This lecture was typed in by Terry A. Deckard.

     I. IN WHAT SENSE OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW CAN BE PARTIAL.

     II. THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD ACCEPTS NOTHING AS VIRTUE BUT OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW.

     I. IN WHAT SENSE OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW CAN BE PARTIAL.

     In discussing this subject I must--

     1. Remind you of the sense in which it has been shown that obedience cannot be partial; and--

     2. Show the sense in which it can be partial.

     1. In what sense we have seen that obedience to Moral Law cannot be partial.

     (1.) Not in the sense that a moral agent can at the same time be selfish and benevolent. That is, a moral agent cannot choose as an ultimate end the highest well-being of God and of the universe, and, at the same time choose an opposite end, namely his own gratification. In other words, he cannot love God supremely and his neighbour as himself, and at the same time love himself supremely, and prefer his own gratification to the good of God and his neighbour. These two things, we have seen, cannot be.

     (2.) We have seen, that a moral agent cannot honestly choose the well-being of God and the universe, as an ultimate end, that is, for and on account of its intrinsic value, and yet withhold the degree of intensity of choice, which he sees the value of the end demands, and which he is able to render. In other words, he cannot be honest in knowingly and intentionally withholding from God and man their dues. That is, he cannot be honestly dishonest.

     (3.) We have seen, that honesty of intention implies the esteeming and treating of every being and thing, known to the mind according to its nature and relations, and every interest, according to its estimated relative importance, and our ability to promote it.

     (4.) We have seen that neither of the following suppositions can be true.

     (a.) It cannot be true, that an act or choice may have a complex character, on account of complexity in the motives that induce it.

     (b.) It cannot be true, that the will or heart may be right, while the emotions and affections are wrong, in the sense of sinful.

     (c.) It cannot be true, that a ruling, latent, but actually existing, holy preference or intention, may co-exist with opposing volitions.

     These things, we have seen, cannot be; and, therefore, that the following is true, to wit, that obedience to moral law cannot be partial, in the sense that a moral agent can partly obey, and partly disobey, at the same time; that he cannot be both holy and unholy in the same act; that he cannot at the same time serve both God and mammon. This certainly is the doctrine both of natural and revealed theology. This summing up of what was taught in the last lecture, conducts us to the second inquiry, namely,--

     2. In what sense obedience to moral law can be partial.

     And here I would observe, that the only sense in which obedience to moral law can be partial is, that obedience may be intermittent. That is, the subject may sometimes obey, and at other times disobey. He may at one time be selfish, or will his own gratification, because it is his own, and without regard to the well-being of God and his neighbour, and at another time will the highest well-being of God and the universe, as an end, and his own good only in proportion to its relative value. These are opposite choices, or ultimate intentions. The one is holy; the other is sinful. One is obedience, entire obedience, to the law of God; the other is disobedience, entire disobedience, to that law. These, for aught we can see, may succeed each other an indefinite number of times, but co-exist they plainly cannot.

     II. The government of God accepts nothing as virtue but obedience to the law of God.

     But it may be asked, Why state this proposition? Was this truth ever called in question? I answer, that the truth of this proposition, though apparently so self-evident, that to raise the question may reasonably excite astonishment, is generally denied. Indeed, probably nine-tenths of the nominal church deny it. They tenaciously hold sentiments that are entirely contrary to it, and amount to a direct denial of it. They maintain that there is much true virtue in the world, and yet that there is no one who ever for a moment obeys the law of God; that all Christians are virtuous, and that they are truly religious, and yet not one on earth obeys the moral law of God; in short, that God accepts as virtue that which, in every instance, comes short of obedience to his law. And yet it is generally asserted in their articles of faith, that obedience to moral law is the only proper evidence of a change of heart. With this sentiment in their creed, they will brand as a heretic, or as a hypocrite, any one who professes to obey the law; and maintain that men may be, and act pious, and eminently so, who do not obey the law of God. This sentiment, which every one knows to be generally held by those who are styled orthodox Christians, must assume that there is some rule of right, or of duty, besides the moral law; or that virtue, or true religion, does not imply obedience to any law. In this discussion I shall,--

     1. Attempt to show that there can be no rule of right or duty but the moral law; and,

     2. That nothing can be virtue, or true religion, but obedience to this law, and that the government of God acknowledges nothing else as virtue or true religion.

     1. There can be no rule of duty but the moral law. (See Lecture II, Exclusiveness.)

     Upon this proposition I remark,--

     (1.) That the moral law, as we have seen, is nothing else than the law of nature, or that rule of action which is founded, not in the will of God, but in the nature and relations of moral agents. It prescribes the course of action which is agreeable or suitable to our nature and relations. It is unalterably right to act in conformity with our nature and relations. To deny this, is palpably absurd and contradictory. But if this is right, nothing else can be right. If this course is obligatory upon us, by virtue of our nature and relations, no other course can possibly be obligatory upon us. To act in conformity with our nature and relations, must be right, and nothing, either more or less, can be right. If these are not truths of intuition, then there are no such truths.

     (2.) God has never proclaimed any other rule of duty, and should he do it, it could not be obligatory. The moral law did not originate in his arbitrary will. He did not create it, nor can he alter it, or introduce any other rule of right among moral agents. Can God make anything else right than to love him with all the heart, and our neighbour as ourselves? Surely not. Some have strangely dreamed that the law of faith has superseded the moral law. But we shall see that moral law is not made void, but is established by the law of faith. True faith, from its very nature, always implies love or obedience to the moral law; and love or obedience to the moral law always implies faith. As has been said on a former occasion, no being can create law. Nothing is, or can be, obligatory on a moral agent, but the course of conduct suited to his nature and relations. No being can set aside the obligation to do this. Nor can any being render anything more than this obligatory. Indeed, there cannot possibly be any other rule of duty than the moral law. There can be no other standard with which to compare our actions, and in the light of which to decide their moral character. This brings us to the consideration of the second proposition, namely,--

     2. That nothing can be virtue or true religion but obedience to the moral law.

     By this two things are intended:--

     (1.) That every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law.

     (2.) That nothing can be virtue, but just that which the moral law requires.

     That every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law, will appear, if we consider,--

     (a.) That virtue is identical with true religion:

     (b.) That true religion cannot properly consist in anything else, than the love to God and man, enjoined by the moral law:

     (c.) That the Bible expressly recognizes love as the fulfilling of the law, and as expressly denies, that anything else is acceptable to God.

     "Therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity (love), I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity (love), it profiteth me nothing." (1 Cor. xiii.)

     Love is repeatedly recognized in the Bible, not only as constituting true religion, but as being the whole of religion. Every form of true religion is only a form of love or benevolence.

     Repentance consists in the turning of the soul from a state of selfishness to benevolence, from disobedience to God's law, to obedience to it.

     Faith is the receiving of, or confiding in, embracing, loving, truth and the God of truth. It is only a modification of love to God and Christ. Every Christian grace or virtue, as we shall more fully see when we come to consider them in detail, is only a modification of love. God is love. Every modification of virtue and holiness in God is only love, or the state of mind which moral law requires alike of him and of us. Benevolence is the whole of virtue in God, and in all holy beings. Justice, truthfulness, and every moral attribute, is only benevolence viewed in particular relations.

     Nothing can be virtue that is not just what the moral law demands. That is, nothing short of what it requires can be, in any proper sense, virtue.

     A common idea seems to be, that a kind of obedience is rendered to God by Christians which is true religion, and which, on Christ's account, is accepted of God, which after all comes indefinitely short of full or entire obedience at any moment; that the gospel has somehow brought men, that is, Christians, into such relations, that God really accepts from them an imperfect obedience, something far below what his law requires; that Christians are accepted and justified while they render at best but a partial obedience, and while they sin more or less at every moment. Now this appears to me, to be as radical an error as can well be taught. The subject naturally branches out into two distinct inquiries:--

     (1.) Is it possible for a moral agent partly to obey, and partly to disobey, the moral law at the same time?

     (2.) Can God in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present and full obedience to the moral law?

     The first of these questions has been fully discussed in the preceding lecture. We think that it has been shown, that obedience to the moral law cannot be partial, in the sense that the subject can partly obey, and partly disobey, at the same time.

     We will now attend to the second question, namely,--

     Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present and full obedience to the moral law? Or, in other words, Can he accept anything as virtue or obedience, which is not, for the time being, full obedience, or all that the law requires?

     The term justification is used in two senses.

     (a.) In the sense of pronouncing the subject blameless:

     (b.) In the sense of pardon, acceptance, and treating one who has sinned, as if he had not sinned.

     It is in this last sense, that the advocates of this theory hold, that Christians are justified, that is, that they are pardoned, and accepted, and treated as just, though at every moment sinning, by coming short of rendering that obedience which the moral law demands. They do not pretend that they are justified at any moment by the law, for that at every moment condemns them for present sin; but that they are justified by grace, not in the sense that they are made really and personally righteous by grace, but that grace pardons and accepts, and in this sense justifies them when they are in the present commission of an indefinite amount of sin; that grace accounts them righteous while, in fact, they are continually sinning; that they are fully pardoned and acquitted, while at the same moment committing sin, by coming entirely and perpetually short of the obedience which, under the circumstances, the law of God requires. While voluntarily withholding full obedience, their partial obedience is accepted, and the sin of withholding full obedience is forgiven. God accepts what the sinner has a mind to give, and forgives what he voluntarily withholds. This is no caricature. It is, if I understand them, precisely what many hold. In considering this subject, I wish to propose for discussion the following inquiries, as of fundamental importance.

     (1.) If a present partial obedience can be accepted, how great a part may be withholden and we be accepted?

     (2.) If we are forgiven, while voluntarily withholding a part of that which would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which we do not repent, and forgiven, while in the act of committing the sin for which we are forgiven?

     (3.) What good can result to the sinner, to God, or to the universe from forgiving impenitence, or sin which is persisted in?

     (4.) Has God a right to pardon present sin, and of course sin unrepented of?

     (5.) Have we a right to ask him to forgive present sin, while unrepented of?

     (6.) Must not confession of present sin, and of course sin unrepented of, be base hypocrisy?

     (7.) Does the Bible recognize or proclaim the pardon of sin, under such circumstances?

     (8.) Does the Bible recognize any justification in sin?

     (9.) Can there be such a thing as partial repentance of sin? That is, does not repentance imply present full obedience to the law of God?

     (10.) Must not that be a gross error, that represents God as pardoning and justifying a sinner in the present voluntary commission of sin?

     (11.) Can there be any other than a voluntary sin?

     (12.) Must not present sin be sin unrepented of?

     Let us now attend to these questions in their order.

     (1.) How much sin may we commit, or how much may we, at every moment, come short of full obedience to the law of God, and yet be accepted and justified?

     This must be an inquiry of infinite importance. If we may wilfully withhold a part of our hearts from God, and yet be accepted, how great a part may we withhold? If we may love God with less than all our hearts, and our neighbour less than ourselves, and be accepted, how much less than supreme love to God, and equal love to our neighbour, will be accepted?

     Shall we be told, that the least degree of true love to God and our neighbour will be accepted? But what is true love to God and our neighbour? This is the point of inquiry. Is that true love which is not what is required? If the least degree of love to God will be accepted, then we may love ourselves more than we love God, and yet be accepted. We may love God a little, and ourselves much, and still be in a state of acceptance with God. We may love God a little, and our neighbour a little, and ourselves more than we love God and all our neighbours, and yet be in a justified state. Or shall we be told that God must be loved supremely? But what is intended by this? Is supreme love a loving with all the heart? But this is full and not partial obedience; yet the latter is the thing about which we are inquiring. Or is supreme love, not love with all the heart, but simply a higher degree of love than we exercise toward any other being? But how much greater must it be? Barely a little? How are we to measure it? In what scale are we to weigh, or by what standard are we to measure, our love, so as to know whether we love God a little more than any other being? But how much are we to love our neighbour, in order to our being accepted? If we may love him a little less than ourselves, how much less, and still be justified? These are certainly questions of vital importance. But such questions look like trifling. Yet why should they? If the theory I am examining be true, these questions must not only be asked, but they must admit of a satisfactory answer. The advocates of the theory in question are bound to answer them. And if they cannot, it is only because their theory is false. Is it possible that their theory should be true, and yet no one be able to answer such vital questions as these just proposed? If a partial obedience can be accepted, it is a momentous question, how partial, or how complete must that obedience be? I say again, that this is a question of agonizing interest. God forbid that we should be left in the dark here.

     But let us look at the second question.

     (2.) If we are forgiven while voluntarily withholding a part of that which would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which we do not repent, and forgiven while in the act of committing the sin for which we are forgiven?

     The theory in question is that Christians never, at any time, in this world, yield a full obedience to the divine law; that they always withhold a part of their hearts from the Lord, and yet, while in the very act of committing this abominable sin of voluntarily defrauding God and their neighbour, God accepts their persons and their services, fully forgives and justifies them. What is this, but pardoning present and pertinacious rebellion! Receiving to favour a God-defrauding wretch! Forgiving a sin unrepented of and detestably persevered in? Yes, this must be, if it be true that Christians are justified without present full obedience. That surely must be a doctrine of devils, that represents God as receiving to favour a rebel who has one hand filled with weapons against his throne.

     (3.) But what good can result to God, or the sinner, or to the universe, by thus pardoning and justifying an unsanctified soul? Can God be honoured by such a proceeding? Will the holy universe respect, fear, and honour God for such a proceeding? Does it, can it, commend itself to the intelligence of the universe?

     Will pardon and justification save the sinner, while he yet continues to withhold a part, at least, of his heart from God, while he still cleaves to a part of his sins? Can heaven be edified, or hell confounded, and its cavils silenced, by such a method of justification?

     (4.) But again: Has God a right to pardon sin unrepented of?

     Some may feel shocked at the question, and may insist that this is a question which we have no right to agitate. But let me inquire: Has God, as a moral governor, a right to act arbitrarily? Is there not some course of conduct which is suitable to him? Has he not given us intelligence on purpose that we may be able to see and judge of the propriety of his public acts? Does he not invite and require scrutiny? Why has he required an atonement for sin, and why has he required repentance at all? Who does not know that no executive magistrate has a right to pardon sin unrepented of? The lowest terms upon which any ruler can exercise mercy, are repentance, or, which is the same thing, a return to obedience. Who ever heard, in any government, of a rebel's being pardoned, while he only renounced a part of his rebellion? To pardon him while any part of his rebellion is persevered in, were to sanction by a public act that which is lacking in his repentance. It were to pronounce a public justification of his refusal to render full obedience.

     (5.) But have we a right to ask forgiveness while we persevere in the sin of withholding a part of our heart from him?

     God has no right to forgive us, and we have no right to desire him to forgive us, while we keep back any part of the condition of forgiveness. While we persist in defrauding God and our neighbour, we cannot profess penitence and ask forgiveness without gross hypocrisy. And shall God forgive us while we cannot, without hypocrisy, even profess repentance? To ask for pardon, while we do not repent and cease from sin, is a gross insult to God.

     (6.) But does the Bible recognize the pardon of present sin, and while unrepented of?

     Let the passage be found, if it can be, where sin is represented as pardoned or pardonable, unless repented of and fully forsaken. No such passage can be found. The opposite of this always stands revealed expressly or impliedly, on every page of divine inspiration.

     (7.) Does the Bible anywhere recognize a justification in sin?

     Where is such a passage to be found? Does not the law condemn sin, in every degree of it? Does it not unalterably condemn the sinner in whose heart the vile abomination is found? If a soul can sin, and yet not be condemned, then it must be because the law is abrogated, for surely, if the law still remains in force, it must condemn all sin. James most unequivocally teaches this: "If any man keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all." What is this, but asserting, that if there could be a partial obedience, it would be unavailing, since the law would condemn for any degree of sin; that partial obedience, did it exist, would not be regarded as acceptable obedience at all? The doctrine, that a partial obedience, in the sense that the law is not at any time fully obeyed, is accepted of God, is sheer antinomianism. What! a sinner justified while indulging in rebellion against God!

     But it has been generally held in the church, that a sinner must intend fully to obey the law, as a condition of justification; that, in his purpose and intention, he must forsake all sin; that nothing short of perfection of aim or intention can be accepted of God. Now, what is intended by this language? We have seen in former lectures, that moral character belongs properly only to the intention. If, then, perfection of intention be an indispensable condition of justification, what is this, but an admission, after all, that full present obedience is a condition of justification? But this is what we hold, and they deny. What then can they mean? It is of importance to ascertain what is intended by the assertion, repeated by them thousands of times, that a sinner cannot be justified but upon condition, that he fully purposes and intends to abandon all sin, and to live without sin; unless he seriously intends to render full obedience to all the commands of God. Intends to obey the law! What constitutes obedience to the law? Why, love, good-willing, good-intending. Intending to obey the law is intending to intend, willing to will, choosing to choose! This is absurd!

     What then is the state of mind which is, and must be, the condition of justification? Not merely an intention to obey, for this is only an intending to intend, but intending what the law requires to be intended, to wit, the highest well-being of God and of the universe. Fully intending this, and not fully intending to intend this, is the condition of justification. But fully intending this is full present obedience to the law.

     But again: it is absurd to say that a man can intend fully to obey the law, unless he actually fully intends what the law requires him to intend. The law requires him fully to intend the highest well-being of God and of the universe. And unless he intends this, it is absurd to say that he can intend full obedience to the law; that he intends to live without sin. The supposition is, that he is now sinning, that is, for nothing else is sin, voluntarily withholding from God and man their due. He chooses, wills, and intends this, and yet the supposition is, that at the same time he chooses, wills, intends, fully to obey the law. What is this but the ridiculous assertion, that he at the same time intends full obedience to the law, and intends not fully to obey, but only to obey in part, voluntarily withholding from God and man their dues.

     But again, to the question, can man be justified while sin remains in him? Surely he cannot, either upon legal or gospel principles, unless the law be repealed. That he cannot be justified by the law, while there is a particle of sin in him, is too plain to need proof. But can he be pardoned and accepted, and then justified, in the gospel sense, while sin, any degree of sin, remains in him? Certainly not. For the law, unless it be repealed, and antinomianism be true, continues to condemn him while there is any degree of sin in him. It is a contradiction to say, that he can both be pardoned, and at the same time condemned. But if he is all the time coming short of full obedience, there never is a moment in which the law is not uttering its curses against him. "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do them." The fact is, there never has been, and there never can be, any such thing as sin without condemnation. "Beloved, if our own heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart;" that, is, he much more condemns us. "But if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence towards God." God cannot repeal the law. It is not founded in his arbitrary will. It is as unalterable and unrepealable as his own nature. God can never repeal nor alter it. He can, for Christ's sake, dispense with the execution of the penalty, when the subject has returned to full present obedience to the precept, but in no other case, and upon no other possible conditions. To affirm that he can, is to affirm that God can alter the immutable and eternal principles of moral law and moral government.

     (8.) The next inquiry is, can there be such a thing as a partial repentance of sin? That is, does not true repentance imply a return to present full obedience to the law of God?

     In considering this question, I will state, briefly--

     (i.) What repentance is not.

     (ii.) What it is.

     (iii.) What is not implied in it.

     (iv.) What is.

     I shall in this place only state these points briefly, leaving their full consideration to their appropriate place in this course of instruction.

     (i.) What repentance is not.

     (a.) It is not a phenomenon of the intelligence. It does not consist in conviction of sin, nor in any intellectual views of sin whatever.

     (b.) It is not a phenomenon of the sensibility. It does not consist in a feeling of regret, or remorse, or of sorrow of any kind or degree. It is not a feeling of any kind.

     (ii.) What it is.

     The primary signification of the word rendered repentance is, to reflect, to think again, but more particularly to change the mind in conformity with a second thought, or in accordance with a more rational and intelligent view of the subject. To repent is to change the choice, purpose, intention. It is to choose a new end,--to begin a new life,--to turn from self-seeking to seeking the highest good of being,--to turn from selfishness to disinterested benevolence,--from a state of disobedience to a state of obedience.

     (iii.) What is not implied in it.

     (a.) It does not imply the remembrance of all past sin. This would be implied if repentance consisted, as some seem to suppose, in sorrowing over every particular sin. But as repentance consists in returning or turning to God, from the spirit of self-seeking and self-pleasing to the spirit of seeking the highest well-being of God and the universe, no such thing as the remembrance of all past sin is implied in it.

     (b.) It does not imply a continual sorrowing for past sin; for past sin is not, cannot be, ought not to be, the subject of continual thought.

     (iv.) What is implied in it.

     (a.) An understanding of the nature of sin, as consisting in the spirit of self-seeking, or in selfishness. This is implied, as a condition upon which repentance can be exercised, but it does not constitute repentance. Repentance is the voluntary turning which follows the intellectual illumination or understanding of the nature of sin.

     (b.) A turning from this state to a state of consecration to God and the good of the universe.

     (c.) Sorrow for past sin when it is remembered. This, and the following particulars, are implied in repentance as necessarily following from it.

     (d.) Universal, outward reformation.

     (e.) Emotions of hatred of sin.

     (f.) Emotions of self-loathing on account of sin.

     Certainly, if repentance means and implies anything, it does imply a thorough reformation of heart and life. A reformation of heart consists in turning from selfishness to benevolence. We have seen in a former lecture, that selfishness and benevolence cannot co-exist, at the same time, in the same mind. They are the supreme choice of opposite ends. These ends cannot both be chosen at the same time. To talk of partial repentance as a possible thing is to talk nonsense. It is to overlook the very nature of repentance. What! a man both turn away from, and hold on to sin at the same time? Serve God and mammon at one and the same time! It is impossible. This impossibility is affirmed both by reason and by Christ.

     (9.) The ninth inquiry is; must not that be a gross error that represents God as pardoning and justifying a sinner in the present wilful commission of sin? I answer, yes,--

     (i.) Because it is antinomianism, than which there is scarcely any form of error more God-dishonouring.

     (ii.) Because it represents God as doing what he has no right to do, and, therefore, as doing what he cannot do, without sinning himself.

     (iii.) Because it represents Christ as the minister of sin, and as justifying his people in their sins, instead of saving them from their sins.

     (iv.) Because it represents God as making void, instead of establishing the law through faith.

     (v.) Because it is a prolific source of delusion, leading multitudes to think themselves justified, while living in known sin. But perhaps it will be objected, that the sin of those who render but a partial obedience, and whom God pardons and accepts, is not a voluntary sin. This leads to the tenth inquiry:--

     (10.) Can there be any other than voluntary sin?

     What is sin? Sin is a transgression of the law. The law requires benevolence, good-willing. Sin is not a mere negation, or a not willing, but consists in willing self-gratification. It is a willing contrary to the commandment of God. Sin, as well as holiness, consists in choosing, willing, intending. Sin must be voluntary; that is, it must be intelligent and voluntary. It consists in willing, and it is nonsense to deny that sin is voluntary. The fact is, there is either no sin, or there is voluntary sin. Benevolence is willing the good of being in general, as an end, and, of course, implies the rejection of self-gratification, as an end. So sin is the choice of self-gratification, as an end, and necessarily implies the rejection of the good of being in general, as an end. Sin and holiness, naturally and necessarily, exclude each other. They are eternal opposites and antagonists. Neither can consist with the presence of the other in the heart. They consist in the active state of the will, and there can be no sin or holiness that does not consist in choice.

     (11.) Must not present sin be sin unrepented of?

     Yes, it is impossible for one to repent of present sin. To affirm that present sin is repented of, is to affirm a contradiction. It is overlooking both the nature of sin, and the nature of repentance. Sin is selfish willing; repentance is turning from selfish to benevolent willing. These two states of will, as has just been said, cannot possibly co-exist. Whoever, then, is at present falling short of full obedience to the law of God, is voluntarily sinning against God, and is impenitent. It is nonsense to say, that he is partly penitent and partly impenitent; that he is penitent so far as he obeys, and impenitent so far as he disobeys. This really seems to be the loose idea of many, that a man can be partly penitent, and partly impenitent at the same time. This idea, doubtless, is founded on the mistake, that repentance consists in sorrow for sin, or is a phenomenon of the sensibility. But we have seen that repentance consists in a change of ultimate intention,--a change in the choice of an end,--a turning from selfishness to supreme disinterested benevolence. It is, therefore, plainly impossible for one to be partly penitent, and partly impenitent at the same time; inasmuch as penitence and impenitence consist in supreme opposite choices.

     So then it is plain, that nothing is accepted as virtue under the government of God, but present full obedience to his law.

     1. If what has been said is true, we see that the church has fallen into a great and ruinous mistake, in supposing that a state of present sinlessness is a very rare, if not an impossible, attainment in this life. If the doctrine of this lecture be true, it follows that the very beginning of true religion in the soul, implies the renunciation of all sin. Sin ceases where holiness begins. Now, how great and ruinous must that error be, that teaches us to hope for heaven, while living in conscious sin; to look upon a sinless state, as not to be expected in this world; that it is a dangerous error to expect to stop sinning, even for an hour or a moment, in this world; and yet to hope for heaven! And how unreasonable must that state of mind be, that can brand as heretics those who teach, that God justifies no one, but upon condition of present sinlessness!*

*Their present sinlessness is not the ground, but only a sine quà non, of gospel justification.--See Lecture LVI, subject, "Justification."

     2. How great and ruinous the error, that justification is conditionated upon a faith that does not purify the heart of the believer; that one may be in a state of justification who lives in the constant commission of more or less sin. This error has slain more souls, I fear, than all the universalism that ever cursed the world.

     3. We see that, if a righteous man forsake his righteousness, and die in his sin, he must sink to hell.

     4. We see, that whenever a Christian sins he comes under condemnation, and must repent and do his first works, or be lost.