THE WORKS OF

JAMES ARMINIUS

VOL. 2

THE PRIVATE DISPUTATIONS

OF

JAMES ARMINIUS, D.D.

ON THE PRINCIPAL ARTICLES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

COMMENCED BY THE AUTHOR CHIEFLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF FORMING A

SYSTEM OF DIVINITY

DISPUTATION I

ON THEOLOGY

I. As we are about again to commence our course of

theological disputations under the auspices of our gracious

God, we will previously treat a little on theology itself.

II. By the word "theology" we do not understand a conception

or a discourse of God himself, of which meaning it would

properly admit; but we understand by it, "a conception" or "a

discourse about God and things divine," according to its

common use.

III. It may be defined, the doctrine or science of the truth

which is according to godliness, and which God has revealed

to man that he may know God and divine things, may believe on

him and may through faith perform to him the acts of love,

fear, honour, worship and obedience, and obtain blessedness

from him through union with him, to the divine glory.

IV. The proximate and immediate object of this doctrine or

science is, not God himself, but the duty and act of man

which he is bound to perform to God. In theology, therefore,

God himself must be considered as the object of this duty.

V. On this account, theology is not a theoretical science or

doctrine, but a practical one, requiring the action of the

whole man, according to all and each of its parts -- an

action of the most transcendent description, answerable to

the excellence of the object as far as the human capacity

will permit.

VI. From these premises, it follows that this doctrine is not

expressed after the example of natural science, by which God

knows himself, but after the example of that notion which God

has willingly conceived within himself from all eternity,

about the prescribing of that duty and of all things required

for it.

DISPUTATION II

ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THEOLOGY MUST BE TAUGHT

I. It has long been a maxim with those philosophers who are

the masters of method and order, that the theoretical

sciences ought to be delivered in a synthetical order, but

the practical in an analytical order, on which account, and

because theology is a practical science, it follows that it

must be treated according to the analytical method.

II. Our discussion of this doctrine must therefore commence

with its end, about which we must previously treat, with much

brevity, both on its nature or what it is, and its qualities;

we must then teach, throughout the entire discourse, the

means for attaining the end, to which the obtaining of the

end must be subjoined, and, at this, the whole discussion

must terminate.

III. For, according to this order, not only the whole

doctrine itself, but likewise all its parts, will be treated

from its principal end, and each article will obtain that

place which belongs to it according to the principal relation

which it has to its total and to the end of the whole.

IV. But though we are easily satisfied with all treatises in

which the body of divinity is explained, provided they agree

according to the truth, at least in the chief and fundamental

things, with the Scripture itself; and though we willingly

give to all of them praise and commendation; yet, if on

account only of inquiry into the order, and for the sake of

treating the subject with greater accuracy, we may be allowed

to explain what are our views and wishes.

V. In the first place, the order in which the theology

ascribed to God, and to the actions of God, is treated, seems

to be inconvenient. Neither are we pleased with the division

of theology into the pathological, and the therapeutic after

a preface of the doctrine about the principles, the end and

the efficient; nor with that, how accommodating soever it may

be, in appearance, in which, after premising as its

principles the word of God, and God himself, as the causes of

our salvation, and therefore the works and effects of God,

and man who is its subject is placed as a part of it. So

neither do we receive satisfaction from the partition of

theological science into the knowledge of God and of man; nor

from that by which theology is said to exercise itself about

God and the church; nor that by which it is previously

determined that we must treat about God, the motion of a

rational creature to him, and about Christ; nor does that

which prescribes us to a discourse about God, the creatures,

and principally about man and his fall, about his reparation

through Christ, and about the sacraments and a future life.

DISPUTATION III

ON BLESSEDNESS, THE END OF THEOLOGY

I. The end of theology is the blessedness of man; and that,

not animal or natural, but spiritual and supernatural.

II. It consists in fruition, the object of which is a

perfect, chief, and sufficient good, which is God.

III. The foundation of this fruition is life, endowed with

understanding and with intellectual feeling.

IV. The connective or coherent cause of fruition is union

with God, by which that life is so greatly perfected, that

they who obtain this union are said to be "partakers of the

divine nature and of life eternal."

V. The medium of fruition is understanding and emotion or

feeling -- understanding, not by species or image, but by

clear vision, which is called that of face to face; and

feeling, corresponding with this vision.

VI. The cause of blessedness is God himself, uniting himself

with man; that is, giving himself to be seen, loved,

possessed, and thus to be enjoyed by man.

VII. The antecedent or only moving cause is the goodness and

the remunerative justice of God, which have the wisdom of God

as their precursor.

VIII. The executive cause is the power of God, by which the

soul is enlarged after the capacity of God, and the animal

body is transformed and transfigured into a spiritual body.

IX. The end, event, or consequence is two-fold, (1.) a

demonstration of the glorious wisdom, goodness, justice,

power, and likewise the universal perfection of God; and (2.)

his glorification by the beatified.

X. Its adjunct properties are, that it is eternal, and is

known to be so by him who possesses it; and that it at once

both satisfies every desire, and is an object of continued

desire.

DISPUTATION IV

ON RELIGION

I. Omitting all dispute about the question, "whether it be

possible for God to render man happy by a union with himself

without the intervening act of man," we affirm that it has

pleased God not to bless man except by some duty performed

according to the will of God, which God has determined to

reward with eternal blessedness.

II. And this most equitable will of God rests on the

foundation of the justice and equity according to which it

seems lawful and proper, that the Creator should require from

his creature, endowed with reason, an act tending to God, by

which, in return, a rational creature is bound to tend

towards God, its author and beneficent lord and master.

III. This act must be one of the entire man, according to

each of his parts -- according to his soul, and that

entirely, and each of his faculties, and according to his

body, so far as it is the mute instrument of the soul, yet

itself possessing a capacity for happiness by means of the

soul. This act must likewise be the most excellent of all

those things which can proceed from man, and like a

continuous act; so that whatever other acts those may he

which are performed by man through some intervention of the

will, they ought to be performed according to this act and

its rule.

IV. Though this duty, according to its entire essence and all

its parts, can scarcely be designated by one name, yet we do

not improperly denominate it when we give it the name of

Religion This word, in its most enlarged acceptation,

embraces three things -- the act itself, the obligation of

the act, and the obligation with regard to God, on account of

whom that act must be performed. Thus, we are bound to honour

our parents on account of God.

V. Religion, then, is that act which our theology places in

order; and it is for this reason justly called "the object of

theological doctrine."

VI. Its method is defined by the command of God, and not by

human choice; for the word of God is its rule and measure.

And as in these days we have this word in the Scriptures of

the Old and New Testament alone, we say that these Scriptures

are the canon according to which religion is to be conformed.

We shall soon treat more fully about the Scriptures how far

it is required that we should consider them as the canon of

religion.

VII. The opposites to religion are, impiety, that is, the

neglect and contempt of God, and eqeloqrhskeia will-worship,

or superstition, that is, a mode of religion invented by man.

Hypocrisy is not opposed to the whole of religion, but to its

integrity or purity; because that in which the entire man

ought to be engaged, is performed only by his body.

DISPUTATION V

ON THE RULE OF RELIGION, THE WORD OF GOD, AND THE SCRIPTURES

IN PARTICULAR

I. As religion is the duty of man towards God, it is

necessary that it should be so prescribed by God in his sure

word as to render it evident to man that he is bound by this

prescript as it proceeds from God; or, at least, it may and

ought to be evident to man.

II. This word is either endiaqeton, [an inward or mental

reasoning,] or wroforikon, [a spoken or delivered discourse]

the former of them being engrafted in the mind of man by an

internal inscription, whether it be an increation or a

superinfusion; the latter being openly pronounced.

III. By the engrafted word, God has prescribed religion to

man, first by inwardly persuading him that God ought, and

that it was his will, to be worshipped by man; then, by

universally disclosing to the mind of man the worship that is

pleasing to himself, and that consists of the love of God and

of one's neighbour; and, lastly, by writing or sealing a

remuneration on his heart. This inward manifestation is the

foundation of all external revelation.

IV. God has employed the outward word, First, that he might

repeat what had been engrafted -- might recall it to

remembrance, and might urge its exercise. Secondly, that he

might prescribe to him other things besides, which seem to be

placed in a four-fold difference. (1.) For they are either

such things as are homogeneous to the law of nature, which

might easily be raised up on the things engrafted, or which

man could not with equal ease deduce from them. (2.) Or they

may appear to be such things as these, yet such as it has

pleased God to circumscribe, lest, from the things engrafted,

conclusions should be drawn that were universally, or at

least for that time, repugnant to the will of God. (3.) Or

they are merely positive, having no communion with these

engrafted things, although they rest on the general duty of

religion. (4.) Or, lastly, according, to some state of man,

they are suitable to him, particularly for that into which

man was brought by the fall from his primeval condition.

V. God communicates this external word to man, either orally,

or by writing. For, neither with respect to the whole of

religion, nor with respect to its parts, is God confined to

either of these modes of communication; but he sometimes uses

one and sometimes another, and at other times both of them,

according to his own choice and pleasure. He first employed

oral enunciation in its delivery, and afterwards, writing, as

a more certain means against corruption and oblivion. He has

also completed it in writing; so that we now have the

infallible word of God in no other place than in the

Scriptures, which are therefore appropriately denominated

"the instrument of religion."

VI. These Scriptures are contained in those books of the Old

and the New Testament which are called "canonical:" They

consist of the five books of Moses; the books of Joshua,

Judges, and of Ruth; the First and Second of Samuel; the

First and Second of Kings; the First and Second of

Chronicles; the books of Ezra and of Nehemiah, and the first

ten chapters of that of Esther; fifteen books of the

prophets, that is, the three Major and the twelve Minor

Prophets; the books of Job, the Psalms, Proverbs,

Ecclesiastes, the Canticles, Daniel, and of the Lamentations

of Jeremiah: All these books are contained in the Old

Testament. Those of the New Testament are the following: The

four Evangelists; one book of the Acts of the Apostles;

thirteen of St. Paul's Epistles; the Epistle to the Hebrews;

that of St. James; the two of St. Peter; the three of St.

John; that of St. Jude; and the Apocalypse by St. John. Some

of these are without hesitation accounted authentic; but

about others of them doubts have been occasionally

entertained. Yet the number is quite sufficient of those

about which no doubts were ever indulged.

VII. The primary cause of these books is God, in his Son,

through the Holy Spirit. The instrumental causes are holy men

of God, who, not at their own will and pleasure, but as they

were actuated and inspired by the Holy Spirit, wrote these

books, whether the words were inspired into them, dictated to

them, or administered by them under the divine direction.

VIII. The matter or object of the Scriptures is religion, as

has already been mentioned. The essential and internal form

is the true intimation or signification of the will of God

respecting religion. The external is the form or character of

the word, which is attempered to the dignity of the speaker,

and accommodated to the nature of things and to the capacity

of men.

IX. The end is the instruction of man, to his own salvation

and the glory of God. The parts of the whole instruction are

doctrine, reproof, institution or instruction, correction,

consolation, and threatening.

DISPUTATION VI

ON THE AUTHORITY AND CERTAINTY OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES

I. The authority of the word of God, which is comprised in

the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, lies both in the

veracity of the whole narration, and of all the declarations,

whether they be those about things past, about things

present, or about those which are to come, and in the power

of the commands and prohibitions, which are contained in the

divine word.

II. Both of these kinds of authority can depend on no other

than on God, who is the principal author of this word, both

because he is truth without suspicion of falsehood, and

because he is of power invincible.

III. On this account, the knowledge alone that this word is

divine, is obligatory on our belief and obedience; and so

strongly is it binding, that this obligation can be augmented

by no external authority.

IV. In what manner or respect soever the church may be

contemplated, she can do nothing to confirm this authority;

for she, also, is indebted to this word for all her own

authority; and she is not a church unless she have previously

exercised faith in this word as being divine, and have

engaged to obey it. Wherefore, in any way to suspend the

authority of the Scriptures on the church, is to deny that

God is of sufficient veracity and supreme power, and that the

church herself is a church.

V. But it is proved by various methods, that this word has a

divine origin, either by signs employed for the enunciation

or declaration of the word, such as miracles, predictions and

divine appearances -- by arguments engrafted on the word

itself, such as the matters which it contains, the style and

character of the discourse, the agreements between all the

parts and each of them, and the efficacy of the word itself;

and by the inward testification or witness of God himself by

his Holy Spirit. To all these, we add a secondary proof --

the testimony of those persons who have received this word as

divine.

VI. The force and efficacy of this last testimony is entirely

human, and is of importance equal to the quantum of wisdom,

probity and constancy possessed by the witnesses. And on this

account the authority of the church can make no other kind of

faith than that which is human, but which may be preparatory

to the production of faith divine. The testimony of the

church, therefore, is not the only thing by which the

certainty of the Scriptures is confirmed to us; indeed it is

not the principle thing; nay, it is the weakest of all those

which are adduced in confirmation.

VII. No arguments can be invented for establishing the

divinity of any word, which do not belong by most equitable

reason to this word; and, on the other hand, it is impossible

any arguments can be devised which may conduce even by a

probable reason to destroy the divinity of this word.

VIII. Though it be not absolutely necessary to salvation to

believe that this or that book is the work of the author

whose title it bears; yet this fact may be established by

surer arguments than are those which claim the authorship of

any other work for the writer.

IX. The Scriptures are canonical in the same way as they are

divine; because they contain the rule of faith, charity,

hope, and of all our inward and outward actions. They do not,

therefore, require human authority in order to their being

received into the canon, or considered as canonical. Nay, the

relation between God and his creatures, requires that his

word should be the rule of life to his creatures.

X. We assert that, for the establishment of the divinity of

the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, this disjunctive

proposition is of irrefutable validity: Either the Scriptures

are divine, or (far be blasphemy from the expression!) they

are the most foolish of all writings, whether they be said to

have proceeded from man, or from the evil spirit.

COROLLARIES

I. To affirm "that the authority of the Scriptures depends

upon the church, because the church is more ancient than the

Scriptures," is a falsehood, a foolish speech, an implication

of manifold contradictions and blasphemy.

II. The authority of the Roman pontiff to bear witness to the

divinity of the Scriptures, is less than that of any bishop

who is wiser and better than he, and possessed of greater

constancy.

DISPUTATION VII

ON THE PERFECTION OF THE SCRIPTURES

I. We denominate that which comprehends all things necessary

for the church to know, to believe, to do and to hope, in

order to salvation, "THE PERFECTION OF THE SACRED

SCRIPTURES."

II. As we are about to engage in the defense of this

perfection, against inspirations, visions, dreams and other

novel enthusiastic things, we assert, that, since the time

when Christ and his apostles sojourned on earth, no

inspiration of any thing necessary for the salvation of any

individual man, or of the church, has been given to any

single person or to any congregation of men whatsoever, which

thing is not in a full and most perfect manner comprised in

the sacred Scriptures.

III. We likewise affirm, that in the latter ages no doctrine

necessary to salvation has been deduced from these Scriptures

which was not explicitly known and believed from the very

commencement of the Christian church. For, from the time of

Christ's ascent into heaven, the church of God was in an

adult state, being capable indeed of increasing in the

knowledge and belief of things necessary to salvation, but

not capable of receiving accessions of new articles; that is,

she was capable of increase in that faith by which the

articles of religion are believed, but not in that faith

which is the subject of belief.

IV. Whatever additions have since been made, they obtain only

the rank of interpretations and proofs, which ought

themselves not to be at variance with the Scriptures, but to

be deduced from them; otherwise, no authority is due to them,

but they should rather be considered as allied to error; for

the perfection, not only of the propositions, but likewise of

the explanations and proofs which are comprised in the

Scriptures, is very great.

V. But the most compendious way of forming a judgment about

any enunciation or proposition, is, to discern whether its

subject and predicate be either expressly or with equal force

contained in them, that proposition may be rejected at least

as not necessary to salvation, without any detriment to one's

salvation. But the predicate may be of such a kind, that,

when ascribed to this subject, it cannot be received without

detriment to the salvation. For instance, "The Roman pontiff

is the head of the church." "The virgin Mary is the mediatrix

of grace."

DISPUTATION VIII

ON THE PERSPICUITY OF THE SCRIPTURES

I. The perspicuity of the Scriptures is a quality agreeing

with them as with a sign, according. to which quality they

are adapted clearly to reveal the conceptions, whose signs

are the words comprised in the Scriptures, to those persons

to whom the Scriptures are administered according to the

benevolent providence of God.

II. That perspicuity is a quality which agrees with the

Scriptures, is proved from its cause and its end. (1.) In

cause, we consider the wisdom and goodness of the author,

who, according to his wisdom knew, and according to his

goodness willed, clearly and well to enunciate or declare the

meanings of his own mind. (2.) In the end is the duty of

those to whom the Scriptures are directed, and who, through

the decree of God, cannot attain to salvation without this

knowledge.

III. This perspicuity comes distinctly to be considered both

with regard to its object and its subject. For all things [in

the Scriptures] are not equally perspicuous, nor is every

thing alike perspicuous to all persons; but in the epistle of

St. Paul, some things occur which "are hard to be

understood;" and "the gospel is hid, or concealed, to them

who are lost, in whom the god of this world hath blinded the

minds of them who believe not"

IV. But those senses or meanings, the knowledge and belief of

which are simply necessary to salvation, are revealed in the

Scriptures with such plainness, that they can be perceived

even by the most simple of mankind, provided they be able

duly to exercise their reason.

V. But they are perspicuous to those alone who, being

illuminated by the light of the Holy Spirit, have eyes to

see, and a mind to understand and discern. For any colour

whatever, though sufficiently illuminated by the light, is

not seen except by the eye which is endued with the power of

seeing, as with an inward light.

VI. But even in those things which are necessary to be known

and believed in order to salvation, the law must be

distinguished from the gospel, especially in that part which

relates to Jesus Christ crucified and raised up again. For

even the gentiles, who are aliens from Christ, have "the work

of the law written in their hearts," though this is not

saving, except by the addition of the internal illumination

and inspiration of God; but "the doctrine of the cross, which

is foolishness and a stumbling block to the natural man," is

not perceived without the revelation of the Spirit.

VII. In the Scriptures, some things may be found so difficult

to be understood, that men of the quickest and most

perspicacious genius may, in attaining to an understanding of

those things, have a subject on which to bestow their labours

during the whole course of their lives. But God has so finely

attempered the Scripture, that they can neither be read

without profit, nor, after having been perused and reperused

innumerable times, can they be put aside through aversion or

disgust.

DISPUTATION IX

ON THE MEANINGS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES

I. The legitimate and genuine sense of the holy Scriptures

is, that which the Holy Ghost, the author of them, intended,

and which is collected from the words themselves, whether

they be received in their proper or in their figurative

signification; that is, it is the grammatical sense, as it is

called.

II. From this sense, alone, efficacious arguments may be

sought for the proof of doctrines.

III. But, on account of the analogical similitude of

corporeal, carnal, natural, and earthly things, and those

belonging to the present life, to things spiritual, heavenly,

future and eternal, it happens that a double meaning, each of

them certain and intended by the author, lies under the very

same words in the Scriptures, of which the one is called "the

typical," the other "the meaning prefigured in the type" or

"the allegorical." To this allegorical meaning, we also refer

the analogical, as opposed in a similar manner to that which

is typical.

IV. From these meanings, that which is called "the

ethiological" and "the tropological" do not differ, since the

former of them renders the cause of the grammatical sense,

and the latter contains an accommodation of it to the

circumstances of persons, place, time, &c.

V. The interpretation of Scripture has respect both to its

words and to its sense or meaning.

VI. The interpretation of its words is either that of single

words, or of many words combined; and both of these methods

constitute either a translation of the words into another

language, or an explanation [or paraphrase] through other

words of the same language.

VII. Let translation be so restricted, that, if the original

word has any ambiguity, the word into which it is translated

may retain it: or, if that cannot be done, let it have

something equivalent by being noted in the margin.

VIII. In the explanation [or paraphrase] which shall be made

by other words, endeavours must be used that explanatory

words be sought from the Scriptures themselves. For this

purpose, attention to the synonymy and phraseology will be

exceedingly useful.

IX. In the interpretation of the meanings of the words, it

must be sedulously attempted both to make the sense agree

with the rule or "form of sound words," and to accommodate it

to the scope or intention of the author in that passage. To

this end, in addition to a clear conception of the words, a

comparison of other passages of Scripture, whether they be

similar, is conducive, as is likewise a diligent search or

institution into its context. In this labour, the occasion

[of the words] and their end, the connection of those things

which precede and which follow, and the circumstances, also,

of persons, times and places, will be principally observed.

X. As "the Scriptures are not of private or peculiar

explanation," an interpreter of them will strive to "have his

senses exercised" in them; that the interpretation of the

Scriptures, which, in those sacred writings, comes under the

denomination of "prophecy," may proceed from the same Spirit

as that which primarily inspired the prophecy of the

Scriptures.

XI. But the authority of no one is so great, whether it be

that of an individual or of a church, as to be able to

obtrude his own interpretation on the people as the authentic

one. From this affirmation however, by way of eminence, we

except the prophets and the apostles. For such interpretation

is always subjected to the judgment of him to whom it is

proposed, to this extent -- that he is bound to receive it,

only so far as it is confirmed by strength of arguments.

XII. For this reason, neither the agreement of the fathers,

which can, with difficulty, be demonstrated, nor the

authority of the Roman pontiff, ought to be received as the

rule of interpretation.

XIII. We do not wish to introduce unbounded license, by which

it may be allowable to any person, whether a public

interpreter of Scripture or a private individual, to reject,

without cause, any interpretations whatsoever, whether made

by one prophet, or by more; but we desire the liberty of

prophesying [or public expounding] to be preserved entire and

unimpaired in the church. This liberty, itself, however, we

subject to the judgment of God, as possessing the power of

life and death, and to that of the church, or of her prelates

who are endowed with the power of binding and loosing.

DISPUTATION X

ON THE EFFICACY OF THE SCRIPTURES

I. When we treat on the force and efficacy of the word of

God, whether spoken or written, we always append to it the

principal and concurrent efficacy of the Holy Spirit.

II. The object of this efficacy is man, but he must be

considered either as the subject in whom the efficacy

operates, or as the object about whom this efficacy exercises

itself.

III. The subject of this efficacy in whom it operates, is man

according to his understanding and his passions, and as being

endowed with a capacity, either active or passive. (1.)

According to his understanding, by which he is able to

understand the meanings of the word, and to apprehend them as

true and good for himself: (2.) According to his passions, by

which he is capable of being carried by his appetites to

something true and good which is pointed out, to embrace it,

and to repose in it.

IV. This efficacy is not only preparatory, by which the

understanding and the passions are prepared to apprehend

something else that is yet more true and good, and that is

not comprised in the external word; but it is likewise

perfective, by which the human understanding and affections

are so perfected, that man cannot attain to an ulterior

perfection in the present life. Therefore, we reject [the

doctrine of] those who affirm that the Scriptures are a dead

letter, and serve only to prepare a man, and to render him

capable of receiving another inward word.

V. This efficacy is beautifully circumscribed in the

Scriptures by three acts, each of which is two-fold. (1.)

That of teaching what is true, and of confuting what is

false. (2.) That of exhorting to what is good, dissuading

from what is evil, and of reproving if any thing has been

done beyond or contrary to one's duty. (3.) That of

administering consolation to a contrite spirit, and of

denouncing threats against a lofty spirit.

VI. The object of this efficacy, about which it exercises

itself, is the same man, placed before the tribunal of divine

justice, that, according to this word, he [reporter] may bear

away from it a sentence either of justification or of

condemnation.

DISPUTATION XI

ON RELIGION IN A STRICTER SENSE

We have treated on religion generally, and on its principles

as they are comprehended in the scriptures of the Old and New

Testament. We must now treat upon it in a stricter

signification.

I. As religion contains the duty of man towards God, it must

necessarily be founded in the mutual relation which subsists

between God and man. If it happen that this relation is

varied, the mode of religion must also be varied, the acts

pertaining to the substance of every religion always

remaining, which are knowledge, faith, love, fear, trust,

dread and obedience.

II. The first relation between God and man is that which

flows from the creation of man in the divine image, according

to which religion was prescribed to him by the comprehensive

law that has been impressed on the minds of men, and that was

afterwards repeated by Moses in the ten commandments. For the

sake of proving man's obedience, God added to this a

symbolical law, about not eating the fruit of the tree of the

knowledge of good and evil.

III. Through the sin of man, another relation was introduced

between him and God, according to which, man, being liable to

the condemnation of God, needs the grace of restoration. If

God bestow this grace on man, the religion which is to be

prescribed to man must now be also founded on that act, in

addition to creation. Since this act [on the part of God]

requires from man an acknowledgment of sin and thanksgiving

for deliverance, it is apparent that, in this new relation,

the mode of religion ought likewise to be varied, as, through

the appointment of God, it has in reality been varied.

IV. It was the pleasure of God so to administer this

variation, that it should not immediately exhibit this grace

in a complete manner, but that it should retain man for a

season under the sealed dominion of guilt, yet with the

addition of a promise of grace to be exhibited in his own

time. Hence, arises the difference of the religion which was

prescribed by Moses to the children of Israel, and that which

was delivered by Christ to his followers -- of which the

former is called "the religion of the Old Testament and of

the promise," and the latter," that of the New Testament and

of the gospel;" the former is also called the Jewish

religion; the latter, the Christian.

V. The use of the ceremonial law under Moses, and its

abrogation under Christ, teach most clearly that this

religion or mode of religion differs in many acts. But as the

Christian religion prevails at this time, and as [its

obligations are] to be performed by us, we will treat further

about it, yet so as to intersperse, in their proper places,

some mention, both of the primitive religion and of that of

the Jews, so Jar as they are capable, and ought to serve to

explain the Christian religion.

VI. But it is not our wish for this difference to be extended

so far as to have the attainment of salvation, without the

intervention of Christ, ascribed to those who served God

under the pedagogy of the Old Testament and by faith in the

promise; for the subjoined affirmation has always obtained

from the time when the first promise was promulgated: "There

is none other name under heaven, given among men, than that

of our Lord Jesus Christ, by which men must be saved."

VII. It appears, from this, that the following assertion,

which was used by one of the ancients, is false and

untheological: "Men were saved at first by the law of nature,

afterwards, by that of Moses, and at length, by that of

grace." This, also, is further apparent, that such a

confusion of the Jewish and Christian religions as was

introduced by it, is completely opposed to the dispensation

or economy of God.

DISPUTATION XII

ON THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, ITS NAME AND RELATION

I. Beginning now to treat further on the Christian religion,

we will first declare what is the meaning of this term, and

we will afterwards consider the matter of this religion, each

in its order.

II. The Christian religion, which the Jews called "the heresy

of the Nazarenes," obtained its name from Jesus of Nazareth,

whom God hath appointed as our only master, and hath made him

both Christ and Lord.

III. But this name agrees with him in two ways -- from the

cause and from the object. (1.) From the cause; because Jesus

Christ, as "the Teacher sent from God," prescribed this

religion, both by his own voice, when he dwelt on earth, and

by his apostles, whom he sent forth into all the world. (2.)

From the object; because the same Jesus Christ, the object of

this religion, according to godliness, is now exhibited, and

fully or perfectly manifested; whereas, he was formerly

promised and foretold by Moses and the prophets, only as

being about to come.

IV. He was, indeed, a teacher far transcending all other

teachers -- Moses, the prophets, and even the angels

themselves -- both in the mode of his perception, and in the

excellence of his doctrine. In the mode of his perception;

because, existing in the bosom of the Father, admitted

intimately to behold all the secrets of the Father, and

endued with the plenitude of the Spirit, he saw and heard

those things which he speaks and testifies. But other

teachers, being endued, according to a certain measure with

the Spirit, have perceived either by a vision, by dreams, by

conversing "face to face," or by the intervention of an

angel, those things which it was their duty to declare to

others; and this Spirit itself is called "the Spirit of

Christ."

V. In the excellence of his doctrine, also, Christ was

superior to all other teachers, because he revealed to

mankind, together and at once, the fullness of the very

Godhead, and the complete and latest will of his Father

respecting the salvation of men; so that, either as it

regards the matter or the dearness of the exposition, no

addition can be made to it, nor is it necessary that it

should.

VI. From their belief in this religion, and their profession

of it, the professors were called Christians. (Acts xi, 26; 1

Pet. iv, 16.) That the excellence of this name may really

belong to a person, it is not sufficient for him to

acknowledge Christ as a teacher and prophet divinely called.

But he must likewise religiously own and worship him as the

object of this doctrine, though the former knowledge and

faith precede this, and though from it, alone, certain

persons are sometimes said to have believed in Christ.

DISPUTATION XIII

ON THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, WITH REGARD TO THE MATTER

GENERALLY

I. Since God is the object of all religion, in its various

modifications, he must likewise be the object of this

religion. But Christ, in reference to God, is also an object

of it, as having been appointed by God the Father, King and

Lord of the universe, and the Head of his church.

II. For this reason, in a treatise on the Christian religion,

the following subjects come, in due order, under our

consideration: (1.) The object itself, towards which faith

and religious worship ought to tend. (2.) The cause, on

account of which, faith and worship may and ought to be

performed to the object. (3.) The very act of faith and

worship, and the method of each, according to the command of

God and Christ. (4.) Salvation itself, which, as being

promised and desired, has the power of an impelling cause,

which, when obtained, is the reward of the observance of

religion, and from which arises the everlasting glory of God

in Christ.

III. But man, by whom [the duties of] this religion must be

executed, is a sinner, yet one for whom remission of sins and

reconciliation have now been obtained. By this mark, it is

intended to be distinguished from the religion of the Jews,

which God also prescribed to sinners; but it was at a time

when remission of sins had not been obtained, on which

account, the mode of religion was likewise different,

particularly with regard to ceremonies.

IV. This religion, with regard to all those things which we

have mentioned as coming under consideration in it, is, of

all religions, the most excellent; or, rather, it is the most

excellent mode of religion. Because, in it, the object is

proposed in a manner the most excellent; so that there is

nothing about this object which the human mind is capable of

perceiving, that is not exhibited in the doctrine of the

Christian religion. For God has with it disclosed all his own

goodness, and has given it to be viewed in Christ.

V. The cause, on account of which, religion may and ought to

be performed to this object, is, in every way, the most

efficacious; so that nothing can be imagined, why religion

may and ought to be performed to any other deity. that is not

comprehended in the efficacy of this cause, in a pre-eminent

manner.

VI. The very act of faith and worship is required, and must

be performed, in a manner the most signal and particular; and

the salvation which arises from this act, is the greatest and

most glorious, both because God will afford a fuller and more

perfect sight of himself, than if salvation had been obtained

through another form of religion, and because those who will

become partakers of this salvation, will have Christ

eternally as their head, who is the brother of men, and they

will always behold him. On this account, in the attainment

and possession of salvation, we shall hereafter become, in

some measure, superior to the angels themselves.

DISPUTATION XIV

ON THE OBJECT OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION: AND, FIRST, ABOUT

GOD, ITS PRIMARY OBJECT, AND WHAT GOD IS

I. The object of the Christian religion is that towards which

the faith and worship of a religious man ought to tend. This

object is God and his Christ -- God principally, Christ

subordinately under God -- God per se, Christ as God has

constituted him the object of this religion.

II. In God, who is the primary object of the Christian

religion, three things come in order under our consideration:

(1.) The nature of God, of which the excellence and goodness

is such that religion can honourably and usefully be

performed to it. (2.) The acts of God, on account of which

religion ought to be performed to him. (3.) The will of God,

by which he wills religion to be performed to himself, and

that he who performs it be rewarded; and, on the contrary,

that the neglecter of it be punished.

III. To every treatise on the nature of God, must be prefixed

this primary and chief axiom of all religion: "There is a

God." Without this, vain is every inquiry into the nature of

God; for, if the divine nature had no existence, religion

would be a mere phantasm of man's conception.

IV. Though the existence of God has been intimated to every

rational creature that perceives his voice, and though this

truth is known to every one who reflects on such an

intimation; yet, "that there is a God," may be demonstrated

by various arguments. First, by certain theoretical axioms;

and because when the terms in which these are expressed have

been once understood, they are known to be true, they deserve

to receive the name of "implanted ideas."

V. The first axiom is, "Nothing is or can be from itself? For

thus it would at one and the same time, be and not be, it

would be both prior and posterior to itself, and would be

both the cause and effect of itself. Therefore, some one

being must necessarily be pre-existent, from whom, as from

the primary and supreme cause, all other things derive their

origin. But this being is God.

VI. The second axiom is, "Every efficient primary cause is

better or more excellent than its effect." From this, it

follows that, as all created minds are in the order of

effects, some one mind is supreme and most wise, from which

the rest have their origin. But this mind is God.

VII. The third axiom is, "No finite force can make something

out of nothing; and the first nature has been made out of

nothing." For, if it were otherwise, it neither could nor

ought to be changed by an efficient or a former; and thus,

nothing could be made from it. From this, it follows, either

that all things which exist have been from eternity and are

primary being, or that there is one primary being. But this

being is God.

VIII. The same truth is proved by the practical axiom, or the

conscience, which has its seat in all rational creatures. It

excuses and exhilarates a man in good actions; and, in these

which are evil, it accuses and torments -- even in those

things [of both kinds] which have not come, and which never

will come, to the knowledge of any creature. This stands as a

manifest indication that there is some supreme judge, who

will institute a strict inquiry, and will pass judgment. But

this judge is God.

IX. The magnitude, the perfection, the multitude, the

variety, and the agreement, of all things that exist, supply

us with the fifth argument, which loudly proclaims that all

these things proceed from one and the same being and not from

many beings. But this being is God.

X. The sixth argument is from the order perceptible in

things, and from the orderly disposition and direction of all

of them to an end, even of those things which, devoid of

reason, themselves, cannot act on account of an end, or at

least, cannot intend an end. But all order is from one being,

and direction to an end is from a wise and good being. But

this being is God.

XI. The preservation of political, ecclesiastical and

economical society among mankind, furnishes our seventh

argument. Amidst such great perversity and madness of Satan

and of evil men, human society could never attain to any

stability or firmness, except it were preserved safe and

unimpaired by One who is supremely powerful. But this is God.

XII. We take our eighth argument from the miracles which we

believe to have been done, and which we perceive to be done,

the magnitude of which is so great as to cause them far to

exceed the entire force and power of the created universe.

Therefore, a cause must exist which transcends the universe

and its power or capability. But this cause is God.

XIII. The predictions of future and contingent things, and

their accurate and strict completion, supply the ninth

argument as being things which could proceed from no one

except from God.

XIV. In the last place, is added, the perpetual and universal

agreement of all nations, which general consent must be

accounted as equivalent to a law, nay to a divine oracle.

COROLLARY

On account of the dissensions of very learned men, we allow

this question to be discussed, "from the motion which is

apparent in the world, and from the fact, that whatever is

moved is moved by another, can it be concluded that there is

a God?

DISPUTATION XV

ON THE NATURE OF GOD

I. Concerning God, the primary object of theology, two things

must be known, (1.) His nature, or what God is, or rather

what qualities does he possess? (2.) Who God is, or to whom

this nature must be attributed. These must be known, lest any

thing foolish or unbecoming be ascribed to God, or lest

another, or a strange one, be considered as the true God. On

the first of these we will now treat in a few disputations.

II. As we are not able to know the nature of God, in itself,

we can, in a measure, attain to some knowledge from the

analogy of the nature which is in created things, and

principally that which is in ourselves, who are created after

the image of God; while we always add a mode of eminence to

this analogy, according to which mode God is understood to

exceed, infinitely, the perfections of things created.

III. As in the whole nature of things, and in man, who is the

compendium or abridgment of it, only two things can be

considered as essential, whether they be disparted in their

subjects, or, in a certain order, connected with each other

and subordinate in the same subject, which two things are

Essence and Life; we will also contemplate the nature of God

according to these two impulses of his nature. For the four

degrees, which are proposed by several divines -- to be, to

live, to. feel, and to understand -- are restricted to these

two causes of motion; because the word "to live," embraces

within itself both feeling and understanding.

IV. We say the essence of God is the first impulse of the

divine nature, by which God is purely and simply understood

to be.

V. As the whole nature of things is distributed according to

their essence, into body and spirit, we affirm that the

divine essence is spiritual, and from this, that God is a

Spirit, because it could not possibly come to pass that the

first and chief being should be corporeal. From this, one

cannot do otherwise than justly admire the transcendent force

and plenitude of God, by which he is capable of creating even

things corporeal that have nothing analogous to himself.

VI. To the essence of God no attribute can be added, whether

distinguished from it in reality, by relation, or by a mere

conception of the mind; but only a mode of pre-eminence can

be attributed to it, according to which it is understood to

comprise within itself and to exceed all the perfections of

all things. This mode may be declared in this one expression:

"The divine essence is uncaused and without commencement."

VII. Hence, it follows that this essence is simple and

infinite; from this, that it is eternal and immeasurable;

and, lastly, that it is unchangeable, impassable and

incorruptible, in the manner in which it has been proved by

us in our public theses on this subject.

VIII. And since unity and goodness reciprocate with being,

and as the affections or passions of every being are general,

we also affirm that the essence of God is one, and that God

is one according to it, and is, therefore, good -- nay, the

chief good, from the participation of which all things have

both their being, and their well being.

IX. As this essence is itself pure from all composition, so

it cannot enter into the composition of any thing. We permit

it to become a subject of discussion, whether this be

designated in the Scriptures by the name of "holiness," which

denotes separation or a being separated.

X. These modes of pre-eminence are not communicable to any

thing, from the very circumstance of their being such. And

when these modes are contemplated in the life of God, and in

the faculties of his life, they are of infinite usefulness in

theology, and are not among the smallest foundations of true

religion.

DISPUTATION XVI

ON THE LIFE OF GOD

I. Life is that which comes under our consideration, in the

second impulse of the divine nature; and that it belongs to

God, is not only evident from its own nature, but is likewise

known, per se, to all those who have any conception of God.

For it is much more incredible that God is something

senseless and dead, than that there is no God. And the life

of God is easily proved. For, as whatever is beside God is

from him, we must also attribute life to him, because among

his creatures are many things which have life; and we affirm

that God is a living substance, and that life belongs to him,

not only eminently but also formally, since life is simply

perfection.

II. But, as life is taken, either in the second act, and is

called "operation," or in the first, principal and radical

act, and thus is the very nature and form of a living thing,

we attribute this, of itself, primarily and adequately to

God; so that he Is the life of himself, not having it from

His union with another thing; (for that is the part of

imperfection,) but existing the same as it does -- he being

life itself, and living by the first act, but bestowing life

by the second act.

III. The life of God, therefore, is most simple, so that it

is not, in reality, distinguished from his essence; and

according to the confined capacity of our conception, by

which it is distinguished from his essence, it may, in some

degree, be described as being "an act that flows from the

essence of God," by which is intimated that it is active in

itself; first, by a reflex act on God himself, and then on

other objects, on account of the most abundant copiousness,

and the most perfect activity of life in God.

IV. The life of God is the foundation and the proximate and

adequate principle not only of ad intra et ad extra, an

inward and an outward act, but likewise of all fruition by

which God is said to be blessed in himself. This seems to be

the cause why God wished himself, principally in reference to

life, to be distinguished from false gods and dead idols, and

why he wished men to swear by his name, in a form composed

thus: "The Lord liveth."

V. As the essence of God is infinite and most simple,

eternal, impassable, unchangeable and incorruptible, we ought

likewise to consider His life with these modes of being and

life; on which account we attribute to him per se

immortality, and a most prompt, powerful, indefatigable and

insatiable desire, strength and delight to act and to enjoy,

and in action and enjoyment, if it be lawful, thus to express

ourselves.

VI. By two faculties, the understanding and the will, this

life is active towards God himself; but towards other things

it is active by three faculties, power, or capability, being

added to the two preceding. But the faculties of the

understanding and the will are accommodated to fruition, and

this chiefly as they tend towards God himself; secondarily,

and because it thus pleases him of his abundant goodness, as

they tend towards the creatures.

DISPUTATION XVII

ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF GOD

I. The understanding of God is that faculty of his life which

is first in nature and order, and by which the living God

distinctly understands all things and every one, which, in

what manner soever, either have, will have, have had, can

have, or might hypothetically have, a being of any kind, by

which he also distinctly understands the order, connection,

and relation of all and each of them between each other, and

the entities of reason, those beings which exist, or which

can exist, in the mind, imagination, and enunciation.

II. God knows all things, neither by intelligible

representations, nor by similitude, but by his own and sole

essence; with the exception of evil things, which he knows

indirectly by the good things opposed to them, as privation

is known by means of our having been accustomed to any thing.

III. The mode by which God understands, is, not by

composition and division, not by gradual argumentation, but

by simple and infinite intuition, according to the succession

of order and not of time.

IV. The succession of order, in the objects of the divine

knowledge, is in this manner: First. God knows himself

entirely and adequately, and this understanding is his own

essence or being. Secondly. He knows all possible things, in

the perfection of his own essence, and, therefore, all things

impossible. In the understanding of possible things, this is

the order: (1.) He knows what things can exist by his own

primary and sole act. (2.) He knows what things, from the

creatures, whether they will come into existence or will not,

can exist by his conservation, motion, assistance,

concurrence, and permission. (3.) He knows what things he can

do about the acts of the creatures consistently with himself

or with these acts. Thirdly. He knows all entities, even

according to the same order as that which we have just shown

in his knowledge of things possible.

V. The understanding of God is certain and infallible; so

that he sees certainly and infallibly, even, things future

and contingent, whether he sees them in their causes, or in

themselves. But this infallibility depends on the infinity of

the essence of God, and not on his unchangeable will.

VI. The act of understanding of God is occasioned by no

external cause, not even by its object; though if there be

not afterwards an object, neither will there be any act of

God's understanding about it.

VII. How certain soever the acts of God's understanding may

themselves be, this does not impose any necessity on things,

but rather establishes contingency in them. For, as he knows

the thing itself and its mode, if the mode of the thing be

contingent, he must know it as such, and, therefore, it

remains contingent with respect to the divine knowledge.

VIII. The knowledge of God may be distinguished according to

its objects. And, First, into the theoretical, by which he

understands things under the relation of entity and truth;

and into the practical, by which he considers things under

the relation of good, and as objects of his will and power.

IX. Secondly. One [quality of the] knowledge of God is that

of simple intelligence, by which he understands, himself, all

possible things, and the nature and essence of all entities;

another is that of vision, by which he beholds his own

existence and that of all other entities or beings.

X. The knowledge by which God knows his own essence and

existence, all things possible, and the nature and essence of

all entities, is simply necessary, as pertaining to the

perfection of his own knowledge. But that by which he knows

the existence of other entities, is hypothetically necessary,

that is, if they now have, have already had, or shall

afterwards have, any existence. For when any object,

whatsoever, is laid down, it must, of necessity, fall within

the knowledge of God. The former of these precedes every free

act of the divine will; the latter follows every free act.

The schoolmen; therefore, denominate the first "natural," and

the second "free knowledge."

XI. The knowledge by which God knows any thing if it be or

exist, is intermediate between the two [kinds] described in

theses 9 & 10; In fact it precedes the free act of the will

with regard to intelligence. But it knows something future

according to vision, only through its hypothesis.

XII. Free knowledge, or that of vision, which is also called

"prescience," is not the cause of things; but the knowledge

which is practical and of simple intelligence, and which is

denominated "natural," or "necessary," is the cause of all

things by the mode of prescribing and directing to which is

added the action of the will and of the capability. The

middle or intermediate [kind of] knowledge ought to intervene

in things which depend on the liberty of created choice or

pleasure.

XIII. From the variety and multitude of objects, and from the

means and mode of intelligence and vision, it is apparent

that infinite knowledge and omniscience are justly attributed

to God; and that they are so proper or peculiar to God

according to their objects, means and mode, as not to be

capable of appertaining to any created thing.

DISPUTATION XVIII

ON THE WILL OF GOD

I. The will of God is spoken of in three ways: First, the

faculty itself of willing. Secondly, the act of willing.

Thirdly, the object willed. The first signification is the

principal and proper one, the two others are secondary and

figurative.

II. It may be thus described: It is the second faculty of the

life of God, flowing through the understanding from the life

that has an ulterior tendency; by which faculty God is borne

towards a known good -- towards a good, because this is an

adequate object of every will -- towards a known good, not

only with regard to it as a being, but likewise as a good,

whether in reality or only in the act of the divine

understanding. Both, however, are shown by the understanding.

But the evil which is called that of culpability, God does

not simply and absolutely will.

III. The good is two-fold. The chief good, and that which is

from the chief. The first of these is the primary, immediate,

principal, direct, peculiar and adequate object of the divine

will; the latter is secondary and indirect, towards which the

divine will does not tend, except by means of the chief good.

IV. The will of God is borne towards its objects in the

following order: (1.) He wills himself. (2.) He wills all

those things which, out of infinite things possible to

himself he has, by the last judgment of his wisdom,

determined to be made. And first, he wills to make them to

be; then he is affected towards them by his will, according

as they possess some likeness with his nature, or some

vestige of it. (3.) The third object of the will of God is

those things which he judges fit and equitable to be done by

creatures who are endowed with understanding and with free

will, in which is included a prohibition of that which he

wills not to be done. (4.) The fourth object of the divine

will is his permission, that chiefly by which he permits a

rational creature to do what he has prohibited, and to omit

what he has commanded. (5.) He wills those things which,

according to his own wisdom, he judges to be done concerning

the acts of his rational creatures.

V. There is out of God no inwardly moving cause of his will;

nor out of him is there any end. But the creature, and its

action or passion, may be the outwardly moving cause, without

which God would supersede or omit that volition or act of

willing.

VI. But the cause of all other things is God, by His

understanding and will, by means of His power or capability;

yet so, that when he acts either through his creatures, with

them or in them, he does not take away the peculiar mode of

acting, or of suffering, which he has divinely placed within

them; and that he suffers them, according to their peculiar

mode, to produce their own effects, and to receive in

themselves the acts of God, either necessarily, contingently,

or freely. As this contingency and liberty do not make the

prescience of God to be uncertain, so they are destroyed by

the volition of God, and by the certain futurition of events

with regard to the understanding of God.

DISPUTATION XIX

ON THE VARIOUS DISTINCTIONS OF THE WILL OF GOD

I. Though the will of God be one and simple, yet it may be

variously distinguished, from its objects, in reference to

the mode and order according to which it is borne towards its

objects. Of these distinctions the use is important in the

whole of the Scriptures, and in explaining many passages in

them.

II. The will of God is borne towards its object either

according to the mode of nature, or that of liberty. In

reference to the former, God tends towards his own primary,

proper and adequate object, that is, towards himself. But,

according to the mode of liberty, he tends towards other

things -- and towards all other things by the liberty of

exercise, and towards many by the liberty of specification;

because he cannot hate things, so far as they have some

likeness of God, that is, so far as they are good; though he

is not necessarily bound to love them, since he might reduce

them to nothing whenever it seemed good to himself.

III. The will of God is distinguished into that by which he

absolutely wills to do any thing or to prevent it; and into

that by which he wills something to be done or omitted by his

rational creatures. The former of these is called "the will

of his good pleasure," or rather "of his pleasure;" and the

latter, "that of his open intimation." The latter is

revealed, for this is required by the use to which it is

applied. The former is partly revealed, partly secret, or

hidden. The former employs a power that is either

irresistible, or that is so accommodated to the object and

subject as to obtain or insure its success, though it was

possible for it to happen otherwise. To these two kinds of

the divine will, is opposed the remission of the will, that

is, a two-fold permission, the one opposed to the will of

open intimation, the other to that of good pleasure. The

former is that by which God permits something to the power of

a rational creature by not circumscribing some act by a law;

the latter is that by which God permits something to the will

and capability of the creature, by not placing an impediment

in its way, by which the act may in reality be hindered.

IV. Whatever things God wills to do, he wills them (1.)

either from himself, not on account of any other cause placed

beyond him, (whether that be without the consideration of any

act perpetrated by the creature, or solely from the occasion

of the act of the creature,) (2.) or on account of a

preceding cause afforded by the creature. In reference to

this distinction, some work is said to be "proper to God,"

some other "extraneous, strange and foreign." But there is a

two-fold difference in those things which he wills to be

done; for they are pleasing and acceptable to God, either in

themselves, as in the case of moral works; or they please

accidentally and on account of some other thing, as in the

case of things ceremonial.

V. The will of God is either peremptory, or with a condition.

(1.) His peremptory will is that which strictly and rigidly

obtains, such as the words of the gospel which contain the

last revelation of God: "The wrath of God abides on him who

does not believe;" "He that believes shall be saved;" also

the words of Samuel to Saul: "The Lord hath rejected thee

from being king over Israel." (2.) His will, with a

condition, is that which has a condition annexed, whether it

be a tacit one, such as, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall

be overthrown." "Cursed is every one that continueth not in

all things which are written in the book of the law to do

them," that is, unless he be delivered from this curse as it

is expressed in Gal. iii, 13. See also Jer. xviii, 7-10.

VI. One will of God is absolute, another respective. His

absolute will is that by which he wills any thing simply,

without regard to the volition or act of the creature, such

as is that about the salvation of believers. His respective

will is that by which he wills something with respect to the

volition or the act of the creature. It is also either

antecedent or consequent. (1.) The antecedent is that by

which he wills something with respect to the subsequent will

or act of the creature, as, "God wills all men to be saved if

they believe." (2.) The consequent is that by which he wills

something with respect to the antecedent volition or act of

the creature, as, "Woe to that man by whom the Son of man is

betrayed! Better would it have been for that man if he had

never been born! Both depend on the absolute will, and

according to it each of them is regulated.

VII. God wills some things, so far as they are good, when

absolutely considered according to their nature. Thus he

wills alms-giving, and to do good to man so far as he is his

creature. He also wills some other things, so far as, all

circumstances considered, they are understood to be good.

According to this will, he says to the wicked man, "What hast

thou to do, that thou shouldst take my covenant in thy

mouth?" And he speaks thus to Eli: "Be it far from me that

thy house, and the house of thy father, should walk before me

for ever; for them that honour me I will honour, and they

that despise me shall be lightly esteemed." This distinction

does not differ greatly from the antecedent will of God,

which has been already mentioned.

VIII. God wills some things per se or per accidens. Of

themselves, he wills those things which are simply relatively

good. Thus He wills salvation to that man who is obedient.

Accidentally, those things which, in some respect are evil,

but have a good joined with them, which God wills more than

the respective good things that are opposed to those evil.

Thus he wills the evils of punishment, because he chooses

that the order of justice be preserved in punishment, rather

than that a sinning creature should escape punishment, though

this impunity might be for the good of the creature.

IX. God wills some things in their antecedent causes, that

is, he wills their causes relatively, and places them in such

order that effects may follow from them; and if they do

follow, he wills that they, of themselves, be pleasing to

him. God wills other things in themselves. This distinction

does not substantially differ from that by which the divine

will is distinguished into absolute and selective.

COROLLARIES

I. Is it possible for two affirmatively contrary volitions of

God to tend towards one object which is the same and uniform?

We answer in the negative.

II. Can one volition of God, that is, one formally, tend

towards contrary objects? We reply, It can tend towards

objects physically contrary, but not towards objects morally

contrary.

III. Does God will, as an end, something which is beyond

himself, and which does not proceed from his free will? We

reply in the negative.

DISPUTATION XX

ON THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD WHICH COME TO BE CONSIDERED UNDER

HIS WILL AND, FIRST, ON THOSE WHICH HAVE AN ANALOGY TO THE

AFFECTIONS OR PASSIONS IN RATIONAL CREATURES

I. Those attributes of God ought to be considered, which are

either properly or figuratively attributed to him in the

Scriptures, according to a certain analogy of the affections

and virtues in rational creatures.

II. Those divine attributes which have the analogy of

affections, may be referred to two principal kinds, so that

the first class may contain those affections which are simply

conversant about good or evil, and which may be denominated

primitive affections; and the second may comprehend those

which are exercised about good and evil in reference to their

absence or presence, and which may be called affections

derived from the primitive.

III. The primitive affections are love, (the opposite to

which is hatred,) and goodness; and with these are connected

grace, benignity and mercy. Love is prior to goodness towards

the object, which is God himself; goodness is prior to love

towards that object which is some other than God.

IV. Love is an affection of union in God, whose objects are

not only God himself and the good of justice, but also the

creature, imitating or related to God either according to

likeness, or only according to impress, and the felicity of

the creature. But this affection is borne onwards either to

enjoy and to have, or to do good; the former is called "the

love of complacency;" the latter, "the love of friendship,"

which falls into goodness, God loves himself with complacency

in the perfection of His own nature, wherefore he likewise

enjoys himself. He also loves himself with the love of

complacency in his effects produced externally; both in acts

and works, which are specimens and evident, infallible

indications of that perfection. Wherefore he may be said, in

some degree, likewise to enjoy these acts and works. Even the

justice or righteousness performed by the creature, is

pleasing to him; wherefore his affection is extended to

secure it.

V. Hatred is an affection of separation in God, whose many

object is injustice or unrighteousness; and the secondary,

the misery of the creature. The former is from "the love of

complacency;" the latter, from "the love of friendship." But

since God properly loves himself and the good of justice, and

by the same impulse holds iniquity in detestation; and since

he secondarily loves the creature and his blessedness, and in

that impulse hates the misery of the creature, that is, he

wills it to be taken away from the creature; hence, it comes

to pass, that he hates the creature who perseveres in

unrighteousness, and he loves his misery.

VI. Hatred, however, is not collateral to love, but

necessarily flowing from it; since love neither does nor can

tend towards all those things which become objects to the

understanding of God. It belongs to him, therefore, in the

first act, and must be placed in him prior to any existence

of a thing worthy of hatred, which existence being laid down,

the act of hatred arises from it by a natural necessity, not

by liberty of the will.

VII. But since love does not perfectly fill the whole will of

God, it has goodness united with it; which also is an

affection in God of communicating his good. Its first object

externally is nothing; and this is so necessarily first,

that, when it is removed, no communication can be made

externally. Its act is creation. Its second object is the

creature as a creature; and its act is called conservation,

or sustentation, as if it was a continuance of creation. Its

third object is the creature performing his duty according to

the command of God; and its act is the elevation to a more

worthy and felicitous condition, that is, the communication

of a greater good than that which the creature obtained by

creation. Both these advances of goodness may also be

appropriately denominated "benignity," or "kindness." Its

fourth object is the creature not performing his duty, or

sinful, and on this account liable to misery according to the

just judgment of God; and its act is a deliverance from sin

through the remission and the mortification of sin. And this

progress of goodness is denominated mercy, which is an

affection for giving succour to a man in misery, sin

presenting no obstacle.

VIII. Grace is a certain adjunct of goodness and love, by

which is signified that God is affected to communicate his

own good and to love the creatures, not through merit or of

debt, not by any cause impelling from without, nor that

something may be added to God himself, but that it may be

well with him on whom the good is bestowed and who is

beloved, which may also receive the name of "liberality."

According to this, God is said to be "rich in goodness,

mercy," &c.

IX. The affections which spring from these, and which are

exercised about good or evil as each is present or absent,

are considered as having an analogy either in those things

which are in the concupiscible part of our souls, or in that

which is irascible.

X. In the concupiscible part are, first, desire and that

which is opposed to it; secondly, joy and grief. (1.) Desire

is an affection of obtaining the works of righteousness from

rational creatures, and of bestowing a remunerative reward,

as well as of inflicting punishment if they be contumacious.

To this is opposed the affection according to which God

execrates the works of unrighteousness, and the omission of a

remuneration. (2.). Joy is an affection from the presence of

a thing that is suitable or agreeable -- such as the fruition

of himself, the obedience of the creature, the communication

of his own goodness, and the destruction of His rebels and

enemies. Grief, which is opposed to it, arises from the

disobedience and the misery of the creature, and in the

occasion thus given by his people for blaspheming the name of

God among the gentiles. To this, repentance has some

affinity; which is nothing more than a change of the thing

willed or done, on account of the act of a rational creature,

or, rather, a desire for such change.

XI. In the irascible part are hope and its opposite, despair,

confidence and anger, also fear, which is affirmatively

opposed to hope. (1.) Hope is an earnest expectation of a

good, due from the creature, and performable by the grace of

God. It cannot easily be reconciled with the certain

foreknowledge of God. (2.) Despair arises from the

pertinacious wickedness of the creature, opposing himself to

the grace of God, and resisting the Holy Spirit. (3.)

Confidence is that by which God with great animation

prosecutes a desired good, and repels an evil that is hated.

(4.) Anger is an affection of depulsion in God, through the

punishment of the creature that has transgressed his law, by

which he inflicts on the creature the evil of misery for his

unrighteousness, and takes the vengeance which is due to him,

as an indication of his love towards justice, and of his

hatred to sin. When this affection is vehement, it is called

"fury." (5.) Fear is from an impending evil to which God is

averse.

XII. Of the second class of these derivative affections, (See

Thesis 11) some belong to God per se, as they simply contain

in themselves perfection; others, which seem to have

something of imperfection, are attributed to him after the

manner of the feelings of men, on account of some effects

which he produces analogous to the effects of the creatures,

yet without any passion, as he is simple and immutable and

without any disorder and repugnance to right reason. But we

subject the use and exercise of the first class of those

affections (See Thesis 10) to the infinite wisdom of God,

whose property it is to prefix to each of them its object,

means, end and circumstances, and to decree to which, in

preference to the rest, is to be conceded the province of

acting.

DISPUTATION XXI

ON THOSE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD WHICH HAVE SOME ANALOGY TO THE

MORAL VIRTUES, AND WHICH ACT LIKE MODERATORS OF THE

AFFECTIONS, CONSIDERED IN THE PRECEDING DISPUTATION.

I. But these attributes preside generally over all the

affections, or specially relate to some of them. The general

is justice, or righteousness, which is called "universal" or

"legal," and concerning which it was said by the ancients,

that it contains, in itself, all the virtues. The special

are, particular justice, patience, and those which are the

moderators of anger, and of chastisements and punishments.

II. The justice of God, considered universally, is a virtue

of God, according to which he administers all things

correctly and in a suitable manner, according to that which

his wisdom dictates as befitting himself. In conjunction with

wisdom, it presides over all his acts, decrees and deeds; and

according to it, God is said to be "just and right," his way

"equal," and himself to be "just in all his ways."

III. The particular justice of God is that by which he

consistently renders to every one his own -- to God himself

that which is his, and to the creature that which belongs to

itself. We consider it both in the words of God and in his

deeds. In this, the method of the decrees is not different;

because, whatever God does or says, he does or says it

according to his own eternal decree. This justice likewise

contains a moderator partly of his love for the good of

obedience, and partly of his love for the creature, and of

his goodness.

IV. Justice In deeds may be considered in the following

order: That the first may be in the communication of good,

either according to the first creation, or according to

regeneration. The second is in the prescribing of duty, or in

legislation, which consists in the requisition of a deed, and

in the promise of a reward, and the threat of a punishment.

The third is in the judging about deeds, which is

retributive, being both communicative of a reward and

vindicative. In all these, the magnanimity of God is to be

considered. In communication, in promise, and in

remuneration, his liberality and magnificence are also to

come under consideration; and they may be appropriately

referred partly to distributive, and partly to commutative

justice.

V. Justice in words is also three-fold. (1.) Truth, by which

he always enunciates or declares exactly as the thing is, to

which is opposed falsehood. (2.) Sincerity and simplicity, by

which he always declares as he inwardly conceives, according

to the meaning and purpose of his mind, to which are opposed

hypocrisy and duplicity of heart. And (3.) Fidelity, by which

he is constant in keeping promises and in communicating

privileges, to which are opposed inconstancy and perfidy.

VI. Patience is that by which he patiently endures the

absence of that Good, that is, of the prescribed obedience

which he loves, desires, and for which he hopes, and the

presence of that evil which he forbids, sparing sinners, not

only that he may execute the judicial acts of His mercy and

severity through them, but that he may also lead them to

repentance, or that he may punish the contumacious with

greater equity and severity. And this attribute seems to

attemper the love [which God entertains] for the good of

justice.

VII. Long suffering, gentleness or lenity, clemency and

readiness to pardon, are the moderators of anger,

chastisements and punishments.

VIII. Long suffering is a virtue by which God suspends his

anger, lest it should instantly hasten to the depulsion of

the evil, as soon as the creature has by his sins deserved

it.

IX. Gentleness or lenity is a virtue, by which God preserves

moderation concerning anger in taking vengeance, lest it

should be too vehement -- lest the seventy of the anger

should certainly correspond with the magnitude of the

wickedness perpetrated.

X. Clemency is a virtue by which God so attempers the

chastisements and punishments of the creature, even at the

very time when he inflicts them, that, by their weight and

continuance, they may not equal the magnitude of the sins

committed; indeed, that they may not exceed the strength of

the creature.

XI. Readiness to forgive is a virtue by which God shows

himself to be exorable to his creature, and which fixes a

measure to the limits of anger, lest it should endure for

ever, agreeably to the demerit of the sins committed.

COROLLARIES

Does the justice of God permit him to destine to death

eternal, a rational creature who has never sinned? We reply

in the negative.

Does the justice of God allow that a creature should be saved

who perseveres in his sins? We reply in the negative.

Cannot justice and mercy, in some accommodated sense, be

considered, as, in a certain respect, opposed? We reply in

the affirmative.

DISPUTATION XXII

ON THE POWER OR CAPABILITY OF GOD

I. When entering on the consideration of the power or

capability of God, as we deny the passive power which cannot

belong to God who is a pure act, so we likewise omit that

which is occupied with internal acts through necessity of

nature; and at present we exhibit for examination that power

alone which consists in the capacity of external actions, and

by which God not only is capable of operating beyond himself,

but actually does operate whenever it is his own good

pleasure.

II. And it is a faculty of the divine life, by which,

(subsequently to the understanding of God that shows and

directs, and to his will that commands,) he is capable of

operating externally what things soever he can freely will,

and by which he does operate whatever he freely wills.

III. The measure of the divine capability is the free will of

God, and that is truly an adequate measure; so that the

object of the capability may be, and, indeed, ought to be,

circumscribed and limited most appropriately from the object

of the free will of God. For, whatever cannot fall under his

will, cannot fall under his capability; and whatever is

subject to the former, is likewise subject to the latter.

IV. But the will of God can only will that which is not

opposed to the divine essence, (which is the foundation both

of His understanding and of his will,) that is, it can will

nothing but that which exists, is true and good. Hence,

neither can his capability do any other. Again, since, under

the phrase "what is not opposed to the divine essence," is

comprehended whatsoever is simply and absolutely possible,

and since God can will the whole of this, it follows that God

is capable of every thing which is possible.

V. Those things are impossible to God which involve a

contradiction, as, to make another God, to be mutable, to

sin, to lie, to cause some thing at once to be and not to be,

to have been and not to have been, &c., that this thing

should be and not be, that it and its contrary should be,

that an accident should be without its subject, that a

substance should be changed into a pre-existing substance,

bread into the body of Christ, that a body should possess

ubiquity, &c. These things partly belong to a want of power

to be capable of doing them, and partly to a want of will to

do them.

VI. But the capability of God is infinite -- and this not

only because it can do all things possible, which, indeed,

are innumerable, so that as many cannot be enumerated as it

is capable of doing, [or after all that can be numbered, it

is capable of doing still more]; nor can such great things be

calculated without its being able to produce far greater, but

likewise because nothing can resist it. For all created

things depend upon him, as upon the efficient principle, both

in their being and in their preservation. Hence, omnipotence

is justly ascribed to him.

VII. This can be communicated to no creature.

DISPUTATION XXIII

ON THE PERFECTION, BLESSEDNESS AND GLORY OF GOD

I. Next in order, follows the perfection of God, resulting

from the simple and infinite circuit of all those things

which we have already attributed to God, and considered with

the mode of pre-eminence -- not that perfection by which he

has every individual thing most perfectly, (for this is the

office of simplicity and infinity,) but that by which he has

all things simply denoting some perfection in the most

perfect manner. And it may be appropriately described thus:

It is the interminable, and, at the same time, the entire and

perfect possession of essence and life.

II. And this perfection of God infinitely transcends every

created perfection, in three several ways: (1.) Because it

has all things. (2.) It has them in a manner the most

perfect. And (3.) It does not derive them from any other

source. But as the creatures have, through participation, a

perfection from God, faintly shadowed forth after its

archetype, so, of consequence, they neither have every

perfection, nor in a manner the most perfect; yet some

creatures have a greater perfection than others; and the more

of it they possess, the nearer are they to God, and the more

like him.

III. From this perfection of God, by means of some internal

act, his blessedness has its existence; and by means of some

relation of it ad extra, his glory exists.

IV. Blessedness is an act of God, by which he enjoys his own

perfection, that is fully known by his understanding, and

supremely loved by his will, with a delightful satisfaction

in it. It is, therefore, through the act of the

understanding, and of the will; of the understanding, indeed,

reaching to the essence of the object, but the act of which

would not be an act of felicity, unless it had this, its

being an act of felicicity[sic.], from the will which

perpetually desires to behold the beatified object, and is

delightfully satisfied in it.

V. But this blessedness is so peculiar to God that it cannot

be communicated to any creature. Yet he is, himself, with

respect to the object, the beatified good of creatures

endowed with understanding, and the effector of the act which

tends to the effect, and which is delightfully satisfied in

it. Of these, consists the blessedness of the creature.

VI. Glory is the divine excellence above all things, which he

makes manifest by external acts, in various ways.

VII. But the modes of manifestation, which are declared to us

in the Scriptures, are principally two -- the one, by an

effulgence of unusual light and splendour, or by the opposite

to it, a dense darkness and obscurity; the other, by the

production of works which agree with his perfection and

excellence.

VIII. This description of the divine nature is the first

foundation of all religion. For it is concluded, from this

perfection and blessedness of God, that the act of religion

can be worthily and usefully exhibited to God, to the

knowledge of which matter, we are brought, through the

manifestation of the divine glory.

The candid reader will be able, in this place, to supply from

the preceding public disputations, the theses on the Father

and the Son, and those on the Holy Spirit, the Holy and

undivided Trinity.

DISPUTATION XXIV

ON CREATION

I. We have treated on God, who is the first object of the

Christian religion. And we would now treat on Christ, who,

next to God, is another object of the same religion; but we

must premise some things, without which, Christ would neither

be an object of religion, nor would the necessity of the

Christian religion be understood. Indeed, the cause must be

First explained, on account of which God has a right to

require any religion from man; THEN the religion, also, that

is prescribed in virtue of this cause and right, and, LASTLY,

the event ensuing, from which has arisen the necessity of

constituting Christ our saviour, and the Christian religion,

employed by God, through his own will, who hath not, by the

sin of man, lost His right which he obtains over him by

creation, nor has he entirely laid aside his affection for

man, though a sinner, and miserable.

II. And since God is the object of the Christian religion,

not only as the Creator, but likewise as the Creator anew,

(in which latter respect, Christ, also, as constituted by God

to be the saviour, is the object of the Christian religion,)

it is necessary for us first to treat about the primitive

creation, and those things which are joined to it according

to nature, and, after that, about those which resulted from

the conduct of man, before we begin to treat on the new

creation, in which the primary consideration is that of

Christ as Mediator.

III. Creation is an external act of God, by which he produced

all things out of nothing, for himself, by his Word and

Spirit.

IV. The primary efficient cause is God the Father, by his

Word and Spirit. The impelling cause, which we have indicated

in the definition by the particle "for," is the goodness of

God, according to which he is inclined to communicate his

good. The ordainer is the divine wisdom; and the executrix,

or performer, is the divine power, which the will of God

employs through an inclination of goodness, according to the

most equitable prescript of his wisdom.

V. The matter from which God created all things, must be

considered in three forms: (1.) The first of all is that from

which all things in general were produced, into which, also,

they may all, on this account, relapse and be reduced; it is

nothing itself, that our mind, by the removal of all entity,

considers as the first matter; for, that, alone, is capable

of the first communication of God ad extra; because, God

would neither have the right to introduce his own form into

matter coeval [with himself], nor would he be capable of

acting, as it would then be eternal matter, and, therefore,

obnoxious to no change. (2.) The second matter is that from

which all things corporeal are now distinguished, according

to their own separate forms; and this is the rude chaos and

undigested mass created at the beginning. (3.) The third

consists both of these simple and secret elements, and of

certain compound bodies, from which all the rest have been

produced, as from the waters have proceeded creeping and

flying things, and fishes -- from the earth, all other living

things, trees, herbs and shrubs -- from the rib of. Adam, the

woman, and from seeds, the perpetuation of the species.

VI. The form is the production itself of all things out of

nothing, which form pre existed ready framed, according to

the archetype in the mind of God, without any proper entity,

lest any one should feign an ideal world.

VII. From an inspection of the matter and form, it is

evident, First, that creation is the immediate act of God,

alone, both because a creature, who is of a finite power is

incapable of operating on nothing, and because such a

creature cannot shape matter in substantial forms. Secondly.

The creation was freely produced, not necessarily, because

God was neither bound to nothing, nor destitute of forms.

VIII. The end -- not that which moved God to create, for God

is not moved by any thing external, but that which

incessantly and immediately results from the very act of

creation, and which is, in fact, contained in the essence of

this act -- this end is the demonstration of the divine

wisdom, goodness and power. For those divine properties which

concur to act, shine forth and show themselves in their own

nature action -- goodness, in the very communication --

wisdom, in the mode, order and variety -- and power, in this

circumstance, that so many and such great things are produced

out of nothing.

IX. The end, which is called "to what purpose," is the good

of the Creatures themselves, and especially of man, to whom

are referred most other creatures, as being useful to him,

according to the institution of the divine creation.

X. The effect of creation is this universal world, which, in

the Scriptures, obtains the names of the heaven and the

earth, sometimes, also, of the sea, as being the extremities

within which all things are embraced. This world is an entire

something, which is perfect and complete, having no defect of

any form, that can bear relation to the whole or to its

parts; nor is redundant in any form which has no relation to

the whole and its parts. It is, also, a single, or a united

something, not by an indivisible unity, but according to

connection and co-ordination, and the affection of mutual

relation, consisting of parts distinguished, not only

according to place and situation, but likewise according to

nature, essence and peculiar existence. This was necessary,

not only to adumbrate, in some measure, the perfection of God

in variety and multitude, but also to demonstrate that the

Lord omnipotent did not create the world by a natural

necessity, but by the freedom of his will.

XI. But this entire universe is, according to the Scriptures,

distributed in the best manner possible into three classes of

objects, (1.) Into creatures purely spiritual and invisible;

of this class are the angels. (2.) Into creatures merely

corporeal. And (3.) Into natures that are, in one part of

them, corporeal and visible, and in another part, spiritual

and invisible; men are of this last class.

XII. We think this was the order observed in creation:

Spiritual creatures, that is, the angels, were first created.

Corporeal creatures were next created, according to the

series of six days, not together and in a single moment.

Lastly, man was created, consisting both of body and spirit;

his body was, indeed, first formed; and afterwards his soul

was inspired by creating, and created by inspiring; that as

God commenced the creation in a spirit, so he might finish it

on a spirit, being himself the immeasurable and eternal

Spirit.

XIII. This creation is the foundation of that right by which

God can require religion from man, which is a matter that

will be more certainly and fully understood, when we come

more specially to treat on the primeval creation of man; for

he who is not the creator of all things, and who, therefore,

has not all things under his command, cannot be believed,

neither can any sure hope and confidence be placed in him,

nor can he alone be feared. Yet all these are acts which

belong to religion.

COROLLARIES

I. The world was neither created from all eternity, nor could

it be so created; though God was, from eternity, furnished

with that capability by which he could create the world, and

afterwards did create it; and though no moment of time can be

conceived by us, in which the world could not have been

created.

II. He who forms an accurate conception, in his mind, of

creation, must, in addition to the plenitude of divine

wisdom, goodness and power, or capability, conceive that

there was a two-fold privation or vacuity -- the First,

according to essence or form, which will bear some

resemblance to an infinite nothing that is capable of

infinite forms; the SECOND, according to place, which will be

like an infinite vacuum that is capable of being the

receptacle of numerous worlds.

III. Hence, this, also, follows, that time and place are not

Separate Creatures, but are created with things themselves,

or, rather, that they exist together at the creation of

things, not by an absolute but a relative entity, without

which no created thing can be thought upon or conceived.

IV. This creation is the first of all the divine external

acts, both in the intention of the Creator, and actually or

in reality; and it is an act perfect in itself, not serving

another more primary one, as its medium; though God has made

some creatures, which, in addition to the fact of their

having been made by the act of creation, are fitted to be

advanced still further, and to be elevated to a condition yet

more excellent.

V. If any thing be represented as the object of creation, it

seems that nothing can be laid down more suitably than those

things which, out of all things possible, have, by the act of

creation, been produced from non-existence into existence.

DISPUTATION XXV

ON ANGELS IN GENERAL AND IN PARTICULAR

I. Angels are substances merely spiritual, created after the

image of God, not only that they might acknowledge, love and

worship their Creator, and might live in a state of happiness

with him, but that they might likewise perform certain duties

concerning the rest of the creatures according to the command

of God.

II. We call them "substances," against the Sadducees and

others, who contend that angels are nothing more than the

good or the evil motions of spirits, or else exercises of

power to aid or to injure. But this is completely at variance

with the whole Scripture, as the actions, (which are those of

supposititious beings,) the appearances, and the names which

they ascribe to them, more than sufficiently demonstrate.

III. We add that they are "merely spiritual," that we may

separate them from men, the species opposite to them, and may

intimate their nature. And though composition out of matter

and form does not belong to angels, yet, we affirm that they

are absolutely compound substances, and that they are

composed, (1.) Of being and essence. (2.) Of act and power,

or capability. (3.) Lastly, of subject and inhering accident.

IV. But because they are creatures, they are finite, and we

measure them by place, time, and number. (1.) By PLACE, not

that they are in it corporeally, that is, not that they

occupy and fill up a certain local space, commensurate with

their substance; but they are in it intellectually, that is,

they exist in a place without the occupying and repletion of

any local space, which the schoolmen denominate by way of

definition, "to be in a place." But, as they cannot be in

several places at once, but are sometimes in one place, and

sometimes in another, so they are not moved without time,

though it is scarcely perceptible. (2.) We measure them by

TIME, or by duration or age, because they have a commencement

of being, and the whole age in which they continue they have

in succession, by parts of past, present and future; but the

whole of it is not present to them at the same moment and

without any distance. (3.) Lastly. We measure them by NUMBER,

though this number is not defined in the pages of the sacred

volume, and, therefore, is unknown to us, but known to God;

yet it is very great, for it is neither diminished nor

increased, because the angels are neither begotten nor die.

V. We say that they were "created after the image of God;"

for they are denominated "the sons of God." This image, we

say, consists partly in those things which belong to their

natures, and partly in those things which are of supernatural

endowment. (1.) To their nature, belong both their spiritual

essence, and the faculty of understanding, of willing, and of

powerfully acting. (2.) To supernatural endowment, belong the

light of knowledge in the understanding, and, following it,

the rectitude or holiness of the will. Immortality itself, is

of supernatural endowment; but it is that which God has

determined to preserve to them, in what manner soever they

may conduct themselves towards him.

VI. The end subjoined is two-fold -- that, standing around

the throne of God as his apparitors or messengers, for the

glory of the divine Majesty, the angels may perpetually laud

and celebrate [the praises of] God, and that they may, with

the utmost swiftness, execute, at the beck of God, the

offices of ministration which he enjoins upon them.

VII. We are informed in the Scriptures themselves, that there

is a certain order among angels; for they mention angels and

archangels,-and attribute even to the devil his angels. But

we are willingly ignorant of that distinction into orders and

various degrees, and what it is which constitutes such

distinction. We also think that if [the existence of] certain

orders of angels be granted, it is more probable that God

employs angels of different orders for the same duties, than

that he appoints distinct orders to each separate ministry;

though we allow that those who hold other sentiments, think

so with some reason.

VIII. For the performance of the ministries enjoined on them,

angels have frequently appeared clothed in bodies, which

bodies they have not formed and assumed to themselves out of

nothing, but out of pre-existing matter, by a union neither

essential nor personal, but local, (because they were not

then beyond those bodies,) and, according to an instrumental

purpose, that they might use them for the due performance of

the acts enjoined.

IX. These bodies, therefore, have neither been alive, nor

have the angels, through them, seen, heard, tasted, smelled,

touched, conceived phantasms or imaginations, &c. through the

organs of these bodies, they produced only such acts as could

be performed by an angel inhabiting them, or, rather,

existing in them, as the mover according to place. On this

account, perhaps, it is not improperly affirmed, that bodies,

truly human, which are inhabited by a living and directing

spirit, can be discerned, by human judgment, from these

assumed bodies.

X. God likewise prescribed a certain law to angels, by which

they might order their life according to God, and not

according to themselves, and by the observance of which they

might be blessed, or, by transgressing it, might be eternally

miserable, without any hope of pardon. For it was the good

pleasure of God to act towards angels according to strict

justice, and not to display all his goodness in bringing them

to salvation.

XI. But we do not decide whether a single act of obedience

was sufficient to obtain eternal blessedness, as one act of

disobedience was deserving of eternal destruction.

XII. Some of the angels transgressed the law under which they

were placed; and this they did by their own fault, because by

that grace with which they were furnished, and by which God

assisted them, and was prepared to assist them, they were

enabled to obey the law, and to remain in their integrity.

XIII. Hence, is the division made of angels into the good and

the evil. The former are so denominated, because they

continued steadfast in the truth, and preserved "their own

habitation." But the latter are called "evil angels," because

they did not continue in the truth, and "deserted their own

habitation."

XIV. But the former are called "good angels," not only

according to an infused habit, but likewise according to the

act which they performed, and according to their confirmation

in habitual goodness, the cause of which we place in the

increase of grace, and in their holy purpose, which they

conceived partly through beholding the punishment which was

inflicted on the apostate angels, and partly through the

perception of increased grace. [If it be asked,] Did they not

also do this, through perfect blessedness, to which nothing

could be added?, we do not deny it, on account of the

agreement of learned men, though it seems possible to produce

reasons to the contrary.

XV. The latter (Thesis 13) are called "evil angels," First,

by actual wickedness, and then by habitual wickedness and

pertinacious obstinacy in it; hence, they take a delight in

doing whatever they suppose can tend to the reproach of God

and the destruction of their neighbour. But this fixed

obstinacy in evil seems to derive its origin partly from an

intuition of the wrath of God and from an evil conscience

which springs out of that, and partly from their own

wickedness.

XVI. But, concerning the species of sin which the angels

perpetrated, we dare not assert what it was. Yet we say, it

may with some probability be affirmed, that it was the crime

of pride, from that argument which solicited man to sin

through the desire of excellence.

XVII. When it is the will of God to employ the assistance of

good angels, he may be said to employ not only those powers

and faculties which he has conferred on them, but likewise

those which are augmented by himself. But we think it is

contradictory to truth, if God be said to furnish the devils,

whose service he uses, with greater knowledge and power than

they have through creation and their own experience.

COROLLARIES

I. We allow this to become a subject of discussion: Can good

angels be said sometimes to contend among themselves, with a

reservation of that charity which they owe to God, to each

other, and to men?

II. Do angels need a mediator? and is Christ the mediator of

angels? We reply in the negative.

III. Are all angels of one species? We think this to be more

probable than its contrary.

DISPUTATION XXVI

ON THE CREATION OF MAN AFTER THE IMAGE OF GOD

I. Man is a creature of God; consisting of a body and a soul,

rational, good, and created after the divine image --

according to his body, created from pre-existing matter, that

is, earth mixed and besprinkled with aqueous and ethereal

moisture, -- according to his soul, created out of nothing,

by the breathing of breath into his nostrils.

II. But that body would have been incorruptible, and, by the

grace of God, would not have been liable to death, if men had

not sinned, and had not, by that deed, procured for himself

the necessity of dying. And because it was to be the future

receptacle of the soul, it was furnished by the wise Creator

with various and excellent organs.

III. But the soul is entirely of an admirable nature, if you

consider its origin, substance, faculties, and habits. (1.)

Its origin; for it is from nothing, created by infusion, and

infused by creation, a body being duly prepared for its

reception, that it might fashion matter as with form, and,

being united to the body by a native bond, might, with it,

compose one ufisamenon, production. Created, I say, by God in

time, as he still daily creates a new soul in each body.

IV. Its substance, which is simple, immaterial, and immortal.

Simple, I say, not with respect to God; for it consists of

act and power or capability, of being and essence, of subject

and accidents; but it is simple with respect to material and

compound things. It is immaterial, because it can subsist by

itself, and, when separated from the body, can operate alone.

It is immortal, not indeed from itself, but by the sustaining

grace of God.

V. Its faculties, which are two, the understanding and the

will, as in fact the object of the soul is two-fold. For the

understanding apprehends eternity and truth both universal

and particular, by a natural and necessary, and therefore by

a uniform act. But the will has an inclination to good. Yet

this is either, according to the mode of its nature, to

universal good and to that which is the chief good; or,

according to the mode of liberty, to all other [kinds of]

good.

VI. Lastly. In its habits, which are, First, wisdom, by which

the intellect clearly and sufficiently understood the

supernatural truth and goodness both of felicity and of

righteousness. Secondly. Righteousness and the holiness of

truth, by which the will was fitted and ready to follow what

this wisdom commanded to be done, and what it showed to be

desired. This righteousness and wisdom are called "original,"

both because man had them from his very origin, and because,

if man had continued in his integrity, they would also have

been communicated to his posterity.

VII. In all these things, the image of God most wonderfully

shone forth. We say that this is the likeness by which man

resembled his Creator, and expressed it according to the mode

of his capacity -- in his soul, according to its substance,

faculties and habits -- in this body, though this cannot be

properly said to have been created after the image of God who

is pure spirit, yet it is something divine, both from the

circumstance that, if man had not sinned, his body would

never have died, and because it is capable of special

incorruptibility and glory, of which the apostle treats in 1

Corinthians 15, because it displays some excellence and

majesty beyond the bodies of other living creatures, and,

lastly, because it is an instrument well fitted for admirable

actions and operations -- in his whole person, according to

the excellence, integrity, and the dominion over the rest of

the creatures, which were conferred upon him.

VIII. The parts of this image may be thus distinguished: Some

of them may be called natural to man, and others

supernatural; some, essential to him, and others accidental.

It is natural and essential to the soul to be a spirit, and

to be endowed with the power of understanding and of willing,

both according to nature and the mode of liberty. But the

knowledge of God, and of things pertaining to eternal

salvation, is supernatural and accidental, as are likewise

the rectitude and holiness of the will, according to that

knowledge. Immortality is so far essential to the soul, that

it cannot die unless it cease to be; but it is on this

account supernatural and accidental, because it is through

grace and the aid of preservation, which God is not bound to

bestow on the soul.

IX. But the immortality of the body is entirely supernatural

and accidental; for it can be taken away from the body, and

the body can return to the dust, from which it was taken. Its

excellence above other living creatures, and its peculiar

fitness to produce various effects, are natural to it, and

essential. Its dominion over the creatures which belongs to

the whole man as consisting of body and soul, may he partly

considered as belonging to it according to the excellence of

nature, and partly as conferred upon it by gracious gift, of

which dominion this seems to be an evidence, that it is never

taken wholly away from the soul, although it be varied, and

be augmented and diminished according to degrees and parts.

X. Thus was man created, that he might know, love and worship

his Creator, and might live with him for ever in a state of

blessedness. By this act of creation, God most manifestly

displayed the glory of his wisdom, goodness and power.

XI. From this description of man, it appears, that he is both

fitted to perform the act of religion to God, since such an

act is required from him -- that he is capable of the reward

which may be properly adjudged to those who perform [acts of]

religion to God, and of the punishment which may be justly

inflicted on those who neglect religion; and therefore that

religion may, by a deserved right, be required from man

according to this relation; and this is the principal

relation, according to which we must, in sacred theology,

treat about the creation of man after the image of God.

XII. In addition to this image of God, and this reference to

supernatural and spiritual things, comes under our

consideration the state of the natural life, in which the

first man was created and constituted, according to the

apostle Paul, "that which is natural was first, and

afterwards, that which is spiritual." (1 Cor. xv, 46.)

This state is founded in the natural union of body and soul,

and in the life which the soul naturally lives in the body;

from which union and life it is that the soul procures for

its body, things which are good for it; and, on the other

hand, the body is ready for offices which are congruous to

its nature and desires. According to this state or condition,

there is a mutual relation between man and the good things of

this world, the effect of which is, that man can desire them,

and, in procuring them for himself, can bestow that labour

which he deems to be necessary and convenient.

DISPUTATION XXVII

ON THE LORDSHIP OR DOMINION OF GOD

I. Through creation, dominion over all things which have been

created by himself, belongs to the Creator. It is, therefore,

primary, being dependent on no other dominion or on that of

no other person; and it is, on this account, chief because

there is none greater; and it is absolute, because it is over

the entire creature, according to the whole, and according to

all and each of its parts, and to all the relations which

subsist between the Creator and the creature. It is,

consequently, perpetual, that is, so long as the creature

itself exists.

II. But the dominion of God is the right of the Creator, and

his power over the creatures; according to which he has them

as his own property, and can command and use them, and do

about them, whatever the relation of creation and the equity

which rests upon it, permit.

III. For the right cannot extend further than is allowed by

that cause from which the whole of it arises, and on which it

is dependent. For this reason, it is not agreeable to this

right of God, either that he delivers up his creature to

another who may domineer over such creature, at his arbitrary

pleasure, so that he be not compelled to render to God an

account of the exercise of his sovereignty, and be able,

without any demerit on the part of the creature, to inflict

every evil on a creature capable of injury, or, at least, not

for any good of this creature; or that he [God] command an

act to be done by the creature, for the performance of which

he neither has, nor can have, sufficient and necessary

powers; or that he employ the creature to introduce sin into

the world, that he may, by punishing or by forgiving it,

promote his own glory; or, lastly, to do concerning the

creature whatever he is able, according to his absolute

power, to do concerning him, that is eternally to punish or

to afflict him, without [his having committed] sin.

IV. As this is a power over rational creatures, (in reference

to whom chiefly we treat on the dominion and power of God,)

it may be considered in two views, either as despotic, or as

kingly, or patriarchal. The former is that which he employs

without any intention of good which may be useful or saving

to the creature; that latter is that which he employs when he

also intends the good of the creature itself. And this last

is used by God through the abundance of his own goodness and

sufficiency, until he considers the creature to be unworthy,

on account of his perverseness, to have God presiding over

him in his kingly and paternal authority.

V. Hence, it is, that, when God is about to command some

thing to his rational creature, he does not exact every thing

which he justly might do, and he employs persuasions through

arguments which have regard to the utility and necessity of

those persuasions.

VI. In addition to this, God enters into a contract or

covenant with his creature; and he does this for the purpose

that the creature may serve him, not so much "of debt," as

from a spontaneous, free and liberal obedience, according to

the nature of confederations which consist of stipulations

and promises. On this account, God frequently distinguishes

his law by the title of a COVENANT.

VII. Yet this condition is always annexed to the

confederation, that if man be unmindful of the covenant and a

contemner of its pleasant rule, he may always be impelled or

governed by that domination which is really lordly, strict

and rigid, and into which, he who refuses to obey the other

[species of rule], justly falls.

VIII. Hence, arises a two-fold right of God over his rational

creature. The First, which belongs to him through creation;

the Second, through contract. The former rests on the good

which the creature has received from his Creator; the latter

rests on the still greater benefit which the creature will

receive from God, his preserver, promoter and glorifier.

IX. If the creature happen to sin against this two-fold

right, by that very act, he gives to God, his Lord, King and

Father, the right of treating him as a sinning creature, and

of inflicting on him due punishment; and this is a THIRD

right, which rests on the wicked act of the creature against

God.

DISPUTATION XXVIII

ON THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

I. Not only does the very nature of God, and of things

themselves, but likewise the Scriptures and experience do,

evidently, show that providence belongs to God.

II. But providence denotes some property of God, not a

quality, or a capability, or a habit; but it is an act, which

is not ad intra nor internal, but which is ad extra and

external, and which is about an object different from God,

and that is not united to him from all eternity, in his

understanding, but as separate and really existing.

III. And it is an act of the practical understanding, or of

the will employing the understanding, not completed in a

single moment, but continued through the moments of the

duration of things.

IV. And it may be defined the solicitous, everywhere

powerful, and continued inspection and oversight of God,

according to which he exercises a general care over the whole

world, and over each of the creatures and their actions and

passions, in a manner that is befitting himself, and suitable

for his creatures, for their benefit, especially for that of

pious men, and for a declaration of the divine perfection.

V. We have represented the object of it to be both the whole

world as it is a single thing consisting of many parts which

have a certain relation among themselves, and possessing

order between each other, and each our the creatures, with

its actions and passions. We preserve the distinction of the

goodness which is in them, (1.) According to their nature,

through creation; (2.) According to grace, through the

communication of supernatural gifts, and elevation to

dignities; (3.) According to the right use both of nature and

grace; yet we ascribe the last two, also, to the act of

providence.

VI. The rule of providence, according to which it produces

its acts, is the wisdom of God, demonstrating what is worthy

of God, according to his goodness, His severity, or his love

for justice or for the creature, but always according to

equity.

VII. The acts of providence which belong to its execution,

are -- preservation, which appears to be occupied about

essences, qualities and quantities -- and government, which

presides over actions and passions, and of which the

principal acts are motion, assistance, concurrence and

permission. The three former of these acts extend themselves

to good, whether natural or moral; and the last of them

appertains to evil alone.

VIII. The power of God serves universally, and at all times,

to execute these acts, with the exception of permission;

specially, and sometimes, these acts are executed by the

creatures themselves. Hence, an act of providence is called

either immediate or mediate. When it employs [the agency of]

the creatures, then it permits them to conduct their motions

agreeably to their own nature, unless it be his pleasure to

do any thing out of the ordinary way.

IX. Then, those acts which are performed according to some

certain course of nature or of grace, are called ordinary;

those which are employed either beyond, above, or also

contrary to this order, are styled extraordinary; yet they

are always concluded by the terms due fitness and

suitableness, of which we have treated in the definition.

(Thesis 4.)

X. Degrees are laid down in providence, not according to

intuition or oversight itself, neither according to presence

or continuity, but according to solicitude and care, which

yet are free from anxiety, but which are greater concerning a

man than concerning bullocks, also greater concerning

believers and pious persons, than concerning those who are

impious.

XI. The end of providence and of all its acts, is the

declaration of the divine perfections, of wisdom, goodness,

justice, severity and power, and the good of the whole,

especially of those men who are chosen or elected.

XII. But since God does nothing, or permits it to be done in

time, which he has not decreed from all eternity, either to

do or to permit that decree, therefore, is placed before

providence and its acts as an internal act is before one that

is external.

XIII. The effect, or, rather, the consequence, which belongs

to God himself, is his prescience; and it is partly called

natural and necessary, and partly free -- FREE, because it

follows the act of the divine free will, without which it

would not be the object of it -- Natural and Necessary, so

far as, (when this object is laid down by the act of the

divine will,) it cannot be unknown by the divine

understanding.

XIV. Prediction sometimes follows this prescience, when it

pleases God to give intimations to his creatures of the

issues of things, before they come to pass. But neither

prediction nor any prescience induces a necessity of any

thing that is afterwards to be, since they are [in the divine

mind.] posterior in nature and order to the thing that is

future. For a thing does not come to pass because it has been

foreknown or foretold; but it is foreknown and foretold

because it is yet to come to pass.

XV. Neither does the decree itself, by which the Lord

administers providence and its acts, induce any necessity on

things future; for, since it, the decree, (§ 12) is an

internal act of God, it lays down nothing in the thing

itself. But things come to pass and happen either necessarily

or contingently, according to the mode of power, which it has

pleased God. to employ in the administration of affairs.

DISPUTATION XXIX

ON THE COVENANT INTO WHICH GOD ENTERED WITH OUR FIRST PARENTS

I. Though, according to His right and power over man, whom he

had created after his own image, God could prescribe

obedience to him in all things for the performance of which

he possessed suitable powers, or would, by the grace of God,

have them in that state; yet, that he might elicit from man

voluntary and free obedience, which, alone, is grateful to

him, it was his will to enter into a contract and covenant

with him, by which God required obedience, and, on the other

hand, promised a reward, to which he added the denunciation

of a punishment, that the transaction might not seem to be

entirely one between equals, and as if man was not completely

bound to God.

II. On this account, the law of God is very often called a

Covenant, because it consists of those two parts, that is, a

work commanded, and a reward promised, to which is subjoined

the denunciation of a punishment, to signify the right which

God had over man and which he has not altogether surrendered,

and to incite man to greater obedience.

III. God prescribed this obedience, first, by a law placed in

and imprinted on the mind of man, in which is contained his

natural duty towards God and his neighbour, and, therefore,

towards himself also; and it is that of love, with fear,

honour and worship towards a superior. For, as true virtue

consists in the government or right ordering of the

affections, (of which the first, the chief, and that on which

the rest depend, is Love,) the whole law is contained in the

right ordering of love. And, as no obedience seems to be

yielded in the case of a man who executes the whole of his

own will without any, even the least resistance, therefore,

to try his obedience, that thing was to be prescribed, to

which, by a certain feeling, man had an abhorrence; and that

was to be forbidden, towards which he was drawn by a certain

inclination. Therefore the love of ourselves was to be

regulated or rightly ordered, which is the first and

proximate cause that man should live in society with his

species, or according to humanity.

IV. To this law, it was the pleasure of God to add another,

which was a symbolical one. A symbolical law is one that

prescribes or forbids some act, which, in itself, is neither

agreeable nor disagreeable to God, that is, one that is

indifferent; and it serves for this purpose that God may try

whether man is willing to yield obedience to him, solely on

this account, because it has been the pleasure of God to

require such obedience, and though it were impossible to

devise any other reason why God imposed that law.

V. That symbolical law was, in this instance, prohibitive of

some act, to which man was inclined by some natural

propensity, (that is, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of

good and of evil,) though "it was pleasant to the eyes and

good for food." By the commanding of an indifferent act, it

does not seem to have been possible to try the obedience of

man with equal advantage.

VI. This seems to be the difference between each [of these

kinds of] obedience, that the first (Thesis I) is true

obedience and, in itself, pleasing to God; and the man who

performs it is said truly to live according to godliness; but

that the latter (Theses 4 and 5) is not so much obedience,

itself, as the external profession of willingly yielding

obedience; and it is therefore an acknowledgment, or the

token of an acknowledgment, by which man professes himself to

be subject to God, and declares that he is willingly subject.

Exactly in the same manner, a vassal yields obedience to his

lord, for having fought against his enemies, which obedience

he confesses that he cheerfully performs to him, by

presenting him annually with a gift of small value.

VII. From this comparison, it appears that the obedience

which is yielded to a symbolical law is far inferior to that

which is yielded to a natural law, but that the disobedience

manifested to a symbolical law is not the less serious, or

that it is even more grievous; because, by this very act, man

professes that he is unwilling to submit himself, and indeed

not to yield obedience in other matters, and those of greater

importance, and of more difficult labour.

VIII. The reward that corresponds with obedience to this

chief law, the performance of which is, of itself, pleasing

to God, (the analogy and difference which exist between God

and man being faithfully observed,) is life eternal, the

complete satisfying of the whole of our will and desire. But

the reward which answers to the observance of the symbolical

law, is the free enjoyment of the fruits of Paradise, and the

power to eat of the tree of life, by the eating of which man

was always restored to his pristine strength. But this tree

of life was a symbol of eternal life, which man would have

enjoyed, if, by abstaining from eating the fruit, he had

professed obedience, and had truly performed such obedience

to the moral law.

IX. We are of opinion that, if our first parents had remained

in their integrity by obedience performed to both these laws,

God would have acted with their posterity by the same

compact, that is, by their yielding obedience to the moral

law inscribed on their hearts, and to some symbolical or

ceremonial law; though we dare not specially make a similar

affirmation, respecting the tree of the knowledge of good and

evil.

X. So, likewise, if they had persisted in their obedience to

both laws, we think it very probable that, at certain

periods, men would have been translated from this natural

life, by the intermediate change of the natural, mortal and

corruptible body, into a body spiritual, immortal, and

incorruptible, to pass a life of immortality and bliss in

heaven.

COROLLARY

We allow this to be made a subject of discussion: Did Eve

receive this symbolical command about the tree of the

knowledge of good and evil, immediately from God, or through

Adam?

DISPUTATION XXX

THE MANNER IN WHICH MAN CONDUCTED HIMSELF FOR FULFILLING THE

FIRST COVENANT, OR ON THE SIN OF OUR FIRST PARENTS

I. When God had entered into this covenant with men, it was

the part of man perpetually to form and direct his life

according to the conditions and laws prescribed by this

covenant, because he would then have obtained the rewards

promised through the performance of both those conditions,

and would not have incurred the punishment due and denounced