from which it is apparent that, by these words, is

described the purpose of God, which is "according to

election."

But that this may be more plainly understood, we may examine

briefly the design and the scope of the apostle. The Jews

objected that they, by virtue of the covenant and the divine

word, committed to them, were the peculiar people of God,

and, therefore, that honour could not be taken away from

them, without the disgrace and the violation of the divine

decree. They asserted, however, that the honour referred to,

and the title of the people of God was taken from them by the

Apostle Paul, when he made those only, who should believe in

the Christ whom he preached, partakers of the righteousness

of God, and of eternal salvation. Since they had not believed

in that Christ, it followed, according to the doctrine of the

apostle, that they were strangers to the righteousness of God

and eternal salvation, and unworthy to be longer considered

the people of God. But since they considered this to be

contrary to the decree and the covenant of God, they

concluded that it was, at the same time, absurd and foreign

to the truth. The apostle answers that the covenant, decree,

or word of God hath not "taken none effect," (verse 6), but

remains firm, even if many of the Jews should not be reckoned

among the people of God, because that decree or covenant did

not comprehend all Israelites, universally without election

and distinction; for that decree was "according to election,"

as set forth in those words of God announcing his purpose.

For God said "In Isaac," not in Ishmael, "shall thy seed be

called." Also "The elder," Esau, "shall serve the younger,"

Jacob. The apostle asserts that God declared most clearly in

these words, that He did not regard the whole progeny of

Abraham, or that of Isaac, or of Jacob, or all of their

individual descendants, as His people, but only those who

were "the children of the promise" to the exclusion of "the

children of the flesh." The Apostle reasons, most

conclusively from those words of God, that the purpose of God

is according to election, and that it, therefore, embraces,

in itself, not all the Israelites, but, while it claims some,

it rejects others. From which it follows that it is not

wonderful or contrary to the purpose or covenant of God, that

some of the Jews are rejected by God, and those indeed, who

are specially excluded by that decree according to those

words of God, as "the children of the flesh," i.e. those who

were seeking to be justified "by the works of the law" and

according to the flesh. Compare Rom. ix, 7-11 and 30-32, also

x, 3-5 with ch. iv, 1-3.

In Romans viii, 29, those acts -- I refer now to the decree

and the execution of the decree -- are clearly distinguished.

In the decree two things are mentioned, foreknowledge and

predestination, "for whom He did foreknow, He also did

predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son." It is

inquired -- what is the import of this foreknowledge or

prescience? Some explain it thus: -- "whom He foreknew," i.e.

whom He previously loved, and affectionately regarded as His

own, as indeed the simple word "to know" is sometimes used,

as "I know you not." (Matt. xxv, 12.) "The Lord knoweth the

way of the righteous." (Psalm i, 6.) Others say that

foreknowledge, or prescience of faith in Christ, is here

signified. You assent to the former, and reject the latter,

and with good reason, if it has the meaning, which you

ascribe to it. But it is worthy of consideration whether the

latter meaning of the work "foreknow" may not be so

explained, as not only not to impinge upon the former, but

also to harmonize with it most completely so that the former

cannot be true without the latter. This will be evident, if

it shall be demonstrated that God can "previously love and

affectionately regard as His own" no sinner unless He has

foreknown him in Christ, and looked upon him as a believer in

Christ.

To prove this I proceed thus: -- God acknowledges, as His

own, no sinner, and He chooses no one to eternal life except

in Christ, and for the sake of Christ. "He hath chosen us in

Him," (Ephes. i, 4); "wherein He hath made us accepted in the

Beloved," (verse 6). "Nor any other creature shall be able to

separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our

Lord." (Rom. viii, 39). "God was in Christ reconciling the

world unto Himself." (2 Cor. v, 19).

For, if God could will to any one eternal life, without

respect to the Mediator, He could also give eternal life,

without the satisfaction made by the Mediator. The actual

bestowment of eternal life is not more limited, than the

purpose to bestow it. God truly loved the world, and, on

account of that love, gave His own Son as its Redeemer. (John

iii, 16). But the love, here spoken of, is not that by which

He wills eternal life, as appears from the very expression of

John -- for he interposes faith in Christ between that love

and eternal life. Hence God acknowledges no one, in Christ

and for Christ's sake, as His own, unless that person is in

Christ. He who is not in Christ, can not be loved in Christ.

But no one is in Christ, except by faith; for Christ dwells

in our hearts by faith, and we are engrafted and incorporated

in him by faith. It follows then that God acknowledges His

own, and chooses to eternal life no sinner, unless He

considers him as a believer in Christ, and as made one with

him by faith. This is proved by the following testimonies:

"As many as received him, to them gave He power to become the

sons of God, even to them that believe on his name." (John i,

12.) But to those, to whom He gave this power, and to them,

considered in one and the same manner, He also decreed to

give this power, since the decree of Predestination effects

nothing in him who is predestinated, and there is, therefore,

no internal change in him, intervening between the decree and

the actual bestowment of the thing, destined and prepared by

the decree. "God so loved the world that He gave His only

begotten Son that whosoever believeth in him shall not

perish, but have everlasting life." (John iii, 16). "They

which be of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham." (Gal.

iii, 9.) "Without faith it is impossible to please him."

(Heb. xi, 6.) Hence he is not in error who says that

foreknowledge or prescience of faith in Christ is signified

in Rom. viii, 29, unless he adds the assertion that the

faith, referred to, results from our own strength and is not

produced in us by the free gift of God.

The same explanation is proved true from the following

member: "whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be

conformed to the image of He Son." No one is conformed to the

image of the Son of God if he does not believe on him.

Therefore, no one is predestinated by God to that conformity,

unless he is considered as a believer, unless one may claim

that faith itself is included in that conformity which

believers have with Christ -- which would be absurd, because

that faith can by no means be attributed to Christ, for it is

faith in him, and in God through him; it is faith in

reference to reconciliation, redemption, and the remission of

sins. It is true, also, since it is the means of attaining

that conformity. But you say, -- "They, who are predestinated

to be justified and to become the sons of God, are also

predestinated to believe, since adoption and justification

are received by faith." I deny that consequence; indeed I

assert that just the contrary can be concluded from that

argument, if the act of predestination is one and the same.

This I will prove: -- If adoption and justification is

received by faith, then they, who are predestinated to be

justified and to become the sons of God, are, of necessity,

considered as believers. For that, which is destined to any

one by Predestination, will certainly be received by him. And

as he is when he receives it, such he was considered to be,

when he was predestinated to receive it. Therefore, the

believer alone was predestinated to receive it. From which I

again conclude, that no one is chosen by God to adoption and

the communication of the gift of righteousness, unless he is

considered by Him as a believer. You add -- "It cannot be

said correctly, that God foreknew that men would believe, and

then predestinated them to faith, since those, whom He

foreknew to believe, He thus foreknew because He decreed that

they should believe. But what relation has this to the

matter. Such an affirmation is not made by the defenders of

the sentiment to which I have referred. You confound two

kinds of Predestination, and unite together acts of a

different character. The Predestination in which God decreed

to justify and adopt as sons believers in Christ, is not the

same with that, in which He decreed, by certain means, to

give faith to these and not to those. For the decree, is in

this case, concerning the bestowment of faith in that,

concerning the justification and adoption of believers;

which, can not, indeed, be the same decree, on account of the

diversity of the subject and the attribute. Otherwise it is

true, that "God first foreknew that men would believe, and

then predestinated them to faith." For He foreknew that they

would believe by His own gift, which decree was prepared by

Predestination. These things, having been thus plainly set

forth, may throw some light on this whole discussion, in

reference to Predestination. This we will do, at greater

extent, hereafter, when we shall subjoin our own view of the

mode and order of Predestination.

Those testimonies, which you cite from the Fathers and

School-men, can be very easily harmonized with what has been

said by us, yet to avoid prolixity, I will dispense with that

labour. One thing, however, I will observe; namely, that the

explanation of Peter Lombardus, however true it may be

elsewhere, it is not adapted to the passage in Rom. viii, 29.

For the Apostle has there presented the object of

Predestination, (conformity to the image of Christ,) in a

different light from that in which it is set forth or

presented by Lombardus, namely, "that they should believe the

word preached unto them." I will add, also, that you do not

rightly conclude, because the word foreknowledge is used

elsewhere by the Holy Spirit for the purpose of God, that, in

the passage under discussion, it can not signify prescience

of faith.

Further, in the decree of election, you refer to two acts,

one "the purpose of choosing certain men to His love and

grace, by which choice, men are made vessels of mercy and

honour;" the other, "the purpose of saving, or of the

bestowment of glory. This is not an unimportant distinction,

if all things are correctly understood. For those things,

which God prepares in election, are contained in grace and

glory. But your statement -- "Some, by the divine purpose,

were chosen to the eternal love of God," must be explained to

refer to that communication of love, by which God determined

to communicate Himself to some.

If you regard, in a different light, that love of God which

embraces us, it must be considered as preceding, in the order

of nature, that decree or the Divine purpose by which grace

and glory are prepared for us, grace, I say, which is the

means of attaining to glory. Otherwise if you understand, by

that word, the gracious disposition of God towards us, it

coincides with the love of God, and is to be placed above the

purpose or decree of God as its cause. This also is indicated

by the order of the predicaments (in the logical sense of

that word). For the purpose or decree is placed in the

predicament of Action, the gracious affection and love, in

the preceding predicament of Quality. This is evident from

Ephes. i, 5-6, where God is said to have predestinated and

adopted us "to the praise of the glory of His grace." If

grace, then, is to receive praise from those acts, it must be

placed before them as their cause.

Your position that "men to be created," are the object of the

former purpose is not correct. For we are now treating of the

subject, not as it is, in itself -- for we know that the

eternal purpose of God is antecedent to the actual existence

of man -- but as it is presented to the divine mind, in the

act of decree, and in that of Predestination. If the object

of that purpose is considered with that limitation, it is

certain that men, not" to be created," but "already created,

and sinners," -- that is, in the divine mind -- are the

object of the divine purpose and Predestination. This is

evident, from the love and gracious affection from which, and

the grace to which he chose them. For that love is in Christ;

in him is that gracious affection of God towards us; the

grace which is prepared for us as a saving means, has place

in Christ, and not elsewhere. This you have, with sufficient

clearness, signified, when you said that men, in that grace

to which He chose them, were made vessels of mercy;" which

word is misplaced, except when wretchedness and sin have

preceded it.

But if you think of the love and gracious affection of God,

as in God apart from any consideration of Christ, I shall

deny that the purpose and decree of Predestination was

instituted and established by God, according to those things,

so considered, and I shall claim from you the proof, which,

in my judgment, you will not be able to give, both because

the love of God towards those "to be created" is uniform

towards all, for in Adam all were created without any

difference, and because that love and gracious affection, by

which the purpose of Predestination was executed, saves with

certainty, the predestinated; but the predestinated are not

saved by that love and affection, considered out of Christ.

If you say that the love and gracious affection in God is the

same, whether considered in Christ or out of Christ, I admit

it: but man, "to be created," and man "having been created,

and a sinner," are the same man. Created, and continuing in

the condition of creation, he could be saved, by obedience,

of the love and gracious affection of God, considered out of

Christ. As a sinner, he could not be saved, except by the

same feelings, considered in Christ. If you make the sinner

the object of Predestination, you ought to add to

predestinating grace, a mode adapted to the sinner who is to

be saved. If you do not add this, will grace, considered

without that mode, be sufficient? I do not think that you

will urge that the grace and love, by which a man, who is not

a sinner, can be saved, and which is separate from mercy, is

to be considered in Christ, and affects us on account of, and

in respect to, him. If, however, you do this, I shall ask the

proof. And, after all the proof which you may be able to

present, it will be proper to say that Christ himself is to

be here considered in different relations; in the former

case, as Mediator, preserving and confirming the

predestinated in the integrity of their state; in the latter,

as Mediator, redeeming and renewing the same persons from the

state of sin and corruption; and I will add that grace and

salvation come to us, not by the former, but by the latter

mediation. For he is "Jesus, for he shall save his people

from their sins." (Matt. i, 21.) He is "the Lamb of God,

which taketh away the sin of the world" (John i, 29). He is

the Redeemer of the world by his flesh given "for the life of

the world" (John, vi, 51); by the destruction of "the works

of the devil" (1 John, iii, 8, and Heb. ii, 14); and by that

reconciliation, which consists "in imputing their trespasses

unto them, and hath committed unto us the word of

reconciliation." (2 Cor. v, 19).

That act, indeed, is "of the mere will of God," but not

"without respect to sin in the creatures;" of sin, which is

considered, not as the cause moving God to election, but as a

condition, which must exist in the object of that act. And,

in this sense, He does injury. to no one, if He does not

elect all, since He is not under obligation to bestow mercy

on any one. But He can ordain no one to punishment, without

the prevision of sin, in view of any right which He possesses

over His creatures. For that right is not unlimited, as many

think -- unlimited, I say, in such a sense that God can

rightly inflict any act, possible to His omniscience, upon

any creature considered in any respect, and without injustice

bring upon the creature all things which the creature can

suffer from his omnipotent Creator. This can be made plain by

the following demonstration: Every right of God, over His

creatures, depends either on the goodness of God towards His

creatures, or on their wickedness towards Him, or on some

contract entered into between God and His creatures. Without

considering the right, which depends on contract, let us

discuss the others. The right, which depends on the goodness

of God, or on the wickedness of men, can not exceed the

magnitude of those things severally. Man received from God,

by His goodness in creation, his existence, both that of

nature, and that of supernatural grace, in the latter of

which is also included the power of attaining to the highest

felicity, and that of a supernatural nature, which God

promised to man on the condition of obedience. The opposite

of this highest felicity is the deepest misery into which the

same man would fall, justly and according to divine right, if

he should transgress that law. Hence, exists the right of God

over man, in that he is a creature, according to which He can

take from him that very being which He has given, and reduce

it to its pristine Nothing. Hence, also, He can not have the

right to condemn to eternal punishment a man unless he has

become a sinner. For these four things -- existence, non-

existence, happiness, misery -- are so mutually connected,

that, as happiness is better than existence, so misery is

worse than non-existence. This, Christ signified when he said

"good were it for man if he had never been born" (Mark xiv,

21). Therefore, the divine right does not permit that He

should inflict misery on man, to whom He has given existence,

except on the commission of that, by the opposite of which he

could obtain felicity, the opposite of that wretchedness.

Hence, if He should not elect all, He would do injustice to

no one, if the non-elect should be only deprived of the good

to which they had no claim; but injustice would be done to

them, if, by non-election or reprobation, they must suffer

evil which they had not deserved. The right of God does not

so far extend itself over them.

There seems to have been need of this explanation, otherwise,

we must, of necessity, far into many absurdities, and impinge

on the righteousness of God. This, Augustine also, admits, in

many passages. I will quote one or two: "God is good, God is

just; He can deliver some without merit, because He is good;

He can not damn any one without demerit, because He is just."

(In Julian, lib. 3, cap. 18.) "If it is believed that God

damns any one, who does not deserve it, and is chargeable

with no sin, it is not believed that He is far from

iniquity." (Epistola 106, ad Paulinum.)

I may be permitted, with your leave, to note some things in

the explanation of the second act, which seem to have been