WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS OR CAN BE ANY SORT OF FREEDOM OF WILL, AS THAT WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OF THE LIBERTY OF ALL MORAL AGENTS; AND WHETHER ANY SUCH THING EVER WAS OR CAN BE CONCEIVED OF.
Section I: Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of
Liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's self-determining Power.
Section II: Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered.
Section III: Whether any event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its existence.
Section IV: Whether Volition can arise without a Cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul.
Section V: Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause ofArminian Liberty; and how, this being the state of the case, Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently.
Section VI: Concerning the Will determining in things which are perfectly indifferent in the view of the mind .
Section VII: Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference
Section VIII: Concerning the supposed Liberty of the will, as opposite to all Necessity
Section IX: Of the Connexion of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding.
Section X: Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives: with particular observations on the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings about the Freedomof the Will.
Section XI: The evidence of Gods certain Foreknowledge of the volitions of moral Agents
Section XII: God's certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions as is without all necessity.
Section XIII: Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian liberty.