Section I: Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion
of
Liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's self-determining
Power.
Section II: Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered.
Section III: Whether any event whatsoever, and Volition in particular,
can come to pass without a Cause of its existence.
Section IV: Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the
activity of the nature of the soul.
Section V: Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should
be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent,
and cannot help the cause ofArminian Liberty; and how,
this being the state of the case, Arminian writers are
obliged to talk inconsistently.
Section VI:
Concerning the Will determining in things which are perfectly indifferent in the view of the
mind .
Section VII:
Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in
Indifference
Section VIII: Concerning the supposed Liberty of the will, as opposite to all Necessity
Section IX: Of the Connexion of the Acts of the Will with the
Dictates of the Understanding.
Section X:
Volition necessarily connected with the influence of
Motives:
with particular observations on
the great
inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings about
the Freedomof the Will.
Section XI:
The evidence of Gods certain Foreknowledge of the volitions of moral Agents
Section XII:
God's certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of
moral
agents, inconsistent with such a contingence of those
volitions as is without all necessity.
Section XIII:
Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be
connected with any thing
antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to
overthrow Arminian liberty.
