MENTAL PHILOSOPHY;
EMBRACING THE THREE DEPARTMENTS OF THE INTELLECT, SENSIBILITIES, AND WILL.
BY THOMAS C. UPHAM, D.D., 1799-1872.
PROFESSOR OF MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN BOWDOIN COLLEGE;
MEMBER OF THE ACADEMY OF METAPHYSICAL AND ETHICAL SCIENCES;
AUTHOR OF "ESTHETIO AND MORAL LETTERS," "THE INTERIOR LIFE," "DIVINE UNION."
IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. I.: THE INTELLECT, WITH AN APPENDIX ON LANGUAGE.
NEW YORK:
HIARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
FRANKLIN SQUARE.
1869.
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1869, BY THOMAS C.
UPHAM, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States,
for the State of Maine.
PREFACE.
IN preparing the following work, I trust I have felt, in some
degree, the responsibility which obviously ought to attach to such an
attempt. It has been my object, aided by the views and researches which
have characterized the labours of various philosophical sects, to give a
condensed, but just and impartial, account of most of the leading
principles of Mental Philosophy, so far as they appear to be ascertained
and recognised at the present time. The Work, accordingly, is essentially
Eclectic in its character; and, as such, can neither incur the discredit,
nor claim the honour, of belonging exclusively to any of the great
Philosophical Schools, although it does not hesitate to acknowledge its
indebtedness to all. In connexion with a cordial application of the
Eclectic principle, which has laid open to me the truth wherever it may be
found, and under whatever name, I have felt it important to adhere as
closely as possible to the rules of Inductive philosophizing, in
opposition to that excess of bold conjecture and unchastened speculation
which have too often perplexed and deformed mental inquiries. And in doing
this I have been obliged to submit mny conclusions everywhere to the
subjective test of my own mental experience and operations, as developed
within the sphere of my personal consciousness. In this way I have hoped,
with Divine assistance, to prepare a Work which, together with some
important views that might, perhaps, properly be considered original,
should select, arrange, and systematize the doctrines of a multitude of
writers; and which, while it might commend itself with some degree of
confidence to the philosopher, should, at the same time, be accordant, as
sound Philosophy ever will be, with the principles and interests of
correct morals and religion. The aspect of the times evidently demanded
that the attempt should be made-by somebody. There is no question that a
Work of this kind, especially in connexion with the mental training of
young persons, has for some time been greatly needed. But whether I have
succeeded, in a task of so much difficulty and requiring so much care, in
meeting the reasonable expectations and wishes of the friends of mental
science, I must leave to others to decide. The reader will notice that the
Work proceeds, after a brief discussion of the doctrine of Primary Truths,
and a few other preparatory views, upon the basis of a threefold division
of the mind, viz., the INTELLECT, the SENSIBILITIES, and the WILL. This
general division, which, notwithstanding its obvious importance, has not
generally been made prominent in philosophical writers, and has even been
rejected by some, is strictly adhered to throughout. In the view of the
writer it is a fundamental one, without which there is no adequate
foundation for morals, aesthetics, or religion. From this general division
other: subordinate arrangements and classifications, some of which are
peculiar to the present Work, naturally and easily flow. And thus the
reader will find the whole subject opening itself connectedly and symmetrically, and in such
a manner as to present, in its completed outline, not merely a disjointed
congeries of philosophical facts, but the regularity and beauty of a
philosophical system. The general division of the Sensibilities is into
the Natural or Pathematic and Moral. Under the head of the MORAL
SENSIBILITIES, I have examined the subject of conscience at some length
and in various points of view, and cannot but hope that some of the
difficulties which have hitherto attended it have been removed, and that
the whole subject is placed, to some extent, in a consistent and
satisfactory light. In many other respects, particularly in the
classification of the Emotions and the Desires, and their relation to each
other, and in some of the doctrines contained in the portion on the Will,
the reader will find some important views, which I suppose he will not be
likely to find, in the form in which they are now presented, in other
philosophical works. This work, in its original form, appeared a number of
years since, and has passed through successive editions. It has been
favourably received by the public; perhaps as much so as other
philosophical works. Nevertheless, desirous of rendering it as perfect as
possible, I have recently subjected it to re-examination and revision, and
accordingly it appears now in a somewhat new form, in some respects
condensed and in others enlarged, and with the results of the author's
latest inquiries and emendations.
THOMAS C. UPHAM.
New York, Sept., 1869,
CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION.
CHAP. I.-PRIMARY TRUTHS. Section Page 1.
Importance of preliminary statements in Mental Philosophy.. 17 2. Nature
of such preliminary statements....................... 18 3. Of the name or
designation given them....................... 19 4. Primary truth of
personal existence.......................... 20 5. Occasions of the origin
of the idea or belief of personal existence 20 6. Primary truth of
personal identity........................... 22'7. Reasons for regarding
this a preliminary truth................ 23 8. There are original and
authoritative grounds of belief......... 2A 9. Primary truths having
relation to the reasoning power........ 27 10. No beginning or change of
existence without a cause......... 27 11. Occasions of the origin of the
primary truth of effects and causes 28 12. Matter and mind have uniform
and fixed laws................. 29 13. This primary truth not founded on
reasoning................SO30 CHAP. II.-IM-IIATERIALITY OF THE MIND. 14.
On the meaning of the terms material and immaterial......... 32 15.
Difference between mind and matter shown from language.... 33 16. Their
different nature shown by their respective properties... 34 17. The soul's
immateriality indicated by the feeling of identity.. 35 18. The material
doctrine makes a man a machine................ 35 19. No exact
correspondence between the mental and bodily state 36 20. Evidence of this
want of exact correspondence................ 37 21. Comparative state of
the mind and body in dreaming......... 39 22. The great works of genius an
evidence of immateriality... 40 23. The doctrine of materiality
inconsistent with future existence 41 CHAP. III.-LAWS OF BELIEF. 24. Of
belief, its degrees and its sources.......................... 43 25. Of
suggestion, consciousness, and the senses, as grounds of
belief....................................................... 44 26.
Memory and testimony considered as sources of belief........ 45 27.
Objection to reliance on testimony........................... 47 28. Of
judgment or relative suggestion as a ground of belief...... 48 29. Of
reasoning as a ground or law of belief.................... 49 CHAP.
IV.-GENERAL CLASSIFICATION. 30. The mind may be regarded in a threefold
point of view.......51 31. Evidence of the general arrangement from
consciousness..... 51 32. Evidence of the same from the terms found in
different languages 53 33. Evidence from inin'ciental remalrs In
writers................. 54 34. Further proof from various writers on the
mind............ 57 35. Classification of the intellectual states of the
mind........... 60
DIVISION FIRST. THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTANDING.
INTELLECTIVE OR INTELLECTUAL STATES OF THE MIND. PART FIRST. THE EXTERNAL
OR SENSUOUS INTELLECT. INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL ORIGINi. CHAP.
I.-ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. Section Page 36. Connexion of the mind
with the material world............. 65 37. Of the origin or beginnings of
knowledge.................... 66 38. Our first knowledge in general of a
material or external origin 68 39. Further proof of the beginnings of
knowledge from external
causes................................................... 70 40. The same
subject further illustrated......................... 72 41. Subject
illustrated from the case of James Mitchell.......... 73 42. Illustration
from the case of Caspar Hauser................. 74 43. Of connatural or
innate knowledge................. 77 44. The doctrine of innate knowledge
not susceptible of proof... 78 45. The doctrine tried by the idea of a
God..................... 78 46. The further discussion of this subject
unnecessary........... 80 47. Further remarks on the rise of knowledge by
means of the senses.........................8............ 81 CHAP. II.-THE
POWER OF SENSATION. 48. Sensation a simple mental state originating in the
senses..... 83 49. All sensation is properly and truly in the
mind.............. 84 50. Sensations are not images or resemblances of
objects........ 87 51. The connexion between the mental and physical
change not susceptible of explanation................................ 88
CHAP. III.-PERCEPTION, OR THE PERCEPTIVE POWER. 52. Of the meaning and
nature of perception.................... 89 53. Of the primary and
secondary qualities of matter............ 90 54. Of the secondary
qualities of matter........................ 92 55. Of the nature of mental
powers or faculties, and their names. 92 CHAP. IV.-THE SENSES OF SMELL AND
TASTE. 56. Nature and importance of the senses as a source of knowledge 94
57. Of the connexion of the brain with sensation and perception. 95 58.
Order in which the senses are to be considered.............. 96 59. Of the
sense and sensation of smell...................9....... 96 60. Of
perceptions of smell in distinction from sensations........ 97 61. Of the
sense and sensation of taste........................... 98 62. Design and
uses of the senses of smell and taste............ 99 CHAP. V.-THE SENSE OF
HEARING. 63. Organ of the sense of hearing..............................
100 64. Nature of sonorous bodies and the medium of the communications of
sound......................................... 101 65. Varieties of the
sensation of sound................. 103 66. Manner in which we learn the
place of sounds............... 104 67. Application of these views to the
art of ventriloquism....... 105 68. Uses of hearing, and its connexion
with oral language....... 106
1X CHAP. VI.-THE SENSE OF TOUCH. Section Page 69. Of the sense
of touch and its sensations in general.......... 107 70. Idea of
externality suggested in connexion with the touch.. 108 71. Origin of the
notion of extension, and of form and figure.... 110 72. On the sensation
of heat and cold.......................... 111 73. On the sensation of
hardness and softness.................. 113 74. Of certain indefinite
feelings sometimes ascribed to the touch 114 75. Relation between the
sensation and what is outwardly signified.................................
115 CHAP. VII.-THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 76. Of the organ of sight, and the uses
or benefits of that sense 117 77. Statement of the mode or process in
-visual perception...... 118 78. Of the original and acquired perceptions
of sight............ 119 79. The idea of extension not originally from
sight............. 119 80. Of the knowledge of the figure of bodies by the
sight....... 121 81. Measurements of magnitude by the
eye................... 123 82. Of objects seen in the mist, and of the sun
and moon in the horizon.................................................
124 83. Of the estimation of distances by sight..................... 126
84. Estimation of distance when unaided by intermediate objects 128 85. Of
objects seen on the ocean, &c............................ 130 86.
Explanatory remarks...................................... 131 CHAP.
VIII.-oF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES, AND IDEALISM. 87. By means of sensations
we have a knowledge of outward
things.................................................. 132 88. Objection
to a reliance on the senses....................... 133 89. The senses
circumscribed or limited rather than fallacious.. 133 90. Some alleged
mistakes of the senses owing to want of care.. 135 91. Of mistakes in
judging of the motion of objects............. 138 92. Of mistakes as to
the distances and magnitude of objects.... 140 93. The senses liable to be
diseased............................ 141 94. On the real existence of a
material world................... 142 95. Doctrine of the non-existence of
matter considered......... 143 96. The senses as much grounds of belief as
other parts of our
constitution............................................. 145 97. Opinions
of Locke on the testimony of the senses.......... 145 CHAP. IX.-HABITS OF
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 98. General view of the law of habit and of its
applications..... 147 99. Of habit in relation to the
smell............................ 149 100. Of habit in relation to the
taste............................ 150 101. Of habit in relation to the
hearing........................ 152 102. Of certain universal habits based
oir sounds................ 154 103. Application of habit to the
touch......................... 156 104. Other striking instances of habits
of touch................. 159 105. Habits considered in relation to the
sight.................. 160 106. Sensations may possess a relative as well
as positive increase of power................................ 162 107. Of
habits as modified by particular callings or arts.......... lij6 108. The
law of habit considered in reference to the perception of the outlines and
forms of objects........................ 164 109. Notice of some facts
which favour the above doctrine....... 165 110. Additional illustrations
of Mr. Stewart's doctrine........... 166 A 2
CHAP. X.-MUSCULAR HABITS. Section Page 111. Instances in proof
of the existence of muscular habits...... 167 112. Muscular habits
regarded by some writers as involuntary... 169 113. Objections to the
doctrine of involuntary muscular habits.. 169 CHAP. XI.-THE CONCEPTIVE
POWER.-CONCEPTIONS. 114. Conceptivity and characteristics of
conceptions............. 172 115. Of conceptions of objects of
sight.......................... 173 116. Of the influence of habit on our
conceptions............... 175 117. Influence of habit on conceptions of
sight........... 176 118. Of the subserviency of our conceptions to
description...... 176 119. Of conceptions attended with a momentary
belief.......... 177 120. Conceptions which are joined with
perceptions............. 180 121. Conceptions as connected with fictitious
representations... 182 CHAP. XII.-SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS OF MENTAL
STATES. 122. Origin of the distinction of simple and complex............
183 123. Nature and characteristics of simple mental states.......... 184
124. Simple mental states not susceptible of definition.......... 184 125.
Simple cognitive states representative of a reality.......... 185 126.
Origin of complex notions and their relation to simple..... 186 127.
Supposed complexness without the antecedence of simple
feelings.................................... 187 128. The precise sense in
which complexness is to be understood 188 129. Illustrations of analysis
as applied to the mind.............. 190 130. Complex notions of external
origin...................... 191 131. Of objects contemplated as
wholes......................... 192 132. Something more in external
objects than mere attributes or
qualities......................................... 193 133. Explanatory
remarks on the true philosophical method..... 194 CHAP. XIII.
—ABSTRACTION.-THE ABSTRACTIVE POWER. 134. Abstraction implied in the
analysis of complex ideas........ 197 135. Instances of particular
abstract ideas........................ 198 136. Names, and complexity in
the power of abstraction......... 199 137. Of generalizations of
particular abstract mental states...... 202 138. Of the importance and
uses of absrtaction.................. 202 CHAP. XIV.-GENERAL ABSTRACT
IDEAS. 139. General abstract notions the same with genera and species..
203 140. Process in classification, or the forming of genera and species
204 141. Early classifications sometimes incorrect................... 205
142. Illustrations of our earliest classifications.................. 206
143. Of the nature of general abstract ideas...................... 207
144. Objection sometimes made to the existence of general notions 209 145.
The power of general abstraction in connexion with numbers,
&c........................................... 210 146. Of general abstract
truths or principles.................. 211 147. Of the speculations of
philosophers and others............. 212 148. Of different opinions
formerly prevailing........2........ 212 149. Of the opinions of the
Nominalists.........................213 150. Of the opinions of the
Conceptualists....................... 214 151. Further remarks of Brown on
general abstractions.........216 CHAP. XV.-OF THE POWER OP ATTENTION. 152.
Names given it, and its result when in exercise............. 217 153. Of
different degrees of attention....................... 217
Xi Section Page 154. Complexness of the power of
attention..................... 219 155. Dependence of memory on
attention...........2......... 220 156. Of exercising attention in
reading.......................... 222 157. Alleged inability to command
the attention................ 223 CHAP. XVI.-DREAMING AND SOMNAMBULISIM.
158. Definition of dreams and the prevalence of them............ 225 159.
Connexion of dreams with our waking thoughts............ 226 160. Dreams
are often caused by our sensations................. 227 161. Explanation
of the incoherency of dreams. (1st cause)..... 229 162. Second cause of
the incoherency of dreams................. 229 163. Apparent reality of
dreams. (1st cause).................... 230 164. Apparent reality of
dreams. (2d cause)...................... 231 165. Of our estimate of time
in dreaming......................... 232 166. Of the senses sinking to
sleep in succession.................. 235 167. General remarks on cases of
somnambulism................ 236 168. Further illustrations of
somnambulism..................... 238 DIVISION FIRST. THE INTELLECT OR
UNDERSTANDING. INTELLECTIVE OR INTELLECTUAL STATES OF THE MI ND. PAERT
SECOND. THE INTERNAL OR SUPER-SENSUOUS INTELLECT. INTELLECTUAL STATES OF
INTERNAL ORIGIN. CHAP. I.-INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 169. The soul has
fountains of knowledge within................ 243 170. Declaration of
Locke, that the soul has knowledge in itself.. 244 171. Opinions of
Cudworth on the subject of internal knowledge. 245 172. Further remarks of
the same writer on this subject......... 246 173. Writers, who have
objected to the doctrine of an internal source of
knowledge.............................. 248 174. Knowledge begins in the
senses, but has internal accessions. 250 175. Instances of notions which
have an internal origin.......... 252 176. Imperfections attendant on
classifications in mental
philosophy..................................................... 254 CHAP.
II. —TEE INTUITIONAL OR SUGGESTIONAL POWER. 177. Place, general objects,
and names of this power............. 255 178. Ideas of existence, mind,
self-existence, and personal identity 257 179. Origin of the idea of
externality............................ 259 180. Idea of matter or
material existence........................ 260 181. Origin of the idea of
motion................................. 262 182. Of the nature of unity
and the origin of that notion........ 262 183. Nature of-succession, and
origin of the idea of succession... 264 184. Origin of the notion of
duration............................ 264 185. Of time and its
measurements, and of eternity.............. 267 186. Marks or
characteristics of time............................ 267 187. The idea of
space not of external origin................ 269 188. The idea of space
has its origin in suggestion............... 271 189. Characteristic marks
of the notion of space................. 272 190. Of the origin of the idea
of power........................ 273 191. Origin of the idea of the first
or primitive.................. 275 192. Of the ideas of right and
wrong............................ 276 193. Origin of the ideas of moral
merit and demerit............. 277 194. Of other elements of knowledge
developed in suggestion... 278 195. Suggestion a source of principles as
well as of ideas........ 279
CHAP. III.-CONSCIOUSNESS. Section Page 196. Consciousness
the second source of internal knowledge; its nature............ 282 197.
Further remarks on the proper objects of consciousness.... 283 198.
Consciousness a ground or law of belief.................... 285 199.
Instances of knowledge developed in consciousness......... 286 CHAP.
IV.-RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR JUDGMENT. 200. Of the susceptibility of
perceiving or feeling relations...... 289 201. Occasions on which feelings
of relation may arise........... 290 202. Of the use of correlative
terms............................. 291 203. Of the great number of our
ideas of relation................ 292 204. Of relations of identity and
diversity....................... 292 205. Of axioms in connexion with
relations of identity and diversity 293 206. (II.) Relations of degree,
and names expressive of them..... 294 207. Relations of degree in
adjectives of the positive form....... 295 208. (III.) Of relations of
proportion........................... 296 209. (IV.) Of relations of place
or position...................... 297 210. (V.) Of relations of
time.............................. 299 211. (VI.) Of relations of
possession......3.................... 300 212. (VII.) Of relations of
cause and effect............... 301 213. Of complex terms involving the
relation of cause and effect. 302 214. Remarks on instituted or
conventional relations........ 303 215. Connexion of relative suggestion
or judgment with reasoning 304 CRAP. V.-ASSOCIATION. (I.) PRIMARY LAWS.
216. Reasons for considering this subject here................... 305 217.
Meaning of association and illustrations.................. 306 218. Of the
general laws of association...................... 307 219. Resemblance the
first general law of association............ 308 220. Resemblance in every
particular not necessary............ 309 221. Of resemblance in the
effects produced..................... 310 222. Contrast the second general
or primary law................ 311 223. Contiguity the third g'eneral or
primary law................ 313 224. Cause and effect the fourth primary
law.................... 314 CRAP. VI.-ASSOCIATION. (II.) SECONDARY LAWS.
225. Secondary laws and their connexion with the primary...... 315 226. Of
the influence of lapse of time............................ 316 227.
Secondary law of repetition or habit........................ 318 228. Of
the secondary law of coexistent emotion................ 319 229. Original
difference in the mental constitution............... 320 230. The
foregoing law as applicable to the sensibilities......... 321 231. Of
associations caused by present objects of perception..... 323 232. Causes
of increased vividness in these instances............ 325 CHAP.
VII.-CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS. (I.) INTELLECTUAL. 233. Association sometimes
misleads our judgments............. 326 234. Casual association in respect
to the place of sensation...... 327 235. Connexion of our ideas of
extension and time.............. 328 236. Of high and low notes in
music............................. 330 237. Connexion of the ideas of
extension and colour............. 331 238. Tendency of the mind to pass
from the sign to the thing
signified................................................... 332 239.
Whether there be heat in fire, &c........................... 334 PA0.
Whether there be meaning in words........................ 334 241. Benefit
of examining such connexions of thought........... 336
Xiii Section Page 242. Power of the will over mental
associations................. 337 243. Association controlled by indirect
voluntary power......... 338 244. Further illustrations of indirect
voluntary power........... 339 CHAP. VIII.-MEMORY. 245. Remarks on the
general nature of memory.................. 341 246. Of memory as a ground
or law of belief.................... 342 247. Of differences in the
strength of memory................... 343 248. Of circumstantial memory,
or that species of memory which is based on the relations of contiguity in
time and place.. 345 249. Illustrations of specific or circumstantial
memory.......... 347 250. Of philosophic memory, or that species of memory
which is based on other relations than those of contiguity........ 348
251. Further illustrations of philosophic memory............... 350 252.
Of that species of memory called intentional recollection... 351 253.
Instance illustrative of the preceding......................... 353 254.
Remarks on the memory of the aged....................... 354 255. On the
compatibility of strong memory and good judgment. 356 256. Marks of a good
memory................................... 357 257. Directions or rules for
the improvement of the memory..... 358 258. Further directions for the
improvement of the memory..... 361 259. Of observance of the truth in
connexion with memory...... 363 260. Of committing to writing as a means
of aiding the memory.. 363 261. Of mnemonics or systems of artificial
memory.............. 364 CHAP. IX.-DURATION OF MEMORY. 262. Restoration of
thoughts and feelings supposed to be forgotten 365 263. Mental action
quickened by influence on the physical system 367 264. Other instances of
quickened mental action, and of a restoration of
thoughts........................................ 368 265. Effect on the
memory of a severe attack of fever........... 369 266. Approval and
illustrations of these views from Coleridge... 370 267. Application of the
principles of this chapter to education... 372 268. Connexion of this
doctrine with the final judgment and a future
life................................................. 373 CHAP.
X.-REASONING. 269. Reasoning a source of ideas and
knowledge................. 375 270. Illustrations of the value of the
reasoning power.......... 376 271. Definition of reasoning, and of
propositions................ 378 272. Process of the mind in all cases of
reasoning............... 379 273. Grounds of the selection of
propositions................... 381 274. Reasoning implies the existence
of antecedent or assumed propositions.............................. 382
27.5. Of reasoning a priori....................................... 384
276. Of reasoning a posteriori................................... 386 277.
Of reasoning a fortiori..................................... 387 278. Of
differences in the power of reasoning.................... 387 279. Of
habits of reasoning..................................... 389 280. Of
reasoning in connexion with language or expression..... 390 CHAP.
XI.-DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING. 281. Of the subjects of demonstrative
reasoning........... 392 282. Use of definitions and axioms in
demonstrative reasoning... 393 283. The opposites of demonstrative
reasonings absurd.......... 394 284. Demonstrations do not admit of
different degrees of belief.. 395 285. Of the use of diagrams in
demonstrations................... 396 286. Of signs in general as
connected with reasoning............ 397
Section Page 287. Of the influence of demonstrative
reasoning on the mental
character............................................... 399 288. Further
considerations on the influence of demonstrative
reasoning.......................................... 400 CHAP. XII. —IORAL
REASONING. 289. Of the subjects and importance of moral reasoning.........
402 290. Of the nature of moral certainty.......................... 403
291. Of reasoning from analogy................................ 404 292.
Caution to be used in reasoning from analogy.......... 406 293. Of
reasoning by induction.................................. 407 294. Of the
caution necessary in inductive processes............. 408 295. Of
instances or experiments in inductive reasoning termed instantie
crucis............................... 408 296. Of combined or accumulated
arguments.................... 409 CHAP. XIII.-PRACTICAL DIRECTIONS IN
REASONING. 297. Logic, and rules relating to the practice of
reasoning........ 411 298. Of being influenced inll reasoning by a love of
the truth...... 412 299. Care to be used in correctly stating the subject
of discussion 413 300. Consider the kind of evidence applicable to the
subject..... 414 301. Reject the aid of false arguments or
sophisms.............. 415 302. Fallacia equivocationis, or the use of
equivocal terms and phrases........................................... 417
303. On the sophism of estimating actions and character fiom the
circumstances of success merely......................... 419 304. Of
adherence to our opinions........................... 420 305. Effects on
the mind of debating for victory instead of truth.. 421 CHAP.
XIV.-IMAGINATION. 306. Imagination an intellectual process closely related
to reasoning...................................................... 423
307. Definition of the power of imagination......................424 308.
Process of the mind in the creations of the imagination..... 425 309.
Further remarks on the same subject....................... 426 310.
Illustration fiom the writings of Dr. Reid................ 427 311.
Grounds of the preference of one conception to another.... 428 312.
Illustration of the subject from Milton..................... 428 313. The
creations of imagination not entirely voluntary......... 429 314.
Illustration of the statements of the preceding section...... 431 315. On
the utility of the faculty of the imagination............. 432 316. Works
of imagination give different degrees of pleasure.... 433 317. Importance
of theimagination in connexion with reasoning 435 318. Of misconceptions
by means of the imagination............. 437 319. Explanation of the above
misrepresentations of the
imagination....................................... 438 320. Feelings of
sympathy aided by the imagination............ 439 CRAP. XV.-COMPLEX IDEAS
OF INTERNAL ORIGIN. 321. Of complex ideas of external
origin....................... 440 322. Nature of complex ideas of internal
origin.................. 441 323. Of complex notions formed by the
repetition of the same
thing................................................... 442 324. Of the
help afforded by names in the combination of numbers 443 325. Instances of
complex notions made up of different simple
ideas................................... 444 326. Not the same internal
complex ideas in all languages....... 446 327. Origin of the complex
notion of a Supreme Being.......... 448
XV DIVISION FIRST. THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTANDING. INTELLECTIVE
OR INTELLECTUAL STATES OF THE MIND. PART THIRD. IMPERFECT AND DISORDERED
INTELLECTUAL ACTION. CHAP. I.-CONNEXION OF THE MIND AND BODY. Section Page
328. Disordered intellectual action connected -with the body... 453 329.
The mind constituted on the principle of a connexion with the
body................................................ 454 330. Illustration
of the subject from the effects of old age........ 455 331. The connexion
of the bodily system with the mental shown from the effects resulting from
diseases.................. 456 332. Shown also from the effects of
stimulating drugs and gases. 457 333. Influence on the body of excited
imagination and passion... 458 334. This doctrine of use in explaining
mental phenomena....... 460 CHAP. II.-EXCITED CONCEPTIONS OR APPARITIONS.
335. Of excited conceptions and of apparitions in general........ 461 336.
Of the less permanent excited conceptions of sight......... 462 337. Of
the less permhanent excited conceptions of sound........ 463 338. First
cause of permanently vivid conceptions or apparitions. Morbid sensibility
of the retina of the eye............... 464 339. Second cause of
permanently excited conceptions or apparitions. Superabundance of blood in
the system.......... 467 340. Methods of relief adopted in this
case...................... 469 341. Third cause of excited conceptions.
Attacks of fever...... 470 342. Fourth cause of apparitions and other
excited conceptions. Inflammation of the
brain............................... 471 343. Facts having relation to the
fourth cause of excited conceptions.....................................
473 344. Fifth cause of apparitions. HIysteria..................... 473
CHAP. III.-PARTIAL INSANITY. 345. Meaning of the term and kinds of
insanity.................. 474 346. Of disordered or alienated
sensations....................... 475 347. Of disordered or alienated
external perception.............. 476 348. Disordered state or insanity of
intuition.................... 477 349. Unsoundness or insanity of
consciousness.................. 479 350. Insanity of the judgment or
relative suggestion............. 480 351. Disordered or alienated
association. Light-headedness..... 481 352. Illustrations of this mental
disorder........................ 481 o53. Of partial insanity or
alienation of the memory............. 482 354. Of the power of reasoning
in the partially insane............ 484 355. Instance of the above form of
disordered reasoning......... 485 356. Of readiness of reasoning in the
partially insane............ 486 357. Partial mental alienation by means
of the imagination...... 487 358. Insanity or alienation of the power of
belief................ 488 CHAP. IV.-TOTAL INSANITY OR DELIRIIUIM. 359.
Idea of total insanity or delirium..................... 490 360. Of
perception in cases of total or delirious insanity......... 491 361. Of
association in delirious insanity......................... 492 362.
Illustration of the above section........................... 492 363. Of
the memory in connexion with delirious insanity........ 494 364. Of the
power of i'easoning in total or delirious insanity...... 494 365. Of the
form of insanity called furor or madness............. 495 366. Of the
causes of the different kinds of insanity.............. 496 367. Of moral
accountability in mental alienation............... 497
Section Page 368. Of the imputation of insanity to
individuals................ 498 369. Of the treatment of the
insane........................... 499 APPENDIX ON LANGUAGE. CHAP.
I.-NATURAL SIGNS. 1. Of the natural and necessary communication of the
mental states from one to another................................ 503 2.
Mental states first expressed by gesture and the countenance. 504 3. Of
the use made of natural signs by the deaf and dumb...... 505 4. Further
illustrations of the great power of natural signs.... 507 5. Of the system
of signs existing among the N. A. Savages..... 510 6. Of the symbolic
exhibitions ofthe Hebrews................. 512 7. Of the instinctive
interpretation of certain natural signs..... 513 8. Further evidence of
the instinctive interpretation of natural
signs.................................................... 514 9.
Considerations on the use of natural signs................... 516 CHAP.
II.-ORAL SIG-NS, OR SPEECH. 10. Remarks on the original formation of oral
signs............. 518 11. Of the possibility of forming an oral language
without Divine aid........................................ 520 12. Oral
signs or words are in general arbitrary................ 522 13. Words at
first few in number, and limited to particular objects 523 14. Of the
formation of general names or appellatives.5...... 523 15. Formation of
appellatives implies the feeling of resemblance. 525 16. On the increase
in the number of nouns or appellatives...... 526 17. Of the formation of
verbs................................... 527 18. Formation of adjectives
and other parts of speech........... 528 19. The foregoing principles
confirmed from the deaf and dumb.. 529 20. Of the formation of
prepositions....... 530 21. Of the origin and original import of
conjunctions.... 5..... 531 22. Further remarks on the meaning of
conjunctions, etc........ 532 23. Of the origin of particular or proper
names................. 532 24. Principle of selection and significancy of
proper names...... 533 25. Of the origin and significancy of the names of
places........ 534 CHAP. III.-WRITTEN SIGNS. 26. Of the causes which led
to the formation of written signs... 535 27. The first artificial signs
addressed to the eye were pictures... 536 28. Of hieroglyphical
writing............................... 538 29. Of the written characters
of the Chinese. 539 30. The Chinese character an improvement on the
hieroglyphical 540 31. Artificial delineations employed as signs of
sound........... 541 32. Formation of syllabic
alphabets............................. 541 33. The preceding views
confirmed by recent researches......... 542 34. On the recent formation of
the Cherokee syllabic alphabet... 543 35. Facts relative to the invention
of the Cherokee alphabet..... 544 36. Conventional written signs as
expressive of numbers, etc.... 546 CHAP. IV.-CHARACTERISTICS OF LANGUAGES.
37. All _anguages have their characteristic traits................. 548
38. Characteristics of the languages of uncivilized nations....... 549 39.
Characteristics of language in civilized and scientific nations. 550 40.
Characteristics of languages depend much on habits......... 551 41.
Languages aid in forming correct ideas of national character. 552 42. Of
the correspondence between national intellect, etc........ 553 43.
Different languages suited to different minds and subjects.... 555 44.
Such differences shown by attempts at translating.......... 556 45. Of the
study of the Greek and Latin languages............ 558 46. Of an universal
language...................5................. 60
INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER I.
PRIMAIRY TRUTHS.
1. Importance of preliminary statements in Mental Philosophy. WE propose in a few introductory chapters
to give some preparatory statements, which will aid, it is hoped, in
making the way easier and clearer for what is to follow. The subjects of
these introductory chapters, different in their nature, but agreeing in
having certain common relations, are Primary Truths, the Immateriality of
the mind, Laws of belief, and the general Classification into the
intellect, sensibilities, and will, which is the basis of all the
subseqnlent inquiries. The first chapter is on the subject of primary
truths. It is often highly important, in the investigation of a department
of science, to state, at the commencement of such investigation, and
whether the investigation be of a specific or more general nature, what
things are to be considered as preliminary and taken for granted, and what
are not. If this precaution had always been observed, which, where there
is any room for mistake or misapprehension, seems so reasonable, many
useless disputes would have been avoided, and the paths to knowledge, too
often unnecessarily perplexed and prolonged, would have been rendered more
direct and easy. It is impossible to proceed with inquiries in the science
of MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, as it will be found to be in almost every other,
without a proper understanding of those fundamental truths which are
necessarily involved in what follows. And it will, accordingly, be the object of this chapter to endeavour to
ascertain some of them. ~ 2. Nature of such preliminary statements. Those
preliminary principles which may be found necessary to be admitted as the
antecedents and conditions of all subsequent inquiries, will be called,
for the sake of distinction and convenience, PRIMARY TRUTHs. Other names
have been given them, such as the " principles of common sense," and the
"primordial elements of the human understanding;" but this is the
designation, which especially commends itself to acceptance, both for its
simplicity and its peculiar appropriateness to the subject. i3But passing
from the name to the thing, the question arises, What are these truths.
And in what manner do we know them? According to the view of the subject
taken by Buffier, a judicious French writer, who has made it a matter of
special inquiry, and has written a treatise upon it, and whose views are
approved and adopted in the subsequent investigations of Dugald Stewart,
they are such, and such only, as can neither be proved nor r~elfuted by
other propositions of greater _perspicuity. And this seems to be not only
a succinct, but a satisfactory account of them, since, if there were other
propositions into which they could be resolved, and by means of which they
could be made clearer, then they could no longer be regarded as Primary,
but those other clearer propositions would have that character. But it may
be' asked again, Are there any propositions of this kind? Are there any so
clear, that the great instrument of human reasoning cannot render them
more perspicuous? Can there not be a complete action of the human mind in
all its parts without the laying down of any antecedent truths whatever,
as auxiliaries in its efforts after knowledge?The answer to such
questions, however formidable they may at first appear, is by no means
difficult. In the first place, every man, who investigates at all, often experiences doubts in his inquiries. I-Ie accordingly
endeavours to render such doubtful views clearer by argument. He goes on
from step to step, from one proposition to another; but, unless he at last
finds some truth utterly too clear to be rendered more so by reasoning, he
must evidently proceed, adding deduction to deduction without end. His
resting-place, accordingly, is in those truths which are elementary, and
which illuminate the understanding by their own light, and not by a light
let in from any other source. In the second place, the nature of reasoning
itself leads to the same view. It is well understood, that there can be no
process of reasoning, without involving the fact of a successive
perception of relations. But it is hardly necessary to say, that there can
be no feeling or perception of relation where there is but one object of
contemplation. —Something, therefore, must, from the nature of the case,
be assumed as the antecedent, the basis, or necessary condition of every
such process. ~ 3. Of the name or designation given them. We propose to
call those propositions, which are so elementary as to be susceptible
neither of proof nor of refutation from other propositions of greater
clearness, PRIMARY TRUTHS. Such propositions are termed, in the first
place, TRUTHS, since they are forced upon us, as it were, by our very
constitution. They exist as surely as the mind exists, where they have
their birthplace; they as certainly and as strongly control the
convictions of men, as the demonstrations of geometry; and not of one man
merely, or any particular set of men, but of all mankind; for the few who
pretend to reject them in speculation, constantly retract and deny such
rejection of them in their practice. And yet they are not the deductions
of reasoning, laboriously wrought out by proposition added to proposition;
but rather the natural and necessary revelations and announcements of our
mental nature. With sufficient reason, also, are the propositions in question called PRIMARY because, as would seem to follow
from the very definition of them, they are the propositions into which all
reasoning ultimately resolves itself, and are necessarily involved and
implied in the various investigations of which the mind is capable,
whether they relate to the great subject before us or to others. As has
been intimated, there cannot possibly be a process of reasoning, without
some first principle or admitted truth from which to start. ~ 4. Primary
truth of personal existence. The PRIMARY TRUTH which we are naturally led
to consider first, is that of the reality of our personal existence. The
proposition t/~cat we exist is a sort of corner-stone to everything else;
the foundation of our knowledge; the place and basis from which the
edifice must rise.-Without undertaking to prove this ftmdamental truth, we
nevertheless fully recognise and admit it. In other words, it is a
proposition antecedent to reasoning, but which, notwithstanding, fully and
perfectly secures our belief. If we reason on the subject of personal
existence, there is necessarily implied an I, a personal self, by whom the
process of reasoning is conducted, and which renders all such reasoning
nugatory. If we doubt concerning ourpersonal existence, thlere is the same
implication, since there can be no doubting unless there is some one to
doubt. And, of course, there can be no one to doubt where there is no
personal existence. That we exist, therefore, is a truth of nature, and
not of argumentation. Nothing which comes within the reach of the human
mind is more clearly defined to its perception, more thoroughly
controlling and operative, and more raised above cavils and skepticism,
whether rational or irrational, than this. ~ 5. Occasions of the origin of
the idea or belief of personal existence. It remains, however, a distinct
subject of inquiry, Under what circumstances this elementary belief
arises?-And, in answer to this inquiry, we may say with abundant confidence, if it be not the earliest, it
is at least among the earliest notions which the mind is capable of
forming. A kind Providence has not conceded to a conviction, so essential
to our whole mental history, a dilatory and late appearance. But that same
Providence has given a place as well as a time, an occasion as well as a
period of its formation; and although it may be impossible for us ever to
ascertain that occasion with certainty, we may at least conjecture. We
look, therefore, in our meditations on this topic, at man in the
commencement of his existence. We see him suddenly called forth from a
state where there was neither form, nor knowledge, nor power, endowed with
such capabilities of thought and action, both internal and external, as
his Creator saw fit to give. Thus brought into being, and thus fitted up
for his destined sphere, we will suppose that some external object is for
the first time presented to the senses. The result of this is, that there
is an impression made on the senses; and then at once there is a change in
the mind, a new thought, a new feeling. Although, as already suggested,
there is room for different conjectures here, there is much reason to
believe that this is the true occasion of the origin of the belief in
question. The first internal experience, the earliest thought or feeling,
is immediately followed by the notion of personal or self-existence, as
the subject of this new thought or feeling. And this idea or conviction of
personal existence, which arises at this ~very early period, is
continually suggested and confirmed in the course of the successive
duties, enjoyments, and sufferings of life. Such has commonly been
supposed to be the origin of the belief in question. We may as well
suppose it to come into being in connexion with the first act of the mind,
as with any subsequent act, although with less distinctness and strength
than afterward. But whether this account of the origin of the conviction
of our personal existence be the true one or not, we may still hold to the fact of the belief itself as
something beyond doubt. We may also regard it as necessarily resulting
from our mental constitution, and as wholly inseparable from our being. ~
6. Primary truth of personal identity. The second of those preliminary
truths which we term primary is the proposition of our Personal
Identity.-If the consideration of our personal existence naturally comes
first in the order of time, that of the truth now before us is not
secondary in point of importance. We can not dispense with either without
unsettling the grounds of inquiry and belief, and barring the access to
all knowledge whatever. IDENTITY iS synonymous with sameness. And both
terms, when we consider them as standing for mental states in distinction
from the objects or things which the mental states represent, are the
names of simple states of the mind. Although, therefore, the meaning of
the term Identity is as clear as that of other terms standing for simple
ideas, and everybody is supposed to understand it, it is not susceptible
of definition. The term is applied to various objects, and, among others,
to men.-The word PERSONAL implies Self, and personal identity is,
therefore, the identity of ourselves. But the term self is complex,
embracing both mind and matter, and hence we are led to consider the
distinct notions of mental and bodily identity. I. /MENTAL IDENTITY.-By
this phrase we express the continuance and oneness of the thinking
principle merely. The soul of man is truly a unit. It is not, like matter,
separable into parts. It may bring, from time to time, new
susceptibilities into action; but its essence is unchangeable. That which
constitutes it a thinking and sentient principle, in distinction from that
which is unthinking and insentient, never deserts it, never ceases to
exist, never becomes other than what it originally was. II. ]BODILY
IDENTITY. -By these expressions we mean the sameness of the bodily shape
and organization. This is the only meaning we can attach to them,
since the materials which compose our bodily systems are constantly
changing. The body is not a unit in the same sense the soul is. It was a
saying of Seneca, that no man bathes twice in the same river; and still we
call it the same, although the water within its banks is constantly
passing away. And in like manner we ascribe identity to the human body,
althoughl it is subject to constant changes; meaning by the expressions,
as just remarked, merely the sameness of shape and organization. III.
PERSONAL IDENTITY.-This form of expression is more general, or rather more
complex and comprehensive, than either of those which have been mentioned:
It has reference to both mind and matter, as we find them combined
together in that complex existence which we term man or person. It is
equivalent to what is conveyed by the two phrases of mental identity and
bodily identity. BBut it is evident we cannot easily separate the two when
speaking of men. And accordingly, when it is said that any one is
conscious of, knows, or has a certainty of his personal identity, it is
meant to be asserted that he is conscious of having fornmerly possessed
the powers of an organized, animated, and rational being, and that he
still possesses those powers. He knows that he is a human being now, and
that he was a lhuman being yesterday, or last week, or last year.-There is
no mystery in this. It is so plain, no one is likely to misunderstand it,
although we admit our inability to give a definition of identity. ~ 7.
Reasons for regarding this a primary truth. If personal identity be a
primary truth, it is antecedent to argument, and is independent of
it.-What grounds are there, then, for regarding it as such a In the FIRST
place, the mere fact that it is constantly implied in those conclusions
which we formni in respect to the future from the past, and universally in
our daily actions, is of itself a decisive reason for reckoning it among the original and essential intimations
of the human intellect. On any other hypothesis we are quite unable to
account for that practical recognition of it in the pursuits of men, which
is at once so early, so evident, and so universal. The farmer, for
instance, who looks abroad on his cultivated fields, knows that he is the
same person who, twenty years before, entered the forest with an axe on
his shoulder, and felled the first tree. The aged soldier, who recounts at
his fireside the battles of his youth, never once doubts that he was
himself the witness of those sanguinary scenes which he delights to
relate. It is altogether useless to attempt either to disprove or to
confirm to them a proposition which they believe and know, not from the
testimony of others or from reasoning, but from the interior and
authoritative suggestion of their very nature; and which, it is
sufficiently evident, can never be eradicated from their belief and
knowledge until that nature is changed. A SECOND circumstance in favor of
regarding the notion of personal identity as an admitted or primary truth,
is, that men cannot prove it by argument if they would; and, if they do
not take it for granted, must forever be without it. The propriety of this
remark will appear on examination.-There evidently can be no argument,
properly so called, unless there is a succession of distinct propositions.
From such a succession of propositions, no conclusion can be drawn by any
one, unless he is willing to trust to the evidence of memory. But memory
involves a notion of the time past; and whoever admits that he has the
power of memory, in however small a degree, virtually admits that he has
existed the same at some former period as at present. The considerations
which we have now particularly in view, and which are greatly worthy of
attention in connexion with the principle under examination, mayS with a
little variation of terms, be stated thus. Remembrance, without the
admission of our personal identity, is clearly an impossibility. But there
can be no process of reasoning without memory. This is evident, because
arguments are made up of propositions which are successive to each other,
not only in order, but in point of time. It follows, then, that there can
be no argument whatever, or on any subject, without the admission of our
identity, as a point from which to start. What, then, will it avail to
attem-pt to reason either for or against the views which are here
maintained, since, in every argument which is employed, there is
necessarily an admission of the very thing which is the subject of
inquiry? ~ 8. There are original and authoritative grounds of belief.
Supposing men actually to exist, and to be conscious of the continuance
and sameness of their existence, we are next to enter into the interior of
their constitution, and to inquire after such elements of intelligence and
action as are to be found there. The next proposition, therefore, which is
to be laid down as fundamental and as preliminary to all reasoning is,
that there are in mYen CERTAIN ORIGINAL AND AlUTIHORITATIVE GROUNDS OF
BELIEF. Nothing is better known than that there is a certain state of the
mind which is expressed by the term BELIEF. As we find all men acting in
reference to it, it is not necessary to enter into any verbal explanation.
Nor would it be possible by such explanation to increase the clearness of
that notion which every one is already supposed to entertain.-Of this
belief, we take it for granted, and hold it to be in the strictest sense
true, that there are original and authoritative grounds or sources;
meaning by the term ogriginal that these grounds or sources are involved
in the nature of the mind itself, and meaning by the term authoritative
that this belief is not a mere matter of chance or choice, but naturally
and necessarily results from our mental constitution, aid is binding upon
us. Sometimes we can trace the state of the mind which we term belief, to
an affection of the senses, 1C To sometimes to consciousness, sometimes to memory, and at
others to human testimony. In all these cases, however, the explanation
which we attempt to give of the origin of belief, is limited to a
statement of the circumstances in which the belief arises. But the fact
that belief arises under these circumstances, is ultimate, is a primary
law; and, being such, it no more admits of explanation than does the mere
feeling itself. Many writers have clearly seen and defended the necessity
of the assumption which has now been made. Mr. Stewart, among others, has
expressed the opinion (HIST. IDISsER., pt. i., ~ ii.), that there is
involved, in every appeal to the intellectual powers in proof of their own
credibility, the sophism of reasoning in a circle or PETITIO PRINCIPII;
and expressly adds, that, unless this credibility be assumed as
unquestionable, the further exercise of human reasoning is altogether
nugatory. —Not less decisive is the language of Sir James Mackintosh on
this subject (Ethical Philosophy, sect. vi.): "Universal skepticism
involves a contradiction in terms. It is a belief that there can, be no
belief.' It is an attempt of the mind to act without its structure, and by
other laws than those to which its nature has subjected its operations. To
reason without assenting to the principles on which reasoning is founded,
is not unlike an effort to feel without nerves or to move without
muscles.. o macn can, be callowed to be an opponent in reasoning who does
not set out with admitting all the principles, without the admission, of
which it is impossible to reason. It is, indeed, a puerile, nay, in the
eye of wisdom, a childish play, to attempt either to establish or to
confute principles by argument, which every step of that argument must
presuppose. The only difference between the two cases is, that he who
tries to prove them can do so only by first taking them for granted; and
that he who attempts to impugn them falls at the very first step into a
contradiction from which he never can rise."
9. Primary truths having relation to the reasoning
power. Man may be sure of the fact of his existence and of its
p5ermanency; he may be possessed of grounds of belief to a certain extent,
such as have been mentioned; and still we may suppose him incapable of
reasoning. His knowledge would be greatly limited, it is true, without
that noble faculty, but he would know something; his consciousness would
teach him his own existence; his senses convey to himn intimations of
external origin; the testimony of others furnish various facts that had
come within their observation. But, happily, man is not limited to the
scanty knowledge which would come in by these sources alone; he can
compare and combine, as well as perceive and experience; and, by means of
the propositions thus combined and compared together, is enabled to deduce
conclusions. But there is this worthy of notice, that the reasoning power,
although it -exists in man, and is a source of belief and a foundation of
klowledge, is necessarily built upon principles which are either known or
assumed.-This is seen in the most common and ordinary cases of the
exercise of this susceptibility. And it will be found also on examination,
that one assnumption may be resolved into another, and again into another,
until we arrive at certain ultimate truths which are at the foundation of
all reasoning whatever. It is important, therefore, to inquire, what
general assumptions, having particular reference to the reasoning power,
and absolutely essential to its action, are to be made. And these will be
found to be two in number; at least there are two only which are
particularly worthy of notice: one having special relation to the past,
and the other to the future. ~ 10. No beginning or change of existence
without a cause. The one which has a relation to the past, and is the
foundation-of all reasonings, having a reference to any period antecedent
to the present moment, may be stated as follows: thatc there 4s no
begiynin or ctcanye of existence witoutz, a cause.-This principle, like
others which have been mentioned, we may well suppose to be universally
admitted. When ahy new event takes place, men at once inquire the cause;
as if it could not possibly have happened without some effective or
preparative antecedent. And such being the general and unwavering
reception of the principle before us, it would seem to follow clearly that
there are grounds for it in the human constitution. A reliance on any
principle whatever, so firm and general as is here exhibited, is not
likely to be accidental. And when we inquire what these grounds are, we
shall not fail to come to the conclu*sion, that the proposition in
question is supported by an original intimation or feeling which is
utterly inseparable from our mental nature, and which is made known to us
by consciousness alone.-Although the feeling of belief, which is implied
in the proposition that there is no beginning or change of existence
without a cause, is an original one, directly resulting from our nature,
still it is in our power to give some account of the circumstances in
which it arises. ~ 11. Occasions of the origin of the primary truth of
effects and causes. The mind embraces the elementary truth which we are
considering at a very early period. Looking round upon nature, which we
are led to do more or less from the commencement of our being, we find
everything in motion. Things which had no existence are raised into life;
and new forms are imparted to what existed before. The human mind, which
is essentially active and curious, constantly contemplates the various
phenomena which come under its notice; observing not only the events and
appearances themselves, but their order in point-of time, their
succession. And it is led in this way to form the belief (not by
deduction, but from its own active nature), that every new existence and
every change of existence are preceded by something, without which they
could not have happened. Undoubtedly the belief, as in many other cases, is
comparatively weak at first, but it rapidly acquires unalterable growth
and strength; so much so that the mind applies it without hesitation to
every act, to every event, and to every finite being. And thus a
foundation is laid for numberless conclusions having a relation to
whatever has happened in time past. It is true that the verbal
proposition, by which our belief in this case is expressed, is not always,
nor even generally, brought forward and stated in our reasonings on the
past, but it is always implied. This primary truth is an exceedingly
important one. By its aid the human mind retains a control over the ages
that are gone, and subordinates them to its own purposes. It is
susceptible, in particular, of a moral and religious application. Let this
great principle be given us, and we are able to track the succession of
sequences upward, advancing from one step to another, until we find all
things meeting together in one self-existent and unchangeable head and
fountain of being. But there it stops. The principle will not apply to
God, since HIe differs from everything else which is the object of
thought, in being an existence equally without change and without
beginning. ~ 12. Matter and mind have uniform and fixed laws. It is
necessary to assume also, particularly in connexion with the reasoning
power, that matter and mind have uniform and permanent laws. This
assumption, as well as the preceding, is accordant with the common belief
of mankind. All men believe that the setting sun will rise again at the
appointed hour, that the decaying plants of autumn will revive in spring,
that the tides of ocean will continue to heave as in times past, and the
streams and rivers to flow in their courses. If they doubted, they would
not live and act as they are now seen to do. This belief in the uniformity
and permanency of the laws of nature does not arise at once; but has its
birth at first in, some particular instance, then in others, till it becomes of universal application. In the
first instance, the feeling in question, which we express in various ways
by the terms anticipation, faith, expectation, belief, and the like, is
weak and vacillating; but it gradually acquires strength and distinctness.
And yet this feeling, so important in its applications, is the pure work
of nature; it is not taught men, in the strict sense of that term, but is
produced within them; the necessary and infallible product and growth of
our mental being; a sort of inalienable gift of the Almighty to every man,
woman, and child; arising in the soul with as much certainty and as little
mystery as the notions, expressed by the words power, duration, right,
wrong, truth, or other elementary states of the mind. It is true, it is an
expectation or belief, directed to a particular object, and, therefore, is
not easily susceptible of being expressed by a single term, as in the case
of the ideas just referred to; but the circumstance of its being expressed
by a circumlocution does not render the feeling less distinct or real than
others. — As, therefore, the strong faith, which men entertain in the
continuance of the laws of creation, is the natural and decisive offspring
of that mental constitution which God has given us, there is good ground
for assuming the truth of that to which this faith relates, and to regard
it as a principle in'future inquiries, that matter and mind are governed
by uniform laws. ~ 13. This primary truth not founded on reasoning. B]ut
perhaps it is objected, that we can arrive at the great truth under
consideration without assuming it as something ultimate, as something
resulting from our constitution; and that nothing more is wanting in order
to arrive at it than a train of reasoning. -The sun, it is said, rose
to-day, therefore he will rise tomorrow: Food nourished me to-day,
therefore it will do the same to-morrow: The fire burned me once,
therefore it will again. But it demands no uncommon sagacity to perceive that something is here wanting, and that a link in the
chain of thought must be supplied in order to make it cohere. The mere
naked fact that the sun rose today, without anything else being connected
with it, affords not the least ground for the inference that it will rise
again; and the same may be said of all sinilar instances. lNow the link
which is wanting in order to bind together the beginning and the end in
such arguments as have been referred to, is the precise assulmption which
has been made, and which is held to be as reasonable as it is necessary,
because it is founded on an acknowledged, universal, and elementary
feeling of our nature. And we may here affirm with perfect confidence,
that, without makling this assumption, the power of reasoning cannot
deduce a single general inference, cannot arrive at so mLich as one
general conclusion, either in matter or mind, which has relation to the
future. But the moment we make the assumption, a vast foundation of
knowledge is laid. Grant that nature is uniform in her laws; then give us
the fact that food nourished us to-day, or that the sun rose to-day, or
any other fact of the kind, and it follows, with readiness and certainty,
that what has once been will be again.-So that we ml-ust regard the
principle of the permanency and uniformity of the laws of nature as
something antecedent to reasoning, and not subsequent to it; a principle
authorized and sustained by an ultimate, and not by any secondary action
of the mind. This subject will be better understood in connexion with the
chapter on the Intuitional or Suggestional Power, and with what will be
said in a future chapter on the subject of Assumptions in Reasoning.
CIHAPTER II.
IMMATERIALITY OF THE MIND.
On the meaning of the terms material and immaterial. ANOTHER Of those topics
which may be deemed introductory and auxiliary to the main subject, is the
question of the materiality or immateriality of the soul. In entering upon
this inquiry, which is obviously too important to be altogether dispensed
with, it will be necessary, in the first place, to explain the meaning of
the leading terms. The words MATERIAL and IMMATERIAL are relative, being
founded on the observation of the presence or of the absence of certain
qualities.-Why do we call a piece of wood, or of iron, material. It is
because we notice in them certain qualities, such as extension,
divisibility, impenetrability, and colour. And, in whatever other bodies
we observe the presence of these qualities, we there apply the term. The
term IMMATERIAL, therefore, by the established use of the language and its
own nature, it being in its etymology the opposite of the other, can be
applied only in those cases where these qualities are not found. Hence we
assert the mind to be immaterial, because, in all our knowledge of it, we
have noticed an utter absence (or, perhaps, more properly, have always
failed to detect the presence) of those qualities which are acknowledged
to be the ground of the application of the opposite epithet. The soul
undoubtedly has its qualities or properties, but not those which have been
spoken of. Whatever we have been conscious of, and have observed within
us, our thought, our feeling, remembrance, and passion, are evidently and
utterly diverse from what is understood to. be included under the term
materiality. Such is the origin of these two terms, and the ground of the distinction between them. And,
thus explained, they can hardly fail to be understood. We may, therefore,
now proceed to state the evidence of the actual existence of that
distinction between mind and matter which is obviously implied in every
application of them. In other words, we are to attempt to show that the
soul is not matter, and that thought and feeling are not the result of
material organization. ~ 15. Differerice between mind and matter shown
from language. Is it a fact that the being or existence called the SOUL is
distinct and different from that existence which we call MATTER?,-It is
not unusual, in writings on the philosophy of the mind, to refer to the
structure of languages in order to illustrate our mental nature; and, in
respect to the question now before us, we are warranted in saying, in the
first place, that Language, in general, is one proof of such distinction.
In the preceding section we have seen the use of certain terms in our own
language, and the grounds of it. All other languages, as well as our own,
have names and epithets distinctly expressive of the two existences in
question. This circumstance, when we consider that the dialects of men are
only their thoughts and feelings imbodied, as it were, may be regarded as
a decisive proof that the great body of mankind believe in both, and, of
course, believe in a' well-founded distinction between them. That such is
the belief of men generally, as clearly evinced by the structure of
languages and in various other ways, will not, probably, be denied. It is
a matter too evident to permit us to anticipate a denial. When, therefore,
we take into view that there are grounds of belief fixed deeply and
originally in our constitution, and that, in their general operation, they
must be expected to lead to truth and not to error, we are runable to
harbour the supposition, that men are deceived and led astray in this
opinion; that they so generally and almost universally believe in the
existence of wlat, in point of fact, does not exist.
16. Their different nature shown by their respective
properties. Again, the distinction between mind and matter is shown by the
difference in the qualities and properties which men agree in ascribing to
them respectively.-The properties of matter are extension, hardness,
figure, solidity, divisibility, and the like. The attributes of mind are
thought, feeling, volition, reasoning, the passions. The phenomena
exhibited by matter and mind are not only different in their own nature,
but are addressed, considered as objects of perception, to different parts
of our constitution. We obtain a knowledge of material properties, so far
as it is direct and immediate, by means of the senses; but all our direct
knowledge of the nature of the mental phenomena is acquired by
consciousness. Every one knows that the phenomena in question are not
identical. There is no sameness or similitude, for instance, in what we
express by the terms hardness and desire, solidity and hatred,
divisibility and belief, extension and imagination. But let us look more
at particulars. All matter is divisible. The smallest particle has its top
and bottom, its right and left side, and may be regarded as susceptible of
measurement. But what does consciousness testify in regard to the mental
phenomena? Does it give us the least intimation that they are mechanically
divisible2 Is any man ever conscious of a half, quarter, or third of a
hope, joy, or sorrow, actually cut asunder and set off from the remaining
half, two thirds, or three quarters of such hope, joy, or sorrow? It is
not only true that no one has had such experience, but no one ever
conceives such experience possible. And as to extension, are we ever
conscious of a thought, feeling, or volition as having length and breadth;
as being, for instance, an inch in length and half an inch in breadth?
There is'nothing of the kind. Consciousness never gave, and it is not too
much to say that it never will give, any such information. The properties
or attributes of matter and mind, therefore, are entirely different. And
as all persons hold it to be nnphilosophical to ascribe attributes so different to the same
subject, we conclude the subjects of them are not the same. And
accordingly, we call the subject of one class of phenomena Mind, and, that
of the other Matter. ~ 17. The soul's immateriality indicated by the
feeling of identity. There is another somewhat striking consideration
which may aid in evincing the immateriality of the soul. It is well known
that the materials of which the human body is composed are constantly
changing. The whole bodily system repeatedly undergoes, in thle course of
the ordinary term of man's life, a complete renovation; and yet we
possess, during the whole of this period, and amid these utter changes of
the bodily part, a consciousness of the permanency as well as of the unity
of the mlind. "This fact," remarks Mr. Stewart, "is surely not a little
favourable to the supposition of mind being a principle essentially
distinct from matter, and capable of existing when its connexion with the
body is dissolved." Truly, if the soul, like the body, were made up of
particles of matter, and the particles were in this case, as in the other,
always changing, we should be continually roving, as an old writer
expresses it, and sliding away from ourselves, and should soon forget what
we once were. The new soul, that entered into the same place, would not
necessarily enter into the possession of the feelings, consciousness, and
knowledge of that which had gone. And hence we rightly infer, from an
identity in these respects, the identity or continued existence of the
subject to which such feelings, consciousness, and knowledge belong. And
as there is not a like identity or continued existence of the material
part, we may infer, again, that the soul is distinct from matter. ~ 18.
The material doctrine makes man a machine. The doctrine that thought is
the result of material organization, and that the soul is not distinct
from the body, is liable, also, to this no small objection: that it makes the soul truly and literally a machine. If what we
term mind be in truth matter, it is, of course, under the same influences
as matter. But matter, in all its movements and combinations, is known to
be subject to a strict and inflexible direction, the origin of which
direction is exterior to itself. The material universe is truly an
automaton, experiencing through all time the same series of motions, in
obedience to some high and authoritative intelligence; and is so entirely
subject to fixed laws, that we can express in mathematical formulas not
only the state of large bodies, but of a drop of water or of a ray of
light; estimating minutely extension and quantity, force, velocity, and
resistance. It is not thus with the hmman mind. That the mind has its laws
is true; but it knows what those laws are; whereas matter does not. This
makes a great difference. Matter yields a blind and unconscious obedience;
but the mind is able to exercise a foresight; to place itself in new
situations; to subject itself to new influences; to surround itself with
new motives, and thus control, in a measure, its own laws. In a word, mind
is free; we have the best evidence of it, that of our own consciousness.
But matter, as we learn from all our observations of it, may justly be
characterized as a slave. It does not turn to the right or left; it does
not do this or that, as it chooses; it possesses no self-determining and
self-moving element; but, the subject of an overpowering allotment, it is
borne onward to the appointed mark by an inflexible destiny.-If these
views be correct, we see here a new reason for not confounding and
identifying these two existences. ~ 19. Nlo exact correspondence between
the mental and bodily state. The train of thought in the last section
naturally leads us to remark further, that there is an absence of that
precise correspondence between the mental and bodily state which would
evidently follow from the admission of materialism. Those who make thought
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IMMATERIIALITY OF THE MIND. 37 and feeling the result of material
organization, commonly locate that organization in the brain. It is there
the great. mental exercises, in the phraseology of materialists, are
secreted, or are developed, or are brought out in some other mysterious
way, by means of a purely physical combination and action. Hence, such is
the fixed and unalterable nature of matter and its results, if the brain
be destroyed, the soul must be destroyed also; if the brain be injured,
the soul is proportionally injured; if the material action be disturbed,
there must be an exactly corresponding disturbance of the mental action.
The state of the mind, on a fair interpretation of this doctrine, is not
less dependent on that of the body than the complicated motions of the
planetary system are on the law of gravitation. But this view, whether we
assign the residence of the soul to the brain or to any other part of the
bodily system, does not appear to be accordant with fact. It is not only
far from being approved and borne out, but it is, directly contradicted by
wellattested experience in a multitude of cases. ~ 20. Evidence of this
want of exact correspondence. WVo are desirous not to be misapprehended
here. We readily grant that the mind, in our present state of existence,
has a connexion with the physical system, and particularly with the brain.
It is, moreover, obviously a natural consequence of this, that, when the
body is injured, the mental power and action are in some degree affected;
and this we find to be agreeable to the facts that come within our
observation. But it is to be particularly noticed, that the results are
just such as might be expected from a mere connexion of being; and are
evidently not such as might be anticipated from an identity of being. In
the latter case, the material part could never be affected, whether for
good or evil, without a result precisely corresponding in the mind. But,
in point of fact, this is not the case. The body is not unfrequently
injured when the mind is not so; and, on the
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38 I1NTRODUCTION. other hand, the soul seems to be almost entirely
prostrated when the body is in a sound and active state. How many persons
have been mutilated in battle, in every possible way short of an utter
destruction of animal life, and yet have discovered at such times a more
than common greatness of mental power! How often, when the body is not
only partially weakened, but is resolving, at the hour of death, into its
original elements, and possesses not a single capability entire, the mind,
remaining in undiminished strength, puts forth the energy and beauty of
past days! We are now speaking of injuries to our corporeal part, and of
bodily debility in general; but if we look to the brain in particular,
which is more intimately connected with the mental action than any other
part of the bodily system, we shall find ourselves fully warranted in an
extension of these views there. According to the system of the
materialists, the soul does not merely exist and act in connexion with the
body, but is identical with it. And not only this, they go further, and
locate this identity in the brain, ialking the soul and the brain not
merely connected together, but identically the same thing. But the
objection to their views, which, in its general form, has already been
made, exists here in full strength. If that organization, which they hold
to result in thought and feeling, be identical with the brain, it must be
diffused through the whole of that organ, or limited to some particular
part. But it appears, from an extensive collection of well-a-uthenticated
facts, that every part of the brain has been injured, and almost every
part absolutely removed, but without permanently affecting the mental
powers, which is absolutely impossible if there be an identity of the two
things. " Every part of that structure," says Dr. Ferriar, in a' learned
Memoir, "has been deeply injured or totally destroyed, without impeding or
changing any part of the process of thought." He remarks again, after
bringing forward a considerable number of wellauthenticated facts, as
follows: "On reviewing the
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IMMATERIALITY OF THE MIND. 39 whole of this evidence, I am disposed to
conclude, that, as no part of the brain appears essentially necessary to
the existence of the intellectual faculties, and as the whole of its
visible structure has been materially changed without affecting the
exercise of those faculties, something more than the discernible
organization must be requisite to produce the phenomena of tlhinkilng.'" ~
21. Comparative state of the mind and body il dreaming. The views of the
two preceding sections receive some confirmation from the comparative
state of the mind and body in dreaming.-In sound sleep, the senses sink
into a state of utter and unconscious sluggishness; the inlet to
everything external, as far as we can judge, is shut up; the muscles
become powerless, and everything in the body has the appearance of death.
It is true, the soul appears, for tilhe most part, to be fallen into a
like state of imbecility; but this is not the case in its dreams, which
are known-to take up no small portion of the hours of sleep. At such times
it does not appear to stand in need of the same repose with the body;
otherwise it would seek and possess it. On the contrary, when the powers
of the body are utterly suspended, the soul is often exceedingly on the
alert; it rapidly passes from subject to subject, attended sometimes with
sad and sometimes with raised and joyful affections. But this is not all:
often, in the hours of sleep, the intellect exhibits an increased
invention, a quickened and more exalted energy in all its powers. Many
writers have remarked, that the conclusions of abstruse investigations
have been suggested to them at such times. Not a few would conclude
themselves persons of genius, if they could pronounce the arguments and
the harangues in the awakened soberness of the morning, which they had
framed in the visions of the night. Does not this state of things seem to
indicate that there is a natural and fundamental clis* Memoirs of the
Manchester Philos. Society, vol. iv.
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40 INTRODUCTION. tinction between the mental and the material part of
mail? ~ 22. The great works of genius an evidence of immateriality. Now
let ns look at what mind, in man's awakened moments, is able to
accomplish, and see if the results of its action, in its higher and nobler
exercises, are such as we commonly expect from or ascribe to matter.-Look
first at the kindred powers of memory and imagination. I am at this moment
sitting in my chair, with a book and paper before me, and a pen in my
hand. But my memory is aroused, my imagination takes wing, and my soul
suddenly finds itself (at least considered in reference to its operations)
in a far-distant place. I see distinctly before me the trees which shaded
me, and the hills where I wandered in my childhood. The same waters flow
before me, the same bright smu shines in the heavens; I see around me a
multitude of familiar faces, and embrace, with all the vividness of early
affections, my old companions. In this excursion of the soul, how many
recollections have been revived! HIow many feelings have been restored!
What pictures of natural and social beauty have been presented to the
intellectual sight! But do we commonly, or can we, with any show of
reason, ascribe this wonderful power, wlich transfers us in a moment to
the distant and the past, to a mere mass of matter? I think not. Look,
again, at the powers of judgment and reasoning, and of imagination in its
greater and more permanent efforts. In doing this, we are to keep in mind
that those thlings which cannot be known directly and in their own
essence, are known for the most part simply by their results. And in
accordance with this view, which leads us to look from results to causes,
I ask myself, What was it that originated and perfected the demonstrations
of Euclid? Where was the authorship of the political institutions of Solon
and Lycurgus, of modern England and France, and of that still greater
effort of political wisdom, the Amnerican
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IMMATERIALITY OF THE MIND. 41 Constitution? What was it that infused the
breath of immortality into the Iliad and Odyssey? What was it that gave
birth to the wonderful inventions and combinations of the Jerusalem
Delivered, the Fairy Queen, and the Paradise Lost? Where shall we look for
the origin of the Philippics of the Ancients, or, in later times, of the
speeches of Fox and of the orations of Bossuet? In these, and in all other
cases where human genius has achieved its higher triumphs, we submit it to
any one to say, whether manldkind generally would be likely to ascribe
their origin to a mere lump of matter When men cast their eyes upon a
piece of matter, they look simply for material herbage and flower, leaves
and fruit; for something which is addressed, and addressed exclusively, to
the taste and touch, the sight and smell; and not for political axioms and
mathematical demonstrations, for flights of fancy and flashes of
eloquence. We venture to assert, that the man who gives himself up to the
influence of the vast conceptions imbodied in the works and institutions
of human genius, will find it as difficult to attribute them to a purely
material cause, as it is to adopt the theory of the atheist, and ascribe
the beautiful and complicated machinery of the universe to a fortuitous
concurrence of atoms. ~ 23. The doctrine of materiality inconsistent with
future existence. With the subject of the immaterial nature of the soul,
that of its immortality is closely connected. It is ttue, the immortal
existence of the soul does not follow with absolute certainty from the
mere fact of its immateriality; but it is, at least, rendered in some
degree probable. Certainly we have no direct evidence of the
discontinuance of the soul's existence at death as we have of that of the
body. What takes place at death is only a removal of the soul's action
from our notice, but not, as far as we know, a cessation and utter
extinction of it. The supposition, therefore, is a reasonable one, that
the soul will continue
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42 INTRODUCTION. to exist, merely because it exists at present, inasmuch
as its immaterial nature does not require the suspension of its existence
at death, and as we have no direct evidence of such an event.-Death, in
the language of Mir. Stewart, onlylifts up the veil which conceals from
our eyes the invisible world. It annihilates the material universe to our
senses, and prepares our minds for some new and unknown state of beirig.
But the opposite doctrine, that which asserts the materiality of the soul,
so far from furnishing a presumption in favor of our future existence,
seems to render immortality impossible. Those, who hold that thought and
feeling are in some way the direct and positive result of material
organization, are understood to admit that the soul (or, rather, what they
speak of as the soul) dies with the body; and certainly they would be very
inconsistent with themselves if they did not do so. Where, then, is that
immortality, of which the light of nature as well as Revelation assures us
2We are aware of what the materialist will say here. We understand him to
assert that a new soul will be created after deatlh, either at the final
resurrection or at some antecedent period, which will take the place in
all respects of the old one which perished with the body. But there is an
insuperable difficulty here. It is inconceivable (we assert it with entire
confidence) that a soul, created subsequently in time, should be conscious
of, or, rather, should recognise, mental operations and affections as its
own, which operations and affections pertained, in point of fact, to
another soul. Such a case would constitute an originctionz rather than a
continuance of existence; it would not be our immortality, but that of
another; the chain connecting the present with the future would be broken;
and we, w.ho are destined, on the system of materialism, to perish with
the body, could not by any possibility participate in that future
existence which is raised up to take the place. of the present. Would
there be any propriety or justice in bringing such new-created soul before
the judgment-seat of the Supreme Being in
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IMMATERIALITY OF THE MIND. 43 reference to crimes or to virtues which in
fact pertained to another soul! It is evident, since such a soul could not
be conscious of or recognise a previous existence, simply because such
existence had never taken place, it would not be a suitable object of
praise and blame, reward and punishment, in reference to deeds done in the
present life. So that it seems to be an inevitable conclusion, that the
souls which are destined to come under the Divine adjudication, in other
words whlich are made amenable to God's eternal law, which in its
principles is the same in the hflture life as the present, must
remainpernmanent, whatever may become of the body, until the fullness of
the final sentence shall be passed upon them. But if the soul is material
and dies with the body, then it is not permanent, and cannot be so. The
immateriality of the soul, therefore, on the supposition of the body's
being dissolved and destroyed at death, becomes the basis of its
immortality. If the doctrine of immateriality falls, then that of
immortality and of a future retribution falls with it. —All arguments,
therefore, which go to sustain the soul's immortality and its liability to
future judgment, indirectly support the doctrine of its immateriality. We
add nothing further, excepting the single remark, that the distinction
between the body and soul is either implied or asserted in various
passages of the Scriptures; as, for instance, when we are directed "not to
fear them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul."
CIHAPTER III. LAWVS OF BELIEF. ~ 24. Of belief, its degrees, and its
sources. MAN is so constituted that, under certain circumstances, he
naturally and necessarily believes, and has knowledge. As that state of
mind which we term BELIEF is simple, and, consequently, undefinable, we
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44 INTRODUCTION. have therefore a knowledge of it, not by verbal
definition, but wholly by our own internal reflection or consciousness.
Belief is always the same in kind or nature; but it admits of different
degrees. We ascertain the existence of these differences of strength,
which we express by various terms, such as presumption, probability, high
probability, and certainty, by means of that same internal consciousness
which assures us of the existence of the mere feeling itself. In the
chapter on Primary Truths, we had occasion to assert it as an indisputable
principle, that there are in inwen certain, originacl and authoritative
grounds of belief: This is an important doctrine in mental philosophy, and
one which is always to be kept in mind. It is perhaps proper, before we
proceed further, to state some of those original principles by which our
belief is thus naturally controlled. ~ 25. Of intuition, consciousness,
and the senses, as grounds of belief. The most marked and prominent of
those grounds or laws of belief, which are understood to be original and
ultimate in the mental constitution, are Suggestion or Intuition,
Consciousness, the Senses, Memory, Testimony, Relative Suggestion, and
Reasoning. I.-SUGGESTION or INTUITION. By means of this cognitive power we
have a knowledge of certain elementary notions, such as the abstract
conceptions of existence, mind, self-existence or self, personal identity,
succession, duration, space, unity, number, power, right, wrong, and some
others. All men possess these notions, all understand them; but if they
are asked in what way they come to a knowledge of them, they can only say
that, in virtue of the constitution of the mind itself, they are naturally
and necessarily suggested.-The mind is so constituted, that they naturally
and necessarily flow forth from it, and thus furnish the foundations of
belief and knowledge. II.-CoNscIoUSNssEs. By means of that internal
reflection which is denominated consciousness, we have a knowledge of our
mental states, of the various
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LAWS OF BELIEF. 45 perceptions, affections, and decisions of the mind. In
regard to all such objects of knowledge, we are obliged to rest,
ultimately, upon consciousness. The belief from this source is in the
highest degree authoritative and decisive. It is impossible for ns to
disbelieve that the mind experiences certain sensations, or puts forth
certain operations, whenever, in point of fact, that is the case; or to
believe them to be otherwise than they in fact are. III. -TiE SENSES. The
states of mind to which operations upon or affections of our senses give
rise, are also, by our very constitution, the occasions or grounds of
belief. By means of the senses, we have a knowledge, in particular, of the
external, material world; of trees, and fields, and waters; of the sounds
of the elements and the music of birds; of the sun, and moon, and stars,
and all the various and beautiful forms of the tangible and visible
creation. Men, prompted by the suggestions of their own mental nature,
universally rely upon the senses in respect to everything which comes
within their appropriate sphere. When one man states to another a report
of what has happened at some time, the hearer yields to him a greater or
less degree of credence, according to the circumstances. But if the
narrator asserts that he saw or heard it with his own eyes or ears, that
the affair actually camne under the cognizance of his own senses,
everybody deems such a statement satisfactory.: What better evidence, they
say, than that of his senses! ~ 26. Memory and Testimony considered as
sources of belief. IV.-Another original ground or law of belief is the
Memory. So far as we are confident, or, rather, have no particular reason
to doubt, that the original sensations and perceptions in any given case
are correctly reported in the remembrance, the latter controls our belief
and actions not less than those antecedent states of mind on which it is
founded. " The eviden6e of memory," says Dr. Beattie, " commands
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46 ILNTRODUCTION. our belief as effectually as the evidence of sense. I
cannot possibly doubt, with regard to any of my transactions of yesterday
which I now remember, whether I performed them or not. That I dined
to-day, and was in bed last night, is as certain to me as that I at
present see the colour of this paper. If we had no memory, knowledge and
experience would be impossible; and if we had any tendency to distrust our
memory, knowledge and experience would be of as little use in directing
our conduct and sentiments as our dreams now are. Sometimes we doubt
whether, in a particular case, we exert memory or imagination; and our
belief is suspended accordingly: but no sooner do we become conscious that
we eenegnbee, than conviction instantly takes place; we say, I am certain
it was so, for I now remember I was an eye-witness."* There remains,
however, another inquiry: What is the origin of this confident reliance?
And the reply here is, as in many other cases, It is our nature, our
mental constitution; the will and ordinance of the Being who created us.
Whatever may be said on the subject, there must be, and there are, certain
original grounds, certain fundamental laws of belief, wlhich, in every
analysis of our knowledge, are fixed and permanent boundaries, beyond
which we cannot proceed. And reliance on memory is one of them. V. —HUAN
TESTIMONY. By this is commonly meant the report of men concerning what has
fallen under their personal observation. And this forms another ground of
belief. As to the fact that men readily receive the testimony of their
fellow-beings, and that such testimony influences their belief and
conduct, it cannot be denied. They thus universally yield credence to the
statements of each other, unless something comes to their knowledge
unfavourable to the credibility of the narrator, because it is natural or
constitutional to do so. In other words, the very nature of our mental
constitution, independently of the suggestions of reason and experience,
leads us to be* Beattie's Essay on Truth, pt. i., ch. ii., ~ 4,
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LAWS OF BELIEF. 47 lieve what men assert. We are so constituted, that the
very first sound of the human voice which reaches us calls into action a
disposition on our part to admit the truth of whatever intelligence it
conveys.-In support of this view (which, it may be remarked, has in its
favour the weighty names of Reid and Campbell among others), reference may
properly be made to what we observe in children. In the earliest period of
life, as soon as the first gleams of intelligence are visible, they look
with hope and fondness to those who support them; there seems to be no
doubt, no suspicion, no want of confidence. This strong reliance discovers
itself from time to time, as they advance towards youth; and, in the whole
of the early part of our existence, is so distinct, strong, and operative,
that men have given to it a specific name, in order to distinguish it from
the more chastened credence of riper years. We speak of the caution and
the convictions of manhood, and of the simplicity and CREDULITY of
children. ~ 27. Objection to reliance on testimony. It may be objected to
the doctrine of reliance on human testimony, that we are liable to be led
into mistakes by the statements of our fellow-men. This objection merits
some attention; and the answer to it may be summed up in two
particulars.-FIRST. The proportion of cases of deception, compared with
those where we are not deceived, is very small. We admit that we may be
disappointed and deceived sometimes, but not often, in comparison with the
whole number of cases where we place reliance. Men are naturally disposed
to speak the truth; it is much easier than to speak what is not true, for
truth is at hand; but the practice of prevarication and misstatement
requires labour and invention —besides jarring violently upon every
honourable sentiment within us. So capable is this view of being
sustained, that even those men who have brought upon themselves the infamy
of being considered liars, probably utter the truth a hundred
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48 INTRODUCTION. times where they utter a falsehood once.-SEcoND.
Admitting that we are liable to be led astray by means of testimony, still
it is in our power, and is our duty, to take suitable precautions against
this liability.We are by no means required to place implicit confidence in
it, without a regard to the circumstances under which it is given, and the
character and opportunities of the person who gives it. Every one knows
that there are in himself tendencies and principles which, in certain
circumstances, may be brought in conflict with the more ennobling
principle of truth; and that he is liable to error, even when he supposes
himself to be seeking the truth, from the mere want of labour and care.
And we may make use of this experience in judging of the testimony of
others, since we may reasonably suspect in them the existence of similar
tendencies and similar want of circumspection. It is therefore consistent
with any suitable degree of reliance on testimony to satisfy ourselves
whether the person who testifies possessed ample means of information;
whether he made use of those means; and whether, in giving testimony, he
may not be under the influence of interest or passion. ~ 28. Of judgment
or relative suggestion as a ground of belief. VI.-Another ground or law of
belief, of such a nature as to be entitled to a distinct consideration, is
RELATIVE SUGGESTION. By this phrase is expressed the power or
susceptibility, by means of which we perceive the relations of objects. It
is also called the JUDGMENT. What RELATIONS themselves are, it is
unnecessary to attempt to define; no mere form of words can render the
conception of them clearer to any person's comprehension than it is
already supposed to be. All that needs be asserted is the mere fact, that,
when the mind contelmplates two or more objects, we naturally put forth
other perceptions or feelings; we cannot avoid doing it. For instance, we
feel or p1erceive such objects to be the same or different, like or
unlike, equal or unequal, cause or effect, whole or part, attribute or
subject, &c.
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LAWS OF BELIEF. 49 These new feelings, as well as the direct perceptions
of the objects to which they relate, are occasions of belief. We not only
believe the existence of the feelings or mental states themselves, but
find ourselves unable to resist and exclude -the belief of the actual
existence and truth of that to which they correspond, viz., relations. The
relations of things, it is true, are not objects directly addressed to the
external senses; and as we cannot directly see them, nor hear them, nor
feel them, they seem comparatively obscure. And yet we are so constituted,
that the cognizance of them is utterly inseparable from a knowledge of
those objects in respect to which they exist. If they are'not perceivable
by the outward senses, they are nevertheless perceivable by the mind, and
are undoubtedly, in some important sense, real subjects of contemplation
and knowledge.-Accordingly, RELATIVE SUGGESTION, the name of the
susceptibility by means of which we become acquainted with relations, is
properly regarded a LAWV OF BELIEF. ~ 29. Of reasoning as a ground or law
of belief. VII.-All REASONING, both Moral and Demonstrative, and in
whatever form it exists, is also an original foundation of belief.
Relative suggestion and reasoning, or in other words judgment and
ratiocination, are closely connected together, since every train of
reasoning implies and involves a series of felt or perceived relations.
Perceptions of relation may be regarded as the links which bind together
such separate perceptions, facts, or truths, as come within the range of
the subject reasoned upon, and without which they would inevitably remain
in their original state of insulated and unavailable propositions. Truth
is added to truth, feeling arises successive to feeling, until we arrive
at the conclusion which invariably fixes our belief. When, however, we
assert, that the conclusions deduced from a process of reasoning
invariably influence our belief, we should particularly keep in mind I.-C
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50 INTRODUCTION. here that belief may exist in very various degrees. When
the successive feelings which we have in a train of reasoning are all
intuitive, and the propositions with which we commenced were certain, or
were assumed as such, belief is, of course, of the highest kind. And this
is always the case in demonstrations; for there we always begin with
either known or assumed truths; and as the propositions compared together
are entirely abstract, there seems to be no room for doubt or mistake. But
in moral reasoning, although the mental process is the same, the
conclusion is not necessarily true; the propositions contemplated are in
general of a different character fromnwhat we find in demonstrative
reasoning; and the conclusion will vary from mere presumption to absolute
certainty, according to the nature of the facts laid before the mind. But
is it a fact, that Reasoning necessarily controls our convictions in any
case? What evidence is there that our belief, in a greater or less degree,
is naturally dependent on its conclusions -If we can suppose such a
question to be seriously put, a prompt and satisfactory answer is to be
found in the general and in individual experience. No man has it in his
power to refuse obedience to; the decisions of reasoning; nor does he ever
do it, except from an inability to embrace at once, and to balance the
successive steps of the process. So far as he fully tmderstands the
elementary parts which enter into a just train of reasoning, and can
estimate the relative bearing of one part on another, just so far his
belief is naturally and necessarily affected. It will naturally suggest
itself, that the statements of this chapter are merely preparatory, and
are not by any means to be accepted as full and exhaustive statements of
the great cognitive powers and sources of knowledge, which are thus
briefly and imperfectly described. They will be more fully considered when
coming up again for examination in their appropriate place.
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GENERAL CLASSIFICATION. 51 CtIAPTER IV. GENERAL CLASSIFICATION. ~ 30. The
mind may be regarded in a threefold point of view. IT is undoubtedly true,
that the human soul is to be regarded as constituting a nature which is
one and indivisible; but still there is abundant reason for asserting that
its nature can never be fully understood by contemplating it solely and
exclusively under one aspect. There are, accordingly, three prominent and
well-defined points of view in which the mind may be contemplated, viz.,
the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will; otherwise expressed by the
phrases INTELLECTUAL, SENTIMIENTIVE 01r SENTIENT, and VOLITIONAL states of
the mind. W~hatever truly and appropriately belongs to the intellect, has
something peculiar and characteristic of it which shuts it out from the
domain of the sensibilities; and whatever has the nature of a volition,
has a position apart both from the intellectual and the sentient. This is
a fundamental arrangement, which, when properly and fully carried out and
applied, includes the whole soul. To the one or the other of these general
heads, everything involved in our mental existence may be referred. In
fully exhausting, therefore, these topics, we may justly count upon having
completed the exploration of the mental constitution. ~ 31. Evidence of
the general arrangement from conscionsness. The general arrangement which
has been spoken of, ViZ., into the INTELLECTUAL, SENTIMENTIVE, and
voLITIONAL states of the mind, appears to be susceptible of abundant
illustration and proof. It is not our intention, however, to enter into
the discussion of its correctness at much length; but merely to indicate,
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52 INTRODUCTION. as briefly as possible, some of the grounds on which it
has been made; premising, at the same time, that the whole of this work,
while it is based in a good degree on this fundamental division, will be
found to furnish incidental evidence throughout of its truth. In proof of
the propriety of the general arrangement in question, we may refer, in the
first place, to Consciousness. In doing this we are, of course, obliged to
presume that the reader nnderstands what is meant by the term
consciousness; and that he assents to the truth, so readily and generally
acknowledged, that we have much of our knowledge of the mind by its aid.
Mental philosophers assure us that we are enabled, by means of
consciousness, to ascertain what thought and feeling are in themselves,
and to distinguish them from each other, And if we are not willing to
depend upon the information thus given us, if we reject its authority in
the hopes of finding something more certain, we shall only be involved in
greater difficulty; in the language of Condillac on this very subject, "
we stray from a point which we apprehend so clearly that it can never lead
us into error."'-' But if it be true that the existence and distinctive
character of the mental acts are made known, in a good degree at least, by
consciousness, and that we may justly and confidently rely on its
testimony, we naturally inquire, What does it teach in the p!resent case.
Aind, in answering this question, we may safely appeal to any person's
recollections, and ask, Whether he has ever been in danger of confounding
a mere perception, a mere thought, either with desires and emotions on the
one hand, or with volitions on the other a Does not his consciousness
assure him that the mental states, which we thus distinguish by these
different terms, are not identical; that the one class is not the other;
that they as actually differ from each other as association does from
belief, or imagination from memory? -It may be objected, however, that we
find ourselves perplexed and at a loss to explain, by any statement *
Origin of Knowledge, pt. i., ch. i.
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GENERAL CLASSIFICATION. 53 in words, the precise difference in this case,
whatever that difference may actually be. We readily admit the fact
implied in this objection, but without admitting that it has any weight as
proof against the distinction in question. No simple notion or feeling
whatever is susceptible of a definition, of an explanation by mere words
alone. And it cannot be expected of anything, whose own nature we cannot
explain by words, that we can fully explain by a mere verbal statement its
difference from other things. It would seem, therefore, that we may rest
in this inquiry upon men's consciousness; not of one merely, but of any
and all men. The understanding stands apart from the rest. The will also
has its separate and appropriate position. We may, at least, assert with
full confidence, that no one is in danger of confounding volitions with
intellections; that is to say, with the mere notions of the understanding.
On this point there is certainly a general agreement. And yet our
consciousness, if we will but attend to its intimations with proper care,
will probably teach us, that the nature of a volition more nearly
approaches that of a purely intellectual act than it does the distinctive
nature of emotions and desires. It is undoubtedly true, that volitions may
have aroused and excited antecedents, and may thus be very closely
connected with the various affections; but in themselves they are cold and
unimpassioned; they are purely executive or mandatory, and are as
obviously free from any actual impregnation of appetite, sentiment, or
desire, as the most abstract and callous exercises of the intellect. ~ 32.
Evidence of the same from terms found in different languages. We are
enabled further to throw some light on this subject fiom a consideration
of the terms which are found in various languages. Every language is, in
some important sense, a mirror of the mind. Something may be learned of
the tendency of the mental operations, not only from the form or structure
of language in general, but even from the import of partic
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54 INTROI)UCTION. ular terms. There can be no hesitation in saying that
every language has its distinct terms, expressive of the threefold view of
the mind under consideration,. and which are constantly used with a
distinct and appropriate meaning, and without being interchanged with each
other, as if they were synonymous. In other words, there are terms ill all
languages (meaning those, of course, which are spoken by nations somewhat
advanced in mental culture) which correspond to the English terms
INTELLECT, SENSIBILITIES, WILL. If such terms are generally found in
languages differing from each other in form and in meaning, it is
certainly a strong circnmstance in proof that the distinction which we
propose to establish actually exists. On the supposition of its having no
existence, it seems impossible to explain the fact that men should so
universally agree in making it. If, on the other hand, it does exist, it
is reasonable to suppose that it exists for some purpose; and, existing
for some purpose, it must, of course, become known; and, being known, it
is naturally expressed in language, the same as any other object of
knowledge. And this is what we find to be the case. So that we may
consider the expression to be an evidence of the fact; the sign, an
intimation and evidence of the reality of the thing signified. ~ 33.
Evidence from incidental remarks in writers. We now pass to other sources
of evidence on this subject. No small amount of knowledge, bearing upon
the capabilities and the character of the human mind, may be gathered from
the incidental remarks of writers of careful observation and good sense.
And accordingly, if we find remarks expressive of mental distinctions
repeatedly made by such men, when they are not formally and professedly
treating of the mind, it furnishes a strong presumption that such
distinctions actually exist. Their testimon y is given under circumstances
the most favourable to an unbiased opinion; and ought to be received into
the
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GENERAL CLASSIFIOATION. 55 vast amount of evidence, drawn from a great
variety of sources, which goes to illustrate the true nature Qf the soul.
The popular author of Literary Hours has given, in one of his Works, an
interesting biographical sketch of Sir Richard Steele. After remarking
upon the inconsistencies of his life, his excellent resolutions, and his
feeble performances, his successive seasons of riot and of repentance, he
refers the cause of these inconsistencies to the feebleness of the will;
and, in doing it, he incidentally, but very clearly, makes the distinction
under consideration. 1" His misfortune, the cause of all his errors, was
not to hlave clearly seen where his deficiencies lay; they were neither of
the head nor of the heeart, but of the yvoition. H-e possessed the wish,
but not the power of volition, to carry his purposes into execution.97* As
we are not at liberty to stippose that so respectable a writer employs
words without meaning, he must be regarded as intending to make the
distinction which has been asserted to exist. In Dr. Currie's well-written
Life of Burns, it is asserted that the force of that remarkable poet lay
in the powers of his understanding and the sensibilities of his heart. And
the writer not only thus clearly indicates the distinction between the
understanding or intellect and the heart, but in another passage, which
undoubtedly discloses the key to the poet's character and conduct, he
distinguishes both of them from the volitional power. The passage referred
to is this: "He knew his own failings; he predicted their con-, sequences;
the melancholy foreboding was not long absent from his mind; yet his
pacssions carried him down the stream of error, and swept him over the
precipice he saw directly in his course. The fatal defect in his character
lay in the.comnparative weakness of his volition, which, governing the
conduct according to the dictates of the understanding, alone entitles it
to be denominated rational."t * Drake's Essays illustrative of the
Tattler, Spectator, and Guardian, vol. i., p. 50. t Currie's Life of
Burns, Philadelphia ed., p. 62.
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56 INTRODUCTION. A recently-published Inquiry concerning the Indications
of Insanity, in which are various sketches of personal history and
character that illustrate certain traits of the mind, has the following
statement: "' Delinquents of this description are, perhaps, not unable to
distinguish between what is right and what is wrong; but their will is not
governed by their ndcer3standing, and they want the power of restraining
themselves from that which, when committed, they are afraid to reflect
upon. Their will remains; but it springs from depraved sensctions and
enzotions, or from _pcssions inordinate and unrestrained."* A celebrated
writer, in giving directions to his son as to the manner of conducting
negotiations with foreign ministers, makes use of the following language:
" If you engage his heart, you have a fair chance for imposing upon his
ucnderstanding and determining his will."t This writer, as well as many
others, employs the more common term heart to express the sensibilities;
and he evidently uses language as if there were a known and admitted
distinction between the intellectual, sentient, and voluntary parts of our
nature; since he speaks of the control or regulation of the understanding
as being, in the case under consideration, subsequent to the possession of
the heart, and the determination of the Nwill as subsequent to both, or,
at least, as not identical with them. In his Diary of private and personal
experiences, under date of Jan. 12th, 1723, President Edwards, in speaking
of the consecration which he felt it his duty to make of himself to God,
and of the self-renunciation consequent upon it, says: "I can challenge no
right in this uznderstcanding, this will, these ctfections, which are in
me." We might multiply. passages of this kind to almost any extent, if our
limits would permit it. And these passages, if the distinction for which
we contend does not exist, must obviously convey erroneous ideas. This *
Conolly's Inquiries concerning the Indications of Insanity, &c., Lond.
ed., p. 454. t Chesterfield, Lond. ed., vol. iii., p. 1.37.
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GENERAL CLASSIFICATION. 57 we cannot well suppose. On the contrary, we
have not the least doubt that they express a great and, important fact in
our mental constitution; a fact which is-at the basis of all true
philosophy of the mind. A single extract more from Shakspeare (Hamalet,
Act i., Sc. ii.) will close this class of evidences on this topic. "It
shows a will most incorrect to heaven, A heart unfortifiedAn understanding
simple and unschool'd." ~ 34. Further proof from various writers on the
mind. The distinction in question has also been fully recognized by
various distinguished writers on the mind. The following passage is to be
found in Mr. Locke: " Thus, by a due considercttion, and excczrininy any
good proposed, it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion
to the value of that good, whereby, in its turn and place, it may come to
work upon the will, and be pursued. For good, though appearing, and
allowed ever so great, yet, till it has raised desires in our minds, and
thereby made us uneasy in its want, it reaches not our wills."' Here the
threefold division in question is distinctly recognised. The due
consideration and examining which are spoken of, imply an act of the
intellect; the desires, which are subsequently raised, are appropriately
ascribed to the sensibilities; and these last are followed by an act of
the other part of our nature, viz., the will. Mr. tIume, in his
Dissertation on the Passions, has the following passage, which is clear
enough in its import without comment: "It seems, evident that reason, in a
strict sense, as meaning the judgment of truth and falsehood, can never,
of itself, be any motive to the will, and can have no influence but so far
as it touches some passion or afection." In the Essays on the Principles
of Morality and Natural Religion, ascribed to Lord Kames, is a passage as
follows: "He hath c.ppetites and pCtsions which prompt him to their
respective gratifications; * Essay on the Understanding, bk. ii., ch.
xxi., ~ 46. C2
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b 8 INTRODUCTION. but he is under no necessity of blindly submitting to
their impulse. For reason hath a power of restraint. It suggests motives
from the cool views of good and evil. He deliberates upon these. In
consequence of his deliberation, he chooseth; and here, if anywhere, lies
our liberty." Among writers more recent, who have insisted on this
distinction with much earnestness and clearness, we may mention Sir James
Macintosh. In some strictures on Dr. Price's Review of the Principal
Questions in Morals, he has occasion to make a remark, the substance of
which had been given before, and is repeated afterward, "that no
perception or judgment, or other unmixed act of the understancdina, merely
as such, and without. the agqncy of some intermediate emviotnio can affect
the will."* A writer of our own country, who has furnished some valuable
contributions to a knowledge of our mental structure, expresses himself
thus: "Why do not philosophers consider all the operations of the
understanding and the affections as constituting but one general class of
operations, and as belonging to one faculty? The reason is, they see no
similarity between intellectual perceptions and affectionS. A perception
is not a feeling either of pleasure or pain, nor a desire. And pleasure,
and pain, and desires, they clearly see, are not perceptions. Hence
classing them together would be improper, and create confusion. It would
be confounding things which differ, and destroying all those distinctions
which are necessary to the acquirement of scientific knowledge. For a
person has no more than a confused notion of things who does not make
distinctions where there are differences, or point out the difference
between one thing and another. As perceptions and affections generically
differ, philosophers have distinguished them, and formed them into
distinct classes; and so they have admitted the existence of two
faculties. And for the same reason they admit two, they ought to grant
there are * General View of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p. 157.
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GENERAL CLASSIFICATION. 59 three faculties. For, when we attend to the
affections and to volitions, it is evident there is a generic difference
between them. It is evident that pain, pleasure, and desires are not
volitions, and have no similarity to those voluntary exertions which
produce: effects on the body, and in other things around us. For these
affections do not immediately produce any external effects; they are
effects themselves produced by the heart, and are either virtuous or
vicious. For it has been shown, that vice and virtue belong to the heart
only, and its operations or affections. There is, therefore, no more
propriety in classing the affections and volitions together, than in
making but one class of the affections and perceptions. The affections and
volitions so widely differ, that they naturally divide themselves into two
distinct general classes.9"* It would be easy here, as in the case of
writers not professedly and formally treating of mental philosophy, to
multiply passages of the same import from numerous other inquirers into
the lmind, if it were thought necessary. The view thus taken by English
and American writers is sustained by judicious metaphysicians of other
countries, of which our limits will permit us to give only a single
passage as an instance. The writer, after some remarks on the origin of
the desires, hopes, acid fears, proceeds as follows: " Ces affections
internes sont ce que nous nommons sentimfens. Ils different des
sensations, en ce que les sensations ont leur source directement dans
l'ext6rieur, tandis que les sentimens sont produits en nous seulement A
l'occasion de l'exterieur, soit qu'il nous affecte actuellement, soit
ql'fil nous ait pr6c6demment affectes. Ils resemblent aux sensations, en
ce que, comme elles, ils sores independans de notre volont8, et non
suLsceptibles d'6tre produits ou emp6ches par nous. Qui pent, en effet,
desirer, esqperer, crcaindre d volont~?"t * Burton's Essays on
Metaphysics, Ethics, and Theology, p. 92. t De La Libert6 et de ses
Differens Modes, par Augustin-Franiois Thery.
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60 INTRODUCTION. ~ 35. Classification of the intellectual states of the
mind. For the reasons which have been given, we find ourselves authorized,
in the first place, in arranging the states, exercises, or acts of the
mind (for these terms, the most general we can employ, will apply to all
of these classes), under the three general heads of Intellectual,
Sentimentive or Sentient, and Volitional. Our intellectual states of:
mind, together with their corresponding susceptibilities or powers, will
first come under consideration. On looking attentively, however, at the
intellectual part of our nature, we readily discover that the results
which are to be attributed to it are susceptible of a subordinate
classifih cation, viz., into INTELLECTUAL or INTELLECTIVE STATES of
External, and those of Internal origin. It is presumed, that, on a little
examination, this distinction will be sufficiently obvious. If the mind
were insulated and cut off from the outward world, or if there were no
such outward world, could we feel, or see, or hear? - All those mental
affections which we express when we speak of the diversities of taste and
touch, of sound and sight, are utterly dependent on the existence and
presence of something which is exterior to the intellect itself. But this
cannot be said of what is expressed by the words truth, falsehood,
opinion, intelligence, cause, obligation, effect, and numerous creations
of the intellect of a like kind. It is worthy of remark, that the
subordinate classification which is now proposed to be made did not
escape, in its essential characteristics, the notice of very ancient
writers. We have the authority of Cudworth,that those intellectual states
which have an internal origin, bore among the Greeks the name of NOEMATA,
tho7ughts or intellections; while those of external origin were called
AISTHIEMATA, sensations. Although this classification, the grounds of
which cannot fail readily to present themselves, has been recognised and
sanctioned, in some form or other, by numerous writers on the human mind,
it is probable that some fu* Cudworth's Immutable Morality, bk. iv., ch.
i.
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GENERAL CLASSIFICATION. 61 ture opportunity will be found more fully to
explain and defend it; the objections which have sometimes been made will
not be overlooked; and it will readily be perceived, that we shall be
better prepared for this proposed explanation, after having considered the
relation which the mind sustains to the external world by means of the
senses, and analyzed the knowledge which has its origin in that source.
Such are the topics which we have thought it necessary to bring to the
reader's notice in these Introductory chapters. We do not see how they
could well have been omitted; and they could not have found a place in the
body of the work without producing some degree of confusion. With the
basis which is thus laid, and with that divine assistance which is
necessary to the success of all efforts, we proceed with increased hope
and confidence in the investigation of the numerous and diversified
problems which are involved in the analysis and history of the human mind.
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DIVISION FIRST. THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTANDING. INTELLECTIVE OR
INTELLECTUAL STATES OF THE MIND. PART FIRST. THE EXTERNAL OR SENSUOUS
INTELLECT. INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL OR SENSUOUS ORIGIN.
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CHAPTER I. ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. ~ 36. Connection of the mind
with the material world. TI-E human mind has a nature and principles of
its own; but, at the same time, it cannot properly be said that it is
entirely independent in its action; that is to say, it undoubtedly has a
connexion, more or less intimate and important, with other things. An
entire separation of the soul and its action from everything else is
merely a supposition, an hypothesis, which is not realized in our present
state of being. What the soul will be in a future state of existence, is,
of course, another inquiry. It is possible that it may be disburdened,
more than it is in this life, of connexions and dependencies, and will
possess more freedom and energy; but it seems to be our appropriate
business at present to examine it as we find it here. Confining our
attention, therefore, to what now is, we proceed to say, that in our
present existence Providence has obviously designed and established an
intimate connexion between the soul and the material world. We have a
witness of this in the mere fact of the existence of an external creation.
Was all this visible creation made for nothingS Are the flowers of the
garden and the wilderness formed merely to waste their sweetness on the
air? Are all those varieties of pleasing sound, that come forth from
animate and inanimate nature, uttered and breathed out in vain? Can we
permit ourselves to suppose, that the symmetry of form everywhere existing
in the outward world, the relations and aptitudes, the beauties of
proportion, and the decorations of colours, exist without any object? And
yet this must be so, if there be no connexion between the soul of man and
outward objects. What would be proportion, what would be colour, what
would be harmony of sound without the
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66 ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. soul, to which they are addressed, and
from which they are aclknowledged to derive their efficacy? Where there is
no soul, where there is a deprivation and want of the conscious spirit,
there is no sight, no hearing, no touch, no sense of beauty. Everything
around us, considered in its results, depends on the mind; the senses are
merely the medium of communication, the conditions and helps of the
perceptions, and not the perceptions themselves.-With such considerations
we justify what has been said, that Providence designed, and that it has
established an intimate connexion between the soul and the material world.
And there is another train of thought which leads to the same conclusion.
On any other supposition than the existence of such a connexion, we cannot
account for that nice and costly apparatus of the nerves and organs of
sense with which we are furnished. Although we behdld on every side
abundant marks of the Creator's goodness in forms and varieties of
existence without end, we may safely say he does nothing in vain. The
question, then, immediately recurs, What is the meaning of the expenditure
of the Divine goodness in the formation of the eye, in the windings and
ingenious construction of the ear, and in the diffusion of the sense of
touch?. We cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question, except on
the ground that there is a designed and established connexion between the
mind and the material world. If we admit the existence of this connexion,
everything is at once explained. ~ 37. Of the origin or beginnings of
knowledge. The Creator, therefore, established the relation between mind
and matter; and if we are correct in the statements which are to follow,
it will be found a striking and important fact, that, in this connexion of
the mental and material world, we are to look for the commencement of the
mind's activity, and for the beginnings of knowledge. The soul, considered
in its
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OIIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 67 relationship to external nature, may be
compared to a stringed instrument. Regarded in itself, it is an invisible
existence, having the capacity and elements of harmony. The nerves, the
eye, and the senses generally are the chords and artificial framework
which God has woven round its unseen and unsearchable essence. This living
and curious instrument, which was before voiceless and silent, sends forth
its sounds of harmony as soon as it is swept by outward infl-uences. ]But
this, it will be noticed, is a general statement; so general and
indefinite, perhaps, that it will be necessary to descend to some
particulars, which will more fully illustrate our meaning. We proceed,
therefore, to say specifically, that there are certain elementary notions,
which seem to be involved in, and inseparable from, our very existence,
such as self, identity, personality, and others. The supposition would be
highly unreasonable that we can exist for any length of time without
possessing them. It is certain that these notions are among the earliest
which men form; and yet cautious and judicious inquirers into the mind
have expressed the opinion, that even these do not arise except
subsequently to an impression on the organs of sense. Speaking of a being,
whom, for the sake of illustration, he supposed to be possessed of merely
the two senses of hearing and smelling, Mr. Stewart makes this remark:'"
Let us suppose, then, a particular sensation to be excited in the mind of
such a being. The moment this happens, he must necessarily acquire the
knowledge of two facts at once; that of the existence of the senatscion,
and that of his owen existence as a sentient being.'* This language
clearly implies, that the notions of existence and of person or self are
attendant upon, and subsequent to, an affection of the mind, caused by an
impression on the senses. In his Essays he still more clearly and
decisively advances the opinion, that the mind is originally brought into
* Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. i., ch. i.-See also ~ 5 of this Work.
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68 ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. action through the medium of the
senses, and that human knowledge has its origin in this way.-" All our
simple notions," he says (Essay iii.), "or, in other words, all the
primary elements of our knowledge, are either presented to the mind
immediately by the powers of consciousness and perception, or they are
gradnally unfolded in the exercise of the various faculties which
characterize the human understanding. According to this view of the
subject, the sum total of our knowledge may undoubtedly be said to
originate in sensation, inasmuch as it is by impressions- from without
that consciousness is first awakened, and the different faculties of the
understanding put in action."~ Perhaps this subject, however, will always
remain in some degree of doubt; and we have merely to say, that of the
various opinions which have been advanced in respect to it, we give the
preference to that which has been referred to, as supported by Stewart, De
Gerando, and other judicious writers, without any disposition to assert
its infallibility, and yet with the feeling that the preponderance of
arguments is greatly in its favor. The mind, therefore, appears at its
creation to be merely an existence, involving certain principles, and
endued with certain powers, but dependent for the first and original
developement of those principles and the exercise of those powers on the
condition of an outward impression. But then it is to be remembered, that
it is no sooner brought into action, than it finds new sources of thought
and feeling in itself. ~ 38. Our first knowledge in general of a material
or external origin. Our doctrine, then, is (affirmed with as much
assurance as is suitable in a case which perhaps can never be divested of
some degree of obscurity), FIRST, that there is an established and close
connection between * Views similar to those of Mr. Stewart are maintained
by De Gerando, in a Memoir entitled, De la Generation des Connoisances
Hzumamnes.
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ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 69 the mind and the material world; and,
SECOND, that it is by means of this connexion, and through the mediumship
and instrumentality of the senses, that the mind is first brought into
action. And in further illustration and support of these views, we proceed
now to some additional facts and arguments, which are entitled to a candid
consideration, and which we think can hardly fail to be assented to. What
has been said will, in the first place, be found agreeable to each one's
individual experience. If we look back to the early periods of life, we
discover not merely that our ideas are then comparatively few in number,
but that far the greater proportion of them are suggested by external
objects. They are forced upon us by our immediate wants; they have
relation to what we ourselves see, or hear, or touch; and only a small
proportion are internal and abstract. As we advance in years,
susceptibilities and powers of the mind are brought into exercise, which
have a less intimate connexion with things external; and thoughts from
within are more rapidly multiplied than front without. We have in some
measure exhausted that which is external; and as the mind, awakened to a
love of knowledge and a consciousness of its own powers, has at last been
brought fully into action by means of repeated affections of the senses, a
new world (as yet in some degree a TERRA INCOGNITA) projects itself upon
our attention, where we are called upon to push our researches and gratify
our curiosity.-This is the general experience, the testimony which each
one can give for himself. In the second place, what has been said finds
confirmation in what we observe of the progress of the mind in infants and
children generally. The course of things which we observe in them agrees
with what our personal consciousness and remembrance, as far back as it
goes, enables us to testify with no little confidence in our own case. 1No
one can observe the operations of the mind in infants and children,
without being led to believe that the Creator has instituted
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70 ORIGIN OF KNOWLFIDGE IN GENERAL. a connexion between the mind and the
material world, and that the greater portion of our early knowledge is
from an outward source. To the infant its nursery is the world. The first
ideas of the human race are its particular conceptions of its nurse and
mother; and the origin and history of all its notions may be traced to its
animal wants, to the light that breaks in from its window, and to the few
objects in the immediate neighbourhood of the cradle and hearth. When it
has become a few years of age, there are other sources of information,
other fountains of thought, but they are still external and material. The
child then learns the topography of his native village; he explores the
margin of its river, ascends its flowering hills, and penetrates the
seclusion of its valleys. His mind is full of activity; new and exalting
views crowd upon his perceptions; he beholds, and hears, and handles; he
wonders, and is delighted. And it is not till after he has grasped the
elements of knowledge, which the outward world gives, that he retires
within himself, compares, reasons, and seeks for causes and effects. It is
in accordance with what has now been stated of the tendencies of mind in
children, that we generally find them instructed by means of sensible
objects, or by pictures of such objects. When their teachers make an
abstract statement to them of an action or event, they do not understand
it; they listen to it with an appearance of confusion and vacancy, for the
process is undoubtedly against nature. But show them the objects
themselves, or a faithful picture of them, and interpret your abstract
expressions by a reference to the object or picture, and they are observed
to learn with rapidity and pleasure. The time has not yet arrived for the
springing up and growth of thoughts of an internal and abstract origin. ~
39. Further proof of the beginnings of knowledge from external causes. In
the third place, the history of language is a strong proof of the
correctness of the position, that
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ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 71 the mind is first brought into action
by means of the senses, and acquires its earliest knowledge from that
sonrce. At first words are few in numb er, corresponding to the limited
extent of ideas. The vocabulary of savage tribes (those, for example,
which inhabit the American continent) is, in general, exceedingly limited.
The growth of a language corresponds to the growth of mind; it extends
itself by the increased number and power of its words, nearly in exact
correspondence with the mnltiplication and the increased complexity of
thought. Now the history of all language teaches us, that words, which
were invented and brought into use one after another, in the gradual way
just mentioned, were first employed to express external objects, and
afterward were -used to express thoughts of an internal origin. Some
writer remarks, that among the Boschuanas of South Africa, who live in a
parched and arid country, the word rPULO, which literally signifies rai,,
is the only term they have to express a blessing or blessings. But there
may be blessings internal as well as external; goods and joys of the mind
as well as of the body; still, in the language of these Africans, it is
all crain; the blessings of hope, and peace, and friendship, and
submissiori, and all other modes of intellectual and sentient good, are
expressed by this one term, because in their first and external experience
it was employed as the name of an object of the highest external good.
There are multitudes of instances of this kind. Almost all the words ini
every language expressive of the susceptibilities and operations of the
mind, may be clearly shown to have had an external origin and application
before they were applied to the mind. Take certain terms in the English
language, which are of Latin derivation. To IMAGINE, in its literal
signification, implies the forming of a picture; to IMPRESS conveys the
idea of leaving a stamp or mark, as the seal leaves its exact likeness or
stamp on wax; to REFLECT literally means to turn back, to go over the
ground again. These words cannot be applied to the mind
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72 ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. in the literal sense; the nature of the
mind will not admit of such an application; the inference therefore is,
that they first had an external application. Now if it be an established
truth, that all language has a primary reference to external objects, and
that there is no term expressive of mental acts which was not originally
expressive of something material, the conclusion would seem to be a fair
one, that the part of our knowledge, which has its rise by means of the
senses, is, as a general statement, first in origin. And the more so, when
we combine with these views the considerations which have been previously
advanced. ~ 40. The same subject further illustrated. And, in the fourth
place, it is not too much to say, that all the observations which have
been made on persons who, from their birth, or at any subsequent period,
have been deprived of any of the senses, and all the extraordinary facts
which have come to our knowledge having a bearing on this inquiry, go
strongly in favour of the views which have been given.It appears, for
instance, from the observations whichl have been made in regard to persons
who have been deaf until a particular period, and then have been restored
to the power of hearing, that they never previously had those ideas whichl
naturally come in by that sense. If a person has been born blind, the
result is the same; or if having the sense of sight, it has so happened
that he has never seen any colours of a particular description. In the one
case he has no ideas of colours at all, and in the other only of those
colours which he has seen.-It may be said, perhaps, that this is what
might be expected, and merely proves the senses to be a source of
knowledge, without necessarily involving the priority of that knowledge to
what has an internal origin. But then observe the persons referred to a
little further, and it will be found, as a general statement, that the
powers of their minds have not been unfolded; they lay wrapped up, in a
great measure, in their original
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ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 73 darkness; no inward light springs up to
compensate for the absence of that which, in other cases, bursts in from
the outward world. This circumstance evidently tends to confirm the
principle we are endeavouring to illustrate. Of those extraordinary
instances to which we alluded as having thrown some light on the history
of our intellectual acquisitions, is the account which is given in the
Memoirs of the French Academy of Sciences for the year 1703, of a deaf and
dumb young man in the city of Chartres. At the age of threeand-twenty, it
so happened, to the great surprise of the whole town, that he was suddenly
restored to the sense of hearing, and in a short time he acquired the use
of language. Deprived for so long a period of a sense which in importance
ranks with the sight and the touch, unable to hold communion with his
fellowbeings by means of oral or written language, and not particularly
compelled, as he had every. care taken of him by his friends and
relations, to bring his faculties into exercise, the powers of his mind
remained without having opportunity to unfold themselves. Being examined
by some men of discernment, it was found that he had no idea of a God, of
a soul, of the moral merit or demerit of human actions; and what might
seem to be yet more remarkable, he knew not what it was to die; the
agonies of dissolution, the grief of friends, and the ceremonies of
interment being to him inexplicable mysteries. Here we see how much
knowledge a person was deprived of merely by his wanting the single sense
of hearing; a proof that the senses were designed by our Creator to be the
first source of knowledge, and that without them the faculties of the soul
would never become operative. ~ 41. Subject illustrated from the case of
James Mitchell. But the foregoing is lnot the only instance of this sort
which ingenious men have noticed and recorded. In the Transactions of the
Royal Society at EdinI. —D
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74 ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. burgh (vol. vii., pt. 1) is a Memoir
communicated by Dugald Stewart, which gives an account of James Mitchell,
a boy born deaf and blind. The history of this lad, who laboured under the
uncommon affliction of this double deprivation, illustrates and confirms
all that has been above stated. He made wliat use he could of the only
senses which he possessed, those of touch, taste, and smell, and gained
from them a number of ideas. It was a proof of the diligence with which he
employed the limited means which were given him, that he had, by the sense
of touch,'thoroughly explored the ground in the neighbourhood of the house
where he lived, for hundreds of yards. But deprived of sight, of hearing,
and of intercourse by speech, it was very evident to those who observed
him, as might be expected, that his knowledge was in amount exceedingly
small. I-Ie was destitute of those perceptions which are appropriate to
the particular senses of which he was deprived; and also of many other
notions of an internal origin, which would undoubtedly have arisen if the
powers of the mind had previously been rendered fully operative by means
of those assistances which it usually receives from the bodily
organs.-Such instances as these, however they may at first appear, are
extremely important. They furnish us with an appeal, not to mere
speculations, but to fact. And it is only by checking undue speculation,
and by recurring to facts, that our progress in this science will become
sure, rapid, and delightful.* ~ 42. Illustration from the case of Caspar
Hauser. There is a recent instance, perhaps more decisive than has ever
before occurred, and as melancholy as it is; deeply interesting. We refer
to the case of Caspar Hauser. I know that attempts have been made to throw
discredit upon the statements and the * The statements concerning the
young man of Chartres are particularly examined in Condillac's Essay on
the Origin of Knowledge, at Section fourth of Part first. The interesting
Memoir of Stewart has recently been republished in the third volume of his
Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind.
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ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GEENERAL. 75 history of this young man. But, after
much investigation, the facts have been so well established, that they may
properly be received as throwing important light on the history of the
human mind. It appears, from all that can be gathered on the subject, that
this unfortunate lad was from infancy confined in a low and small
apartment, which he sometimes called a cage. No light ever entered this
little prison. Till his release in the seventeenth year of his age, he
never saw the sky, nor the pleasant light of day, nor ever perceived any
difference between day and night. Whenever he awoke from sleep, which was
generally sound and at stated intervals, he found a loaf of bread and a
pitcher of water near him. Sometimes the water was mixed with opium or
some other intoxicating drug. Under the influence of this mixture, which
was occasionally given him, he was suddenly cast into a profound slumber;
and when he afterward awoke, he found that he had a clean shirt on, and
that his nails had been cut. He never saw the face of the man who changed
his clothing and brought him his food and drink. The only objects which he
had to amuse himself with were two wooden horses and several ribands.
These horses he believed to have a degree of life and sensibility. His
only occupation was to move them backward and forward by his side, and to
tie the ribands upon them in various positions. While in his little prison
he never heard a human voice, nor any other sound except what he himself
made in playing with his little wooden companions. Thus it was in a
solitude and inactivity little less than that of the grave, he spent his
infancy, childhood, and youth. But it is unnecessary to go into all the
particulars of this unfortunate young man's history. When he Was released
from his confinement in the year 1828, he was, as nearly as could be
ascertained from the structure and: developements of his body, about 17
years of age.-And what was the condition of his mind H lie had no
knowledge of language, excepting
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76 ORIGIN OF IKNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. a few words, to which he seems to have
attached scarcely any meaning. When he appeared, helpless and alone, in
the streets of Nuremberg, the common questions of the police officers were
put to him. What is your name? What is your business Whence came you? But
he had no perception of their import. He heard without understanding; he
saw without perceiving; the tears stood in his eye; unintelligible sounds
and sorrowful moans burst from his lips. I-e was entirely ignorant of all
the common objects and occurrences of nature, and of all the usual
customns and conveftiences of life. Like the blind boy couched by
Cheselden for the cataract, he was incapable of estimating the true
direction and distance of things. The objects which were presented to his
notice affected him as they do an infant or a little child. He
endeavoured, for instance, to lay hold of all bright and glittering
objects just as a child does; and when he could not reach them, or was
forbidden to touch them, he cried. He was attracted by the brightness of
an object; but he seemed incapable of distinguishing one object from
another. When objects were brought very near to him, he generally gazed at
them with a stupid look, which only in particular instances was expressive
of curiosity and astonishment. I-He could not distinguish animated things
from inanimate, but ascribed a degree of life to all. He had no ideas of
family, of relationship and friendship, and would often ask for an
explanation of what is meant by mother, brother, and sister. He had no
moral or religious ideas; and even the sentiments of modesty and shame, so
deeply implanted in the human breast and so easily called into action,
seem never to have been excited in his bosom. In a word, his mind was
essentially an unintelligent blank; and this merely because it had been
shut out from any connexion with the outward world of men and nature. No
basis had been laid for its operations; the power destined to bring it
into action had never touched it; it was like some desert place of earth,
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ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 77 where the sun never shone, and the
breeze never blew, and the rain never descended, that presents to the eye
of the beholder one unvaried surface of arid and withering desolation. ~
43. Of connatural or innate knowledge. The considerations of this chapter
naturally bring us upon th~e question of innate or connatural knowledge.
It was formerly maintained by certain writers, that there are in the minds
of men ideas and propositions which are not acquired or taught at any time
or in any way, but are coetaneous with the existence of the mind itself,
being wrought into, and inseparable from it. It was maintained that they
are limited to no one class, neither to the rich nor the poor, neither to
the learned nor the ignorant, to no clime and to no conmtry, but all
participate in them alike. They were supposed to be characterized by three
marks: FIRST, that they exist from the very beginning of the mind's
existence; SECOND, that they are entirely distinct in themselves, and are
the subjects of distinct consciousness from the time that they were called
into being; and, THIIRD, that, in being common to all men and all nations,
they are universal. These propositions and ideas, being thus coetaneous
with the existence of the soul, and being there established at the
commencement of its existence by the ordinance of the Deity, were further
regarded as the first principles of knowledge, and as the rules by which
men were to be guided in all their reasonings about natural and moral
objects. From these innate and original propositions, the following may be
selected as specimens of the whole: (1.) Of the natural kind. The whole is
greater than a part: Whatever is, is: It is impossible for the same thing
to be and not to be at the same time and in the same sense. —(2.) Of the
moral kind. Parents must be honoured: Injury must not be done: Contracts
should be fulfilled, and others of a moral nature.-(3.) Of the religious
kind. There is a God:
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78 ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAtL. God is to be worshipped: God will
approve virtue and punish vice. ~ 44. The doctrine of innate knowledge not
susceptible of proof. The prominent argument brought forward by the
supporters of the doctrine of innate knowledge was this, that all mankind,
without exception, and from the earliest period of our being able to form
an acquaintance with their minds, exhibit a knowledge of ideas and
propositions of this kind, and that this universal knowledge of them
cannot be accounted for, except on the ground of their being coetaneous
with the mind's existence, and originally implanted in it. Our answer is
briefly this. If we admit that all men are acquainted with them and assent
to them, this by no means proves them innate, so long as we can account
for this acquaintance and this assent in some other way. It is granted by
all that the mind exists, that it is capable of action, and that it
possesses the power or the ability of acquiring knowledge. If, therefore,
in the exercise of this ability, which all admit it to have, we canl come
to the knowledge of what are called innate or connatural ideas and
propositions, it is unnecessary to assign to them another origin, in
support of which no positive proof can be brought. But the truth is, that
it does not appear that all men are acquainted with the ideas and
propositions in question; and especially they do not exhibit such a
distinct acquaintance with them from the first dawn of their knowledge, as
would be the case if they were connatural in the mind. The supposed fact,
on which the argument in support of innate knowledge is founded, has the
appearance at least of being an assumption; it has never been confirmed by
candid and careful inquiry, which ought to be done before it is made use
of as proof; nor is it susceptible of such confirmation. ~ 45. The
doctrine tried by the idea of a God. Let us test the matter by a single
case. Every enumneration of innate propositions embraces the follow
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ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 79 ing, That all men have a notion of a
God; and undoubtedly, if there be any one which has a claim to
universality and early developement, it is this. JBut, in point of fact,
we know that all men are not acquainted with this notion; the testimony of
travellers among uncivilized nations has been given again and again, that
there is not such a universal acquaintance. It is true that all men have
in themselves the elements from which the idea may be formed; but, owing
to the peculiar circumstances of extreme depression and ignorance in which
they are sometimes placed, there are some individuals in whom it is not
developed; and perhaps whole tribes or classes of men, as some travellers
have stated, in whom the developement is so indistinct and weak as to be
hardly perceptible. There is also a class of unfortunate persons to be
found in civilized and Christian nations (we have reference to the deaf
and dumb, those in the situation of the young man at Chartres), who will
throw light on this subject, if men will but take the trouble to examine
those who have in no way received religious instruction. There is reason
to believe that, in many cases, they will be found utterly without a
knowledge of their Creator. We will give a single instance. iMassieu was
the son of a poor shepherd in the neighbourhood of Bordeaux. Destitute
from birth of the sense of hearing, and, as a natural consequence, of the
power of speech, he grew up, and knew barely enough to enable him to watch
his father's flocks in the fields. Although his capacity was afterward
fully proved to be of the most comprehensive and splendid character, as it
was not then drawn out and brought into action, he appeared in early life
to be but little above an idiot. In this situation he was taken under the
care of the benevolent Sicard, who was able, after great labour and
ingenuity, to quicken by degrees the slumbering power of thought into
developement and activity. Did his instructor suppose that Massieu was
acquainted with the notion of a God. —Far from it; he had abundant
evidence to the contrary; nor did he even
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8 0 ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. undertake to teach him that vast idea
for some time. Hle directed his attention at first to knowledge more
obvious and accessible in its origin; he led him, in perfect consistency
with what is required by the nature and laws of the mind, by easy steps
from one degree of knowledge to another, till he supposed him capable of
embracing the glorious conception of a First Cause. Then he contrived to
arouse his attention and anxiety; he introdnuced himn to a train of
thought which would naturally bring him to the desired result; he had
previously taught him the relation of cause and effect; and on this
occasion he showed him his watch, and, by signs, gave him to understand
that it implied a designer and maker; and the same of a picture, a piece
of statuary, a book, a building, and other objects indicative of design.
Then he held up before him a chain, showing him how one link was connected
with, and dependent on, another; in this way he introduced into the mind
of Massien the complex notion of the mutual dependence and concatenation
of causes. At last the full idea, the conception of a primary,
self-existent, and self-energetic cause, the notion of a God, came like
light from Heaven into his astonished and rejoicing soul. He trembled,
says his historian; he was deeply affected, prostrated himself, and gave
signs of reverence and adoration. And when he arose, he uttered by signs
also, for he had no other language, these beautiful words, which his
instructor declared he should never forget: Ah! let me go to my father, to
my mother, to my brothers, to tell them of a God; they know him not.* ~
46. The further discussion of this subject unnecessary. Such facts and
illustrations as have been given seem to settle this question. Our view,
then, is this: The cognitive faculties, or those faculties which have
relation to the origin of knowledge, may be regarded as INNATE; but the
knowledge which is the result of the * See the work of Sicard, entitled
Cours d'Instruction d'un SourdMuet de Naissance, chap. xxv.
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ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 81 exercise of such faculties (and this is
the case with all perceptions, all propositions, and all forms of
knowledge whatever) is to be regarded, not as innate, but as ACQUIRED. And
this view is consistent with the admission, that many of the ideas and
propositions which are regarded as innate, arise at an early period, are
nearly universal, and are of very great importance. The further discussion
of the subject here does not appear to be necessary. At the present time
there is, with but few exceptions, much unanimity in relation to it. But
those who wish to go more fully into a question which formerly attracted a
good deal of attention, will find a more minute examination of it in the
philosophical writings of Locke, Gassendi, and Leibnitz, and, more
recently, in the works of De Gerando. ~ 47. Concluding remarks on the rise
of.knowledge by means of the senses. Considering it, therefore, as
sufficiently settled that there is no innate or connatural knowledge,
whatever may be true of innate or connatural cognitive powers, we recur
with increased confidence to the principle laid down in the beginning of
this chapter, that the mind is first brought into action by the
intermediation of the senses, and that the beginnings and the greater part
of its earliest knowledge are from an external source. Let us suppose a
man entirely cut off from all outward material impressions, or, what is
the same thing, with his senses entirely closed. It is very obvious, and
the instances already brought forward clearly prove, that he would be
entirely deprived of that vast amount of knowledge which has an immediate
connexion with the senses. But this is not all; there are other ideas
whose connexion with the senses is less immediate, of which he would not
fail to be deprived, by being placed in the circumstances supposed. Even
if he should possess the idea of existence, and of himself as a thinking
and sentient being (although we cannot ( 2
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82 ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. well imagine how this should be,
independently of some impression on the senses), still we have no reason
to believe that he would know anything of space, of motion, of the place
of objects, of duration, of time. What could he know of time without a
knowledge of day and night, the: riing and setting sun, the changes of the
seasons, or some other of its measurements! What could.he know of motion
while utterly unable to form the idea of place! And what could he know of
place without the aid of the senses! And, under such circumstances, what
reasoning would he be capable of, further than to form the single
proposition, that his feelings, whatever they might be, belonged to
himself! And we might go further, and ask, What would he know of himself a
Look at the subject in whatever way we will, we must, I think, at last
come to the conclusion, that the connexion of the mind with the material
world by means of the senses is the basis of our early mental history, and
the only key that can satisfactorily unlock its explanation. This is the
beginning. We are far from saying or believing that it is the end. The
Sensational sources of knowledge come first; the Internal or
Super-sensational make their appearance afterward. If there are cognitions
or knowledges which come from below, there are others, which in their due
time and place will be found to come from above. The doctrine of outward
sources of knowledge does not exclude that of inward sources. And the
whole truth will be found in that broad and comprehensive Eclecticism,
which, while it discriminates between mind and matter, recognises the
claims and relations of both, and combines Sensationalism and
Intellectualism, the Sensuous and the Super-sensuous, in one conjoined and
harmonious system.
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POWER OF SENSATION. 83 CHAPTER II. THE POWER OF SENSATION. ~ 48. Sensation
a simple mental state originating in the senses. IN connection with the
general principles laid down in the Introductory chapters, and in the
chapter on the Origin of Knowledge, which prepare the way, in a nnmber of
important respects, for what is to follow, we are ready to proceed to the
investigation of the various mental powers and susceptibilities. And here
we make two very brief remarks. FIRST, it will be found, in the history of
the mind's development, that each power, each susceptibility, has its
appropriate place. And the examination of a power out of the right place
causes much perplexity; while the examination of it where it appropriately
belongs throws light upon it and upon the other powers with which it is
connected. Thus we cannot understand Perception without the antecedent
knowledge of Sensation; we cannot understand the Conceptive power without
the antecedent knowledge of that which perceives; the philosophical
analysis of the Reasoning power implies the knowledge of the power of
Memory, and so on. The examination of the powers in a reverse order,
placing Perception before Sensation, the Reasoning power before Memory,
and the power of Imagination before that which furnishes conceptive
states, or even a slight deviation from the true order of arrangement in
these and in other cases, produces more or less of perplexity and
confusion. A SECOND remark is, that man is not only a cognitive being, a
being made to acquire knowledge, but also an -esthetic or emotional, a
moral, and active being; and, therefore, that his powers, as we shall be
led to see, are very various in their character. And there are some
important powers, which it is difficult to class either as percep
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84 POWER OF SENSATION. tive or active, and which seem, in their position
and functions, to be chiefly auxiliary to the prompt and definite action
of others; such as the power of Habit and the power of Association. With
these remarks we are prepared to enter upon the analysis before us. In
proceeding with the examination of the External or Sensational intellect,
in distinction from the Internal or Supersensational intellect, the first
cognitive power which presents itself to our notice is Sensation. This
power is variously named Sensation, the Sensational power, and
Sensationality. Owing to the imperfection of language, the word SENSATION
sometimes means the mental power or faculty, and sometimes the result of
the exercise of that power. The power is one thing, the result of the
exercise of that power is another. But as we generally get the best idea
of the powers or susceptibilities of the mind from an examination of the
results to which they give rise, we shall proceed briefly to examine
sensation, the mental state, in distinction from the sensational or
sensuous power, with which it originates. It is generally understood that
sensation is a simple act or state of the mind, and, as a necessary result
of its simplicity, that it is unsusceptible of definition. As these
characteristics alone, however, would not separate it from many other
mental states, it has this peculiarity to distinguish it, that it is
immediactely szccessive to a chancge in some organ of sense, or, at least,
to a bodily change of some kind. But it is evident that, in respect to
numerous other feelings, this statement does not hold good. They are
immediately subsequent, not to bodily impressions, but to other states of
the soul itself. Hence it is, that while we speak of the sensations of
heat and cold, hardness, softness, and the like, we do not commonly apply
this term to joy and sorrow, hatred and love, and other emotions and
passions. ~ 49. All sensation is properly and truly in the mind. Sensation
is often regarded as something having a
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SENSATION OR SENSATIONALITY. 85 position, and as taking place in the body,
and particularly in the organ of sense. The sensation of touch, as we seem
to imagine, is in the hand, which is the organ of touch, and is not truly
internal; the hearing is in the ear, and the vision in the eye, and not in
the soul. But it will at once occur, that this supposition, however widely
and generally it may be made, is altogether at variance with those
essential notions which we have found it necessary to form of matter. If
the matter of the hand, of the eye, or ear, can have feeling in any degree
whatever, there is no difficulty in the supposition, that the matter of
the brain, or any other material substance, can put forth the exercises
and functions of thought. But, after what has been already said on the
subject of the mind's immateriality, this supposition is altogether
inadmissible. All we can say with truth and on good grounds is, that the
organs of sense are accessory to sensation and necessary to it, but the
sensation or feeling itself is wholly in the mind. How often it is said,
in the use of metaphorical language, that the eye sees; but the language,
expressive of the literal and real fact is, that the soul sees, for the
eye is only the organ, instrument, or minister of the soul in visual
perceptions. " A man," says Dr. Reid, " cannot see the satellites of
Jupiter but by a telescope. Does he conclude from this that it is the
telescope that sees those stars? By no means; such a conclusion would be
absurd. It is no less absurd to conclude that it is the eye that sees or
the ear that hears. The telescope is an artificial organ of sight, but it
sees not. The eye is a natural organ of sight by which we see; but the
natural organ sees as little as the artificial." Among other things
illustrative of the correctness of what has been said, there is this
consideration also. The opinion that sensation is in the organ or some
other material part, and not in the soul, is inconsistent with the
fundamental and indisputable doctrine of mental identity. " When I say I
see, I hear, I feel," says the same judicious author, " this implies that
it
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86 POWER OF SENSATION. is one and the same self that performs all these
operations. And as it would be absurd to say that my memory, another man's
imagination, and a third man's reason, may make one individual intelligent
being, it would be equally absurd to say that one piece of matter seeing,
another hearing, and a third feeling, may make one and the same percipient
being. And again, it would not be out of place to illustrate the subject
from what may be witnessed immediately after death, and before the
decomposition and dissolution of the body. The eye still remains; the
sense of hearing remains; the sense of touch and the other senses are
there; but there is no vision, no hearing, no tactual sensation, because
the senses are not complemented and made available by the presence of the
soul. Although the opinion that sensation is not in the mind but in the
body, is unfounded, it is not, perhaps, surprising that such a belief
should have arisen. If the hand be palsied, there is no sensation of
touch; if the ear be stopped, there is no sensation of hearing; if the eye
be closed, there is no vision; hence it happens, that when we have these
sensations, we are led to think of the organ or part of the bodily system,
with the affection of which theyare connected. When we feel a pain arising
from an external cause, it is a natural, and often a useful curiosity
which endeavours to learn the particular place in the body which is
affected. This, which we are generally able to ascertain, always arrests
our attention more or less. In this way we gradually form a very strong
association, and almost unconsciously transfer the place of the inward
sensation to that outward part, with which we have so frequently connected
it in our thoughts. Although this is clearly a mere fallacy, the
circumstance of its being a plausible and tenacious one renders it the
more necessary to guard against it. * Reid's Intellectual Powers, Essay
ii.
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SENSATION OR SENSATIONALITY. 87 ~ 50. Sensations are not images or
resemblances of objects. But while we are careful to assign sensations
their true place in the mind, and to look upon what is outward in the body
as merely the antecedents or causes of them, it is a matter of some
consequence to guard against a danger directly the reverse of that which
has been remarked on. We are apt to transfer to the sensation, considered
as existing in the mind, some of those qualities which belong to the
external object. But, in point of fact, our sensations are by no means
copies, pictures, or images of outward objects; nor are they
representations of them in any material sense whatever; nor do they
possess any of their qualities. It is true, we often think it otherwise;
constantly occupied with external objects, when in the act of
contemplation we retire within the mind, we unwarily carry with us the
form and qualities of matter, and stamp its likeness on the thought
itself. But the thought, whatever it may by the constitution of our nature
be the sign of, has no form, and presents no image analogous to what are
outwardly objects of touch and sight; nor has it form or image in any
sense which we can conceive of. When, therefore, we have an idea of some
object as round or square, we are not to infer, from the existence of the
quality in the outward object, that the mental state is possessed of the
same quality or attribute; when we think of anything as extended, it is
not to be supposed that the thought itself has extension; when we behold
and admire the varieties of color, we are not at liberty to indulge the
presumption that the inward feelings are painted over, and radiant with
corresponding hues. There is nothing of the kind; and the admission of
such a principle would lead to a multitude of errors. This subject is
illustrated in the following manner by Dr. Reid, whom we have already had
repeated occasion to refer to on the subject before us.-" Pressing my
hand, with force against the table, I feel pain, and I feel the table to
be hard. The pain is a sensation of the mind, and there is nothing that
resembles
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88 THE SENSATIONAL POWER. it in the table. The hardness is in the table,
nor is there anything resembling it in the mind. Feeling is applied to
both, but in a different sense; being a word common to the act of
sensation, and to that of perceiving by the sense of touch. " I touch the
table gently with my hand, and I feel it to be smooth, hard, and cold.
These are qualities of the table perceived by touch; but I perceive them
by means of a sensation which indicates them. This sensation not being
painful, I commonly give no attention to it. It carries my thought
immediately to the thing signified by it, and is itself forgotten as if it
had never been. But by repeating it, and turning my attention to it, and
abstracting my thought from the thing signiified by it, I find it to be
merely a sensation, and that it has no similitude to the hardness,
smoothness, or coldness of the table which are signified by it. " It is
indeed difficult, at first, to disjoin things in our attention which have
always been conjoined, and to make that an object of reflection which
never was so before; but some pains and practice will overcome this
difficulty in those who have got the habit of reflecting on the operations
of their own minds.'"* ~ 51. The connexion between the mental and physical
change not susceptible of explanation. External bodies operate on the
senses before there is any affection of the mind, but it is not easy to
say what the precise character and extent of this operation is. We know
that some object capable of affecting the organ must be applied to it in
some way either directly or indirectly, and it is a matter of knowledge
also, that some change in the organ actually takes place; but further than
this we are involved in uncertainty. All we can undertake to do at present
is the mere statement of the facts, viz., the application of an external
body, and some change in consequence of it in the organ of sense. * Reid's
Intellectual Powers, Essay ii.
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THE PERCEPTIVE POWER. 89 Snbseqnently to the change in the organ, either
at its extremity and outward developement, or in the brain, with which it
is connected, and of which it may be considered as making a part, a change
in the mind or a new state of the mind immediately takes place. I-fere
also we are limited to the mere statement of the fact. We here touch upon
one of those boundaries of the intellect which men are probably not
destined to pass in the present life. We find ourselves unable to resolve
and explain the connexion between mind and matter in this case, as we do
in all others. All we know and all we can state with confidence is, that a
mental affection is immediately subseqlent to an affection or change which
is physical. CHAPTER III. PERCEPTIONK OR THE PERCEPTIVE POWER. ~ 52. Of
the meaning and nature of perception. WE next come to the subject of
PERCEPTION. We consider this power here, because this seems its proper
place. It is obviously subsequent, in the history of the mind's
developement, to the Sensational power, but is as clearly antecedent to
many others which are to follow. This is the second cognitive power, and
is variously denominated Perception, the Perceptive power, and
Perceptivity. Its results, or the states of mind to which it gives rise,
are called perceptions. And the power, as in other analogous cases, is
most easily and satisfactorily inderstood from an examination of its
results. It is hardly necessary to add that what we have to say here does
not concern internal perception, but merely that which relates to objects
exterior to the mind. Perception, using the term in its application to
outward objects, differs from sensation as a whole does from a part; it
embraces more. It may be defined, therefore, an affection or state of the
mind which is
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90 THE PERCEPTIVE POWER. immediactely successive to certain cgfections of
the organ of sense, and which/ is referred by us to something external as
its cause. In regard to the specific nature of this reference, namely,
whether it involves some inductive process, or whether it is a purely
instinctive tendency, there may be differences of opinion; but possibly
and probably the truth may include a very simple mental process, which has
the form of reasoning, but which is prompted and secured in its action by
an implanted or instinctive tendency of the mind. It will be recollected
that the term SENSATION, when applied to the mind, expresses merely the
state of the mind, without reference to anything external which might be
the cause of it, and that it is the name of a truly simple feeling.
Perception, on the contrary, is the name of a complex mental state,
including not merely the internal affection of the mind, but also a
reference to the exterior cause. Sensation is wholly within; but
Perception carries us, as it were, out of ourselves, and makes us
acquainted with the wolqd around us. It is especially by means of this
last power that material nature, in all its varieties of form and beauty,
is brought within the range of our inspection. If we had but sensation
alone, there would still be form and fragrance, and colour and harmony of
sound, but it would all seem to be wholly inward. The mind would then
become not merely what Leibnitz supposed it to be, a mirror of the
universe;, it would be to us the universe itself; we could know no other
world, no other form of being. Perception or perceptivity prevents the
possibility of such a mistake; operating in virtue of its own law of being
and action, it undeceives and dissipates the flattering notion that all
things are in the soul; it leads us to other existences, and, in
particular, to the knowledge of the vast and complicated fabric of the
material creation. ~ 53. Of the primary and secondary qualities of matter.
From what has been said, it will be noticed that
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PERCEPTION. 91 SENSATION implies the existence of an external material
world as its cause, or at least as the occasion of its existence; and that
PERCEPTION implies the same existence both as cause and object. As,
therefore, the material world comes now so directly and closely under
consideration, it seems proper briefly to advert to that subject. It is
obvious we are ignorant, so far as the senses are concerned, of the.
subjective or real essence of matter. Our sensuous knowledge embraces
merely its qualities or properties, and nothing more. Without proposing to
enter into a minute examination of them, it will be proper to recall the
recollection here, that the qualities of material bodies have been ranked
by writers under the two heads of Primary and Secondary. The PRIMARY
QUALITIES are known by being essential to the existence of all bodies.
They. are extension, figure, divisibility, and solidity; and some writers
have included motion. They are called PRIMARY for the obvious reason that
all men embrace them in the notions which they form of matter, and that
they are essential to its existence. All bodies have extension, all bodies
have figure, all are capable of division, all possess the attribute of
solidity. By SOLIDITY in bodies (perhaps some would prefer the term
RESISTANCE) is to be understood that quality by which a body hinders the
approach of others between which it is interposed. In this sense, even
water, and all other fluids, are solid. If particles of water could be
prevented from separating, they would oppose so great resistance that it
would be impossible for any two bodies, between which they might be, to
come in contact. This was shown in an experiment which was once made at
Florence. A quantity of water was enclosed in a gold ball, which, on the
most violent pressure, could not be made to fill the internal cavity,
until the water inside was forced through the pores.-There is reason also
for that part of the arrangement which includes DIVISIBILITY. W/e cannot
conceive of a particle so small as not to be susceptible
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92 PERCEPTIVITY. of division. And to that small particle must belong not
only divisibility, but the qualities of solidity, extension, and figure. ~
54. Of the secondary qualities of matter. The SECONDAY qualities of bodies
are of two kinds: (1.) Those which have relation to the perceiving and
sentient mind; (2.) Those which have relation to other bodies. Under the
first class are to be included sound, colour, taste, smell, hardness and
softness, heat and cold, roughness and smoothness, &c. When we say of a
body it has sound, we imply in this remark that it possesses qualities
which will cause certain effects ill the mind; the term sound being
applicable by the use of language both to the qualities of the external
object, and to the effect produced within. When we say it has colour, we
always make a like reference to the mind which beholds and contemplates
it; and it is the same of the other secondary qualities of this
description. The other class of secondary qualities (or properties, as
they are not unfrequently termed), those which have relation to other
material bodies, are exceedingly various and numerous. The material
substance which, in relation to the mind, possesses the qualities of sound
and colour, may possess also, in relation to other bodies, the qualities
or properties of malleability, fusibility, solubility, permeability, and
the like. ~ 55. Of the nature of mental powers or faculties, and their
names. One or two explanatory remarks may properly be made here. We are
now considering the specific powers of the mind as they present themselves
for examination in the respective general Departments to which they
belong. But it is desirable to remember, that the powers or faculties,
which it is necessary thus to make distinct objects of consideration, are
not, on that account, to be regarded as distinct from the mind itself.
They are not separate from the mind, but are
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THE PERCEPTIVE POWER. 93 included in it; and, psychologically considered,
merely involve and imply the fact of the ability of the mind to act in a
particular way; although it may properly be added, that the particular
form of action is rendered possible, and is in some cases necessitated by
the circumstances in which the mind is placed. It is to these varieties of
action, manifesting themselves under different circumstances, but having a
commonness of mental origin, that we give specific names; and speak, as I
think, with entire propriety of the power of perception, of the conceptive
power, of the powers, or faculties, or susceptibilities of the memory,
imagination, reasoning, and the like. And without employing such specific
names, no satisfactory analysis and history of the mind would be possible.
II. And further we confess to some reluctance in employing, to any great
extent, new terms. Sometimes this is necessary, but not very often. As a
general rule, it is better to employ the common and acknowledged
phraseology, only taling care to limit and explain it so far as it may be
liable to misapprehension, in consequence of a new and scientific
application. " It looks too much like affectation," says Locke, speaking
of the common and recognized forms of speech, "wholly to lay them by; and
philosophy itself, though it likes not a gaudy dress, yet, when it appears
in public, must have so much complacency as to be clothed in the ordinary
fashion and language of the country, so far as it can consist with truth
and perspicuity." III. We are not to suppose, when we speak of a power or
susceptibility of the mind, that, because the name of it is often a single
word, the power itself is for that reason a single or simple thing, and
unsusceptible of analysis. Some powers, such as the powers of Sensation
and Intuition, appear to be simple. Others, such as Imagination and
Reasoning, are obviously complex. In the latter there are a number of
mental acts, comprehended under one name; and it is necessary, therefore,
to analyze them, and to be
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94 TIHE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. come acquainted with their parts,
otherwise our notionS will become confused, and often erroneous. CHAPTER
IV. THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. ~ 56. Nature and importance of the
senses as a source of knowledge. IN connexion with what has been said in
the last two chapters on the powers of sensation and perception, it is
desirable to keep clearly in the mind the precise relation of the senses
to the origin, progress, and amount of our knowledge, and to possess, if
possible, a correct- understanding of their true value. In a certain
sense, the possession of the bodily organs with which we are furnished is
not essential and prerequisite to the possession of that knowledge which
we are accustomed to ascribe to them. There is nothing unwarrantable and
unreasonable in the sulpposition, that the knowledge which we have by
their means might have been possessed without their aid, either
immediately, or in some way altogether different. Their use and
indispensableness in the acquisition of a certain portion of what men are
permitted to know, is a matter of arrangement and appointment on the part
of our Maker. It is undoubtedly an evidence of the correctness of this
remark, that the Supreme Being has a full acquaintance with all those
outward objects which present themselves to our notice, without being
indebted to any material instrumentality and mediation. He perceives in
another way, or, rather, all knowledge is inherent in, and originally and
unalterably essential to, himself. It is not so, as we have reason to
believe, with any other beings, and certainly not with man. Althongh a
great part of his knowledge relates to material things, he is so formed,
and his constitution is so ordered, that he is wholly dependent for it on:
the senses.-Deprive ]him of the ear, and all nature be
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THE SENSES OF SMELL -AND TASTE. 95 comes voiceless and silent; deprive him
of the eye, and the sun and moon withdraw their light, and the universe
becomes darkened like sackcloth; deprive him of the sense of touch, and he
is then entirely insulated, and as much cut off from all communication
with others as if Jie were the only being in existence. ~ 57. Of the
connexion of the brain with sensation and perception. It may perhaps be
asked, Whether these views are intended to exclude the brain, as having a
connexion with the senses in the results which are here ascribed to them?
And this inquiry leads us to observe (what has been before alluded to),
that the brain is a prominent organ in the material part of the process of
sensation and of external perception. The senses evidently cannot be
separated from the nervous system. But the substance which is found in the
nerves, excepting the coat in which it is enveloped, is the same as in the
brain, being of the same soft and fibrous texture, and in continuity with
it. As a general statement, when the brain has been in any way injured,
the inward- sensation, which would otherwise be distinct on the
presentation of an external body, is imperfect. Also, if the nerve be
injured, or if its continuity be disturbed by the pressure of a tight
ligature, the effect is the same; a circumstance which goes to confirm the
alleged identity of substance in the two. The brain, therefore, and
whatever of the same substance is in continuity with it, particularly the
nerves, constitute the sensorial organ, which, in. the subordinate organs
of taste, smell, sight, touch, and hearing, presents itself under
different modifications to external objects. On this organ, the sensorial,
as thus explained, an impression must be made before there can be
sensation and perception. An impression, for instance, is made on that
part of the sensorial organ called the auditory nerve, and a state of mind
immediately succeeds, which is variously termed, according to the view in
which it is
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96 THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. contemplated, either the sensation or
the perception of sound.-An impression is made by the rays of light on
that expansion of the optic nerve which forms what is called the RETINA of
the eye, and the intellectual principle is immediately brought into that
new position, which is termed visual perception, or a perception of sight.
—The hand is impressed on a body of an uneven and rough surface, and
immediately consequent on this application and pressure is that state of
mind which is termed a sensation or perception of roughness. ~ 58. Order
in which the senses are to be considered. In considering those mental
states which we possess by means of the senses, it is natural to begin
with that sense which will cause us the least difficulty in the analysis
of its results, and to proceed to others successively, as we find them
increasing in importance. It may not be altogether easy to apply this
principle with strictness, but it will answer all the purpose for which it
is here introduced, if we consider the senses in the following order, the
smell, taste, hearing, touch, and sight. The mind holds a communication
with the material world by means of the sense of smelling. All animal and
vegetable bodies (and the same will probably hold good of other bodies,
though generally in a less degree) are continually sending out effluvia of
great subtilty. These small particles are rapidly and widely scattered
abroad in the neighbourhood of the body from which they proceed. No
percipient being can come within the circumference occupied by these
continually moving and volatile atoms, without experiencing effects from
it. ~ 59. Of the sense and sensation of smell. The medium through which we
have the sensations and perceptions of smell, is the organ which is termed
the olfactory nerve, situated principally in the nostrils, but partly in
some continuous cavities. When any
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THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 97 odoriferous particles, sent from
external objects, affect this organ, there is a certain state of mind
produced, which varies with the nature of the odoriferous bodies. But we
can no more infer, from the sensation itself merely, that there exists any
necessary connexion between the smell and the external objects, than that
there exists a connexion between the emotions of joy and sorrow and the
same objects. It might, indeed, be suggested to us by the change in our
mental states, that there must be some cause or antecedent to the change;
but this suggestion would be far from implying the necessity of a
corporeal cause. How, then, does it happen that we are not merely sensible
of the particular sensation, but refer it at once to some external object,
to the rose or the honeysuckle? In answer, it may be remarked, if we had
always been destitute of the senses of sight and touch, this reference
never could have been lade; but, having been furnished with them by the
beneficent Author of our being, we make this reference by experience. When
we have seen the rose, when we have been near to it and handled it, we
have uniformly been conscious of that state of mind which we term a
sensation of smell. When we have come into the neighbourhood of the
honeysuckle, or when it has been gathered and presented to us, we have
been reminded of its fragrance. And thus, having learned by experience
that the presence of the odoriferous body is always attended with the
sensations of smell, we form the habit, aided perhaps by some interior
instinctive tendencies, of attributing the sensations to that body as
their cause. ~ 60. Of perceptions of smell in distinction from sensations.
The mental reference spoken of in the last section is made with almost as
much promptness as if it were necessarily involved in the sensation
itself. It is at least so rapid, that we find ourselves unable to mark the
mind's progress from the inward feeling to the I.-E
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98 THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. conception of the outward cause. Nor is
this inability surprising, when we consider that we have repeated this
process, both in this and in analogous cases, from our earliest childhood.
No object has ever been present to us, capable of operating on the senses,
where this process has not been gone through. The result of this
long-continued and frequent repetition has been an astonishing quickness
in the mental action, so much so that the mind leaps outward with the
rapidity of lightning, to be present with, and to comprehend the causes of
the feeling within. This view, it will be seen, helps in illustrating the
nature of IPERCEPTION, as distinguished from sensation. The outlines of
that distinction have already been given; and every one of the senses, as
well as that now under consideration, will furnish proofs and
illustrations of it. Accordingly, when we are said to perceive the smell,
or to have perceptions of the smell of a body, the rapid process which has
been described is gone through, and the three things which were involved
in the definition of Perception already given are supposed to exist: (1.)
The presence of the odoriferons body, and the affection of its appropriate
organ; (2.) The change or sensation in the mind; and (3.) The reference of
the sensation to the external body as its cause. ~ 61. Of the sense and
the sensation of taste. The tongue, which is covered with numerous nervous
papille, forms essentially the organ of taste, although the papilla are
found scattered in other parts of the cavity of the mouth. The application
of any sapid body to this organ immediately causes in it a change or
affection; and this is at once followed by a mental affection or a new
state of the mind. In this way we have the sensations and perceptions, to
which we give the names sweet, bitter, sour, acrid, and others. Having
experienced the inward sensation, the affections of the mind are then
referred by us to some
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THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 99 thing external as their cause. We do
not, however, always, nor even generally, distinguish the qualities which
constitute this cause by separate and appropriate designations; but
express them by the names that are employed for the internal feeling,
viz., sweetness, bitterness, sourness, &c. This reference of what is
internally experienced to its external cause, is very rapidly made; so
that we at once say of one apple it is sweet, and of another it is sour.
Still it is to be kept in mind, that, in point of fact, it is subsequent,
both in the order of nature and of time, to the mere sensation; although
we may not be able, in consequence of its rapidity, to mark distinctly the
progress of the mental action from the one to the other. As in the case of
smells, which have already been remarked ulpon, the reference is the
result of our former experience. We say of one body it is sweet, and of
another it is sour, because we have ever observed that the mental states
indicated by those terms have always existed in connexion with the
presence of those bodies. Whenever, therefore, we say of any bodies that
they are sweet, bitter, sour, or apply any other epithets expressive of
sapid qualities, we mean to be understood to say, that such bodies are
fitted in the constitution of things to cause in the mind the sensations
of sweetness, bitterness, and sourness, or other sensations expressed by
denominations of taste. Or, in other words, that they are the established
antecedents of such mental experiences, as there is, further than this, no
necessary connexion between them. ~ 62. Design and uses of the senses of
smell and taste. It is not unprofitable to delay oftentimes, and
contemplate the designs and uses which nature has in view in her works.
Although the sense of smell may appear (and perhaps with sufficient
reason) to be of less importance than the other senses and the other parts
of the animal economy, it is not without its ends. There is evidently
design in the position of the organ
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100 THE SENSE OF SMELL AND TASTE. in reference to the effluvia, which are
the direct subjects of its action, it being placed in the inside of the
canal, where the air is continually forced in and out with every breath we
draw. The organ is precisely adapted, both in its nature and its place, to
its appointed medium of communication with other bodies; nor is this the
only mark of design attending it. This sense is frequently a source of
gratification; and although it is less keen and powerful in men than in
many inferior animals, it still has power enough to afford much assistance
in this respect, that it often warns us of the presence of objects which
experience has found to be injurious to us. The remark has been justly
made, that the senses both of taste and smell are of great use in
distinguishing bodies that cannot be distinguished by our other senses.
They are peculiarly quick and exact in their judgments, especially in
discerning, before we can ascertain it in any other way, the beginning and
progress of those changes which all bodies are constantly undergoing. But
in both of these senses design and utility are discoverable in reference
to food in particular. While the sense of smell guards the entrance of the
canal for breathing, the sense of taste has its station at the entrance of
the alimentary canal. Hence the food which we consume undergoes the
scrutiny of both; an intentional and benevolent provision for protecting
men and the animal creation generally against the introduction of what
would be noxious to them. CHAPTER V. THE SENSE OF HEARING. ~ 63. Organ of
the sense of hearing. FOLLOWING the order which has been proposed, we are
next to consider the sense of rEARING. And, in proceedingto the
consideration of this subject, the remark is a very obvious one, that we
should be unable
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THE SENSE OF HEARING. 101 to hear if we had not a sense designed for and
appropriate to, that result. The air, when put strongly in motion, is
distinctly perceived by the touch; but no impression which it could make
on that sense would cause that internal feeling which is termed a
sensation of sound. Our Creator, therefore, has taken care that these
sensations shall have their own organ; and it is obviously one of precise
and elaborate workmanship. The ear is designedly planted in a position
where, with the greatest ease, it takes cognizance of whatever is going on
in the contiguous atmosphere. When we examine it externally, we not only
find it thus favorably situated, but presenting a hollowed and capacious
surface, so formed as to grasp and gather in the undulations of air
continually floating and in motion around it. WVithout, however, delaying
to give a milnute description of the internal construction of the ear,
which belongs rather to the physiologist, it will answer our present
purpose merely to add, that these undulations are conducted byit through
various windings, till they are brought in a state of concentration, as it
were, against the.membrane called the TYMPANUM. It is worthy of notice,
that on the internal surface of this membrane (the drum, as it is
popularly called) there is a nerve spread out in a manner analogous to the
expansion of the optic nerve at the bottom of the eye. Whether this
nervous expansion be indispensably necessary to the result or not, it is
certain that a pressure upon or affection of the tympanum by the external
air is followed by a new state of the mind, known as the sensation or
perception of sound. ~ 64. Nature of sonorous bodies, and the medium of
the communication of sound. When we leave the bodily organ, and, looking
outward, inquire still firther for the origin of the sensations which we
have by means of the ear, we find them attributable ultimately to the
presence and influence of the substances around us. Those uncdula
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102 THE SENSE OF HEARING. tions of air, which impinge upon the tympanum,
and without which there is no sensation of sound, are caused by the
vibrations or oscillations of the particles of certain bodies. The
material substances which have this quality are termed sonorous, as wood,
brass, iron, &c.; but it exists in different bodies in very various
degrees. The quality of sonorousness, therefore, in any substance, is
properly a susceptibility of motion among its own parts. When it is
forcibly struck, this motion exists first in itself, and is afterward
communicated to the circumambient air. The movement of the air which is
thus caused, is again communicated, like the concentric waves of water
agitated by a stone thrown into it, to other portions successively, till
it reaches the ear. The air, accordingly, is the medium of communication
between the sonorous body and the tympanumn of the ear. It is true that
many solid bodies are good conductors of sound as well as tbe atmosphere;
but as portions of air, through which the vibratory motion must of course.
pass, are in all cases interposed between that organ and the sounding
body, it is not necessary to dwell upon them here. It is sufficient for
our present purpose merely to understand, that there is in every sounding
body, in the first place, a vibratory motion among its own particles from
some cause or other; that this vibration or undulation is communicated
from the sounding body to the air, and from one portion of air to another,
till it reaches the organ of hearing. Why the internal sensation should at
once follow the completion of this process is another inquiry, which we do
not undertake to explain. We have before us the antecedent and the
consequent, the affection of the organ of hearing by an outward impulsei
and the new mental state within; but the reason of this invariable
connexion in two things that are entirely distinct and different, is a
matter beyond our limited comprehension.
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THE SENSE OF HEARING. 103 ~ 65. Varieties of the sensation of sound. The
sensations which we thus become possessed of by the hearing, are far more
nLumerous than the words and the forms of speech, having relation to them
in different languages, would lead us to suppose. It will help to
illustrate this subject if we recur a moment to the sense of TASTE. The
remark has somewhere been made to this effect, and probably with much
truth, that if a person were to examine five hundred different wines, he
would hardly find two of them of precisely the same flavour. The diversity
is almost endless, although there is no language which distinguishes each
variety of taste by a separate name. It is the same in respect to the
sensations of sound. These sensations exhibit the greatest variety,
although the differences are too minute to be separated and distinctly
represented by language. These views will appear the less objectionable,
when it is remembered that sounds differ from each other both in the tone
and in the strength of the tone. It is remarked by Dr. RPeid, that five
hundred variations of tone may be perceived by the ear; also an equal
number of variations in the strength of the tone; making, by a combination
of the tones and of the degrees of strength, many thousands of simple
sounds, differing either in tone or strength. In a perfect tone, a great
many undulations of elastic air are required, which must be of equal
duration and extent, and follow each other with perfect regularity. Each
undulation is made up of the advance and retreat of innumerable particles,
whose motions are all uniform in direction, force, and time. Accordingly,
there will be varieties also and shades of difference in the same tone,
arising from the position and manner of striking the sonorous body, from
the constitution of the elastic medium, and from the state of the organ of
hearing. Different instruments, such as a flute, a violin, and a bass
viol, may all sound the same tone, and yet be easily distinguishable. A
considerable number of hu
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104 THE SENSE OF HEARING. man voices may sound the same note, and with
equal strength, and yet there will be some difference. The same voice,
while it maintains the proper distinctions of sound, may yet be varied
many ways by sickness or health, youth or age, and other alterations in
our bodily condition to which we are incident. ~ 66. Manner in which we
learn the place of sounds. It is a fact worthy of notice in respect to
sounds, that we should not know, previous to all experience on the
subject, whether a sound came from the right or left, from above or below,
from a smaller or a greater distance. And this will appear the less
surprising, when we remember, that the undulations of air are always
changed from their original direction by the channels and the windings of
the ear before they strike e the tympanum. Abundant facts confirm this
statement. Dr. Reid mentions, that once, as he was lying in bed, having
been put into a fright, he heard his own heart beat. He took it to be some
one knocking at the door, and arose, and opened the door oftener than once
before he discovered that the sound was in his own breast. Some traveller
has related, that when he first heard the roaring of a lion in a desert
wilderness, not seeing the aninmal, he did not know on what side to
apprehend danger, as the sound seemed to him to proceed from the ground,
and to enclose a circle, of which he and his companions stood in the
centre. It is by custom or experience that we learn to distinguish the
place of things, and, in some measure also, their nature, by means of
their sound. It is thus that we learn that one noise is in a contiguous
room, that another is above our heads, and another is in the street. And
what seems to be an evidence of this is, that when we are in a strange
place, after all our experience, we very frequently find ourselves
mistaken in these respects. If a man born deaf were suddenly made to hear,
he would probably consider his first sensations of
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THE SENSE OF HEARING. 105 sound as originally wholly within himself. But,
in process of time, we learn not only to refer the origin of sounds to a
position above or below, to the right or left, but to connect each
particular sound with a particular external cause, referring one to a bell
as its appropriate external cause, another to a flute, another to a
trumpet. ~ 67. Application of these views to the art of ventriloquism. We
are naturally led to make a few remarks here in explanation of
VENTRILoQuI'M, a well-known art, by which persons can so modify their
voice as to make it appear to their audience to proceed from different
objects, distances, and directions. There is no peculiarity of structure
in ventriloquists, as is often supposed; except that the capacity of the
chest and the lmngs is sometimes found to be greater than usual. It is
also true, that the power and activity of the muscles, connected with the
organs of speech and with the chest and lungs, is considerably increased
by frequent exercise. Nevertheless, the great natural requisite on the
part of the ventriloquist is to be able to mimic sounds; and he will be
likely to succeed nearly in proportion to his skill in this particular.
The secret, then, of his acoustic deceptions, supposing him to be capable
of exact imitation, will be sufficiently understood by referring to the
statement maiaintained in the preceding section, viz., That, previous to
experience, we are unable to refer sounds to any particular external
cause. The sound itself never gives us any direct and immediate indication
of the place, or distance, or direction of the sonorous body. It is only
by experience, it is only by the association of place with sound, that the
latter becomes an indication of the former. Now supposing the
ventriloquist to possess a delicate ear, which is implied in his ability
to mimic sounds, he soon learns, by careful observation, the difference
which change of place causes in the same sound. tHaving in this way
ascertained the particular moduE 2
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106 THE SENSE OF HEARING. lations of sound, which, in accordance with the
experience of men and the associations they have formed, are appropriate
to ally particular distances, direction, or object, it is evident,
whenever he exactly or very nearly imitates such modulations, that the
sounds must appear to his audience to come from such distance, object, or
direction. One part of the art, however, consists in controlling the
attention of persons present, and in directing that attention to some
particular place by a remark, motion, or some other llethod. If, for
instance, the sound is to come from under a tumbler or hat, the performer
finds it important to have their attention directed to that particular
object, which affords him an opportunity for the exercise of all those
associations which they have formed with any sound coming from a very
confined place. All, then, that remains for him to do, is to give his
voice a dull modulation and on a low key, wLich we know from our
experience to be the character of confined sounds. Then there seems to be
a voice speaking under a tumbler or hat; and if any person should, either
intentionally or unintentionally, lift these articles up, the
ventriloquist immediately utters himself more distinctly and freely, like
a person who has been very munch confined on being readmitted into the
free and open air. It is also necessary, when his face is towards his
auditors, that he should make use chiefly of the muscles of the throat; an
outward and visible moving of the lips would munch weaken the deception. ~
68. Uses of hearing and its connexion with oral language. Although, as in
the cases just mentioned, the artifices of men may sometimes impose upon
this organ and lead its decisions astray, it is one, in the ordinary calls
for its exercise, of exceeding value. One of the distinguished benefits of
the sense of hearing is, that, in consequence of it, we are enabled to
hold intercourse with each other by means of spoken language, without
which the advancement of the human mind
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THE SENSE OF HEARING. 107 must have inevitably been very limited. It is by
means of speech that we express our feelings to the little company of our
neighbours and our own family; and without it this pleasant and cheering
intercourse must be almost entirely suspended. Not limited in its
beneficial results to families and neighbourhoods, it has been the medium
of the transmission of thought from age to age, from generation to
generation. So that in one age has been concentrated the result of all the
researches, the combination of the wisdom of all the preceding. 1" There
is, without all doubt," it has been observed, "a chain of the thoughts of
human kind, from the origin of the world down to the moment at which we
exist, a chain not less universal than that of the generation of every
being that lives. Ages have exerted their influence on ages; nations on
nations; truths on errors; errors on truths." Whether oral language was an
original invention of man, or whether, in the first instance, it was a
power bestowed lupon him by his Creator and coeval with the humnan race,
the ear must, in either case, have been the primary recipient.-The faculty
of speech, so necessary and so beneficial, could not have existed, either
by inventiori or by communication, without the sense of hearing. And hence
it happens, that all those who are born deaf are without speech. Their
inability to speak is not in general the result of a defect in the organs
of speech, but because they cannot hear others, and thus imitate the
sounds they utter. CHAPTER VI. TIE SENSE OF TOUCH. ~ 69. Of the sense of
touch and its sensations in general. WE are next to consider the sense of
TOJVCH. The principal organ of this sense is the hand, although it is not
limited to that part of our frame, but is diffused
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108 THE SENSE OF TOUCH. over the whole body. The hand principally arrests
our attention as the organ of this sense, because, being furnished with
various articulations, it is easily moveable by the muscles, and can
readily adapt itself to the various changes of form in the objects to
which it is applied. The senses which have hitherto been examined are more
simple and uniform in their results than that of the touch. lBy the ear we
merely possess that sensation which we denominate hearing; we have the
knowledge of sounds, and that is all. By the palate we acquire a knowledge
of tastes; and by the sense of sinelling we become acquainted with the
odours of bodies. The knowledge which is directly acquired by all these
senses, is limited to the qualities which have been mentioned. By the
sense of touch, on the contrary, we become acquainted, not with one
merely, but with a variety of qualities or attributes, such as the
following: heat and cold, hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness,
resistance, extension, and figure; and, in particular, it is in the
application of this sense that we find an occasion furnished for the
origin of the antecedent and more-general notion of externality. ~ 70.
Idea of externality suggested in connexion with the touch. If man were
possessed of the sense of smell alone, it would be found that the earliest
elements of his knowledge consisted exclusively in sensations of odours.
According, however, as these sensations were agreeable or disagreeable, he
would acquire the additional ideas of pleasure and pain. And, having
experienced pleasure and pain, we may suppose that this would subsequently
give rise both to the feelings and the abstract conceptions of desire and
aversion. -But if he had no other sense, all these feelings would seem to
him to be internal, not only in their experience, but their origin; in
other words, to be mere emanations from the soul itself; and he would be
incapable of referring them to an external cause.-If he were possessed of
the sense of hearing alone, the result would be similar;
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THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 109 his existence would then seem to consist
essentially of sounds, as in the other case it would be made up of odours;
nor, indeed, by the aid of merely both these senses combined, would he be
able to form an idea of externality or ontness. But this idea is a most
important one; it is the connecting thought, which introduces us to an
acquaintance with a new form of existence, different from that interior
existence which we variously call by the names spirit, mind, or soul. This
idea first arises in the mind, although it is not directly addressed to
that sense, by means of the touch. There is no question that the other
senses might of themselves furnish a basis of considerable extent for the
mental action. By means of their aid alone, such a developement of mind
might take place, that we could perceive, think, compare, abstract,
reason, and will. And although, mnder such circumstances, everything would
seem to us to be internal, yet we should probably find the mental action
mnemlbarrassed and easy, and a source of pleasure. But, after a time, we
decide to move the limbs in a particular direction, and to press the hand
or some other part:of the body through some hard and resisting substance.
It is when we attempt to do anything of this kindl, which calls the sense
of touch into action, that we find the wonted series of thoughts
disturbed, the desire checked, and the volition counteracted. It is
probably at this precise position of the mind, with scarcely the interval
of a momentary pause of wonder, that there arises vividly in the soul a
new thought, a new state of mind, which we call the idea of externality or
outness. It is the sense of touch which impinges upon the obstacle that
stands in our way; and no other sense admits of this peculiar application.
It is thus the means of partially disturbing the previous connexion and
tendency of thought, and of giving occasion for the rise of the new idea
which is under consideration. And this idea, called into existence under
these -circumstances, becomes associated with all those
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110 THE SENSE OF TOUCH. notions which we subsequently form of matter. —It
may be of some importance to add here, that we shall have occasion to
refer to this idea again in a subsequent chapter on the Intuitional or
Suggestional power. And the idea or thought, being thus originated on the
appropriate occasion of its origin, and not by an arbitrary act of
volition merely, but by the necessities of our mental existence, is an
affirmation in the soul itself of the reality of that for which it stands,
however difficult it may be to define or describe it. It is to be
remembered, that externality is not a direct object of the touch, as
extension and hardness are, but that the tactual sense simply furnishes
the occasiowm on which it is formed. ~ 71. Origin of the notion of
extension, and of form or figure. The idea of EXTENSION has its origin by
means of the sense of touch. When the touch is applied to bodies, when in
the intermediate parts there is a continuity of the same substance, we
necessarily form that notion. It is not, however, to be imagined that
Extension, as it exists outwardly, and the corresponding notion in the
mind, actually resemble each other. So far from any imitation and copying
from one to the other, or resemblance in any way, there is a radical and
utter diversity. As to outward, material extension, it is not necessary to
attend to it here; our business at present is with the corresponding
mental state. Nor will it be necessary to delay even upon that; the more
we multiply words upon it, the more obscure it becomes. As it is a simple
mental state, we cannot resolve it into others, and in that way make it
clearer by defining it. We must refer in this case, as in others like it,
to each one's personal experience. It will be better understood in that
way than by any form of words. The notion of extension is intimately
connected with, and may be considered in some sort the foundation of, that
of the FOyRM or figure of bodies. —Dr.
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THE SENSE OF TOUCHI. 11 Brown somewhere calls the Form of bodies their
relation to each other in space. And it is very true that the form of
bodies involves the fact of the relation of their parts to each other. But
we do not propose here to consider form in its outward existence, but only
the idea or mental state which corresponds to it. The notion which we have
of the form of things is subsequent, in the order of nature, to that which
we have of their extension. The former could not exist without the
antecedent existence of the latter. ]Both are simple; both are
undefinable; and both are to be ascribed in their origin to the occasion
furnished by the sense of touch. ~ 72. On the sensations of heat and cold.
Among the states of mind which are usually classed with the intimations of
the sense under consideration, are those which are connected with changes
in the temperature of our bodies. Some writers, it is true, have been
inclined to dissent from this arrangement, and have hazarded an opinion
that they onght not to be ascribed to the sense of TOUCH; but Dr. Reid, on
the contrary, who gave to our sensations the most careful and patient
attention, has decidedly assigned to them this origin. Among other
remarks, he has expressed himself on this subject to this effect. " The
words HEAT and COLD," he remarks (Inquiry into the Human Mind, chap. v.),
" have each of them two significations; they sometimes signify certain
sensations of the mind, which can have no existence when they are not
felt, nor can exist anywhere but in the mind or sentient being; but more
frequently they signify a quality in bodies, which, by the laws of nature,
occasions the sensations of heat and bold in us; a quality which, though
connected by custom so closely with the sensation that we cannot without
difficulty separate them, yet hath not the least resemblance to it, and
may continue to exist when there is no sensation at all. "The sensations
of heat and cold are perfectly
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112 TIHE SENSE OF TOUCII. known, for they neither are, nor can be,
anything else than what we feel them to be; but the qualities in bodies
which we call heat and colc are unknown. They are only conceived by us as
unknown causes or occasions of the sensations to which we give the same
names. But, though common sense says nothing of the nature of the
qualities, it plainly dictates the existence of them; and to deny that
there can be heat and cold when they are not felt, is an absurdity too
gross to merit confutation. For what could be more absurd than to say that
the thermometer cannot rise or fall unless some person be present, or that
the coast of Guinea would be as cold as Nova Zembla if it had no
inhabitants a "It is the business -of philosophers to investigate, by
proper experiments and induction, what heat and cold are in bodies. And
whether they make heat a particular element diffused through nature, and
accumulated in the heated body, or whether they make it a certain
vibration of the parts of the heated body; whether they determine that
heat and cold are contrary qualities, as the sensations undoubtedly are
contrary, or that heat only is a quality, and cold its privation; these
questions are within the province of philosophy; for common sense says
nothing on the one side or the other. C" But, whatever be the nature of
that quality in bodies which we call heat, we certainly know this, that it
cannot in the least resemble the sensation of heat. It is no less absurd
to suppose a likeness between the sensation and the quality, than it would
be to suppose that the pain of the gout resembles a square or a triangle.
The simplest man that hath common sense does not imagine the sensation of
heat, or anything that resembles that sensation, to be in the fire. iHe
only imagines that-there is something in the fire which makes him and
other sentient'beings feel heat. Yet as the name of heat, in common
language, more frequently and more properly signifies this unknown
something in the fire than the sensation occasioned
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THE SENSE OF TOUCI. 113 by it, he justly laughs at the philosopher who
denies that there is any heat in the fire, and thinks that he speaks
contrary to common sense." ~ 73. On the sensations of hardness and
softness. "Let us next consider," continues the same writer, "I HARDNESS
and SOFTNESS; by which words we always understand real properties or
qualities of bodies, of which we have a distinct conception. " When the
parts of a body adhere so firmly that it cannot easily be made to change
its figure, we call it hiard; when its parts are easily displaced, we call
it soft. This is the notion which all mankind have of hardness and
softness: they are neither sensations nor like any sensation; they were
real qualities before they were perceived by touch, and continue to be so
when they are not perceived: for if any man will affirm that diamonds were
not hard until they were handled, who would reason with him? " There is,
no doubt, a sensation, by which we perceive a body to be hard or soft.
This sensation of hardness may easily be had by pressing one's hand
against a table, and attending to the feeling that ensues, setting aside,
as much as possible, all thoughts of the table and its qualities, or of
any external thing; But it is one thing to have the sensation, and another
to attend to it and make it a distinct object of reflection. The first is
very easy; the last, in most cases, extremely difficult. "VWe are so
accustomed to use the sensation as a sign, and to pass immediately to the
hardness signified, that, as far as appears, it was never made an object
of thought, either by the vulgar or by philosophers; nor has it a name in
any language. There is no sensation more distinct or more frequent; yet it
is never attended to, but passes through the mind instantaneously, and
serves only to introduce that quality in bodies which, by a law of our
constitution, it suggests. " There are, indeed, some cases, wherein it is
no dif
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114 THE SENSE OF TOUCH. ficult matter to attend to the sensation
occasioned by the hardness of a body; for instance, when it is so violent
as to occasion considerable pain: then nature calls upon us to attend to
it; and then we acknowledge that it is a mere sensation, and can only be
in a sentient being. If a man runs his head with violence against a
pillar, I, appeal to him whether the pain he feels resembles the hardness
of the stone; or if he can conceive anything like what he feels to be in
an inanimate piece of matter. "The attention of the mind is here entirely
turned towards the painful feeling; and, to speak in the common language
of mankind, he feels nothing in the stone, but feels a violent pain in his
head. It is quite otherwise when he leans his head gently against the
pillar; for then he will tell you that he feels nothing in his head, but
feels hardness in the stone. Ilath he not a sensation in this case as well
as in the other Undoubtedly he hath; but it is a sensation which nature
intended only as a sign of something in the stone; and, accordingly, he
instantly fixes his attention upon the thing signified; and cannot,
without great difficulty, attend so much to the sensation as to be
persuaded that there is any such thing distinct from the hardness it
signifies. " But, however difficult it may be to attend to this fugitive
sensation, to stop its rapid progress, and to disjoin it from the external
quality of hardness, in whose shadow it is apt immediately to hide itself:
this is what a philosopher by pains and practice must attain, otherwise it
will be impossible for him to reason justly on this subject, or even to
understand what is here advanced. For the last appeal, in subjects of this
nature, must be to what a man feels and perceives in his own mind." ~ 74.
Of certain indefinite feelings sometimes ascribed to the touch. In
connexion with these views on the sensations of touch, it is proper to
remark, that certain feelings have been ascribed to that sense which are
probably
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THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 115 of a character too indefinite to admit of a
positive and undoubted classification. Although they clearly have their
place in the general arrangement which has been laid down, with the states
of mind which we are now considering; that is to say, are rather of an
external and material, than of an internal origin; still they do not so
evidently admit of an assignment to a particular sense. Those sensations
to which we now refer (if it be proper to use that term in application to
them) appear to have their origin in the human system considered as a
whole, made up of bones, flesh, muscles, the senses, &c., rather than to
be susceptible of being traced to any particular part. Of this description
are the feelings expressed by the terms uneasiness, weariness, weakness,
sickness, and those of an opposite character, such as ease, hilarity,
health, vigour, and the like. ~ 75. Relation between the sensation and
what is outwardly signified. ~We here return a moment to the subject of
the relation between the internal sensation and the outward object; and
again repeat that the mental state and the corresponding outward object
are altogether diverse. This view holds good in the case of the secondary,
as well as of the primary qualities of matter. Whether we speak of
extension, or resistance, or heat, or colour, or roughness, there are, in
all cases alike, two things, the internal affection and the outward
quality; but they are utterly distinct, totally without likeness to each
other. But how it happens that one thing, which is totally different from
another, can nevertheless give us a knowledge of that from which it
differs, it would be a waste of time to attempt to explain. Our knowledge
is undoubtedly limited to the mere fact. This is one of those difficult
but decisive points in MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, Of which it is essential to
possess a precise and correct understanding. The letters which cover over
the pages of a book are a very different thing from the thought, and the
combinations of thought, which they stand for. The accountant's col
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116 THE SENSE OF TOUCH. umns of numerals are not identical with the
quantities and their relations which they represent.'And so in regard to
the mind; all its acts are of one kind, and what they stand for is of
another. The mind, in all its feelings and operations, is governed by its
own laws, and characterizes its efforts by the essential elements of its
own nature. Nothing which is seen or heard, nothing which is the subject
of taste, or touch, or any other sense, nothing material which can be
imagined to exist in any place or in any form, can furnish the least
positive disclosure either of its intrinsic nature or of the mode of its
action. What, then, is the relation between the sensation and the outward
object, between the perception and the thing perceived? Evidently that of
the sign and the thing signified. And as in a multitude of cases, the sign
may give a knowledge of its object, without any other grounds of such
knowledge than mere institution or appointment, so it is in this.. The
mind, maintaining its appropriate action, and utterly rejecting the
intervention of all images and:visible representations, except what are
outward and material, and totally distinct from itself both in place and
nature, is, notwithstanding, susceptible of the knowledge of things
exterior, and can form an acquaintance with the universe of matter. A
misapprehension in this respect, the mistaken supposition of the mind's
either receiving actual filmy images from external objects, or being
itself transformed into the likeness of such images, has been, in times
past, the source of much confusion and contention. [But that opinion,
however prevalent it may have been once, is mere hypothesis;'it has not
the slightest well-fpunded evidence in its favour. Still we can reject it
wholly from our belief, and from all influence on our belief, only by
guarding against early associations, by a rigid self-inspection, and by
carefully separating the material and the immaterial, the qualities of
mind and of matter.
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THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 117 CHAPTER VII. THE SENSE OF SIGIIT. ~ 76. Of the
organ of sight, and the uses or benefits of that sense. OF those
instruments of external perception with which a benevolent Providence has
favoured us, a high rank must be given to the sense of seeing. If we were
restricted in the process of acquiring knowledge to the informations of
the touch merely, how many embarrassments would attend our progress, and
how slow it would prove! Having never possessed sight, it would be many
years before the most acute and active person could form an idea of a
mountain, or even of a large edifice. But by the additional help of the
sense of seeing, he not only observes the figure of large buildings, but
is in a moment possessed of all the beauties of a wide and variegated
landscape. The organ of this sense is the eye. On a slight examination,
the eye is found to be a sort of telescope, having its distinct parts, and
discovering throughout the most exquisite construction. The medium on
which this organ acts are rays of light, everywhere diffused, and always
advancing, if they meet with no opposition, in direct lines. The eye, like
all the other senses, not only receives externally the medium on which it
acts, but carries the rays of light into itself; and, on principles purely
scientific, refracts and combines them anew. It does not, however, fall
within our plan to give a minute description of the eye, which belongs
rather to the physiologist; but such a description, with the statement of
the uses of the different parts of the organ, must be to a candid and
reflecting mind a most powerful argument in proof of the existence and
goodness of the Supreme Being. How wonderful,
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118 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. among other things, is the adaptation of the rays
of light to the eye! If these rays were not of a texture extremely small,
they would cause much pain to the organ of vision, into which they so
rapidly pass. If they were not capable of exciting within us the
sensations of colour, we should be deprived of much of that high
satisfaction which we now take in beholding surrounding objects; showing
forth, wherever they are to be found, the greatest variety and the utmost
richness of tints. ~~ 77. Statement of the mode or process in viGual
perception. In the process of vision, the rays of light, coming from
various objects and in various directions, strike, in the first place, on
the pellucid or transparent part of the ball of the eye. If they were to
continue passing on precisely in the same direction, they would produce
merely one mingled and indistinct expanse of colour. In their progress,
however, through the crystalline humour, they are refracted or bent from
their former direction, and are distributed to certain focal points on the
retina, which is a white, fibrous expansion of the optic nerve. The rays
of light, coming from objects in the field of vision, whether it be more
or less extensive, as soon as they have been distributed on their distinct
portions of the retina, and have formed an image there, are immediately
followed by the sensation or perception which is termed sight. The image
which is thus pictured on the retina, is the last step which we are able
to designate in the material part of the process in visual perception; the
mental state follows, but it is not in our power to trace, even in the
smallest degree, any physical connexion between the optical image and the
corresponding state of the mind.-All that we can say in this case is, that
we suppose them to hold to each other the relation of antecedent and
consequent by an ultimate law of our constitution.
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THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 119 ~ 78. Of the original and acquired perceptions of
sight. In speaking of those sensations and perceptions, the origin of
which is generally attributed to the sense of sight, it is necessary to
make a distinction between those which are ORIGINAL and those which are
ACQUIRED. Nothing is properly original with the sense of sight but the
sensations of colour, such as red, blue, yellow. These sensations (or
perceptions, as they are otherwise called, when the internal feeling is
combined with a reference to the external cause) are exceedingly numerous.
In this respect, the intimations of the sense of sight stand on the same
footing with those of taste and hearing; although distinctive names, in
consequence of the difficulty of accurately separating and drawing the
line between each, are given only in a few cases. All the sensations of
colour are original with the sight, and are not to be ascribed to any
other sense. A part, however, of that knowledge, which we attribute to the
sight, and which has the appearance of being immediate and original in
that sense, is not so. Some of its alleged perceptions are properly the
results of sensations, combined not only with the usual reference to an
external cause, but with various other acts of the judgment. In some cases
the combination of the acts of the judgment with the visual sensation is
carried so far, that there is a sort, of transfer to the sight of the
knowledge which has been obtained from some other source. And not
unfrequently, in consequence of a long and tenacious association, we are
apt to look upon the knowledge thus acquired as truly original in the
seeing power. This will suffice, perhaps, as a statement of the general
fact, while the brief examination of a few instances will help to the more
thorough understanding of those acquired perceptions of the sight which
are here referred to. ~ 79. The idea of extension not originally from
sight. It is well known that there is nothing more coinmon than for a
person to say that he sees the length
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120 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. or breadth of any external object; that he sees
its extent, &c. These expressions appearto imply (and undoubtedly are so
understood) that extension is a direct object of sight. There is no
question that such is the common sentiment, viz., that the outlines and
surface which bodies permanently expand and present to the view, are truly
seen. An opinion different from this might even incur the charge of great
absurdity. But, properly, the notion of extension, as we have already
seen, has its origin in the sense of touch. Being a simple and elementary
thought, it is not susceptible of definition; nor, when we consider
extension as existing outwardly and materially, can we make it a matter of
description without running into the confusion of using synonymous words.
But, whatever it is (and certainly there can be neither ignorance nor
disagreement. on that point, however much language may fail of conveying
our ideas), the knowledge of it is not to be ascribed originally to the
sight. The notion of extension is closely connected with externality. It
is not possible to form the idea of extension from mere consciousness, or
a reflection on what tales place within us. But making a muscular effort,
and thus applying the touch to some resisting body, we first have the
notion of outness; and either from the same application of that sense, or
when we have repeated it continuously on the same surface, we have the
additional notion of its being extended or spread out. If a man were fixed
immoveably in one place, capable of smelling, tasting, hearing, and
seeing, but without tactual impressions originating from a resisting body,
he would never possess a knowledge of either. Having first gained that
knowledge from the touch in the way just mentioned, he learns in time what
appearance extended bodies (which are, of course, coloured bodies) make to
the eye. At a very early period, having ascertained that all coloured
bodies are spread out or extended, he invariably asso
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THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 121 ciates the idea of extension with that coloured
appearance. Hence he virtually and practically transfers the knowledge
obtained by one sense to another; and even, after a time, imagines
extension to be a direct object of sight, when, in fact, what is seen is
only a sign of it, and merely suggests it. An affection of the sense of
touch is the true and original occasion of the origin of this notion; and
it becomes a;l idea of sight only by acquisition or transference. ~ 80. Of
the knowledge of the figure of bodies by the sight. Views similar to those
which have been already advanced will evidently apply to, the figure of
bodies. We acquire a knowledge of the figure or form of bodies originally
by the sense of touch. But it cannot be doubted that this knowledge is
often confidently attributed to the sense of sight as well as the touch.
Although there is reason to believe that men lalour under a mistake in
this, it is not strange, when we trace back our mental history to its
earlier periods, that such, a misapprehension should exist. A solid body
presents to the eye nothing but. a certain disposition of colours dnd
Iight. We may imagine ourselves to.see the prominences or cavities in such
bodies, when in truth we see only the light or the shade occasioned by
them. This light and shade, however, we learn by experience to consider
-as the sign of a certain solid figure.-A proof of the truth of this
statement is, that a painter, by carefully imitating the distribution of
light and shade which he sees in objects, will make his work very
naturally and exactly represent not only the general outline of a body,
but its prominences, depressions, and other irregularities. And yet his
delineation, which, by the distribution of light and shade, gives such
various representations, is on a smooth and plain surface. It was a
problem submitted by Mlr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke, whether a blind man, who
has learned the difference between a cube and a sphere by-the touch, can,
on being suddenly restored to sight, distinguish
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122 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. between them, and tell which is the sphere and
which is the cube, by the aid of what may be called his new sense merely.
And the answer of Mr. Locke was, in agreement with the opinion of Molyneux
himself, that he cannot. The blind man knows what impressions the cube and
sphere make on the organ of touch, and by that sense is able to
distinguish between them; but, as he is ignorant what impression they will
make on the organ of sight, he is not able, by the latter sense alone, to
tell which is the round body and which is the cubic. It was remarked, that
solid bodies present to the eye nothing but a certain disposition of light
and colours. -It seems to follow from this, that the first idea which will
be conveyed to the mind on seeing a globe, will be that of a circle on a
plain surface, but variously shadowed with different degrees of light.
This imperfect idea is corrected in this way.. Combining the suggestions
of the sense of touch with those of sight, we learn by greater experience
what kind of appearance solid convex bodies will make to us. That
appearance becomes to the mind the sign of the presence of a globe; so
that we have an idea of a round body by a very rapid mental correction,
whereas the notion first conveyed to the mind is truly that of a plain,
circular surface, on which there is a variety in the dispositions of light
and shade. It is an evidence of the correctness of this statement, that in
paintings, plain surfaces, variously shaded, represent convex bodies, and
with great truth and exactness. It appears, then, that extension and
figure are originally perceived, not by sight, but by touch. We do not
judge of them by sight until we have learned by our experience that
certain visible appearances always accompany and signify the existence of
extension and of figure. This knowledge we acquire at a very early period
in life; so much so, that we lose, in a great measure, the memory both of
its commencement and progress.
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THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 123 ~ 81. Measurements of magnitude by the eye. What
has been said naturally leads us to the consideration of MAGNITUDE. This
is a general term for Extension, when we conceive of it not only as
limited or bounded, but as related to and compared with other objects.
Although we make use of the eye in judging of it, it is to be kept in
mind, that the knowledge of magnitude is not an original intimation of the
sight, but is at first acquired by the aid of touch. So well known is
this, that it has been common to consider Magnitude under the two heads of
tangible or real, and visible or apparent; the tangible magnitude being
always the same, but the visible varying with the distance of the object.
A man of six feet stature is always that height, whether he be a mile
distant, or half a mile, or near at hand; the change of place making no
change in his real or tangible magnitnude. But the visible or apparent
magnitude of this man may be six feet or two feet, as we view him present
with us and immediately in our neighbourhood, or at two miles' distance;
for his magnitude appears to our eye greater or less, according as he is
more or less removed. In support of the doctrine that the knowledge of
magnitude is not an original intimation of the sight, but is at first
acquaired by the aid of touch, we may remark, that, in judging of
magnitude by the sight, we are much influenced not merely by the visual
perception, but particularly by comparison with other objects, the size of
which is known or supposed to be known. "I remember once," says Dr.
Abercrombie (Intellec. Powers, part ii., sect. 1), " having occasion to
pass along Ludgate Hill, when the great door of St. Paul's was open, and
several persons were standing in it. They appeared to be very little
children, but, on coming up to them, were found to be full-grown persons.
In the mental process which here took place, the door had been assumed as
a known magnitude, and the other objects judged of by it. Had I attended
to the door being much larger than any door that
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124 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. one is in the habit of seeing, the mind would have
made allowance for the apparent size of the persons; and, on the other
hand, had these been known to be full-grown persons, a judgment would have
been formed of the size of the door." Among the multitude of instances
which might be adduced in illustration of the doctrine under notice, the
following statement, to be found in the seventh number of the Edinburgh
Journal of Science, is a somewhat striking one. In examining a dioramic
representation of the inside of Rochester Cathedral, which produced the
finest effect, from the entire exclusion of all extraneous light and of
all objects, excepting those on the picture itself, the writer of the
statement referred to was struck with an appearance of distortion in the
perspective, which he ascribed to the canvass not hanging vertically. Upon
mentioning this to the gentleman who exhibited the picture, he offered to
walk ini front of it, and strike its surface with the palm of his hand, to
show that the canvass was freely suspended. Upon doing this, a very
remarkable deception, or illusion rather, took place. As his hand passed
along, it gradually became larger and larger till it reached the middle,
when it became enormously large. It then diminished till it reached the
other end of the canvass. As the hand moved towards the middle of the
picture, it touched the parts of the picture more and more remote from the
eye of the observer; and, consequently, the mind referred the hand and the
object in contact with it to the same remote distance; and, consequently,
gave it a fictitious magnitude, corresponding with the visible figure it
presented, combined with the supposition of its being placed at a
distance. (See Edin. Journ. of Science, N o. vii., p. 90, and Art.
Science, Edin. Encyc.) ~ 82. Of objects seen in the mist, and of the sun
and moon in the horizon. In accordance with the above-mentioned principle,
it happens, that objects seen by a person in a mist
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THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 125 seem larger than life. Their faint appearance
rapidly conveys to the mind the idea of being considerably removed,
although they are actually near to us. And the mind immediately draws the
conclusion (so rapidly as to seem'a simple and original perception), that
the object, having the same visible or apparent magnitude, and yet
supposed to be at a considerable distance, is greater than other objects
of the same class. So that it. is chiefly the -view of the mind, a law or
habit of the intellect, which in this particular case gives a fictitious
expansion to bodies; although it is possible that the result may in part
be attributed to a difference in the refraction of the rays of light,
caused by their passing through a denser and less uniform medium than
usual. These remarks naturally remind us of the wellknown fact, that the
sun and moon seem larger in the horizon than in the meridian. A number of
reasons may be given for this appearance.-(1.) The horizon may seem more
distant than the zenith, in consequence of intervening objects. We measure
the distance of objects in part by means of those that are scattered along
between, and any expanse of surface, where there are no such intervening
objects, appears to us of 1ess extent than it actually is. Now if the rays
of light form precisely the same image in the eye, but the source of them
is supposed to be further off in the horizon than in the zenith, such have
been our mental habits, that the object in the horizon will probably
appear the largest.-(2.) Another reason, which is sometimes assigned, of
the enlarged appearance of the sun and moon in the horizon is, that the
rays from them fall on the body of the atmosphere obliquely, and, of
course, are reflected downward towards the beholder, and subtend a
larger-angle at his eye. Hience, as we always see objects in the direction
of the ray just before it enters the eye, if we follow the rays back in
the precise direction of their approach, they will present to the eye the
outlines of a larger object as their source than they would if they had
not been
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126 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. refracted.-When the atmosphere is not clear, but
unlsual masses of vapour are accumulated in it, whether immediately around
us or anywhere else in the direction of the rays, the refraction is
increased, and the object is proportionally enlarged. This circumstance
helps to explain the fact of the enlargement not being uniform, but
sometimes greater and at others less. — (3.) Our estimate of the size of
the sun and moon is also affected by the simultaneous perception of other
objects of known magnitude, which happen to be in the same direction. The
setting sun, for instance, when it is seen through distant woods, appears
much enlarged. The woods, in consequence of their distance, subtend but a
small angle at the eye; but, being objects of known magnitude, they appear
enlarged and nearly of their natural size in our conception of them. And
as the sun fills a larger space in our eye than the separate trees which
fall within its disk, it experiences in our conception an enlargement,
precisely corresponding with the imagined or conceptive enlargement of the
objects which are encircled by its rays. Just as in the case of a balloon,
which, at a great elevation, crosses the disk of the sun or moon. The
balloon is an object of known size and of great size; but, in fact, when
seen at a great elevation; it is materially and visually a mere speck,
although munch enlarged qnentally. Accordingly, when it passes over the
disk of the sun or moon, those bodies will appear greatly enlarged, so as
to correspond with our previous conceptions of the size of the body which
their rays at that time encircle.-(The reader will find this subject more
fully explained in Dr. Arnott's Elements of Physics, vol. i.) ~ 83. Of the
estimation of distances by sight. We are next led to the consideration of
distances as made known and ascertained by the sight. By the distance of
objects, when we use the term in reference to ourselves, we mean the space
which is interposed between those objects and our own position. Tt
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THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 127 might be objected, that space interposed is only a
synonymous expression for the thing to be defined. Nevertheless, no one
can be supposed to be ignorant of what is meant. Even blind men have a
notion of distance, and can measure it by the touch, or by walking forward
until they meet the distant object. The perception of distance by the
sight is an acquired and not an original perception, although the latter
was universally supposed to be the fact until comparatively a recent
period. All objects in the first instance appear to touch the eye, but our
experience has corrected so many of the representations of the senses
before the period which we are yet able to retrace by the memory, that we
cannot prove this by a reference to our own childhood and infancy. It
appears, however, from the statement of the cases of persons born blind on
the sudden restoration of their sight. —" When he first saw," says
Cheselden, the anatomist, when giving an account of a young man whom he
had restored to sight by couching for the cataract, " he was so far from
making any judgment about distance, that he thought all objects touched
his eye, as he expressed it, as what he felt did his skin; and thought no
objects so agreeable as those which were smooth and regular, although he
could form no judgment of their shape, or guess what it was in any object
that was pleasing to him." This anatomist has further informed us that he
has brought to sight several others, who had no remembrance of ever having
seen; and that they all gave the same account of their learning to see, as
they called it, as the young man already mentioned, although not in so
many particulars; and that they all had this in common, that, having never
had occasion to move their eyes, they knew not how to do it, and, at
first, could not at all direct them to a particular object; but in time
they acquired that faculty, though by slow degrees.* * Some doubts have
been raised from time to time of the correctness of Cheselden's
experiments and inquiries here referred to. For
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128 TiHE SENSE OF SIGHT. Blind persons, when at first restored to sight,
are unable to estimate the distance of objects by that sense; but soon
observing that certain changes in the visible appearance of bodies always
accompany a change of distance, they fall upon a method of estimating
distance by the visible appearance. And it would no doubt be found, if it
could be particularly examined into, that all mankind come to possess the
power of estimating the distances of objects by sight in the same way.
When a body is removed from us and placed at a considerable distance, it
becomes smaller in its visible appearance, its colours are less lively,
and its outlines less distinct; and we may ex-' pect to find various
intermediate objects, more or fewer in number corresponding with the
increase of the distance, showing themselves between the receding object
and the spectator. And hence it is that a certain visible appearance comes
to be the sign of a certain distance. HIistorical and landscape painters
are enabled to turn these facts to great account in their delineations. By
means of dimness of colour, indistinctness of outline, and the partial
interposition of other objects, they are enabled apparently to throw back,
at a very considerable distance from the eye, those objects which they
wish to appear remote. While other objects, that are intended to appear
near, are painted vivid in colour, large in size, distinct in outline, and
are separated from the eye of the spectator by few or no intermediate
objects. ~ 84. Estimation of distance when unaided by intermediate
objects. As we depend in no small degree upon intermediate objects in
forming our notions of distance, it results, tunately, Mr. Stewart has
taken up the subject with his accustomed caution and candour in his
Account of James Mitchell, a boy born deaf and blind. He shows to ample
satisfaction, in a note near the commencement of that Narration, that the
facts which have been brought forward in opposition to Cheselden may be
satisfactorily explained, without any impeachment of the correctness of
his statements or the justness of his conclusions from them.-See
additional confirmations of this subject in the life of Caspar Hauser.
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THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 129 that we are often much perplexed by the absence of
such objects. Accordingly we find that people frequently mistake when they
attempt to estimate by the eye the length or width of unoccupied plains
and marshes, generally making the extent less than it really is. For the
same reason they misjudge of the width of a river, estimating its width at
half or three quarters of a mile at the most, when it is, perhaps, not
less than double that distance. The same holds true of other bodies of
water, and of all other things which are seen by us inll a horizontal
position, and under similar circumstances. We mistake in the same way,
also, in estimating the height of steeples, and of other bodies that are
perpendicular, and not on a level with the eye, provided the height be
considerable. As the upper parts of the steeple out-top the surrounding
buildings, and there are no contiguous objects with which to compare it,
any measurement taken by the eye must be inaccurate, but is generally less
than the truth. Hence perhaps it is that a man on the top of a steeple
appears smaller to those below than the same man would seem to the same
person and at the same distance on level ground. A man on the earth's
surface, placed at the same distance, would probably appear nearly of his
actual size. As we have been in the habit of measuring horizontal
distances by the eye, we can readily form a nearly accurate opinion
whether the person be at a hundred feet distance, or more or less; and the
mind immediately makes an allowance for this distance, and corrects the
first visual representation of the size of the person so rapidly that we
do not remember it. But, having never been in the habit of measuring
perpendicular distances, the mind is at a loss, and fails to make that
correction which it would readily, and, as it were, intuitively make in
the case of objects on level ground. The mistake, therefore, of his
supposed nearness, combined with this perplexity, causes the comparative
littleness of the man on the steeple. F 2
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130 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. The fixed stars, when viewed by the eye, all
appear to be alike indefinitely and equally distant. Being scattered over
the whole sky, they make every part of it seem like themselves at an
indefinite and equal distance, and therefore contribute to give the whole
sky the appearance of the inside of a sphere. Moreover, the horizon seems
to the eye to be further off than the zenith; because between us and the
former there lie many things, as fields, hills, and waters, which we know
to occupy a great space; whereas between us and the zenith there are no
considerable things of known dimensions. And, therefore, the heavens
appear like the segment of a sphere, and less thai a hemisphere, in the
centre of which we seem to stand. -And the wider our prospect is, the
greater will the sphere appear to be, and the less the segment. ~ 85. Of
objects seen on the ocean, &c. A vessel seen at sea by a person who is not
accustomed to the ocean, appears much nearer than it actually is, and on
the same principles as already illustrated. In his previous observations
of the objects at a distance, he has commonly noticed a number of
intermediate objects interposed between the distant body and himself. It
is probably the absence of such objects that chiefly causes the deception
under which he labours in the present instance. In connexion with what has
been said, we are led to make this further remark, that a change in tile
pu-rity of the air will perplex, in some measure, those ideas of distance
which we receive from sight. Bishop Berkeley remarks, while travelling in
Italy and Sicily, he noticed that cities and palaces, seen at a great
distance, appeared nearer to him by several miles than they actually were.
The cause of this he very correctly supposed to be the purity of the
Italian and Sicilian air, which gave to objects at a distance a degree of
brightness and distinctness which, in the less clear and pure atmosphere
of his native country, could be observed only in those towns and
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THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 131 separate edifices which were near. At home he had
learned to estimate the distances of objects by their appearance; but his
conclusions failed him when they came to. be applied to objects in
countries where the air was so much clearer.-And the same thing has been
noticed by other travellers who have been placed in the like
circumstances. ~ 86. Explanatory remarks. We have now given a brief
outline, first, of the power of Sensation or Sensationality, and, second,
of the power of Perception or Perceptivity; together with some account of
the senses, through which they respectively operate, and by means of which
they are made available as sources or inlets of knowledge. The next
faculty naturally presenting itself for consideration in the list of the
faculties of the mind distinctively known as Cognitive, is the Conceptive
power. But before we can reach this faculty, which is one of great
importance, because without it the hnman mind would be limited in its
inquiries to the sphere of objects actually present, we must delay a
little upon the subject of the reliance which can be justly placed upon
the senses; a subject which involves the acceptance or rejection of
IDEALISM, a doctrine which, in limiting our knowledge to ideas or states
of the mind, denies by implication any true knowledge of objects outside
of ourselves. II. There is also another subject, to which it is necessary
that attention should early be given —that of HABIT. The term Habit
indicates a law of the mind's action; and back of that law, inasmuch as
law is only the form or mode of activity, there is and must be a principle
or power. When spoken of as a power of the mind, as is often done and not
without reason, Habit rejects the descriptive epithet of Cognitive; but I
think may properly be denominated an Auxiliary power. And as its mighty
influence is felt in all the three leading Departments under which the
mind
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132 OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES, is to be considered, we shall lose nothing
in giving it an early recognition. NoTE. —In the well-known Natural
History of Buffon, a writer distinguished alike for learning and
eloquence, we have an account of the process by which the full use of the
sight and of the other external senses is acquired. He invents a
delightful recital, and puts it in-the mouth of our first parent; and thus
instructs us in the most abstruse subjects b'y an appeal to the
imagination. His views, founded obviously on much inquiry and reflection,
notwithstanding the imaginary circumstances in which he presents them, may
be regarded as confirmatory of what has been said in these chapters on the
uses and the comparative developement and reliableness of the senses.
CHAPTER VIIII. OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES, AND IDEALISM. ~ 87. By means of
sensations we have a knowledge of outward things. IN the third chapter of
the Introduction it was remarkled, that the states of mind to which
operations upon or affections of our senses give rise, are, by our very
constitution, the occasions or grounds of belief; and that it is by means
of the senses we have a knowledge, in particular, of the external,
material world. The new feelings, following an affection of the senses,
are in some sense the occasions on which the active and curious mind moves
out of the world of its own spiritual and immaterial existence, and
becomes acquainted with matter. It is somewhat here as in the reading of a
book. When we read a book, only certain coloured marks or lines, arranged
in a particular order, are directly presented to our senses; but we find
them connected with new states of mind, utterly distinct from the direct
impression which they make. A piece of paper, written over with such
coloured delineations, becomes to the soul a sign of the most various and
exalted ideas; and in like manner, such is the constitution of our mental
nature, it is found to be the case that certain new affections of the
mind, provided they are caused- by means of the senses, become the signs
of various existences, which are wholly
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ND IDEALISM. 133 diverse from the feelings themselves. We experience the
feelings, in other words the mental states, which all admit to be in
themselves neither archetypes nor resemblances of anything whatever which
is external to the soul; and then at once we become acquainted with a vast
multitude of outward objects. On the authority of such feelings as are
immediately consequent on an affection of the senses, all mankind, if the
evidence of their general conduct and of their express declarations is to
be regarded, believe in outward objects, as having a distinct and real
existence, as having forms, properties, and relations. ~ 88. Objection to
a reliance on the senses. Nevertheless, without denying the fact of this
general reliance on the senses as a ground of belief, an objection has
been made to its being well placed. The objection, stated in a few words,
is this, THAT OUR SENSES SOMETIMES DECEIVE US, AND LEAD US INTO MISTAKES.
In support of the objection, such instances as the following are brought
forward.-The sun and moon appear to the spectator on the earth's surface
to be a foot or two in diameter, and little more than half a mile high; a
straight stick, thrust into the water, appears to us crooked, as seen by
the eye in that position; a square tower at a distance is mistaken for a
round one; a piece of ice for a stone; a brass coin for a gold one. Nor
are such mistakes to be ascribed solely to the sense of sight; they are
not unfrequently committed when we rely on the intimations of the taste
and smell, the touch and hearing. —Various facts of the above kind have
been brought forward to discredit the senses, and to prevent a reliance on
them. It is not necessary to extend the enumeration of them, as these will
serve for a specimen of the whole. ~ 89. The senses circumscribed or
limited rather than fallacious. That there are some apparent grounds for
the ob
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134 OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES, jection which has been made to a full
reliance on the testimony of the senses, it is not necessary to deny. It
is nevertheless true, that the great mass of the alleged fallacies which
have been brought forward in opposition to such reliance, are susceptible
of a satisfactory explanation. —But before entering into particulars, it
is requisite to make the general remark, that the senses are more properly
circumscribed or limited than fallacious; and that they lead us astray,
not so much by their own direct action as in consequence of our expecting
too much of them. Now if we keep this in view, and moderate and chasten
our expectations by the evidently limited nature of the senses, we shall
find less to complain of. The imperfect examination of the senses which we
have just gone through, evinces the truth of this remark. It is the
business, the appropriate function of the sense of smelling, to give us a
knowledge of the odours of bodies. When we have these sensations, we may
be led, from some principle of the mind, to look for the cause of them,
but nothing more; we do not learn from it what the cause is. It is not
pretended that this sense alone can give us the notion of an external
odoriferous body. The sense of taste is equally limited with that of
smell; but both, as far as they go, are grounds of knowledge, and do not
deceive. It might, no doubt, be said, that they may be diseased, and thus
mislead us; but the remarks of this section go on the supposition that the
senses are in a sound state.-When we come to the sense of hearing, we find
that the perceptions of sound have, in part, an acquired character. The
reference of a particular sound to a particular external cause always
implies the previous exercise of the touch, also the exercises of that
principle of the mind which is termed association, and of an act of the
judgment. But hearing, when in a sound state, is always a ground of belief
and knowledge, as far as the mere sensation of sound is concerned, and so
far can be most certainly trusted. It is the appropriate business of the
sense of sight,
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AND IDEALISM. 135 against the testimony of which so many objections have
been made, to render us acquainted with the colours of bodies. To say,
therefore, that it leads us into errors in respect to solidity, extension,
size, direction, or distance, is but very little, or, rather, nothing to
the purpose. These are acquired perceptions, and have their origin in
another sense, that of touch. The visual sensations are in these cases
mere signs of the knowledge which we have from another source. When,
therefore, we separate what belongs to the sight from what belongs to the
touch, and distinguish between them, it is impossible to fix the charge of
misrepresentation upon either. And hence, on the question whether our
senses mislead us, we are always to consider to which of the senses the
particular things under review appropriately belong. And in many cases
when we are searching after truth, it becomes ius to call in the aid of
all the senses, and not to consult one to the entire omission of the
others. They all make parts of one great and wonderful system, and cannot
be safely separated. When they are in a sound state; when the intellectual
experiences, of which they are the origin, are properly discriminated;
and, further, when the intimations of one sense are aided by those of
another, and by the guidance of the reasoning power, which clearly ought
not to be excluded, we may then confidently expect to be led by them into
the truth, so far as our Creator designed that it should be made known to
us. ~ 90. Some alleged mistakes of the senses owing to want of care. If
the course indicated at the close of the last section were always
followed, the mistakes to which we are occasionally exposed would be much
less frequent. But even when we refer to all the senses, and combine with
this reference the deductions of reasoning, we may still err from want of
care. Beyond all question, some of the mistakes ascribed to the senses are
owing to premature inferences from them; to a want
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136 OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES, of caution, discrimination, and full
inquiry. This particular view of the subject is illustrated as follows by
Dr. Reid.-" Many things called the deceptions of the senses are only
conclusions rashly drawn from the testimony of the senses. In these cases
the testimony of the senses is true, but we rashly draw a conclusion from
it which does not necessarily follow. We are disposed to impute our errors
rather to false information than to inconclusive reasoning, and to blame
our senses for the wrong conclusions we draw from their testimony. "Thus,
when a man has taken a counterfeit guinea for a true one, he says his
senses deceived him; but he lays the blame where it ought not to be laid:
for we may ask him, Did your senses give a false testimony of the colour,
or of the figure, or of the impression? No. But this is all that they
testified, and this they testified truly. From these premises you
conclude~ that it was a true guinea, but this conclusion does not follow;
you erred, therefore, not by relying upon the testimony of sense, but by
judging rashly from its testimony. Not only are your senses innocent of
this error, but it is only by their information that it can be discovered.
If you consult them properly, they will inform you that what you took for
a guinea is base metal, or is deficient in weight, and this can only be
known by the testimony of sense. " I remember to have met with a man who
thought the argument used by Protestants against the Popish doctrine of
transubstantiation, from the testimony of our senses, inconclusive;
because, said he, instances may be given where several of our senses may
deceive us; how do we know, then, that there may not be cases wherein they
all deceive us, and no sense is left to detect the fallacy? I begged of
him to know an instance wherein several of our senses deceive us. I take,
said he, a piece of soft turf; I cut it into the shape of an apple; with
the essence of apples I give it the smell of an apple; and with paint I
can give it the skin and colour of an apple. Here, then, is a body, which,
if
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EAND IDEALISM. 137 you judge by your eye, by your touch, or by your smell,
is an apple. "To this I would answer, that no one of our senses deceives
us in this case. Mly sight and touch testify that it has the shape and
colour of an apple; this is true. The sense of smelling testifies that it
has the smell of an apple: this is likewise true, and is no deception.
Where, then, lies the deception? It is evident it lies in this, that
because this body has some qualities belonging to the apple, I conclude
that it is an apple. This is a fallacy, not of the senses, but of
inconclusive reasoning."* There are other instances where the subject
might be placed in a true light. It is well known (to take an illustration
not unfrequently referred to by writers) that the vibrations of a pendulum
are affected by its geographical position, the latitude where it is.
Before this fact was ascertained, a person might have employed a pendulum
of a given length as a measure of comparative duration at two distant
points on the globe's surface. And when he had done this, he might have
been disposed to declare, on the authority of his senses and personal
observation, that two portions of time, measured in different latitudes,
were the same, although they were in fact different. But here comes the
question: Are his senses to blame for this mistake? Not at all. The
testimony of the senses and of observation, as far as it went, was
correct. The mistake is evidently to be attributed to erroneous deduction.
The conclusion was bottomed on the great and undoubted principle of
reasoning, that the laws of nature are uniform. But then there were
mistaken assumptions in this particular case which vitiated the reasoning,
viz., that the earth is circular and not a spheroid; and that the same
quantity of the attractive force of the earth operates on the pendulum at
every point on the earth's surface. Here is the foundation of the mistake;
in certain facts precipitately assumed as grounds of reasoning, and in the
deductions from them, and-not in the senses. * Reid's Intellectual Powers
of Man, Essay ii.
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138 OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES, ~ 91; Of mistakes in judging of the motion
of objects. " Many false judgments," it is further remarked by Dr. Reid,
"that are accounted deceptions of sense, arise from our mistaking relative
motion for real or absolute motion. These can be no deceptions of sense,
because by our senses we perceive only the relative motions of bodies; and
it is by reasoning that we infer the real from the relative which we
perceive. A little reflection may satisfy us of this. " It was before
observed, that we perceive extension to be one sensible quality of bodies,
and thence are necessarily led to conceive space, though space be of
itself no object of sense. When a body is removed out of its place, the
space which it filled remains empty till it is filled by some other body,
and would remain if it should never be filled. Before any body existed,
the space which bodies now occupy was empty space, capable of receiving
bodies, for no body can exist where there is no space to contain it. There
is space, therefore, wherever bodies exist or can exist. " Hence it is
evident that space can have no limits. It is no less evident that it is
immoveable. Bodies placed in it are moveable, but the place where they
were cannot be moved; and we can as easily conceive a thing to be moved
from itself, as one part of space brought nearer to, or removed further
from another. "This space, therefore, which is unlimited and immoveable,
is called by philosophers absolute s2ace. Absolute or real motion is a
change of place in absolute space. "Our senses do not testify the absolute
motion or absolute rest of any body. When one body removes from another,
this may be discerned by the senses; but whether any body keeps the same
part of absolute space, we do not perceive by our senses. When one body
seems to remove from another, we can infer with certainty that there is
absolute motion; but whether in the one or the other, or partly in both,
is not discerned by sense. "Of all the prejudices which philosophy contra
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AND IDEALISM. 139 diets, I believe there is none so general as that the
earth keeps its place unmoved. This opinion seems to be universal, till it
is corrected by instruction, or by philosophical speculation. Those who
have any tincture of education are not now in danger of being held by it,
but they find at first a reluctance to believe that there are antipodes;
that the earth is spherical, and turns round its axis every day, and round
the sun every year. They can recollect the time when reason struggled with
prejudice upon these points, and prevailed at length, but not without some
effort. "The cause of a prejudice so very general is not unworthy of
investigation. But that is not our present business. It is sufficient to
observe, that it cannot justly be called a fallacy of sense; because our
senses testify only the change of situation of one body in relation to
other bodies, and not its change of situation in absolute space. It is
only the relative motion of bodies that we perceive, and that we perceive
truly. It is the province of reason and philosophy, from the relative
motions which we perceive, to collect the real and absolute motions which
produce them.."All motion must be estimated from some point or place which
is supposed to be at rest. We perceive not the points of absolute space,
from which real and absolute motion must be reckoned; and there are
obvious reasons that lead mankind, in a state of ignorance, to make the
earth the fixed place from which they may estimate the various motions
they perceive. The custom of doing this from infancy, and of using
constantly a language which supposes the earth to be at rest, may perhaps
be the cause of the general prejudice in favour of this opinion. " Thus it
appears, that if we distinguish accurately between what our senses really
and naturally testify, and the conclusions which we draw from their
testimony by reasoning, we shall find many of the errors, called fallacies
of the senses, to be no fallacy of the senses, but rash judgments, which
are not to be imputed to our senses."
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140 OF RELLANCE ON THE SENSES, ~ 92. Of mistakes as to the distances and
magnitude of objects. One class of the fallacies by means of the senses is
made np of those errors we commit in Our perceptions of the distance of
objects. Our sight, it is said, often represents objects to be near which
are distant, and objects to be distant which are near. That we often form
erroneous judgments as to the distance of objects, is true; but it is a
mistaken sentiment which ascribes these erroneous opinions to the
misrepresentations of the sight in itself considered. Take the case of the
sun and moon. Those heavenly bodies, as they come under the cognizance of
sight, appear not only very small, but also as being at no great distance.
Still, in this very instance (although this is one of the cases most
frequently referred to by the expositors of the alleged weaknesses and
errors of the senses), it cannot be shown that there is any deception
practised upon us by that sense. It has sufficiently appeared that
extension, figure, the magnitude and the distance of bodies, are not
direct objects of sight, and that our notions of them are not original in
that sense, but are acquired. While, therefore, we have a direct
acquaintance with colours by means of sight, it happens that, in
estimating the distance of objects by the same sense, we are obliged to
call in the aid of the intimations of the touch, and to make use also of
comparison and judgment. And hence we are able to fix on this general
principle, that the apparent magnitude of an object will vary with its
distance.-It is clear, therefore, that there is no deception practised
upon us. W}hen, by such calculations as we are able to make, we have
ascertained the distance of the sun and moon, then every one is satisfied
that their apparent magnitude or their appearance to the eye is just such
as it should be; and that the eye gives to us precisely the same
representation as in any other instance of visible objects presented to
it. It gives such a view of the object and of the distance of the object
as it was designed to give; and teaches us here the same as it teaches us
constantly.
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AND IDEALISM. 141 (II.) Another class of errors are those of magnitude.
The notions which we form on that subject also are acquired, and not
original. We judge objects to be great or small in comparison with
ourselves or with one another, and not in consequence of anything which is
directly or immediately perceived in the objects themselves. We might call
many objects small which happened to be of the size of a particular
diamond, and yet not inconsistently speak of the diamond itself as a very
large one; and this for the simple reason that our notions of large and
small are not absolute but relative, and are formed by repeated acts of
comparison. If there were but one object in creation besides ourselves,
and if we could not reason from ourselves to that object, we could not
possibly form any notion of its magnitude as distinct from the mere idea
of extension. It is very clear, our senses could not, of themselves,
authorize us to speak of such an object as large or small. Nor could it be
done by reasoning, inasmuch as there are supposed to be no other objects
with which to compare it.- These few remarks and illustrations can hardly
fail to evince, that such mnistakes as may exist in regard to the distance
and magnitude of objects, are not exclusively attributable to the senses.
~ 93. The senses liable to be diseased. There is one respect, however, in
which it is perhaps true that we can speak with propriety of deceptions
arising from the cause now under consideration. The body, as a whole,
being liable to be diseased, the senses, as a part of the physical system,
are of course not exempted from this liability. As a mere question of
fact, it cannot be deemed a matter of doubt that the senses are often
physically disordered, and at such times all persons are liable to be led
astray by them. What is sweet to persons ordinarily, may appear bitter to
one with a diseased palate; what is white to the mass of mankind, may
appear of a yellow hue to one whose organ of sight is diseased; the
physical condi
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142 oF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES, tion of the sense of touch may be so
perverted as to lead the diseased person to imagine he is made of glass or
feathers instead of flesh and blood. But it is surely enough to say, in
respect to cases of this kind, that such is the condition of humanity, the
sad but common allotment of mankind. What principle in our mental
constitution is not liable to be perverted? What susceptibility is not
liable to find its action suspended? In our general conduct, we rely, and
very correctly, on the MEMORY; but the laws of memory may be disorganized
by what may be termed a mental disease. We rely with equal readiness on
the REASONING power; no one doubts that its conclusions are a ground of
belief. [But of what value is reasoning when uttered in the ravings of a
madman, or when drawing its conclusions in a lunatic asylunm?a-It follows,
therefore, if the senses deceive us in the case we are now attending to,
the fault, if such it is to be considered, is not an exclusive one. It
belongs to other parts of our nature also, not excepting its noblest and
most trustworthy powers. And if we must reject the testimony of the senses
simply because they are liable to be diseased, we must, for the same
reason and in consistency with ourselves, reject the testimony of memory,
of reason, and even of consciousness. ~ 94. On the real existence of a
material world. It will be noticed that, in what has been said, we have
taken for granted the actual existence of an external, material world.
Certain it is, that no man who has the ordinary constitution of a man, if
he gives himself up to the instinctive tendencies of his nature, can doubt
the reality of such an external, material creation. All external nature is
operating upon us from the very moment of our birth, and giving origin,
consistency, and strength to this belief. The resistance which bodies
present to the touch when that sense is impressed upon them by the agency
of the muscles, gives occasion for the distinct and important idea of
externality; and with this idea the senses soon enable
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AND IDEALISM. 143 us to associate others, as extension, colour, form, and
all material qualities and properties. In this way we become acquainted
with what is called the outward world. And we are now prepared to assert
explicitly, that this supposed outward world has an actual and independent
existence. But an objection is made here. It may be said that the mere
fact of our having sensations or ideas of externality, extension, colour,
and the like, does not necessarily involve and imply the true and actual
existence of those things which they represent, or of which they are
supposed and believed to be the effect. In other words, we may possess
certain internal affections, and attribute them to something external and
material as their cause; and we may truly and siincerely believe the
reality of such a cause, while, in point of fact, it does not exist; and,
consequently, our conviction of a truly existing material world may be a
self-imposition and delusion. It is this view which furnishes the basis of
the doctrine known as IDEALISM. On this doctrine, which limits our
knowledge to what is internal or subjective, and which therefore denies
any real knowledge of the outward material world, a few remarks may
properly be offered. ~ 95. Doctrine of the non-existence of matter
considered. The first remark which we have to make concerns the mere fact
of belief. We have already made the declaration with confidence; that no
man who has the ordinary constitution of a man can doubt of the reality of
external, material things. It is no presumption to assert, that the belief
of the reality of an external cause of our sensations is universal. This
is the common feeling, the common language of all mankind. -Those who deny
the propriety of relying on the evidence of the senses for the existence
of the material world, and who deny such existence, should explain this
belief. That such a belief exists cannot be denied; that it is a false
belief, an unfounded convic
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144 OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES, tion, ought not to be lightly asserted. It
wars too much, as even a slight examination would suffice to show, with
the sentiments of man's moral and religious constitution. It is to be
acknowledged with gratitude, that the great mass of mankind fully believe
in the existence of the Deity, a being of perfect truth as well as
benevolence. And this being is man's creator. But to create man so that he
should be irresistibly led to believe in the existence of a material world
when it did not exist, to create him with high capacities of thought,
feeling, and action, and then to surround him with mere illusive and
imaginary appearances, does not agree with that notion of God which we are
wont to entertain. Mr. Stewart, in speaking of the metaphysical inquiries
of Des Cartes, observes in relation to himself, that his reasonings led
him to conclude, that God cannot possibly be supposed to deceive his
creatures; and, therefore, that the intimations of our senses and the
decisions of our reason are to be trusted to with entire confidence,
wherever they afford us clear and distinct ideas of their respective
objects. In the second place, it will undoubtedly be admitted, that the
sensations which have been spoken of have an existence. This existence, it
is true, is wholly internal; but still the simple fact remains that they
exist; our consciousness most decisively teaches us so. But it has been
laid down as a primary truth, a first principle, that there is no
beginning or change of existence without a cause. This is an elementary
principle, placed as far above all objection and skepticism as any one can
be, and evidently preliminary to the full exercise of reasoning. And
where, then, is the cause of these internal effects? What man, who denies
the existence. of the material world, is able to indicate the origin of
these results? If, yielding to the suggestions of our nature and the
requisitions of our belief, we seek for a cause external to ourselves, we
find a satisfactory explanation; otherwise we may expect to find none of
any kind.
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AND IDEALISM. 145 ~ 96. The senses as much grounds of belief as other
parts of our constitution. Furthermore, it must be admitted, as has
already been particularly stated and shown, that there are certain
original sources or grounds of belief in. our constitution. To say
otherwise would be to loosen and destroy the foundations of all knowledge,
whether that knowledge has relation to matter or mind. But what evidence
is there that there are such original sources of belief, or that any one
thing in particular is the foundation of such belief more than any other
thing? The answer is, our own internal consciousness and conviction, and
this merely; we are conscious of belief, and are able to trace it to the
occasions which give it rise. Now if we carefully examine our minds, we
shall find that the intimations of the senses as effectually cause belief
as any other source of evidence whatever. Our consciousness, ourl internal
conviction tells us, that our belief is as decisively regulated by the
perceptions, derived through the senses, as by our intuitive or inductive
perceptions; and that they are as much a ground of knowledge. We assert
this with confidence; therefore, if the senses are not a ground of belief
and knowledge, the way is fairly open for unlimited skepticism on all
subjects. It will in this case be impossible to fix upon anything whatever
which is to be received as evidence, and men must give up all knowledge of
intellect as well as matter, and will be at once released from all moral
obligation. ~ 97. Opinions of Locke on the testimony of the senses. As the
satisfactory understanding of this subject is of much practical
importance, we shall close what has been said upon it by some passages
from Mr. Locke. — " If, after all this," he says, in the Fourth Book of
his Essay, " any one will be so skeptical as to distrust his senses, and
to affirm that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during
our whole being, is but I. -G
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146 OF RELIANCE ON THE SENSES. the series and deluding appearalices of a
long dream, whereof there is no reality; and, therefore, will question the
existence of all things, or our knowledge of anything; I must desire him
to consider that, if all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes
the question; and so it is not much matter that a waking man should answer
him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I make him this answer,
that the certainty of things existing in rerumn, nzatutrca, when we have
the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can
attain to, but as our condition needs. For our faculties being suited not
to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive
knowledge of things, free from all doubt and scruple, but to the
preservation of us in whom they are, and accommodated to the nlse of life,
they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give ius certain
notice of those things which are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he
that sees a candle burning, and hath experimented the force of its flame
by puttinlg his finger in it, will little doubt that this is something
existing without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great pain;
which is assurance enough, when no manil requires greater certainty to
govern his actions by than what is as certain as his actions themselves.
And if our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass
furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy, by
putting his hand into it he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty
greater than he could wish, that it is something more than bare
imagination. So that this evidence is as great as we can desire, being as
certain to us as our pleasure or pain, i. e., happiness or misery, beyond
which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being. Such an
assurance of the existence of things without us is sufficient to direct us
in the attaining the good and avoiding the evil which is caused by them,
which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with
them."
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I-ABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 147 CHAPTER IX. HABITS OF SENSATION
AND PERCEPTION. ~ 98. General view of the law of habit and of its
applications. WE proceed now, in accordance with an intimation at the
close of the 7th Chapter, to the consideration of a great mental
principle, generally known as the law of HABIT. We sometimes speak of
Habit as a law, and sometimes as a power. The term law denotes a fixed
line or mode of action; but if the action has a beginning, and if it tends
to certain fixed results, which could not otherwise have existed, it
implies the existence somewhere of power. But if it should be conceded,
that it is proper to speak of IHabit as a mental power (a view ill support
of which much might be said), it is not in any proper sense of the terms a
Cognitive power; in other words, it does not directly and by its own
action originate or increase our knowledge; but it oftentimes very greatly
aids the action of the faculties of cognition as well as the emotional and
other susceptibilities. And this is sufficient to justify us in speaking
of it as one of the Auxiliary powers of the nind, and in giving it this
early consideration. But in this case as in others our attention will be
directed chiefly to results. The result, which is involved in a Habit, is
this: Thiat the mental action acquires'facility and strength Jfrom
repetition or practice. The fact that the facility and the increase of
strength implied in HABIT is owing to mere repetition, or what is more
frequently termed practice, we learn, as we do other facts and principles
in relation to the mind, from the observation of men around us, and from
our own personal experience. And as it has hitherto been found wholly
impracticable to resolve it into any general fact or principle more
elementary, it may justly be regarded as something ultimate and essential
in our nature.
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148 IABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. The term Habit, by the use of
language,indicates the facility and strength acquired in the way which has
been mentioned, including both the result and thle manner of it. As the
law of habit has reference to the whole mind of minM, the application of
the term which expresses it is of course very extensive. We apply it to
the dexterity of workmen in the different manual arts, to the rapidity of
the accountant, to the coup d'ceil or eye-glance of the military engineer,
to the tact and fluency of the extemporaneous speaker, and in other like
instances. We apply it also in cases where the mere exercise of emotion
and desire is concerned; to the avaricious man's love of wealth, the
ambitious man's passion for distinction, the wakeful suspicions of the
jealous, and the confirmed and substantial benevolence of the
philanthropist. It is remarkable, that the law under consideration holds
good in respect to the body as well as the mind. In the mechanical arts,
and in all cases where there is a corporeal as well as mental effort, the
effect of practice will be found to extend to both. Not only the acts of
the mind are quickened and strengthened, but all those muscles which are
at such times employed, become stronger and more obedient to the will.
Indeed, the submission of the muscular effort to the volition is
oftentimes rendered so prompt by habit, that we are unable distinctly to
recollect any exercise of volition previous to the active or muscular
exertion. It is habit which is the basis of those characteristic
peculiarities that distinguish one man's handwriting from another's; it is
habit which causes that peculiarity of attitude and motion, so easily
discoverable in most persons, termed their gait; it is habit also which
has impressed on the muscles immediately connected with the organs of
speech, that fixed and precise form of action, which, in different
individuals, gives rise, in part at least, to characteristics of voice.
The habit in the cases just mentioned is both bodily and mental, and has
become so strong, that it is hardly possible to counteract it for any
lengthl of time.L-The great law
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HABITS OF SENSATION AD PERCEPTION. 149 of Habit, which is a Power as well
as a Law, is applicable to all the leading divisions of our mental nature,
the Intellect, the Sensibilities; the Will; and as we advance from one
view of the mllind to another, we shall have repeated occasion to notice
its influence. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall limit our
remarks to habit, considered in connexion with the Sensations and
Perceptions. ~ 99. Of habit in relation to the smell. We shall consider
the application of the principle of Habit to the senses in the same order
which has already been observed.; In the first place, therefore, there are
habits of Smell. —This sense, like the others, is susceptible of
cultivation. As there are some persons whose power of distinguishing the
difference between two or more colours is feeble, so there are some who
are doubtful and perplexed, in like manner, in the discrimination of
odours. And as the inability mllay be overcome in some measure ill the
former case, so it may be in the latter. The fact that the powers of which
the smell is capable are not more frequently brought out and quickened, is
owing to the circumstance that it is not ordinarily needed. It sometimes
happens, however, that men are colnpelled to make an nncommon use of it,
when, by a defect in the other senses, they are left without the ordinary
helps to knowledge. It is then we see the effects of the law of Habit. It
is stated in 1'Mr. Stewart's account of James Mitchell, who was deaf,
sightless, speechless, and, of course, strongly induced by his unfortunate
situation to maike much use of the sense we are considering, that his
smell would immediately and invariably inform him of the presence of a
stranger, and direct to the place where he might be; and it is repeatedly
asserted, tlhat this sense had become in him extremely acute.-" It is
related," says Dr. Abercrombie, "of the late Dr. Moyse, the well-kinown
blind philosopher, that he could distinguish a black dress on his friends
by its smell."
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1'50 HABITS OF SENSATION A-ND PERCEPTION. In an interesting account of a
deaf, dumb, and blind girl in the Hartford Asylum recently published,
statements are made on this subject of a similar purport. -" It has been
observed," says the writer," of persons who are. deprived of a particular
sense, that additional quickness or vigour seems to be bestowed on those
which remain. That blind persons are often distinguished by peculiar
exquisiteness of touch, and the deaf and dumb, who gain all their
knowledge through the eye, concentrate, as it were, their whole souls in
that channel of observation. With her whose eye, ear, and tongue are alike
dead, the capabilities both of touch and smell are exceedingly heightened.
Especially the latter seems almost to have acquired the properties of a
new sense, and to transcend the sagacity even of a spaniel." —Such is the
influence of habit onl the intimations of the sense under consideration. ~
100. Of habit in relation to the taste. The same law is applicable to the
Taste. We see the results of the frequent exercise of this sense in the
quickness which the dealer in wines discovers in distinguishing the
flavour of one wine from that of alnother. So marked are the results in
cases of this kind, that one is almost disposed to credit the story which
Cervantes relates of two persons who were requested to pass their judgment
upon a hogshead, which was supposed to be very old and excellent.. One of
them tasted the wine, and pronounced it to be very good, with the
exception of a slight taste of leather which le perceived in it. The
other, after mature reflection and examination, pronounced the same
favourable verdict, with the exception of a taste of iron, which he could
easily distinguish. On emptying the hogshead, there was found at the
bottom an old key with a leathern thong tied to it. Another practical view
of this subject, however, presents itself here. The sensations which we
experience in this and in other like cases, not only acquire by repetition
greater niceness and discrimination, but in
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IIABIT'S OF SENSATION AND PERCElPTION. 151 creased strength (and perhaps
the increased strength is in all instances the foundation of the greater
power of discrimination). On this topic we have a wide and lelanchloly
source of illustration. The bibber of Mwine and the drinker of ardent
spirits readily acknowledge, that the sensation was at first only
moderately pleasing, and perhaps in the very slightest degree. Every time
they carried the intoxicating potion to their lips, the sensation grew
more p)leasing, and the desire for it -waxed stronger. Perhaps they were
not aware that tlis p'rocess was going on in virtue of a great law of
hlnnanity; bnut they do not pretend to deny the fact. They mnight, indeed,
have suspected at an early period that chains were gathering around them,
whatever might be the cause; but what objection had they to be bouncld
with links of flowers; delightful while they lasted, and easily broken
wvhen necessary! But here was the mistake. Link vw,;as added to link,
chain was woven with chain, till lie who boasted of his strength was at
last made sensible of his weakness, and foulnd himself a prisoner, a
captive, a deformed, altered, alnd degraded slave. There is a threefold
operation. The sensation of taste acquires an enhanced degree of
pleasantness; the feeling of uneasiness is increased in a corresponding
measnure wheln the sensation is not indulged by drinkinog; and the desire,
which is necessarily attendant on the nneasy feeling, becomes in like
mLanner more and more imperative. To alleviate the uneasy feeling and this
importunate desire, the unhappy nan goes again to his cups, and with a
shaky hand pours down the delicious poison. AVhat then? Ile has added a
new link to his chain; at every repetition it grows heavier and heavier;
till that, which at first lie bore lightly aind cheerfully, now presses
hinm like a coat of iron, and galls like fetters of steel. There is a
great and fearful law of his nature bearing him down to destruction. Every
indulogence is the addition of a new weight to what was before placed upon
hlini, thus lesseninig the probability of escape, and accelerating
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152 IHABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. his gloomy, fearful, and
interminable sinking. Ve do not mean to say that he is the subject of an
implacable destiny, and cannot help himself. But it would seem that he can
help himself only in this way; by a prompt, absolute, and entire
suspension of the practice in all its forms, which has led him into this
extremity. ]But few, however, have the resolution to do this; the
mulltitCude Lmake a few unllilling and feeble efforts, and resign
themselves to the horrors of their fate. Some years since there was a
pamlphlet published in England, entitled the Confessions of a Drunkarc.
The statements made in it are asserted on good authority to be authentic.
Alcld what does the writer say 2 — " my condition there is no hope that it
should ever change; the -waters have gone over me; but out of the black
depths, could I be heardc, I w ould cry out to all those who have but set
a foot in the perilous flood. Could the youlth, to whom the flavour of his
first wine is clelicious as the opening scenes of life, or the entering
upon some newly-discovered paradise, look into my desolation, and be made
to understand what a dreary thing it is when a man shall feel himself
going down a precipice with open eyes and a passive Arill; to see his
destruction, and have no porwer to stop it, and yet to feel it all the way
emanating from himself; to perceive all goodness -emptied out of him, and
yet not be able to forget a time when it wras otherwise; to bear about the
piteous spectacle of his own self-ruin; could he see my fevered eye,
feverish with last night's drinking, and feverishly looking for this
night's repetition of the folly; could lie feel the body of the death of
which I cry hourly, with feebler and feebler outcry, to be delivered, it
were enough to make him dlash the sparkling beverage to the earth in all
the pride of its mantling temptation."'0 ~ 101. Of habit in relation to
the hearing. There is undoubtedly a natural difference in the quickness
ancd discrimination of hearing. This sense * London Quarterly Review, vol.
xxvii., p. 120.
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HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 153 is more acute in some than in
others; but in those who possess it in much natural excellence, it is
susceptible of a high degree of cultivation. Musicians are a proof of
this, whose sensibility to the melody and concord of sweet sounds
continually increases with the practice of their art. This increase of
sensibility in the perceptions of hearing is especially marked and evident
when uncommon causes have operated to secure such practice. And this is
the state of things with the Blind. The readers of Sir Walter Scott may
not have forgotten the blind fiddler, >who figures so conspicuously with
verse and harp in Red Gauntlet; a character sufficiently extraordinary,
but by no means an improbable exaggeration. The blind necessarily rely
much more than others on the sense of hearing. By constant practice they.
increase the accuracy and power of its perceptions. Shut out from the
beauties that are seen, they please themselves with what is heard, and
greedily drink in the melodies of song. Accordingly, music is made by them
not only a solace, but a business and a means of support; and in the
Institutions for the Blind this is considered an important department of
instruction. -Many particular instances on record, and well authenticated,
confirm the general statement, that the ear may be trained to habits, and
that thus the sensations of sound may come to us with new power and
meaning. It is related of a celebrated blind man of Puiseaux in France,
that he could determine the quantity of fluid in vessels by the sound it
produced while runling from one vessel into another.: "Dr. Rush," as tihe
statement is given in Abercrombie's Intellectual Powers, "relates of two
blind young men, brothers, of the city of Philadelphia, that they knew
when they approached a post in walking across a street, by a peculiar
sound which the ground under their feet emitted in the neighbourhood of
the post; and that they could tell the names of a number of tame pigeons,
with which they amused themselves in a little garden, G2
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154 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. by only hearing them fly over
their heads." Dr. Salnderson, who became blind so early as not to remember
having seen, when happening in any new place, as a room, piazza, pavement,
court, and the like, gave it a character by means of the sound and echo
from his feet; and in that way was able to identify pretty exactly the
place, and assure himself of his position afterward. A wisiter in the
First Volume of the Manchester Philosophical Memoirs, who is our authority
also for the statement just made, speaks of a certain blind man in that
city as follows: "I had an opportunity of repeatedly observing the
peculiar manner in which he arranged his ideas and acquired his
infornation. Whenever he was introduced into company, I remarked that he
continued some time silent. -.The sound directed him to judge of the
dimensions of the room, and the different voices of the number of persons
that were present. His distinction in these respects was very accurate,
and his memory so retentive that he was seldom mistaken. I have known him
instantly recognise a person on first hearing him, though more than two
years had elapsed since the time of their last meeting. He determined
pretty nearly the stature of those he was conversing with by the direction
of their voices; and he made tolerable conjectures respecting their
tempers and dispositions by the manner in which they conducted their
conversation." ~ 102. Of certain universal habits based on sounds. There
are certain habits of hearing (perhaps we should say classes of habits)
which all men, by the aid of the other senses, combined with that of the
judgment, form at an early period of life. The first class of habits here
referred to are those which have relation to the particular cause anld the
distance of sounds. The manner in which we learn these has been pointed
out in a previous section (~ 66). The mere sensations of sound are
entirely a distinct thing from the ideas of cause, place, and direction,
which we generally coin
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HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 155 bine with them. Owing to frequent
repetition from early life, this combination is effected so rapidly, that
we are unable to retrace the successive steps of the process, and the
whole seems to be involved in a single sensation. Perhaps it may be said
that the effect of repetition (that is to say, the I-IABIT) has more
direct and special relation to the act of judgment, which combines the
reference with the sensation, than to the sensation itself. However tllhat
may be, it may still be proper to speak of habits of hearing in the
respect now under consideration, when we remember that the reference has
been so long and closely interwoven with the sensation as to be apparently
and practically, though not really, identical -with it. I In respect to
spoken language also, our habits are so laboriously and deeply founded,
that we may almost consider ourselves as having a new sense superadded to
that of hearing. In our ordinary conversation with others, we seem to hear
the whole of what is said; nothing is lost, as we imagine. But that this
is not the fact, and that we are sustained in such cases not wholly by an
actual sensation of sound, but in part, at least, by an acqluired power of
HABIT, iS evident from this. When we hear proper names, whether of
persons, places, or natural objects, pronoumnced for the first time, we
often hesitate in respect to them; are not certain that we possess the
syllables intended to be conveyed, and ask for the repetition of them. We
experience the same difficulty and uncertainty, as every one must have
known who has tried it, when we hear a person read or converse in a
foreign language. But when the conversation is in our own language, and
relates to persons and objects we are acquainted with, it is altogether
different, as has already been intimated. But what is the ground of the
difference? Why are we perplexed in one case and not in the other 2-In our
intercourse with others in conversation, it almost constantly happens (at
least as much so as on any other occasions), that the ear catches nothing
but imperfect syllables, half-uttered words, sounds jumbled and com
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156 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. mingled together; but we are
nevertheless not commonly at a loss and perplexed, as in the cases before
mentioned. By the aid of judgment, and the power of conception, whose
action has in this case, by long repetition, formed itself into a prompt
and decisive habit, we at once separate these confused elements, supply
the breaks in their connexion, fill up the deficiencies, and make out a
continuous and significant whole. And yet this is done so rapidly, and is
so common, that in most cases we imagine there is nothing more than the
pure and unmixed sensation. ~ 103. Application of habit to the touch. The
sense of touch, like the others, may be exceedingly improved by habit. The
more we are obliged to call it into use, the more attention we pay to its
intimations. By the frequent repetition, therefore, under such
circumstances, these sensations not only acquire increased intenseness in
themselves, but particularly so in reference to our notice and
rememnbrance of them. But it is desirable to confirm this, as it is all
other principles from time to time laid down, by an appeal to facts, and
by careful inductions from them. Diderot relates of the blind man of
Puiseaux mentioned in a former section, that he was capable of judging of
his distance from the fireplace by the degree of heat, and of his approach
to any solid bodies by the action or pulse of the air upon his face. The
same thing is recorded of many other persons in a similar situation;* and
it may be regarded as a point * It is a singular circumstance, that
something similar to what is here stated of the ability of blind men to
discover the nearness or distance of objects by changes in the resistance
of the atmosphere, has been noticed by the naturalist Spallanzani in
respect to bats. He discovered that bats, when perfectly blinded and
afterward set at liberty, had the extraordinary faculty of guiding
themselves through the most complicated windings of subterraneous
passages, without striking against the walls, and they avoided with great
skill cords, branches of trees, and other obstacles, placed by design in
their way. This ability is probably owing to an extreme delicacy in the
wing, which is of a very large size in proportion to that of the animal,
and
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HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 157 well established, that blind
people, who are unable to see the large and heavy bodies presenting
themselves in their way as they walk about, generally estimate their
approach to them by the increasing resistance of the atmosphere. A blind
person, owing to the increased accuracy of his remaining senses,
especially of the touch, would be better trusted to go through the
apartments of a house in the darkness of midnight, than one possessed of
the sense of seeing without any artificial light to guide him. In the
celebrated Dr. Saunderson, who lost his sight in very early youth, and
remained blind through life, although he occupied the professorship of
mathematics in the English University of Cambridge, the touch acquired
such acuteness that he could distinguish, by merely letting them pass
through his fingers, spurious coins, which were so well executed as to
deceive even skilful judges who could see.* The case of a Mr. John
Metcalf, otherwise called Blind Jack, which is particularly dwelt upon by
the author of the Article in the Memoirs just referred to, is a striking
one. The writer states that he became blind at an early period; but,
notwithstanding, followed the profession of a wagoner, and occasionally of
a guide in intricate roads during the night, or when the tracks were
covered with snow. At length he became a projector and surveyor of
highways in difficult and mountainous districts; an employment for which
one would naturally suppose a blind man to be but indifferently qualified.
But he was found to answer all the expectations of his employers, and most
of the roads over the peak in Derbyshire, in England, were altered by his
directions. Says the person who gives this account of Blind Jack, " I have
several times met is covered with an exceedingly fine network of nerves.
The bat, as it strikes the air with its wings, receives sensations of
heat, cold, and resistance, and, in consequence, is enabled to avoid
objects which would otherwise obstruct its flight, apparently in the same
way that blind persons perceive a door or a wall by a change in the
temperature or in the resistance of the air. * Memoirs of Manchester
Philos. Society, vol. i., p. 164.
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158 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION, this man, with the assistance of a
long staff traversing the roads, ascending precipices, exploring valleys,
and investigating their several extents, forms, and situations, so as to
answer his designs in the best manner." In the interesting Schools for the
Blind'which have recently been established in various parts of the world,
the pupils read by means of the fingers. They very soon learn by the touch
to distinguish one letter from another, which are made separately for that
purpose of wood, metals, or other hard materials. The printed sheets which
they use are conformed to their method of studying them. The types are
much larger than those ordinarily used in printing; the paper is very
thick, and, being put upon the types while wet, and powerfully pressed,
the letters on it are consequently raised, and appear in relief. The
pupils, having before learned to distinguish one letter from another, and
also to combine them into syllables and words, are able, after a time, to
pass their fingers along the words and sentences of these printed sheets,
and ascertain their meaning with a good degree of rapidity. Perhaps it may
occasion some surprise when we add, that men may not only read by the
touch, but may even find a substitute for the hearing in that sense.
Persons who were entirely deaf have in some instances discovered a
perception of the proportion and harmony of sounds. "It will scarcely be
credited," says an English writer, speaking of one in that situation,
"that a person thus circumstanced should be fond of music; but this was
the fact in the case of Mr. Arrowsmith. He was at a gentleman's glee club,
of which I was president at that time,'and, as the glees were sung, he
would place himself near some article of wooden furniture, or a partition,
door, or window-shutter, and would fix the extreme end of his finger
nails, which he kept rather long, upon the edge of some projecting part of
the wood, and there remain until the piece under performance was finished,
all the while expressing, by the most significant gestures, the pleasure
he experienced
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HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 159 from the perception of musical
sounds. Hle was not so mnuch pleased with a solo as with a pretty full
clash of harmony; and if the music was not very good, or I should rather
say, if it was not correctly executed, he would show no sensation of
pleasure. But the most extraordinary circumstance in this case is, that he
was most evidently delighted with those passages in which the composer
displayed his science in modulating the different keys. When such passages
happened to be executed with precision, he could scarcely repress the
emotions of pleasure which he received. within any bounds; for the delight
he evinced seemed to border on ecstasy.'+ ~ 104. Other striking instances
of habits of touch. The power of the touch will increase in proportion to
the necessity of a reliance on it. The more frequent the resort to it, the
stronger will be the habit;' but the necessity of this frequent reference
to it will be found to be peculiarly great where a person is deprived of
two of his other senses. It is noticed of James Mitchell, whose case has
been already referred to, that lie distinguished such articles as belonged
to himself from the property of others by this sense. Although the
articles were of the same form and materials with those of others, it
would seem that- he was not at a loss in identifying what was his own. It
will be recollected that he could neither see nor hear, and was, of
course, speechless. He was obliged, therefore, to depend chiefly on the
touch. This sense was the principal instrument he made use of in forming
an acquaintance with the strangers who frequently visited him. And what is
particularly remarkable, he actually explored by it, at an early period, a
space round his father's residence of about two hundred yards in extent,
to any part of which he was in the practice of walking fearlessly and
without a guide whenever he pleased. It is related of the deaf and blind
girl in the Hart* London Quarterly Review, vol. xxvi., p. 404.
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160 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. ford Asylum, that it is impossible
to displace a single article in her drawers without her perceiving and
knowing it; and that, when the baskets of linen are weekly brought from
the laundress, she selects her own garments without hesitation, however
widely they may be dispersed among the mass. This is probably owing, at
least in great part, to habits of touch, by means of which the sense is
rendered exceedingly acute.-Diderot has even gone so far as to conjecture
that persons deprived of both sight and hearing would so increase the
sensibility of touch as to locate the seat of the soul in the tips of the
fingers. ~ 105. Habits considered in relation to the sight. The law of
habit affects the sight also. By a course of training this sense seems to
acquire new power. The length and acuteness of vision in the mariner who
has long traversed the ocean has been frequently referred to.-A writer in
the North American Review (July, 1833) says he once " knew a man in the
Greek Island of Hydra, who was accustomed to take his post every day for
thirty years on the summit of the island, and look out for the approach of
vessels; and, although there were over three hundred sail belonging to the
island, he would tell the name of each one as she approached with unerring
certainty, while she was still at such a distance as to present to a
comnmon eye only a confused white blur upon the clear horizon.' There are
numerous instances to the same effect, occasioned by the situations in
which men are placed, and the calls for the frequent exercise of the
sight. The almost intuitive vision of the skilful engineer is, beyond
doubt, in most cases merely a habit. He has so often fixed his eye upon
those features in a country which have a relation to his peculiar calling,
that he instantly detects the bearing of a military position, its
susceptibility of defence, its facilities of approach and retreat, &c. No
man is born without the sense of touch, but many are born without the
sense of hearing; and,
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IfABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 161 wherever this is the case, we are
entitled to look for habits of sight. Persons under such circumstances
naturally and necessarily rely much on the visual sense, whatever aids may
be had by them from the touch. Hence habits; and these imply increased
qiickness and power wherever they exist. It is a matter of common remark,
that the keenness of visual observation in the DEAF and DUMB is strikingly
increased by their peculiar circumstances. Shut out from the intercourse
of speech, they read the minds of men in their movements, gestures, and
countenances. They notice with astonishing quickness, and apparently
without any effort, a thousand things which escape the regards of others.
This fact is undoubtedly the foundation of the chief encouragement which
men have to attempt the instruction of that numerous and unfortunate class
of their fellow-beings. They can form an opinion of what another says to
them by the motion of the lips, and sometimes even with a great degree of
accuracy. That this last, however, is common it is not necessary to
assert; that it is possible, we have the testimony of well-authenticated
facts. In one of his letters, Bishop Burnet mentions to this effect the
case of a young lady of Geneva.-" At two years old," he says, " it was
perceived that she had lost her hearing, and ever since, though she hears
great noises, yet hears nothing of what is said to her; but, by observing
the motion of the lips and mouths of others, she acquired so many words,
that out of these she has formed a sort of jargon, in which she can hold
conversation whole days with those who can speak her language. She knows
nothing of what is said to her unless she sees the motion of their lips
that speak to her; one thing will appear the strangest part of the whole
narrative. She has a sister with whom she has practised her language more
than with anybody else, and in the night, by laying her hand on her
sister's mouth, she can perceive by that what she says, and so can
discourse with her in the dark." (London Quarterly Review, vol. xxiv., p.
399.)
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162 H ABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. Such are the views which have
been opened to us in considering the law of HABIT in connexion with the
senses; and we may venture to say, with confidence, that they are
exceedingly worthy of notice. There are two suggestions which they are
especially fitted to call up. They evince the striking powers of the human
mind, its irrepressible energies, which no obstacles can bear down. They
evince also the benevolence of our Creator, who opens in the hour of
misery new sources of comfort, and compensates for what we have not by
increasing the power and value of what we have. ~ 106. Sensations may
possess a relative as well as positive increase of power. There remains a
remark of some importance to be made in connexion with the general
principle which has been brought forward, and as in some measure auxiliary
to it; for it will help to explain the more striking instances of habits,
if any should imagine that the fact of mere repetition is not sufficient
to account for them. Our sensations and perceptions may acquire not only a
direct and positive, but a relative and virtual increase of power. This
remark is thus explained. We shall hereafter see the trutlh of an
important principle to this effect, that there will be a weakness of
remembrance in any particular case in proportion to the want of interest
in it. Now hundreds and thousands of our sensations and perceptions are
not remembered because we take no interest in them. Of course they are the
same, relatively to our amount of knowledge and our practice, as if they
had never existed at all. But when we are placed in some novel Situation,
or when, in particular, we are deprived of any one of the senses, the
pressure of our necessities creates that interest which was wanting
before. Then we delay upon, and mark, and remember, and interpret a
multitude of evanescent intimations which were formerly neglected. The
senses thus acquire a very considerable relative power and value. And, in
order to make out a
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HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 163 satisfactory explanation of some
instances of habits, it is perhaps necessary that this relative increase
should be added to the direct and positive augmentation of vigour and
quickness, resulting from mere repetition or exercise. ~ 107. Of habits as
modified by particular callings or arts. Hitherito it has been our chief
object to examine habits in their relation to the senses separately; it is
proper, also, to take a general view of them, as formed and modified by
the particular callings and employ-ments of men. Habits of perception are
frequently formed under such circumstances, where all the senses are not
only possessed, but where they exist with their ordinary aptitudes and
powers. In consequence of the habits which he has been called upon to form
by his particular situation, a farmer of a tolerable degree of experience
and discernment requires but a slight inspection in order to give an
opinion on the qualities of a piece of land, and its suitableness for a
settlement. A skilful printer will at once notice everything of excellence
or of deficiency in the mechanical execution of a printed work.-The same
results are found in all who practise the fine arts. An experienced
painter at once detects a mannerism in colouring, combinations and
contrasts of light and shade, and peculiarities of form proportion, or
position, which infallibly escape a person of more limited experience. Dr.
Reid speaks on this subject in the following characteristic manner. —" Not
only men, but children, idiots, and brutes, acquire by habit many
perceptions which they had not originally. Almost every employment in life
hath perceptions of this kind that are peculiar to it. The shepherd knows
every sheep of his flock, as we do our acquaintance, and can pick them out
of another flock one by one. The butcher lknows by sight the weight and
quality of his beeves and sheep before they are killed. The farmer
perceives by his eye very nearly the quantity of hay in a rick, or of corn
in a heap. The:sailor sees the bur
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164 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. den, the build, and the distance
of a ship at sea, while she is a great way off. Every man accustomed to
writing, distinguishes acquaintances by their handwriting as he does by
their faces. And the painter distinguishes by the works of his art the
style of all the great masters. In a word, acquired perception is very
different in different persons, according to the diversity of objects
about which they are employed, and the application they bestow in
observing them."@ ~ 108. The law of habit considered in reference to the
perception of the outlines and forms of objects. Before leaving the
subject of Habit, considered as influencing Sensation and Perception,
there is one other topic which seems to be entitled to a brief notice; we
refer to the manner in which we perceive the outlines and forms of bodies.
In discussing the subject of Attention, Mr. Stewart, in connexion with his
views on that subject, introduces some remarks in respect to vision. He
makes this supposition, That the eye is fixed in a particular position,
and the picture of an object is painted on the retina. He then starts this
inquiry: Does the mind perceive the complete figure of the object at once,
or is this perception the result of various perceptions we have of the
different points in the outline a-He holds the opinion, that the
perception is the result of our perceptions of the different points in the
outline, which he adopts as naturally consequent on such views as the
following. The outline of every body is made up of points or smallest
visible portions; no two of these points call be in precisely the same
direction; therefore every point by itself constitutes just as distinct an
object of attention to the mind, as if it were separated by some interval
of empty space from all the other points. The conclusion therefore is, as
every body is made up of parts, and as the perception of the figure of the
whole object implies a knowledge of the relative situation of the
different parts with respect to each other, that such * Reid's Inquiry
into the Human Mind, chap. vi., ~ 20.
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HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 165 perception is the result of a
number of different acts of attention. But if we adopt this view of Mr.
Stewart, it is incumbent upon us to show how it happens that we appear to
see the object at once. The various facts which have been brought forward
in this chapter, appear to furnish us with a solution of this question.
The answer is, that the acts of perception are performed with such
rapidity, that the effect with respect to us is the same as if it were
instantaneous. A habit has been formed; the glance of the mind, in the
highest exercise of that habit, is indescribably quick; time is virtually
annihilated; and separate moments are to our apprehension of them crowded
into one. ~ 109. Notice of some facts which favour the above doctrine.
Some persons will probably entertain doubts of Mr. Stewart's explanation
of the manner in which we perceive the outlines of objects; but there are
various circumstances which tend to confirm it.-When we look for the first
time on any object which is diversified with gaudy colours, the mind is
evidently perplexed with the variety of perceptions which arise; the view
is indistinct, which would not be the case if there were only one, and
that an immediate perception. And even in paintings, which are of a more
laudable execution, the effects at the first perception will be similar.
But there is another fact, which comes still more directly to the present
point. We find that we do not have as distinct an idea, at the first
glance, of a figure of a hundred sides, as we do of a triangle or square.
But we evidently should, if the perception of visible figure were the
immediate consequence of the picture on the retina, and not the combined
result of the separate perceptions of the points in the outline. Whenever
the figure is very simple, the process of the mind is so very rapid that
the perception seems to be instantaneous. But when the sides are
multiplied beyond a certain number, the interval of time necessary for
these different acts of attention becomes perceptible.
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166 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. We are then distinctly conscious
that the mind labours from one part of the object to another, and that
some time elapses before we grasp it as a whole. ~ 110. Additional
illustrations of Mr. Stewart's doctrine. These views and illustrations are
still further colifirmed by some interesting and, perhaps, more decisive
facts. In 1807, Sir Everard Home, well known for his various philosophical
publications, read before the Royal Society an account of two blind
children whom he had couched for the cataract. One of these was John
Salter. Upon this boy various experiments were made, for the purpose,
among other things, of ascertaining whether the sense of sight does
originally, and of itself alone, give us a knowledge of the true figure of
bodies. Some of the facts elicited under these circumstances have a
bearing upon tihe subject now before us. In repeated instances on the day
of' his restoration to sight, the boy called square and triangular bodies,
which were presented to the visual sense merely, rotund. On a square body
being presented to him, he expressed a desire to touch it. "This being
refused, he examined it for some time, and said at last that he had found
a corner, and then readily counted the four corners of the square; and
afterward, when a triangle was shown him, he counted the corners in the
same way; but, in doing so, his eye went along the edge from corner to
corner, naming them as he went along." On the thirteenth day after the
cataract was removed,the visual power he had acquired was so small that he
could not, by sight, tell a square from a circle, without previously
directing his sight to the corners of the square figure as he did at
first, and thus passing from corner to corner, and counting them one by
one. It was noticed that the sight seemed to labour slowly onward from one
point and angle to another, as if it were incapable of embracing the
outline by a simultaneous and undivided movement. The process, however,
became more and more easy and rapid, until the perception, which at first
was obvious
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MUSCULAR HABITS. 16T ly made up of distinct and successive acts, came to
be in appearance (and we must suppose it was only in appearance) a
concentrated and single one. It was the same with Caspar iHauser. It is
remarked by his biographer, that, whenever a person was introduced to him
(this was probably soon after his release from his prison), he went up
very close to him, regarded him with a sharp, staring look, and noticed
particularly each distinct part of his face, such as the forehead, eyes,
nose, mouth, and chin. HIe then collected.and consolidated all the
different parts of the countenance, which he had noticed separately and
piece by piece, into one whole. And it was not till after this process
that he seemed to have a knowledge of the countenance or face, in
distinction from {le parts of the face. CHAPTER X. MUSCULAR HIABITS. ~
111. Instances in proof of the existence of muscular habits. FnoM habits,
considered as affecting the senses, the transition is easy to MUSCULAR
HABITS. On this subject, therefore, we shall now offer a few remarks.-Of
the fact that such habits exist, it is presumed no doubt can be generally
entertained. Muscular habits may be detected in the gait and in the speech
of men generally; they are found with specific characteristics in
particular classes of men; every mechanic forms them, and they vary in
their aspect with his particular business. Hence the enlarged and powerful
neck of the porter, the strong and brawny arm of the blacksmith, and the
particular habitudes of all their movements. But we will not delay on this
part of the subject any further than to point out one or two familiar
instances.-Every man's handwriting is a striking instance and a proof of
Muscular habit. In acquiring that art, the muscles have undergone a
complete sys
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168 MUSCULAR HABITS. tem of instruction. That instruction and training
they practically and punctually regard ever afterward; so much so that we
can tell a man's writing to which we are accustomed almost as readily as
we recognise the man himself when we see him.-Again, walking is an
instance and illustration of muscular habits. The process of walking is an
easy one; but it is made so by a habit, founded upon a long and difficult
training; and every man has his particular habit or method of walking. We
see evidence that habit is involved in walking in children, who obviously
do not walk by mere instinct, but learn to do it by repeated experiments
made upon the muscles of motion. Not long since, a singular fact came to
the knowledge of the writer, which confirms this remark. A man was
accidentally thrown from his cart, and the wlieel of the cart passed over
his neck and injured his spine. For six weeks he was destitute of the
power of sensation and motion. About that time his sensation was restored,
and the variouis parts of the body were again subjected to the general
control of the will. But he could not walk nor use his arms to any
profitable purpose; not because he was destitute of the voluntary and
muscular power, but because he unexpectedly found himself at a loss to
determine what particular muscles to employ, in order to produce the
desired result. If he wished, for example, to use an extensor muscle in
the arm or leg, he was just as likely to use a flexor as the one he
intended. In other words, he was about as likely to bend his arm, or to
turn his leg in or out, as to straighten them, and it was only by repeated
experiments lhe could ascertain the particular muscles which he wished to
use. In everything relating to bodily action, he was thrown back into the
condition of early childhood, and it was not till after a long and tedious
process of experimenting on the numerous muscles of motion, that he was
enabled to walk and to labour as he was accustomed to do before his
injury. There are, then, muscular habits as well as habits of sensation
and perception. -But the subject of these habits is introduced
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MUSCULARLI HABITS. 169 here, although the train of thought seemed
naturally to lead to it, not so much for its own sake as in consequence of
its connexion with volition. ~ 112. Muscalar habits regarded by some
writers as involuntary. It seems to have been the opinion of some writers
(among others of Drs. Reid and HIartley), that bodily or muscular habits
operate in many cases without design and volition on the part of the
person who has formed them; and that, as they are without any attendant
thought, without any preceding mental operation, such bodily acts are to
be considered as purely mechanical or automatic. They endeavour to explain
and confirm their views by the instance of a person learning to play on
the harpsichord. When a person first begins to learn, it is admitted by
all that there is an express act of volition preceding every motion of the
fingers. By degrees, the motions appear to cling to each other
mechanically; we are no longer conscious of volitions preceding and
governing them. In other words, there is nothing left but the motions;
there is no act of the mind; the performance, admirable as it is, has the
same character and the same merit with that of the action of a
well-contrived machine. ~ 113. Objections to the doctrine of involuntry
muscular habits. In replying to these views, it may be safely admitted
that, in playing the harpsichord and some other musical instruments, we
have not always a distinct remembrance of volitions, and consequently the
muscular effort has sometimes the appearance of being independent of the
will. But this mere appearance is not sufficient to command our assent to
the doctrine advanced by these writers until the four following objections
be set aside. (1.) The supposition that the acts in question are automatic
is nnnecessary.-If it be true, as there is so much reason to believe, that
habit is a general law of our nature, then it may be regarded as
applicable not 1.-H
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170 MUSCULARg IABITS, only to the muscular efforts, but to the preceding
volditions themselves. It is implied in this view (supposing it to be a
correct one), that such volitions may be very rapid, so as scarcely to
arrest our attention a moment. Now the natural result of such slight
attention will be, that they will exist and pass away without being
remembered. These considerations are suffcient to explain the mere
appearance which is admitted to exist, but which Reid and Hartley attempt
to explain by an utter denial of the putting forth of volitions at all.
But, if this be the case, then the supposition that the acts in question
are automatic and involuntary, is an unnecessary one. (2.) The most rapid
performers on musical instruments are able, when they please, to play so
slowly that they can distinctly observe every act of the will in the
various movements of the fingers. And when they have checked their motions
so as to be able to observe the separate acts of volition, they can
afterward so accelerate those motions, and, of course, so diminish the
power (or, what may be regarded as the same thing, the time of attending
to them), that they cannot recall the accompanying volitions. This is the
rational and obvious supposition, that there is not an exclusion of
volitions, but an inability to recollect them, on account of the slight
degree of attention. Any other view necessarily implies an inexplicable
jumble of voluntary- and involuntary actions in the same performance. (3.)
If there be no volitions, the action must be strictly and truly automatic;
that is, it must, from the nature of the case, be the motion of a machine.
It must always go on invariably in the same track, without turning to the
right hand or to the left. If this be the case in playing the harpsichord,
which is by no mneans probable, it is certainly not in some other
instances of habits. It must be supposed, that there is as much rapidity
of volition put forth by the ropedancer, the equilibrist, the equestrian
actor of the circus, &c., as by the player on the harpsichord. Now
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MUSCULAR HABiTS. 171 if it be admitted that the ordinary steps of the
singular and surprising feats they perform are familiar to them, still the
process is evidently not an invariable one. It may be pronounced
impossible for them to perform experiments which agree in every particular
with preceding experiments. They are necessarily governed in their
volitions and movements by a variety of circumstances, which arise on
every particular occasion, and which could not be foreseen. Hence the
muscular movements in these cases, being controlled by the will, are not
mechanical; and as we have abundant reason to believe them often not less
rapid in the performance than the muscular movements are in playing the
harpsichord, why should we consider these last mechanical, and not
voluntary. (4.) And there is this additional consideration. If the
physical action becomes strictly automatic, being impelled onward by its
own law of movement, and at the same time placed beyond any volitional
control, it does not appear how it is to stop at all. And besides, if the
hypothesis of Reid and Hartley be true, then there is some general
tendency or principle in our nature by which actions originally voluntary
are converted into mechanical actions. Nor will it be easy to show why
this principle should not extend further than mere bodily movements. It
will be the result of this tendency to wrest all those powers which it
reaches, whether bodily or mental, from the control of the will. In other
words, when we consider the extent.)f its application, and its wonderful
results, wherever it applies, we must conclude that this principle will
infallibly make men machines, mere automatons, before they have lived out
half their days.-Such are some of the objections to the doctrine that
muscular habits are involuntary.
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172 THE CONCEPTIVE POWERI CHAPTER XI. THE CONCEPTIVE POWER.-CONCEPTIONS. ~
114. Conceptivity and characteristics of conceptions. HIAVING considered
the Power of sensation or Sensationality, whose results, strictly
considered, are wholly subjective or internal, and also the Power of
perception or Perceptivity, by means of which the sensations are connected
with their outward causes and thus give us a knowledge of the material
world, and further considered the modification of their action by means of
the auxiliary power of Habit, we proceed now to a third Cognitive power,
namely, the Conceptive power or Conceptivity. By means of the firstnamed
power alone, we should know nothing outside of ourselves; by means of the
second we have a knowledge of outward things, but we are limited in our
knowledge to the objects which are now before us. A little reflection,
therefore, shows us that we need another power, which will enable us to
keep our past knowledges in our possession, when the objects of knowledge
have passed beyond the reach of our senses. The power which enables us to
do this, and without which man would fall far below his present standard
of intelligence and happiness, is the Conceptive power. Undoubtedly the
basis of the existence and action of this faculty is found in the
antecedent existence and action of sensation and perception; but it has
its distinctive place and its appropriate laws and results. Some of the
marks or characteristics of the mental states, which owe their origin to.
Conceptivity, and are therefore called Conceptions, are as follows. (I.)
As already intimated in what has been said of the necessity of the
Conceptive power, conceptions differ in the first place from sensations
and perceptions in this respect, that the external objects which are
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CONCEPTIONS. 173 the foundation of them, and without which they never
could have existed, are not present. When the rose, the honeysickle, or
other odoriferous body is presented to us, the effect which follows in the
mind is termed a sensation. When we afterward think of that sensation (as
we sometimes express it), when the sensation is recalled, even though very
imperfectly, without the object which originally caused it being present,
it then becomes, by the use of language, a CONCEPTION. And it is the same
in instances of perception, considered as distinct from and additional to
sensation. When, inl strictness of speech, we are said to perceive
anything, as a tree, a building, or a mountain, the objects of our
perceptions are in all cases before us. But we may form conceptions of
them; they may be recalled and exist in the mincl's eye, however remote
they may be in fact, both in time and place. (II.) Conceptions differ also
from remembrances or ideas of memory. We take no account of the period,
the particular time, when those objects which laid the foundation of them
were present; whereas in every act of the memory there is combined with
the conception of the thing a notion also of the past time. It is true,
that without conceptions there would be no possibility of the exercise of
the power of memory; but remembrances, as we shall see when we come to the
consideration of that subject, are something more. Conceptions, therefore,
discriminated alike from what goes before and from what comes after, stand
by themselves; with their appropriate origin and name. And in addition to
what has been said there are some things further characteristic of them,
which we will now proceed to notice. ~ 115. Of conceptions of objects of
sight. One of the striking facts in regard to our conceptions is, that we
can far more easily conceive of the objects of some senses than of others.
lie who has beheld the pyramids of Egypt and the imposing remains of
Grecian temples, or has visited among Na
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174 THE CONCEPTIVE POTWER. ture's still greater works the towering heights
of the Alps and the cataract of Niagara, will never afterward be at a loss
in forming a vivid conception of those interesting objects. The visual
perceptions are so easily and so distinctly recalled, that it is hardly
too much to say of them that they seem to exist as permanent pictures in
the mind. It is related of Carsten Niebuhr, a well-known traveller in the
East, that, in extreme old age, after he had become blind, he entertained
his visitors with interesting details of what he had seen many years
before at Persepolis; describing the walls, on which the inscriptions and
bas-reliefs of which he spoke were found, just as one would describe a
building which he had recently visited. His son, who has given an account
of his life, remarks, in connexion with this fact, "we could not conceal
our astonishment. IIe said to us that, as he lay blind upon his bed, the
images of all that he had seen in the East were ever present to his soul;
and it was therefore no wonder that he should speak of them as of
yesterday. In like manner, there was vividly reflected to him, in the
hours of stillness, the nocturnal view of the deep Asiatic heavens, with
their brilliant host of stars, which he had so often contemplated, or else
their blue and lofty vault by day; and this was his greatest enjoyment."
There seems to be less vividness in the conceptions of sound, touch,
taste, and smell, particularly the last three. Every one knows that it is
difficult in ordinary cases to recall with much distinctness a particular
pain which we have formerly experienced, or a particular taste or smell.
The fact that the perceptions of sight are more easily and distinctly
recalled than others may be thus partially explained. —Visible objects,
or, rather, the outlines of them, are complex; that is, they are are made
up of a great number of points or very small portions. IHIence the
conception which we form of such an object as a whole is aided by the
principles of association. The reason is obvious. As every original
perception of a visible object
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CONCEPTIONS. 175 is a compound made up of many parts, whenever we
subsequently have a conception of it, the process is the same; we have a
conception of a part of the object, and the principles of association help
us in conceiving of the other parts. Association connects the parts
together; it presents them to the mind in their proper arrangement, and
helps to sustain them there. We are not equally aided by the laws of
association in forming our conceptions of the objects of the other senses.
In the latter case, the Associative power avails itself of the aid of the
principle of contiguity in time merely; while in the former (that is to
say, in the restoration of visual sensations and perceptions), it avails
itself of the additional principle of contiguity in place. This will be
better understood when we come to the subject of Association. ~ 116. Of
the influence of habit: on our conceptions. It is another circumstance
worthy of notice in regard to conceptions, that the power of forming them
depends in some measure on HAIT. —A few instances will help to illustrate
the statement, that what is termed Habit, and the auxiliary power involved
in it, may extend to the susceptibility of conceptions as well as to
sensations and perceptions; and the first to be given will be of
conceptions of sound. Our conceptions of sounds are not, in general,
remarkably distinct, as was intimated in the last section. It is
nevertheless true, that a person may, by practice, acquire the power of
amusing himself with merely reading written music. Having frequently
associated the sounds with the notes, he has at last such a strong
conception of the sounds, that he experiences by merely reading the notes
a very sensible pleasure. It is for the same reason, viz., because our
conceptions are strengthened by repetition or practice, that readers mav
enjoy the harmony of poetical numbers without at all articulating the
words. In both cases they truly hear nothing; there is no actual sensation
of sound, and yet there is a virtual enunciation and melody in the mind.
It
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176 THE CONCEPTIVE POWER. seems to be on this principle we are enabled to
explain the fact, that Beethoven composed some of his most valued musical
pieces after he had become entirely deaf; originating harmonic
combinations so profound and exquisite as to require the nicest ear as a
test, at the very time he was unable to hear anything himself. ~ 117.
Influence of habit on conceptions of sight. That our power of forming
conceptions is strengthened by habit, is capable of being further
illustrated from the sight. A person who has been accustomed to drawing
retains a much more perfect notion of a building, landscape, or other
visible object, than one who has not. A portrait painter, or any person
who has been in the practice of drawing such sketches, can trace the
outlines of the human form with very great ease; it requires hardly more
effort from them than to write their names.-This point may also be
illustrated by the difference which we sometimes notice in people in their
conceptions of colours. Some are fully sensible of the difference between
two colours when they are presented to them, but cannot with confidence
give names to these colours when they see them apart, and may even
confound the one with the other. Their original sensations and perceptions
are supposed to be equally distinct with those of other persons; but their
subsequent conception of the colours is far from being so. This defect
arises partly at least from want of practice; that is to say, from the not
having formed a habit. The persons who exhibit this weakness of conception
have not been compelled by their situation, nor by mere inclination, to
distinguish and to name colours so much as is common. ~ 118. Of the
subserviency of our conceptions to description. It is highly favourable to
the talent for lively description when a person's conceptions are readily
suggested and are distinct. Even such a one's common conversation differs
from that of those whose conceptions arise more slowly and are more faint.
One
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CONCEPTIONS. 177 manll, whether in conversation or in written description,
seems to place the object which he wishes to describe directly before us;
it is represented distinctly and to the life. Another, although not
wanting in a command of language, is confused and embarrassed amid a
multitude of particulars, which, in consequence of the feebleness of his
conceptions, he finds himself but half acquainted with; and he therefore
gives us but a very imperfect and confused notion of the thing which he
desires to make known. It has been by some supposed that a person might
give a happier description of an edifice, of a landscape, or other object,
from the conception than from the actual perception of it. The perfection
of a description does not always consist in a minute specification of
circumstances; in general, the description is better when there is a
judicious selection of them. The best rule for making the selection is to
attend to the particulars that make the deepest impression on our own
minds, or, what is the same thing, that most readily and distinctly take a
place in our conceptions. -When the object is actually before us, it is
extremely difficult to compare the impressions which different
circumstances produce. When we afterward conceive of the object, we
possess merely the outline of it; but it is an outline made up of the most
striking circumstances. Those circumstances, it is true, will not impress
all persons alike, but will somewhat vary with the degree of their taste.
But when, with a correct and delicate taste, any one combines lively
conceptions, and gives a description from those conceptions, he can hardly
fail to succeed in it. And, accordingly, we find here one great element of
poetic power. It is the ability of forming vivid conceptions, which bodies
forth "The forms of things unknown; the poet's pen Turns them to shapes,
and gives to airy nothing A local habitation and a name." ~ 119. Of
conceptions attended with a momentary belief. Our conceptions are
sometimes attended with beH 2
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178 THE CONCEPTIVE POWER. lief; when they are very lively, we are apt to
ascribe to them a real outward existence, or believe in them. We do not
undertake to assert that the belief is permanent; but a number of facts
strongly lead to the conclusion that it has a momentary existence. (1.) A
painter, in drawing the features and bodily form of an absent friend, may
have so strong a conception, so vivid a mental picture, as to believe for
a moment that his friend is before him. After carefully recalling his
thoughts at such times, and reflecting upon them, almost every painter is
ready to say that he has experienced some illusions of this kind. "We
read," says Dr. Conolly, " that when Sir Joshua Reynolds, after being'many
hours occupied in painting, walked out into the street, the lamp-posts
seemed to him to be trees, and the men and women moving shrubs." It is
true, the illusion is, in these cases, very short, because the intensity
of conception, which is the foundation of it, can never be kept up long
when the mind is in a sound state. Such intense conceptions are unnatural.
And, further, all the surrounding objects of perception, which no one can
altogether disregard for any length of time, tend to check the illusion
and terminate it. (2.) When a blow is aimed at any one, although in sport,
and he fully knows it to be so, he forms so vivid a conception of what
might possibly be the effect,;hat his belief is for a moment controlled,
and he unavoidably shrinks back from it. This is particularly the case if
the blow approaches the eye. Who can help winking at such times? It is a
proof of our belief being controlled under such circumstances, that we can
move our own hands rapidly in the neighbourhood of the eye, either
perpendicularly or horizontally, and, at the same time, easily keep our
eyelids from motion. But when the motion is made by another, the
conception becomes more vivid, and a belief of danger inevitably
arises.-Again, place a person on the battlements of a high tower; his
reason tells him he is in no danger; he knows he is in none. But, after
all,
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CONCEPTIONS. 179 he is unable to look down from the battlements without
fear; his conceptions are so exceedingly vivid as to induce a momentary
belief of danger, in opposition to all his reasonings. (3.) When we are in
pain from having struck our foot against a stone, or when pain is suddenly
caused in us by any other inanimate object, we are apt to vent a momentary
rage upon it. That is to say, our belief is so affected for an instant,
that we ascribe to it an accountable existence, and would punish it
accordingly. This is observed particularly in children and in savages. It
is on the principle of our vivid conceptions being attended with belief
that poets so often ascribe life, and agency, and intention to the rains
and winds, to storms, and thunder, and lightning. How natural are the
expressions of King Lear, overwhelmed with the ingratitude of his
daughters, and standing with his old head bared to the pelting tempest!
"_Nor rain, wind, thunder, fire are my daughters; I tax not you, ye
elements, with unkindness; I never gave you kingdoms, called you
children." (4.) There are persons who are entirely convinced of the folly
of the popular belief of ghosts and other nightly apparitions, but who
cannot be persuaded to sleep in a room alone, nor go alone into a room in
the dark. Whenever they happen out at night, they are constantly looking
on every side; their quickened perceptions behold images which never had
any existence except in their own minds, and they are the subjects of
continual disquiet and even terror.-" It was my misfortune,) says Dr.
Priestly, "to have the idea of darkness and the ideas of invisible,
malignant spirits and apparitions very closely connected in my infancy,
and to this day, notwithstanding I believe nothing of those invisible
powers, and consequently of their connexion with darkness, or anything
else, I cannot be perfectly easy in every kind of situation in the dark,
though I am sensible I gain ground upon this prejudice continually." In
all such cases we see the influence of the prejn
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180 THE CONCEPTIVE POWER. dices of the nursery. Persons who are thus
afflicted were taught in early childhood to form conceptions of ghosts,
visible hobgoblins, and unearthly spirits, and the habit still continues.
It is true, when they listen to their reasonings and philosophy, they may
well say they do not believe in such things. But the effect of their
philosophy is merely to check their belief; not in ten cases in a thousand
is the belief entirely overcome. Every little while, in all solitary
places, and especially in the dark, it returns, and, when banished,
returns again; otherwise we cannot give an explanation of the conduct of
these persons. ~ 120. Conceptions which are joined with perceptions. The
belief in our mere conceptions is the more evident and striking whenever
they are at any time joined with our perceptions.-A person, for instance,
is walking in a field in a foggy morning, and perceives something, no
matter what it is; but he believes it to be a man, and does not doubt it.
In other words, he truly perceives some object, and, in addition to that
perception, has a mental conception of a man attended with belief. When he
has advanced a few feet further, all at once he perceives that what he
conceived to be a man is merely a stump with a few stones piled on its
top. He perceived at first as plainly, or but little short of it, that it
was a stump, as in a moment afterward; there were the whole time very
nearly the same visible form and the same dimensions in his eye. But he
had the conception of a man in his mind at the same moment, which
overruled and annulled the natural effects of the visual perception; the
conception being associated with a present visible object, acquired
peculiar strength and permanency, so much so that he truly and firmly
believed that a human being was before him. But the conception has
departed, the present object of perception has taken its place, and it is
now impossible for him to conjure up the phantom, the reality of which he
but just now had no doubt of.
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CONCEPTIONS. 181 In his Voyage of Discovery to the Arctic Regions, Captain
Ross mentions an incident illustrative of the power and fruitfulness of
our conceptions, when upheld by the actual presence of objects. It will be
recollected that the immense masses of ice which are found floating in the
Polar Seas often display a variety of the most brilliant hues. Speaking of
one of these icebergs, as they are called, which'he early fell in with,
and which was about forty feet high and a thousand feet long,
"imagination," he says, "painted it in many grotesque figures; at one time
it looked something like a white lion and horse rampant, which the quick
fancy of sailors, in their harmless fondness for omens, naturally enough
shaped into the lion and unicorn of the king's arms, and they were
delighted accordingly with the good luck it seemed to augur." One of the
numerous characters whom Sir Walter Scott has sketched with so much truth
to nature, speaks of himself as being banished on a certain occasion to
one of the sandy keys of the West Indies, which was reputed to be
inhabited by malignant demons. This person, after acknowledging he had his
secret apprehensions upon their account, remarks, " in open daylight or in
absolute darkness, I did not greatly apprehend their approach, but in the
misty dawn of the morning, or when evening was about to fall, I saw, for
the first week of my abode on the Key, many a dim and undefined
spectre-now resembling a Spaniard with his capa wrapped around him, and
his huge sombrera, as large as an umbrella, upon his head-now a Dutch
sailor, with his rough cap and trunk hoseand now an Indian cacique, with
his feathery crown and long lance of cane. I always approached them, but,
whenever I drew near, the phantom changed into a bush, or a piece of
driftwood, or a wreath of mist, or some-such cause of deception." But it
is unnecessary to resort to books for illustrations of this topic.
Multitudes of persons have a conceptive facility of creations, which is
often trouble
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182 THE CONCEPTIVE POWER. some and perplexing, especially in uncommon
sittuations and in the night. And in all cases this tendency is greatly
strengthened whenever it can lay hold of objects, the outlines of which it
can pervert to its own purposes.-In instances of this kind, where the
conceptions are upheld, as it were, by present objects of perception, and
receive a sort of permanency from them, nothing is better known than that
we often exercise a strong and unhesitating belief. These instances,
therefore, can properly be considered as illustrating and confirming the
views in the preceding section. ~ 121. Conceptions as connected with
fictitious representations. These observations suggest an explanation, at
least in part, of the effects which are produced on the mind by
exhibitions of fictitious distress. In the representation of tragedies, it
must be admitted that there is a general conviction of the whole being but
a fiction. But, although persons enter the theatre with this general
conviction, it does not always remain with them the whole time. At certain
peculiarly interesting passages in: the poet, and at certain exhibitions
of powerful and well-timed effort in the actor, this general impression
that all is a fiction, fails. The feelings of the spectator may be said to
rush into the scenes; he mingles in the events; carried away and lost, he
for a moment believes all to be real, and the tears gush at the
catastrophe which he witnesses. The explanation, therefore, of the
emotions felt at the exhibition of a tragedy, such as indignation, pity,
and abhorrence, is, that at certain parts of the exhibition we have a
momentary belief in the reality of the events which are represented. And,
after the illustrations which have been given, such a belief cannot be
considered impossible.-The same explanation will apply to the emotions
which follow our reading of tragedies when alone, or any other natural and
affecting descriptions. In the world of conceptions which the genius of
the writer conjures up, we are transported out of the world
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SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS. 183 of real existence, and for a while fully
believe in the reality of what is only an incantation. The Conceptive
power has a very close connexion with the Imagination; but the precise
relation existing between the two will be more easily explained and
understood, when we come in its proper place to the last-named power.
CI-IHAPTER XII. SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS OF ItMENTAL STATES. ~ 122.
Origin of the distinction of simple and complex. BEFORE proceeding to the
next cognitive power which comes in course, we delay here for the brief
consideration of another subject, incidental to the proper and full
knowledge of the mind, the importance of which can hardly fail to appear
from a mere statement of it; a subject involving, not the origin of mental
states, but their comparative value. In looking at our thoughts and
feelings as they continually pass under the review of our internal-
observation, we readily perceive that they are not of equal worth; we do
not assign to themn the same estimate; one state of mind is found to be
expressive of one thing only, and that thing, whatever it is, is precise,
and definite, and inseparable; while another state of mind is found to be
expressive of, and virtually equal to, many others. And hence we are led,
not only with the utmost propriety, but even by a sort of necessity, to
make a division of the whole body of our mental affections into the two
classes of SIMPLE and COMPLEX. Nature herself makes the division; it is
one of those characteristics which gives to the mind, in part at least,
its greatness; one of those elements of power without which the soul could
not be what it is, and without a knowledge of which it is difficult to
possess a full and correct understanding of it in other respects.
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184 SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS ~ 123. Nature and characteristics of simple
and mental states. We shall first offer some remarks on those mental
states, which are simple, and shall aim to give an understanding of their
nature, so far as can be expected on a subject, the clearness of which
depends more on a reference to our own personal consciousness than on the
teaching of others. Let it be noticed, then, in the first place, that a
simple state of mind CANNOT BE SEPARATED INTO PARTS.It is clearly implied
in the very distinction between simnplicity and complexity, considered in
relation to the states of the mind, that there can be no such separation,
no such division. It is emphatically true of our simple ideas, and
emotions, and desires, and of all other simple states of mind, that they
are one and indivisible. Whenever you can detect in them more than one
element, they at once lose their character of simplicity, and are to be
regarded as complex, however they may have previously appeared.
Inseparableness consequently is their striking characteristic; and it may
be added, that they are not only inseparable in themselves, but are
separate from everything else. There is nothing which can stand as a
substitute for them where they are, or represent them where they are not;
they are independent unities, constituted exclusively by the mind itself,
having a specific and positive character, but nevertheless known only in
themselves. ~ 124. Simple mental states not susceptible of definition. Let
it be observed, in the second place, that simple mental states CANNOT BE
DEFINED.-This view of them follows necessarily from what has been said of
their oneness and inseparableness, compared with what is universally
understood by defining. In respect to deiinitions, it is undoubtedly true,
that we sometimes use synonymous words, and call such use a definition;
but it is not properly such. In every legitimate definition, the idea
which is to be defined is to be separated, as fai' as may be thought
necessary, into its sub
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OF BIENTAL STATES. 185 ordinate parts; and these parfs are to be presented
to the mind for its exanmination, instead of the original mental affection
or state illto which they entered. This process must be gone through in
every instance of accurate defining; this is the general and authorizecl
view of definition; and it is not easy to see in what else it can well
consist. But this process will not apply to our simple thoughts and
feelings, because, if there be any such thing as simple mlental states,
they are characterized by inseparableness and oneness. And, furthermore,
if we define ideas by elmploying other ideas, we must count upon meeting
at last with such as shall be ultimate, and will reject all verbal
explanation; otherwise we can never come to an end in the process. So that
the simple nmental affections are not only undefinable in themselves, but,
if there were no such elementary states of mind, there could be no
defining in any other case; it would be merely analysis upon analysis, a
process without completion, and a labour witho-ut end; leaving the subject
in as much darkness as when the process nas begun. When wve speak of
simple ideas and feelings, and a person, in consequence of our inability
to define them, professes to be ignorant of the terms we use, we can
frequently aid him in understanding them by a statement of the
circumstances, as far as possible, under which the simple mental state
exists. But, having clone this, we can nerely refer himl to his own senses
and consciousness, as the only teachers from which he can expect to
receive satisfaction. ~ 125. Simple cognitive states representative of a
reality. The first two marks apply to all the mental states; the
sentimentive and volitional as well as the intelleetive. A third markl or
characteristic of those simple mental states, which appropriately belong
to the intellect and may be spoken of as cognitive, is that they always
stand for or RIEPRESENT A REALITY. In other words, no simlple idea of this
kind is, in its own
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186 SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS nature, delusive or fictitious, but always
has something precisely corresponding to it; we do not say in form or
outline, but in the reality of existence. And this is true both of things
mental and material. If the idea has relation to outward things, there is
something answering to it; and if it has relation to mental things, it is
the same. It is not always so with complex ideas; these, as Mr. Locke
justly gives us to understand, are sometimes CHIMERIcAL. That is to say,
the elements of which they are composed are so brought together and
combined as to form something, of which nature presents no corresponding
reality. If, for instance, a person had an idea of a body, yellow, or of
some other colour, malleable, fixed, possessing, in a word, all the
qualities of iron or of gold, with this difference only of its being
lighter than water, it would be what Mr. Locke terms a CHIMERICAL idea;
because the combination of the elements here exists only in the human
mind, and not in nature; the thing has no outward or objective reality.
The words CENTAUR, DRAGON, and HYPOGRIFF, which are the well-known names
for imaginar.y beings possessing no actual existence, are expressive of
chimerical complex ideas. These ideas have nothing corresponding to themn.
But it is not so with the simnple states of mind, of the class which we
are now considering. If it were otherwise, since in our inquiries after
truth we naturally proceed from what is conmplex to what is simple, there
would be no sure foundation of knowledge. Whenever, in our analysis of a
subject, we arrive at truly simple ideas, we have firm footing; there is
no mistake, no delusion. Nature, always faithful to her own character,
gives utterance to the truth alone. But man, in combining together the
elements which nature furnishes, does not always avoid mistakes. ~ 126.
Origin of complex notions and their relation to simple. Our simple
cognitive states, which we have thus endeavoured to explain, were probably
first in origin.
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OF MENTAL STATES. 187 There are reasons for considering them as antecedent
in point of time to mental states which are complex, although in many
cases it may not be easy to trace the progress of the mind from the one to
the other. The complex notions of external material objects embrace the
separate and simple ideas and sensations of resistance, extension,
hardness, colour, taste, and others. As these elementary cognitions,
whatever may be the distinctive and appropriate name which attaches to
them, evidently have their origin in distinct and separate senses, it is
but reasonable to suppose that they possess a simple before they are
combined together in a complex existence. Simple ideas, therefore, may
justly be regarded as antecedent in point of time to those which are
complex, and as laying the foundation of them. Hence we see that it is
sufficiently near the truth, and that it is not improper to speak of our
complex ideas, as derived from, or made up of simple ideas. This is the
well-known language of Mr. Locke on this subject; and when we consider how
much foundation there is -for it in the constitution and operations of the
human mind, there is good reason for retaining it.Although purely simple
states of the mind are few in number, vast multitudes of a complex nature
are formed from them. The ability which the mind possesses of originating
complex thoughts and feelings from elementary ones, may be compared to our
power of uniting together the letters of the alphabet in the formation of
syllables and words. ~ 127. Supposed complexness without the antecedence
of simple feelings. It is possible, that some persons may object to the
doctrine proposed in the last section, that complex mental states are
subsequent in point of time to those which are simple; and may be inclined
to adopt the opinion, that some at least of our complex notions are framed
at once and immediately, whenever an occasion presents itself, and are not
necessarily dependent
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188 SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS on the prior existence of any other
feelings. When the eye, for instance, opens on a wide and diversified
landscape, they suppose the whole to be embraced in one complex mental
state, the formation of which is not gradual and susceptible of
measurement by time, but is truly instantaneous. When we direct our
attention to objects of less extent, as a portrait, a landscape, or
historical painting, they imagine it to be still more evident that the
complexity of mind, correspondcling to the complexity of the object, is a
result without any antecedent process. Without doubt what has now been
said is in some instances apparently the case; but this appearance (for we
cannot speak of it as anything more than such) is susceptible of an
obvious explanation, without an abandonment of the general principle which
has been laid down. No one is ignorant that the mind often passes with
exceeding rapidity along the successive objects of its contemplation. This
rapidity may in some cases be so great, that no foundation will be laid
for remembrance; and of course, in such cases, the complex feeling has the
appearance of being formed without the antecedence of other simple
feelings. Often the eye glances so rapidly over the distinct parts of the
portrait, the historical painting, or even the wide landscape, that we are
utterly unable in our recollection to detect the successive steps of its
progress. There naturally seems, therefore, to be but one view, instead of
distinct and successive glancings of the mind fromn hill to hill, from
forest to forest, and from one verdant spot to another, prior to the
supposed one and instantaneous comprehension of the whole. But there is
much reason for saying that this oneness of comprehension is in seeming
and appearance only, and not in fact. (See ~ 106-108.) ~ 128. The precise
sense in which complexness is to be understood. But while we distinctly
assert the frequent complexness of the mental affections, it should be
particularly kept in mind, that they are not to be regarded
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OF MENTAL STATES. 189 in the light of a material compound, where the
parts, although it may sometimes appear to be otherwise, necessarily
possess no higher unity than that of juxtaposition, and, of course, can be
literally separated from each other, and then put together again. There is
nothing of this kind; neither putting together nor taking asunder, in this
literal and material sense.But if our thoughts and feelings are not made
up of others, and are not complex ill the material sense of the
expressions, what then constitutes their complexness 2 This inquiry gives
occasion for the important remark, that complexness in relation to the
mind is not literal, but virtual only. What we term a complex feeling, in
itself considered and so far as its purely psychical nature is concerned,
is truly simple; but, at the same time, it is-equal to many others, and is
complex only in that sense. Thought after thought, and emotion following
emotion, passes through the mind; and, as they are called forth by the
operation of the laws of association, many of them necessarily have
relation to the same object. Then there follows a new state of mind, which
is the result of those previous feelings, and is complex in the sense
already explained. That is to say, it is felt by us to possess a virtual
equality to those separate antecedent thoughts and emotions. Our simple
feelings are like streams coming from different mountains, but meeting and
mingling together at last in the common centre of some intermediate lake;
the tributary fountains are no longer separable, but have disappeared, and
become merged and confounded in the bosom of their common resting-place.
Or they may be likened to the higher forms of coinage; the dimes and
dollars, which are as much units, in themselves considered, as the tens
and hundreds of the inferior coinage which they represent, and to which
they are equal in value. The language which expresses the composition and
complexity of thought is, therefore, to be regarded as essentially
metaphorical when applied to the mind, and is not to be taken in its
literal meaning. We are
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190 SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS under the necessity of employing in this
case, as in others, language which has a material origin, but we shall not
be led astray by it if we carefully attend to what has been said, and
endeavour to aid our conception of it by a reference to our internal
experience. ~ 129. Illustrations of analysis as applied to the mind. The
subject of the preceding section will be the better understood by the
consideration of analysis as applicable to the mind. As we do not combine
literally, so we do not untie or separate literally; as there is no
literal complexness, so there is no literal resolution or analysis of it.
Nevertheless, we have a meaning when we speak of analyzing our thoughts
and feelings. And what is it? What are we to understand by the term
analysis?, Although this subject is not without difficulty, both in the
conception and in the expression of it, it is susceptible of some degree
of illustration.-It will be remembered that there may be analysis of
material bodies. The chemist analyzes when he takes a piece of glass,
which appears to be one substance, and finds that it is not one, but is
separable into silicious and alkaline matter. He takes other bodies, and
separates them in like manner; and, whenever he does this, the process is
rightly called analysis, which literally means taking apart. Now we apply
the same term to the mind; but the thing expressed by it, the process gone
through, is not the same. All we can say is, there is something like this.
We do not resolve and separate a complex thought as we do a piece of glass
or other material body into its parts; we are utterly unable to do it, if
we should seriously make the attempt; every mental state is in itself and
in fact simple and indivisible, and is complex only virtually. Complex
notions are the results rather than the compounds of former feelings;.
and, though not literally made up of parts, have the relation to them
which any material whole has to the elements composing it, and in that
particular sense
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OF MENTAL STATES. 191 may be said to comprehend or embrace the subordinate
notions. Mental analysis accordingly concerns merely this relation. We
perform such an analysis when, by means of our reflection and
consciousness, aided by the power of abstraction, we are able to indicate
those separate and subordinate feelings, to which, in our conception of
it, the complex mental state is virtually equal. The term GOVERNMENT, for
instance, when nsed in reference to the mental perception of the thing
thus named, expresses a complex state of the mind; we may make this mental
state, which is in fact only one, although it is virtually more than one,
a subject of contemplation; and we are said to analyze it when we are able
to indicate those separate and more elementary notions, without the
existence and antecedence of which it could not have been formed by the
mind. We do not literally take the complex state in pieces, but we
designate other states of mind, which every one's knowledge of the origin
of thought convinces him must have preceded it, such as the ideas of
power, right, obligation, command, and the relative notions of superior
and inferior. ~ 130. Complex notions of external origin. The doctrine of
simplicity and complexness of mental states is applicable, in both its
forms, to the Intellective and Sentimentive parts of our nature; in other
words, there may be a complex affection or passion, as well as a complex
perception. The acts of the Will, the other great division of the mental
nature, are always simple. When we consider the subject in reference to
the intellect alone, we may add further, that there is complexity of the
Intellect, both in its internal and external action; and it seems proper,
in this connexion, to say something in particular of COMPLEX NOTIONS Of
EXTERNAL ORIGIN. What we term our simple ideas are representative of the
parts of objects only. The sensations of colour, such as red, white,
yellow; the original intima
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192 SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS tions from the touch, such as resistance,
extension, hardness, and softness, do not, in themselves considered, give
us a knowledge of substances, but only of the parts, attributes, or
elements of substances. Accordingly, the ideas which we have of the
various objects of the external world are for the most part complex. We
speak of a house, a tree, a flower, a plant, a mineral, an animal; and in
none of these cases are the ideas which we have simple; but, on the
contrary, embrace a considerable number of eleIents. ~ 131. Of objects
contemplated as wholes. In point of fact, the various external objects
which come under our notice are presented to us as ]wholes; and, as such
(whatever may have been the original process leading to that result), we
very early contemplate them. —Take, for instance, a LOADSTONE. In their
ordinary and common thoughts upon it (the result, probably, of some
ancecedent and very early training), men undoubtedly contemplate it as a
whole; the state of mind which has reference to it embraces it as such.
This complex notion, like all others which are complex, is virtually equal
to a number of others of a more elementary character.HI-ence, when we are;
called upon to give an account of the loadstone, we can return no other
answer than by an enumeration of its elements. It is something which has
weight, colour, hardness, power to draw iron, and whatever else we
discover in it. We use the term GOLD. This is a complex term, and implies
a complexity in the corresponding mental state. But if we use the word
gold,:or any other synonymous word, in the hearing of a man who has
neither seen that substance nor had it explained to him, he will not
understand what is meant to be conveyed. We must enter into an analysis,
and show that it is a combination of the qualities of yellowness, great
weight, fusibility, ductility, and whatever else it possesses. We look
upward to the sun in the heavens.
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OF IMENTAL STATES. 193 But what should we know of that great aggregate, if
we could not contemplate it in the elements of form and extension, of
brightness and heat, of roundness and regularity of motion?-All the
ideas,' therefore, which we form of external objects considered as wholes,
are complex; and all such complex notions are composed of those which are
simple. ~ 132. Something more in external objects than mere attributes or
qualities. [But it is to be anticipated that we shall expose ourselves
here to be pressed by certain inquiries. It will be said, perhaps, that
this makes the whole visible creation a mere aggregate (susceptible
undoubtedly of being arranged into classes, but, after all, a mere
aggregate) of attributes, qualities, or properties. What we behold yonder,
it will perhaps be alleged as an illustration of the objection, is mere
greenness, resistance, hardness, form, &c., but nothing more; it is not a
TREE. In the firmament there is brightness, and heat, and roundness, and
uniformity of motion, but that is all; we mistake when we suppose there is
a reality, an actual sUN. In a word, this view of external objects brings
us back to 6ne of the doctrines ascribed in ancient times to Pyrrho, and
in fact to that modern. Idealism, which has already been noticed, that
there is nothing external to us but certain uniform appearances, which are
mistaken for existences and realities without being so. It is, perhaps,
enough to say in regard to this objection, that we reject the idea of its
being rightfully applied to ourselves, because we do not hesitate to admit
and assert the truth of an existence (however difficult it may be to the
mind fully to conceive of it) independently of these qualities; in other
words, that there is something more, in point of fact, than what is
outwardly exhibited. On a careful examination of our feelings, we shall
probably find it impossible even to conceive of a quality without a
subject, or an attribute without some object to which it belongs. We I.-I
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194 SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS believe (and we cannot help believing) that
there must necessarily be some foundation, some basis, which is the
support of such attributes and qualities. We may not be able to tell
precisely what it is; we may not have it in our power to describe or
define it; but still it exists. The quality, therefore, and the existence
to which it belongs, the outward accessible presentation and the
subjective nature or essence, are not, in the view of the mind, identical.
(See ~ 93-96.) It will, then, perhaps be asked, Why do we not direct our
attention at once to the true subjective existence, to matter itself, and
not delay upon its appendages? The answer is, we cannot; the mind has its
limits. It might be asked, with the same reason, Why we do not look
directly into the existence and essence of the Deity, instead of studying
Hlin in his worlks and intermediate manifestations? It might be asked, Why
we do not directly contemplate the existence and essence of the mind,
instead of studying it in its attributes and operations? The answer in all
these cases is the same, viz., that we are unable to do it. And yet we
believe in the existence and reality of a God, although we know him only
through his manifestations and attributes. We believe in the existence and
reality of the human mind, although the direct subject of our knowledge is
not the mind itself, but merely its attributes and operations. It is the
same in regard to the material world. The qualities and properties of
bodies are the signs or marks which are immediately presented to our
notice. They form the occasion on which the mind, by its Suggestional or
Intuitional power, to be considered hereafter in its appropriate place,
assures us of something more than the signs which immediately fall under
our notice. This something, which we cannot help regarding as an actual
and independent reality, we call variously a material subject, material
existence; or simply matter. ~ 133. Explanatory remarks on the true
philosophical method. And at this point in our inquiries we can perhaps
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OF IENTAL STATES. 195 briefly state, with the hope of being better
understood than at any earlier time, some of the characteristics of the
mental method which we have proposed to pursue. And FIRST, in order to
relieve this department of knowledge from some of the perplexities which
have attended its progress, the distinction is to be carefully observed
between mental philosophy and Ontology. Mental philosophy, conceding the
existence of the mind and its inherent powers as an admitted fact, deals
chiefly with the phenomena which the mind exhibits and the classification
of them. Ontology, desirous of knowing what it is which lies back of
phenomena, advances with greater boldness but with less success, and
announces itself as the science of existence. The problems of existence,
which are hidden in the Infinite or Absolute of things, belong to God, and
can never be exhausted by any thing short of omniscience. The problems of
phenomena, coming within the limits of the finite, can be dealt with by
faculties which are adapted to them, and are brought within the reach- of
human cognitions, so far at least as it is necessary or best for us to
know them. (2.) Further, the most satisfactory method, in attempting to
learn the history and character of the mind, is that which has been so
successful in other departments of science, and which is known from its
earliest and ablest expositor as the Baconian. A method which, commencing
with the rejection of all prejudices, and having no interests but those of
truth, proceeds with the careful observation and the equally careful
classification of mental facts, as they are disclosed not only in the
sphere of our own consciousness, but as they are revealed in the
observation of the thoughts and feelings of others, and in the history of
men in all ages. This method, in its application to the mind, includes all
the facts and intimations, especially those relating to personality and
the foundation of moral distinctions, which are suggested and affirmed by
the Intuitional power, as well as the knowledge coming from other sources.
The A PRIORI
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196- SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS. method, therefore, so far as it is
legitimately based upon intuitional facts, and is kept true to the laws of
our mental nature, is included within the sphere of the Baconian process,
when the latter is understood and interpreted in its true spirit. (3.)
Again, such is the connexion between the mind and the body, that a true
philosophy of the mind includes some knowledge of physical conditions. And
although it would be an error to accept the extreme views of Cabanis, a
well-known French physician and materialistic philosopher, who maintained
that "all ideas, sentiments, and passions, goodness, and virtue, are
derived from physical sensation," and of other writers of this class, the
philosophic method will require the acceptance and study of certain
departments of physiology and pathology, as helps in the interpretation of
mental action. The distinction first drawn and demonstrated by Sir Charles
Bell between the nervous filaments connected with sensation and those
connected with motion may serve as an illustration of the importance of
the study of the body, as an auxiliary means of understanding the action
of the mind. Still more striking illustrations may be found in numerous
able treatises on Insanity, which justly make great account, in their
attempts to explain the disordered manifestations of the mind, of the
physiology and functions of the brain and the nervous system. (4.) It
comes also within the sphere of mental philosophy to indicate its relation
to the many and important departments of science, which, in their
principles, if not in their applications, are based upon it, or are
closely connected with it. The principles of morals, the laws of evidence,
the doctrine of sesthetics, logic, language, axiomatic truths, artistic
taste, the philosophy of eloquence, the philosophic relation of the
sciences to each other, religion itself which connects the soul with
God,-it is difficult to see how these. and other great departments,
involving thought and feeling, and truth and dutyi can be rightly un
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ABSTRACTION. 197 derstood, except in the light which is communicated
through a knowledge of the nature and operations of the human mind.
CHIAPTER XIII. ABSTRACTION.-THE ABSTRACTIVE POWER. ~ 134. Abstraction
implied in the analysis of complex ideas. THE remarks which have been made
in the course of the foregoing chapter, on the analysis and examination of
our Complex Intellectual states, naturally lead to the consideration of
another subject, in some respects intimately connected with that topic.
When we have once formed a complex notion (no matter at what period, in
what way, or of what kind), it not unfrequently happens that we desire,
for various reasons, to examine more particularly some of its parts. Very
frequently this is absolutely necessary to the full understanding of it.
Although undoubtedly its elementary parts once came under review, that
time is now long past; it has become important to institute a new
inspection, to take each simple notion involved in it, and examine it by
itself. And this is done by means of the process of ABSTRACTION, and in no
other way. By the aid of that process, our complex notions, however
comprehensive they may be, are susceptible, if one may be allowed so to
speak, of being taken to pieces, and the elementary parts may be
abstracted or separated from each other; that is, they are made subjects
of consideration apart from other ideas, with which they are ordinarily
found to be associated. And hence, whenever this is the case in respect to
the states of the mind, they are sometimes called ABSTRACTIONS, and still
more frequently are known by the name of ABSTRACT IDEAS. For the purpose
of distinctness in what we have to say, they may be divided into the two
classes of Par
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198 ABSTRACTION. ticular and General; that is to say, in some cases the
abstraction relates only to a single idea or element; in others it
includes more.-General Abstract Ideas (or the notions which we form of
Genera and Species) will form a distinct subject of consideration. ~ 135.
Instances of particular abstract ideas. We shall proceed, therefore, to
remark here on Particular abstractions. Of this class, the notions which
we form of the different kinds of colours may be regarded as instances.
For example, we hold in our hand a rose; it has extension, colour, form,
fragrance. The mind is so deeply occupied with the colour as almost wholly
to neglect the other qualities. This is a species of abstraction, although
perhaps an imperfect one, because, when an object is before us, it is
difficult, in. our most attentive consideration of any particular quality
or property, to withdraw the mind wholly from the others. When, on the
contrary, any absent object of perception occurs to us, when we think of
or form a conception of it, our thoughts will readily fix upon the colour
of such object, and make that the subject of consideration, without
particularly regarding its other qualities and attributes, such as weight,
hardness, taste, extension, and form. We may also distinguish in any body
(either when present or still more perfectly when absent) its solidity
from its extension, or we may direct our attention to its weight, or its
length, or breadth, or thickness, and make any one of these a distinct
object in our thoughts. And hence, as it is a well-known fact that the
properties of any body may be separated in the view and examination of the
mind, however closely they may be connected in their appropriate subjects,
we may layV down this statement in respect to the states of the mind
before us, viz.: When any quality or attribute of an object, which does:
not exist by itself, but in a state of combination, is detached by our
minds from its customary associates, and is considered separately, the
notion we form of it becomes a particular abstract
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THE ABSTRACTIVE POWER. 199 idea.-The distinctive mark of this class is,
that the abstraction is limited to one quality. It should, perhaps, be
particularly, added, that the abstraction or separation may exist
mentally, when it cannot take place in the object itself. For instance,
the length of a building, its breadth and color, and even its size and
figure, may each of them be made subjects of separate mental
consideration, although there can be no real or actual separation of these
things in the building itself. If there be any one of these properties,
there must necessarily be all. ~ 136. Names, and complexity in the power
of abstraction. The power by which this is done is variously called
Abstraction, or the Abstractive power, and sometimes, without any
violation of the recognised analogies of the language, by the appropriate
term "Abstractment." A power of the mind always implies something to be
effected; and if there is a definite susceptibility, either simple or
complex, which is appropriate to the result, aInd which secures that
result when nothing else can do it, it is entitled to be called a power.
It stands as a distinct addition to the mental forces, and brings to our
view a new element, without which man would fall short of that
intellectual greatness which characterizes and illustrates his existence.
And thus making, in this general Department of the mind, the Cognitive
powers the special subjects of consideration, but introducing here and
elsewhere, as it is most convenient, the Auxiliary powers which diversify
and strengthen all other mental activities, we proceed, with a careful
regard to the comparative position which nature has assigned them, from
Sensation to Perception, from Perceptivity to the Conceptive power; and
onward step by step to the important power of Abstraction, which, coming
next in course, will be found to widen the sphere of mental activity, and
to give a new element of dignity and strength. (2.) We have already had
occasion to say, in a for
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200 ABSTRACTION OR ABSTRACTIAIENT. mer chapter, that some powers of the
mind are simple, others complex; some, like the powers of Sensation and
Intuition, securing their results, so far as we can judge, by a single
movement; others, like the Reasoning power and the Imagination, fulfilling
the objects for which they were given us by a complexity of action. It is
generally conceded, I believe, that the abstractive or abstractional power
aims at and secures the results which it holds under its control, not by a
single act, but. by a complexity of movement, consisting in a number of
distinct mental operations, but all of them regulated and harmonized by
appropriate relational adjustments and by unity of purpose. The statement
may be illustrated thus. The process which is gone throu'gh in every case
of abstraction, applies of course to those things and those states of mind
which are complex; but which, though now consolidated in a complex form,
are nevertheless made lp of separate elements. Not only the object of
thought, whether external or internal, sensuous or supersensuouS, is a
complexity; but the idea which corresponds to it, and which brings it
within the reach of mental examination, is complex also. And accordingly,
leaving the outward object, whether material or psychical, and.limiting
our examination to the corresponding idea, it will be found that the
process under consideration presents, as the thing to be done by it, the
separation of a particular abstract idea from those ideas with which it
has been customarily associated. (3.) And in doing this, it appears, in
analyzing the complex activity of Abstractment, that there is, and must
be, something of the nature of a mental deterluination or choice; in other
words, an act of the will. And further, it is a necessity, that this act
of the will shall concern the previous complex mental state, when viewed
in one respect rather than another; or, what is the same thing, it will
concern one part of the complex idea rather than another. So that we may
truly and justly be said to have not only a desire, but a determination to
consider or examine sonme part of the
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PARTICULAR ABSTRACT IDEAS. 201 complex idea more particularly than the
others. When the mind is in this manner directed to any particular part of
a complex notion, we find it to be the fact, that the principle of
association, or whatever principle it is, which keeps the othler parts in
their state of union with it, ceases in a greater or less degree to
operate and to maintain that union; the other parts, ceasing to be kept
together by the action of the power which had previously constituted their
union, rapidly fall off and disappear, and the particular quality, towards
which the mind is especially directed, remains the sole subject of
consideration. That is to say, it is abstracted, and the mental state
which interiorly corresponds to it becomes an abstract idea.-If, for
example, we have in mind the complex notion of any object, a house, tree,
plant, flower, and the like, but have a desire and determination to make
the colour, which forms a part of this complex notion, a particular
subject of attention, the consequence is, that, while the quality of
colour occupies our chief regard, the other qualities will disappear and
no more be thought of. If we determine to examine the weight or extension
of an object, the result will be the same; in other wvords, the extension,
weight, colour, and whatever else may be discriminated in its attributes,
will become distinct and exclusive objects of attention, and will thus be
mentally abstracted. (4.) Such, in the formation of particular abstract
ideas, seems, when we analyze it into its elementary steps, to be the
process of the mind, viz.: The direction of an act of the will to a
particular part of a complex notion, and the consequent detention of the
part towards which the mental choice is directed, and the natural and
necessary disappearance, under such circumstances, of the other parts. But
the process, restricted by appropriate occasions and aiming at special
objects, exhibits a unity of design and- a certainty of result, which
entitles it to be called a power. 12
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202 ABSTRACTION OR ABSTRACTMENT. ~ 137. Of generalizations of particular
abttract mental states. The terms GrENERALIZING and GENERALIZATION are
often found applied to the states of mind under consideration. When we
have made any quality of a body a distinct and separate subject of
attention, we may further regard it as belonging to one or more objects,
according as we find such to be the fact or otherwise. What is chiefly
meant- therefore, when we speak of the generalizing of this class of
abstract notions, is, that, in our experience of things, we observe them
to be common to many subjects. We find whiteness to be a quality of snow,
of chalk, of milk, and of other bodies; and whenever, with the simple
abstract notion of whiteness, we connect in our thoughts the additional
circumstance of its not being limited to one body, but the property of
many, the term may be said to be generalized.; And this seems to be all
that can be properly understood by generalization when applied to the
states of mind now before us. ~ 138. Of the importance and uses of
abstraction. The power of Abstraction is by no means an unimportant one,
even when limited to the separation of the particular or simple elements
of thought.-" A carpenter," says Kames,* speaking of the great utility of
abstraction, " considers a log of wood with regard to hardness, firmness,
colour, and texture; a philosopher, neglecting these properties, makes the
log undergo a chemical analysis, and examines its taste, its smell, and
component principles; the geometrician confines his reasoning to the
figure, the length, breadth, and thickness; in general, every artist,
abstracting from all other properties, confines his observations to those
which have a more immediate connexion with his profession." Besides its
well-known uses in the various forms of reasoning (particularly
demonstrative reasoning), abstraction is greatly subservient to the
exertions of a creative imagination, as they appear in painting, archi*
Elements of Criticism, Tol. iii., Appendix.
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GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 203 tecture, poetry, and the other fine or liberal
arts.The poet and the painter are supplied wvith their materials from
experience; withont having received ideas from some source, they never
could have practised their art. But, if they do not restrict themselves to
mere imitation, they mnust combine and modify the ideas which they have,
so as to be able to form new creations of -their own. But every such
exertion of their powers presupposes the exercise of abstraction in
decomposing and separating actual conceptions, and in forming them anew.
The power of abstraction, therefore, may justly be considered as a
characteristic of the great masters in the liberal arts. From how many
delightful forms in nature, and how many ideal temples, contemplated for a
long time in the mind's eye, must the genius that planned the Parthenon
have abstracted eachl form of beauty and excellence of proportion! From
how many forests, both seen and finagined, and fields of bloom, and rivers
and waterfalls, must the mind that conceived the Garden of Paradise Lost
have drawn the sounds that delight the ear, and the colo-urs that are
pleasant to the sight CIIHAPTER XIV. GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. ~ 139.
General abstract notions the same with genera and species. TEV proceed, in
connexion with the remarks of the last chapter, to the consideration of
GEIERAL ABSTRACT ideas; a subject of so much interest that it deserves a
separate notice; and which has frequently been thought to be attended with
no small difficulty. General Abstract notions are not only different, in
consequence of embracing a greater number of elementary parts, from those
which are particular, but are also susceptible of being distinguished from
the great body of our other complex notions.-The idea, for example, which
we form of any individual, of
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204 TIIE ABSTRACTIVE POWER. John, Peter, or James, is evidently a complex
one, but it is not necessarily a general one. The notion which we frame of
a particular horse or of a particular tree, is likewise a complex idea,
but not a general one. There will be found to be a clear distinction
between them, although it may not be perfectly obvious at first. GENERAL
ABSTRACT IDEAS are our notions of the classes of objects, that is, of
Genera and Specie. They are expressed by general names, without, in most
cases, any defining or lim.itation, as when we use the words ANIALL,
MlAN:, HOIRSE, BIRD, SHIEEP, FISH, TREE, not to express any one in
particular of these various classes, but animals, men, horses, and trees
in general. ~ 140. Process in classification, or the forming of genera and
species. ~Now if our general abstract ideas, as far as they relate to
external objects, are truly notions of SPECIES and GETNERA, it will aid us
in the better understanding of theml if we briefly consider how species
and genera are formed. lMVen certainly find no great practical difficulty
in forming these classifications, since we find that they do in fact make
them in numberless instances, and at a very early period of life. They
seem to be governed in the process by definite and uniform mental
tendencies,-Vi~hat, then, in point of fact, is the process in
classification. It is obvious, in the first place, that no classification
can be made without considering two or more objects together. A number of
objects, therefore, are first presented to us for our observation and
inquiry, which are to be exanmined first in themselves. and then in
comparison with each other. 5We will take a familiar scene to illustrate
what takes place. We suppose ourselves to stand on the bank of a navigable
river; we behold the flowing of its waters, the cliffs that overhang it,
the trees that line its shore, the boats and boatmen on its bosom, the
flocks and herds that prels down to drink from its waves. W~ith such a
scene before us, it is to be expected that the mind will rapidly make each
and all of these the sub
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GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 205 jects of its contemplation; nor does it pursue
this contemplation and inquiry far, without perceiving certain relations
of agreement or difference. Certain objects before- it are felt to-be
essentially alike, and others to be essentially different; and hence they
are not all arranged in one class, but a discrimination is made, and
different classes are formed. The flocks and herds are formed into their
respective classes. The tall and leafy bodies on the river's bank,
although they differ from each other in some respects, are yet found to
agree in so many others, that they are arranged together in another class,
and called by the general name of TREE. The living, moving, and reasoning
beings, that propel the boats on its waters, form another class, and are
called IAxN. —And there is the same process, and the same result, in
respect to all other bodies coming within the range of our observation. ~
141. Early classifications sometimes incorrect. It has been intimated,
that, in making these classifications, men are governed by definite and
uniform mental tendencies; still it must be acknowledged that mistakes are
sometimes committed, especially in the early periods of society, and in
all cases where the opportunities of examination and comparison are
imperfect. When man first opens his eyes on nature (and in the infancy of
our race, he finds himself a novice wherever he goes), objects so
numerous, so various in kind, so novel and interesting, crowd upon his
attention, that, attempting to direct himself to all at the same time, he
loses sight of their specifical differences, and blends them together more
than a calm and accurate examination would justify. And hence it is not to
be wondered at that our earliest classifications, the primitive genera and
species, are sometimes incorrectly made. Subsequently, when knowledge has
been in some measure amassed, and reasoning and observation have been
brought to a greater maturity, these errors are
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206 ABSTRACTION OR ABSTRACTMENT. attended to; individuals are rejected
from species where they do not properly belong, and species from genera.
The most savage and ignorant tribes will in due season correct their
mistakes and be led into the truth. ~ 142. Illustrations of our earliest
classifications. We are naturally led to introduce some circumstances here
which throw light on this part of our subject. What we wish to illustrate
is the simple fact, that men readily perceive the resemblances of objects,
and exhibit a disposition to classify them in reference to sulch
resemblance. The first case which we shall mention in illustration of this
is that of Caspar Hauser. The principal objects which Caspar had to amuse
himself with in his prison were two little wooden horses, which, in his
entire ignorance, he believed to be possessed of life and sensibility.
After the termination of his imprisonment, his biographer informs uls,
that to "every animal he met with, whether quadruped or biped, dog, cat,
goose, or fowl, he gave the name of horse." In the year 1814, Pitcairn's
Island, a solitary spot in the Pacific Ocean, was visited by two English
cruisers. Two of the young men that belonged on the island, and whose
knowledge was, of course, exceedingly limited, came on board one of the
vessels. " The youths," says the Narrative, "were greatly surprised at the
sight of so many novel objects; the size of the ship, the guns, and
everything around them. Observing a cow, they were at first alarmed, and
expressed a doubt whether it was a huge goat or a horned hog, these being
the only two species of quadrupeds they had ever seen." The English
navigator Cook, in going from New Zealand to the Friendly Islands, lighted
on an island called Wateeoo. —' The inhabitants," he says, " were afraid
to come near our cows and horses, nor did they form the least conception
of their nature. But the sheep and goats did not surpass the limits of
their
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GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 207 ideas, for they gave us to understand they
knew them to be birds." Captain Cook informs us that these people were
acquainted with only three sorts of animals, viz., dogs, hogs, and
birds.-Of hogs and dogs they had probably never known more than one
variety or class, and had never been led to suspect that there was, or
could be, any other. But, having noticed a great variety of birds in their
forests and waters, they had undoubtedly found it necessary, before this
period, not only to give a general name expressive of all birds, but also
to classify some of the subordinate varieties. This people, therefore, not
unnaturally, although we we do not pretend to say with much
discrimination, applied the term BIRDS to the sheep and goats of the
English. They knew not but there might be some new class of birds which
they had not hitherto noticed; and they saw no insuperable objection in
the size of the sheep and goats to this disposition of them, whatever
other objection they might, on a further examination, have subsequently
found. ~ 143. Of the nature of general abstract ideas. The notions which
are thus formed in all cases of classification, are commonly known, in the
Treatises having relation to these subjects, as General Abstract ideas.
And they are no less numerous than the munltiplied varieties of objects
which are found to exist everywhere around us. It is thus that we form the
general notions of animal and of all the subordinate species of animals;
of tree and its numerous varieties; of earths and minerals, and whatever
else is capable of being arranged into classes. We may apply these views
not only to natural objects, but to forms and relations of a very
different character. The word Triangle is the name of a general abstract
idea. Great exceptions, however, have been taken to certain incautious
expressions of Mr. Locke on this point. He asserts that it requires some
pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle,
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208 ABSTRACTION on ABISTRACTMENT. and gives the following reason: "for it
must neither be oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrlral,
nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once." This language is
undoubtedly open to some degree of criticism. The correct view seems to be
this. The word TRIANGLE is not only the name of a class, but of a very
general class; it is the name of a Genns, embracing all those figures
which agree in the circumnstance of being bounded by three straight lines
meeting one another so as to form three angles. A figure having any other
form (in other words, not exhibiting a resemblance or similarity in this
respect), is excluded from the Genus; but it is still so extensive, taken
in the sense just now mnentioned, as to include all figurees whatever of
that name. —Now there are embraced within the genus, as in numerous other
cases, subordinate classes, which are distinguished by their appropriate
names, viz., the class of acute-angled triangles, that of right-angled
triangles, of obtuse-angled triangles, &c. But it is to be noticed, that
the general idea, whatever objects it may be founded upon, does not
embrace every particular which mlakes a part of such objects. When we look
at a numnber of men, we find them all differing in some respects, in
height, size, cdlour, tone of voice, and in other particulars. The mind
fixes only upon those traits or properties with which it can combine the
notion of resemblance; that is to say, those traits, qualities, or
properties in which the individuals are perceived to be alike, or to
resemble each other.-The complex mental state, which embraces these
qualities and properties, and nothing more (with the exception of the
superadded notion of other bodies having resembling qualities), is a
General Abstract idea. And hence the name. Such notions are called
ABSTRACT, because, while embracing many individuals in certain respects,
they detach and leave out altogether a variety of particulars in which
those individuals disagree. If there were not this discrimination and leav
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GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 209 ing out of certain parts, we never could
consider these notions, regarded as wholes, as otherwise than individual
or particular.-They are called GENERAL, because, in consequence of the
discrimination and selection which has just been mentioned, they embrace
such qualities alid properties as exist not in one merely, but in many.
The difference, therefore, between the complex notion which we form of any
particular object, and the general complex feeling now under
consideration, is truly this: the latter combines together fewer
particulars, but unites with such as it does combine together the
additional notion of resemblance, which implies as its basis the
comparison of a number of objects, and is, perhaps, the distinguishing
circumstance. If it should be asked, By virtue of what principle is this
discovery of a resembling relation made. the answer is to be found in the
fact, that there is in the mind an original tendency or susceptibility, by
means of which, whenever we perceive different objects together, we are
instantly, without the intervention of any other mental process, sensible
of their relation in certain respects. This susceptibility, which deals
with the relations of things, and which is known as the power of Relative
Suggestion or Judgment, will be noticed in its appropriate place. ~ 144.
Objection sometimes made to the existence of general notions. It is proper
briefly to notice an objection sometimes made, viz., that it is not
possible for us to have such general notion at all, because there is
nothing outward which the general notion or idea precisely corresponds to.
This objection goes too far. It would seem even to lead to the conclusion
that we can have no complex idea of any kind, neither particular nor
general. It cannot be pretended that even our complex notions of
particular objects correspond precisely to those objects. The ideas which
we form of a particular house, tree, or plant, or any other individual
object, are often erroneous in some respects, and probably always im
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210 POWER OF ABSTRACTION. perfect. But they are not, for that reason, to
be regarded as false and chimerical, and to be rejected as having no
foundation in nature. We will suppose ourselves to have been acquainted in
former years with a particular elm; we have looked upon it a thousand
times, and it is familiar to us as any of our most cherished remembrances.
At this great distance of time and place we form an idea, a conception, a
notion of it, but it cannot be presumed to be a perfect or complete one.
It cannot be pretended that we have a notion not only of the trunk, bnt of
every leaf and of the form of every leaf, and of every branch and its
intertwinings with every other branch; that it exists in our minds
precisely, and in every respect, the same as it exists on the spot where
it grows. If, therefore, general abstract ideas are to be rejected because
they embrace only parts of those objects which are ranked under them, we
must on the same grounds reject and deny also our complex notions of
individual objects; but this probably no one is prepared to do. ~ 145. The
power of general abstraction in connexion with numbers, &c. The ability
which the mind possesses of forming general abstract ideas is of much
practical importance; but whether it be the characteristical attribute of
a rational nature or not, as some have supposed, it is not necessary now
to inquire. It is not easy to estimate the increase of power which is thus
given to the action of the human mind, particularly in reasoning. By means
of general abstract propositions, we are able to state volumes in a few
sentences; that is to say, the truths, stated and illustrated in a few
general propositions, would fill volumes in their particular applications.
But it is enough here to refer to a single circumstance in illustration of
the uses of this power. Without the ability of forming general notions, we
should not be able to znumber, even in the smallest degree. Before we can
consider objects as forming a
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GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 211 multitude, or are able to number them, it
seems necessary to be able to. apply to them a common name. This we cannot
do until we have reduced them to a genus; and the formation of a genus
implies and requires the exercise of the power of abstraction.
Consequently, we should be unable, without such power, to number. —How
great, then, is the practical importance of that intellectual process by
which general abstractions are formed! -Without the ability to number, we
should be at a loss in all investigations where this ability is required;
without the power to classify, all our speculations must be limited to
particulars, and we should be capable of no general reasoning. ~ 146. Of
general abstract truths or principles. There are not only general abstract
ideas, but abstract truths or principles also of a general nature, which
are deserving of some attention, especially in a practical point of view.
Although enough has already been said to show the importance of
abstraction, it may yet be desirable to have a more full view of its
applications. The process in forming general truths or principles of an
abstract nature seems to be this. We must begin undoubtedly with the
examination and study of particulars; with individual objects and
characters, and with insulated events. We subsequently confirm the truth
of whatever has been ascertained in such inquiry by an observation of
other like objects and events.- We proceed from one individual to another
till no doubt remains. —Having in this way arrived at some general fact or
principle, we thenceforward throw aside the consideration of the
particular objects on which it is founded, and make it alone, exclusively
and abstractly, the subject of our mental contemplations. We repeat this
process again and again, till the mind, instead of being wholly taken up
with a multitude of particulars, is stored with truths of a general kind.
These truths it subsequently combines in trains of reasoning, compares
together, and deduces from thelm others of still wider application.
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212 ABSTRACTION OR ABSTRACTMIENT. ~ 147. Of the speculations of
philosophers and others. What has been said leads us to observe, that
there is a characteristical difference between the speculations of men of
philosophic minds and those of the common mass of people which is worthy
of some notice. The difference between the two is not so much, that
philosophers are accustomed to carry on processes of reasoning to a
greater extent, as this, that they are more in the habit of empldying
general abstract ideas and general terms, and that, consequently, the
conclusions which they form are more comprehensive. Nor are their general
reasonings, although the conclusions at which they arrive seem in their
particular applications to indicate wonderful fertility of invention, so
difficult in the performance as is apt to be supposed. They have so often
and so long looked at general ideas and general propositions; have been so
accustomed, as one may say, to contemplate the general nature of things,
divested of all superfluous and all specific circumstances, that they have
formed a hacbit;J and the operation is performed without difficulty. It
requires in such persons no greater intellectual effort than would be
necessary in skilfully managing the details of ordinary business. The
speculations of the great bulk of mankind differ from those of
philosophers in being, both in the subjects of them and in their results,
particular. They discover an inability to enlarge their view to universal
propositions, which embrace a great nunmber of individuals. They may
possess the power of mere argument, of comparing propositions together
which concern particulars, and deducing inferences from them to a great
degree; but when they attempt to contemplate general propositions, their
minds are perplexed, and the conclusions which are drawn from them appear
obscure, however clearly the previous process of reasoning may have been
expressed. ~ 148. Of different opinions formerly prevailing. The subject
of general abstract ideas, of which we
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GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. 213 have thus given a summary view, excited very
considerable interest during the Scholastic ages; and different opinions
have prevailed concerning them, not only at that period, but more or less
down to the present time. It is perhaps not necessary in most cases and
for most persons to plunge deeply into the history of philosophical
opinions. The discordant views which are there found have a tendency to
confuse and embarrass the young mind. A knowledge of the truth, when it is
once found, is in general of far greater consequence than an acquaintance
with the prolonged and conflicting discussions which led to it. The
disputes, however, on ihe topic of general abstractions so widely
prevailed, and excited so much interest and effort, that it seems to be
necessary to give a short sketch of some of them. We propose, therefore,
to refer briefly to two conflicting systems of thought and argument on
this subject, Nominalism and Conceptualism. ~ 149. Of the opinions of the
Nominalists. About the commencement of the 12th century, Roscelinus, the
instructor of Abelard, whose name occupies so conspicuous a place in the
history of Scholastic learning, laid the foundations of Nominalism.
Denying the existence of general abstract ideas, he maintained that
nothing can be called general or universal but names, and that even to
them universality can be ascribed only virtually, and not in the strict
and literal sense of the term.-That is, the names are in the first
instance given to individuals, but when any individuals are specified, the
nature of the mind is such, that we naturally and immediately think of
other individuals of the same kind. So that the names are in fact
particular, although, owing to the operation of the principle of
association, the practical effect is the same as if it were otherwise, and
hence the epithets "general" and " universal" are applied to them. This
opinion in respect to general ideas and names, or some doctrine
essentially of this description, has found
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214 GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. many advocates from the days of Roscelinus to
those of Berkeley and iHume. ~ 150. Of the opinions of the Conceptualists.
Those who hold to the actual existence of general abstract ideas, a
doctrine which is commonly and truly understood to imply the actual
existence in some generic form of the objects which they represent, in
other words an objective Realism, have generally been called
Conceptualists. And of this number, among the celebrated men of earlier
times, was Abelard, who seems to have had a deeper philosophical insight
than his teacher Roscelinus. We have already given, with such distinctness
as the obscurity and difficulty of the subject admitted, what we suppose
to be the true mental process. Whether we are right, believing as we do
that the mind itself is and must be its own interpreter, we leave to the
testimony of each one's internal and external experience, subjected to the
reflex process of a candid examination. But it is possible that some may
be desirous of a single testimony from other sources. Some of the
objections to the doctrine of IRoscelinus and those who have thought with
him, are forcibly summed up in Dr. Thomas Brown's Philosophy of the Mind,
Lectures 46 and 47. We quote the passages here, both on account of their
intrinsic value, andt for the purpose of- recalling, -as we have done in
some other instances, the name and merits of an able writer. "Of that
rigid Nominalism, which involves truly no mixture of Conceptualism, or of
the belief of those feelings of relation for which I have contended, but
denies altogether the existence of that peculiar class of feelings or
states of mind which have been denominated general notions or general
ideas, asserting the existence only of individual objects perceived, and
of general terms that comprehend these, without any peculiar mental state
denoted by the general term, distinct from those separate sensations or
perceptions
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NOMINALISM AND CONCEPTUALISM. 215 which the particular objects
comprehended under the term might individually excite, it seems to me that
the very statement of the opinion itself is almost a sufficient
confutation, since the very invention of the general term, and the
extension of it to certain objects only, not to all objects, implies some
reason for this limitation, some feeling of general agreement of the
objects included in the class, to distinguish them from the objects not
included in it, which is itself that very general-notion professedly
denied.* As long as some general notion of circumnstances of resemblance
is admitted, I see very clearly how a general term may be most accurately
limited; but if this general notion be denied, I confess that I cannot
discover any principles of limitation whatever. Why have certain objects
been classed together, and not certain other objects, when all have been
alike perceived by us; and all, thereforeif there be nothing more than
mere perception in the process, are capable of receiving any denomination
which we may please to bestow on them? Is it arbitrarily, and without any
reason whatever, that we do not class a rose-bush with birds, or an
elephant with fish? and if there be any reason for these exclusions, why
will not the Nominalist tell us what that reason is-in what feeling it is
foundand how it can be made accordant with his system? * It is proper to
remark, in introducing this passage from Dr. Brown, that this acute writer
is to be considered as expressing himself too strongly when he asserts, in
a sentence not here quoted, that the feeling of resemblance is all that
the general name truly, designates. Possibly he meant to convey by this
assertion nothing more than this, that the feeling of resemblance is the
prominent and distinguishing circumstance in the notions expressed by
general names, since in another passage he speaks of general terms being "
invented to express all that multitude of objects which agree in exciting
one common feeling of relation, the relation of a certain similarity." If
that were not his intention, then we are to consider his views as correct
only so far as they go. The feeling of resemblance is a prominent
circumstance; but there is something-more than. this. Whenever we form a
complex notion, which is both general and abstract, we combine the feeling
of resemblance, the existence of which Dr. Brown has so clearly
demonstrated, with the notion of those properties which are found to be
possessed in common.
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216 GENERAL ABSTRACT IDEAS. Must it not be that the rose-bush and a
sparrow, though equally perceived by us, do not excite that general notion
of resemblance which the term' bird is invented to express-do not seem to
us to have those relations of a common nature, in certain respects, which
lead us to class the sparrow and the ostrich, however different in other
respects, as birds; or the petty natives of our brooks and rivulets with
the mighty monsters of the deep, under one general and equal denomination?
If this be the reason, there is more in every ease than perception and the
giving of a general name; for there is a peculiar state of mind-a general
relative feeling -intervening between the perception and the invention of
the term, which is the only reason that can be assigned for that very
invention." ~ 151. Further remarks of Brown on general abstractions. "C an
the Nominilalist then assert that there is no feeling of the resemblance
of objects, in certain respects, which thus intervenes between the
perception of them as separate objects, which is one stage of the process,
and the comprehension of them under a sin-gle name, which is another stage
of the process-or must he not rather confess that it is merely in
consequence of this intervening feeling we give to the number of objects
their general name, to the exclusion of the multitudes of objects to which
we do not apply it, as it is in consequence of certain other feelings,
excited by them individually, we give to each separate object its proper
name, to the exclusion of every other object. To repeat the process, as
already described to you, we perceive two or more objectswe are struck
with their resemblance in certain respects. We invent a general name to
denote this feeling of resemblance, and we class under this general name
every particular object, the perception of which is followed by the same
feeling of resemblance, and no object but these alone."
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OF ATTENTION. 217 CHAPTER XV. OF THE POWER OF ATTENTION. ~ 152. Names
given it, and its result when in exercise. WE come now to another power,
which does not directly and by virtue of its own activity originate
knowledge, and therefore is not in strictness denominated and classed as
one of the Cognitive faculties; but exceedingly important in its relations
and influence, it is entitled to a leading place among those powers which
we have found it necessary to notice and introduce from time to time as
AUXILIARY powers. We refer to the power of Attention; the Attentional
power; or simply and analogically, by adding the termination which
indicates function or office, "Attentivement." The result of the exercise
of the power of attention is the realization in fact of that state of
mind, which, in consequence of the imperfection of language, we call by
the same name, attention; but wlich, considered as an effect, may easily
be discriminated from its cause. We sometimes call it attentiveness. And
it is this resulting experience which first claims our notice. WVhen that
state of mind exists, which is denominated attention, so that we can truly
say of a person that he is attentive, it is found, that the mind is
steadily directed, for a length of time, to some object of sense or
intellect, exclusive of other objects. All other objects, for the time
being, are shut out. In other words, the grasp, which the perceptive power
fixes upon the object of its contemplations, is an undivided, an unbroken
one. ~ 153. Of different degrees of attention. In agreement with this view
of the subject, we often speak of attention as great or small, as existing
in I.-K
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218 OF ATTENTION; a very high or a very slight degree. When the view of
the mind is only momentary, and is unaccompanied, as it generally is at
such times, with any force of emotion or energy of volitional action, then
the attention is said to be slight. When, on the contrary, the mind
directs itself to an object or series of objects with earnestness, and for
a considerable length of time, and refuses to attend to anything else,
then the attention is said to be intense. We commonly judge at first of
the degree of attention to a subject from the length of time during which
the mind is occupied: with it. But, when we look a little further, it will
be found that the time will generally depend upon the strength and
permanency of the attendant emotion of interest. And hence both the time
and the degree of feeling are to be regarded in our estimate of the power
of attention in any particular case; the former being the result, and, in
some sense, a measure of the latter. Of instances of people who are able
to give but slight attention to any subject of thought, who cannot bring
their minds to it with steadiness and power, we everywhere find
multitudes, and there are some instances where this ability has been
possessed in such a high degree as to be worthy of notice. There have been
mathematicians who could investigate the most complicated problems amid
every variety and character of disturbance. It was said of Julius Caesar,
that, while writing a despatch, he could at the same time dictate four
others to his secretaries; and if he did not write himself, could dictate
seven letters at once. The same thing is asserted also of the Emperor
Napoleon, who had a wonderful capability of directing his whole mental
energy to whatever came before him.* The chess-player Philidor could
direct three games of chess at the same time, of one of which only he
required ocular inspection, the moves of the other two being announced to
him by an assistant. The moves * Segur's History of the Expedition to
Russia, book vii., clh. 13.
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THE ATTENTIONAL POWER. 219 of the chessmen formed the subject about which
his thoughts were employed; and such was the intensity of interest and
such the power of the will, that the mind found no difficulty in dwelling
upon it to the entire exclusion of other subjects, and for a considerable
length of time. ~ 154. Complexness of the power of attention. The power,
by means of which these remarkable results are experienced, is not simple,
but complex. In its first aspect, it is purely intellectual. We see only
the direction of the perceptive power to its appropriate object, which it
holds firmly in its grasp, excluding the other objects which throng around
it from the range of its contemplation. But if we look a little further,
we shall find, that, back of the act of perceptivity, is an act of the
will, directing, condensing, and confining the perception. And then,
again, it is well understood, that the act of the will requires, in
another part of our nattre, but outside of the perceptive or intellectual,
a feeling of desire or interest, which is antecedent to the volitional
act, and which brings the will into action. Such is the analysis of the
Attentional power, which of course implies its complexity; namely, an act
of perception; the volitional control of the perceptive act, without which
it would be unfixed and wandering; with the intermediate sentiment or
feeling, which sometimes takes the form of a desire and sometimes of a
sentiment of du(ty. And at this point it is proper to add an explanatory
remark. It is sometimes thought, that the powers or faculties of the mind
which are complex, inasmuch as they are susceptible of being analyzed into
their component elements, are for that reason not to be regarded as
powers. We could not feel justified in assenting to such a view, because
in settling the question of what are to be regarded as mental faculties
and what are not, we are to take into consideration the objects had in
view, and the combinations and
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220 OF ATTENTION. relative. adjustment of the component elements which
constitute the complexness of such faculties, and also their modes and
quickness of action, and the certainties of result. On the view that all
the mental faculties are and must be simple, and that, if they are
susceptible of being resolved by analytical processes into component parts
or elements, they cease to be regarded as such, it logically follows, that
the powers of perception and abstraction, of reasoning, imagination, and
memory would be excluded from the list of mental faculties. A result,
which would not only perplex the recognised facts and relations of the
mind, but would violate the usages of language, and find itself at war
with intuitive convictions. ~ 155. Dependence of memory on attention. We
are sometimes obliged, partially at least, to anticipate subjects. And on
the supposition that we know something of the memory, an attribute of the
mind which is to be particularly considered hereafter, we may refer here,
in connexion with Attention, to the well-known fact, that memory depends
on attention. That is to say, where attention is slight, remembrance is
weak; and where attention is intense, remembrance continues longer.-There
are many facts which confirm this statement. (1.) In the course of a
single day, persons who are in the habit of winking will close their
eyelids perhaps thousands of times, and,.as often as they close them, will
place themselves in utter darkness. Probably they are conscious at the
time both of closing their eyelids and of being in the dark; but, as their
attention is chiefly taken np with other things, they have entirely
forgotten it. —(2.) Let a person be much engaged in conversation, or
occupied with any very interesting speculation, and the clock will strike
in the room where he is, apparently without his having any knowledge of
it. He hears the clock strike as much as at any other time, but, not
attending to the perception of sound, and having his thoughts directed
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POWER OF ATTENTION. 221 another way, he immediately forgets.-(3.) In the
occupations of the day, when a multitude of cares are pressing us on every
side, a thousand things escape our notice; they appear to be neither seen
nor heard, nor to affect us in any way whatever. But at the stillness of
evening, when anxieties and toils are quieted, and there is a general
pause in nature, we seem to be endued with a new sense, and the slightest
sound attracts our attention. Shakspeare has marked even this. "The crow
doth sing as sweetly as the lark WThen neither is attended; and, I think,
The nightingale, if she should sing by day, When every goose is cackling,
would be thought NTo better a musician than the wren." It is on the same
principle that people dwelling in the vicinity of waterfalls do not appear
to notice the sound. The residents in the neighbourhood even of the great
cataract of Niagara are not seriously disturbed by it, although it is an
unbroken, interminable thunder to all others. -The reason in all these
cases is the same as has already been given. There is no attention and no
remembrance, and, of course, virtually no perception. (4.) Whenever we
read a book, we do not observe the words merely as a whole, but every
letter of which they are made np, and even the minute parts of these
letters. BRut it is merely a glance; it does not for any length of time
occupy our attention; we immediately forget, and with great difficulty
persuade ourselves that we have truly perceived the letters of the word.
The fact that every letter is in ordinary cases observed by us, may be
proved by leaving out a letter of the word, or by substituting others of a
similar form. We readily, in reading, detect such omissions or
substitutions. (5.) An expert accountant can sum up, almost with a single
glance of the eye, a long column of figures. The operation is performed
almost instantaneously, and yet he ascertains the sum of the whole with un
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222 OF ATTENTION. erring certainty. It is impossible that he should learn
the sum without noticing every figure in the whole column, and without
allowing each its proper worth; but the attention to them was so very
slight, that he is nnable to remember this distinct notice. Many facts of
this.kind evidently show, as we think, that memory depends upon attention,
or, rather, upon a continuance of attention, and varies with that
continuance. ~ 156. Of exercising attention in reading. If attention, as
we have seen, be requisite to memory, then we are furnished with a
practical rule of considerable importance. The rule is, Not to give a
hasty and careless reading of authors, but to read them with a suitable
degree of deliberation and thought.It is the fault of some persons that
they are too quickly weary; that they skip from one author to another, and
from one sort of knowledge to another. It is true, there are many things
to be known; we would not have a person limit himself entirely to one
science, but it is highly important that he should guard against that
rapid and careless transition from subject to subject which has been
mentioned. If we are asked the reason of this direction, we find a good
and satisfactory one in the fact referred to at the head of this section,
that there cannot be memory without attention, or, rather, that the power
of memory will vary with the degree of attention. By yielding to the
desire of becoming acquainted with a greater variety of departments of
knowledge than the understanding is able to master, and, as a necessary
consequence, by bestowing upon each of them only a very slight attention,
we remain essentially ignorant of the whole. The person who pursues such a
course finds himself unable to recall what he has been over; he has a
great many half-formed notions floating in his mind, but these are so ill
shaped and so little under his control as to be little better than actual
ignorance. This
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OF ATTENTION. 223 is one evil result of reading authors and of going over
sciences in the careless way which has been specified, that the knowledge
thus acquired, if it can be called knowledge, is of very little practical
benefit, in'consequence of being so poorly digested and so little under
control. But there is.another and, perhaps, more serious evil. This
practice greatly disqualifies one for all intellectual lpursuits. To store
the mind with new ideas is only a part of education. It is at least a
matter of equal importance to impart to all the mental powers a suitable
discipline, to exercise those that are strong, to strengthen those that
are weak, and to maintain among all of them a suitable balance. An
attentive and thorough examination of subjects is a training of the mind
in both these respects. It furnishes it with that species of knowledge
which is most valuable, because it is not mixed up with errors; and,
moreover, gives a strength and consistency to the whole structure of the
intellect. Whereas, when the mind is long left at liberty to wander from
object to object without being called to account and subjected to the
rules of salutary discipline, it entirely loses at last the ability to-
dwell upon the -subjects of its thoughts, and to examine them. And when
this power is once lost, there is little ground to expect any solid
attainments. ~ 157. Alleged inability to command the attention. We are
aware that those who, in accordance with these directions, are required to
make a close and thorough examination of subjects, will sometimes complain
that they find a. great obstacle in their inability to fix their
attention. They are not wanting in ability to comprehend, but find it
difficult to retain the mind in one position so long as to enable them to
connect together all the parts of a subject, and duly estimate their
various bearings. When this:intellectual defect exists, it becomes a new
reason for that thorough examination of subjects which has been above
recommended. It has probably been caused
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224 OF ATTENTION. by a neglect of such strictness of examination, and by a
too rapid and careless transition from one subject to another. It will be
recollected, that Attention, considered as a result in distinction from
the Power of attention, expresses the state of the mind when it is
steadily directed for some time, whether longer or shorter, to some object
of sense or intellect, exclusive of other objects. All other objects are
shut out; and, when this exclusion of everything else continues for some
time, the attention is said to be intense. —Now it is well known that such
an exclusive direction of the mind, or rather of the perceptive part of
the mind, cannot exist for any long period without being accompanied with
a feeling of desire or of duty. In the greatest intellectual exertions,
not the mere powers of judging, of abstracting, and of reasoning are
concerned; there will also be a greater or less movement of the feelings.
And it will be found that no feeling so surely lays the foundation in
cases of attention for that volitional action which gives a definite
direction and pertinacity to the perceptions, as a love of the truth. Mr.
Locke thought that the person who should discover a remedy for wandering
thoughts would do great service to the studious and contemplative part of
mankind. We know of no other effective remedy than the one just mentioned,
A LOVE OF THE TRUTH, a desire to know the nature and relations of things
merely for the sake of knowledge. It is true that a conviction of duty
will do much; ambition and interest may possibly do more; but when the
mind is led to deep investigations by these views merely, without finding
something beautiful and attractive in the aspect of knowledge itself, it
is likely to prove a tiresome process. There is a glory in the Truth,
which it never imparts to another. Christ says of himself, that " he came
into the world to bear witness to the truth." A desire to know the truth
in morals, in religion, in sci
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DREAMING. 225 ence, in the arts, in government, and in all the various
kinds and methods of thought and inquiry, furnishes the key to much that
is great and ennobling in the history of the race. When the inspiration
which lays the foundations of activity comes from God, it is always in
this direction. It was the inspiration found in a love of the truth, far
more than any aspirations and hopes of a personal nature, which gave
strength and perseverance to Christopher Columbus in his multiplied
disappointments and trials. It was such a desire as this, a desire to know
the hidden forces and their applications which the God of nature had
beneficently treasured up in the works of nature, that inspired and
developed the mechanical genius of Fulton, and sustained him in his long
and weary labours. "I saw D'Alembert," says a recent writer, (congratulate
a young man very coldly who brought him a solution of a problem. The young
man said,'I have done this in order to have a seat in the Academy.''Sir,'
answered ID'Alembert,'with such dispositions you never will earn one.
Science must be loved for its own sake, and not for the advantage to be
derived. No other principle will enable a man to make progress in the
sciences!' " CIHAPTER XVI. DREAMING AND SOMNAMBULISM. ~ 158. Definition of
dreams and the prevalence of them. AMONG numerous other subjects in mental
philosophy which claim their share of attention, that of Dreaming is
entitled to its place; nor can we be certain that any other will be found
more appropriate to it than the present, especially when we consider how
closely it is connected in all its forms with our sensations and
conceptions. And what are Dreams? It * Memoirs of Montlosier, vol. i., p.
59, as quoted in Mackintosh's Ethical Philosophy, sect. vii. K 2
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226 DREAMING. approaches perhaps sufficiently near to a correct general
description to say, that they are our mental states and operations while
we are asleep. [But the particular views which are to be taken in the
examination of this subject will not fail to throw light on this general
statement. The mental states and exercises which go under this name have
ever excited much interest. It is undoubtedly one reason of the attention
which the subject of our dreams have ever elicited among all classes of
people, that they are so prevalent; it being very difficult, if not
impossible, to find a person who has not had more or less of this
experience. Mr. Locke, however, tells us of an individual who never
dreamed till the twenty-sixth year of his age, when he happened to have a
fever, and then dreamed for the first time. Plutarch also mentions one
Cleon, a friend of his, who lived to an advanced age, and yet had never
dreamed once in his life, and remarks that he had heard the same thing
reported of Thrasymedes. Undoubtedly these persons dreamed very seldom, as
we find that some dream much more than others; but it is possible that
they may have dreamed at some time and entirely -forgotten it. So that it
cannot with certainty be inferred, from such instances as these, that
there are any who are entirely exempt from dreaming. ~ 159. Connexion of
dreams with our waking thoughts. In giving an explanation of dreams, our
attention is first arrested by the circumstance that they have an intimate
relationship with our waking thoughts. The great body of our waking
experiences appear in the form of trains of associations; and these trains
of associated ideas, in greater or less continuity, and with greater or
less variation, continue when we are asleep. -Condorcet (a name famous in
the history of France) told some one, that, while he was engaged in
abstruse and profound calculations, he was frequently obliged to leave
them in an unfinished state, in order to retire
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DREAMING. 227 to rest; and that the remaining steps and the conclusion of
his calculations have more than once presented themselves in his
dreams.-Franklin also has made the remark, that the bearings and results
of political events, which had caused him much trouble while awake, were
not unfrequently unfolded to hilm in dreaming.-Mr. Coleridge says, that,
as he was once reading in the Pilgrimage of Purchas an account of the
palace and garden of the Khan Ktlubla, he fell into a sleep, and in that
situation composed an entire poem of not less than two hundred lines,
some. of which he afterward committed to writing. The poem is entitled
lKubla Khan, and begins as follows: " In Xanadu did Kubla Khan A stately
pleasure-dome decree; Where Alph, the sacred river, ran Through caverns
measureless to man Down to a sunless sea." It is evident, from such
statements as these, which are confirmed by the experience of almost every
person, that our dreams are fashioned from the materials of the thoughts
and feelings which we have while awake; in other words, they will, in a
great degree, be merely the repetition of our customary and prevailing
associations. So well understood is this, that President Edwards, who was
no less distinguished as a mental philosopher than as a theologian,
thought it a good practice to take particular notice of his dreams, in
order to ascertain from them what his predominant inclinations were. ~
160. Dreams are often caused by our sensations. But while we are to look
for the materials of our dreams in thoughts which had previously existed,
we further find that they are not beyond the influence of those slight
bodily sensations, of which we are susceptible even in hours of sleep.
These sensations, slight as they are, are the means of introducing one set
of associations rather than another.-Dugald Stewart relates an incident
which may be considered an evi
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228 DREAMING. dence of this, that a person with whom he was acquainted had
occasion, in consequence of an indisposition, to apply a bottle of hot
water to his feet when he went to bed; and the consequence was, that he
dreamed he was making a journey to the top of Mount lEtna, and that he
found the heat of the ground almost insupportable. There was once a
gentleman in the English army who was so susceptible of audible
impressions while he was asleep, that his companions could make him dream
of what they pleased. Once, in particular, they made him go through the
whole process of a duel, from the preliminary arrangements to the firing
of the pistol, which they put into his hand for that purpose, and which,
when it exploded, waked him. A cause of dreams closely allied to the above
is the variety of sensations which we experience from the stomach,
viscera, &c.-Persons, for instance, who have been for a long time deprived
of food, or have received it only in small quantities, hardly enough to
preserve life, will be likely to have dreams in some way or other directly
relating to their condition. Baron Trenck relates, that, being almost dead
with hunger when confined in his dungeon, his dreams every night presented
to him the well-filled and luxurious tables of Berlin, from which, as they
were presented before him, he imagined he was about to relieve his hunger.
"The night had far advanced," says Irving, speaking of- the voyage of
Mendez to Hispaniola, "but those whose turn it was to take repose were
unable to sleep from the intensity of their thirst; or, if they slept, it
was to be tantalized with dreams of cool fountains and running brooks."
The state of health also has considerable influence, not only in producing
dreams, but in giving them a particular character. The remark has been
made by medical men, that acute diseases, particularly fevers, are often
preceded and indicated by disagreeable and oppressive dreams.
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DREAMING. 229 ~ 161. Explanation of the incoherency of dreams. (lst
cause.) There is frequently much of wildness, inconsistency, and
contradiction in our dreams. The mind passes very rapidly from one object
to another; strange and singular incidents occur. If our dreams be truly
the repetition of our waking thoughts, it may well be inquired, How this
wildness and inconsistency happen? The explanation of this peculiarity
resolves itself into two parts.-The FIRST ground or cause of it is, that
our dreams are not subjected, like our waking thoughts, to the control and
regulation of surrounding objects. While we are awake, our trains of
thought are kept uniform and coherent by the influence of such objects,
which continually remind us of our situation, character, and duties; and
which keep in check any tendency to revery. But in sleep the senses are
closed; the soul is accordingly, in a great measure, excluded from the
material world, and is thus deprived of the salutary regulating influence
from that source. ~ 162. Second cause of the incoherency of dreams. In the
second place, when we are asleep, our associated trains of thought are no
longer under the control of the WILL. We do not mean to say that the
operations of the will are suspended at such times, and that volitions
have no existence. On the contrary, there is sufficient evidence of the
continuance of these mental acts, in some degree at least, since volitions
must have made a part of the original trains of thought, which are
repeated in dreaming; and, furthermore, we are often as conscious of
exercising or putting forth volitions when dreaming as of any other mental
acts, for instance, imagining, remembering, assenting, or reasoning. When
we dream that we are attacked by an enemy sword in hand, but happen, as we
suppose in our dreaming experiences, to be furnished in self-defence with
an instrument of the same kind, we dream that we will to exert it for our
own
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230 DREAMING. safety and against our antagonist; and we as truly, in this
case, put forth the mental exercise which we term volition, as in any
other we exercise remem'brance, or inmagine, or reason in our sleep.
Admitting, however, that the will continues to act in sleep, it is quite
evident that the volitions which are put forth by it:have ceased to
exercise their customary influence in respect to.our mental operations.
Ordinarily we are able, by means of an act of the will, to fix our
attention upon some particular part of any general subject which has been
suggested, or to transfer it to some other part of such subject, and thus
to direct and to regulate the whole train of mental action. But, the
moment we are soundly asleep, this influence ceases, and hence, in
connexion with the other cause already Rmentioned, arise the wildness,
incoherency, and contradictions which exist. A person, while he is awake,
has his thoughts under such government, and is. able, by' the direct and
indirect influence of volitions, so to regulate them, as generally to
bring them, in the end, to some conclusion which he foresees and wishes to
arrive at. But in dreaming, as all directing and governing influence, both
internal and external, is at an end, our thoughts and feelings seem to be
driven forward, much like a ship at sea without a rudder, wherever it may
happen. ~ 163. Apparent reality of dreams. (lst cause.) When objects are
presented to us in dreams, we look upon them as real; and events, and
combinations and series of events, appear the same. We feel the same
interest and resort to the same expedients as in the perplexities and
enjoyments of real life. When persons are introduced as forming a part in
the transactions of our dreams, we see them clearly in their living
attitudes and stature; we converse with them, and hear them speak, and
behold them move, as if actually present. One reason of this greater
vividness of our dreaming conceptions and of our firm belief in their
reality
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DREAMING. 231 seems to be this. The subjects upon which our thoughts are
then employed occupy the mind exclusively. We can form a clearer
conception of an object with our eyes shut than we can with them open, as
any one will be convinced on making the experiment; and the liveliness of
the conception will increase in proportion as we can suspend the exercise
of the other senses. In sound sleep, not only the sight, but the other
senses also, may be -said to be closed; and the attention is not.
continually diverted by the multitude of objects which arrest the hearing
and touch when we are awake.-It is, therefore, a most natural supposition,
that our conceptions must at such times be extremely vivid and distinct.
At ~ 119 we particularly remarked upon conceptions, or those ideas which
we have of absent objects of perception, which possess this vividness of
character. And it there appeared that they might be attended with a
momentary belief even when we are awake. But, as conceptions exist in the
mind when we are asleep in a much higher degree distinct and vivid, what
was in the former case a momentary, becomes in the latter a permanent
belief. Hence everything has the appearance of reality; and the mere
thoughts of the mind are virtually transformed into persons, and varieties
of situations, and events, which are regarded. by us in precisely the same
light as the persons, and situations, and events of our every-day's
experience. ~ 164. Apparent reality of dreams. (2d cause.) A second
circumstance which goes to account for the fact that our dreaming
conceptions have the appearance of reality is, that they are not
susceptible of being controlled, either directly or indirectly, by mere
volition.-We are so formed as almost invariably to associate reality with
whatever objects of perception continue to produce in us the same effects.
A hard or soft body, or any substance of a particular colour, taste, or
smell, are always, when presented to our
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232 DREM-IING. senses, followed by certain states of mind essentially the
same; and we yield the most ready and firm belief in the existence of such
objects. In a word, we are disposed, from our very constitution, to
believe in the existence of objects of perception, the perceptions of
which do not depend on the WILL, but which we find to be followed by
certain states of the mind, whether we choose it or not. -But it is to be
recollected that our dreaming thoughts are mere conceptions; our senses
being closed and shut up, and external objects not being presented to
them. This is true. But if we conclude in favour of the real existence of
objects of perception because they produce in us sensations independently
of our volitions, it is but natural to suppose that we shall believe in
the reality of our conceptions also, whenever they are in like manner
beyond our voluntary control. They are both merely states of the mind; and
if belief always attends our perceptions wherever we find them to be
independent of our choice, there is no reason why conceptions, which are
ideas of absent objects of perception, should not be attended with a like
belief under the same circumstances.-And essentially the same
circumstances exist in dreaming; that is, a train of conceptions arise in
the mind, and we are not conscious at such times of being able to exercise
any direction or control whatever over them. They exist, whether we will
it or not; and we regard them as real. ~ 165. Of our estimate of time in
dreaming. Our estimate of time in dreaming differs from that when awake.
Events which would take whole days or a longer time in the performance,
are dreamed in a few moments. So wonderful is this compression of a
multitude of transactions into the very shortest period, that when we are
accidentally awakened by the jarring of a door which is opened in the room
where we are sleeping, we sometimes dream of depredations by thieves or
destruction by fire in the very instant of our awaking.-" A friend of
mine," says
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DREAMIIG. 233 Dr. Abercrombie, " dreamed that he crossed the Atlalltic,
and spent a fortnight in America. In emnbarkingl on his return he fell
into the sea, and, having awoke with the fright, discovered that he had
not been asleep above ten minutes." Count Lavallette, who some years since
was condemned to death in France, relates a dream which occurred during
his imprisonment as follows: " One night while I was asleep, the clock of
the Palais de Justice struck twelve, and awoke me. I heard the gate open
to relieve the sentry, but I fell asleep again immediately. In this sleep
I dreamed that I was standing in the Rue St. HIonore, at the corner of the
Rue de l'Echelle. A melancholy darkness spread around me; all was still;
nevertheless, a low and uncertain sound soon arose. All of a sudden I
perceived at the bottom of the street, and advancing towards me, a troop
of cavalry, the men and horses, however, all flayed. This horrible troop
continued passing in a rapid gallop, and casting frightful looks on me.
Their march, I thought, continued for five hours, and they were followed
by an immense number of artillery-wagons, full of bleeding corpses, whose
limbs still quivered; a disgusting smell of blood and bitumen almost
choked me. At length the iron gate of the prison, shutting with great
force, awoke me again. I made my repeater strike; it was no more than
midnight, so that the horrible phantasmagoria had lasted no more than two
or three minutes, that is to say, the time necessary for relieving the
sentry and shutting the gate. The cold was severe and the watchword short.
The next day the turnkey confirmed my calculations." Our dreams will not
unfrequently go through all the particulars of some long journey, or of
some military expedition, or of a circumnavigation of the globe, or of
other long and perilous undertakings, in a less number of hours than it
took weeks, or months, or even years in the actual performance of them. We
go from land to land, and from city to city, and into desert places; we
experience transitions from joy to
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234 DREAMING. sorrow, and from, poverty to wealth; we are occupied in the
scenes and transactions of many long months; and then our slumbers are
scattered, and, behold; they are the doings of a fleeting watch of the
night! This striking circumstance in the history of our dreams is
generally explained by supposing that our thoughts, as they successively
occupy the mind, are more rapid than while we are awake. But their
rapidity is at all times very great; so much so, that in a few moments
crowds of ideas pass through the mind which it would take a long time to
utter, and a far longer time would it take to perform all the transactions
which they concern. This explanation, therefore, is not satisfactory, for
our thoughts are oftentimes equally rapid in our waking moments. The true
reason, we apprehend, is to be found in those preceding sections, which
took under examination the apparent reality of dreams. Our conceptions in
dreaming are considered by us real; every thought is an action; every idea
is an event; and successive states of mind are successive actions and
successive events. IIe who in his sleep has the conception of all the
particulars of a military expedition to MIoscow or of a circumnavigation
of the globe, seems to himself to have actually experienced all the
various and multiplied fortunes of the one and the other. Hence what
appears to be the real time in dreams, but is only the apparent time, will
not be that which is sufficient for the mere thought, but that which is
necessary for the successive actions. " Something perfectly analogous to
this may be remarked," says Mr. Stewart, "in the perceptions we obtain by
the sight of sense.* When I look into a showbox, where the deception is
imperfect, I see only a set of paltry daubings of a few inches in
diameter; but if the representation be executed with so much skill as to
convey to me the idea of a distant prospect, every object before me swells
in its dimensions in proportion to the extent of space which I conceive it
to * Stewart's Elements, chapter on Dreaming.
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DREAMING. 235 occupy, and what seemed before to be shut within the limits
of a small wooden frame, is magnified in my apprehension to an immense
landscape of woods, rivers, and mountains." ~ 166. Of the senses sinking
to sleep in succession. It is true, as a general statement, that in sleep
the mind ceases to retain its customary power over the muscular movements
of the system; and all the senses are at such times locked up, and no
longer perform their usual offices. The effect upon the senses is such
that it seems to be proper to speak of them as individually going to sleep
and awaking from sleep. It remains, therefore, to be observed, that there
is considerable reason to suppose that the senses fall asleep in
succession.-For a detailed explanation and proof of this singular fact,
reference must be had to Cullen, and particularly to Cabanis, a French
writer on subjects of this nature, whom we have already had occasion to
mention; but the conclusion at which they arrive on this particular point
may be here stated.* The sight, in consequence of the protection of the
eyelids, ceases to receive impressions first, while all the other senses
preserve their sensibility entire, and may, therefore, be said to be first
in falling asleep. The sense of taste, according to the above writers, is
the next which loses its susceptibility of impressions, and then the sense
of smelling. The hearing is the next in order, and last of all comes the
sense of touch. — Furthermore, the senses are thought to sleep with
different degrees of profoundness. The senses of taste and smelling awake
the last; the sight with more difficulty than the hearing, and the touch
the easiest of all. Sometimes a very considerable noise does not awake a
person; but if the soles of the feet are tickled in the slightest degree,
he starts up immediately. Similar remarks are made by the writers above
referred to on the muscles. Those which move the arms and legs cease to
act when sleep is approaching * Rapports du Physique et du Moral de
l'omme, Mem. x.
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236 SOMNAMBULISM. sooner than those which sustain the head; and the latter
before those which support the back. —And here it is proper to notice an
exception to the general statement at the commencement of this section,
that the mind, in sleep, ceases to retain its power over the muscles. Some
persons can sleep standing, or walking, or riding on horseback; with such
we cannot well avoid the supposition, tlat the voluntary power over the
muscles is in some way retained and exercised in sleep.-These statements
are particularly important in connexion with the facts of somnambulism;
only admit that the susceptibility of the senses and the power of the
muscles may remain even in part while we are asleep, and we call account
for them. We know that this is not the case in a vast majority of
instances; but that it does sometimes happen is a point which seems at
last to be sufficiently well established. ~ 167. General remarks on cases
of somnambulism. With the general subject of dreaming, that of
Somnambulism is naturally and intimately connected. Somnambulists, as the
term itself indicates, are persons who are capable of walking and of other
voluntary actions while asleep.-Of such persons many instances are on
record; and the facts which they present to our notice are both
practically and psychologically matters of considerable interest and
importance. (I.) A number of things may be said in explanation of
somnambulism. The somnambulist, in the first place, is in all cases
dreaming, and we may suppose, in general, that the dream is one which
greatly interests him. After he has awaked, the action he has passed
through appears, in his recollection of it, to be merely a dream, and not
a reality. "A young noblenan,)' says Dr. Abercrombie, "living in the
citadel of Breslau, was observed by his brother, who occupied the same
room, to rise in his sleep, wrap himself in a cloak, and escape by a
window to the roof of the building. He there tore in pieces a magpie's
nest,
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SOMNAMBULISM. 237 wrapped the young birds in his cloak, returned to his
apartment, and went to bed. In the morning he mentioned the circumstances
as having occurred in a dream, and could not be persuaded that there had
been anything more than a dream, till he was shown the magpies in his
cloak." And this is noticed to be commonly the fact. What has been done
has the appearance of being a dream. And there is no doubt that the mind
of the somnambulist is in that particular state which we denominate
dreaming. (II.) In the second place, those volitions which are a part of
his dreams retain their power over the muscles, which is not the fact in
the sleep and the dreaming of the great body of people.-Consequently,
whatever the somnambulist dreams is not only real in the mind, as in the
case of all other dreamers, but his ability to exercise his muscles
enables him to give it a reality in action. Whether he dream of writing a
letter, of visiting a neighbour's house, of cutting and piling wood, of
thrashing his grain, or ploughing his field (acts which have at various
times been ascribed to the somnambulist), his muscles are faithful to his
vivid mental conceptions, which we may suppose in all cases closely
connected with his customary labours and experiences, and frequently
enable him to complete what he has undertaken, even when his senses are at
the same time closed up. But the inquiry arises here, How it happens,
while in most cases both senses and muscles lose their power, in these, on
the contrary, the muscles are active while the senses alone are asleep?-In
reference to this inquiry, it must be acknowledged that it is involved at
present in some uncertainty, although there is much reason to anticipate
that it may hereafter receive light from further investigations and
knowledge of the nervous system and functions. There is a set of nerves
which are understood to be particularly connected with respiration, and
which appear to have nothing to do with sensation and with muscular
action. There is another set which are known to pos
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238 SOMNAMBULISM. sess a direct and important connexion with sensation and
the muscles. These last are separable into distinct filaments, having
separate functions; some being connected with sensation merely, and others
with volition and muscular action. In sensation, the impression made by
some external body exists at first in the external part of the organ of
sense, and is propagated along one class of filaments to the brain. In
volition and voluntary muscular movement, the origin of action, as far as
the body is concerned, seems to be the reverse, commencing in the brain,
and being propagated along other and appropriate nervous filaments to the
different parts of the system. Hence it sometimes happens, that, in
diseases of the nervous system, the power of sensation is in a great
measure lost, while that of motion fully remains; or, on the contrary, the
power of motion is lost, while that of sensation remnains. These views
help to throw light on the subject of somnambulism. Causes at present
unknown to us may operate, through their appropriate nervous filaments, to
keep the muscles awake, without disturbing the repose and inactivity of
the senses. A man may be asleep as to all the powers of external
perception, and yet be awake in respect tb the capabilities of muscular
motion. And, aided by the trains of association which make a part of his
dreams, may be able to walk about and to do many things without the aid of
the sight and hearing. ~ 168. Further illustrations of somnambulism.
(III.) Further, we are not to forget here a remark on the sleep of the
senses, a subject already briefly alluded to, and which is an exception to
the general statement then made in regard to them. Both in somnambulism
and in ordinary cases of dreaming the senses are not always entirely
locked up; many observations clearly show that it is possible for the mind
to be accessible through them, and that a new direction may be given in
this way to a person's dreams without awaking him. Hence somnambu
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SOMNAMB3ULISM. 239 lists may sometimes have very slight visual
perceptions; they may in some slight measure be guided by sensations of
touch; all the senses may be affected ill a small degree by their
appropriate objects, or this may be the case with some and not with
others, without effectually disturbing their sleep.-These facts will be
found to help in explaining any peculiar circumstances which may be
thought not to come within the reach of the general explanation which has
been given. (IV.) But this is not all. There are some cases, which are
notl reached by the statements: hitherto made. There are not only slight
exceptions to the general fact, that somnambulists, like persons in
ordinary sleep, are insensible to external impressions, but occasionally
some of a marked and extraordinary character. There are a few cases (the
recent instance of Jane Rider in this country is one) where persons in the
condition of somnnambulism have not only possessed slight visual power,
but perceptions of sight increased much above the common degree. In the
extraordinary narrative of Jane Rider, the author informs us that he took
two large wads of cotton and placed them directly on the closed eyelids,
and then bound them on with a black silk handkerchief. The cotton filled
the cavity under the eyebrows, and reached down to the middle of the
cheek, and various experiments were tried to ascertain whether she could
see. In one of them a watch enclosed in a case was handed to her, and she
was requested to tell what o'clock it was by it; upon which, after
examining both sides of the watch, she opened the case, and then answered
the question. She also read, without hesitation, the name of a gentleman,
written in characters so fine that no one else could distinguish it at the
usual distance from the eye. In another paroxysm, the lights were removed
from her room, and the windows so secured that no object was discernible,
and two books were presented to her, when she immediately told the titles
of both, though one of them was
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240 SOMNAMBULISM. a book which she had never before seen. In other
experiments, while the room was so darkened that it was impossible, with
the ordinary powers of vision, to distinguish the colonrs of the carpet,
and her eyes were also bandaged, she pointed out the different colours in
the hearth rug, took up and read several cards lying on the table,
threaded a needle, and performed several other things, which could not
have been done without the aid of vision.*-Of extraordinary cases of this
kind, it would seem that no satisfactory explanation (at least no
explanation which is unattended with difficulties) has as yet been given.
* As quoted in Dr. Oliver's Physiology, chap. 30.
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DIVISION FIRST. THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTANDING. INTELLECTIVE OR
INTELLECTUAL STATES OF THE MIND. PART SECOND. THE INTERNAL OR
SUPER-SENSUOUS INTELLECT. INTELLECTUAL STATES OF INTERNAL ORIGIN.
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CHAPTER I. INTERNAL ORIGIN OF LKNOWLEDGE. ~ 169. The soul has fountains of
knowledge within. IN tracing the history of the mind thus far, we have
seen the beginnings of knowledge, and that the material world around us is
the providentially appointed handmaid and nurse of the soul in the days of
its infancy, and for that purpose is endued with form, fragrance, and
colour. Material eyes were given to the soul (not made a part of its
nature, but assigned to it as all instrumental and auxiliary agent), that
it might see; and material hands, that it might handle; and hearing, that
it might hear. By means of these and other senses we become acquainted
with whatever is visible and tangible, and has outline and form. But there
is not only a sensuous, but a super-sensuous experience; not only an
EXTERNAL or SENSATIONAL intellect, but an INTERNAL or SUPER-SENSATIONAL
intellect. And hence it happens, that the termn Intellectualislm, in
distinction from Sensationalism, is often used as the name of a doctrine
and method of philosophic inquiry which goes outside of and beyond the
senses. The intellectualist accepts sensationalism as far as it goes, but
he affirms that there is something beyond it. In other words, there are
inward powers of perception, hidden fountains of knowledge, which open
themselves and flow up in the interior and secret places of the soul. The
soul finds knowledge in itself, which neither sight, nor touch, nor
hearing, nor any other sense, nor any outward forms of matter could give.
"The natural progress of all true learning," says the author of Hermes,
"is from sense to intellect." Having begun with the senses, and first
considered the sensations and perceptions which we there receive, and
other forms of knowledge, such as the conceptions, which are based
immediately upon them, we
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244 INTERNAL' ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. are next to enter more exclusively into
thie mind itself, and to explore the fruitful sources of knowledge which
are internal. And, in thus doing, it is a satisfaction to know that we are
treading essentially in the steps of many distinguished writers, who
maintain that a part of our knowledge only can be traced to the senses,
and that the origin of other portions is to be sought wholly in the
intellect itself. ~ 170. Declaration of Locke, that the soul has knowledge
in itself. After alluding to the senses as one great source of knowledge,
"the other fountain," says Locke, "from which experience furnisheth the
nnderstanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own
minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which
operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the
understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from
things without, and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing,
reasoning, knowing, willing, and all: the different actings of our own
minds, which we, being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from
these receive into our understandings ideas as distinct as we do from
bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly
within himself. And thougoh it be not sense, as having nothing to do with
EXTERNAL objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be
called INTERNAL SENSE. But, as I call the other Sensation, so I call this
Reflection; the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by
reflecting on its own operations within itself." It is, perhaps, necessary
to remark here, that we introduce this passage from Mr. Locke merely in
support of the general doctrine, without wishing to intimate a full
approbation of the manner in which he has applied it in its details. It is
probably true, that Mr. Locke, although he started upon a right track,
failed very much in hlis attempts to carry out his own plan. But what we
say now concerns the general question; and, in reference to that question,
the pas
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INTTERNAL ORIGIN OF INOWLEDGE. 245 sage just referred to is undoubtedly
weighty in itself, as well as in consequence of the great reputation and
acknowledged discernment of its author. It is undoubtedly the doctrine of
Mr. Locke, that our knowledge begins with Sensation; in other words, that
impressions made on the bodily system are the first occasions, so far as
we are able to judge, of bringing the mind into action. But it does not
follow from this (and the passage just quoted shows that Mr. Locke did not
suppose it thus to follow), that sensation is the only source of
knowledge. There is undeniably sometlling distinct from sensation;
thoughts, which have an interior origin, and calmot be accounted for by
external objects alone; ideas, wlhich are based upon the succession,
relation, and infinite of things, and not upon what is fixed, tangible,
and measurable; or which are the representatives and exponents of what is
mental rather than of what is material. ~ 1.71. Opinions of Cudworth on
the subject of internal knowledge. We may properly introduce hei'e a
quotation or two from another great authority, nearly contemporaneous with
Mr. Locke, that of Dr. Cudworth, a name which is acknowledged to rank
deservedly high among those that are most closely associated with exalted
wisdom and virtue. Let us, however, be again reminded, that our whole
object here is to establish the general position, that there is knowledge
of a purely internal,. or, if the expression be preferred, of a
super-sensuous origin, as well as of an external origin; and that,
therefore, a reference to writers for that purpose does not necessarily
involve an approbation of, or a responsibility for, their opinions any
further tlalln they relate to the particular object in view.-The
posthumous work froml which these extracts are nmade, is understood to
have been written in reply to Mr. Ilobbes, who held the opinion that all
our thoughts, of whatever kind, are only either direct, or transformed and
modified sensations. And, therefore, the statements made in it, being
called forth under such circunmstances, mllltst
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246 INTERNAL ORIGIN OF iKNOWLEDGE. be supposed to have been carefully
meditated, and oil that gronlid, among others, are entitled to much
weigol.t. " That oftentimes," says Cudworth,* "there is more taken notice
of and perceived by the mind, both in the sensible objects themselves and
by occasion of them, than was impressed from them, or passively received
by sense; which, tllerefore, must needs proceed from some inward active
princlliple in that which perceives, I shall make it further appear by
some other instances.'For, first, let a brute and a man at the same time
be made spectators of one and the same artificial statue, picture, or
landscape; here the brute will passively receive all that is impressed
from the outward object upon sense by local motion, as well as the man,
all the'several colours and figures of it; and yet the man will presently
perceive something in this statue or picture which the brute takes no
notice of at all,;viz., beauty, and pulchritude, and symmetry, besides the
liveliness of the effigies and portraiture. The eye of the brute being
every jot as good a glass or mirror, and perhaps endued with a more
perspicacious sense or power of passive perception than that of a man.
"Or, again, let both a man and a brute at the same time hear the same
musical airs; the brute will- only be sensible of noise and souinds, but
the man will also perceive harmony in them, and be very much delighted
with it, nay, even enthusiastically transported by it. Wherefore the brute
perceiving all the sounds as well as the mnan, but nothing of the harmony,
the difference must needs arise from sonle inward active principle or
anticipation in the man, which the brute hathl not." ~ 172. Further
remarks of the same writer on this subject. "Bullt I shall yet further
illustrate this business," says this learned writer near the conclusion of
the same chapter, "that the mind may actively comlpre* Immutable
Aforality, book iv., chap. ii., ~ 14.
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INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 247 liend more in the -outward objects of
sense, and by occasion of them, than is passively received and impressed
from them, by another instance. Suppose a learned written or printed
volume held before the eye of a brute-creature or illiterate person;
either of them will passively receive all that is impressed upon sense
from those delineations, to whom there will be nothing but several scrawls
of ink drawn upon white paper. But if a man that hath inward anticipations
of learning in him look upon them, he will immediately have another
comprehension of them than that of sense, and a strange scene of thoughts
presently represented to his mind from them; he will see heaven, earth,
sun, moon, and stars, comets, meteors, elements, in those inky
delineations; he will read profound tlieorems of philosophy, geometry,
astronomy in them, learn a great deal of new knowledge from them that he
never understood before, and thereby justly admire the wisdom of the
composer of them. Not that all this was passively stamped lupon his soul
by sense from those characters (for sense, as I said before, can perceive
nothing here but inky scrawls, and the intelligent reader will many times
correct his copy, finding errctas in it), but because his mind was before
furnished with certain inward anticipations, that such characters signify
the elements of certain sou-nds; those sounds, certain notions or
cogitations of the mind; and because lie hath an active power of exciting
any such cogitations within himself, lle reads in those sensible
delineations the passive stamps or prints of another man's wisdom or
knowledge upon them, and also learns knowledge and instruction from them,
not as infused into his mind froml those sensible characters, but, by
reason of those hints and significations thereby proposed to it,
accidentally kindled, awakened, and excited in it; for all but the
phantasms of black, inky strokes and figfires arises from the inward
activity of his own mimld. Wherefore this instance in itself shows how the
activity of the mind may comprehend more in and from sensible objects than
is passively imprinted by them nupon sense."
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248 INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. There are other illustrations in this
valuable writer. One is to this effect. We cast our eyes upon what he
calls the book of nature, the sky, the earth, and the waters, with the
multiplied forms which inhabit them. We see there many things addressed to
the " outward mind," as he terms it (that is to say, the mind, or rather
the intellective part of it, so far as it is connected with the external
world and the senses), such as extension, and colour, and form, and
whatever else is especially connected with the senses. The outward mind,
operating, so to speak, through the outward eye of the mindl, beholds
whatever is in this way presented to it, and stops there. But to the
inward mind, which has an inward vision, there is something more. To the
inward or super-sensuous mind, availing itself of its intuitional
suggestions, there are revelations, which in some respects are far more
important, of causation and power, of space and time, of intelligence,
design, and order, of unity and diversity, of goodness and wisdom.* ~ 173.
Writers who have objected to the doctrine of an internal source of
knowledge. But it ought not to pass unnoticed, that there have been
writers who have objected to the doctrine of an internal source of
knowledge in distinction from that knowledge which is outward, and is
dependent, not only for its occasion, but for its very nature, on the *
Many other writers, as Stewart, Degerando, Brown, Coleridge, Price,
Jouffroy, and Cousin, advocate this general doctrine. Many German writers,
with Leibnitz at their head, take the same view. Kant, in his Criticism of
the Pure Reason, expresses himself thus: "' Der Zeit nach geht also keine
Erkenntniss in uns vor der Erfahrung vorher, und mit dieser fangt alle an.
Wenn aber gleich alle unsere Erkenntniss mit der Erfahrung afihebt, so
entspringt sie darum doch nicht eben alle aus der Erfahrung. Denn es k6nne
wohl seyn, dass selbst unsere Erfahrungserkenntniss ein Zusammengesetztes
aus dem sey, was wir durch Eindriicke empfangen, und dem, was unser
eigenes Erkenntnissvermigen (durch sinnliche Eindriicke bloss veranlasst),
aus sich selbst hergiebt, welchen Zusatz wir von jenem Grundstoffe nicht
eher unterscheiden, als his lange Uebung uns darauf aufmerksam, und zur
Absonderung desselben geschikt gemacht hat." —Kant's Critilc, der reinen
Vernizift, Einleitung,'I.
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INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 249 senses. It was the opinion, among
others, of Mr. iHobbes, who preceded Locke, and was not without merit as a
metaphysician, that all our knowledge might be traced to the senses, and
that, of course, no other origin of it need be sought. "The original of
all thoughts," says that writer, Leviathan, ch. i., " is that which we
call SENSE. There is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at
first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense." This
was the opinion also of his contemporary, Gassendi, who was his particular
friend and correspondent, and, at a still later period, of Condillac. The
latter supported his views at length and with much ingenuity, particularly
in his Treatise on Sensations. These writers appear to have maintained, as
a general statement, that we have no siniple ideas but such as exist in
the mind directly by means of the senses. As they further maintained that
those of a complex nature are composed, not merely virtually, but
literally, of such as are simple, they consequently considered them in the
light of combined and transformed sensations. Such appears to be the
general outline of their doctrine, although it has its obscurities and
perplexities, as might be expected, in consequence of being essentially
ill-founded.-" If we consider," says Condillac," that to remember, to
compare, to judge, to distinguish, to imagine, to be astonished, to have
abstract ideas, to have ideas of number and duration, to know truths,
whether general or particular, are but so many modes of being attentive;
that to have passions, to love, to hate, to hope, to fear, to will, are
but so many different modes of desire; and that attention in the one case,
and desire in the other case, of which all these feelings are modes, are
themselves, in their origin, nothing more than modes of sensation, we
cannot but conclude that SENSATION involves in itself all the faculties of
the soul."* This sentence, in its evident meaning, and as it is understood
both by its author and his commentators, * Traitd des Sensations, pt. i.,
ch. 7, ~ 2, L 2
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250 INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. is clearly at variance with the doctrine
of Cudworth and of other advocates of the "super-sensuous" or
transcendental philosophy, and entirely cuts off what has been variously
termed the internal, reflex, or subjective source of our knowledge.
According to the doctrine of Hobbes, Condillac, Helvetius, and other
writers of the sensuous or material school, everything may be traced back
to the senses, not merely as its occasion, but as its direct, or, at
least, its essential cause; everything becomes tangible and material; we
are utterly unable to form a conception even of the invisible and glorious
Deity, except under such an appearance as the imagination, dealing with
sensible images alone, can picture forth from the gross and limited
materials of the earth. And in the same way, every other idea, however
spiritual and whatever it may relate to, must be capable of being followed
back to some archetype in outward material existences. The mind may
separate, and modify, and combine sensible ideas or images, but can never
get above them; there is a portion of earthliness in every possible
thought.-It must, therefore, be obvious, that the tendency of this system
is to lower the im1ind's position; not only to limit the range, but to
depress the character of its powers, especially when we consider, that; as
one of its legitimate results, it rejects the doctrine of a Moral Sense
and of the Immrnutability of Moral Distinctions. It may be said, however,
and perhaps with some degree of plausibility, that the propriety of
receiving it does not depend so much upon its tendency, as upon the direct
evidence which may be brought in its support, in which, nevertheless, it
is found to be greatly- deficient. ~ 174. Knowledge begins in the senses,
but has internal accessions. In order to have a clear understanding of the
particular topic before us, let us briefly advert to certain general
views, already -more or less attended to, having a connexion with it. In
making the human soul a subject of inquiry, it is an obvious consideration
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INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 251 that a distinction may be drawn between
the soul, contemplated in itself, and its acts, or states, or the
knowledge which it possesses. The inquiry, therefore, naturally arises,
Under what circumstances the acquisition of knowledge begins? Now this is
the very question which has already been considered; nor can it be deemed
necessary to repeat here the considerations which havm been brought up in
reference to it. It is enough to express our continued reliance on the
general experience and testimony of mankind, so far as it is possible to
ascertain them on a sIubject of so much difficulty, that the beginnings of
thought and knowledge are immediately subsequent to certain affections of
those bodily organs which we call the SENSES. In other words, were it not
for impressions on the senses, which may be traced to objects external to
them, our mental capabilities, whatever they may be, would in all
probability have remnained folded up, and have never been redeemed from a
state of fruitless inaction. HIence the process, which is implied in the
perception of external things, or what is commonly termed by Mr. Locke
sensation, may justly be considered the OCCASION of the introductory step
to all our knowledge. But it does not follow from this, nor is it by any
means true, that the whole amount of it, in its ultimate progress, is to
be ascribed directly to the same source. All that can be said with truth
is, that the mind receives the earliest part of its ideas by means of the
senses, and that, in consequence of having received these elementary
cognitions, all its powbecome rapidly and fully operative. And here we
come to the SECOND great source of knowledge. The powers of the mind being
thus fairly brought into exercise, its various operations then furnish us
with another set of notions, which, by way of distinguishing them from
those received through the direct mediation of the senses, may be called,
in the language of Mr. Locke, ideas of reflection, or, to use a
phraseology embracing all possible cases, ideas or knowledges of INTERNAL
ORIGIN.
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252 INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. These two sources of human thought and
knowledge, the Internal and External, however they may have been
confounded by some writers, are easily distinguished from each other. The
ideas which arise in the mind solely from the fact of the previous
existence of certain mental operations, could not have been suggested by
anything which takes place in the external world independently of those
operations. Of this last class, some instances, with illustrations of the
same, may properly be mentioned here. ~ 175. Instances of notions which
have an internal origin. Among other things which do not come within the
limits of sensuous knowledge, but are to be ascribed to the second great
source, are those mental experiences expressed by the terms TI-IINKING,
DOUBTING, BELIEVING, and CERTAINTY.-It is a matter of internal observation
(that is, of consciousness or of inward reflection, which are synonymous
with internal observation), that the mind does not; and cannot, for any
-length of time, remain inactive. IHence there is occasion for that
specific experience which we denomlinate THINKING. There is both the
process of thinking, which we express by the word thinking; and the
additional idea founded upon that process, which we express by the word
thought. But obviously the knowledge which we thus have, whether expressed
by the word THINKING or the word THOUGHT, is of internal origin; it'is not
an object of touch, or taste, or sight; it is to be ascribed to the mind
itself alone, and to its inherent activity, unaided by any immediate and
direct action of the senses. Again, in the examination of some topic which
is proposed for discussion, a proposition is stated with little or no
evidence attending it, and the mind, in reference to that proposition, is
brought into a position to which we give the name of doubting. We have
both the process of doubting, and the abstract idea founded upon it which
we express by the word doubt. And here again, all we can say of this new
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INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 253 form of experience is, that it has its
origin within, and necessarily exists immediately subsequent, not to mere
outward impressions, but to certain other mental states, of which we are
conscious. But then, in this very instance, if the evidence be
considerably increased, the mental estimation which we form is altered in
regard to it, and to this new state of the mind we give the name of belief
or believing. And, in case the evidence of the proposition is of a higher
and more decided character, then there arises another state of the mind,
which we denominate certcainty. The ideas of right and wrong, of unity and
number, of time and space, order, proportion, similitude, truth, wisdom,
power, obligation,:succession, cause, effect, and many others, have a like
origin; at least there are none of them to be ascribed directly and
exclusively to the senses. —It is cheerfully granted, that, in determining
this point, it is proper to refer to the common experience of mankind, and
to rely upon it. But it is believed in all these instances (certainly in
the most of them), that such a reference will be amply decisive.. Let it,
then, be left to the candid internal examination of each individual to
determine, Whether a distinction be not rightly drawn between the origin
of these ideas, and that of those forms of knowledge which we attribute to
the senses, and which take their place as a part of our cognitions nnder
the names of red, blue, sweet, fragrant, bitter, hard, smooth, loud, soft,
&c.? On this question it is thought that, in general, there can be but one
answer, although some writers, through the love of excessive
simplification, have been betrayed into error in regard to it. Hence it is
distinctly to be kept in mind, that there are two sources of thought and
knowledge. An affection of the senses by means of external objects is the
immediate occasion of one portion; the constitution of the mind and its
operations are the occasions or source of the other. Those notions which
can be
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254 INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWVLEDGE. ascribed directly to any one of the
senses as their specific source, and not merely as an indirect and general
occasion of their origin, are External, while all others seem to be
entitled to be called Internal. And yet it will be recollected that we
have found it necessary to treat of some notions under the general head of
External Knowledge, not precisely corresponding to the view now given. The
mental states which we now have reference to, were found, however, to be
so closely connected in their origin with the exercise of the senses, or
with some other affection of the bodily system (such as the idea of
externality, the uneasy feeling of hunger, thirst, &c.), as to come lunder
consideration, in part or in whole, somewhat more naturally there than in
any subsequent part of our inquiries. ~ 176. Imperfections attendant on
classifications in mental philosophy. The remarks just made naturally lead
us to embrace this opportunity to suggest a caution applicable to the
subject of Classification in mental philosophy in general. It will be
recollected, that the first general arrangement of the states of the mind
was into the great Divisions of Intellectual, Sentient or Sentimentive,
and Volitional. Beginning with the INTELLECTUAL part Of our nature, we
found our intellections susceptible of being divided into those of an
External and those of an Internal origin; and have hitherto directed our
inquiries with a reference to this division. Now the remark we would make
is, that the classifications just referred to, and all other, general
classifications in mental philosophy,- although they may be theoretically
and philosophically true, are nevertheless not always easy and
satisfactory in their application. As the mind begins to operate in all
its parts and in all its relations nearly simultaneously (and certainly at
a very early period of life), the history of its multiplied acts and
feelings becomes very much interwoven and perplexed. In the matter of
Classification, therefore, nothing more is to be expect
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INTUITIONAL OR SUGGESTIONAL POWER. 255 ed than a general outline,
approximating as nearly as possible to an expression of what is conceived
to be the truth; our inquiries are to be directed by such general outline
so far as can be done consistently with the often involved and complicated
nature of the mental operations; but, after all, the value of our
investigations'will depend essentially and chiefly on the accuracy of the
details. We make these remarks here, because some who assent to the
general arrangement may perhaps imagine that they see reason for an
alteration in the disposition of the subordinate parts. And we readily
admit that cases are to be found where it is somewhat difficult to
determine under what general head particular thoughts are to be placed,
and particular mental exercises and associations are to be arranged. But
if, as before intimated, the outlines of the system be generally correct
or nearly so, and the details, although they may sometimes be wrongly
placed relatively to such outlines, be given with accuracy, not much will
be found which there will be occasion to object to. CHAPTER II. THE
INTUITIONAL OR SUGGESTIONAL POWER. ~ 177. Place, general objects, and
names of this power. UNDER the head of the Internal or Super-sensuous
intellect, there are four leading Cognitive principles, which are easily
discriminated from'all others, and are worthy of special notice:
Intuition, Consciousness, Judgment, and Reasoning. The Intuitional or
Suggestional power, which gives us a knowledge of things in the absolute;
Consciousness, which gives us a knowledge of mental states and operations;
Relative Suggestion or Judgment, by means of which we become acquainted
with the immediate relations of objects; and Reasoning, which gives us a
knowledge of relations that are more remote. The first of these
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256 INTUITIONALx OR SUGGE STIONAL POWER. which claims attention, and which
seems to be first in the order of nature, inasmuch as it deals with those
elementary truths which are fundamental to all others, is the Intuitional
or Suggestional power. As discriminative and descriptive of this
susceptibility, though imperfectly so, it may be enough to say now, that
it is a power, which gives rise to knowledge, not secondarily by means of
acts of comparison and deduction, but by means of its own original
activity and vigor. Its appropriate objects must of course exist; and this
important faculty, without asking aid of the senses on the one hand or of
reasoning on the other, at once reveals them. It is proper to say here, in
justification in part' of the arrangement of the mental powers which we
have thought it necessary to make, that the powers of the mind are known
and identified as such, not merely by the characteristics which
discriminate the forms of their respective activities, but also in part by
the objects with which they deal, and the ends or uses which they are
intended to secure. The objects with which the Intuitional power deals are
not merely mental, or those which-transcend-the function of the senses,
but they are things in the absolute; and which, existing in the
impersonalities of truth, are subjects of cognition, without being
subjects of analysis. I think there are three marks or characteristics of
them, although the marks are not laid down as exhaustive, but are meant
rather as hints and helps than as exclusive and final affirmations. FIRST,
they are necessary in their origin. Whatever and wherever they may be,
they may be said to exist in the nature of things. The fact of their
existence affirms itself, because the opposite of their existence is not a
conceivable possibility. SECOND, they are essential and immutable. Space
and duration, for instance, which are revealed to us by means of this
power, are not only necessities in their origin, but they are necessities
to every thing else; and they are immutable, because, as no reason can be
given for their beginning, so none can be given 91I~N ~IV- V- ~LL V
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INTUITIONAL OR SUGGESTIONAL POWER. 257 for their termination. THIRD, as
they are objects which are common to all, so, by means of the Intuitional
or Suggestional power, they come within the knowledge of all. The use of
the term Suggestion, as applicable to the power under consideration, is
proposed by Dr. Reid in his Inquiry into the II-unlan M1ind, chap. ii., ~
7. HIe there speaks of certain notions or ideas, such as our ideas of
existence, mind, ansd personality, as not gotten by comparing ideas and
perceiving agreements and disagreements, but as the gifts of nature, and
as immediately inspired by our mental constitutitution. And in a few
paragraphs after, not knowing, as he says, any word more proper, he asks
leave to make use of the term Suggestion as the name expressive of the
faculty, to which we are indebted for notions of this kind. Mr. Stewart
also, in his Philosophical Essays, speaks of certain mental phenomena,
instancing among them our ideas of time and number, of existence,
identity, and motion, as attendant upon the objects of our consciousness,
and as SUGGESTED by them. The use of the term, ill its philosophical
application, is recognised also, among others who might be memtioned, by
Dr. Thomas Brown and Sir William Hamilton. The term Intuition is
frequently employed for the same purpose by other philosophical writers.
And as there is sometinmes an advantage in having more than one form of
expression, we feel at liberty to accept both, and to use them as
convertible. ~ 178. Ideas of existence, mind, self-existence, and personal
identity. It is a part of our plan, as we advance from one portion of the
mind to another, not only to lay down its general divisions, and to
indicate successively in their true place the powers or faculties coining
under theni, but also to mention specifically, so far as may be necessary
for an illustration of the subject, some of the results of the exercise of
those powers. Accordingly, we shall now proceed to give an account of some
ideas which have an intuitional origin, without
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258 INTUITIONAL OR SUGGESTIONAL POWVER. undertaking to give a complete
enumeration of them. (I.) Of the idea of Existence. Among the various
notions, the origin of which naturally requires to be considered under the
head of Suggestion or Intuition, is that of Existence. What existence is
in itself (that is to say, independently of any existent being), it would
be useless to inquire. Using the phrase idea of existence as expressive of
a mental state, by means of which that which we call existence is made
known to us, it is the name of a purely simple idea, and cannot be
defined. The history of its rise is briefly this: Such is our nature that
we cannot exist without having the notion of existence. So that the origin
of the idea of existence is inseparable from the mere fact that we have a
percipient and sentient nature. An insentient being, if such a supposition
be possible, may exist without having any such idea. IBut man, being
constituted with powers of perception and feeling, cannot help perceiving
that lie is what he is. If we think, then there is something which has
this capability of thought; if we feel, then there is not only the mere
act of feeling, but something also which puts forth the act. (II.) The
idea of MIND. The origin of the notion of Mind is similar to that of
existence. Neither of them can be strictly and properly referred to the
senses. We do not see the mind, nor is it an object of touch, or of taste,
or of any other sense. Nor, on the other hand, is the notion of mind a
direct object of the memory, or of reasoning, or of imagination. The
notion arises naturally, or is SUGGESTED or INTUITIONED, from the mere
fact that the mind actually exists, and is susceptible of various feelings
and operations. The same may be said of all the distinct powers of the
mind, such as the power of perception, of memory, of association, of
imagination, of the will; not of the acts or exercises of these powers, it
will be noticed, but of the powers themselves. That is to say, they are
made known to us, considered abstractly and as distinct subjects of
thought, not by direct per
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INTUITIONAIL OR SUGGESTIONAL POWER. 259 ception, either inward or outward,
but by spontaneity or suggestion. We say not by direct perception, because
there is something intermediate between the power and the knowledge of it,
viz., the act or exercise of the power, which is the occasion of the
knowledge of the power itself. The Suggestional or Intuitional Power,
availing itself of this occasion, gives us a knowledge of the distinct
susceptibilities of the mind, just as it does of the mind as a whole.
(III.) Similar remarks, as far as spontaneity is concerned, will apply to
the notions (whether we consider them as simple or complex) of
SELF-EXISTENCE and PERSONAL IDENTITY. At the very earliest period they
flow out, as it were, from the mind itself; not resulting from any
prolonged and laborious process, but freely and spontaneously suggested or
intuitioned by it. This is so true, that no one is able to designate
either the precise tilme, or the precise circumstances under which they
originate; for they spring into being under all circumstances. We cannot
look, or touch, or breathe, or move, or think without them. These are
products of our mental nature too essential and important to be withheld,
or to be given only on rare and doubtful occasions; but are brought into
existence in all times and places, and under all the varieties of action
and feeling. —(See, in connexion with this section, ~ 4, 5, 6.) ~ 179.
Origin of the idea of externality. In giving an account of the origin of
ideas, it is proper, in this connexion, to refer to the notion of
outwardness or externality. Outwardness, although it is involved in
everything which the senses.have a connexion withl is, nevertheless, not a
direct subject of the senses., As in other cases of ideas of internal
origin, we do not, in strictness of speech, smell it, or taste it, or see
it, or hear it, or touch it; and yet there is nothing which we see, taste,
hear, or touch, of which externality is not predicable. The simple fact
is, that the senses (or, rather, in this case one of them, that of TOUCi)
furnlish the occasion (not the thing itself, but
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2601 INTUITIONAL OR SUGG:ESTIONAL POWER. simply the occcasion) on which
the Intellect, in virtue of its own spontaneity of action, gives us a
knowledge of it. We have already had opportunity (~ 70) to speak of this
idea as a most important one; as the connecting thought, which introduces
ls to a new manifestation of existence, different from that interior
existence, which we variously call by the names spirit, mind, or soul. It
is evident, if we could not form the idea of externality, everything which
is the subject of mental experience would seem to be wholly internal, mere
modifications of the inward or mental being. It is this idea, taken in
connexion with the circumstances of its origin, which solves what has
sometimes been considered a great mystery. The question is often asked,
How is it possible that the mind should pass over from the circle of its
own existence, the limits of its own actual personality, into the region
and the knowledge of things wholly different from itself? In other words,
using forms of expression which certain German philosophers have made
familiar, from the EGO to the NON-EGO? If we will interrogate nature, and
rest satisfied with her responses, the matter is simple. It is the power
that gives us a knowledge of Mind, and uniting mind with its operations
gives us the idea of Personality, and combining the present with the p