THE WORKS OF
JAMES ARMINIUS
VOL. 3
A FRIENDLY DISCUSSION
BETWEEN
JAMES ARMINIUS & FRANCIS JUNIUS,
CONCERNING PREDESTINATION,
CONDUCTED BY MEANS OF LETTERS
The origin of this discussion is thus stated by the elder
Brandt: "On the subject of Predestination, he [Junius]
endeavoured to defend the opinion of Calvin, by rendering it
a little more palatable. For he did not maintain that the
divine predestination had respect to mankind either
ANTECEDENT TO THE DECREE OF THEIR CREATION, or SUBSEQUENT TO
THEIR CREATION, ON A FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THEIR FALL, but that it
had respect only to MAN ALREADY CREATED, so far as BEING
ENDOWED BY GOD WITH NATURAL GIFTS, HE WAS CALLED TO A
SUPERNATURAL GOOD. On that account James Arminius, then one
of the ministers of the church at Amsterdam, entered into an
epistolary conference with him, and tried to prove that the
opinion of Junius, as well as that of Calvin, inferred the
NECESSITY OF SIN, and that he must therefore, have recourse
to a third opinion, which supposed man, not only AS CREATED
but AS FALLEN, to have been the object of predestination.
Junius answered his first letter with that good temper, which
was peculiar to him, but seemed to fabricate out of the
various opinions concerning predestination one of his own,
which, Arminius thought contradicted all those which it was
his endeavour to defend. Arminius was induced to compose a
rejoinder to the answer of Junius, which he transmitted to
the Professor, who retained it full six years, to the time of
his death, without attempting to reply."
The letter of Arminius was divided by Junius into twenty-
seven propositions in answering it, and each of them is here
presented, with the answer of Junius, and the reply of
Arminius, corresponding to it.
TO THE
MOST DISTINGUISHED MAN,
FRANCIS JUNIUS, D.D.,
A BROTHER IN CHRIST, WORTHY OF MY MOST PROFOUND REGARD, JAMES
ARMINIUS WISHES YOU HEALTH.
MOST DISTINGUISHED AND VENERATED SIR:
They who do not give their assent to the sentiments of
others, seem to themselves, and wish to seem to others, to
be, in this, under the influence of sound judgment; but
sometimes, ignorance of the sentiments of others is the cause
of this, which, nevertheless, they by no means acknowledge. I
have not hitherto been able to agree, in the full persuasion
of my mind, with the views of some learned men, both of our
own and of former ages, concerning the decrees of
predestination and of reprobation.
Consciousness of my own lack of talents does not permit me to
ascribe the cause of this disagreement to sound judgment:
that I should ascribe it to ignorance is hardly allowed by my
own opinion, which seems to me to be based on an adequate
knowledge of their sentiments. On this account I have been
till this time in doubt; fearing to assent to an opinion of
another, without a full persuasion in my own mind; and not
daring to affirm that which I consider more true, but not in
accordance with the sentiments of most learned men. I have,
therefore, thought it necessary for the tranquillity of my
mind, to confer with learned men concerning that decree, that
I might try whether their erudite labours might be able to
remove my doubt and ignorance, and produce in my mind
knowledge and certainty. I have already done this with some
of my brethren; and with others, whose opinions have
authority, but thus far, (to confess the truth,) with a
result useless, or even injurious to me. I thought that I
must have recourse to you, who, partly from your published
works, and partly from the statements of others, I know to be
a person such that I may, without fear, be permitted to hope
from you some certain result.
REPLY OF FRANCIS JUNIUS TO THE MOST LEARNED MAN, AND MY VERY
DEAR BROTHER, JAMES ARMINIUS GREETING:
TERTULLIAN, On whose works, as you know, I have now been long
engaged, has been the cause of my long silence, respected
brother. In the mean time, I placed your letter on a shelf
plainly in my view, that I might be reminded of my obligation
to you, and might attend, at the earliest possible
opportunity, to your request. You desire from me an
explication of a question of a truly grave character, in
which the truth is fully known to God: that which is
sufficient He had expressed in His written word, which we
both consult with the divine help. You may set forth openly
what you think and do not think. You desire that I should
present my views, that from this mutual interchange and
communication of sentiments, we may illustrate the truth of
divine grace. I will do what I can according to the measure,
which the Lord has admeasured to me; and whatever I may
perceive of this most august mystery, I will indicate it,
whether I regard it as truth or as a merely speculative
opinion, that you with me may hold that which belongs to the
Deity. Whatever pertains to my opinion, if you have a more
correct sentiment, you may, in a kind and brotherly manner,
unfold it, and by a salutary admonition recall me into the
way of truth. I will here say nothing by way of introduction,
because I prefer to pass at once to the subject itself, which
may rather be "good to the use of edifying," as the apostle
teaches. I judge that all desire the truth in righteousness:
but all do not therefore see the truth in righteousness. "We
know in part, and we prophesy in part," (1 Cor. xiii, 9,) and
"when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you
into all truth." (John xvi, 13.) We perceive a part of the
truth: and present a part; the rest will be given in his own
time, by the Spirit of truth to those who seek. May he
therefore grant to both of us that we may receive and may
present the truth.
That we may both realize greater advantage from this
brotherly discussion, and that nothing may carelessly fall
from me, I will follow the path marked out in your letters,
writing word for word, and distinguishing the topics of your
discussion into propositions; and will subjoin to them, in
the same order, my own opinion concerning each point, that in
reference to all things you may be able to see clearly, and
according to the Divine will, determine from the mode of my
answer, what I think and what I do not think. The following
is your first proposition, in which you may recognize
yourself as speaking.
FIRST PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I see, then, most renowned sir, that there are three views in
reference to that subject, [predestination] which have their
defenders among the doctors of our church. The first is that
of Calvin to Beza; the second that of Thomas Aquinas and his
followers; the third that of Augustine and those who agree
with him. They all agree in this, that they alike hold that
God, by an eternal and immutable decree, determined to bestow
upon certain men, the rest being passed by, supernatural and
eternal life, and those means which are the necessary and
efficacious preparation for the attainment of that life.
THE REPLY OF FRANCIS JUNIUS TO THE FIRST PROPOSITION OF
ARMINIUS
If one should wish to accumulate a variety of opinions, he
would in appearance have a large number of them; but let
these be the views of men to whom will readily be assigned
the first place in relation to this doctrine. But in
reference to the points of agreement among them all, of which
you speak, there are, unless I am deceived, two things most
worthy of explanation and notice. First, that what you say is
indeed true, that "God, by an eternal and immutable decree,
determined to give eternal, supernatural life to certain
men;" but that eternal life is not here primarily, or per se
the work of that divine predestination, but rather in a
secondary manner, and dependent, by consequence, on adoption
th~v uiJoqesiav The apostle demonstrates this in Ephes. i, 5.
"Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by
Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of
his will." And in verse 11, "which He hath purposed in
Himself; that in the dispensation of the fullness of time, He
might gather together in one all things in Christ," &c.
Also, Romans viii, 17, "if children, then heirs; heirs of
God, and joint-heirs with Christ," &c. We must not, however,
forget that if an effect is substituted for the
distinguishing part of the essence the definition of the
thing is defective. Predestination, if we regard its peculiar
and distinguishing quality, is, according to the testimony of
the Scripture, to filiation, (so to speak,) or the adoption
of children, the effect and sequence of which is eternal
life. It is thus true that we are predestinated to life, but,
accurately speaking, we are predestinated to adoption by the
special grace of our heavenly Father. He who proposes one,
supposes the other; but it is necessary that the former
should be always set forth distinctly in the general
discussion. Hence it seems that the arrangement of this whole
argument will be less encumbered, if we consider that saving
decree of the divine predestination in this order; that God
has predestinated us to the adoption of children of God in
Christ "to himself," and that he has pre-arranged by his own
eternal decree the way and the end of that adoption; the way
of that grace, leading us in the discharge of duty, by our
vocation and justification, but its end, that of life, which
we shall obtain when our glorification is perfected, (Rom.
8,) which are the effects of that grace, and the most certain
consequences of our adoption. The statement that God has
predestinated certain persons to life, is a general one; but
it is not sufficiently clear or convenient for the purpose of
instruction, unless gratuitous adoption in Christ is
supposed, prior to justification and life and glory.
There is still another statement, made by you, which seems to
me to need consideration, that "God has bestowed on certain
men those means which are the necessary and efficacious
preparation for the attainment of that life." For though that
assertion is true, yet it must be received with cautious
discrimination and religious scrupulousness. Our filiation is
(so to speak) the work of the divine predestination, because
God is our father, and by His grace unites us to himself as
sons. But whatever God has ordained for the consummation of
this adoption in us, it is, in respect to that adoption, not
a means but a necessary adjunct or consectary. That eternal
life, bestowed on us, is a consectary of our adoption "to
himself." But in respect to the adjuncts and consequence,
they may be called mutually, the means one of another; as
calling is said to be the means of justification, and
justification of glorification, (Rom. 8.) Yet though they are
means, most of them are necessary and efficacious in certain
respects, not per se and absolutely. For if they were, per se
and absolutely necessary and efficacious, they would be
equally necessary and efficacious in all the pious and elect.
Yet most of them are not of this character; since even
infants and they who come in their last hours, being called
by the Lord, will obtain eternal life without those means.
These things have been said, the opportunity being presented.
We agree generally in reference to the other matters.
THE REPLY OF JAMES ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF FRANCIS JUNIUS
To that most distinguished person, Doctor Francis Junius, and
my brother in Christ, to be regarded with due veneration.
REVEREND SIR:
I have read and reviewed your reply, and used all the
diligence of which I was capable, considering it according to
the measure of my strength, that I might be able to judge
with greater certainty concerning the truth of the matter
which is under discussion between us. But while I consider
everything in the light of my judgment, it seems to me that
most of my propositions and arguments are not answered in
your reply. I venture, therefore, to take my pen and to make
some comments in order to show wherein I perceive a
deficiency in your answer, and to defend my own arguments. I
am fully persuaded that you will receive it with as much
kindness as you received the liberty used in my former
letter, and if any thing shall seem to need correction and to
be worthy of refutation, you will indicate it to me with the
same charity; that, by your faithful assistance, may be able
to understand the truth which I seek with simplicity of
heart, and explain it to others to the glory of God and their
salvation, as occasion shall demand. May that Spirit of truth
be present with me, and so direct my mind and hand, that it
may in no respect err from the truth. If however any thing
should fall from me not in harmony with its meaning, I shall
wish that it had been unsaid, unwritten.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO HIS FIRST PROPOSITION
In my former letter I laid down three views held by our
doctors in reference to the decree of Predestination and
Reprobation, diverse, not contrary. Others might perhaps have
been adduced, but not equally diverse among themselves or
from others. For each of these are distinguished by marks
which are manifest and have reference to the essence and
nature of the subject itself, which is under discussion.
First, they give the object of the decree (man) a different
mode or form, since the first presents him to the Deity as an
object to be created, the second as created, the third as
fallen.
Secondly, they adapt to that decree attributes of the Deity,
either different or considered in a different relation. For
the first presents mercy and justice as preparing an object
for themselves; the third introduces the same attributes as
finding their object prepared; the second places grace, which
holds the relation of genus to mercy, over predestination;
and liberty of grace over non-election or the preparation of
preterition, and justice over punishment.
Thirdly, they differ in certain acts. The first view
attributes the act of creation to that decree, and makes the
fall of man subordinate to the same decree; the second and
the third premises creation; the third also supposes the fall
of man to be antecedent in the order of nature to the decree,
regarding the decree of election which flows from mercy and
that of reprobation which is administered by justice, as
having no possible place except in reference to man
considered as a sinner, and on that account meriting misery.
It is hence apparent that I have not improperly separated
those views which are themselves separated and discriminated
by some marked distinction. But you will perhaps persuade me
that our doctors differ only in their mode of presenting the
same truth, more easily than you will persuade them or their
adherents. For Beza in many places sharply contends that God,
when predestinating and reprobating man, considers him, not
as created, not as fallen, but as to be created, and he
claims that this is indicated by the term "lump," used in
Rom. ix, 21, and he charges great absurdities on those who
hold different views. For example, he says that they "who
present man as created to God decreeing, consider the Deity
as imprudent, creating man before he had his own mind
arranged any thing in reference to his final condition. He
accuses those who present man as fallen, of denying, divine
providence, without the decree or arrangement of which sin
entered into the world, according to their view. But I can
readily endure, indeed I can praise any one who may desire to
harmonize the views of the doctors, rather than to separate
them more widely, only let this be done by a suitable
explanation of views, apparently diverse, not by change in
statement, or by any addition, differing from the views
themselves. He, who acts otherwise, does not obtain the
desired fruit of reconciliation, and he gains the emolument
of an erroneously stated sentiment, the displeasure of its
authors.
As to those two respects in which you think that my
explanation of the agreement of those views needs
animadversion, in the former I agree, in the latter I do not
much disagree with you. For Predestination is, immediately,
to adoption, and, through it, to life; but when I propose the
sentiments of others, I do not think that they should be
corrected by me. Yet I cheerfully receive the correction;
though I consider that it has little or nothing to do with
this controversy. Indeed I think that it tends to confirm my
view. For adoption in Christ not only requires the
supposition of sin as a condition requisite in the object,
but of a certain other thing also, of which I did not in my
former letter think it best to treat. That thing is faith in
Jesus Christ, without which adoption is in fact bestowed on
no man, and, apart from the consideration of which, adoption
is prepared for no one by the divine predestination. (John i,
12.) For they who believe are adopted, not they who are
adopted receive the gift of faith: adoption is prepared for
those who shall believe, not faith is prepared for those who
are to be adopted, just as justification is prepared for
believers, not faith is prepared for the justified. The
Scripture demonstrates that this is the order in innumerable
passages. But I do not fully understand in what sense you
style vocation and justification the way of adoption. That
may be called the way of adoption which will lead to
adoption, and that also by which adoption tends to its own
end. You seem to me to understand the term way in the latter
sense, from the fact that you make justification subsequent
to adoption, and you speak of the way of grace leading us in
the discharge of duty, by our vocation and justification.
Here are two things not unworthy of notice. The first is that
you connect vocation with adoption as antecedent to it, which
I think can scarcely be said of vocation as a whole. For the
vocation of sinners and unbelievers is to faith in Christ;
the vocation of believers is to conformity to Christ and to
communion with him. The Scripture makes the former antecedent
to adoption. The latter is to adoption itself, which is
included in conformity and communion with Christ. The second
is that you made adoption prior to justification; both of
which I regard as bestowed on believers at the same time,
while in the order of nature, justification is prior to
adoption. For the justified person is adopted, not the
adopted person is justified. This is proved by the order both
of the attainment of those blessings made by Christ, and that
of the imputation of the same blessings made by God in
Christ. For Christ obtained the remission of sins, before he
obtained adoption, before in the order of nature: and
righteousness is imputed before sonship. For "when we were
enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son,"
(Rev. v, 10,) but being reconciled, we are adopted as sons.
Let us consider also what are opposed to these, namely,
imputation of sins and non-adoption. From these it is clearly
seen that such is the order. Sin is the cause of exclusion
from filiation by the mode of demerit. Imputation of sin is
the cause of the same exclusion by the mode of justice,
punishing sin according to its demerit. In reference to your
remarks concerning means, I observe that this term is applied
by the authors to whose sentiments I refer, to those things
which God makes subordinate to the decree of Predestination,
but antecedent to the execution of that decree, not those by
which or in respect to which Predestination itself is made,
whether to adoption or to life. But I think it may be most
useful to consider whether these, either as adjuncts, or
consectaries, or means, or by whatever other name they may be
called, are only effective to consummate the adoption already
ordained for certain individuals, or whether they were
considered by the Deity in the very act of predestination to
sonship, as necessary adjuncts of those to be predestinated.
SECOND PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
They differ in this, that the first presents men as not yet
created, but to be created, to God, electing and
predestinating, also passing by and reprobating, (though, in
the latter case, it does not so clearly make the
distinction): the second presents them created, but
considered in a natural state, to God electing and
predestinating, "to be raised from that natural state above
it; it presents them to Him in the act of preterition, as
considered in the same natural state, and to Him in that of
reprobation, as involved in sin by their own fault: the third
presents them to Him both electing and predestinating, and
passing by and reprobating as fallen in Adam, and as lying in
the mass of corruption and perdition.
THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SECOND PROPOSITION
That, in this statement of views (which are apparently, not
really, contradictory) you have, in some manner, fallen into
error, we shall, in its own place, demonstrate. I could wish
that in this case an ambiguity, in the verb reprobate, and
the verbal reprobation, had been avoided. This word is used
in three ways; one general, two particular. The general use
is when non-election, or preterition and damnation, is
comprehended in the word, in which way Calvin and Beza
frequently understood it, yet so as to make some distinction.
A particular mode or signification is when it is opposed to
election, and designates non-election or preterition (a Latin
phrase derived from forensic use) in which sense the fathers
used it according to the common use of the Latins. There is
also a particular use of the word, when reprobation is taken
for damnation, as I perceive that it is used by you in this
whole letter. The first mode is synecdochical, the second
common, the third metonymical; I add that the third might
properly be called catachrestic if we attend to the just
distinction of these members. I wholly approve the second
meaning and shall adhere to it in this whole discussion.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SECOND PROPOSITION
I have made a difference, not a contrariety between those
views, and have already explained that difference according
to my judgment. I do not, however, wish to be tedious in the
proof of this point. For, in this matter, it is my aim that
of a number of positions, any one being established, others,
perhaps before unsettled, may be demonstrated.
The word reprobation may be sometimes used ambiguously, but
it was not so used by me: and, if it had been, blame for that
thing ought not to be laid on me, who have used that word in
the sense and according to the use of those, whose views I
presented, but especially according to the sense in which it
has been used by yourself, with whom I have begun this
discussion. For I had examined various passages in your
writings, and in them I found that the word was used by you
in the last sense, which you here call catachrestic. I will
adduce some of those passages, from which you will see that I
have used the word in accordance with your perpetual usage.
In your Notes on Jude, (fol 27-6,) "The proper cause of
reprobation is man himself; of his own sin, dying in sins."
So in your Sacred Axioms concerning Nature and Grace,
prefaced to the Refutation of the Pamphlet of Puccius, Axioms
xliv, xlv, xlvi, xlvii, xlviii, and especially xlix and l,
the words of which I here quote. Axiom xlix, "Nor is
preterition indeed the cause of reprobation or damnation, but
only its antecedent. But the peculiar and internal efficient
cause of this is the sin of the creature, while the
accidental and external cause is the justice of God." Axiom
i, "Therefore Reprobation (that we may clearly distinguish
the matter) is understood either in a wider sense, or in one
which is more narrow and peculiar to itself. In a wider
sense, if you consider the whole subject of the divine
counsel from preterition, as the antecedent and commencement,
to damnation, as the end and consequent, with the
intervention of the peculiar cause of damnation, namely, sin;
in a more narrow and appropriate sense, if you consider only
the effects of sin." We might add, also, what is said in the
51st axiom. Of the theses concerning Predestination,
discussed by Coddaeus under you, the 14th has this remark:
"Preterition is the opposite of preparation of grace and
reprobation or preparation of punishment is the opposite of
preparation of glory. But preparation of punishment is the
act in which God determines to punish his creatures, &c." In
theses 17 and 18, "reprobate on account of sins, from the
necessity of justice." Here you seem to have wished to use
those words properly: which you also signify more plainly in
the Theses concerning election discussed by the younger
Trelcatius under your direction. Thesis xii, "But if
reprobation is made the opposite of election, (as it really
is,) it is a figurative expression, that is either by
synecdoche, or by catachresis. By synecdoche, if it refers to
the whole series of acts opposed to Predestination; by
catachresis, if it refers to non-election. For non-election
is the first limit of the divine purpose, dependent on his
will alone. Reprobation is the ultimate limit, next to the
execution, dependent on the supposition of antecedent
causes." Hence it is apparent that I have used that word in
the sense which you have styled "appropriate." I will state,
in a few words, what I think in reference to the same word,
and its use. I am wholly of the opinion that the word
reprobation, according to the use of the Latin language,
properly signifies non-election, if election does not consist
without reprobation. But I think that it is never used in the
Scripture for an act which is merely negative, and never for
an act which has reference to those who are not sinners. If
at any time Augustine and others of the fathers use it for
preterition, non-election, or any negative act, they consider
it as having reference to a reelection in sin, and in the
mass of corruption, or for a purpose to withhold mercy, the
latter term being used for a deliverance from sin and actual
misery. Calvin and Beza use it in almost every case, for the
mere preparation of punishment, or for both acts.
THIRD PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The first theory is this, that God determined from eternity
to illustrate his own glory by mercy and justice: and as
these could be exercised in fact only in reference to
sinners, that he decreed to make man holy and innocent, that
is, after his own images yet, good in such a sense as to be
liable to a change in this condition, and able to fall and to
commit sin: that he ordained also that man should fall and
become depraved, that He might thus prepare the way for the
fulfillment of his own eternal counsels, that he might be
able mercifully to save some and justly to condemn others,
according to his own eternal purpose, to the declaration of
his mercy in the former, and of his justice in the latter.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE THIRD PROPOSITION
This view seems to have been stated not with sufficient
fullness; for Calvin in his Institutes, (lib. 3,) eloquently
refers to the words of Paul in Ephes. i, "He predestinated
us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself,
&c.," and explains them, preserving the order which we
noticed under Proposition I. God therefore from eternity
determined to illustrate most wisely his own glory by the
adoption of these and the preterition or non-adoption of
those with the introduction also of mercy and justice. This
being settled, that statement may be very well conceded, that
"God determined to illustrate his own glory by mercy and
justice, if it is rightly understood. But this will be
hereafter explained in a summary manner. But it cannot be
conceded, nor can I think that Calvin or Beza would have said
simply that "mercy and justice cannot in fact be exercised
except in reference to sinners. For in the first place (that
we may sooner or later explain these things), sinners are
such in act, in habit, or in capability. We are sinners in
act when the depravity of our nature has carried out its own
operations; we were sinners in habit in the womb and from the
womb, before we wrought the works of the flesh. Adam was such
in capability in some sense before the fall, when he had the
power to lay aside his holy habits of life, and make himself
the bond-slave of sin. So also they are miserable, in act, in
habit, or in capability, who now endure miseries or have put
on the habit of them, are capable of falling into them. The
latter, however, are sinners and miserable, not absolutely
but relatively; not fully but in a certain sense (kata ti)
and only in a comparative mode of speaking as Job iv, 18,
"Behold He put no trust in his servants; and his angels he
charged with folly." Augustine refers to this (Lib. contra.
Priscill et Origen, cap 10) concluding his remarks with this
most elegant sentence: "for by participation in whom they are
righteous, by comparison with Him they are unrighteous."
But in the second place it is not true that "mercy cannot be
exercised except in reference to sinners," for all creatures,
even the angels from heaven, when compared, according to
their own nature, with the Deity, are wretched, since in
comparison with Him they are not righteous, and because, by
their own nature, they can sink into misery, (which is
certainly the capability of misery; as, on the contrary, not
to be capable of misery, is the highest happiness), they are
miserable by capability. Therefore, He who has freed them
from possible misery by His own election, has bestowed mercy
on them; in reference to which they are called "elect angels"
by Paul. (1 Tim. v, 21.) We may here merely refer to the fact
that the word mercy (the Latin term misericordia being used
in a more contracted sense) does not necessarily suppose
misery, as will be seen by a reference to the original
languages, the Hebrew and Greek, in which the men of God
wrote. The Hebrews expressed that idea by two words dsj and
symjr neither of which had reference properly and necessarily
to misery e]leov of the Greeks does not necessarily suppose
misery, if we regard the common usage of the Scriptures; for
parents exercise it towards their children, though happy and
free from misery. In the third place, it is by no means more
true that "he can exercise justice only in reference to
sinners." For he who renders to each his due, exercises
justice: but God would clearly not be just if he did not
render their due to the righteous as well as to the
unrighteous. For even towards Adam, if he had remained
righteous, God would have exercised justice both by the
bestowment of his own reward upon him, analogous to his
righteousness, and by that supernatural gift, analogous to
his own power and grace, which He adumbrated to man by the
symbol of the tree of life. It was possible that God should
exercise justice in reference even to those who were not
sinners. But concerning judgment to death, the case is
different. From what has already been said, we readily
conclude in reference to the rest. In reference to the word
ordain, we shall speak under the sixth proposition.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO HIS THIRD PROPOSITION
I might show that the sentiments of Calvin and Beza were well
and fully set forth by me in those words, by many passages
selected from their writings. For though sometimes, when they
make mention of adoption, and non-adoption, which is its
contrary by logical division and opposition, yet they do not
set forth their views, as it was explained by you in answer
to my first proposition, and as you have just explained it in
these words: "God, therefore, from eternity, determined to
illustrate most wisely his own glory by the adoption of
these, and the preterition or non-adoption of those, with the
introduction of mercy and justice." For in two respects there
is a departure in those words from their sentiment.
In the first place, because they do not consider that the
illustration of the glory of God is effected immediately by
the adoption of these and the non-adoption or preterition of
those, but by a declaration of mercy and justice, which are
unfolded in the acts of adoption or election, and of non-
adoption or reprobation. It seems proper, according to the
rule of demonstration, that this order should be preserved;
the glory of God consists in the declaration of the
attributes of God; the attributes of God are illustrated by
acts suitable to those attributes.
Secondly, mercy and justice are not said by them to be
introduced into the decree of predestination and reprobation.
For those words signify that God, according to other
attributes of his nature, decreed the adoption of these and
the non-adoption of those, to the illustration of his own
glory, in which deed he used also mercy and justice for the
execution of that decree, and indeed with the condition of a
change in the object. But this was not their view, but it was
as I have already set it forth, namely, "God determined from
eternity to illustrate his own glory by mercy and justice:
since the glory of God can be neither acknowledged nor
celebrated, unless it be declared by his mercy and his
justice. But they consider mercy the appropriate cause of
adoption, but justice the cause of non-adoption or
reprobation, and they regard his purpose of illustrating both
as the whole cause of predestination, that is, of election
and reprobation; for they divide predestination into these
parts or species. Therefore in my statement less was ascribed
to mercy and justice in that decree than those authors think
ought to be ascribed to those attributes, and than they do
ascribe to them in the explanation of their entire view. Nor
is it with justice denied that it is a part of their
sentiment that mercy and justice can only be exercised in
fact in reference to actual sinners. For they assert this
most clearly, not indeed restricting the word justice to
punitive justice, which, indeed, is my view, as is evident
from my sixth proposition, and I think that this can be
understood from them. I will adduce a few passages from many.
Beza (adversus calumnias Nebulonis, ad art. 2) "God, having
in view the creation of man, to declare the glory both of his
mercy and of his justice, as the result showed, made Adam in
his own image, that is, holy and innocent; since as he is
good, nothing depraved can be created by him. But they must
be depraved on whom he determines to have mercy, and they
also whom he justly determines to condemn." From this passage
I quoted the words in which I stated this view. The same Beza
again says (lib. 1, quest. et reap. fol. 126, in 8,) "Since
God had decreed from eternity, as can be learned from events,
to manifest in the highest degree his own glory in the human
race, which manifestation might consist partly in the
exercise of mercy, partly in the demonstration of hatred
against sin, he made a man inwardly and outwardly pure, and
endowed with right understanding and will, but susceptible of
change. He, as supremely good, could not and would not indeed
create any evil thing, and yet unless evil had entered into
the world, there would have been no place for mercy or
judgment." He expresses himself, in the plainest manner
possible, in his conference with Mombelgartes; "Let us," says
Beza "lay down these principles. God, an infinitely wise
architect, and whose wisdom is unlimited, when He determined
to create the world, and especially the human race had a
certain proposed end, &c. For the eternal and immutable
purpose of God was antecedent to all causes, because He
decreed in Himself from eternity to create all men for His
own glory. But the glory of God is neither acknowledged nor
celebrated, unless his mercy and justice is declared.
Therefore, He made an eternal and immutable decree by which
He destined some particular individuals, of mere grace, to
eternal life, and some, by an act of judgment, to eternal
damnation, that He might declare His mercy in the former, but
His justice in the latter. Since God had proposed this end to
Himself in the creation of men, it was necessary that He
should also devise the way and the means by which He could
attain that end, that His mercy and His justice might be
equally manifested. For since mercy presupposes misery, it
can neither have place nor be declared where misery does not
exist, it was then necessary that man should be created, that
in him there might be a place for the mercy of God. This
could not be found without preceding misery. So also, since
justice presupposes crime, without which justice cannot be
exercised, (for where there is no crime, there justice has no
place,) it was necessary that man should be so created that,
without the destruction of his nature, he might be a fit
subject, that in him God might declare His own justice. For
He could not declare His own justice in man unless He should
have destined him to eternal damnation. Therefore, God
proposed, &c." These things were published by James Andreas,
but acknowledged by Beza, for in his answer to that
discussion he does not say that views, not his own, are
attributed to him. You see, therefore, that I have adapted
the proper object to those attributes according to their
opinion, which sentiment they without doubt think that they
have derived from the Scripture; in which this is fixed that
God cannot justly punish one who is not a sinner; in which
also the same author will deny that the word mercy is so used
that, when attributed to God, it may signify salvation from
possible misery; since, in their view, it every where
designates salvation from the misery which the sinner has
merited, and which either has been or can be justly inflicted
by the Deity. But I shall not wish to contend strenuously
that it is not possible that mercy should be exercised
towards those not actually miserable, and I can easily assent
to those things which you have said concerning that subject,
if they may have the meaning which I will give in my own
words, namely, that all creatures, even angels and men, when
compared with God, are miserable, misery being here taken for
non felicity, not for that which is opposed to felicity in a
privative sense, but for that which is opposed to it in a
contradictory sense; as nothing more is proved by the reason
from analogy. In comparison with God they are not just,
therefore, in comparison with him they are not happy. For
there are three antecedents, each of which has its
consequent; just, unjust, not just; happy, unhappy or
miserable, not happy. From justice results happiness, from
injustice misery, from non-justice non-felicity.
But creatures as such can be compared with God, both in
relation of the limit whence they proceed, and in relation to
the limit to which they advanced by the Deity. In relation to
the latter, angels and men exist, are just, are happy; in
relation to the former, they do not exist, are not just, are
not happy, since they come from nothing and can therefore be
returned to nothing. But in this relation they cannot be
called unjust or unhappy, since the limit, from which they
were brought forward, is opposed, by contradiction, not by
privation, to the limit to which they are borne by the divine
goodness, or more briefly, since they are brought from
possibility to actuality, which possibility and actuality are
contradictory not privative, one of the other. Now, since
they consist of possibility and actuality, it is not possible
that they, if deserted by divine support, should return to
nothing, but it is necessary that they, if thus deserted,
should return to nothing. It is moreover possible that,
continuing to exist by the divine power, yet being left to
themselves and having power to decide their own course, they
should, in their second action, not live according to the
dictates of justice, by which they were governed in their
first action, but do something contrary to it, and by this
act become unrighteous and sinners, and, having become such,
should put on the habit of unrighteousness, the habit of
righteousness having been removed, either as an effect or on
the ground of demerit, so that they would become miserable
first by desert, next by act, and finally by habit. But if
God should hinder them from deserving that misery that is
from sinning and becoming actually miserable, I do not see
why that act may not be ascribed to mercy since it originates
in the desire to prevent misery, which desire pertains to
mercy. I concede, indeed, that this is so, and that it is not
therefore absolutely true that mercy can only be exercised
towards actual sinners. But I wish that it should be observed
that mercy is not used, in that sense, by Calvin and Beza,
and indeed if mercy, thus understood, should be substituted
for the same affection, as it is used by Calvin and Beza, the
whole relation and description of the decree would be
changed. I remark also that mercy, understood as you present
it, does not come under consideration when the subject
treated of is the predestination of men: for it is not
exercised by God towards man, as one who has not been saved
from possible misery by the divine predestination. Finally,
it should also be considered that the relation between mercy
understood in the latter, and mercy understood in the former
sense is such that both cannot concur to the salvation of a
man. For if there be occasion for the mercy, which saves from
possible misery, there can be no place for that which
delivers from actual misery, as the opportunity for the
exercise of its peculiar functions is taken away, or, rather,
precluded by the former; if on the contrary the mercy, which
frees from actual misery, is necessary, the other does not
act, and so the former excludes the latter in the relation of
both cause and effect, and the latter consequently excludes
the former, not succeeding after the fulfillment of its
office, but existing by the necessity of its own action, as
the man has failed of the former.
We remark in reference to justice that it is indeed very true
that it can have place, and can be exercised towards those
who are not sinners. For it is the rewarder not only of
sinful, but of righteous conduct. But why may it not be
deduced from these things, so considered by you, that the
necessary existence of sin cannot be inferred even from the
necessary declaration of the mercy and justice of God, since
both, considered in a certain light, can be exercised towards
those who are not sinners. In this way the order of
predestination established by Calvin and Beza is wholly
overthrown. But as mercy, saving from possible misery, and
justice, rewarding virtue do not need the pre-existence of
actual misery and sin, yet it is certain that mercy, freeing
from actual misery and justice, punishing sin, can only be
exercised towards the actually miserable and sinful. But
Calvin and Beza every where use the terms, mercy and justice,
in this sense, when they discuss the decree of predestination
and probation. Since, also, mercy and justice, understood in
the former sense, have no place in the predestination and
reprobation of men, but only as they are received in the
former signification, mercy, saving from possible misery and
justice, rewarding good deeds, might be properly omitted in
the discussion of the predestination and reprobation of men,
though I do not deny that such a consideration may have its
appropriate and by no means small advantages. Since we have
entered on the consideration of mercy and justice, we may, if
you have leisure and are so disposed, continue it for a short
time, comparing each with the other, for the illustration of
the subject which we now discuss, in reference first to the
object of both, then to the order in which each acts on its
own object.
Mercy and justice, the former saving from possible misery,
the latter rewarding good conduct can be exercised towards
one and the same object, as is manifest in the case of the
elect angels, who are saved from possible misery, and have
obtained from the divine goodness the reward of right
conduct. But that same mercy cannot be exercised in reference
to the same object with punitive justice. For whatever is
worthy of the act of punitive justice is not saved from
possible misery. The mercy, also which saves from actual
misery is in this respect similar to the other kind of mercy,
that it cannot concur in respect to the same object with
punitive justice; but it is to be considered whether and how,
like the other mercy, it can be exercised at the same time
with the justice which rewards goodness. We, indeed see, that
in the Scriptures the reward of a good deed is promised to
those who have obtained mercy in Christ, and is in fact
bestowed upon them, but the reward, though it may be of
justice, is yet not of justice, understood in that sense in
which justice is regarded, when rewarding a good deed,
according to the promise of the law, and of debt; for the
former remuneration is the grace of God in Jesus Christ, who
is made unto us of God, righteousness, (justice) and
sanctification. Justice, in one case bestowing a remuneration
of debt, may be called legal, but, in the other, of grace,
may not inappropriately be called evangelical, the union of
which with the mercy saving from actual misery has been
effected in a wonderful manner by God in Jesus Christ, our
High Priest, and expiatory sacrifice. The object, then, of
punitive justice is essentially and materially different from
the object of mercy considered in either light, and of
justice remunerating right conduct.
But the object of mercy, saving from possible misery, is
different in its formal relation from the object of mercy,
saving from actual misery, for the former is a creature,
righteous and considered in his state as it was by creation,
but the latter is a sinful creature, and fallen from his
original state into misery by transgression. Of those two
classes both of mercy and justice, the former in each case is
to be excluded from the decree of the predestination and
reprobation of men, namely, mercy-saving from possible misery
and justice, rewarding goodness from a legal promise, but the
latter, preside over that decree, namely, mercy-saving from
actual misery, over predestination, and punitive justice over
reprobation. Now let us examine the order, according to which
each, compared by themselves and among themselves, tends to
its own object. Mercy preventing misery and justice rewarding
goodness according to law, tending towards one subject, take
this order, that mercy should first perform its office, and
then justice discharge its functions. For the prevention of
sin, and therefore of misery, precedes any good deed, and
therefore precedes the reward of that good deed, therefore,
also, the misery which saves from actual misery precedes the
justice which rewards a good deed, of grace. For that mercy
not only takes away the guilt and dominion of sin, but
creates in the believer a habit of righteousness, by which a
good deed is produced, to be compensated of grace by the
reward. But concerning mercy-saving from actual misery, which
is the administration of predestination, and punitive justice
which is the cause of reprobation, what judgment shall we
form? We will say that both tend, at the same moment, to
their own object, but we will [make] consider the former as
an antecedent in the order of nature. For though he, who
elects, in the very fact that he elects, reprobates also the
non-elect, yet the act of election is antecedent in the order
of nature, just as an affirmative is in the order of nature
prior to negation. From which we infer (of this we will speak
hereafter) that the decree to leave man to the decision of
his own destiny, and to permit the fall, does not belong to
the decree of reprobation, since it is prior to and more
ancient than the decree of predestination.
I wish that this order may be considered with somewhat more
diligence and at greater length, for it will open before us a
way of knowing some other things, different from and yet by
no means wholly foreign to the subject now under discussion.
If the mercy, which bestows grace and life, holds the prior
relation to this decree, and the justice, which denies grace
and inflicts death, the posterior relation in the order of
nature, though not of time, then it is still more to be
considered, whether the object of this decree is adequately
and with sufficient accuracy described by the term sinner; or
whether something else ought not also to be added, which may
so limit the object, that it may be made adequate to the
decree which originated in such mercy and justice, and may be
in harmony with it, namely the nature of the object thus made
adequate, and, in its own capability, tending to its own
peculiar and appropriate object. If any one thinks that the
functions of justice towards sin and the sinner are prior to
those of mercy and that the rendering of it's due punishment
to sin is prior by nature to the remission of the same to the
sinner, I wish he would attend diligently to two points.
First, that a two-fold action is attributed, by those who
discuss this matter, to justice, so far as it premises over
the decree of reprobation, or preterition and predamnation,
and this in harmony with the nature of the subject; the
former is negative, the latter affirmative, and in this order
that the negative precedes the affirmative. From this it
follows that if that negative act is posterior, in the order
of nature, to the affirmative act of predestination, as is
the case, then the functions of mercy must be prior; for from
mercy originates the affirmative act of predestination, which
is antecedent to the negative act of reprobation. SECONDLY,
that the punishment, due to sin, is by this decree destined
for no one, unless so as it is not removed by mercy; and in
this respect, though justice may in its own right claim the
punishment of the sinner, yet it exacts that punishment,
according to the decree of predomination which is made by
justice, in view not of the fact that it is due to the
sinner, but of the fact that it has not been remitted to him
of mercy; else all men universally would be predamned, since
they all have deserved punishment. Hence, this ought also to
be considered whether the justice, which is the
administratrix of the decree of reprobation or predamnation
is revealed according to the Law or the Gospel, of legal
rigor or softened by some mercy and forbearance. If mercy,
the administratrix of predestination is revealed according to
the Gospel, as is true, it seems from what has already been
said, that justice the opposite of mercy, which is prior to
it, in the order of nature, should be also revealed according
to the Gospel. If any one thinks that these views are vain
and useless, let him consider that what is said in the
Scripture concerning legal righteousness is not useless --
"The man which doeth those things shall live by them," (Rom.
x, 5,) and "cursed is every one that continueth not in all
things which are written in the book of the law to do them."
(Gal. iii, 10.)
Let him also consider what is said concerning Evangelical
righteousness, "He that believeth in the Son hath everlasting
life, (John iii, 36,) and "He that believeth not is
condemned. (John iii, 18.) I wish that these things may be
considered thoroughly by the thoughtful, and I ask a
suspension of their decision until they have accurately
weighed the matter.
FOURTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The second theory is this -- God, from eternity, considering
men in their original native condition determined to raise
some to supernatural felicity and ordained for the same
persons supernatural means which are necessary, sufficient
and efficacious to secure that felicity to them, to the
praise of his glorious grace; and to pass by others, and to
have them in their natural state, and not to bestow on them
those supernatural and efficacious means, to declare the
liberty of his own goodness; and that he reprobated the same
individuals, so passed by, whom he foresaw as not continuing
in their original condition, but falling from it of their own
fault, that is, he prepared punishment for them to the
declaration of his own justice.
THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FOURTH PROPOSITION
This theory is stated, in these words, not more nearly in
accordance with the sentiment of its authors than the
preceding. For in the first place, I do not remember that I
have read these words in Thomas Aquinas, or others: in the
second place, if any have used this phraseology, they have
not used it in that sense, as shall be proved under the sixth
proposition. But in the phrase supernatural felicity,
understand th<n uiJoqesian, the adoption of the sons of God
with all its adjuncts and consectaries. After the words
"declare the liberty of his own goodness," add, if you
please, "and the perfection of his manifold wisdom." The word
reprobation is to be taken catachrestically, as we have
before observed. I should prefer that words should be
variously distinguished in referring to matters which are
distinct.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE FOURTH PROPOSITION
If I have stated this second theory as nearly in accordance
with the sentiments of its authors as in the preceding case,
it is well; but I fear on this point since I do not, with
equal confidence claim a knowledge of the second. Yet I think
that I have derived the explanation of this from the Theses
discussed under your direction in which I recognize your
style and mode of discussion. Thus in Thesis 10 of those
which were discussed, Coddaeus being the respondent, is this
statement. "Human beings" (that is, one part of the material
of predestination, as is stated in Thesis 7, of the same
disputation concerning predestination) "are creatures in a
condition of nature (which can effect nothing natural,
nothing divine) to be exalted above nature, and to be
transmitted to a participation of divine things by the
supernatural energy of the Deity." The same assertion is
found in the Thesis 4 of your tenth theological disputation,
in which the subject of the predestination of human beings
alone is discussed, as is the case with the first Thesis,
that no one may think that things, said in common concerning
the predestination of angels and of men, ought to be
expressed in general terms. which might afterwards be
attributed specially to each of these classes, according to
their different condition to the elect angels, an exaltation
from that nature, in which they were created by the Deity,
but to elect human beings on elevation from their corrupt
nature into which they fell, of their own fault. If, however,
this matter is thus understood, there is now no discrepancy
between us in this respect.
But I think that it is evident from those words of your
Theses that human beings, considered in their original
condition are the material of predestination, or its adequate
object. Human beings I say in their original condition, both
in the fact that nothing supernatural or divine has been
bestowed upon them, and that they have not yet fallen into
sin.
Considered in their original condition, I say again, in view
of the fact that even if they have either supernatural and
divine gifts or sin, they are not considered with reference
to these by Him who determined to perform any certain act
concerning them, which is equivalent to an assertion that
neither supernatural or divine gifts, nor sin, held, in the
mind of Him who considered them the position of a formal
cause in the object, From these words I deduce this
conclusion:
Human beings, considered in their natural state which can
admit nothing supernatural or divine, are the object or
material of predestination;-But human beings, considered in
their natural condition, are here as beings considered in
that natural state, which can do nothing supernatural or
divine, or rather they are the same in definition;-
Therefore, human beings in their natural state are the object
and material of predestination, that is, according to the
views embraced in your Theses. The Major Proposition is
contained in the Thesis. For if the will or decree of God in
reference to the exaltation of men from such a state of
nature to a state above nature is predestination, then men,
considered in that natural state, are the true material of
predestination; since the acts of God, both the internal,
which is the decree concerning the exaltation of certain
human beings, and the external, which is the exaltation
itself, (as it ought to be, if we wish to consider the mere
object) leave to us man in his mere natural state which can
do nothing supernatural or divine.
If it is said that, in these words, the condition of sin is
not excluded, since even sinners may be raised from their
corrupt nature, I reply, in the first place, that this cannot
be the meaning of those words, both because it is not
necessary that it should be said of such a nature that can do
nothing supernatural or divine, for this is understood from
the qualifying term, when it is spoken of as "corrupt," and
because, in the definition of preterition, Thesis 15, that
act, by which the pure nature of some creatures is not
confirmed, is attributed to preterition, which preterition is
the leaving of some created beings in their natural
condition. I reply, in the second place, that there is here
an equivocation in the definition, and that the decree is
equivocal and only true on the condition of its division, of
which I will say more hereafter. The Minor is true, for this
is evident from the reciprocal and equivalent relation of the
antecedent and consequent to each other. But what pertains to
predestination is enunciated in these words, "to be exalted
above nature, and to be transferred to a participation of
divine things by the supernatural energy of the Deity, which
divine things pertain to grace and glory," as in your Thesis
9. It is not doubtful that my words, in which I have
described the second theory, are in harmony with these
statements, but if any one thinks that there is a discrepancy
because, in your Theses, grace and glory are united, and that
it can be understood from my words that I designed to
indicate that glory first, and grace afterwards, are prepared
for men in predestination, I would inform him that I did not
wish to indicate such an idea, but that I wished to set
forth, in those words, what the predestinate obtain from
predestination.
I come now to the second part, which refers to preterition,
and in reference to this, your Theses make this statement
"Preterition is the act of the divine will, by which God,
from eternity, determined to leave some of his creatures in
their natural state, and not to communicate to them that
supernatural grace by which their nature might be preserved
uncorrupt, or, having become corrupt, might be restored to
the declaration of the freedom of his own goodness." Also in
your theological axioms Concerning Nature and Grace, axiom
44. "To this purpose of election in Christ is opposed the
eternal purpose of non-election or preterition, according to
which some are passed by as to be left in their own natural
state." These are my words: "but he determined to pass by
some and to leave them in their natural state, and not to
impart to them those supernatural and especially those
efficacious means, to declare the freedom of his own
goodness." He, who compares our statements, will see that one
and the same sentiment is expressed in different words. For
"supernatural grace" and "supernatural means" signify the
same thing, "the grace by which nature, when uncorrupt, might
be strengthened, and when corrupt, might be restored," is
what I have described in the phrase "efficacious means." For
"efficacious means" either confirm nature when uncorrupt or
restore it when corrupt; as sufficient means are those which
have the power to confirm or restore. Moreover the end, which
I have proposed, is expressed in your second Thesis, "to the
praise of his glorious grace," and again, in the second
Thesis of the tenth disputation, "to the praise of his most
glorious grace," and in Thesis 15 of the disputation
concerning predestination, in which Coddaeus is the
respondent, you have stated the end of preterition to be "the
declaration of the freedom of the divine goodness, with no
additional remark; yet I do not object to what you wish to
add in this place, "the perfection of his manifold wisdom."
However, the freedom of goodness and the perfection of wisdom
cannot be at the same moment engaged in the acts of
predestination and preterition. For the office of wisdom
takes precedence, in pointing out all possible methods of
illustrating the glory of God, and that which may especially
conduce to the glory of God. But the freedom of his goodness
is subsequent in its operation, in making choice of the mode
of illustration, and in carrying it out into the action, in
the exercise (so to speak) of power. In reference to the
third part, I make the same remark, namely, concerning
reprobation, or the preparation of punishment, that I have
also explained it correctly according to your view, for thus
is reprobation or the preparation for punishment defined in
Thesis seventeen. "It is the act of the divine pleasure, by
which God from eternity determined for the declaration of his
own justice to punish his creatures, who should not continue
in their original state, but should depart from God, the
author of their origin, by their own deed and depravity. But
I have used the same words with only this addition, "the same
individuals, so passed by," by which addition I have only
done that which was made requisite by the arrangement and
distinction in character which I have adopted; for those, for
whom punishment is prepared, are not different from those who
are passed by, though punishment was prepared for them, not
because they are included in the latter class, the passed by,
but because they were foreseen as those who would be sinners.
I cannot, therefore, yet persuade myself that this sentiment
has been incorrectly set forth by me. If I shall see it
hereafter, I will freely acknowledge it, though this may not
be of so much importance.
This indeed I desire, that whether the first view, or the
second, or any other view whatever be presented, it may be
clearly and strongly proved from the Scriptures, and be
defended, with accuracy, from all objections. In reference to
the word "reprobate," I have spoken before in reply to your
second answer, and I am prepared to use it hereafter
according to your later explanation, as you have given it in
your last answer. I should perhaps have so used it, in my
former letter, if I had found it so used by yourself in your
own writings, for I know that equivocal meaning has always
been the mother of error, and that it ought to be carefully
avoided in all serious discussions.
FIFTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The third theory is that God determined of his grace to free
some of the human race, fallen, and lying in the "lump" (Rom.
ix, 21 ) of perdition and corruption, to the declaration of
his Mercy; but to leave in the same "lump," or at least to
damn, on account of final impenitence, others, to the
illustration both of the freedom of his gratuitous grace
towards the vessels of glory and mercy, and of his justice
towards the vessels of dishonour and wrath. I do not state
these views, that I may instruct you in reference to them,
but that you may see whether I have correctly understood
them, and may direct and guide me, if I am, in any respect,
in error.
THE REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE FIFTH PROPOSITION
This theory agrees with the first and second in all respects,
if you make this one exception, that, in the latter case, the
election and reprobation of men is said to have been made
after the condition of the fall and of our sin, in the former
case without reference to the fall, and to our sin. But
neither of them seems properly and absolutely to pertain
altogether to the relation of election and reprobation since
all admit that the cause of election and reprobation is
placed in the consent only of the Being, who alone
predestinates. For, whether it is affirmed that election and
reprobation are made from among human beings in their
original state, or from those, who are fallen and sinful,
there was not any cause in them, who, in either state, were
equal in all respects, according to nature, but only in the
will and liberty of God electing, who separated these from
those, and adopted them unto himself "of his own will"
boulhqeiv as James says (ch. 1, vers. 18,) or according to
the counsel of his will. But yet this circumstance is worthy
of notice, and we will, hereafter in its own place, give our
opinion concerning it, according to the Scriptures, as there
will be an appropriate place for speaking of this subject.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE FIFTH PROPOSITION
The circumstance of sin and of the fall is of very great
importance in this whole subject, not indeed as a cause but
as a quality, requisite in the object, without a
consideration of which I do not think that election or
reprobation was or could have been made by the Deity, which
matter we will hereafter more fully discuss. There are also
many men learned, and not unversed in the sacred Scriptures,
who say that God could not be defended from the charge of
sin, if he had not in that decree, considered, man as a
sinful being. But I cannot, for a two-fold reason, assent to
your denial that the formal cause of the object properly
pertains to the subject of that decree, because all fully
agree in admitting that the cause of the decree is placed in
Him, who predestinates. First, because the formal cause of
the object, and not the cause of the act only, is necessarily
required for the definition of that act. Secondly, because it
is possible that the cause of the act may be of such a
nature, that, in its own act, it cannot exert influence on
the object which is presented to it, unless it be furnished
with that formal relation, which I think is the fact in this
case, and will prove it. Nor is there any reason why it
should be said that the freedom of God, in the act of
predestination, is limited though the circumstance of sin may
be stated to be of necessity presupposed to that decree.
But since frequent mention has been made, in this whole
discussion of divine freedom, it will not be out of place to
refer to it at somewhat greater length, and to affix to it
its limits from the Scripture, according to the declaration
of God himself. The subject of freedom is the will, its
object is an act. In respect to the former, it is an
affection of the will, according to which it freely tends
towards its one object; in respect to the latter, it is the
power and authority over its own act. This freedom is, in the
first place and chiefly, in God, and it is in rational
creatures by a communication made by God. But freedom is
limited, or, which is the same thing, it is effected that any
act should not be in the power of the agent in three ways, by
natural and internal necessity, by external force and
coaction, and by the interposition of law. God can be
compelled by no one to an act, he can be hindered by no one
in an act, hence, this freedom is not limited by that kind of
restriction. Law also cannot be imposed on God, as He is the
highest, the Supreme Lawgiver. But He can limit Himself, by
His own act. There are, then, but two causes which effect
that any act should not be in the power of God; the former is
the nature of God, and whatever is repugnant to it is
absolutely impossible; the latter is any previous act of God,
to which another act is opposed. Examples of the former are
such as these; God cannot lie, because He is, by nature,
true. He cannot sin or commit injustice, because he is
justice itself. Examples of the latter are these; God cannot
effect that what has previously occurred may not have
occurred, for, by an antecedent act, he has effected that it
should be; if now can effect that it may not have been, He
will destroy his own power and will. God could not but grant
to David that his seed should sit on his throne, for this was
promised to David, and confirmed by an oath. He cannot forget
the labour of love, performed by the saints, so as not to
bestow upon it a reward, for He has promised that reward. If,
then, any one wishes to inquire whether any act belongs to
the free will and the power of God, he must see whether the
nature of God may restrict that act, and if it is not so
restricted, whether the freedom of God is limited by any
antecedent act, if he shall find that the act is not
restricted in either mode, then he may conclude that the act
pertains to the divine power; but it is not to be immediately
inferred that it has been or will be performed by God, since
any act which depends on His free will, can be suspended by
Him, so as not to be performed. It is also to be observed
here that many things are possible for God, in respect to
this absolute power, which are not possible in respect to
justice. It is possible in respect to His power that He
should punish one who has not sinned, for who could resist
Him, but it is not possible, in respect to justice, for it
would be at variance with the Divine justice. God can do
whatever He wills with His own, but He cannot will to do with
His own that which he cannot do of right. For His will is
restricted by the limits of justice. Nor is the creature, in
such a sense, in the power of God, the Creator, that he can
do, of right, in reference to it, whatever he might do of His
absolute power, for the power of God over the creature
depends, not on the infinity of the Divine essence, but on
that communication by which he has communicated to us our
limited essence. This permits that God should deprive us of
that being which he has given us without merit on our part,
but does not permit that He should inflict misery upon us
without our demerit. For to be miserable is worse than not to
be, as happiness is better than mere existence. And,
therefore, there is not the same liberty to inflict misery on
the creature without demerit, as to take away being without
previous sin. God takes away that which He gave, and He can
do as He wills, with His own, but He cannot inflict misery,
because the creature does not so far belong to God. The
potter cannot, from the unformed lump, make a man to
dishonour and condemnation, unless the man has previously
made himself worthy of punishment and dishonour by his own
transgression.
SIXTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I am not pleased with the first theory because God could not,
in his purpose of illustrating his glory by mercy and
punitive justice, have reference to man as not yet made, nor
indeed to man as made, and considered in his natural
condition. In which sentiment I think that I have yourself as
my precedent, for, in discussing predestination, you no where
make mention of mercy, but every where of grace, which
transcends mercy, as exercised towards creatures, continuing
in their original, natural state, while it coincides with
mercy in being occupied with the sinner, but when you treat
of the passed by and the reprobate, you mention justice, and
only in the case of such. Besides, according to that opinion,
God is, by necessary consequence, made the author of the fall
of Adam and of sin, from which imputation he is not freed by
the distinctions of the act and the evil in the act, of
necessity and coaction, of the decree and its execution, of
efficacious and permissive decree, as the latter is explained
by the authors of this view, in harmony with it, nor a
different relation of the divine decree and of human nature,
nor by the addition of the proposed end, namely that the
whole might redound to the divine glory, &c.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SIXTH PROPOSITION
There are three things to be laid down in order, before I
come to the argumentation itself. First, in reference to the
meaning of the first view; secondly, in reference to its
agreement with the second and third; thirdly, in reference to
a few fundamental principles necessary to the clearness of
this question. In the first place, then, if that view be
fully examined, we shall perceive with certainty that its
authors did not regard man absolutely and only before his
creation, &c., but in a general view and with a universal
reference to that and to all times. For though they make the
act of election and predestination, (as one which exists in
the Deity,) as from eternity, in reference to the creation of
man, yet they teach that its object, namely mankind, was
predestinated without discrimination, and in common, and that
God, in the act of predestination, considered the whole human
race as various parts inwrought by the eternal decree into
its execution. Thus Beza, very clearly on Ephes. i, 4, says,
"Christ is presented to us as mediator. Therefore, the fall
must, in the order of causes, necessarily precede in the
purpose of God, but previous to the fall there must be a
creation in righteousness and holiness." So afterwards, on
ch. iv, 24, "As God has made for Himself a way both for
saving, by his mercy, those whom He had elected in Christ,
and for justly punishing those who, having been conceived in
sin, should remain in their depravity," &c.
This view he also learnedly presents in a note on verses 4
and 5. Thus those authors embrace the first, and, at the same
time, the second and third theories.
But this first theory has an agreement with the second and
also with the third, indeed it is altogether the stone,
though in appearance it seems otherwise, if you attend to the
various objects of these theories. For while the authors of
the first regard man universally, in the argument of
predestination, election and reprobation, the authors of the
second have made a restriction to the case of man before
transgression only, and this with the design to show that, in
predestination, the cause of election and of reprobation was
only in the being predestinating, which is very true. When
they assert, therefore, that the election of man was made
before his fall, they do not exclude the idea of the eternity
of that decree, but consider this to be sufficient if they
may establish the fact that eternal predestination, that is,
election and reprobation, was made by God, without reference
to sin, which the apostle has demonstrated in the example, by
no means obscure, of Jacob and Esau. (Rom. 9) The first,
therefore, differs from the second less in substance than in
the manner of speaking. But those, who adhere to the third
theory, have looked, properly speaking, not so much to the
cause of election and reprobation, as to the order of causes,
of which damnation is the consequence; which damnation, many
in former times, confounding with reprobation, that is, non-
election or predestination, exclaimed that the doctrine of
predestination was impious, and accused the servants of God,
as is most clearly evident from the writings of Augustine and
Fulgentius. The little book of Augustine, which he wrote in
answer to the twelve articles falsely charged against him,
most opportunely explains the matter. Neither those who
favour the second theory, therefore, nor those who favour the
third, have attacked the first, but have rather presented in
a different mode, parts of the same argument, distinct in
certain respects. It seems then that, as to the sum of the
whole matter, they do not differ so much as some suppose, but
have attributed to parts of its execution, (to all of which
the decree has reference,) certain circumstances, not indeed
ineptly in respect to the decree.
Let us now come to certain fundamental principles necessary
to this doctrine, by the application of which its truth may
be confirmed, and those things which seem to operate against
it, may be removed. These seem to me capable of being
included under four heads, the essence of God, His knowledge,
His actions, and their causes, to each of which we will here
briefly refer. We quote first from Mal. iii, 6, "I am the
Lord, I change not;" also from James i, 17, "with whom is no
variableness, neither shadow of turning," and many similar
passages. The truth of this fundamental principle is very
certain; from it is deduced the inevitable necessity of this
conclusion, that in the Deity nothing is added, nothing is
taken away, nothing is changed in fact or relation; for such
have philosophers themselves decided to be the nature of
eternity; but God is eternal. Also that God is destitute of
all movement in His essence, because He is immortal; in His
power because He is pure and simple action; and in intellect,
because "all things are naked and opened unto His eyes," and
He sees all and each of them eternally, by a single glance;
in His will and purpose, for He "is not a man that he should
lie, neither the son of a man that He should repent," (Num.
xxiii, 19,) but He is always the same; and lastly in
operation, for the things which vary are created, while the
Lord remains without Variation, and has in Himself the form
of immutable conception of all those things which exist and
are done mutably in time. The second fundamental principle is
that the knowledge of the eternal, immutable and infinite
mind is eternal, immutable and infinite and knows things to
be known as such, and those to be done as such, (gwstw~v)
eternally, immutably and infinitely. God has a knowledge
practically (praktikw~v) of all evil as a matter of mere
knowledge and finally of all things of all classes, (which
consist of things the highest, the intermediate, and the
lowest of things good and evil,) energetically
(ejnerghtikw~v) according to his own divine mode. There is a
three-fold relation in all science, if comparison is made
with the thing known according to the measure of the being
who knows or takes cognizance of it; inferior, equal, and
superior, or supereminent, which may be made clear by an
illustration from sight. I see the sun, but the light of my
vision is inferior to its light; I take cognizance of natural
objects, but as owls do of the light of the sun, as Aristotle
says. Here is the inferior mode of knowledge, which never
exists in God. In him alone exists equal knowledge, and that
knowledge which is supereminent after the divine mode, for He
has equal knowledge of Himself; He is that which He knows
Himself to be, and he knows adequately what He is. All other
things He knows in the supereminent mode, and has them
present to himself from eternity; if not, there would be two
very grievous absurdities, not to mention others; one, that
something might be added to the Deity, but that nothing can
be added to eternity; the other, that knowledge could not
belong to God univocally as the source of all knowledge. But
nature herself teaches that in every class of objects there
is some one thing which they call univocal, from which are
other things in an equivocal sense; as, for example, things
which are hot, are made so by fire. Here the fire is hot
univocally, other things equivocally. God has knowledge
univocally, other beings equivocally; unless perhaps some may
be so foolish as to place a possessor of knowledge above the
Deity, which would be blasphemy. The third point is that the
actions of God in Himself are eternal, whether they pertain
to His knowledge or His essence, to His intellect, will or
power, and whatever else there may be of this nature; but
from Himself they flow, as it were, out of himself according
to His own mode, or according to that of the creature
according to his eternal decree, yet in an order which is his
own, but adapted to time. According to the mode of the Deity,
action is three-fold; that of creation, that of providence,
so far as it is immediate, and that of saving grace.
For many things proceed from the Deity without the work of
the creature, but they are things which He condescends to
accomplish mediately in nature and in grace. He does, as a
universal principle according to the mode of the creature,
and, as Augustine says, (lib. 7, de. civit. Dei. cap. 30) "He
so administers all things which He has created, as to permit
them also to exercise and to perform their own motions." But
"their own motions" pertain, some of them to nature and to
natural instinct and are directed invariably to one certain
and destined end, and others to the will in the rational
nature, which are directed to various objects either good or
evil, to those which are good, by the influence of the Deity,
to those which are evil by His influence only so far as they
are natural, and by his permission so far as they are
voluntary. From which it can be established in the best and
most sacred manner that all effects and defects in nature and
in the will of all kinds, depend on the providence of God;
yet in such a manner that, as Plato says, the creature is in
fault as the proximate cause, and "God is wholly without
blame."
The fourth point is that the first and supreme cause is so
far universal, that nothing else can be supposed or devised
to be its cause, since if it should depend on any other
cause, it could be neither the first nor the supreme cause,
but there must be another, either prior or superior, or equal
to it, so that neither would be absolutely first or supreme.
In the next place, all causes exist, either as principles or
derived from a principle; "as principles" nature and the will
exist; "from a principle" are mediate causes, from nature,
natural causes, and from the will voluntary causes. The mode
of the latter has been made two-fold by the Deity, necessary
and contingent. The necessary mode is that which cannot be
otherwise, and this is always good, in that it is necessary;
but the contingent is that which is as it happens to be,
whether good or bad. But here a three-fold caution is to be
carefully observed; first, that we hold these modes of the
causes to be from the things themselves and in themselves,
according to the relation of the principles from which they
proceed, for we speak now not of the immediate actions of
God, which are above these principles, as we have before
noticed, the natural causes, naturally, and the voluntary
causes, voluntarily; secondly, that we make both these modes
to be from God, but not in God; for mode in God is only
divine, that is, it surpasses the necessary and contingent in
all their modes; since there can occur to the Deity neither
necessity from any source, nor any contingency, but all
things in the Deity are essential, and in a divine mode;
thirdly, that we should consider those modes as flowing from
God to created things, in such a manner that none of them
should be reciprocated, and, as it were, flow back to God.
For God is the universal principle; and if any of these
should flow back to Him, He would from that fact cease to be
the principle. The reason, indeed, of this is manifest from a
comparison of natural examples, since this whole thing
proceeds not from natural power simply, in so far as it is
natural, but from the rational power of God. For it is a
condition of natural power, that it always produces one and
the same thing in its own kind, and that if it should produce
any thing, out of itself, it must produce something like
itself from the necessity of nature, or something unlike from
contingency. A pear tree produces a pear tree, a bull begets
one of its own species, and a human being begets a human
being; that is, in accordance with the distinct form which
exists in the nature of each thing.
But the operation of rational power, which is capable of all
forms, is of all kinds; to which three things must concur in
the agent, knowledge, power, and will. But the mode of those
things, which rational power effects, is not constituted
according to the mode of knowledge or power, but to the mode
of the will which actually forms the works, which virtually
are formed in the knowledge and power, as in a root; and this
from the freedom of the will and not from the necessity of
nature. If we would illustrate this by an example in divine
things, let it be this: the person of the Father begat the
person of the Son by nature, not by the will; God begat his
creatures by the will, not by nature. Therefore, the Son is
one with the Father, but created things are diverse from the
Deity, and are of all classes, degrees, and conditions, made
by His rational power voluntarily to demonstrate His manifold
wisdom. It is indeed nothing new that those things which are
of nature should be reciprocated and refluent, since many of
them are adequate, while many indeed are essential. But it is
a new idea that those things which are of the will should be
either reciprocated or made adequate. But if this is true in
nature, as it surely is, how much more must it be believed in
reference to God, if He be compared with created things. It
was necessary that these should be laid down by me, my
brother, rather copiously, that the sequence might be more
easily determined by certain limits.
You say that the first opinion does not please you, because
you think that God cannot, in his purpose to illustrate his
glory by mercy and punitive justice, have had reference to
the human race, considered as not yet made. You add, in
amplifying the idea, that God did not have reference even to
the human race, considered as created, and in his natural
condition. That we may each understand the other, I remark
that I understand by your phrase, "have reference to the
human race," to have man as the object or instead of the
object of action. But let us consider, if you please, or
rather, because it does please you and you request it, how
far your view is correct. Indeed, from the first fundamental
principle, which I have before laid down, (from which I trust
that you do not dissent,) I consider man as not yet created,
as created, as fallen, and, in fine, man in general, in
whatever light he may be viewed, to be the object of the
power, knowledge, will, mercy and justice of God; for if this
is granted, it will then be a complete sequence that there is
something, aside from common providence and the special
predestination of the sons of God, not an object of the
action of the Deity. Then there can be some addition to God,
if something can be added to His power, knowledge, will, &c.,
since the power, knowledge, will, &c., of God, is either God,
or a divine, that is, an infinite act. Whatever eternity
looks upon, if it does not look upon it eternally, it ceases
to be eternity; it loses the nature of eternity. If infinity
does not look on infinite things, in an infinite manner, if
it is limited by parts, it ceases to be infinity. To God and
His eternity, it is not is, was or shall be, but permanent
and enduring being, all at once, and without bounds. The
creature exists indeed in time, but is present to God, in a
peculiar, that is, a divine mode, which is above all
consideration of time, and from eternity to eternity; and
this is true not only of the creature itself, but of all its
feelings, whatever may be their origin. You will perhaps say
that this principle is acknowledged in the abstract, but that
here, as it is considered in the concrete, it has a different
relation, in that it has reference to mercy and punishment,
which can really be supposed only in view of antecedent
misery and sin. But these also, my brother, are present with
God as really as those; I do not say in the mode of nature,
which is fleeting, but in that of the Deity, which is
eternal, and in all respects surpasses nature. They, who
think differently, are in danger of denying the most absolute
and eternal essence of the Deity itself. We said also, under
proposition three, that in created things misery and sin may
be considered in relation to the act, the habit, or the
capability also in an absolute and in a relative sense. But
in God, (whom also Aristotle acknowledges to be "energy in
its most simple form," mercy and judgment exist by an eternal
act, and not by a temporal one; and contemplates the misery
and sin of man in all their modes, previous to all time, and
does not merely take cognizance of them as they occur in
time.
Lastly, that we may disclose the fountain of the matter, this
whole idea originates in the fact that the third fundamental
principle which, we before laid down, has not been
sufficiently regarded by those who so think. For since all
action is either internal or external, or both united
together. The internal is in God, as the maker: the external
is in the creature in its own time and place, and in the
thing made just as the house is formed in the mind of the
builder, before it is built materially (as it is said). But
when both acts are united and from them is produced a work,
numerically a unit, which they style a result, then the
internal act is the formal cause; the external act is the
material cause. Nothing in God is temporary; action in God is
alone eternal, for it is internal, it is therefore not
temporary; so, on the contrary, all things out of God are
temporary, therefore the external act is temporary, for it is
out of God. "What, then, do you prove?" you will ask. "That
God in his mercy and punitive justice acts with reference to
man as not yet created, or indeed as created, but considered
in his natural condition?" I indeed admit that whatever it
may be, which can be predicated of man, it can sacredly and
in truth be predicated of him. Yet I see that two statements
may be made of a milder character, and in harmony with the
words of Christ and the apostles, which are clearly
intimated, if not fully expressed by them; the former, that,
in this question, we must consider, not only the mode and the
consequent event (which some call, catechrestically, the
end), namely, mercy and punitive justice, also life and
eternal death, but the fountain and the genus from which
these result, and to which they hold the relation of species,
namely, grace and non-grace, adoption or filiation, and non-
adoption, which is reprobation, as we have said above (Prop.
2), the latter, that, in the argument of election, we must
propose not any particular relation of the human race, but
the common or universal relation so that we may consider him
as not yet created, as created, as fallen &c., yet present in
all respects in the conception of God, so that in this
election, grace towards mankind in the abstract, and mercy
towards man as fallen and sinful, which is of grace, concur,
but in reprobation, the absence of the grace of adoption and
the absence of mercy concur. If these statements are correct,
I do not see in what respect a pious mind can be offended.
For Christ says that they are blessed of God, the Father who
"inherit the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of
the world." (Matt. xxv, 34.)
And Paul says that God "hath blessed us with all spiritual
blessings in heavenly places in Christ, according as he hath
chosen us in him, before the foundation of the world, that we
should be holy and without blame before him in love, having
predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus
Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure, to the
praise, &c." (Ephes. i, 3-6.) "What then? is there no special
reference?" I answer that properly in the argument of
election and reprobation (for the matter of damnation is a
different one) there is no particular reference to men as a
cause, but our separation from the reprobate is wholly of the
mere will of God: in that God has separated and made a
distinction among men, whether not yet created, created or
fallen, and indeed among all things, present alike to Him,
yet equal in all respects by nature and condition, by
electing and predestinating some to the adoption of the sons
of God, and by leaving others to themselves and to their own
nature, not calling them to the adoption of the sons of God,
which is gratuitous and can be ascribed only to grace. This
grace, also, unique in itself only, may be two-fold in the
elect, for either it is grace simply, if you look even from
eternity on man without reference to the fall, which grace is
communicated to the elect, both angels and men, or it is
grace joined to mercy, or gracious mercy, when you come down
to the special matter of the fall and of sin. God dealt with
the angels according to His grace, with us according to His
grace and mercy, if you do not also have reference to
possible misery (of which we spoke, Prop. 3, and misery.) For
in this sense mercy is, and can, with propriety, be called a
divine work of grace. But what is there here which can be
reprehended in God? What is there, which can be denied by us?
God has bestowed human nature on all; it is a good gift; on
certain individuals he has bestowed mercy and the grace of
adoption; this is a better gift. He was not under obligation
to bestow either; He bestowed both, the former on all, the
latter on some men. But it may perhaps be said that
reprobation is one thing, and punitive justice and damnation,
which is under discussion, is another. Let that be conceded;
then there is agreement between us in reference to
reprobation, let us then consider punitive justice and
damnation. It is certain that, as the vessels of mercy which
God has prepared for His glory that He might demonstrate the
riches of His glory, are from eternity fully present to Him
in a divine and incomprehensible manner, without any motion
or change in Himself, so also "the vessels of wrath fitted to
destruction" that he might "show His wrath and make His power
known," (Rom. ix, 22,) are eternally presented to his eyes,
according to the mode of Deity. As vessels, therefore, they
are of God, for He is the maker of all things: as vessels of
wrath, they are of themselves and of their own sin, into
which they rush of their own will, for we all are by this
nature the children of wrath, (Ephes. ii, 3,) but not in our
original constitution. Moses affirms in Gen. i, 31, that "God
saw every thing that He had made, and, behold, it was very
good."
God, who is good, does not hate that which is good. All
things, at their creation, were good, therefore at their
creation, God did not hate any one of all created things: He
hates that which is alien from Himself, but not that which is
His own: He is angry with our fall and sin, not with His own
creation. By creation they are vessels; by the fall, they are
vessels of wrath, and fitted to destruction, as the most just
consequence of the fall and of depravity: for "neither shall
evil dwell with God." (Psalm v, 4.) As in the knowledge of
God is the good of the elect, with whom he deals in mercy, so
in the knowledge of God, as Isaiah says, chapter xlviii, 4
and 8, is the evil of others: the latter He hated and damned
from the period of His knowledge of it. But He knew and
foreknew from eternity; therefore, He hates and damns, and
even pre-damns from eternity.
As this is the relation of the former proposition, the
relation of the other also, added by way of amplification,
"nor indeed to man as made and considered in his original
condition," is also the same. For the consequence is plainly
deduced in the same mode, in reference to the latter as in
reference to the former; and you are not ignorant that
universal affirmations follow by fair deduction from that
which is general to that which is particular. God has
reference from eternity in election and reprobation to
mankind in general; therefore He had reference to man as not
created, created and fallen, and if there is any other term,
by which we can express our ideas. In the case of election,
and of reprobation, I say, He regarded man abstractly, with
whatever relation you may invest him. In the case of
damnation, He regarded the sinner, whom He had not given to
Christ in the election of grace, and whom He from eternity
saw as a sinner. Those holy men, therefore rightly stated
that the election and reprobation of man was made from
eternity: some considered them as having reference to man,
not yet created, others to man as not yet fallen, and yet
others to man as fallen: since in whatever condition you
regard him, a man is elected or reprobated without
consideration of his good or evil deeds. Nor indeed can it be
proved that they are at variance in this matter, unless a
denial of other conditions is shown in plain terms. For such
is the common statement by universal consent. In which, if
any one affirms that the supposition of one involves the
disavowal of the other he opposes the truth of natural logic
and common usage. But if such is the relation of election and
reprobation in a general sense, it is a complete sequence
that they who say that men, as not created, were elected,
speak very truly, since God elected them by the internal act,
before He did by the external act; and that they who affirm
that the election was of man, as created, have reference to
the principle of the external act; and so with the rest. But
all these things are not in reference to His act per se, but
in reference to the condition of the act, which does not
affect its substance. You say that in this opinion you have
me as a precedent since, in the discussion of predestination,
I "no where make mention of mercy, but every where of grace,
which transcends mercy." Indeed, my brother, I have never
thought that I should seem to exclude the other parts when I
might use the term grace, nor do I see how that inference can
be made from the phrase itself. Grace is the genus; it does
not exclude mercy, the species. Grace includes, so to speak,
the path for all times; therefore it includes that of mercy.
Nor do they, who mention mercy, in presenting the species,
exclude the genus, nor, in presenting a part, do they exclude
all which remains. And we, in presenting the genus, do not
deny the species, nor in presenting the whole, do we disavow
a part. Both are found in the Scriptures, which speak of
grace in respect to the whole and its single parts, and in a
certain respect, of mercy: but they take away neither by the
affirmation of the other. I would demonstrate this by
quotations, did I not think that you with me, according to
your skill and intelligence would acknowledge this.
Predestination is of grace: the same grace, which has
effected the predestination of the saints, also includes
mercy: this I sufficiently declared a little while since. I
mentioned grace simply, in the case of simple predestination,
that is, predestination expressed in simple and universal
terms. I speak of mercy, also, in relation to a man who is
miserable, spoken of absolutely, or relatively. You add that
when I treat of the passed by and the reprobate, I mention
justice, and only in the case of such. Let us, if you please,
remove the homonymy; then we shall expedite the matter in a
few words. We exposed the homonymy in the second proposition;
we speak of the reprobate either generally or particularly.
If you understand it generally, the mention of justice is
correctly made, as we shall soon show. If particularly,
either reprobates and those passed by refer to the same,
which is the appropriate signification, or the term reprobate
is applied to the damned, which is catachrestic. I do not
think that you understand it in the former sense, if you
understand it in the latter (as you do), what you say is
certainly very true, that I spoke of justice only when
treating of the damned. However, I do not approve that you
write copulatively of the passed by and the reprobate, that
is, the damned. For although they are the same in subject,
and all the passed by are damned, and all the damned are
passed by, yet their relation as passed by or reprobate is
one thing, and their relation as damned is another.
Preterition or reprobation is not without justice, but it is
not of justice, as its cause: damnation is with justice and
of justice. Election and reprobation or preterition are the
work of free will according to the wisdom of God; but
damnation is the work of necessary will according to the
justice of God; for God "cannot deny Himself" (2 Tim. ii,
13.) As a just judge, it is necessary that He should punish
unrighteousness, and execute judgment. This, I say, is the
work of the manifold wisdom of God, which in those creatures,
in whom he has implanted the principle of their own ways,
namely, a free will, He might exhibit its two-fold use, good
and bad, and the consequent result of its use in both
directions. Hence he has, in His own wisdom, ordained, both
in angels and in men, the way of both modes of its use,
without any fault or sin on His own part. But it is a work of
justice to damn the unrighteous. Therefore also it is said
truly that the passed by are damned by the Deity, but because
they were to be damned, not because they were passed by or
reprobated.
Now I come to your argumentation, in which you affirm that,
"according to that theory, God is, by necessary consequence,
made the author of the fall of Adam, and of sin &c." I do
not, indeed, perceive the argument from which this conclusion
is necessarily deduced, if you correctly understand that
theory. Though I do not doubt that you had reference to your
own words, used in stating the first theory, "that he
ordained also that man should fall and become depraved, that
he might thus prepare the way for the fulfillment of his own
eternal counsels, that he might be able mercifully to save
some, &c." This, then, if I am not mistaken, is your
reasoning. He, who has ordained that man should fall and
become depraved, is the author of the fall and of sin; God
ordained that man should fall and become depraved; therefore,
God is the author of sin. But the Major of this syllogism is
denied, because it is ambiguous; for the word ordain is
commonly, though in a catachrestical sense, used to mean
simply and absolutely to decree, the will determining and
approving an act; which catachresis is very frequent in
forensic use. But to us, who are bound to observe
religiously, in this argument, the propriety of terms, to
ordain is nothing else than to arrange the order in acts, and
in each thing according to its mode. It is one thing to
decree acts absolutely, and another to decree the order of
acts, in each thing, according to its mode. The former is
immediate, the latter, from the beginning to the end, regards
the means, which in all things, pertain to the order of
events. In the former signification, the Minor is denied; for
it is entirely at variance with the truth, since God is never
the author of evil (that is, of evil involving guilt). In the
latter signification the Major is denied, for it is not
according to the truth, nor is it necessary in any respect
that the same person who disposes the order of actions and,
in each thing, according to its mode: should be the author of
those actions. The actor is one thing, the action is
another,-and the arranger of the action is yet another. He
who performs an evil deed is the author of evil. He, who
disposes the order in the doer and in the evil deed, is not
the author of evil, but the disposer of an evil act to a good
end. But that this may be understood, let us use the fourth
fundamental principle, which we have previously stated,
according to this, we shall circumscribe this whole case
within this limit; every fault must always be ascribed to the
proximate, not to the remote or to the highest cause. In a
chain, the link, which breaks, is in fault; in a machine, the
wheel, which deviates from its proper course, is in fault,
not any superior or inferior one. But as all causes are
either principles, or from principles, (in this case,
however, principles are like wheels, by which the causes,
originating from the principles, are moved), God is the
universal principle of all good, nature is the principle of
natural things, and the rational will, turning freely to good
or evil, is the principle of moral actions. These three
principles, in their own appropriate movement, perform their
own actions, and produce mediate causes, act in their own
relations, and dispose them; God in a divine mode, nature in
a natural mode, and the will in an elective mode. God, in a
divine mode, originates nature; nature, in its own mode,
produces man; the will, in its own appropriate mode, produces
its own moral and voluntary actions. If, now, the will
produces a moral action, whether good or evil, it produces
it, of its own energy, and this cannot be attributed to
nature itself as a cause, though nature may implant the will
in man, since the will, (though from nature) is the peculiar
and special principle of moral actions, instituted by the
Deity in nature. But if the blame of this cannot be
attributed to nature as a cause, by what right, I pray, can
it be attributed to God, who, by the mode and medium of
nature, has placed the will in man? I answer then, with
Augustine, in his book against articles falsely imputed to
him, artic. 10.
"The predestination of God neither excited, nor persuaded,
nor impelled, the fall of those who fell, or the iniquity of
the wicked, or the evil passions of sinners, but it clearly
predestinated His own judgment, by which He should recompense
each one according to his deeds, whether good or bad, which
judgment would not be inflicted, if men should sin by the
will of God." He proceeds to the same purpose in art. 11,
remarking, "If it should be charged against the devil, that
he was the author of certain sins, and the inciter to them, I
think he would be able to exonerate himself from that odium
in some way, and that he would convict the perpetrators of
such sins from their own will, since, although he might have
been delighted in the madness of those sinners, yet he could
prove that he did not force them to crime. With what folly,
what madness, then, is that referred to the counsel of God,
which cannot at all be ascribed to the devil, since he, in
the sins of wicked men, aids by enticements, but is not to be
considered the director of their wills. Therefore God
predestinated none of these things that they should take
place, nor did He prepare that soul, which was about to live
basely and in sin, that it should live in such a manner; but
He was not ignorant that such would be its character, and He
foreknew that He should judge justly concerning a soul of
such character."
But if this could be imputed neither to nature, nor to the
devil, how much less to God, the most holy and wise Creator?
God, (as St. Augustine says again, book 6) "does not
predestinate all which he foreknows. For He only foreknows
evil. He does not predestinate it, but He both foreknows and
predestinates good." But it is a good, derived from God,
that, in His own ordination, He disposes the order in things
good and evil; if not, the providence of God would be, for
the most part, indifferent (may that be far from our
thoughts). God does not will evil, but He wills, and
preserves a certain order even in evil. Evil comes from the
will of man; from God is the general and special arrangement
of His own providence, disposing and most wisely keeping in
order even those things which are, in the highest degree,
evil.
Here a two-fold question will perhaps be urged upon me:
first, how can these be said, in reference to the will, to be
its own motions, when we acknowledge that the will itself,
that is, the fountain of voluntary motions, is from nature,
and nature is from God? Secondly, why did God place in human
beings this will, constituted in the image of liberty? I will
reply to both in a few words. To the first; the will is
certainly from nature, and nature is from God, but the will
is not, on that account, the less to be called the principle
of those motions, than nature is called the principle of
natural motions. Each is the principle of its own action,
though both are from the supreme principle, God. It is one
thing to describe the essence of a thing, another to refer to
its source. What is essential to nature and the will? That
the former should be the principle of natural motions, the
latter, of spontaneous motions. What is their source? God is
the only and universal source of all things. Nor is it absurd
that a principle should be derived from another principle:
for although a principle, which originates in another, should
not be called a principle in the relation of origin or
source, yet, in the relation of the act it does not on that
account, cease to be an essential principle. God is, per se,
a principle. Nature and our wills are principles derived from
a principle. Yet each of them has its own appropriate
motions. Nor is there any reason, indeed, why any should
think that these are philosophical niceties: they are natural
distinctions, and that, which is of nature, is from God. But
if we are unwilling to hear nature, let us listen to the
truth of God, to Christ speaking of the devil (John viii,
44), "when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he
is a liar and the father of it." Here he is called "the
father of a lie," and is said "to speak of his own."
According to Christ's words, then, we have the origin and the
act of sin in the devil. For the act has a resemblance to
himself, for he speaks of his own. What, I pray, can be more
conclusive than these words? Hence Augustine, in the answer
already quoted, very properly deduces this conclusion. "As
God did not, in the angels who fell, induce that will, by
which they did not continue in the truth; so he did not
produce in men that inclination by which they imitate the
devil. For he speaketh a lie of his own; and he will not be
free from that charge, unless the truth shall free him." He
indeed gave free will, namely, that essential power to Adam:
but its motion is, in reference to Adam, his own, and, in
reference to all of us, our own. In what sense is it our own,
when it is given to us by God? Whatever is bestowed on us by
God, is either by the law of common right, or of personal and
private property. He gave the will to angels and men by the
law of personal possession. It is therefore, one's own and
its motion belong to the individual. "This," says Augustine,
(lib. de Genes. ad litt. in perf. cap. 5,) "He both makes and
disposes species and natures themselves, but the privations
of species and the defects of natures he does not make, He
only ordains." Therefore God is always righteous, but we are
unrighteous.
To the second question, namely, why did God create in us this
will, and with such a character? I reply; -- it was the work
of the highest goodness and wisdom in the universe. Why
should we, with our ungrateful minds, who have already made
an ill use of those minds, obstruct the fountain of goodness
and wisdom? It was the work of goodness to impress his own
image on both natures, in the superior, on that of angels,
and in the inferior, on that of men: since, while other
things in nature are moved by instinct, or feeling, as with a
dim trace of the Deity, these alone, in the freedom of their
own will, have the principle of their own ways in their own
power by the mere goodness of God. It was the work of wisdom
to make these very species, endued with His own image,
together with so many other objects, and above the others, as
the most perfect mirror of His own glory, so far as is
possible in created things. But why did he make them of such
a character, with mutable freedom? He made His own image, not
himself.
The only essential image of God, the Father, is the Lord
Jesus Christ, one God, eternal and immutable, with the Father
and the Holy Spirit. Whoever thou mayest be, who makest
objections to this, thou hearest the serpent whispering to
thee, as he whispered once to Eve, to the ruin of our race.
Let it suffice thee that thou wast made in the image of God,
not possessing the divine perfection. Immutability is
peculiar to the divine perfection. This pertains by nature to
God. The creature had in himself His image, communicated by
God, and placed in his will: but he, whether angel or man,
who fell, rejected it of his own will. Not to say more, this
whole question was presented by Marcion, and Tertullian, with
the utmost fluency and vigour, discussed it in its whole
extent, in a considerable part of his second book against
Marcion, the perusal of which will, I trust, be satisfactory
to you.
You remark, finally, that they are not freed from the
necessity of that conclusion "by the distinctions of the act,
and the evil in the act, of necessity and creation, of the
decree and its execution, &c." Indeed, my brother, I think
that, from those things, which have just been said, you will
sufficiently perceive in what respects your reasoning is
fallacious. For God does not make, but ordains the sinner, as
I say, with Augustine, that is, He ordains the iniquity of
the sinner not by commanding or decreeing particularly and
absolutely that he should commit sin, but by most wisely
vindicating His own order, and the right of His infinite
providence, even in evil which is peculiar to the creature.
For it was necessary that the wisdom of God should triumph in
this manner, when He exhibited His own order in the peculiar
and voluntary disorder of His own creature. This disorder and
alienation from good the creature prepared for himself by the
appropriate motion of free-will, not by the impulse of the
Deity. But that freedom of the will, says Tertullian against
Marcion (lib. 2, cap. 9) "does not fix the blame on Him by
whom it was bestowed, but on him by whom it was not directed,
as it ought to have been." Since this is so, it is not at all
necessary that I should speak of those particular
distinctions, which, in their proper place, may perhaps be
valid; they do not seem to me to pertain properly to this
argument, unless other arguments are introduced, which I
cannot find in your writings. Besides all those distinctions
pertain generally to the subject of providence, not
particularly to this topic. I am not pleased that the
discussion should extend beyond its appropriate range. But
here some may perhaps say; "Therefore, the judgments of God
depend on contingencies, and are based on contingencies, if
they have respect to man as a sinner, and to his sin." That
consequence is denied: for, on the contrary, those very
things which are contingencies to us, depend on the
ordination of God, according to their origin and action. To
their origin, for God has established the contingency equally
with the necessity: To their action, for He acts in the case
of that which is good, fails to act in that which is evil, in
that it is evil, not in that it is ordained by His special
providence. They are not, therefore, contingencies to the
Deity, whatever they may be to us; just as those things,
which are contingent to an inferior cause, can by no means be
justly ascribed to a superior cause. But I have already
stated this matter with sufficient clearness, in the
discussion of the fourth fundamental principle. Let us,
therefore, pass to other matters.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SIXTH PROPOSITION
The meaning of the first theory is that which I have set
forth in the third proposition. But it is of little
importance to me, whether the object, generally and without
distinction, or with a certain distinction, and invested with
certain circumstances, is presented to God, when
predestinating and reprobating, for that is not, now, the
point before me. If, however, it may be proper to discuss
this also in a few words, I should say that it cannot seem to
one who weighs this matter with accuracy, that the object is
considered in general and without any distinction by God, in
the act of decreeing, according to the sentiment of the
authors of the first theory. For the object was considered by
God, in the act of decreeing, in the relation which it had at
the time. when it had, as yet, been affected by no external
act of God, executing that decree; for this, in a pure and
abstract sense, is an object, free from every other
consideration, which can pertain to an object, through the
action of a cause operating in reference to it. But since,
according to the authors of the first theory, the act of
creation pertains to the execution of the decree, of which we
now treat, it is, therefore, most certainly evident, that
man, in that he was to be made, was the object of
predestination and reprobation. If any one considers the
various and manifold sets of that decree, it is not doubtful
that some of these must be accommodated and applied to this
and others to that condition of man, and in this sense, I
would admit the common and general consideration of the
object. But all those acts, according to the authors of that
first theory, depend on one primary act, namely, that in
which God determined to declare, in one part of that unformed
"lump," from which the human race was to be made, the glory
of his mercy, and, in another part, the glory of his justice,
and it is this very thing which I stated to be displeasing to
me in that first theory; nor can I yet persuade myself that
there exists, in the whole Scripture, any decree, by which
God has determined to illustrate his own glory, in the
salvation of these and in the condemnation of those, apart
from foresight of the fall.
The passage which you quote from Beza, on Ephes. i, 4,
plainly proves that I have done no injustice to those authors
in explaining their doctrine. He says, in that passage, that
God, by the creation and corruption of man, opened a way for
himself to the execution of that which he had before
decreed."
In reference to the harmony of those theories, I grant that
all agree in this, that this decree of God was made from
eternity, before any actual existence of the object, whatever
might be its character, and however it might be considered.
For "known unto God are all his works from the beginning of
the world." (Acts xv, 18.)
It is necessary also that all the internal acts of God should
universally be eternal, unless we wish to make God mutable;
yet in such a sense that some are antecedent to others in
order and nature. I admit also that they agree in this, that
there exists, in the predestinate or the reprobate, no cause
why the former should be predestinated, the latter
reprobated; and that the cause exists only in the mere will
of God. But I affirm that some ascend to a greater height
than others, and extend the act of decree farther. For the
advocates of the third theory deny that God, in any act of
predestination and reprobation, has reference to man,
considered as not yet fallen, and those of the second theory
say that God, in the act of that decree, did not have
reference to man as not yet created. The advocates of the
first, however, openly assert and contend that God, in the
first act of the decree, had reference to man, not as
created, but as to be created. I, therefore, distinguished
those theories according to their objects, as each one
presented man to God, at the first moment of the act of
predestination and reprobation, as free from any divine act
predestinating and reprobating, either internal, by which he
might decree something concerning man, or external, by which
He might effect something in man; this may be called pure
object, having as yet received no relation from the act of
God, decreeing from eternity, and no form from the external
act. But when it has received any relation or form from any
act of God, it is no longer pure object, but an object having
some action of God concerning it, or in it, by which it is
prepared for receiving some further action, as was also a
short time since affirmed. We will hereafter examine your
idea that they substantiate their theory by the example of
Jacob and Esau in Romans 9.
I may be permitted to make some observations or inquiries
concerning what you lay down as fundamental principles of
this doctrine, and of your reply to my arguments. In
reference to the first, concerning the essence of the Deity,
God is in such a sense immutable in essence, power,
intellect, will, counsel and work, that, nevertheless, if the
creature is changed, he becomes to that creature in will, the
application of power, and in work, another than that which he
was to the same creature continuing in his primitive state;
bestowing upon a cause that which is due to it, but without
any change in Himself. Again if God is immutable, He has, for
that very reason, not circumscribed or determined to one
direction, by any decree, the motion of free-will, the
enjoyment and use of which He has once freely bestowed on
man, so that it should incline, of necessity, to one
direction, and should not be able, in fact, to incline to
another direction, while that decree remains. Thirdly, God
has the form and an eternal and immutable conception of all
those things which are done mutably by men, but following, in
the order of nature, many other conceptions, which God has
concerning those things which He wills both to do Himself,
and to permit to men.
In reference to the second, concerning the knowledge of God;
I am most fully persuaded that the knowledge of God is
eternal, immutable and infinite, and that it extends to all
things, both necessary and contingent, to all things which He
does of Himself, either mediately or immediately, and which
He permits to be done by others. But I do not understand the
mode in which He knows future contingencies, and especially
those which belong to the free-will of creature, and which He
has decreed to permit, but not to do of Himself, not, indeed,
in that measure, in which I think that it is understood by
others more learned than myself. I know that there are those
who say that all things are, from eternity, presented to God,
and that the mode, in which God certainly and infallibly
knows future contingencies, is this, that those contingent
events coexist with God in the Now of eternity, and therefore
they are in Him indivisibly, and in the infinite Now of
eternity, which embraces all time. If this is so, it is not
difficult to understand how God may certainly and infallibly
know future contingent events. For contingencies are not
opposed to certainty of knowledge, except as they are future,
but not as they are present. That reasoning, however, does
not exhaust all the difficulties which may arise in the
consideration of these matters. For God knows, also, those
things which may happen, but never do happen, and
consequently do not co-exist with God in the Now of eternity,
which would be events unless they should be hindered, as is
evident from 1 Samuel xxiii, 12, in reference to the citizens
of Keilah, who would have delivered David into the hands of
Saul, which event, nevertheless, did not happen. The
knowledge, also, of future events, which depend on contingent
causes, seems to be certain, if those causes may be complete
and not hindered in their operation. But how shall the causes
of those events, which depend on the freedom of the will, be
complete, among which, even at that very moment in which it
chose one, it was free not to choose it, or to choose another
in preference to it? If indeed at any time your leisure may
permit, I could wish that you would accurately discuss, in
your own manner, these things and whatever else may pertain
to that question. I know that this would be agreeable and
acceptable to many, and that the labour would not be useless.
The knowledge of God is called eternal, but not equally so in
reference to all objects of knowledge. For that knowledge of
God is absolutely eternal, by which God knows Himself, and in
Himself all possible things. That, by which He knows beings
which will exist, is eternal indeed as to duration, but, in
nature, subsequent to some act of the divine will concerning
them, and, in some cases, even subsequent to some foreseen
act of the human will. In general, the following seems to me
to be the order of the divine knowledge, in reference to its
various objects. God knows
1. Himself what He, of Himself is able to do.
2. All things possible what can be done by those beings which
He can make.
3. All things which shall exist by the act of creation.
4. All things which shall exist by the act of creatures and
especially of rational creatures. Whether moved by those
actions of His creatures and
5. What He Himself especially of His rational shall do.
creatures; Or at least receiving occasion from them.
From this, it is apparent that the eternity of the knowledge
of God is not denied by those, who propose, as a foundation
for that knowledge, something dependent on the human will, as
foreseen.
But I do not understand in what way it can be true that, in
every genus, there must be one thing univocal, and from this,
other things in an equivocal sense. I have hitherto supposed
that those things which are under the same genus are univocal
or at least analogous; but, that things equivocal are not
comprehended with those which are univocal, under the same
genus, either in logic, or metaphysics, and still less in
physics. Then I have not thought that the univocal could be
the cause of the equivocal. For there is no similarity
between them. But if there exists a similarity as between
cause and effect, they are no longer equivocal. Thus those
things, which are heated by the fire as I should say, are
heated neither univocally, nor equivocally, but analogically.
God exists univocally, we, analogically. This they admit, who
state that certain attributes of the divine nature are
communicable to us according to analogy, among which they
also mention knowledge.
In reference to the third, concerning the actions of the
Deity; the actions of God are, in Himself, indeed eternal,
but they preserve a certain order; some are prior to others
by nature, and indeed necessarily precede them, whether in
the same order, in which they proceed from Him, I could not
easily say; but I know that there are those who have thus
stated, among whom some mention George Sohnius. Some also of
the internal actions in God, are subsequent in nature to the
foresight of some act dependent on the will of the creature.
Thus the decree concerning the mission of His Son for the
redemption of the human race is subsequent to the foresight
of the fall of man. For although God might have arranged to
prevent the fall, if he had not known that He could use an
easy remedy to effect a restoration, (as some think,) yet the
sure decree for the introduction of a remedy for the fall by
the mission of His Son, was not effected by God except on the
foresight of the disease, namely, the fall.
The mode in which God, as the universal principle, is said to
flow into His creatures, and especially his rational
creatures, and concurs with their nature and will, in
reference to an action, has my approbation, whatever it may
be, if it does not bring in a determination of the will of
the creature to one or two things which are contrary, or
contradictory. If any mode introduces such a determination, I
do not see how it can be consistent with the declaration of
Augustine, quoted by yourself, that God so governs all things
which He has created as also "to permit them to exercise and
put forth their own motions," or with the saying of Plato, in
which God is declared to be free from all blame.
I could wish that it might be plainly and decisively
explained how all effects and defects in nature, and the
will, of all kinds universally, are of the providence of God,
and yet God is free from fault, the whole fault, (if any
exists,) residing in the proximate cause. If any one thinks
that God is exempted from fault because He is the remote
cause, but that the creature, as the proximate cause, is
culpable, (if there is any sin,) he does not seem to me to
present a correct reason why any cause may be in fault, or
free from fault, but, concerning this also, I will hereafter
speak at greater length. In reference to the fourth,
concerning the causes of the actions of God; the universal
cause has no cause above itself, and the first and supreme
cause does not depend on any other cause, for the very terms
include that idea; but it is possible that there may be
afforded to the universal, first and supreme cause, by
another cause, an occasion for the production of some certain
effect, which, without that occasion, the first cause would
neither propose to be produced in itself, nor in fact produce
out of itself, and indeed could neither produce nor propose
or decree to be produced. Such is the decree to damn certain
persons, and their damnation according to that decree.
I readily assent to what you have said in reference to the
modes of necessary and contingent causes, as also those
things which you have remarked in reference to the
distinction between natural and rational power. I am,
however, certain that nothing can be deduced from them
against my opinion, or against those things, which have been
presented by me for the refutation of the first theory.
Having made these remarks, I come to the consideration of
your answer to my arguments. In my former argument, I denied
that man, considered as not yet created, is the object of
mercy rescuing from sin and misery, and of punitive justice,
and I persist in that sentiment; for I do not see that any
thing has been presented, which overthrows it, or drives me
from that position. For man is not, by that consideration,
removed from under the common providence or the special
predestination of God, but providence must, in this case, be
considered as according to mercy and justice thus
administered, and predestination, as decreed according to
them. But the reasoning from the relative to the absolute is
not valid; and the removal, in this case, is from under the
providence of God, considered relatively, not absolutely; so
also with predestination. You foresaw that I would make this
reply, and consequently you have presented a three-fold
answer; but, in no respect, injurious to my reasoning. For as
to the first, I admit that sin and misery were, in the most
complete sense, present with God from eternity, and, as they
were present, so also there was, in reference to them, a
place for mercy and justice. But the theory, which I oppose,
does not make them, (as foreseen,) present to mercy and
justice, but, according to the decree for illustrating mercy
and justice, it presents a necessity for the existence of sin
and misery, as, in their actual existence, there could be in
fact, a place, for the decree, made according to mercy and
justice. As to the second, I grant also that there could be,
in one who was in fact neither a sinner, nor miserable, a
place for mercy saving from sin and possible misery, but we
are not here treating of mercy so considered: and it is
certain that mercy and judgment exist in the Deity, by an
eternal act, but it is in the first action of those
attributes. In a second act, God cannot exercise those
attributes, understood according to the mind of the authors
of that theory, except in reference to a sinful and actually
miserable being. Lastly, what you say concerning the
internal, and external action of the Deity, and these
conjoined, does not disturb, in any greater degree, my
argument. For neither the internal action, which is the
decree of God in reference to the illustration of his glory,
by mercy and punitive justice, nor the external action, which
is the actual declaration of that same glory through mercy
and justice, nor both conjoined can have any place in
reference to a man who is neither sinful, nor miserable. I
know, indeed, that, to those who advocate this theory, there
is so much difference between internal and external action,
that is, as they say, between the decree and its execution,
that God may decree salvation according to mercy and death
according to justice to a person who is not a sinner, but may
not really save, according to mercy, any one, unless, He is a
sinner, or damn, according to justice, any except sinners.
But I deny that distinction; indeed I say that God, can
neither will nor decree, by internal act, that which He
cannot do, by external act, and thus the object of internal
and external action is the same, and invested with the same
circumstances: whether it be present to God, in respect to
his eternal intelligence and be the object of His decree, or
be, in fact, in its actual existence, present to Him and the
object of the execution of the decree. Hence, I cannot yet
decide otherwise concerning that theory, than that it cannot
be approved by those, who think and desire to speak according
to the Scriptures.
The "two statements" which you think "may be made, of a
milder character, and in harmony with the words of Christ and
the apostles," do not serve to explain that first theory, but
are additions, by which it is very much changed, and which
its advocates would by no means acknowledge, as, in my
opinion, was made sufficiently manifest in my statement of
the same theory in reply to your third answer, and may be, at
this time, again demonstrated in a single word. For those
very things, which you make the mode and the consequent event
of predestination and reprobation, are styled, by the authors
of that first theory, the cause, and the principle of that
same decree, and also the end, though not the final one,
which, they affirm, is his glory, to be declared by mercy and
justice. Again they acknowledge no grace in predestination
which is not mercy, and correctly so, for the grace, which is
towards man considered absolutely, is not of election: also
they do not acknowledge any non-grace, or non-mercy, which is
not comprehended in punitive justice. Here I do not argue
against that theory thus explained, not because I approve it
in all respects, but because I have, this time, undertaken to
examine what I affirm to be the view of Calvin and Beza;
other matters will be hereafter considered. I will notice
separately what things are here brought forward, agreeing
with that view, thus explained. The passages of Scripture
quoted from Matthew 25, and Ephesians 1, in which it is
taught that "God, from all eternity, of the good pleasure of
his will, elected some to adoption, sanctification, and a
participation of his kingdom," so far fail to prove the
common view that on the contrary there may be inferred from
them a reference to sin, as a condition requisite in the
object of benediction and election. In the former passage,
the blessed are called to a participation of the kingdom,
which God has prepared for them from eternity; but in whom
and by whom? Is it not in Christ and by Christ? Certainly;
then it was prepared for sinners, not for men considered in
general, and apart from any respect to sin. For "thou shall
call his name Jesus; for he shall save his people from their
sins." (Matt. i, 2.)
The passage from Ephesians 1, much more plainly affirms the
same thing, as will be hereafter proved in a more extended
manner, when I shall use that passage, avowedly to sustain
the theory which makes sin a condition requisite in the
object. I did not present a particular reference to men, as a
cause, which I wished to have kept in mind, but according to
a condition, requisite in the object, namely, misery and sin.
This I still require. The distinction, which you make between
grace and mercy, is according to fact and the signification
of terms, but in this place is unnecessary. For no grace,
bestowed upon man, originates in predestination, as there is
no grace, previous to predestination, not joined with mercy.
God deals with angels according to grace, not according to
mercy saving from sin and misery. He deals with us according
to mercy, not according to grace in contradistinction to
mercy. I speak here of predestination. According to that
mercy, also, is our adoption; it is not, then, of men,
considered in their original state, but of sinners. This is
also apparent from the phraseology of the apostle, who calls
the elect and the reprobate "vessels," not of grace and non-
grace but of "mercy" and "wrath." The relation of "vessels"
they have equally and in common from their divine creation,
sustainment, and government. That they are vessels worthy of
wrath, deserving it, and the "children of wrath," (Ephes. ii,
3), in this also there is no distinction among them. But that
some are "vessels of wrath," that is, destined to wrath, of
their own merit, indeed, but also of the righteous judgment
of God, which determines to bring wrath upon them; while
others are "vessels" not "of wrath" but "of mercy" according
to the grace of God, which determines to pardon their sin,
and to spare them, though worthy of wrath, this is of the
will of God, making a distinction between the two classes;
which discrimination has its beginning after the act of sin,
whether we consider the internal or the external act of God.
From this it is apparent that they are not on this account
vessels of wrath because they have become depraved, the just
consequence of which is wrath, if the will of God did not
intervene, which determines that this, which would be a just
consequence in respect to all the depraved, should be a
necessary consequence in respect to those, whom alone He
refuses to pardon, as He can justly punish all and had
decreed to pardon some. That which is "added by way of
amplification" is confirmed by the same arguments. For there
is no place for punitive justice except in reference to the
sinner; there can be no act of that mercy, of which we treat,
except towards the miserable. But man, considered in his
natural condition is neither sinful nor miserable, therefore
that justice and mercy have no place in reference to him.
Hence, you, my brother, will see that the object of
predestination, made according to those attributes and so
understood, cannot be man, considered in general, since it
requires, in its object, the circumstance of sin and misery,
by which circumstance man is restricted to a determinate
condition, and is separated from a general consideration. I
know, indeed, that, if the general consideration is admitted,
no one of those particular considerations is excluded, but
you also know that if any particular relation is precisely
laid down, that universal relation is excluded. I do not
think that it is to be altogether conceded that, in the case
of election and reprobation, there is no consideration of
well-doing or of sin. There is no consideration of well-
doing, it is true, for there is none to be considered; there
is no consideration of sin as a cause why one, and not
another, should be reprobated, but there is a consideration
of sin as a meritorious cause of the possibility of the
reprobation of any individual, and as a condition requisite
in the object, as I have often remarked, and shall,
hereafter, often remark, as occasion may require. In what
respects, those theories differ was briefly noticed in reply
to your first answer. When God is said to have elected
persons, as not created, as created but not fallen, or as
fallen, all know that it is understood, not that they are in
fact such, but that they are considered as such, for all
admit that God elected human beings from eternity, before
they were created, that is, by the internal act; but no one
says, that man was elected by the external act before he was
created; therefore a reconciliation of those theories was
unnecessary, since the object of both acts is one and the
same, and considered in the same manner. Besides the
questions, when the election was made, and in what sense it
was considered, are different. I wished to confirm my words
by the authority of your consent; whether ignorantly, will be
proved from these statements. You make man, considered as a
sinner, the subject of the preparation of punishment
according to justice, which I, agreeably to your Theses, have
called reprobation, and you, according to your opinion,
presuppose sin in him; but, in the first theory, they make
sin subordinate to that same decree. The preterition, which
the same theory attributes to punitive justice, you attribute
to the freedom of the divine goodness, and you exclude
punitive justice from it, when you make man, not yet a
sinner, the subject of preterition. Predestination, which the
first theory ascribes to mercy, in contra-distinction to
grace, your Theses, already cited (answers 2 and 4) assign to
grace, spoken of absolutely, since they consider man in the
state of nature in which he was created; but you make man, as
a sinner, the subject of grace, as conjoined with mercy, and
you presuppose sin. That first theory, on the other hand,
makes sin subordinate to that predestination, both of which
cannot, at the same time, be true, therefore, in this you
seem to agree with me, as you ascribe election to mercy, only
so far as man is considered miserable, and preparation of
punishment to justice, only so far as man is considered
sinful. You reply, that, when grace is presented, as the
genus, mercy, as the species, is not excluded, and mercy
being presented, as the species, grace, as the genus, is not
excluded. I grant it, but affirm, first, that grace cannot be
supposed here as the genus, for grace, spoken of generally,
cannot be supposed to be the cause of any act, that is, any
special act, such as predestination. Again, the relation of
grace and mercy in this case, is different from that of genus
and species: for they are spoken of, in an opposite manner,
as two different species of grace, the term grace, having the
same appellation with that of the genus, referring to that
grace which regards man as created, the term mercy, receiving
its appellation from its object, referring to that grace
which regards man as sinful and miserable. If man is said to
be predestinated according to the former, the latter can have
no place; if according to the latter, then it is certain that
the former can have no place, otherwise the latter would be
unnecessary. Predestination cannot be said to have been made
conjointly according to both. My conclusion was, therefore,
correct, when I excluded one species by the supposition of
the other. If man is to be exalted to supernatural glory from
a natural state, this work belongs to grace, simply
considered, and in contra-distinction to mercy; if from a
corrupt state, it belongs to grace conjoined with mercy, that
is, it is the appropriate work of mercy. Grace, simply
considered and opposed to mercy, cannot effect the latter,
mercy is not necessary for the former. But predestination is
of such grace as is both able and necessary to effect that
which is proposed in predestination.
What I wrote copulatively, in reference to the passed by and
the reprobate, was written thus, because they are one
subject. But that they are not the same in relation, is
admitted: and I expressed this when I remarked that you
referred to justice only in the case of the latter, namely,
the reprobate, that is, the damned. In my second proposition,
however, I signified that, according to the view of those to
whom I ascribed the second theory, the relation of
preterition was different from that of predamnation, which I
there called reprobation. The homonymy of the term
reprobation is explained in my second answer, and all fault
is removed from me, who have used that word every where
according to your own idea. But it is very apparent, from
what follows, that you dissent from the authors of the first
theory. For you assert that "predestination is of justice,"
but that preterition or reprobation is according to justice,
but not "of justice;" while the authors of the first theory
ascribe to justice the cause of reprobation, however
understood, whether synecdochically, or properly, or
catachrestically, that is, they affirm that both preterition
and predamnation are of justice.
But how are election and preterition "the work of flee-will
according to the wisdom of God and damnation, the work of
necessary will according to the justice of God? I have
hitherto thought, with our theologians, that this whole
decree was instituted by God, in the exercise of most
complete freedom of will, and I yet think that the same idea
is true, according to the declaration, "I will have mercy on
whom I will have mercy," and "He hath mercy on whom He will
have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth." (Rom. ix, 15 &
18.)
In each of these acts God exercises equal freedom. For, if
God necessarily wills in any case to punish sin, how is it
that He does not punish it in all sinners? If he punishes it
in some, but not in others, how is that the act of necessary
will? Who, indeed, does not ascribe the distinction which is
made among persons, equally meriting the punishment, to the
freewill of God? Justice may demand punishment on account of
sin, but it demands it equally in reference to all sinners
without distinction; and, if there is any discrimination, it
is of free-will, demanding punishment as to these, but
remitting sin to those. But it was necessary that punishment
should be at least inflicted on some. If I should deny that
this was so after the satisfaction made by Christ, how will
it be proved? I know that Aquinas, and other of the School-
men, affirm that the relation of the divine goodness and
providence demands that some should be elected to life, and
that others should be permitted to fall into sin and then to
suffer the punishment of eternal death, and that God was free
to decree to whom life, and to whom death should appertain,
according to his will, but their arguments seem to me
susceptible of refutation from their own statements,
elsewhere made concerning the price of our redemption paid by
Christ. For they say the price was sufficient for the sins of
all, but if the necessity of divine justice demands that some
sinners should be damned, then the price was not sufficient
for all. For if justice, in him who receives that price,
necessarily demands that some should be destitute of
redemption, then it must have been offered by the redeemer
with the condition that there must always remain to the
necessity of justice, some satisfaction, to be sought
elsewhere and to be rendered by others. Let no one think that
the last affirmation of the school-men (that concerning the
sufficiency of the price), which, however, they borrowed from
the fathers, is to be rejected, for it could be proved, if
necessary, by plain and express testimonies from the
Scripture.
Let us now come to my second argument, which was this. A
theory, by which God is necessarily made the author of sin,
is to be repudiated by all Christians, and indeed by all men;
for no man thinks that the being, whom he considers divine,
is evil; -- But according to the theory of Calvin and Beza
God is necessarily made the author of sin; -- Therefore it is
to be repudiated. The proof of the Minor, is evident from
these words, in which they say that "God ordained that man
should fall and become corrupt, that in this way he might
open a way for His eternal counsels." For he, who ordains
that man should fall and sin, is the author of sin This, my
argument, is firm, nor is it weakened by your answer. The
word ordain is indeed ambiguous, for it properly signifies to
arrange the order of events or deeds, and in each thing
according to its own mode, in which sense it is almost always
used by the school-men. But it is also applied to a simple
and absolute decree of the will determining an action. What
then? Does it follow, because I have used a word, which is
ambiguous and susceptible of various meanings that I am
chargeable with ambiguity? I think not; unless it is proved
that, in my argument, I have used that word in different
senses. Otherwise sound reasoning would be exceedingly rare,
since, on account of the multitude of things and the paucity
of words, we are very frequently compelled to use words,
which have a variety of meanings. Ambiguity may be charged
when a word is used in different senses in the same argument.
But I used that word, in the same sense in the Major and in
the Minor, and so my argument is free from ambiguity. I
affirm that this is evident from the argument itself. For the
added phrase "that man should fall" signifies that the word
ordain, in both propositions, is to be applied to the simple
decree in reference to an action, or rather to a simple
decree that something should be done. It cannot, on account
of that phrase, be referred to a decree disposing the order
of actions.
Let us now state the syllogism in a few words, that we may be
able to compare your answer with the argument.
He who ordained that man should fall and become depraved, is
the author of the fall and of sin; God ordained that man
should fall and become depraved; Therefore, God is the author
of sin.
You deny the Major, if the word ordain is understood to mean
the disposal of the order of actions. You deny the Minor if
the same word is used to mean a simple decree as to actions,
or things to be done. This is true, and, in it, I agree with
you. But what if the same word in the Minor signifies a
simple decree, &c.? Then, indeed, even by your own admission,
the Major will be true. Else your distinction in the word is
uselessly made, if the Major is false, however the word may
be understood. But that the word is used in the Major in this
sense, is proved by the phraseology, "He who ordained that
man should fall." Then you say that the Minor is false if the
word is used in the same sense in which we have shown that it
is used in the Major, and so the conclusion does not follow.
I reply, that the question between us is not whether that
Minor is true or false, the word ordain being used for the
decreeing of things to be done, but whether they affirm it,
to whom the first theory is attributed. If, then, they affirm
this, and the Major is true, then it follows (and in this you
agree with me,) that God is the author of sin. For you admit
that he is the author of sin, who, by the simple decree and
determination of the will, ordains that sin shall be
committed. Calvin and Beza assert this in plain and most
manifest declarations, needing no explanation, and by no
means admitting that explanation of the word ordain, which,
as you say and I acknowledge, is proper. I wish also that it
might be shown in what way the necessity of the commission of
sin, can depend on the ordination and decree of God otherwise
than by the mode of cause, either efficient or deficient,
which deficiency is reduced to efficiency, when the
efficiency of that which is deficient is necessary to the
avoidance of sin. Beza himself concedes that it is
incomprehensible how God can be free from and man be
obnoxious to guilt, if man fell by the ordination of God, and
of necessity.
This, then, was to be done: their theory was to be freed from
the consequence of that absurdity, which, in my argument, I
ascribe to it. It was not, however, necessary to show how God
ordained sin, and that He is not indeed the author of sin. I
agree with you, both in the explanation of that ordination,
and in the assertion that God is not the author of sin.
Calvin himself, and Beza also, openly deny that God is the
author of sin, although they define ordination as we have
seen, but they do not show how these two things can be
reconciled. I wish, then, that it might be shown plainly, and
with perspicuity, that God is not made the author of sin by
that decree, or that the theory might be changed, since it is
a stumbling block to many, indeed to some a cause of
separating from us, and to very many a cause of not uniting
with us. But I am altogether persuaded that you also perceive
that consequence, but prefer to free the theory of those men
from an absurd and blasphemous consequence, by a fit
explanation, than to charge that consequence to it. This is
certainly the part of candour and good will, but used to no
good purpose, since the gloss, as they say, is contrary to
the text, which is manifest to any one who examines and
compares the text with the gloss. Those two questions, which
you present to yourself, do not affect my argument, when the
matter is thus explained.
Yet I am delighted with your beautiful and elegant discussion
of those questions. But I would ask, in opposition to the
theory of Calvin and Beza, "How can these movements of the
will be called its own and free, when the act of the will is
determined to one direction by the decree of God?" Then, "Why
did God place the will in man, if He was unwilling that he
should enjoy the liberty of its use?" For these questions are
necessarily to be answered by those authors, if they do not
wish to leave their theory without defense. It is therefore,
apparent from these things that my argument does not fail,
but remains firm and unmoved, since all things which you have
adduced, are aside from that argument, which did not seek to
conclude, as my own views, that God is the author of sin (far
from me be even the thought of that abominable blasphemy),
but to prove that this is a necessary consequence of the
theory of Calvin and Beza: which (I confidently say) has not
been confuted by you: nor can it be at all confuted, since
you use the word ordain in a sense different from that in
which they use it, and from that sense, according to which if
God should be said to have ordained sin, nothing less could
be inferred than that He is the author of sin.
I said, moreover, that the theory of Calvin and Beza, in
which they state that God ordained that man should fall and
become depraved, could not be explained so that God should
not be made by it the author of sin, by the distinctions of
the act, and the evil in the act, of necessity and coaction,
of the decree and its execution, of efficacious and
permissive decree, as the latter is explained by the authors
of that theory agreeably to it, nor by the different relation
of the divine decree and of human nature or of man, nor by
the addition of the end, namely, that the whole ordination
was designed for the illustration of the glory of God. You
seem to me, reverend sir, not to have perceived for what
purpose I presented these things, for I did not wish to
present any new course of reasoning against that first
theory, but to confirm my previous objection by a refutation
of those answers, which are usually presented by the
defenders of that theory, to the objection which I made,
that, by it, God is made the author of sin. For they, in
order to repel the charge from their theory, never make the
reply which has been presented by you, for, should they do
this, they would necessarily depart from their own theory,
which is wholly changed, if the word ordain, which they use,
signifies not to decree that sin should be committed, but to
arrange the order of its commission, as you explain that
word. But to show that it does not follow from their theory,
that God is the author of sin, they adduce the distinctions
to which I have referred, and have diligently gathered from
their various writings; which ought to be done before that
accusation should be made against their theory. For, if I
could find any explanation of that theory, any distinction,
by which it could be relieved of that charge, it would have
pertained to my conscience, not to place upon it the load of
such a consequence. Your distinction in the word ordain
indeed removes the difficulty, but, in such a way, that, by
one and the same effort, it removes the theory from which I
proved that the difficulty followed. Prove that the authors
of that theory assert that God ordained sin in no other sense
than that, in which you have shown that the word is properly
used, and I shall obtain that which I wish, and I will
concede that those distinctions were unnecessary for the
defense of that theory. For the word ordain used in your
sense, presupposes the perpetration of sin; in their sense,
it precedes and proposes its perpetration, for "God ordained
that man should fall and become depraved," not that from a
being, fallen and depraved, He should make whatever the order
of the divine wisdom, goodness, and justice might demand.
There is here, then, no wandering beyond the appropriate
range of the discussion. You say that all those distinctions
pertain in common to the question of providence, and
therefore the ordination of sin pertains in common to the
question of providence. If, however, the authors of the first
theory have ascribed the ordination of sin to the divine
predestination, why should it cause surprise, that those
distinctions should also be referred to the same
predestination? There is, in this case, then, no blame to be
attached to me, that I have mentioned these distinctions. On
the contrary, I should have been in fault, if, omitting
reference to those distinctions, I should have made an
accusation against their theory, which they are accustomed to
defend against this accusation by means of those
distinctions. But since you do not, by your explanation,
relieve their theory from that objection, and I have said
that those distinctions do not avail for its relief and
defense, it will not be useless that I should prove my
assertion, not for your sake, but for the sake of those, who
hold that opinion, since they think that it can be suitably
defended by these distinctions.
They use the first distinction thus: "In sin there are two
things, the act and its sinfulness." God, by his own
ordination, is the author of the act, not of the sinfulness
in the act. I will first consider the distinction, then the
answer which they deduce from it. This distinction is very
commonly made, and seems to have some truth, but to one
examining, with diligence, its falsity, in most respects,
will be apparent. For it is not, in general or universally,
applicable to all sin. All sins, especially, which are
committed against prohibitory laws, styled sins of
commission, reject this distinction. For the acts themselves
are forbidden by the law, and therefore, if perpetrated, they
are sins. This is the formal relation of sin, that it is
something done contrary to law. It is true that the act in
that it is such, would not be sin, if the law had not been
enacted, but then it is not an act, having evil or
sinfulness. Let the law be absent, the act is naturally good:
introduce the law, and the act itself is evil, as forbidden,
not that there is any thing in the act which can be called
unlawfulness or sin. I will make the matter clear by an
example. The eating of the forbidden fruit, if it had been
permitted to the human will as right, would, in no way, be
sin, nor any part of sin, it would not contain any element of
sin; but the same act, forbidden by law, could not be
otherwise than sinful, if perpetrated; I refer to the act
itself, and not to any thing in the act to which the term
evil can be applied. For that act was simply made illicit by
the enactment of the law. I shall have attained my object
here in a single word, by simply asking that the sinfulness
in that act may be shown separately from the act itself. That
distinction, however, had a place in acts which are performed
according to a perceptive law, but not according to a due
mode, order, or motive. Thus he, who gives alms, that he may
be praised does a good act badly, and there is, in that deed
both the act and the evil of the act according to which it is
called sin. But the sin which man perpetrated at the
beginning, of the ordination of God, was a sin of commission;
it therefore affords no place for that distinction. This
fundamental principle having been established, the answer,
deduced from that distinction, is at once refuted. Yet let us
look at it. "God," they say, "is, by ordination, the author
of the act, not of the evil in the act." I affirm, on the
contrary, that God ordained that act, not as an act, but as
it is an evil act. He ordained that the glory of His mercy
and justice should be illustrated, of his pardoning mercy,
and His punitive justice; but that glory is illustrated not
by the act as such, but as it is sinful, and as an evil act.
For the act needs remission, not as such, but as evil; it
deserves punishment, not as such, but as evil. The
declaration, then, of His glory by mercy and justice, is by
the act as it is evil, not as it is an act; therefore that
ordination which had its end, the illustration of that glory,
was not of the act as such, but as evil, and of sin, as sin
and transgression. That distinction, therefore, is useless in
repelling the objection, which I have urged against that
theory. I add, for the elucidation of the subject, that if
God efficaciously determines the will to the material of sin,
or to depraved objects, though it may be affirmed that He
does not determine the will to an evil decision, in respect
to the evil, He is still made the author of sin, since man
himself does not will the evil in respect to the evil and the
devil does not solicit to evil in respect to the evil, but in
respect to that which is delectable, and yet he is said to
induce persons to sin.
The second distinction is that of necessity and coaction.
They use it in this way. If the decree of God, in which he
ordained that man should fall, compelled him to sin, then
would God, by that decree, become the author of sin, and man
would be free from guilt: but that decree did not compel man.
It only imposed a necessity upon him so that he could not but
sin; which necessity does not take away his liberty.
Therefore, man, since he sins freely, the decree being in
force, is the cause of his own fall, and God is free from the
responsibility. Let us now consider this distinction, and the
use made of it.
Necessity and coaction differ as genus and species. For
necessity comprehends coaction in itself. Necessity also is
twofold, one from an internal, the other from an external
cause; the one, natural, the other, violent. Necessity, from
an external cause and violent, is also called coaction,
whether it be used contrary to nature, or against the will,
as when a stone is projected upwards, and a strong man makes
use of the hand of a weaker person to strike a third person.
The former has the name of the genus, necessity, but is
referred to a specific idea, by a contraction of the mental
conception. There is, then, between these two species, some
agreement, as they belong to the same genus, and some
discrepancy, since each has its own form. But it is now to be
considered whether they so differ that coaction alone, and
not that other species of necessity, is contrary to freedom;
and whether he who compels to sin is the cause of sin, and
not he who necessitates without compulsion. They indeed
affirm this, who use this distinction. First, in reference to
freedom; it is opposed directly to necessity, considered in
general, whether natural or compulsive, for each of these
species causes the inevitability of the act. For a cause acts
freely when it has the power to suspend its action. Some say
that freedom is fully consistent with natural necessity, and
refer to the example of the Deity, who is, by nature and
freely, good. But is God freely good? Such an affirmation is
not very far from blasphemy. His own goodness exists in God,
naturally and most intimately; it does not then exist in Him
freely. I know that a kind of freedom of complacency is
spoken of by the School-men, but contrary to the very nature
and definition of freedom. We say, in reference to sin, that
he is the cause of sin, who necessitates to the commission of
sin, by any act whatever of necessitation, whether internal
or external, whether by internal suasion, motion, or leading,
which the will necessarily obeys, or by an application of
external violence, which the will is not able, though it may
desire, to resist; though, in that case, the act would not be
voluntary. He, indeed sins more grievously, who uses the
former act, than he, who uses the latter. For the former has
this effect, that the will may consent to the sin, but the
latter has no such effect, though that consent is not
according to the mode of free-will, but according to that of
nature, in which mode only, God can so move the will, that it
may be moved necessarily, that is, that it cannot but be
moved. And in this relation, the will, as it consents by
nature to sin, is free from guilt; for sin, as such, is of
free-will, and tend towards its object, according to the mode
of its own freedom. The law is enacted not for nature but for
the will, for the will as it acts not according to the mode
of nature, but according to the mode of freedom. That
distinction is, therefore, vain, and does not relieve the
first theory from the objection made against it. If any one
wishes, with greater pertinacity, still to defend the idea,
that one and the same act can be performed freely and
necessarily, in different respects, necessarily in respect to
the first cause, which ordains it, but freely and
contingently in respect to the second cause, let him consider
that contingency and necessity differ not in certain
respects, but in their entire essence, and that they divide
the whole extent of being, and cannot, therefore, be
coincident. That is necessary which cannot fail to be done;
that is contingent which can fail to be done. These are
contradictions which can in no way be attributed to the same
act. The will tends freely to its own object, when it is not
determined, to a single direction, by a superior power; but,
when that determination is made by any decree of God, it can
no longer be said to tend freely to its own object; for it is
no longer a principle, having dominion and power over its own
acts. Did it not pertain to the nature of the bones of
Christ, (which they present as an example,) to be broken? Yet
they could not be broken on account of the decree of God. I
reply, that the divine determination being removed, they
could be broken; but, that determination, being presented by
the decree of God, they could not at all be broken, that is,
it was necessary, not contingent, that they should remain
unbroken. Did God, therefore, change the nature of the bones?
That was not necessary. He only prevented the act of breaking
the bones, which were liable by their nature to be broken,
which act could have been performed, and would have been, if
God had not anticipated it by His decree, and by an act
according to that decree. For our Lord gave up the ghost when
the soldiers were approaching the cross to break his bones,
and were about to use the breaking of his legs to accelerate
his death. That I may not be tedious, I will not refute all
the objections; but I am persuaded, from what has been
presented, that they are all susceptible of refutation. The
third distinction is that of the decree and its execution.
They use it thus; though God may have decreed from eternity
to devote certain persons to death, and, that this may be
possible, may have ordained that they should fall into sin,
yet he does not execute that decree, by their actual
condemnation, until after the persons themselves have become
sinful by their own act, and, therefore, He is free from
responsibility. I answer that the fact that the execution of
the decree is subsequent to the act of sin, does not free
from responsibility him, who, by his own decree, has ordained
that sin should occur, that he might afterwards punish it;
indeed he, who has ordained and decreed that sin should be
committed, cannot justly punish sin after its commission; he
cannot justly punish a deed, the doing of which he has
ordained; he cannot be the ordainer of the punishment, who
was the ordainer of the crime. Augustine rightly says, "God
can ordain the punishment of crimes, not the crimes
themselves," that is, He can ordain that they should take
place. I have already demonstrated that man does not become
depraved of his own fault, if God has ordained that he should
fall and become depraved.
The fourth distinction is that of efficacious and permissive
decree: which distinction, rightly explained, removes the
whole difficulty, but it removes also the theory, by which
God is affirmed to have ordained that sin should take place.
The authors, however, of the first theory endeavour to
sustain that theory by reference to permissive decree. They
affirm that God does not effect, but decrees and ordains sin,
and that this is done not by an efficacious, but by a
permissive decree; and they so explain a permissive decree,
that it coincides with one, which is efficacious. For they
explain permission to be an act of the divine will, by which
God does not bestow, on a rational creature, that grace,
which is necessary for the avoidance of sin. This action,
joined with the enactment of a law, embraces in itself the
whole cause of sin. For he, who imposes a law which cannot be
observed without grace, and denies grace to him, on whom the
law is imposed, is the cause of sin by the removal of the
necessary hindrance. But more on this point hereafter.
On the contrary, if permissive decree be rightly explained,
it is certain that he, who has decreed to permit sin, is by
no means the cause of sin; for the action of his will has
reference to its own permission, not to sin. Nor are these
two things, God, in the exercise of His will, permits sin,
and, God wills sin, equivalent. For, the object of the will
is, in the former case, permission, in the latter, sin. On
the contrary rather, the conclusion, God permits, therefore,
He does not will, a sinful act, is valid, for he who wills
any thing does not permit the same thing. Permission is a
sign of want of action in the will. That distinction, then,
does not relieve the first theory. The fifth distinction is
that of the divine decree and human nature, which they use
thus: -- sin, if you consider the divine decree, is
necessary; but if you have reference to human nature, which
is equally free and flexible in every direction, it is freely
and contingently committed; and, therefore, the whole
responsibility is to be placed on human nature, as the
proximate cause. We have discussed this, previously, in
reference to the second distinction, and have sufficiently
refuted it. They make another use of the same distinction, by
a diverse respect of the ends, which God has proposed to
Himself in His decree, and which are proposed to man in the
commission of sin. "For," they say, "God intends, in His
decree, to illustrate His own glory, but man intends to
gratify his own desire; and though man does the very thing,
which is divinely decreed, he does not do it because it is
decreed, but because his will so inclines him. I reply,
first; a good end does not approve, or make good, an action
which is unlawful in itself; for "we are not to do evil that
good may come;" but it is evil to ordain that sin shall be
committed. Secondly, that man, to satisfy his own desire,
should do that which God has forbidden, also results from the
decree of God, and, therefore, man is relieved from
responsibility. Thirdly, though the fulfillment of the divine
decree is not the end which moves man to the commission of
sin, yet that same thing is the cause which, by a gentle,
silent, and imperceptible, yet efficacious, movement effects
that man should sin, or, rather, commit that act which God
had decreed should be committed, which, then, in respect to
man, cannot be called sin. Finally, the last defense consists
in a reference to the end, of which they make this use: "We
are accustomed to state the decree of God, not in these
terms, that 'God has determined to adjudge some men to
eternal death and condemnation,' but we add, ' that His
justice may be illustrated to the glory of his name.'"
I answer, that the addition does not deny the previous
statement, (for this is confirmed by the rendering of the
cause,) and the addition, even of the best end, does not
justify an action which is not in itself formally good, as
has before been stated. From these things, then, it is
apparent, that these grounds of defense are insufficient, and
avail nothing for the defense of that theory which states
that God ordained that men should fall and become depraved,
in order to open to Himself, in that manner, a way for the
execution of the decree which He had, from eternity,
determined and proposed to Himself, for the illustration of
His own glory by mercy and justice. If any one may think that
any other distinction or explanation can be presented, by
which that theory may be defended and vindicated, I shall be,
in the highest degree, pleased, if this is done. But let him
be cautious not to change the theory or add to it any thing
inconsistent with it. You mention, at the end of your sixth
answer, an objection to your view; -- "Then the judgments of
God depend on contingency, and are based on things
contingent, if they have reference to man as a sinner, and to
his sin." I must examine this with diligence, since it also
lies against my view, in that I think that sin must be
presupposed in the object of the divine decree. It is most
manifest, from the Scriptures, that many of the judgments of
God are based on sin, which, yet, cannot be said, to depend
on sin. It is one thing to make sin the object and occasion
of the divine judgments, and another to make it the cause of
the same. The judgment, which God pronounces in reference to
sin, He pronounces freely, nor does this depend on sin, for
He can suspend it, or substitute another in its place; yet it
is based on sin, because, apart from sin, He could not thus
judge. But sin is contingent, or contingently committed.
Therefore, the judgments of God are based on things
contingent. I deny the consequence. The judgments of God are
based on sin, not as it is committed contingently, but as it
is certainly and infallibly foreseen by God. Therefore, the
sight of God intervenes between sin and judgment, and thus,
judgment is based on the certain and infallible vision of
God. Then that which exists, so far as it exists, is
necessary. But the judgments of God are based on sin, already
committed and in existence. In your answer, however, I could
wish that it might be explained to me how those things, which
are contingent, depend on the ordination of God, whether
according to the source or the act, the word ordination
having reference to a decree that certain things shall be
done, not to the disposal of the order in which they shall be
done, for so the word is to be understood in this place. For,
though God has appointed the mode of contingency in nature,
yet it does not follow from this that contingencies have
their source in the ordination of God. For a cause, which is
free and governs its own action, can suspend or carry forward
a contingent act, according to its own will; so also in
reference to the act. I do not, therefore, understand in what
way contingencies, which are such in themselves, are not
contingencies to God, from the fact that He has established
the mode of contingency in nature. Sin is not, in any mode
and in respect to anything, necessary. Therefore, sin is also
contingent to God, that is, it is considered by God as done
contingently, though in His certain and infallible sight, on
account of the infinity of the divine knowledge. Nor is it
the same idea, that a thing should be really contingent to
the supreme cause, and that a thing, truly contingent in
itself, should be considered as contingent by that supreme
cause. For it is understood that nothing can be accidental or
contingent to God, for He is immutable, He is entirely
uncompounded, and, as Being and Essence, belongs to Himself
alone. But the knowledge of God considers things as they are,
though with vision far exceeding the nature of all things.
SEVENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I will not now adduce other reasons why that theory is not
satisfactory to me, since I perceive that you treat it in a
mode and respect different from mine. I come then to the
theory of Thomas Aquinas, to which, I think, you also gave
your assent, and presented proofs from the Scriptures, and I
will openly state that, of which I complain. I would pray you
not to be displeased with the liberty, which I take, if your
good will towards me was not most manifest.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SEVENTH PROPOSITION
I should prefer that those "other reasons," whatever they
might be, had been presented, that I might dispose of the
whole matter, (if possible,) at the same time, for I desire
that my opinion should be known to you without any
dissimulation, and that your expectation should be satisfied.
Nevertheless, I hope, that, in your wisdom, you will
perceive, from what I have already said, and shall yet say,
either what my opinion is concerning those reasons, or what
there may be, according to my view, in which your mind may
rest, (which may the Lord grant). The theory of Thomas
Aquinas I unite with the other, I do not follow it. But I
will, briefly and in a few words, explain what I shall state
in this argument, and in what mode, from the word of God, and
what does not please me in that theory, noticing the words of
your writing in the same order.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SEVENTH PROPOSITION
If I thought, indeed, that you considered that first theory,
as it is explained by its authors, to be in accordance with
the Scriptures, I would, in every way, attempt to divest you
of that idea, but I see that you so explain it, as greatly to
change it; on which account I am persuaded that you judge
that, unless it be explained according to your
interpretation, it is, by no means, in accordance with the
Scriptures. You will also allow me, my brother, to repeat,
that, in your entire answer, you have not relieved that
theory from any objection. For it remains valid, that "God is
made the author of sin, if He is said to have ordained that
man should fall and become depraved that He might open to
Himself a way for the declaration of His own glory, in the
way in which He had already determined by eternal decree."
Yet, that no one may think that my promise was vain, I will
attempt by other arguments also the refutation of that
theory, which presents, as an object to God, in the act of
predestination, man not yet created or to be created. I used
two arguments, one a priore, the other, a posteriore or by
absurdity of consequence. The argument a priore was as
follows; -- Predestination is the will of God in reference to
the illustration of His glory by mercy and justice; but that
will has no opportunity for exercise in a being not yet
created. The argument a posteriore was as follows; If God
ordained that man should fall and become depraved, that He
might open to Himself a way for the execution of that purpose
of His will (predestination,) then it follows that He is the
author of sin by that ordination. These arguments have been
already dwelt upon at sufficient length.
I adduce my third argument. Predestination is a part of
providence, administering and governing the human race;
therefore, it was subsequent to the act of creation or to the
purpose of creating man. If it is subsequent to the act of
creation, or to the purpose of creating man, then man,
considered as not yet created, is not the object of
predestination. I will add a fourth. Predestination is a
preparation of supernatural benefits, it is, therefore,
preceded by the communication of natural gifts, and,
therefore, by creation, in nature, or act, or in the decree
of God. Also a fifth. The illustration of the wisdom of God
in creation, is prior to that illustration of the wisdom of
God, which is the business of predestination. (1 Cor. i, 21.)
Therefore, creation is prior to predestination, in the
purpose of God. If creation is prior, man is considered by
God, in the act of predestination, as existing, not as to be
created.
So also in reference to goodness and mercy, the former of
which, in the act of creation, was illustrated in reference
to Nothing, the latter, in the act of predestination,
concerning that which was subsequent to Nothing. To the same
purpose can all the arguments be used, by which it was proved
that "sin is a condition requisite in the object of
predestination."
EIGHTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I shall, therefore, consider three things in that theory.
1. Did God elect from eternity, of human beings, considered
in their natural condition, some to supernatural felicity and
glory, and non-elect or pass by others?
2. Did God prepare for those whom He elected, that is, for
human beings to be raised from a natural to a supernatural
state, and to be translated to a participation of divine
things, according to the purpose of election, those means
which are necessary, sufficient, and efficacious to the
attainment of that supernatural felicity, but passed by
others, that is, determine not to communicate those means to
them, but to leave them in their natural state?
3. Did God, foreseeing that those persons, thus passed by,
would fall into sin, reprobate them, that is, decree to
subject them to eternal punishment?
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE EIGHTH PROPOSITION
Let this be the rule which shall guide us in our future
discussion. If any use the term, "in their natural
condition," they do not exclude supernatural endowments,
which God communicated to Adam, but use it in opposition to
sin, (which afterwards supervened,) and to native depravity.
They, who use these words otherwise, seem to me to be
deceived by a diversity of relation. The word reprobation is
here used, (as we have before observed,) in its third
signification, which we have called catachrestic; but
sufficient on that point. We will come to those three points
in their order.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE EIGHTH PROPOSITION
Natural condition I have opposed both to supernatural
endowments, and to sin and native depravity, for I have
supposed the former term to be used, to the exclusion of the
latter; -- not incorrectly, whether we consider the force of
the terms themselves, or their use by the school-men. Natural
condition has a relation to supernatural endowments, which
they exclude as transcending it, and to sin and depravity
which they, in like manner, exclude, as corrupting it. Though
I have used the term reprobation in the sense in which it is
used in your Theses and other writings, yet I shall desist
from it hereafter, (if I can keep this in my mind,) and use,
in its place, the words preterition and non-election, except
when I wish to include both acts, by Synecdoche, in one word.
For the term reprobation, as it is used by me, I will
substitute preparation of punishment or predamnation.
NINTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
In the first question, I do not present as a matter of doubt,
the fact that God has elected some to salvation, and not
elected or passed by others for I think that this is certain
from the plain words of Scripture; but I place the emphasis
on the subject of election and non election; -- Did God, in
electing and not electing, have reference to men, considered
in their natural condition. I have not been able hitherto to
receive this as truth.
THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE NINTH PROPOSITION
We remarked, in the sixth proposition, that, though the mode
of regarding man can and ought to be distinguished by certain
respects or relations, yet the authors of the first theory
have stated that mankind was considered in common by the
Deity in the case of election and reprobation; but the
authors of the second have not excluded that common relation
of the human race, which they have referred to a special
relation; but they have only desired that the contemplation
of supervenient sin should not affect the case of election
and reprobation, according to the declaration of the apostle,
"neither having done any good or evil," (Rom. ix, 11,) and
according to those words "natural condition," mean only the
exclusion of any reference to supervenient sin from the case
of election. If this observation is correct, the latter state
of the question, properly considered, will not be at variance
with the former. For he, who states that man, as not yet
created, as not yet fallen, and as fallen, was considered by
the Deity in the case of election and reprobation, he
certainly affirms the latter, and both the former. The
question, therefore, is, properly, not whether God, in
electing and in passing by or reprobating, had reference to
men in their natural condition, that is, apart from the
contemplation of sin, as sin, but the question should be,
whether God had reference, in this case, to man, apart from
any contemplation of sin as a cause. We deny this, on time
authority of the word of God. Nor did Augustine, to whom the
third theory is ascribed, mean any thing else, as he has most
abundantly set forth (lib. 1, quaes. ad Simplicianum), for
what he asserts concerning Jacob and Esau is either to be
understood, in the same manner, in the ease of Adam and Eve,
or the rule of election and reprobation will be different in
different cases, which is certainly absurd. Before, then,
Adam and Eve were made, or had any thing good or evil, the
Divine election, as we have plainly stated in the same
argument, was already made according to the purpose of grace,
which election preceded both persons, and all causes
originating from, or situated in, persons. The truth of this
is proved from authority, reason, and example. From
authority, in Romans 9, Ephesians 1, and elsewhere. From
reason; for, in the first place, election is made in Christ,
not in the creatures, or in any condition in them; secondly,
it is admitted by all, (which you afterwards acknowledge in
part, though in a different sense,) that predestination and
reprobation suppose nothing in the predestinate or the
reprobate, but only in Him who predestinates, as the apostle
affirms "not of works, but of Him that calleth." (Rom. ix,
11.) Augustine presents a most luminous exposition of that
passage, showing, from the reasoning of the apostle, that
neither works, nor faith, nor will, was foreseen in the case.
The procreation of the child depends, in nature, on the
parent only; much more does the adoption of His children
originate in God alone (to whom it peculiarly pertains to be
the cause and principle of all good), not in any
consideration of them. Finally the example of angels
demonstrates the same thing, of whom some are called elect,
others are non-elect. Of the angels, the elect were such
apart from any consideration of their works, and those, who
are non-elect, passed-by; or reprobate, are non-elect, apart
from the consideration of their works. For, as Augustine
conclusively argues in reference to men, "if, because God
foresaw that the works of Esau would be evil, He, therefore,
predestinated him to serve the younger, and, because God
foresaw that the works of Jacob would be good, He, therefore,
predestinated him to have rule over the elder, that which is
affirmed by the apostle, would be false, 'not of works,'" &c.
The state of the case is the same in reference to angels. For
God provided against the possible misery of these, by the
blessing of election; He did not provide against the possible
misery of those, in the work of reprobation and preterition.
But how? by predestinating the elect angels, to the adoption
of sons, who are so styled in Job 1, 2 & 38, and not
predestinating the others. God begat them as sons, not by
nature, but by will, which will is eternal, and preceded from
eternity their existence, which belongs to time. What does
the child contribute towards his procreation? He does not
indeed exist. What does an angel contribute towards his
sonship? If nothing, what does man contribute? In reply to
both these, Augustine, in the place already cited, surely
with equal justice, thunders forth that inquiry of St. Paul,
"who maketh thee to differ from another? and what hast thou
that thou didst not receive?" &c. (1 Cor. iv, 7.)
God, therefore, regards man in general; He does not find any
cause in man; for the cause of that adoption or filiation is
from His sole will and grace. But if any one should say that
sin is the cause of reprobation or preterition, He will not
establish that point. For, in the first place, the reasoning
of Augustine, which we have just adduced, remains unshaken,
based on a comparison of works foreknown; in the second
place, since we are, by nature, equally sinners before God,
one of these three things must be true; -- either all are
rejected on account of sin, as a common reason, or it is
remitted to all, or a cause must be found elsewhere than in
sin, as we have found it. Lastly, "who makes us to differ,"
if it be not God, according to the purpose of His own
election? Therefore, the affirmation stands, that God, in the
case of election and reprobation made from eternity,
considered man in general, so that He has in Himself, not in
man, the cause of both acts. Yet let us accurately weigh the
arguments, which are advanced here, though, properly, they
are not opposed to this theory.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE NINTH PROPOSITION
I think it is sufficiently evident how the authors of the
first theory considered man, from what was said in reply to
your answer to Prop. 6. But that the authors of the second
theory, by the addition of that special relation, did not
exclude the universal relation, seems hardly probable to me.
For he, who says that sin supervened to election and
preterition originating in their own causes, excluding sin
not only from the cause of election and preterition, but from
the subject and the condition requisite in it, he denies that
man, universally, considered as fallen, is presented to him
who elects and passes by, and if he denies this, he denies
also that man is considered in general, by God, in the act of
decree. In other respects I assent to what you affirm. Sin is
not the cause of election and preterition, yet this statement
must be rightly understood, as I think that it is here
understood, namely, that sin is not the cause that God should
elect some, and pass by others: let it be only stated that
sin is the cause that God may be able to pass by some
individuals of the human race made in His own image. In the
former statement there is agreement between us, in the latter
we disagree, if at all. It is not, then, the question, "Did
God have reference, in His own decree, to men apart from any
consideration of sin, as a cause, that is, as a cause that He
should elect these, and pass by those." For this is admitted
even by Augustine, who, nevertheless, presupposes to that
decree sin, as a requisite condition in its object. But the
question is this; "Is sin a condition requisite in the
object, which God has reference in the acts of election and
preterition, or not?" This is apparent by the arguments
presented by myself, which prove, not that sin is a cause of
that decree, but a condition, requisite in the object.
Augustine affirms this, and I agree with him. Let us look at
some passages from his works. In Book 1, to Simplicianus, he
excludes sin as a cause that God should elect or reprobate,
but includes it as a cause that He might have the power to
pass by or reprobate, or as a condition requisite in the
object of election and reprobation. The latter, I prove by
his own words, (there is no necessity of proof as to the
former, for in reference to that, there is agreement between
us). "God did not hate Esau, the man, but He did hate Esau,
the sinner," and again, "Was not Jacob, therefore, a sinner,
because God loved him? He loved in him not sin, of which he
was guilty, but the grace which Himself had bestowed, &c.,
and again, "God hates iniquity, therefore He punishes it in
some by damnation, and removes it from others by
justification." Again, "The whole race from Adam is one mass
of sinful and wicked being, among whom both Jews and
Gentiles, apart from the grace of God, belong to one lump."
If you say that Augustine was here discussing, not
preterition, but predamnation, I reply that Augustine knew no
preterition which was not predamnation, for he prefixes to
preterition hatred as its cause, as he prefixes love to
election. Then, I conclude, according to the theory of
Augustine, that what is affirmed in the case of Esau and
Jacob, is not to be understood in that of Adam and Eve, and
it does not, hence, follow that there would be a diverse mode
of election and reprobation, unless it be first proved that
God, in election, had reference to Adam and Eve, considered
in their primitive state, which, throughout this discussion,
I wholly deny. But there is a manifest difference between
Esau and Jacob, and Adam and Eve. For the former, though not
yet born, could be considered as sinners, for both had been
already conceived in sin; if they had not been created, they
could not be considered as such, for they were such in no
possible sense; not even when they had been created by God,
and remained yet in their original integrity. It cannot be
inferred from this, that "persons, and all causes originating
from, or situated in persons" preceded the act of election.
For sin, in which Jacob and Esau were then already conceived,
did not precede. Yet I admit that sin was not the cause that
God should love one and hate the other, should elect one and
reprobate the other, but it was a condition requisite in the
object of that decree. Those arguments, however, which you
present, do not injure my case. For they do not exclude sin
from the object of that decree as a requisite condition, nor
as a cause without which that decree could not be made, but
only as a cause, on account of which one is reprobated,
another elected.
This is apparent from Romans 9. For Esau had been conceived
in sin when those words were addressed by God to Rebecca. In
the same chapter also, the elect and the reprobate are said
to be "vessels of mercy" and "of wrath," which terms could
not be applied to them apart from a consideration of sin. I
will not now affirm, as I might do with truth, that Jacob and
Esau are to be considered, not in themselves, but as types,
the former being the type of the children of the promise, who
seek the righteousness which is of faith in Christ, the
latter, the type of the children of the flesh, who followed
after the righteousness of the law, which subject requires a
more extended explanation, but here not so necessary. The
first chapter to the Ephesians clearly affirms the same
thing, as it asserts that the election is made in Christ,
because it is of the grace, by which we have redemption in
the blood of Christ, &c.
Your arguments "from reason" do not militate against the
position, which I have assumed, they rather strengthen it.
For in the first place, "the election is made in Christ,"
therefore, it is of sinners, as will be hereafter proved at
greater length. Secondly, "predestination and reprobation
suppose nothing in their subject." Therefore, whatever
character the subject may have, which receives grace, for
such a character, and considered in the same relation, is the
grace prepared. But the sinner receives, and he only, the
grace prepared in predestination. Therefore, also for the
sinner alone, is grace prepared in predestination, but of
this, also, more largely hereafter. Thirdly, men are the sons
of God, not by generation, but by regeneration; the latter,
presupposes sin, therefore, adoption is made from sinners.
The example of angels in this case proves nothing. Their
election and reprobation and those of men are unlike, as you
in many places acknowledge, for their salvation is secured by
the grace of preservation and confirmation, that of men by
the grace of restoration. He begat angels, as sons to
Himself, according to the former grace; He regenerated men as
sons to Himself by the latter grace. Therefore, God regarded
man not in general, but as sinful, in reference to which
point is this question between us, though he might find in
man no cause that He should adopt one and pass by another, in
reference to which we have no controversy. The question then
remains between us, did God, in His decree of predestination
and reprobation, have reference to man considered in his
natural purity, or to man considered as in his sins? I assert
the latter, and deny the former, and I have presented many
arguments in support of my opinion; but I will now consider,
in their order, those things, which you have presented
against it.
TENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS.
First, in general. 1. Since no man was ever created by God in
a merely natural state; whence also no man could ever be
considered in the decree of God, since that, which exists in
the mind, is the material of action and exists in the
relation of capability of action, but takes its form from the
will and decree by which God determined actually to exert His
power, at any time, in reference to man. Hence, whatever
distinction may be made, in the mind, between nature, and a
supernatural gift, bestowed on man at the creation, that is
not to be considered in this place. For the creation of the
first man, and, in him, of all men, was in the image of God,
which image of God in man is not nature, but supernatural
grace, having reference not to natural felicity, but to
supernatural life. It is evident, from the description of the
image of God, that supernatural grace in man is that divine
image. For, according to the Scripture, it is "knowledge
after the image of Him that created him," (Col. iii, 10,) and
"righteousness and true holiness" pertaining to the new man
which is created after" (according to) "God." (Ephes. iv,
24.) In addition to this, all the fathers, seem, without
exception, to be of the sentiment that man was created in a
gracious state. So, also, our Catechism, ques. 62. Since
there is found, in the Scriptures, no reference to the love
of God according to election, no divine volition and no act
of God concerning men, referring to them in different
respects, until after the entrance of sin into the world, or
after it was considered as having entered.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TENTH PROPOSITION
Before I refer to arguments, an ambiguity must be removed,
which is introduced here, and which will be frequently
introduced whenever reference is made to a "merely natural
state." Things are called natural from the term "nature." But
nature is two-fold, therefore, natural things are also two-
fold. I affirm that nature is two-fold, as it is considered,
first in relation to this physical world, situated nearer and
lower in elementary and material things, which is described
by Philosophers in the science of Physics, secondly, in
relation to that spiritual world, namely, that which is more
remote and higher, consisting in spiritual and immaterial
things, which is treated of in Metaphysics, rightly so
called. From the former nature we have our bodies, and by it
we are animals; from the latter, we have our spirits, and by
it we are rational beings, which is also observed by
Aristotle (lib. 2, de gener. animalium cap. 3) in his
statement that the mind alone "enters from without" into the
natural body, and is alone divine; for there is no communion
between its action and that of the body. Hence, it is, that
natural things must, in general, be considered in three
modes; physically, in relation to the body according to its
essence, capability, actions and passions; metaphysically, in
relation to the intelligent mind, according to its essence
and being; and conjointly in relation to that personal union,
which exists in man, as a being composed of both natures. But
particularly, a distinction must be made in these same
natural things, in respect to nature as pure and as corrupt.
Therefore, all those things, which pertain to the nature of
man in these different modes, are said to belong to the mere
natural state of man, sin being excluded.
Now, I come to the particular members of your Proposition.
First, you affirm, "that no man was ever created in a merely
natural state." If you mean that he was created without
supernatural endowments, I do not see how this can be proved,
(though many make this assertion). The Scripture does not any
where make this statement. But you are not ignorant that it
is said in the schools, that a negative argument from
authority, as, "it is not written, therefore, it is not true"
is not valid. Again, the order of creation, in a certain
respect, proves the contrary, since the body was first made
from the dust, and afterwards the soul was breathed into it.
Which, then, is more probable, that the soul was, at the
moment of its creation, endowed with supernatural gifts, or
that they were superadded after its creation? I would rather
affirm that, as the soul was added to the body, so the
supernatural endowments were added to the soul. If God did
this in relation to nature, why may He not have done it, in
the case of grace, which is more peculiar. Lastly, I do not
think that it follows, if man was not made in a merely
natural state, but with supernatural endowments, that grace,
therefore, pertains to creation, and also that supernatural
gifts would therefore, pertain, in common, to the whole race.
That this consequence is false, is proved by the definition
of nature, and the relation of supernatural things. For what
else is nature than the principle of motion and rest,
ordained by God? If, then, supernatural things are ordained
on this principle, they cease to be supernatural and become
natural. Besides the relation of supernatural things is such
that they are not natural, as they are not common; for those
things which are common to all men belong to nature, but
supernatural things are personal, and do not pass to heirs. I
acknowledge that Adam and Eve received supernatural gifts,
but for themselves not for their heirs; nor could they
transmit them to their heirs, except by a general arrangement
or special grace. If this be so, then man is without
supernatural endowments, though, as you claim, the first man
may not have been made without them; and he is justly
considered by us as not possessing them, and much more would
he have been so considered by the Deity. Indeed, my brother,
God contemplated man, in a merely natural state, and
determined in His own decree to bestow upon him supernatural
endowments. He could then be so considered in the decree of
God. He contemplated nature, on which He would bestow grace;
the natural man, on whom He would bestow, by His own decree,
supernatural gifts. Was it not, indeed, a special act of the
will, to create man, and another special act of the will to
endow Him with supernatural gifts? Which acts, even though
they might have occurred at the same time (which does not
seem to me necessary, for the reasons which have been just
advanced) cannot be together in the order of nature, since
one may be styled natural, and the other supernatural. I know
that you afterwards speak of the image of God, but we shall
soon see that this has no bearing, (as you think), on this
case. Meanwhile, I wish that you would always keep in view
the fact, that, though all these things should be true, yet
they are not opposed to that doctrine which asserts that in
this decree, God considered man in general.
I will leave without discussion those subsequent remarks on
the material and the formal relation of the decree of God,
since the force of the argument does not depend on them, and
pass to the proof. "The creation of the first man," you
affirm, "and, in him, of all men, was in the image of God,"
(I concede and believe it,) "which image of God in man is not
nature but supernatural grace, having reference not to
natural felicity but to supernatural life." What is this,
your statement, my brother? Origen formerly affirmed the same
thing, and on this account received the reprehension of the
ancient church in its constant testimony and harmonious
declarations, as is attested by Epiphanius, Jerome and other
witnesses. I do not, however, believe that you agree in
sentiment with Origen, in opposition to the united and wise
declaration of that church, but some ambiguity, which you
have not observed, has led you into this mistake. Let us then
expose and free from its obscurity this subject, by the light
of truth.
The first ambiguity is in the word nature, the second in the
term supernatural. We have just spoken in reference to the
former, affirming that this term may refer to the lower
nature of elementary bodies, or to that higher nature of
spiritual beings, or finally to our human nature, composed of
both natures in one compound subject; and that this latter
nature is itself two-fold, pure and depraved.
The latter ambiguity consists in the fact, that the term
supernatural is applied, at one time, to those things which
are above this inferior nature, and pertain to the superior,
spiritual, or metaphysical nature; at another, to those
things which are above even that higher and metaphysical
nature, that is, to those which are properly and immediately
divine; and at another, to those things which are above the
condition of this our corrupt nature, as they are bestowed
upon us only of supernatural grace, though they might have
pertained to that pure nature. The body, for example, is of
this lower nature, and in comparison with it, the soul is
supernatural. Again, our souls are of the higher nature,
which pertains to angels. In reference to both the soul and
the body, all divine things are supernatural as they are
superior to all corporeal and mental nature. How you say that
"the image of God in man is not nature but supernatural
grace;" that is, as I think, it is not of nature, but of
grace, or not from nature, but from grace. Here consider, my
brother, the former ambiguity. "The image of God is not of
nature," if the lower or corporeal nature is referred to, is
a true statement, but if the higher nature is referred to, it
is not a true statement. For what is nature? It is the
principle, ordained of God, of motion and rest in its own
natural subject, according to its own mode. Place before your
mind the kinds of motion, which occur in the lower nature,
generation, corruption, increase, diminution, alteration,
local transition, which they style fora &c. You will find
this difference, that the subjects of this lower nature
experience these motions according to their own essence and
all other matters, that is, according to their material,
form, and accidents, but the subjects of that higher nature
are moved by no means according to their essence, but only
according to their being; but that divine things surpass both
natures, in an infinite and divine mode, because they are, in
all respects, destitute of all motion. The body is mortal;
whence, if not from this inferior nature? The soul is
immortal; whence, if not from that superior nature? But both
natures are ordained of God, and so perform their work,
immediately, that God performs, by both mediately, all things
which pertain to nature. But the image of God is from that
superior nature, by which God performs mediately in the
children of Adam, as He instituted our common nature in Adam,
our first parent. It is indeed true, that it was supernatural
grace by which God impressed His own image on Adam; just as
he also performed the work of creation by the same grace. God
bestowed its principle not on nature, of nature, but of
Himself; but when nature has received its existence, that
which existed by nature, was produced by nature in the
species and individuals. Though, in its first origin, it is
of grace, yet it is now, in its own essence, of nature, and
is to be called natural. But the image of God is produced, in
the species and in the individuals, by nature. Therefore, it
must be called natural We shall hereafter consider its
definition, for it is necessary first to elucidate the
statement that "the image of God has reference, not to
felicity, but to supernatural life." Let us remove the
ambiguity, as we shall thus speak more correctly of these
matters. Natural felicity pertains either to the nature from
which we have the body, or to that from which we have the
spirit, or to both natures united in a compound being. To
this latter felicity the image of God has, naturally, its
reference; to that of the body as its essential and
intimately associated instrument; to that of the spirit, as
its essential subject; to that of the man, as the entire
personal subject. If you deny this, what is there, I pray
you, in all nature, which does not seek its own good? But, to
every thing, its own good is its felicity. If, in this lower
nature, a stone, the herds, an animal, and, in that higher
nature, spirits and intelligent forms do this, surely it
cannot be justly denied to man, and to the image of God in
man. You add that "it has reference to supernatural life."
This, however, is a life dependent on grace, as all the
adjuncts show. If you understand that it has reference to
that life only, we deny such exclusive reference. If to this
(natural) life, and to that life conjointly, we indeed affirm
this, and assent to your assertion that the image of God in
man has respect to both kinds of felicity, both natural and
supernatural; by means of nature, in a natural mode, and of
grace, in a supernatural mode.
I would now explain this, in a more extended manner, if it
was not necessary that a statement should first be made of
the subject under discussion. Perceiving this very clearly,
you pass to a definition of that image, in proof of your
sentiment. "It is evident," you say, "from the description of
the image of God, that supernatural grace, in man, is that
divine image." You will permit me to deny this, since you ask
not my opinion. You add, "According to the Scripture, it is
'knowledge after the image of Him that created him,' (Col.
iii, 10,) and righteousness and true holiness pertaining 'to
the new man which is created after God.' (Ephes. v, 25)". I
acknowledge that these are the words of the apostle, and I
believe them, but I fear my brother, that you wander from his
words and sentiment.
In the former passage, he does not assert that the image of
God is "knowledge after the image etc," but that the "new man
is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created
him." The subject of the proposition is man, one in
substance, but once "old," now "new." In this subject there
was old knowledge, there is new knowledge. According to the
subject, the knowledge is one, but it differs in mode; for
the old man and the new man understand with the same
intellect, in the previous case as the old, afterwards as the
new man. What, therefore, is the mode of that knowledge!
"After the image of God." This is the mode of our knowledge
and intelligence. The former (that which is old) according to
the image of the first Adam who "begat a son in his own
likeness;" (Gen. v, 3;) the latter according to the image of
the second Adam, Christ and God, our Creator. The image of
God is not said to be knowledge, but knowledge is said to be
renewed in us after the image of God. What, then, is
knowledge? An act of the image of God. What is the image of
God? The fountain and principle of action, fashioning in a
formal manner, the action, or the habit of that image. The
mode, in which this may be understood, is a matter of no
interest to me. Consider, I pray you, and I appeal to
yourself as a judge, whether this can be justly called a
suitable description; -- "The image of God is knowledge
according to the image of God." This description, indeed,
denies that the image of God is either one thing or another;
either knowledge or the image of God, if, indeed, knowledge
is according to the image of God. You will, however,
understand these things better, from your own skill, than
they can be stated by me in writing. I now consider the other
passage. "The image of God is ' righteousness and true
holiness' pertaining 'to the new man, which is created after
God."' Here you affirm something more than in the previous
case, yet without sufficient truth. That knowledge, of which
you had previously spoken, is a part of truth, for it is the
truth, as it exists in our minds. Here you state that it is
truth, and righteousness and holiness. But let us examine the
words of the apostle. He asserts, indeed, that the new man is
one "which after God is created in righteousness and true
holiness." I will not plead the fact that many explain the
phrase "after God," as though the apostle would say "by the
power of God working in us." I assent to your opinion that
the words kata< Qeon mean simply the same as would be implied
in the phrase "to the image," or "according to the image of
God." Yet do you not perceive that the same order, which we
have just indicated, is preserved by Paul; and that the
subject, the principle, and the acts or habits, thereby
inwrought, are most suitably distinguished? The subject is
man, who is the same person, whether as the old; or the new
man. The principle is the image of God, which is the same,
whether old or new, and purified from corruption. The acts or
habits, inwrought by that principle, are righteousness,
holiness, and truth. Righteousness, holiness, and truth are
not the image, but pertain to the image. Let us return, if
you please, to that principle, which the Fathers laid down
"natural things are corrupt, supernatural things are
removed." You may certainly, hence, deduce with ease this
conclusion; -- righteousness, holiness and truth are not
removed, therefore, they are not supernatural. Again, they
have become corrupt, therefore, they are natural. If they had
been removed, none of their elementary principles would exist
in us by nature. But they do exist; therefore, they are by
nature, and are themselves corrupt, and, with them, whatever
originates in them. The same is the fact with the image of
God. The image of God is not removed; it is not, therefore,
supernatural; and, on the other hand, it has become corrupt;
it is, therefore, natural. For it is nowhere, in the
Scriptures, said to be bestowed, but only to be renewed. I
shall offer proof, on this point, from the Scriptures, when I
have made a single remark. Righteousness, holiness, truth,
exist only in the image of God; there is, in man, some
righteousness, holiness and truth; therefore, there is in man
somewhat of the image of God. Moses, in Genesis 1, certainly
relates nothing else than the first constitution of nature,
as made in reference to every subject and species. But he
relates that man was made in the image of God. This, then,
was the constitution of human nature. But, if it is of
nature, then the image of God pertains universally to the
human race, since natural things differ from personal things
in this, that they are common. The same is evident from Gen.
v, 3. Adam begat Seth "in his own likeness," in his own
image; but Adam was made in the image of God; therefore he
begat Seth in the image of God. It may be said, however, that
the image of God, and the image of Adam differ, and that a
distinction is made between them by Moses. They indeed
differ, but in mode, not in their essence; for the image of
God in Adam was uncorrupted, in Seth it was corrupted through
Adam; yet in both cases it was the image. In the same
respect, this image, in the rest of the human race, is called
according to its corruption, the image of the earthy,
according to its renewal, the image of the heavenly. But
since the image of God is diverse in mode only, and not in
essence, it is said to be renewed, and restored, and not to
be implanted or created, as we have before observed, as that
which differs not in essence, but in mode or degree. The same
thing is taught in Gen. ix, 6. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood,
by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made
he man." If the image of God did not exist in the descendants
of Adam, who are slain, the argument of Moses would be
impertinent and absurd. But the argument, either of Moses or
of God, is just and conclusive; for if you say, -- "The
slayer of him, whom God has made in His own image, ought to
be slain by man; God made the man who is slain in his own
image; therefore, let the murderer be slain by man." the
argument is valid. For since man was made in the image of
God, it is just that his murderer should be slain, and indeed
that he should be slain by man. But if you explain the
passage "for in the image of God made He man," so that "He"
shall refer to man, my interpretation of the argument will be
even more confirmed. I do not, however, remember that it is
affirmed any where in the Scriptures that man made man, nor
can it be proved to me. These things, I think will be
sufficient that you may see, my brother, that the image of
God is naturally in man.
What, then, is the image of God? For it is now time that we
pass from destructive to constructive reasoning. I will state
it, in the words of the orthodox Fathers. Let Tertullian, of
the Latins, first speak (lib. 2 advers. Marcion, cap. 9.)
"The distinction is especially to be noticed, which the Greek
Scriptures make, when they speak of the afflatus, not of the
Spirit, (pnohn non pneu~ma) for some, translating from the
Greek, not considering the difference or regarding the proper
use of words, substitute Spirit for afflatus, and afford
heretics an occasion of charging fault on the Spirit of God,
that is, on God Himself; and it is even now a vexed question.
Observe, then, that the afflatus is inferior to the Spirit,
though it comes from the Spirit, as its breath, yet it is not
the Spirit. For the breeze is lighter than the wind, and if
the breeze is of the wind, the wind is not therefore, of the
breeze. It is usual also, to call the afflatus the image of
the Spirit; for thus also, man is the image of God, that is
of the Spirit, for God is Spirit, therefore, the image of the
Spirit is the afflatus. Moreover the image will never in all
respects equal the reality; for to be according to the truth
is one thing, to be the truth itself is another. Thus, also,
the afflatus cannot, in such a sense, be equal to the Spirit,
that, because the truth -- that is the Spirit, or God -- is
without sin, therefore the image, of truth also, must be
without sin. In this respect the image will be inferior to
the truth, and the afflatus will be inferior to the Spirit,
having some lineaments of the Deity, in the fact that the
soul is immortal, free, capable of choice, prescient to a
considerable degree, rational, and capable of understanding
and knowledge. Yet, in these particulars, it is only an
image, and does not extend to the full power of divinity, and
so, likewise, it does not extend to sinless integrity, since
this belongs alone to God, that is to truth, and can not
pertain to the mere image; for as the image, while it
expresses all the lineaments and outlines of the truth, yet
is destitute of force, not having motion, so the soul, the
image of the Spirit, is not able to exhibit its full power,
that is, the felicity of freedom from sin, otherwise it would
be not the soul, but the Spirit, not man, endowed with mind,
but God, &c." Ambrose (hexaemeri lib. 6, cap. 7), after many
arguments, concludes in this way; "for 'what will a man give
in exchange for his soul?' in which there is, not merely a
small portion of himself, but the substance of the entire
human race. It is this by which thou hast dominion over other
living creatures, whether beasts or birds. This is the image
of God, but the body is in the likeness of beasts; in one
there is the sacred mark of divine resemblance, in the other
the vile fellowship with the herds and wild beasts, &c."
Also, in Psalm 118, sermon 10, "Likeness to the image of God
consists, not in the body, or in the material parts of our
nature, but in the rational soul; in respect to which man was
made after the likeness and image of God, and in which the
form of righteousness, wisdom, and every virtue is found."
To the same purpose are the words of Augustine, in his first
Book "De Genes. contra Manich," chap. 17th, and in many other
places. I mention also Jerome, because he evidently has the
same view, and, in writing against Origen, he uses the same
argument with that of Epiphanius and the Greek Fathers. I
would refer to Basil, if you did not know that Ambrose quotes
from him. Why should I speak of Chrysostom, the two
Gregories, Cyril, Theodouret? Damascenus, an epitomist of all
those writers, presents this subject, with the greatest
accuracy, in the book which he has inscribed "Concerning the
respect in which we were made in the image of God." Also, in
another, which has reference to "The two wills in Christ," in
which he uses the following words, "as to the rational, and
intellectual, and voluntary powers, they belong to the mind
at birth, and the Spirit is superadded, as having princely
prerogative, and in these respects both angels and men are
after the image of God, and this is abundantly true of men,
&c.," in which passage he has, with the utmost diligence,
introduced those things which are essential and those which
are adjunct.
I conclude with a single argument from Augustine against the
Manichees. "Those men," he says, "do not know that it is not
possible that nature should use any action, or produce any
effect, the faculty for which has not been received according
to nature. For example, no bird can fly, unless it has
received the faculty of flying, according to nature, and no
beast of the earth can walk, unless it has received the
faculty of walking, according to nature. So, likewise, man
cannot act or will, unless he has received, according to
nature, that faculty, which is called the "voluntary," and
the "energetic;" and he cannot understand if he has not
received from nature the intellectual faculty, and he cannot
see, or perform any other action, and, therefore, in every
kind of nature, natural actions find place, and they exist at
once and together, but those which depend on the will and
activity, do not exist together." From which reasoning he
infers that man understands, reasons, wills, and, above other
creatures, does many things which savour of divinity;
therefore, many faculties exist in man, in respect to which
he is said, in the Scriptures, to have been made in the image
and likeness of God.
Here then is that image of God, in our soul; its essential
parts not only show, of themselves, some resemblance, by
nature, to divinity, but are, by nature and grace together,
adapted to the perception of supernatural grace, as we shall
soon show. You add that "all the fathers, seem, without
exception, to be of the sentiment that man was created in a
gracious state. So also our Catechism, ques. 6." I have,
indeed, known no one among orthodox divines, who holds any
different opinion; nor is there any other correct explanation
of our catechism.
But you seem to fall into an error from a statement, which is
susceptible of a two-fold interpretation, and to unite things
really distinct. For it is not meant that the first man was
created with grace, that is, that he received, in the act of
creation, nature and supernatural grace; but this is their
meaning: the man who was first created, received grace, that
is, supernatural grace, as an additional gift -- which idea
we have before presented in this answer. What then? Did he
not have supernatural grace in creation? If you understand,
by grace, the good will of God, he had grace; if you
understand supernatural gifts, bestowed upon him, then he did
not have those things, which are supernatural, from creation,
or by the force of creation, since creation is the principle
of nature, or its first term, but supernatural things
entirely differ from it; but he had them in creation, that
is, in that first state of creation in which Adam was until
he fell into sin. That you may more easily understand the
subject, let us use the illustration of the sun and moon, to
explain the divine image. The moon has an essential image,
and one which is relative and accidental. As its image is
essential, it has its own light in some degree; yet it would
be darkened, unless it should look towards the sun; as its
image is relative, it has light borrowed from the sun, while
it is looked upon by it, and looks to it. So, there was, in
man, a two-fold relation of the image of God, even from the
creation. For man had his own essential light fixed in the
soul, which shines as the image of God among created things;
he had also a relative light, as he was looked upon by God,
and looked back to God. The essential image is natural; the
relative image was, so to speak, supernatural, for it looked
to God, through nature joined to grace, by a peculiar and
free motion of the will; God looked upon it, of grace, (for,
what action of God towards us is natural?) We have that
essential light, corrupted by sin; it is plain that we have
not lost it. We have lost the relative light; but Christ
restores this, that we may be renewed, after God, in his own
image, and that the essential light may be purified, since
natural things are corrupted, the supernatural are lost, as
we have previously said.
Your second argument is stated thus: "Since there is found,
in the Scriptures, no reference to the love of God according
to election, no divine volition, and no act of God,
concerning men, referring to them in different respects,
until after the entrance of sin into the world, or after it
was considered as having entered." If I should concede this,
yet the sentiment of those, who say that man is considered,
in general, by the Deity, would not, therefore, be confuted,
as we have before shown. But I may, perhaps, be able to
disprove this assertion by authority, by reason, and by
example. You have authority in Romans ix, 11-13. "For the
children being not yet born, neither having done any good or
evil, that the purpose of God, according to election, might
stand, not of works, but of Him that calleth; it was said
unto her, The elder shall serve the younger; as it is
written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated." What do
those three phrases indicate "the children being not yet
born;" again, "neither having done any good or evil;" and
"according to election, not of works, but of Him that
calleth." You will say, "these expressions are according to
truth; but they have reference to fallen and sinful nature."
But they exclude, with the utmost care, all reference to sin
and refer all blessing to the sole vocation of God, who
calleth, as even yourself, my brother, if you are willing to
observe it, (and you certainly are thus willing,) may easily
deduce from that proposition. To this authority you will
certainly submit every semblance of reasoning. (Ephes. i, 4,
5,) "He hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of the
world, having predestinated us unto the adoption of children,
by Jesus Christ to Himself."
Election originates in special love; and when He is said to
have chosen us in Christ, all reference to ourselves is
excluded; predestination also precedes both persons and cases
relating to them. Indeed this is indicated by the words
"foreknow" and "predestinate," (Rom. 8). Christ himself
attributes to the blessing of the Father only that they were
made possessors of the kingdom, "from the foundation of the
world," (Matt. 30). In sin, or previous to sin? In view of
sin, or without reference to it? Why should the former be
true, I ask, rather than the latter? Why indeed, should not
the latter rather, since all things are said to depend on
God, who calleth? To these, let the following considerations
be added:
1. Whatever absurdity may be connected with this subject, you
will perceive, (if you examine it closely,) that it pertains
as much to the former interpretation, and rather more to it
than to the latter. This absurdity is not to be passed by,
but rather to be religiously and suitably removed.
2. I deny that a reference to sin belongs to the matter of
filial adoption. I call nature as a witness: Does not a
father beget sons, before he investigates or observes what
shall be their condition? But this generation, (namely that
of the children of God), is of will and not of nature. True:
yet it is attributed to the will of God alone, not to any
condition in us. Every condition in us is excluded, even that
of sin; the will of God, alone, His purpose, alone, is
considered in the matter. God distinguishes by His mere will
among those equal in nature, equal in sin; whom, considered
in their natural condition simply, not in that of sin, but
generally in Christ, He adopts as His children. As in nature,
children are begotten without reference to their future
condition, so God, of His own will, adopted from eternity His
own children.
3. Whatever is more consistent with the wisdom and grace of
God, would be performed by the Deity, and is to be believed
by us, rather than that which is less consistent. But it is
more consistent with His wisdom and grace that He should
adopt unto Himself children without any consideration of
character, than that He should do so on the supposition of
such consideration; otherwise nature would act more perfectly
than God, as according to nature, fathers beget children,
without such consideration. Therefore, the former view is
more consistent with the character of God, and rather to be
received with faith by us.
As an example, for the confirmation of this matter, we will
take, if you please, that of the Angels. Whoever are the sons
of God, are sons by election. Angels are the sons of God,
(Job 1, 2, & 37,) therefore, they are such by election, as
Paul affirms (1 Tim. v, 21,) when he calls them "the elect."
But they are elect without consideration of their sins, as
they did not sin, but remained in their original condition.
Therefore, the love of God is with election, without
reference to sin, or consideration of it, which you seem to
deny in your assertion. Perhaps you will say that your
assertion had reference only to men. But I reply, that love
and election are spoken of in relation both to angels and
men, and in the same manner, since God placed, in both, his
own image, in reference to which election is made. The most
decisive proof of this is found in the principle that, if any
act which apparently exists in reference to two things, which
have the same relation, does not really exist in reference to
one, it does not exist in reference to the other. In the
election of Angels, there is no reference to their condition
or their works; therefore, in the election of men there is no
such reference. If the condition of Angels and of men is, in
some respects, different, it does not follow that the mode of
their election is different; especially when the relation of
that thing, in reference to which they are chosen, is the
same in both cases. This is the image of God, which,
preserved or restored according to His own will, he has
called and united to Himself, which will remain immutably in
Christ, "gathering together in one all things," (Ephes. i,
10,) and which he had placed on the common basis of his own
nature, from which, those, who were to be damned according to
His judgment, fell of their own will.
It is not possible to adduce any other example; because all
other things are created in a different relation. For they
are destitute of the image of God, in which consists, with
suitable limitations, the object of election. Therefore, the
nature of the divine election, made concerning men, can be
illustrated by the example of angels, and by no other
example. But the divine election was such, not that it
separated, at first, the Angels who sinned from those who did
not sin, but that, of His own will and grace, he
distinguished those who were not about to sin, as previously
elected and predestinated to adoption, from others who were
about to sin of their own free will. What reason, then, is
there that we should think that another mode of the divine
election must be devised in reference to men?
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TENTH PROPOSITION
I apply the term natural to whatever pertains to the
substance and existence of man, without which man cannot
exist. Such are the soul and the body, and the whole system
compounded of them, with all natural attributes, affections,
passions, &c. I apply the term supernatural to whatever God
has bestowed on man above and in addition to those natural
characteristics, which indeed pertain to the perfection of
man, not in respect to his animal nature, but in respect to
his spiritual nature, to the acquisition not of natural, but
of supernatural good. I apply the phrase "merely natural," in
this place, to that which has nothing supernatural added to
it. The sense then of my words is that man is not made in a
merely natural state, without supernatural endowments.
I do not here contend, with much strenuousness, whether he
has those supernatural endowments from the act of creation or
from another act of superinfusion, but leave this without
decision, as neither useful or injurious to my cause. But I
decidedly state and affirm, that God decreed to make man such
by nature, as he in fact did make him; but such, that He
might add to him some supernatural endowments, as He not only
wished that he might be such as he was by nature, but He
wished also to advance him further to a happier state,
namely, to a participation of Himself, to which he could not
attain, unless endowed with supernatural gifts. But when I
deny that man was made in a merely natural state, and,
therefore, was created with supernatural gifts, I wish not to
indicate that the act, by which supernatural endowments are
communicated, was creation, (for in my 26th proposition I
have called that act superinfused Grace,) but that God was
unwilling to cease from the act of communicating His blessing
to that part of primitive matter or Nothing from which He
created man, and that of His own decree, until he should also
have bestowed those supernatural gifts upon him. I thought
that I ought to observe the mode of expression, used in the
Scripture, which declares that man was created "in the image
and likeness of God," which image and likeness of God
comprehends in itself also supernatural gifts. If this is
true, as I contend, then man was created with supernatural
endowments. For he was made in the image of God, and the word
"made" is attributed, without distinction, to all parts of
the image, without separating that, in the image, which is
natural from that which is supernatural to man. I am glad to
quote here the words of Jerome Zanchius, who, in his first
book concerning the creation of man, chapter 1, speaks
concerning this same matter in these terms;" I am pleased
with the sentiment of those, who say that with the
inbreathing of life, there was also inbreathed and infused by
the Deity whatever Adam possessed of celestial light, wisdom,
rectitude, and other heavenly gifts; in which he reflects the
Deity, as His true image. For he was created such as the
Scripture teaches, affirming that he was made in the image of
God, and Solomon in Eccl. vii, 29, "God made man upright."
But he was not such when his body only was formed. When, with
a soul placed in him, he became a living soul, that is a
living man, that he was made upright, just, &c., and thus, at
the same time with his soul, rays also of divine wisdom,
righteousness, and goodness were infused." Thus Zanchius, who
clearly decides what I left without decision in either
direction, and this for a twofold reason; I knew that it was
a matter of dispute among the learned, and I perceived that
nothing could be deduced from it either of advantage or
disadvantage to my cause.
Those supernatural gifts, which were bestowed on man, he
received for transmission to posterity, on the terms, on
which he received them, namely, of grace, not as this word
denotes the principle of natural endowments, for from grace,
understood in its widest sense, we have received even our
nature, as that to which we had no claim, but as it is used
in contra-distinction to nature, and as it is the principle
of supernatural gifts. I can then concede that God had
reference to man in nature, as the subject of grace, the
natural man as the subject of supernatural gifts; but that He
had reference to him, contemplated in the administrative
decree of creation, not in the decree of predestination,
which we have now under discussion; as the subject of grace
sufficient for supernatural felicity, not of effectual grace,
of which we now dispute; as the subject of supernatural
gifts, to be transmitted to his posterity, without exception,
according to the arrangement of grace, and without any
condition, not of such gifts as are peculiar to those, who
are predestinated, and to be bestowed, with certainty and
infallibly, upon them, in reference to which is the
controversy between us.
Hence, these things are not opposed to my sentiment, for in
them the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi is committed. I wish,
however, that you would always remember that I speak
constantly concerning the grace, prepared in the decree of
predestination, and in no other decree. But I have proved
that man was not made in a merely natural state, in the
sense, as I have already stated, of a destitution of
supernatural endowments, whether he is said to have them by
the act of creation, or by the act of superinfusion; and I
have proved it by an argument, deduced from the image and
likeness of God in which man was created. Which argument is
valid, whether the image of God signifies only supernatural
gifts, bestowed on man by the Deity, as our Catechism and
Confession, and some of our theologians affirm in reference
to the image of God, or nature itself, together with those
supernatural gifts, which is my opinion; according to which I
wish that my affirmation, that "the image of God in man is
not nature, but supernatural grace," should be understood,
that is, that it is not nature alone, apart from supernatural
endowments, which is sufficient for any argument. For the
question is not concerning natural qualities, and therefore,
the decision of the point whether they belong to the image of
God, according to my opinion, or not, does not affect the
subject of inquiry. Let supernatural qualities be embraced in
the definition of the image of God, in which man was made,
and I have obtained what I desire.
I also wish that my subsequent remarks should be understood
in the same manner, namely, that the image of God, has
respect, not to natural felicity only, but to supernatural,
and if that is true, as you seem to concede, I have attained
my object. I did not wish to define with accuracy the image
of God in which man was made, since this was not necessary to
my purpose: it was sufficient to have shown that "knowledge,
righteousness, and holiness" pertained also to the image of
God, whether that image consisted wholly or only in part in
them. For either of these statements would be equally
available for my purpose, as I had undertaken to prove that
man was not created without supernatural endowments, and
therefore that he could not have been considered, in the
decree of predestination, as created in a merely natural
state, without supernatural endowments. But, before I come to
the defense of my argument on this point, I must speak, at
somewhat greater length, of three things, in considering
which, a considerable part of your answer is occupied. First.
I will explain more fully than I have before done, what I
call natural, and what, supernatural qualities. Secondly. I
will speak of the image of God, and what things, whether
natural or supernatural, are embraced in it, and in its
definition. Thirdly, by what action of the Deity, man has
both the former, and the latter qualities.
First; I call those qualities natural which pertain to the
nature of man, without which man cannot be man, and which
have their source in the principles of nature, and are
prepared, by their own nature, for natural felicity, as their
end and limit: such are the body, the soul, the union of
both, and that which is made up of both, and their natural
attributes, affections, functions, and passions; under which
I also comprehend moral feelings, which are sometimes spoken
of in contradistinction to those which are natural. I call
those qualities supernatural which are not a part of man, and
do not originate in natural principles, but are superadded to
natural principles, for the increase and perfection of
nature, designed for supernatural felicity, and for a
supernatural communion with God, our Creator, in which that
felicity consists.
Between these, exists a natural relation of this character,
that natural qualities may receive the addition of
supernatural, by the arrangement of God, and that
supernatural qualities are adapted for adding to, adorning
and perfecting nature, and are therefore ordained for
exalting it above itself. Hence, without ambiguity, under the
term natural, I have comprehended nature both corporeal and
spiritual, and that which is composed of both. It is,
however, to be carefully observed -- that ambiguities of
words are to be noticed and explained, in a discussion, when,
if taken in one sense, they favour any view, and, if in the
other, they do not, when, according to one sense, a statement
is true, and, according to the other, is false. But when the
statement is true, and pertinent to the subject, in whatever
sense a word is taken, there is no need of an explanation of
the ambiguity. Thus, in this case, you observe that I
understand, by natural qualities, both those which pertain to
the inferior nature, that is, to the body, and those which
pertain to the superior nature, that is, to the soul, and in
whatever mode you take it, my argument is equally strong and
valid. We shall hereafter notice examples of equally
unnecessary reference to ambiguity.
Secondly; two things must be considered in reference to the
image of God in man, in what things does it consist, and
which of them may be called material, and which supernatural?
I affirm that the image of God in man embraces all those
things which represent in man any thing of the divine nature,
which are partly essential: yet God did not wish that the
images of all of them should be essential to man, whom He
wished to create, in such a condition, not only that he might
be that which he was, but that he might have the capability
of becoming that which he was not, and of failing to be that
which he was. I call essential the soul, and in it the
intellect, and will, and the freedom of the will, and other
affections, actions, and passions, which necessarily result
from them. I call accidental both the moral virtues, and the
knowledge of God, righteousness and true holiness, and
whatever other attributes of the Deity exist, to be
considered in Him as essential to his own nature, but in man
as an express image, of which under the term "divine nature,"
Peter says, that believers are "partakers." 2. I do not think
that all these things can be comprehended under the term
natural, but I think that "knowledge, righteousness and true
holiness," are supernatural, and are to be called by that
name. I am in doubt whether I have your assent to this
affirmation. For in one part of your answer, you say that
those are natural qualities, and present arguments in support
of that view, and in another place, in the same answer, you
acknowledge that Adam had supernatural gifts though not from
the act of creation: by which supernatural qualities, I know
not what you can understand, except those things which are
mentioned by the apostle in Colossians 3, and Ephesians
4. Yet you seem to set forth under the term reflexive image,
those very things which you acknowledge to be supernatural.
But, whether I rightly understand your sentiment or not, I
will speak of those things which, I think, tend to confirm my
sentiment, and to refute your view, as I understand it.
I prove, then, that those qualities are supernatural. First,
from Colossians 3, and Ephesians 4. Whatever things we have,
from regeneration, by the spirit of Christ, are supernatural.
But we have, from regeneration, by the Spirit of Christ, "the
knowledge of God, righteousness and true holiness."
Therefore, they are supernatural. If any one says that we do
not have them, in substance, from regeneration, but only a
renewal of the same qualities, which had previously been made
corrupt, I do not see how that assertion can be proved. For
the phrases of the apostle teach another doctrine. For he who
must "put on the new man," is not clothed with the "new man,"
or with any part of him. But to the new man, pertain
"righteousness and true holiness." Then, in the case of him,
who must be "renewed in knowledge," it is not his knowledge
which has become corrupt and must be renewed, but his
intelligence, which must be enlightened with new knowledge,
which has been utterly expelled by the darkness of the old
man. I designed this, only, in my argument, and not to define
the image of God in man. But I cannot see that I differ from
the view of the apostle in my explanation. For the knowledge
of God, in the passage quoted by me, is the "image of God"
itself, and "after the image of God." Nor are these
expressions at variance with each other, nor are they so
absurd as you wish them to appear. You say "the image of God
is knowledge, according to the image of God, therefore, the
image of God is denied to be either knowledge or image." I
deny this sequence if the definition is rightly understood,
namely, in the following manner. The image of God, renewed in
us by the regenerating Spirit, is the knowledge of God,
according to the image of God, in which, at the beginning, we
were created. This image has a two-fold relation, in that it
is created anew in us by the Spirit of Christ, and that it
was formerly created in us by the Spirit of God. That
knowledge differs not only in mode, but in its whole nature,
from the knowledge of the old man: nor is it said to be
renewed, but the man is said to be renewed in it. But I
confess that I cannot understand how knowledge is an act of
the image of God, and how that image is the fountain or
principle of that act, that is of knowledge. For I have
hitherto thought that man was said to be created in or to the
image of God, that is, because, in mind, will, knowledge of
God, righteousness and finally holiness, he refers to God
Himself, as the archetype. In the other passage from
Ephesians 4, I do not find the three characteristics, "truth,
righteousness and holiness," but only two, righteousness and
holiness, to which is ascribed truth, that is, sincerity,
purity, simplicity. Knowledge, also, is not a member or
portion of that truth, but a gift, created in the intellect
or mind of man, as righteousness and holiness are ingenerated
in the will, or rather the affections of man.
Secondly, I prove that the same qualities are supernatural in
this way. Those things, according to which we are, and are
said to be, partakers of the divine nature, and the children
of God, are supernatural: but we are, and are said to be
partakers of the divine nature, and children of God,
according to knowledge, righteousness and holiness;
therefore, these are supernatural. The Major does not need
proof. The Minor is evident from a comparison of the first,
second, third, and fourth verses of 2 Peter 1. Thirdly, those
things which have their limit in supernatural felicity, are
supernatural; but the knowledge of God, righteousness and
holiness are such; therefore, they are supernatural.
Fourthly, the immediate causes of supernatural acts are
supernatural. But the knowledge of God, righteousness and
holiness, are the immediate causes of supernatural acts:
therefore they are supernatural. I now come to your
arguments, in which you attempt to show that the image of God
in man is natural, and that those qualities, knowledge,
righteousness and holiness, are natural, not supernatural.
Your first argument is this: Supernatural qualities were
removed, natural qualities were corrupted. But truth,
righteousness, holiness, were not removed, they were
corrupted; therefore, they are not supernatural, but natural.
Your first argument is this: Supernatural qualities were
removed, natural qualities were corrupted. But truth,
righteousness, holiness, were not removed, they were
corrupted; therefore, they are not supernatural, but natural.
Your Minor is defended thus. The principles of these
qualities are in us by nature; they would not be, if they had
been removed. I reply -- that I admit the Major; but the
Minor does not seem at all probable to me, not even by the
addition of that reason. For, I affirm that the knowledge
which is according to piety, the righteousness and the
holiness, of which the apostle speaks, were not corrupted,
but removed, and that none of the principles of those
qualities remain in us after the fall. I acknowledge that the
principles and seeds of the moral virtues, which have some
analogy and resemblance to those spiritual virtues, and that,
even those moral virtues themselves, though corrupted by sin,
remained in us after the fall. It is possible that this
resemblance may mislead him who does not accurately
discriminate between these moral and those spiritual virtues.
In support of this sentiment, in which I state that those
gifts were taken away, I have the declaration of the
Catechism, in the answer to question nine, in these words:
"Man deprived himself and all his posterity, of those divine
gifts." But an explanation of the nature of those divine
gifts is given in the sixth question, namely, "righteousness
and holiness." I know not but that I have the support of your
own declaration on this point. For in the eighteenth of your
Theses, Concerning Original Sin, discussed in 1594, are these
words: "For, as in Adam the form of human integrity was
original righteousness, in which he was made by God, so the
form of corruption, or rather of deformity, was a deprivation
of that righteousness."
In the nineteenth Thesis, "The Scripture calls the form,
first mentioned, the image and likeness of God." In the
twentieth Thesis, "The Scripture calls the latter form, the
image and likeness of Adam." If I rightly understand these
expressions, I think that it plainly follows from them that
original righteousness was removed, and that it is,
therefore, supernatural, according to the rule "supernatural
qualities were removed; natural qualities were corrupted." I
have also, in my favour, most, perhaps all, of the Fathers.
Ambrose, in reference to Elijah and his fasting, chap. 4th,
says, "Adam was clothed with a vesture of virtues before his
transgression, but, as if denuded by sin, he saw himself
naked, because the clothing, which he previously had, was
lost," and again in the seventh book of his commentary on the
10th chapter of that gospel, marking, more clearly, the
distinction between the loss of supernatural qualities and
the corruption of natural ones, he speaks thus: "Who are
thieves if not the angels of night and of darkness? They
first despoil us of the garments of spiritual grace, and then
inflict on us wounds." Augustine, (De Trinitate, lib. 14,
cap. 16,) says, "Man, by sinning, lost righteousness and true
holiness, on which account, this image became deformed and
discoloured; he receives them again when he is reformed and
renewed." Again, (De civit. Dei, lib. 14, cap. 11) he affirms
that "free-will was lost." To conclude this part of the
discussion, I ask what were those spiritual qualities, which
were renewed or lost, if not the knowledge of God,
righteousness and holiness.
Another argument, adduced by you, is this: "Whatever belongs
to the species is natural; But the image of God belongs to
the species; Therefore it is natural." I answer, the Major is
not, in every case, true. For a quality may pertain to the
species either by a communication through nature or natural
principles, or by an arrangement of grace. That, which, in
the former, not in the latter, pertains to the species, is
natural. In reference to the Minor, I affirm that the image
of God pertains to the species, partly through nature, partly
of grace; therefore the image of God in man is partly through
nature, partly of grace; therefore, the image of God in man
is partly natural, partly supernatural. If you make any other
inference, you deduce a general conclusion from a particular
proposition, which is not valid. If an addition be made to
your Major, so that, in its full form, it should stand thus:
"Whatever is produced in the species, and its individuals, by
nature, is natural," I will admit it as a whole. But in that
case, the Minor would not be wholly true. For the image of
God is not promised in us wholly by nature, for that part of
it which is in truth and righteousness, and holiness, is
produced in us by nature, but is communicated by an act of
grace, according to the arrangement of grace. But it is
objected that the image cannot be common, if it is not
natural. For natural qualities differ, in that they are
common, from those which are personal, (the question refers
not to supernatural qualities). I answer a thing is common in
a two-fold sense, either absolutely, according to nature, or
conditionally, according to the arrangement of grace. The
image of God is common in part according to nature and
absolutely, in those things which belong to man according to
his essence, and which cannot be separated from his nature,
and in part conditionally, according to the arrangement of
grace, in those things which pertain not to the essence but
to the supernatural perfection of man. The former are
produced in all men absolutely, the latter conditionally,
namely that he should preserve those principles, which are
universal to the species, and particular to the individual,
uncorrupted. Therefore, the whole image is common, but partly
by nature, and partly of the arrangement of grace; by nature,
that part, which is called natural; according to the
arrangement of grace, that part which I call supernatural.
This, also, is according to the declaration of the Scripture
that Seth was begotten in the image and likeness of Adam, not
in the image of God. He was indeed begotten in the image of
God, not as God communicated it, in its integrity, to Adam,
but as Adam maintained it for himself. But Adam maintained it
for himself not in its integrity, therefore, he communicated
it in that condition. But that, which is in its integrity,
and that, which is not in its integrity, differ, not only in
mode and degree, but also in some of the essential parts of
that image, which are possessed by the image, in its
integrity, and are wanting to the image, not in its
integrity, which Adam had originally, by a complete
communication from God, and of which Seth was destitute on
account of the defective communication from Adam.
Your third argument is this: "The image of God is not said to
be produced or created in us, but to be renewed or restored,
therefore, it was not lost or removed, but corrupted."
I answer -- Neither part of your assumption is, in a strict
sense, true; with suitable explanation, both parts are true,
but neither of them is against my sentiment. I will prove the
former assertion, namely, that neither part of the assertion
is true. We are said to be "new creatures in Christ" and "to
be created to good works." David prayed that God would
"create" within him "a clean heart." The image of God is
nowhere said to be restored and renewed within us, but as we
are said to be "renewed in knowledge after the image of God,"
"to be renewed in the spirit of our mind," and "to be
transformed by the renewing of our mind." Yet, with suitable
explanation, both parts of the assumption are true, but they
are very favourable to my sentiment, as I will show. There
are in us, in respect to ourselves, two parts of the image of
God, one essential, the other accidental to us. The essential
part is the soul, endowed with mind, affection and will. The
accidental is the knowledge of God, righteousness, true
holiness, and similar gifts of spiritual grace. The former
are not said to be produced or created in us, because it was
deformed and corrupt. The latter is not said to be restored
or renewed in us, because, from a defect in the subject, it
has no place in us and not because it was not corrupt and
deformed, but it is said to be produced and created in us,
(for we are called, on its access, new creatures,) because it
resembles a mold, by the use of which, that essential part is
restored and renewed. The words of the apostle plainly set
forth this idea, in which it is affirmed not that the
knowledge, referred to, is renewed, but that we, as partakers
of the image of God so far as it is essential to us, are said
to be renewed in knowledge, as in a new mold, according to
the image of God, so far as it is accidental to us. Both
parts, then, of the antecedent are true. For the image of God
is restored and renewed in us, namely, our mind and will, and
the affections of the soul; and the image of God is produced
and created in us, namely, the knowledge of God,
righteousness, and true holiness. The former is the subject
of the latter; the latter is the form, divinely given to the
former. Therefore, also, the argument of Moses in commanding
the murderer to be slain, is valid. For in man, even after
transgression, the image of God remained, so far as it was
essential to him, or that part remained, which pertained to
the essence of man, though the part, which was accidental, is
removed through sin.
We now discuss the action of the Deity, by which we have both
the natural and the supernatural part of the image of God. I
have not made any distinction in the act, both because I
wished to use the phraseology of Scripture, according to
which the word creation signifies the act by which man has in
himself, the image and likeness of God, for it speaks thus:
"Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," and "so
God created man in his own image," and because both parts
equally well answered my purpose. But, if the subject is
considered with accuracy, I think that a distinction is to be
made in those acts, and that one is rightly termed creation,
by which man received natural qualities, the other,
superinfusion, by which he received the supernatural. For
life in man is two-fold, animal and spiritual; animal, by
which he lives according to man, spiritual, by which he lives
according to God. Of the former, the principle is the soul in
man, endowed with intellect and will; of the latter, the
principle is the Spirit of God, communicating to the soul
those excellent gifts of knowledge, righteousness, and
holiness. It is probable that the principles of these kinds
of life, each so diverse from the other, were bestowed on
man, not by the same, but by a different act. But it is not
important to my sentiment to decide in what mode, whether by
a two-fold or a single act of God, man had these qualities,
only let it be understood that he had both the former and the
latter, before God was employed concerning him in the act of
predestination; that is, he had them in respect to the divine
consideration. I make the statement in general terms, because
those things, both natural and supernatural, were conferred
on the whole species, the former absolutely, the latter on
the condition that the species should preserve to itself that
principle. Hence, I conclude, if it was conferred on the
species, then it was conferred by a decree of providence, in
contra-distinction to predestination; if it was conferred
conditionally, it was not conferred by a decree of
predestination, by which no gift is conditionally conferred.
It is now evident from this that my argument is valid. For if
man was created by God, under this condition, that he should
have, not only natural, but also supernatural gifts, either
by the same act of creation, or by the additional act of
superinfusion, (in reference to which I have never
contended,) it follows, then, that God, in the acts of
predestination and reprobation, which separate men, could not
have reference to men, as considered in a merely natural
state. You also seem, afterwards, to concede this, that man
had supernatural endowments, even in his primitive state, but
as an increment to nature, and not from the act of creation,
which is the principle of nature. This I concede, and from it
make this inference, since those things, which the first man
had, were possessed by all his posterity in him, (for all
which he was, we also were in him, according to the 40th
Thesis of your disputation concerning Original Sin,
previously cited,) the former, of nature, the latter, of the
arrangement of grace, it follows that God could not, in the
decree under discussion, have reference to man, considered in
a merely natural state, nor indeed, to man, considered with
supernatural endowments, for a being of such character could
not be passed by, or at least was not passed by, except from
the fact that it was foreseen that he would lose those
supernatural endowments by transgression and sin.
Your assertion that these statements, however true they may
be, are not opposed to that sentiment, which considers man in
general, is valid, if it is proved that man was, or could be
considered universally by God in the act of decree. But I
think that my arguments are valid, also, against that
sentiment. For if God could not consider man in a merely
natural state, if not with supernatural endowments, if not
without sin, regarding him as the object of the acts of
predestination and reprobation, then also he could not
consider the same being in a general sense. For a general
consideration is excluded by the necessary consideration of
any particular circumstance, which becomes the formal
relation (ratio) of the object, apart from which formal
relation God could not consider man, when He was acting in
reference to man in that decree. Besides, how can the general
consideration yet have place, when a circumstance, which that
general consideration comprehends within itself, is excluded.
If what you say concerning "the essential and the relative
image" has this meaning, that the essential image comprehends
truth and righteousness, and holiness, and yet is entirely
natural to man, as may be deduced from some things alleged by
you, then I affirm distinctly, that I cannot oppose it;
indeed, I think that I can prove the contrary. But if you
apply the phrase "essential image" to all which man has,
essential to himself, according to the image of God, I admit
it. Then the "respective" image will embrace what I call
supernatural and accidental. But, as these things, with the
premises which I have laid down, do not tend to refute my
sentiment, I proceed to the remainder of my argument.
My second argument is this, that no love of God according to
election, or divine volition regarding human beings
variously, or divine actions varying in reference to them, is
found after sin entered into the world, or after it was
considered as having entered. But if this argument is valid,
it also refutes the sentiment, which states that man was
considered "in general." For if there is no divine election
and reprobation of men except after the entrance of sin into
the world, then man is considered, not "in general," but
particularly, in reference to the circumstance of sin. But
you plead "authority, reason, and example." You plead
"authority" from three passages of Scripture, Romans 9,
Ephesians 1, and Matthew 25. Neither of these is opposed to
my view, since I do not deny that election and reprobation
were made from eternity, and do not say that sin was the
cause of the decree, but a condition requisite in its object.
The passage in Romans 9, is not adverse to me; first, because
Jacob and Esau had been already conceived in sin, when those
words were addressed to Rebecca, as is evident from the text.
The affirmative, that they had done neither good nor evil, is
to be understood in reference to the distinction which might
be made between them, as is explained by Augustine in many
places. The apostle then denies all reference to sin, namely,
to that by which any distinction might be made between them,
not to that, of which they were both equally guilty.
Secondly, because he attributes all things to the vocation of
God, who calleth, which is of mercy, and has reference only
to sinners. Thirdly, because the "purpose of God, according
to election" which states, "not of works," is a gracious
purpose in Christ, to the promise of which reference is made
in Romans iv, 16 "it is of fruit, that it might be by grace,
to the end the promise might be sure to all the seed," that
is, of faith of, or in Christ, which pertains only to
sinners, for he, who has not sinned, does not need faith in
Christ, since he obtains righteousness, and thereby life, by
the laws. Let this, then, be the answer in reference to this
passage, if it is to be understood of Esau and Jacob in their
own persons, without any typical meaning. But the meaning of
that passage is far different, as could be proved, if it were
necessary.
I come, now, to the passage cited from Ephesians 1. That
passage is so far from being opposed to my sentiment that I
shall hereafter use it as a strong argument in my favour.
Election is here said to be "from eternity;" I grant it. It
is said to have been made "in Christ;" I acknowledge it. It
is said to be "unto the adoption of children by Jesus
Christ;" I consent to it. I do not, however, see that either
of these statements is opposed to the idea, that sin is a
condition, requisite in the object of election and
reprobation. It is true that any reference to ourselves, as a
cause of our own election, is denied. Predestination precedes
persons, in respect to their actual existence, not as they
are considered by the Deity. It refers to causes, before they
actually exist, but not before they are foreseen by God from
eternity, though, in the foresight of God, they exist, not as
the causes of predestination, but as a condition requisite in
the object. In Matthew 25, the blessed of the Father, who
shall possess the kingdom prepared for them of the mere
benediction of God, are spoken of. But that benediction is in
Christ, by which the malediction is removed, which even the
blessed themselves had deserved according to the prescience
of God, before they were blessed in Christ; and the kingdom,
which was prepared for them, by the blood of Christ, is a
kingdom, to which they are raised from the ignominy and
slavery of sin. If you had thoroughly considered that, which
is really in controversy, you would not have thought that
those passages could be used effectually against me.
The reasons, adduced by you, are not more adverse to my
opinion, for they oppose the sentiment which makes sin the
cause of the decree, not that which makes it a condition,
requisite in the object. I will examine them. To the first, I
answer that my sentiment, either as antecedent or consequent,
is not absurd, until it is proved to be so. Your second and
third reasons change the state of the question. For they
exclude from that decree sin, as a cause, on account of which
God adopted children unto Himself, or in view of which He
made the decree; in reference to which there is no question.
To the second, I say, that the subject of discussion, here,
is the adoption made in Christ, which pertains to no one
except by faith in Christ, to which we are not begotten but
begotten again by God. From this it is proved, that the
adoption is of sinners, and of sinners equally involved in
sin, not of men equal in nature. To the third, I answer; --
In the first place, we must judge from the word of God, what
may be more, and what may be less in accordance with the
wisdom and grace of God. In the second place, I affirm that
it is equally in accordance with the wisdom and grace of God,
that He should adopt unto Himself sons from those who are not
sinners as from those who are sinners, and vice versa, if
such should be His choice. What you say in reference to "the
supposition of such consideration" is aside from the subject.
In the third place, the wisdom and grace, according to which
God adopted children unto Himself from among men in that
"hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world unto our
glory, which none of the princes of this world knew," which
wisdom is "Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling-
block," -- and that grace, is that which is joined with
mercy, bestowed on the sinner, and is in Christ. The latter
tends far more illustriously to the glory of God than grace,
as used in contradistinction to mercy, and so much the more,
as he, who has deserved evil, is more unworthy than he, who
has deserved nothing, either good or evil. It has been shown
before, that the example of angels is not analogous, but the
reverse. For God determined to secure the salvation of men
and of angels in different modes. The relations, therefore,
of predestination, in the former, and in the latter case, are
diverse. God stamped His own image on both, but with a
different condition, namely, that it should be preserved in
none, but restored in some, among men. God so tempered, as
Augustine says, the natures of angels and of men, that He
might first show, in them, what their own freewill could
effect, then what should be the beneficial influence of His
grace, preserving in the case of angels, and restoring, in
the case of men. He showed in the case of angels, namely,
grace in contradistinction to mercy. He showed in men, the
power of the latter grace, namely, grace joined to mercy, and
both of his own eternal purpose. Since, then, He did, in men,
what He did not in angels, and, in angels, what He did not in
men, and this from the decree of predestination, I conclude
that there is one relation of divine predestination in the
case of angels, and another in the case of men. Therefore,
there is no love of God towards men, according to election,
without the consideration of sin. There was no discussion
between us in reference to angels, and, in my argument,
express mention was made of men; whatever, then, is proved
concerning angels, has no weight in the refutation of my
argument.
ELEVENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Secondly, of Election.
1. Election is said to have been made in Christ, who was
ordained as mediator for sinners, and was called Jesus,
because He should save, not certain individuals, considered
merely in their nature, but "His people from their sins." He
is said to have been foreordained, and we in Him, and He, in
the order of nature and causes, before us. He was ordained as
saviour, we, as those to be saved. But in Christ, having such
a character, and being considered such as the Scripture
describes him to us, man could not be considered in a merely
natural state. Much less, therefore, could he be elected in
Him.
2. Election is said to have been made of grace, which is
distinguished from nature in a two fold manner, both as the
latter is pure and considered abstractly, and as it is guilty
and corrupt. In the former sense, it signifies the progress
of goodness towards supernatural good, to be imparted to a
creature naturally capable of it; in the latter sense, it
signifies the ulterior progress towards supernatural good to
be communicated to man, as corrupt and guilty, which is also,
in the Scriptures, called mercy. In my judgment, the term
grace is used, in the latter sense, in the writings of the
apostles, especially when the subject of discussion is
election, justification, sanctification, &c. If this is true,
then election of grace was made of men considered, not in a
"merely natural state, but in sin."
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE ELEVENTH PROPOSITION
It is true, that election is made by God the Father in Christ
the Mediator; but that the Mediator was ordained, only for
sinners, is not absolutely true. Therefore, the inference is
not valid. Indeed, should its truth be conceded, yet it has
no weight against those, who state that, in election,
reference was to man in general. But that the Mediator was
ordained, not for sinners alone -- to say nothing of that
Mediation, which is attributed to Christ in creation and
nature, "all things were made by Him; and without him was not
any thing made that was made. In Him was life; and the life
was the light of men." (John i, 3, 4,) "by whom also He made
the worlds." (Heb. i, 2, &c.) -- I demonstrate most
completely by a single argument.
Christ is Mediator for those, to whom He was, from eternity,
given as Head by the Father; -- He was given as Head by the
Father to Angels and men; therefore, he is the Mediator for
both the latter and the former. But angels did not sin; he
was not, then, ordained Mediator for sinners only. Let us
discuss each point, if you please, separately, that we may
more fully understand the subject.
When we speak of the Head, we consider three things,
according to the analogy of nature; its position, by which,
in fact, dignity, and authority, it holds the first place in
the whole body; its perfection, by which it contains all the
inward and outward senses, in itself, as their fountain and
the principle of motion; finally its power, by which all
power, feeling, motion and government is accustomed to flow
from it to the other members.
According to this idea, Christ is indeed the Head, in common,
of all created things; the Head, I say, of superior nature,
and of interior nature, and of all those things which are in
nature. We transcend this universal relation, when we
contemplate the Head, as appointed from eternity. Angels and
men are, after God, capable of eternity; and to both Christ
was given eternally, by the Father, as the Head, not only
that they should exist forever, (which is the attribute of
spiritual nature) but also, and this is specially of grace,
that they should be forever heirs of eternal glory, as sons
of God, heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ. The latter
were ordained of God, by the adoption of grace in Christ
Jesus, all to one end, namely, to the sight, the enjoyment,
and announcement of the glory of God, and of them was
constituted the mystical body of Christ, the celestial
church. Finally, as in all this life, that is the head of a
living creature, from which power, feeling and motion flow
into the members of the body, so in all that eternal life,
the body grows by the influence of Christ, its Head, and each
of the members obtain immutability of life, that is, eternity
from this fact, that they subsist in Christ, their Head,
apart from whom they would be dissolved. But Christ, is the
Mediator by the relation in which he is the Head of angels
and men, for, as Head, he' joins them to Himself; as
Mediator, he joins them to the Father. That Christ is Head
and Mediator, is in fact, one and the same thing, only that
the divinity intervenes in the relation, since He is called
the Head, as to our relation to Himself; and Mediator as to
our relation to the Father. "But," it may be said, "he did
not redeem the angels as he redeemed us. This indeed is true;
but Mediator and Redeemer differ from each other, as genus
and species. To angels, Christ is Mediator of preservation
and confirmation; but to us, he is Mediator, also, of
redemption and of preservation from that from which we have
been redeemed. So he is styled Mediator for both, though in a
different mode. The Major, then, of my syllogism is true,
that "Christ is the Mediator of those to whom he was
appointed from eternity as their Head." But that He was
appointed, both to angels and men, as their Head, and
therefore, as Mediator, is taught by the apostle in
Colossians 1, when he affirms of Christ that he "is the image
of the invisible God," that is, He represents God the Father,
in his word and work, chiefly to those whom the Father has
given to him, as their Head and Mediator; "the first born of
every creature," namely, every one whom God has, of His
grace, predestinated to adoption, and begotten then, that
they might be His children; for there is a comparison of
things which are homogeneous, and so the passage is to be
understood. Then, explaining both those attributes, he
subjoins, first, in general terms, "For by Him were all
things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth
visible, and invisible," (but he explains these things, to
take away the plea of the angel worshipers, whom he assails
in this epistle,) "whether thrones or dominions, or
principalities, or powers; all things were created by Him and
for Him, and He is before all things, and by Him all things
consist;" and then, with particular reference to the glorious
body of which He is precisely the Head and Mediator, "and He
is the Head of the body, the church," who, in the
confirmation of grace is "the beginning," but in redemption,
is "the first-born from the dead," the common end of all,
which is "that in all things he might have the pre-eminence."
The cause, is the decree of the Father, predestinating His
Son for the adoption of His children, "for it pleased the
Father that, in Him, should all fullness dwell, and having
made peace through the blood of His cross to reconcile all
things to Himself;" &c. He sets forth this idea still more
clearly, when, warning them from the worship of angels under
the pretense of philosophy, he says, "for in Him dwelleth all
the fullness of the Godhead bodily. And ye are complete in
Him, which is the Head of all principality and power," that
is, of angels to the worship of whom, they were solicited.
For, of every one soliciting them to the worshipping of
angels, he afterwards affirms that they do not hold the
"Head, from which all the body, by joints and bands having
nourishment ministered and knit together, increaseth with the
increase of God." To the same purpose is Ephesians 1.
It is then to be stated, generally, that he was ordained to
be Mediator for sinners, but not for them only, since he is
also Mediator for the angels, who have maintained their
original purity, but he is ordained as Redeemer for sinners
only. We may be able to express this very idea in another
mode, if we say that he was ordained Mediator, both for
those, who could sin, that they might not sin, and for those,
who had sinned, that they might be saved from their sins.
Both modes of interpretation tend to the same result. The
same is the case with the name Jesus. But what need is there
of many words? We say that he was ordained as Mediator both
for those who stood and for those who fell, as Redeemer only
for those who fell; for those who stood, that they might
remain, standing, and for those who fell, that they might
rise again, and remain standing. From which it follows, a
mode of argumentation, plainly the same, being preserved,
that when election is said to have been made in Christ, God
had reference to man, considered generally, as not yet
created as created in a natural state, as standing and as
having fallen, but this is the same thing as being considered
in a merely natural state, which you deny. The same argument
applies to what follows.
I come to your second argument. You say "Election is said to
have been made of grace," and further, that "grace is spoken
of in a two-fold sense, when it is used in opposition to
nature, and that it is to be taken, in the latter sense, in
this argument," and you conclude that, "the election of grace
was made of men, considered not in a natural state, &c." Do
you not see, my brother, that your conclusion is unsound,
involving the fallacy of division, and that it is also
equivocal? For, in the Major, grace is used collectively or
generally, but in the Minor distributively; in the former, it
is used simply, as to its essence, in the latter, an accident
is taken into account, namely, the different modes of the
object, which do not affect the essence of grace. Why shall
we not rather argue in this manner? Election is of grace; --
grace has reference to those, whom it establishes in good,
and to those whom, saved from evil, it restores to good;
election, then, has reference to the same. That, which is
stated in general terms, should be applied in general terms,
for this, both nature and reason demand, unless there is a
positive restriction in the necessity of the subject, or
there be some limitation by an adjunct. That election is used
in a general sense, is most clearly evident from a comparison
of angels and men. You say, that grace is used, in the latter
signification, in the writings of the Apostles in this and
similar arguments. This may be correct, but this is not
affected by a restriction of the term grace, which in God and
of God, embraces all things, but by a restriction of the
object kata ti the restriction is in the object, that is, in
man, not in that which is added or granted to him. What, if a
farmer should command his servant to cultivate a field, which
field needed first to be cleared, then plowed, and lastly to
be sowed, &c., would you, then, restrict the word cultivate
to one of these processes? That, which is general or common,
remains general or common, and its generality may not be
narrowed down by any particular relations of the object.
Therefore, as you see, this consequence, deduced from faulty
reasoning, is not valid, nor is that, which is stated in
general terms, to be restricted to particular circumstances.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF THE ELEVENTH PROPOSITION
The two arguments advanced by me, as they are most
conclusive, so they remain unaffected by your answers. I
prove this, in reference to the first. Its strength and force
consists in this, that the election of men is said to have
been made in Christ, as the Mediator between God and sinful
men, that is as Reconciler and Redeemer, from which I argued
thus: Whoever are elect in Christ, as Mediator between God
and sinful men, that is, as Reconciler and Redeemer, they are
considered by God, electing them, as sinners; -- But all men,
who are elect in Christ, are elect in Christ, as Mediator
between God and sinful men, that is, as Reconciler and
Redeemer; Therefore, all men, who are elect in Christ, are
considered by God, electing them, as sinners.
The Major is plain. For, in the first place, they, who are
not sinners, do not need a Reconciler and Redeemer. But
election is an act, altogether necessary to those who are
elected. In the second place, Christ himself is not
considered by God as Mediator of Redemption, unless in view
of the fact, that he is ordained as such for those who have
sinned. For the divine foresight of sin preceded, in the
order of nature, the decree by which its ordained that His
Son should be the Mediator, appointed to offer in the
presence of God, in behalf of men, a sacrifice for sins. In
the third place, the election of men by God is made only in
the Mediator, as having obtained, by his own blood, eternal
redemption.
The Minor is evident. For since Christ is the Mediator
between men and God, only as Reconciler, Redeemer, and the
advocate of sinners; Mediator, I say, who, by the act of His
Mediation, affords salvation to those, for whom he is
Mediator. (1 Tim. ii, 5 & 6; Heb. viii, 6 &c.; ix, 15; xii,
24.) Hence follows the conclusion, since the premises are
true, and consist of three terms, and are arranged in a
legitimate form.
Let us now examine your arguments in opposition to what I
have adduced. You affirm that Christ is not ordained as
Mediator for sinners only, and therefore, my conclusion is
not valid. Let it be conceded that your antecedent is true,
yet it does not follow that my conclusion is not valid. For,
in my premises, I did not assert that Christ was ordained
Mediator only for sinners, nor are the questions discussed
between us, -- of what beings is Christ the Mediator -- when
spoken of universally -- and in what modes. But I spoke of
Christ, as ordained a Mediator for men in particular, and
affirmed that he was ordained Mediator for them, only as
sinners; for he was ordained Mediator to take away the sins
of the world. The subject of discussion, then, in the mode in
which he is the Mediator for men. Here, you commit two
fallacies, that of Irrelevant conclusion [ignoratio elenchi],
and that of reasoning from a particular case to a general
conclusion, [a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter]. I
speak of Christ's Mediation as pertaining to a particular
case, namely, as undertaken for man, you treat of his
Mediation, as simply and generally considered. But you
rightly separate the consideration of the mediation, which is
attributed to Christ, in creation and nature, for the latter
is, entirely, of another kind and mode. According to this, he
is the Mediator of God to creatures; according to that, of
creatures to God. The one, refers to all creatures, the
other, only to those, made in the image of God. The one tends
to the communication of all natural and created good to all
creatures, the other, to the bestowment, on rational
creatures, of a participation in infinite and supernatural
good. You, indeed, prove that he was ordained Mediator, not
for sinners only, but without any necessity. For this is not
the question between us. The point to be proved by you, was
that he is the Mediator of men, not of sinners, which I know
that you would not wish to attempt, as a different doctrine
is taught in the Scriptures. Yet, let us examine the
argument. He was ordained as Mediator also for the angels; --
But the angels did not sin; -- Therefore, he was not
constituted Mediator only for sinners. I may concede all
this, for it weighs nothing against my argument, since I have
not said in general terms, that Christ was ordained only for
sinners. I restricted his Mediation to men, to the work of
their salvation, to the mode in which salvation was obtained
for them. Hence, if this be true, I conclude that my argument
remains firm and unmoved, in which I proved that, in Christ
as the Mediator of men before God, only sinners were elected.
I wish that we might always remember that there is no
controversy between us concerning the election of angels or
the mediation, by which they are saved, and that we are
treating only of the election and reprobation of men, and of
the mode of mediation by which they obtain salvation, for it
will be perceived that statements, which, taken generally,
are not true, may be, in the highest degree, true, when
applied to the particular case of mankind. There is, then, no
need of considering those things, which are said concerning
Christ as the Mediator of angels. If, however, I may be
permitted to discuss even this point, I may ask for the proof
of your Major, in which you affirm that "Christ is Mediator
for those to whom he was given, as Head, by the Father." I
think that I have good reason for denying your postulate.
For, in Philemon 2, Christ is said to have received "a name
which is above every name, that, at the name of Jesus, every
knee should bow, of things in heaven, because he, "being in
the form of God, humbled himself and became obedient unto
death, even the death of the cross." Here we see that the
reason of his being constituted the Head, even of heavenly
things, was this, that, by his own blood and death, he might
perform the functions of Mediator for men before God. If he
was the Mediator for angels, then this fact, and not the
former reason, should have been alleged, in this passage, for
his appointment as Head, even of angels.
These two terms, Head and Mediator, seem to me to have an
order and relation, such that the appellation of Mediator
pertains to Christ in a prior relation, and that of had in a
posterior relation, and the latter, indeed, on account of the
former. For, by the act of Mediation, he acquires for himself
the right of dominion, the possession of which the Father
delivers to him, when He bestows the title of Head upon him.
This is implied, also, in the distinction used in schools of
Divinity, Christ is Mediator by merit and by efficacy. By
merit first, then by efficacy. For by his merit, he prepares
for himself a people, the blessings necessary for their
happiness, and the right and power of imparting those
blessings to his own people; from which are derived the
titles Head, saviour, Leader, Prince, and Lord; in accordance
with which titles, there flows, of his own efficacy, to his
own people, an actual communication of those blessings, which
he obtained by the merit of his death. For in Hebrews ii, 16,
it is said that Christ: "took not on him the nature of
angels; but he took on him the seed of Abraham." Now, if the
statement, made by our divines, is true -- that this
assumption of nature was made that he might be able to
perform the functions of Mediator for those whose nature he
assumed, you perceive that the conclusion is valid, that
since "he took not on him the nature of angels," he did not
perform the functions of Mediator for them. To this add, that
it is very frequently said, by our Theologians that Christ is
Mediator only as he stands between God and men, which
assertion they refer to his human nature, taken into a
personal union by the Word, that he might, in this way, stand
between both, partaking, with the Father, of the Divine
nature, and with us, of human nature. Hence, also, he is
called Emmanuel in a twofold sense, first, because he is God
and man in the unity of his person, and secondly, because,
being such, he has united God and men in the office of
Mediation. But he does not stand between God and angels.
Consider, also, the declaration of Heb. v, 1, "every high
priest taken from among men is ordained for men in things
pertaining to God." But Christ was not taken from among
angels, therefore, he was not ordained for angels in things
pertaining to God. Indeed, I affirm, with confidence, that
there was nothing to be done, by the way of any mediation
for, or in behalf of angels before God. I add, also, that a
Mediator should not be inferior in nature to those for whom
he acts in that capacity. But Christ, in his human nature,
was made "a little lower than the angels, for the suffering
of death. (Heb. ii, 9.) Therefore, he is not Mediator for
angels. Finally, I remark, angels are "ministering Spirits
sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of
salvation." (Heb. i, 14.) "Unto the angels hath He not put in
subjection the world to come," but unto Christ Jesus
primarily, and unto all his brethren, secondarily, whose
nature he sanctified in himself, and exalted with himself to
that dignity. Therefore, Christ is not the Mediator of
angels. But the inquiry may be made, Cannot Christ, then, be
said in any manner to be Mediator for angels? I answer; --
The term mediator may be applied in a two fold manner, either
in behalf of creatures to the Deity, or of the Deity to
creatures. I deny that Christ is Mediator in behalf of the
angels before God, but I do not deny he is Mediator for God
to angels. For this coincides with the appellation of Head,
which I confess belong to Christ, in respect to angels,
though in a relation different from that, by which he is the
Head of believers. For the union, which exists between Christ
and believers of the human race, is more strict and close,
than that which exists between him and angels, on account of
the consubstantiality of his human nature with that of men,
from which angels are alien. But enough on these points.
Whether they are, as I have stated them, or not, it affects,
neither favourably nor unfavourably, my argument, but you
entirely agree with me when you say that he was ordained as
Redeemer only for the fallen. From this, also, I infer the
truth of my sentiment. Men are elected in the Redeemer, only
as fallen; for they are not elected that they should remain
standing, but that they should rise again, and then remain
standing, as you have rightly observed. But how can you
infer, that, since election is made in Christ, the election,
I say, of men, in Christ, the Redeemer, (for those words are
to be supplied), it follows that God had respect to men, in
general, considered generally as not yet created, as created
in their natural state, as yet standing and as fallen. I
think that the contrary can, and must be inferred. Therefore,
God, in election, had reference to man, only as fallen. For,
in election, He regarded man in the Redeemer, and the
Redeemer is such only of the fallen.
As to the latter argument, the form of the answer is the
same. I do not use the word grace equivocally; I do not use
it at the same time collectively and distributively. I admit
that it is used in a two-fold sense, for the grace of
preservation and restoration; I admit that it is used
collectively, and absolutely, particularly and concretely,
that is, the grace of preservation and restoration. But, what
then? If I use a word, which has a general and equivocal
sense, is equivocation, therefore, at once, to be laid to my
charge? But I have used that word, at all times in this
discussion, in the same way, namely, as referring to the
grace by which some men are elected. It is that grace by
which restoration and its means are prepared, not that by
which preservation and its means are appointed. For the
latter grace was not bestowed on human beings.
From the former grace alone, all they, who are saved, obtain
their salvation. In the Major of my syllogism, grace is
spoken of in a particular relation, and in the Minor, it is
used in the same way, and, neither in the former nor in the
latter, is it used in a general sense, as the following
syllogism will show. They who are elected according to the
grace of restoration, which is joined with mercy, having
place only in reference to sinners, are considered by Him,
who elects, as sinners; But all men, who are elected, are
elected according to the grace of restoration, which is
joined to mercy, having place only in reference to sinners; -
- Therefore, all men, who are elected, are considered by Him,
who elects, as sinners. Grace is spoken of, throughout,
particularly and relatively in respect to men, and in no
case, is it used generally or absolutely. Indeed, it cannot
be used generally or absolutely when it has reference
relatively and particularly to election, whether of angels or
of men. For neither these nor those are elected or saved by
grace, taken absolutely, but both by grace used relatively,
angels by the grace of preservation, men by the grace of
restoration.
When, however, we treat of election universally and
abstractly, we must discuss the subject of grace, as its
cause, universally, absolutely and abstractly; for, to a
genus, general attributes are to be ascribed, which may be
afterwards applied to the species after their several modes.
Your argumentation, then, is aside from our controversy.
Election is of grace; grace respects those, whom it
establishes, and those whom, saved from evil, it restores to
good. Therefore, election has reference to the same persons.
For we do not now discuss election in general, and
absolutely, if so, the word grace, according to correct
usage, must be understood in a general sense. But we discuss
the election of men; therefore, the general term grace must
be restricted to that grace, according to which men are
elected. It is not, therefore, proper to say that "grace has
reference to those whom it establishes in good," for the
grace, of which we here treat, does not refer to those whom
it establishes in good, for grace established no one of the
human race, it only restored those, to whom it had reference.
But you say that the grace, which establishes in good, and
that, which restores, are one in essence, and only
distinguished and restricted in relation to the object. What
if I should concede this? My conclusion will still be valid.
The question between us has reference to the object and its
formal relations by which relation you say that grace is
distinguished and restricted. But that restriction of the
object has only this force, that the grace, which, according
to your assertion, is one in essence, must unfold itself and
be applied to a sinner, and to one not a sinner, in a
different mode; and indeed must use acts of a different
character in the two cases. There is, then, a restriction in
"that which is added or granted," but it is a necessary
consequence of the restriction of the object. This
distinction, then, is sufficient for the conclusion which I
desire.
The question is not concerning objects of election,
essentially different from each other, but concerning
different modes of considering an object, which is one and
the same in essence, and concerning a different formal
relation. I will illustrate it by a simile. Justice in God is
one in essence, namely, giving to each one that which is due
to him; to him who is obedient, what pertains to him,
according to the divine promise, and to the sinner that which
pertains to him, according to the divine threatening. But
from the fact that justice renders the retribution of
punishment an object, it is necessarily inferred that the
object is worthy of punishment, and was, therefore, liable to
sin; so likewise with grace. Grace then is one in essence,
but varies in its mode; one in principle and end, but varied
in its progress, steps and means: one, when taken absolutely
and in general, but two-fold, when taken relatively and
particularly, at least in respect to opposite and distinct
matters. But in the whole of this course of reasoning, I have
used the term grace, in a particular relation, as it is
varied in mode, progress, steps and means, and as it is taken
relatively and distributively. No equivocation, then, has
been used in this; there is no reasoning from general to
particular, from the abstract to the concrete.
But, though, all these statements be true, they avail
nothing, you affirm, against those who state that mankind in
general were regarded in election. These arguments, indeed,
prove that mankind in general could not have been regarded in
election, or at least that such was not the case. For if man
was considered in general, then he was elected by grace,
taken in a general sense. For a general effect requires a
general cause. But man was elected, not by grace considered
generally, but by grace considered particularly, relatively,
and distributively, with reference to the circumstance of
sin. If man was considered in general, then he was elected in
the Mediator not considered generally, but considered
particularly as Redeemer. Therefore, in election, man was not
considered in general, but with restriction to the
circumstance of sin, which was to be proved. The illustration
of the field to be cultivated, is not against this view,
indeed it is in its favour. For if a farmer should command
his son to cultivate a field, which was overrun with briars,
and, therefore, required culture joined with clearing, then
the word cultivate, though, when taken in a general sense, it
is not restricted to clearing, yet, when applied to that
particular field, it necessarily includes that act. Hence we
infer, that, if a field cannot be cultivated without the act
of clearing, it is, therefore, overrun with briars and weeds,
and, by analogy, if a man can not be saved without the act of
restoration, he is, therefore, a sinner; for a sinner only is
capable of restoration, and restoring grace is adapted only
to his case.
TWELFTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Thirdly, of Non-Election or Preterition. Non-election or
preterition is an act of the divine pleasure, by which God
from eternity determined not to communicate to some men
supernatural happiness, but to bestow on them only natural or
animal happiness, if they should live agreeably to nature; --
But, in an act of this kind, God has not to do with men
considered in a merely natural state; -- Therefore, God does
not pass by certain men, considered in a merely natural
state. The truth of the Minor is proved; --
1. Because there is no natural happiness of this kind, which
is the end of man, and his ultimate neither in fact, for
there has not been, and there is not a man happy in this
sense, nor in possibility, derived from the decree of God
considered, either absolutely, for no man will ever be thus
happy naturally, or conditionally, for God did not design
happiness of this kind for any man on a condition, as the
condition must be that of obedience, which God remunerates by
supernatural happiness.
2. Because sin is the meritorious cause of that act of the
divine pleasure, by which He determined to deny, to some,
spiritual or supernatural happiness, resulting from union
with Himself and from His dwelling in man. "Your iniquities
have separated between you and your God." (Isa. lix, 2.) Nor
can that denial of happiness to man be considered otherwise
than as punishment, which is necessarily preceded by the act
of sin, and its appointment by the foresight of future sin.
These arguments may be useful also in the discussion of other
questions.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWELFTH PROPOSITION
Your definition of non-election or preterition, (which
Augustine calls also reelection,) is by no means just, -- and
this in three respects.
1. Since that, which is made a difference, is not merely an
accident. For if the difference of the things defined is only
an accident, the definition is not a good one. The essential
difference between election and reprobation consists in
adoption by Jesus Christ unto God the Father, the accidental
consectary of which is supernatural happiness. Ephesians 1,
and Romans 8.
2. Because the thing defined is referred, not to its primary
end, but to one which is secondary, which is erroneous. The
primary end of election is union with God by adoption, but a
secondary, and, as we have said, accidental end, is
happiness.
3. Because the definition is redundant; for an addition is
made of something positive, when you insert, in parentheses,
"but to be bestowed," &c., while the definition itself is
purely negative. There is also a fault, and even an error in
that which is added. For non-election or preterition does not
bestow natural happiness, but rather supposes it; God does
not, in that act, bestow a gift on those on whom it already
has been bestowed. This we remark concerning the Major.
The Minor is denied. God, in this act, has reference to man
in general, therefore also, in this mode, He has respect to
the same general reference. Thus you perceive that your whole
reasoning is false. To sustain your Minor you use two
arguments. The first is designed to confirm that part of the
definition, which does not, as we have asserted, belong to
definition; therefore, I need not notice it. Yet since you
afford the occasion, I shall be permitted to make certain
suggestions. The argument denies that there is any "natural
happiness of this kind, which is the end of man, and his
ultimate." If you speak here of the depraved nature of man, I
admit it; for "an evil tree does not bring forth good fruit,"
much less does it acquire any goodness of itself. If you
speak of nature, in its purity, as it was, originally, in
Adam, I deny it. For, to undepraved nature, pertained its own
future natural happiness, though it was afterwards, so to
speak, to be absorbed, by the grace of God, in supernatural
happiness. This happiness was the natural design of man and
his natural end. Do not all things in nature seek their own
good? But since nature seeks not any thing which may not
exist, (it is foolish to seek that, which does not exist,
even in possibility, and nature, the work of an infinitely
wise Architect, is not foolish,) it follows that the good of
each thing exists by nature, in possibility, if the thing
does not attain to it, and in fact, if the thing does attain
to it. But if the condition of natural things is such,
consider, I pray you, my brother, how it can be truly said of
man that he is deprived of natural felicity, and his natural
end, when all things, in nature, are in a different
situation. Surely, nature could not be blind, in her most
excellent work, and see so clearly in all her other works.
But you say that this fact never existed. I admit it, for
Adam fell out by the way; but it was to exist in the future.
You say that it did not exist "in possibility." This is an
error, for God designed it for Adam, on the condition of his
remaining in the right way. I prove this from the words of
God himself; "in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt
surely die." (Gen. ii, 17.) What is death? Is it not
privation? What is privation? Is it not of some natural
attribute or habit? Adam, then, was deprived of natural life,
and of that happy constitution of life, which he obtained in
Eden, otherwise he would have remained happy in it, if he had
continued in the discharge of duty, until God had fulfilled
in him the promise of supernatural life, which was adumbrated
to him by the tree of life in the garden of Eden. For, on the
contrary, it follows that, if he had not eaten the forbidden
fruit, he would not have become mortal, but, with life and
sight, he would have been prepared for translation to a
higher life.
You affirm that God "remunerates obedience by supernatural
happiness." He indeed remunerates obedience in that way, but
not in that way alone. Conjunctively, it is true;
exclusively, it is false. He remunerates obedience in both
ways. For even at the present time, when we are very far
removed from the natural condition of Adam, godliness has the
"promise of the life that now is and of that which is to
come." (1 Tim. iv, 8.) I judge that a two-fold idea, namely,
of the end and of the mode, has led you into error. You have
thought that the only end of man is that which is
supernatural. It is very true, that things subordinate are
not at variance. There is a natural end. As nature is
subordinate to God, so natural ends are subordinate to those
which are supernatural and divine. The end of our nature, so
far as it is natural, is this, that it should approach very
near to the Divine; so far as it is supernatural, it is that
man may be united to God. To the former, Adam could attain by
nature; to the latter, he could be exalted from the former,
by grace. You indeed judged that there could be no mode, in
which both kinds of happiness should concur. But two things
must be observed in this case, one, that natural happiness is
a previous preparation, the other that it is a foundation to
the supernatural. It is prepared for and previous to it.
Unless he had been already happy in nature, even it he had
remained without falling, he would not have attained the
other happiness, there must have been in him that natural
happiness by which he could approach the supernatural. But
when he should have in fact, entered into that supernatural
felicity, then natural happiness would be the foundation and
upon it the consummation would be in supernatural happiness.
If perfection is added to perfection, the less is not
destroyed, but the increase is made upon the less, as fire is
increased by fire, the vegetative faculty by the sentient,
and both by the rational. The less rests in the greater as in
its own principle, and is more fully perfected by it, as it
more fully ceases to be its own, and partakes of the
perfection of another. Thus it will be, in the resurrection
of the dead and in eternal life. The nature of man will be
both perfected and glorified above the mode of nature. It
will so obtain the perfection of nature, as to rest in that
divine and supernatural perfection; and nature will not be
abolished, but be clothed in a supernatural mode, as the
apostle says of the body, in 1 Corinthians 15. These things,
however, are merely incidental.
Your second argument may be stated thus: -- Sin is the
meritorious cause of that negative act; -- Man, in a merely
natural state, has no sin; -- There is not then, in him any
meritorious cause. By consequence God has not any cause of
that negative act. The whole prosyllogism is admitted, but
the inference is denied, because it is made from a particular
case. It would indeed be true if the negative act of the
Deity resulted only from a meritorious cause, but this
position is very far removed from the truth. The cause of
every negative act is either in God or in the creature. The
same is true of this act. But the cause of this act is not in
the creature. Therefore, it is in God. This prosyllogism will
be denied by none. In the will of God alone, exists the cause
that you are not an apostle, and that you may not live to the
age of Adam or Methuselah. Iniquity in man is the cause that
he is far from God, and that God is far from him; namely, in
that respect, of which Isaiah spoke. (Isa. lix, 2.) For, in
other respects, not only is iniquity a cause, but also the
will of God; who, if he would, might remove their iniquity as
a cloud, and bring man near to Himself: I prove that the
cause of this act is not in the creature, as was said before
in the 10th proposition; first, by the authority of Christ in
Matthew 25, and of Paul in Romans 8 & 9, and Ephesians 1;
secondly, by reason, since even that first sin did not take
place, except from the negative act of God, of which negative
act sin cannot be the cause, for the same thing cannot be
both cause and consequence of another thing. But election and
non-election were prior even to the first sin, as we have
before demonstrated. A positive and a negative act of God
also precede every act of the creature, whether good or bad.
For there is no evil act which has not been preceded also by
a negative act of the Deity, permitting the evil. Adam and
Eve sinned, certainly not without a negative act of God,
though there had been committed by them no previous sin,
deserving that negation. What, then, was the cause of that
negative act if it was not the free will of God? In
subsequent sins, however, it may be admitted that sin is,
indeed, the meritorious cause, and the free will of God is
also a cause; for He destroys even sins, when He wills. He
has that power, and if He does not destroy them, it is
because He does not will to do it. But those sins which He
destroys, can not, though a meritorious cause, produce the
negative act of God. You see then, my brother, that sin may
be indeed a meritorious cause of that negative act, but not
singly or alone or always; therefore, it is not the necessary
cause.
Thirdly, by the example of the Angels? What has restrained
the holy Angels from evil and confirmed them in good? The
positive act of God, that is, the manifestation of Himself in
election; for they are elect. What did not restrain the
fallen Angels from evil, into which they rushed of their own
will? The negative act of God, in non-election or preterition
which Augustine also calls reelection. It also belongs to
this act of election, that the former were confirmed in good
against evil, and to reprobation, that the latter were left,
who (as Christ says in John 8.) speak a lie of their own, and
commit sin. However, I wish that you would always remember,
in this case and in subsequent arguments, that it is not
suitable to substitute, for the proper and proximate end, a
remote consequence, or event (which is also called in its own
mode, an end), namely, supernatural happiness. That it is
appropriate and proximate to assert that sin is the
meritorious cause of that divine negative act, by which He
does not adopt certain men as children unto Himself by
Christ, the consectary of which adoption is happiness, is
denied, my brother, by nature herself. God begets sons unto
Himself according to His own will, not according to their
character, whether good as in the case of the elect angels,
or bad as in our own case. He looks upon all, in Christ, not
in themselves, that Christ "might be the first-born among
many brethren." (Rom. viii, 29.) In nature, children are
begotten by parents, without reference to their future
character, and may not God beget his adopted children,
without reference to their character? Nature claims the whole
for itself in those about to be begotten; may grace claim but
a very small part? God forbid.
Of the same nature is the position that "denial of happiness
to man cannot be considered otherwise than as punishment."
For in the first place, "denial of happiness" is not suitably
introduced into the discussion, the subject of which is the
denial of adoption, which, as we have said, is the
appropriate and proximate end of election. This, then, is
not, primarily and per se, the proposition. Again, if the
subject of discussion is adoption, the statement is not true;
for a denial of adoption is not properly punishment; it is,
indeed, previous to punishment, since it is even previous to
sin, but it is not, therefore, punishment. Who, indeed, can
affirm that the antecedent is the same with its consequent,
and that a most remote one? But if, as you think, the
statement is made in reference to happiness, it is not, even
in that case universally true; for a denial of happiness, on
account of sin, is considered as punishment of sin, but a
denial of happiness on account of a voluntary arrangement, or
of the will only, is not punishment. To Adam, in his
primitive state of holiness, God denied supernatural
happiness, until he should fulfill his appointed course. That
was not punishment to Adam. To a private individual it is not
a punishment that he is not an emperor. The denial of
happiness, is not punishment, then, of itself alone, but of
some accident, as a final consequence, (as they say), of the
sin of the creature.
The same consideration is fatal to your statement, that
"denial of happiness is necessarily preceded by the act of
sin." That is true, indeed, of the denial of final happiness,
as they style it; but we are now discussing the denial of the
principle of happiness, that is, of grace and gratuitous
adoption in Christ Jesus. Therefore, though it may be
conceded to you, that sin precedes, in fact, that denial, yet
this also should be added, that antecedent to sin is
particular reelection by God in the beginning and progress of
sin, but that the foundation of that particular reelection is
non-election, or preterition and reprobation, which we
acknowledge to be, not the cause, but the antecedent of sin.
So, likewise, your statement is not universally true, that
"the appointment of that act is preceded by the foresight of
future sin." For that foresight of future sin is both the
consequent, and the antecedent of that divine denial; since
the divine negative act, (as they call it), precedes the
commission of sin, but, as has been before shown, follows
that commission by imposing final unhappiness on the sins of
men. These answers may also be adapted, in the most complete
manner possible, to the arguments which follow.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWELFTH PROPOSITION
Definition and demonstration are distinguished by their
objects. The former, is used for explanation, the latter, for
proof: the former, for the discussion of a single question,
the latter, for that of a compound question. But in this
case, I did not undertake to explain, but to prove. I
therefore, thought I must make use, in my argument, of
definition so far as would tend to prove that which I had
undertaken to prove, which was the reason that I did not use
special effort to adapt my definition of election or
preterition to the rules of art. For if what I lay down is on
the whole kata< pantov true, even if it do not reach the
truth in all respects, kaq o[lou it will be sufficient for
me, for the proof which I have proposed to myself. Hence,
even with those substitutions, which you have considered
important, my proof remains valid, and therefore, that
correction does not seem to be necessary for our purpose.
Yet, I must say something concerning that matter. In general,
I remark, that you could see that I was treating distinctly
of that predestination which is unto glory, not of that which
is unto grace, and of that preterition, by which glory was
not prepared for some, not of that by which God determined
not to communicate grace. This is evident from my eighth
proposition. I must then abstain from matters which belong in
general to grace and glory. Among those general matters is
adoption as children, for the beginning and progress of
which, grace is prepared, and glory for its consummation.
Thus you also remark elsewhere in this answer.
I remark particularly, in reference to your corrections to
the first; -- in adoption and non-adoption consists the
essential difference of election at once to grace and to
glory, and of reprobation from both. Therefore, that the
former difference pertains not to election to glory alone,
and the latter, is not of reprobation from glory alone. For a
difference of genus can not be a difference of species.
Therefore, I ought not in this case to have mentioned
adoption unless I wished, in discussing a species, to set
forth the genus contrary to the law, referred to above kaq
o[lou.
To the second; -- I mentioned no end in my definition of
election, or rather in the part of the definition which I
presented. I did not, indeed, desire to present it in full.
For supernatural happiness or glory is not the end, but the
material or subject of election, which material, embraced in
your Theses in the term blessing, you divide into grace and
glory. I know, indeed, that supernatural happiness is not
communicated to us, except by an antecedent union of
ourselves with God, which is implied in these words from the
same proposition, "to deny supernatural happiness, and
resulting from the union with Himself, and from His
indwelling in man." But let us notice the definition of
preterition contained in your Theses. "Preterition is an act
of the divine pleasure by which God determined, from
eternity, to leave certain of His creatures in their own
natural state, and not to communicate to them supernatural
grace, by which their nature, if unfallen, might be
confirmed, and, if fallen, might be restored; for the
declaration of the freedom of His goodness." In the phrase
"to leave in their own natural state," is comprehended, also,
exclusion from supernatural happiness, or it is not. If not,
the definition is incomplete. I think, however, that you
designed to include, also, that idea, otherwise your Theses
are imperfect, as they treat of the predestination by which
grace and glory are prepared for the elect, but nowhere of
the negative act by which God does not appoint glory for the
non-elect, if not in those words. Yet, even in those words,
according to your idea, that preterition, by which God does
not determine to bestow glory on any one, can not be
included. For you define preterition (Thesis 14) to be
"contrary to the preparation of grace." But the preparation
of punishment is an affirmative act, by which He appoints
punishment for the sinner, opposed, not negatively, but
affirmatively to the preparation of glory. When, therefore, I
wished to describe preterition or non-election, so far as it
is an act by which God does not determine to bestow glory on
some persons, it seemed proper that I should, in some
measure, keep in your track, in that, you nowhere, in your
definition of preterition, mention exclusion from adoption
and union with God.
To the third; -- It is manifest that what is inserted, in
parenthesis, was added for the sake of explanation, and does
not come within the order or relation of the definition, like
the other statements. I do not, however see, that even those
statements are false or faulty, though they may be related,
in the mode which you consider them, to that definition. For
they mark, not an affirmation, but a negative act, and there
is emphasis in the word (tantum) which marks the negative. To
will the bestowment of natural happiness is an affirmative
act, but to will only that bestowment is a negative act, for
it excludes all other happiness, which He does not determine
to bestow. Also, what is that act by which God determines to
bestow only natural happiness, if not preterition or neglect.
If to leave in a natural state is a negative act, and
otherwise your definition of non-election, which considers it
as opposed negatively to predestination, is erroneous, I do
not see how those words "to bestow only supernatural
happiness," do not designate a negative act. If you explain
it so as to distinguish, in this case, the two acts, one,
that by which God determined to bestow natural happiness, the
other, that by which He determined to bestow only that, and
not some other kind of happiness, then I acknowledge that the
former, as an affirmative act, does not pertain to this
decree of preterition. But we have never discussed that kind
of happiness. It might, then, have been easily understood
that I used those words so as to note a negative act, that of
the non-bestowment of any happiness other than natural. When
I was writing those words, I thought of using the phrase "to
leave" in imitation of you, but judged that it would be
unsuitable as presupposing that the bestowment was already
made, and I considered that supernatural happiness was not
yet bestowed, but to be bestowed, if man should live in
obedience. In which I have also your assent, as is manifest
from your answer to my third proposition, at the end. The
definition, therefore, remains, and there is nothing in it to
be blamed, for which there can not be found apology in the
example of your Theses, which I have constantly had before my
eyes in this discussion. That this may be made more plain, I
will compare your definition with mine. You thus define the
preterition by which grace is denied: "Preterition is an act
of the divine pleasure, by which God, from eternity,
determined to leave some of His creatures in their natural
state, and not to communicate to them supernatural grace, by
which their nature, if unfallen, may be confirmed, and, if
fallen, may be restored, to the declaration of the freedom of
His own goodness." If I define the preterition by which glory
is denied, analogically according to the form of your
definition, it will be like this. "Preterition is an act of
the divine pleasure, by which God, from eternity, determined
to leave some of His creatures in their natural state and not
to communicate to them supernatural happiness, or glory, by
which their natural happiness may be absorbed, or into which
their ignominy may be changed, to the declaration of the
freedom of His own goodness." In this definition, I have
proposed that which was sufficient for my purpose; with no
evasion, since, the other adjuncts are neither to the
advantage, nor to the disadvantage of my argument. Therefore,
the Major of my syllogism is true, even if it would not be
true, as a complete definition and reciprocally. For a
conclusion can be proved from a Major, which is on the whole
kata< pantov true.
I come now to the Minor, which I proved by two arguments. The
first is not refuted by you, as it is proposed in a mutilated
condition, and so it is changed into something else. For I
did not deny that natural happiness was prepared for man, but
I added "which is, the design and end of man," in which
words, I meant not that it alone, but that it also was
prepared, but on this condition that it would be absorbed by
the supernatural happiness, which should follow. I wish that
the explanation, which I add, may be thus understood; namely,
that natural happiness, could, neither in fact nor in
possibility, occur to man, as the design of man and his end.
For God promised to man, on condition of obedience, not only
natural but also supernatural happiness. In which, since, I
have also your assent, I conclude my proposition thus. God
does not will to bestow upon any man, considered in his
original natural state, natural happiness alone, as the end
and design of man, to the exclusion of supernatural
happiness. Therefore, God passed by no one, considered in his
original natural state. For whether preterition is the act by
which God does not determine to bestow supernatural happiness
on any one, or that by which He determines to bestow natural
happiness, which I think that you concede, it is equally to
my purpose.
I prove the antecedent in this way. All men are considered in
Adam, on equal terms, whether in their original natural sate,
or in a state of sin, unless some difference is introduced by
the will of God. But I deny that any difference was made in
respect to man's original state, and you confirm the first
reason for that denial, when you say that both kinds of
happiness were prepared for man. Again, that, which God, by
His providence, has prepared for man, is not denied to him by
preterition, the opposite of election, unless from the
foresight that he would not attain to it, under the guidance
of providence, but would turn aside freely, and of his own
accord. But God prepared for the first man, and in him, for
all men, supernatural felicity, for He bestowed on him means
sufficient for its attainment; with the additional aid of
divine grace, (if this was also necessary in that state,)
which is not denied to any man unless he first forsakes God.
Your opinion that I have been led into an error, by a two
fold idea, namely, that of the end and the mode, and that I
thought that a single end only was before mankind, is
incorrect, for my words do not, of themselves, imply this. I
made a plain distinction between the subordinate ends, when I
mentioned natural felicity, which I denied was the end of man
and his ultimate. I, therefore, conceded that natural
happiness belongs to man, otherwise there would have been no
necessity of the addition of the statement that this does not
belong to him as the end of man, and his ultimate, that is,
as that, beyond which nothing further can happen to man. Does
not he, who admits that natural happiness pertains to man,
but not as the end of man and his ultimate, acknowledge a two
fold end of man, one subordinate, namely, natural happiness,
and the other final, which is the end and ultimate of man,
namely, supernatural happiness? I do not, however, think that
it can be said truly that happiness is the end and ultimate
of man. Your additional remarks, concerning the order of
natural and supernatural happiness, I approve, as truthful
and learned; but they are, as you admit, "merely incidental,"
and do not affect the substance of my argument.
My second argument is also valid, but it should be arranged
correctly, thus; -- An act of the divine pleasure by which
God determined to deny to any man spiritual or supernatural
blessedness, depends on a meritorious cause, which is sin;
Preterition is such an act; -- Therefore preterition depends
on sin as its meritorious cause. The reason for the Major is
contained in these words, "that denial of happiness can not
be considered otherwise than as punishment," but it is
necessarily preceded by sin, as its proper cause, according
to the mode of merit. From this it follows that God can not
have reference in that act to men, considered in a merely
natural state, without reference to sin.
I will briefly sustain the Major, and the reason assigned for
it, and then examine your answer. I prove the Major thus:
That which the Providence of God has prepared for man, under
a condition, is not denied to him, except on the non-
performance or the violation of the condition. But God, by
His Providence, prepared supernatural happiness for man, &c.
Again, the passage from Isaiah plainly shows that God would
not have deserted the Jews, if they had not merited it by
their "iniquities." The reason, assigned for the Major, I
sustain in this manner: Whatever is contrary to the blessing
of happiness, prepared, promised, and therefore conditionally
due to man, as made in the image of God, cannot be considered
otherwise than as punishment. A denial of supernatural
happiness is contrary to the blessing of happiness, prepared
for man, as such, for even supernatural happiness was
prepared for him as such. Therefore its denial is punishment.
Again, there is no passage of Scripture, I assert it
confidently, from which it can be shown that such denial is
or can be considered otherwise than in the relation of
punishment, than as it is prepared only for sinners. For we
have stated, with truth, that punitive justice has place only
in reference to sinners.
I proceed to examine your answer. In my syllogism the
inference is not "made from a particular case." For that
negative act of God, now under discussion, only exists in
view of a meritorious cause, that is, it does not exist
except in view of that cause, and that act of God would not
exist, if that cause did not exist. The particle "only" does
not amount to an exclusion of the will of God. For it is
certain that sin is not, in fact the cause of punishment,
except as the will of God, who wills to punish sin according
to its merit, otherwise he can remove sin, and remit its
punishment. How indeed could you suppose that he, who made
sin the meritorious cause of punishment, wished to exclude
the will of God, when the very nature of meritorious cause
requires another cause also, which may estimate merit, and
inflict punishment in proportion as it is merited. I
acknowledge that the cause of every negative act does not
exist in man, nor have I made that statement, for why should
I needlessly enter into the general discussion of this
matter. My subject is the act of preterition or non-election,
by which God denies supernatural happiness to man, and I
affirm that the cause of this is in and of man, so far, that
without the existence of this cause, that act would never be
performed. But you argue that the cause of this act does not
exist in man. First, by authority, then by reason, finally by
example. I deny that proof is contained in the passages,
cited as authority. Let it be shown in what sense, these are
the antecedents, from which this consequence may be deduced.
We have previously examined those passages, so far as the
necessity of the subject required.
Your argument from reason is not more conclusive. You say
that the "first sin did not take place, except from the
negative act of God," also "a positive a