THE NECESSITY OF ATONEMENT AND THE CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THAT AND FREE GRACE IN FORGIVENESS.

By

JONATHAN EDWARDS JR., D.D.,

PRESIDENT OF UNION COLLEGE.

SERMON III.

INFERENCES AND REFLECTIONS.

IN WHOM WE HAVE REDEMPTION THROUGH HIS BLOOD, THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS, ACCORDING TO THE RICHES OF HIS GRACE.--Ephesians 1:7.

HAVING, in the preceding discourses, considered the particulars at first proposed, which were, that we can obtain forgiveness in no other way than through the redemption of Christ,--the reason or ground of this mode of forgiveness,-and the consistency between the complete atonement of Christ, ind free grace in forgiveness,--the way is prepared for the following inferences and reflections

If the atonement of Christ be a substitute for the punishment of the sinner according to the divine law, and were designed to support the authority of that law, equally as the punishment of hell; then we may infer, that the atonement of Christ does not consist in showing that the divine law is just. With regard to this, I venture to assert two things,--that the obedience and death of Christ do not prove that the divine law is just,--that if they did prove this, still, merely by that cir. cumstance, they would make no atonement.

1. The obedience and death of Christ do not prove that the divine law is a just law. The sufferings of Christ no more prove this than the punishment of the damned proves it. The former are the substitute of the latter, and were designed, for substance, to prove and exhibit the same truths, and to answer the same ends. But who will say that the torments of the damned prove the justice of the divine law? No more is this proved by the sufferings of Christ. If the justice of the divine law be called in question, the justice and moral perfection of God is of course equally called in question. This being the case, whatever he can say, whether by obedience or suffering to testify the justice of the law, must be considered as the testimony of a party in his own cause; and also as the testimony of a being whose integrity is as much disputed as the justice of the law. It cannot therefore be received as proof in the case. The testimony of God, whether given in obedience or suffering, so Iona as his character is disputed, as it will be so long as the justice of his law is disputed, proves neither that the law is just, in reality, nor that it is so in his own estimation. A being of a disputed character may be supposed to testify, both contrary to reality and contrary to his own knowledge. And as the character of the Deity is disputed by those who dispute the justice of the divine law, so there is the same foundation to dispute the character and testimony of the Son of God. Therefore the obedience and death of Christ do not prove that the divine law is just.

2. If the obedience and death of Christ did prove that the law is just, still, by this circumstance, they would make no atonement for sin. If it were a truth that the obedience and death of Christ did prove the divine law to be just, and merely on that account made atonement, the ground of this truth would be, that whatever makes it manifest that the law is just, makes atonement. The essence of the atonement on this hypothesis, is placed in the manifestation of the justice of the divine law. Therefore this manifestation, however or by whomsoever it be made, is an atonement. But as the law is really just, it was doubtless in the power of infinite wisdom to manifest the justice of it to rational creatures, without either the obedience or the death of Christ, or of any other person. If it were not in the power of infinite wisdom to manifest the justice of the divine law without the death of Christ; then if Christ had not died, but all men had perished according to the law, it never would have appeared that the law is just. But bare attention to the law itself, to the reason, ground, and necessity of it, especially when this ittention is excited, and the powers of the mind are aided, by even such a divine influence as God does in fact sometimes give to men of the most depraved characters, is sufficient to convince of the justice of the law. But there can be no dispute, whether the sanctifying and savingly illuminating influences of the spirit of God, without the obedience and death of Christ, would convince any man of the justice of the law. We have no more reason to dispute this, than to dispute whether the angels who kept their first estate did believe the justice of the law before they were informed of the incarnation and death of Christ. According to this hypothesis, therefore, all that was necessary to make atonement for mankind was to communicate to them sanctifying grace, or to lead them to repentance; and as to Christ, he is dead in vain.

Besides; if the obedience and death of Christ did ever so credibly manifest the justice of the law, what atonement, what satisfaction for sin would this make? how would this support the authority of the law? how would this male it appear that the transgressor may expect the most awful consequences from his transgression? or that transgression is infinitely abominable in the sight of God? And how would the manifestation of the justice of the law tend to restrain men from transgressing that law? Whatever the effect of such manifestation may be on the minds of those innocent creatures who have regard to justice or moral rectitude; yet, on the minds of those who are disposed to transgress and have lost the proper sense of moral rectitude, the manifestation would have no effectual tendency to restrain them from transgression; therefore would in no degree answer the ends of the punishment threatened in the law, nor be any atonement for sin.

Perhaps some may suppose that what hath now been asserted, that the death or atonement of Christ does not prove the justice of God and of his law, is inconsistent with what hath been repeatedly suggested in the preceding discourses, that it is in end of the death or atonement of Christ to manifest how hateful sin is to God. If the death of Christ manifest God's hatred of sin, it seems that the same event must also manifest God's love of holiness and justice. In answer to this I observe, that the death of Christ manifests God's hatred of sin and love of holiness in the same sense as the damnation of the wicked manifests these, namely, on the supposition that the divine law is just and holy. If it be allowed the divine law is just and holy, then every thing done to support and execute that law, is a declaration in favor of holiness and against sin; or a declaration of God's love of holiness and of his hatred of iniquity. Both the punishment of the damned, and the death of Christ declare God's hatred of all transgressions of his law. And if that law be holy, to hate the transgression of it, is to hate sin, and at the same time to love holiness. But if the law be not holy, no such consequence will follow : it cannot, on that supposition, be inferred from the divine hatred of transgression, that God either hates sin or loves holiness.

Again; we may infer from the preceding doctrine, that the atonement of Christ does not consist essentially in his active or positive obedience. By atonement I mean that which, as a substitute for the punishment which is threatened in the law, supports the authority of that law, and the dignity of the divine government. But the obedience of Christ, even in the most trying circumstances, without any tokens of the divine displeasure against the transgressors of the law, would never support the authority of the law and the dignity of the divine government. It by no means makes it appear that it is an evil and bitter thing to violate the law, and that the violation of it deserves, and may be expected to be followed, with most awful consequences to him who dares to violate it. A familiar example may illustrate this matter. It is the rule or law of a certain family, that a particular child shall steadily attend the school kept in the neighborhood, and that if he absent himself for a day, without license, he shall feel the rod. However, after some time the child being weary of observing this law, does absent himself, and spend the day in play. At night the father being informed of it, arraigns the child, finds him guilty, and prepares to inflict the punishment which he had threatened. At this instant, the brother of the offending child intercedes, acknowledges the reasonableness of the law which his brother hath transgressed, confesses that he deserves the penalty, but offers himself to make satisfaction for his brother's offence. Being interrogated by what means he expects to make satisfaction, he answers, by going himself to school the next day. Now can any one suppose that in this way the second child can make satisfaction for the offence of the first? Or that if the father were to accept the proposal, he would find the authority of his law, and the government of his family, supported with dignity? Or that the offending child, or the other children of the family, would by this means be effectually deterred from future offences of the like nature? And however trying the circumstances of going to school may be, if those circumstances be no token of the father's displeasure at the disobedient child's transgression; still the going to school of the second child, will not make the least satisfaction for the offence of the first.

I venture to say further, that not only did not the atonement of Christ consist essentially in his active obedience, but that his active obedience was no part of his atonement, properly so called, nor essential to it. The perfect obedience of Christ was doubtless necessary in order to the due execution of his prophetical and priestly office, in order to his intercession; and also in order that the salvation of his disciples might be a reward of his obedience. But that it was necessary to support the authority of the divine law in the pardon of sinners, does not appear. If Christ himself could possibly have been a sinner, and had first made satisfaction for his own sin, it does not appear, but that afterward he might also satisfy for the sins of his people. If the pretender to the crown of Great Britain should wage war against king George, in the course of the war should be taken, should be brought to trial, and be condemned to the block; will any man say that the king of France, by becoming the substitute of the pretender, and suffering in his stead, could not make atonement for the pretender, so as effectually to support the authority of the British laws and government, and discourage all future groundless pretensions to the British crown? Yet the king of France could plead no perfect obedience to the British laws. Even the sinner himself, but upon the supposition of the infinite evil of sin, could, by his own sufferings, atone for his sins. Yet he could not exhibit a perfect obedience.

Besides; if the bare obedience of Christ have made atonement, why could not the repentance and perfect obedience of Christ's people themselves have answered, instead of the obedience of Christ? Doubtless if they had suffered the penalty of the divine law, it would have answered to support the authority of the law, and the vigor of the divine government, as really as the death of Christ. And since the eternal sufferings of the people of Christ would have answered the same end of supporting the authority of the law as the sufferings of Christ; why would not the eternal perfect repentance and obedience of the people of Christ, have answered the same end, as Its obedience in their behalf? If it would, both the death and obedience of Christ as our substitute, are entirely in vain. If the elect had only been converted, and made perfectly and perseveringly obedient, it would have answered every purpose both of the death and obedience of Christ. Or if the obedience of Christ in the flesh were at all necessary, it was not necessary to support the authority of the law and government of God; but merely as it was most wise that he should obey. It was necessary in the same sense only, as that the wind should, at this moment, blow from the north-east, and not from the south-west, or from any other quarter.

If the mere active obedience of Christ have made atonement for sin, it may be difficult to account for the punishment of any sinners. If obedience without any demonstration of divine displeasure at sin will answer every purpose of the divine authority and government, in some instances, why not in all instances? And if the obedience of sinners themselves will answer as really as that of Christ, why might not all men have been led by divine grace to repentance, and perfect subsequent obedience, and in that way been saved from the curse of the law? Doubtless they might; nor was there originally, nor is there now, without any consideration of the atonement of Christ, any other necessity of the punishment of any of mankind according to the law, than that which results from mere sovereign wisdom; in which sense, indeed, it was necessary that Christ should be given to be the Saviour of sinners, that Paul should be saved, and that every other event should take place, just as it does take place.

From our doctrine we also learn the great gain which accrues to the universe by the death of Christ. It hath been objected to the idea of atonement now exhibited, that if the death of Christ be an equivalent to the curse of the law, which was to have been inflicted on all his people; then there is on the whole no gain, no advantage to the universe; that all that punishment from which Christians are saved, hath been suffered by Christ, and therefore that there is just as much misery and no more happiness, than there would have been, had Christ not died. To this I answer,

1. That it is not true that Christ endured an equal quantity of misery to that which would have been endured by all his people had they suffered the curse of the law. This was not necessary, on account of the infinite dignity of his person. If a king were to condemn his son to lose an ear or a hand, it would doubtless be esteemed, by all his subjects, a proof of far greater displeasure in the king, than if he should order some mean criminal to the gallows; and it would tend more effectually to support the authority of the law, for the violation of which this punishment should be inflicted on the prince.

2. That if it were true that Christ endured the very same quantity of misery which was due to all his people; still, by his death, an infinite gain accrues to the universe. For though the misery, on this supposition, is in both cases the same, and balances itself; yet the positive happiness obtained by the death of Christ, infinitely exceeds that which was lost by Christ. As the eternal Logos was capable of neither enduring misery, nor losing happiness, all the happiness lost by the substitution of Christ, was barely that of the man Christ Jesus, during only thirty-three years, or rather during the three last years of his life: because it does not appear, but that during the rest of his life he was as happy as men in general, and enjoyed as much or more good than he suffered evil. But the happiness gained by the substitution of Christ, is that of a great multitude, which no man can number, of all nations, kindreds, and people, and tongues. Rev. 7: 9. Now if the happiness of one man for three years, or at most for thirty-three years, be equal to that of an innumerable multitude throughout eternity, with the addition of the greater happiness which Christ himself must enjoy now that he has brought so many sons to glory, beyond what he would have enjoyed, if all these had been plunged in inconceivable and endless misery; then it may be justly said, on the present hypothesis, that by the substitution of Christ no advantage is gained to the universe. But if the latter infinitely exceed the former, the gain to the universe, even on the supposition that the sufferings of Christ were equal to those to which all his people were exposed, is infinite.

I may also hence take occasion to oppose an opinion which appears to me erroneous; which is, that the perfect obedience of Christ was in a great measure designed to show us, that the divine law may be obeyed by men. It shows, indeed, that it may be obeyed by a man in personal union with the divine nature. But how does this, show that it may be obeyed by a mere man? If we should also allow that it shows, that a man born into the world in perfect innocence, and who is not a fallen creature, may obey the law; yet how does this prove that it may be obeyed by a fallen creature, dead in trespasses and sins? It is an undoubted truth, that there is no inability In men to obey the law, except that which is of a moral nature, consisting in the disinclination or disaffection of their own hearts, which does not in the least excuse them in their disobedience. But this is manifest by other considerations than the per. fect obedience of Christ; if it were not, it would not be manifest at all.

Another remark which naturally offers itself in discoursing on this subject is, that Christ's obedience to the precepts of the law, without submitting to the curse, would by no means prove the justice of that curse. This is the idea of some: that God sent his Son into the world, to obey the precepts of the law, and that his mere obedience of these proves the justice both of the precepts and of the penalty of the law. I have already given the reasons by which I am made to believe, that the obedience of Christ does not prove the precepts of the law to be just. But if it did prove the precepts to be just, it would not therefore prove the penalty too to be just. As the precepts of any law may be just and reasonable, yet may be enforced by a penalty which is unjust and cruel; so the proof that the precept is just, does not at all prove but that the penalty may be unjust and cruel. Indeed as the penalty of any law is designed to support and enforce the precept of that law, so to prove the justice of the penalty-, proves the justice of the precept; because not the slightest penalty can be just, when applied to enforce an unjust precept. But this rule when inverted, doth not hold good. To prove the justice of a precept, does by no means prove the justice of the penalty by which that precept is enforced. So that if Christ have proved the precepts of the divine law to be just, this by no means infers the justice of its penalty. On the other hand, if Christ came to prove the justice of the law, and all that he has done to this effect have an immediate reference to the precepts only; and if he have done nothing to establish the justice of the penal part, considered by itself; the aspect of the whole will be, that the penal part is unjustifiable, and that for this reason he did not pretend to justify it.

The subject which hath been under our consideration also shows us, in what sense the sufferings of Christ were agreeable to God. It has been said, that it is incredible that mere pain should be agreeable to a God of infinite goodness; that therefore the sufferings of Christ were agreeable to God only as a proof of the strength of the 'virtue of Christ, or of his disposition to obey the divine law. If by mere pain be meant pain abstracted from the obedience of Christ, I cannot see why it may not be agreeable to God. It certainly is in the damned; and for the same reason might have been, and doubtless was, in the case of our Lord. The Father was pleased with the pains of his Son, as they were necessary to support the authority of his law and government, in the salvation of sinners.

Another reflection naturally suggested by this subject is, that in punishing some sinners according to the curse of the law, and in requiring an adequate atonement in order to the salvation of others, God acts, notfrom any contracted, selfish motives, but from the most noble benevolence and regard to the public good. It hath often and long since been made a matter of objection to the doctrines of the future punishment of the wicked, and of the atonement of Christ, that they represent the Deity as having regard merely to his own honor and dignity, and not to the good of his creatures, and therefore represent him as deficient in goodness. But can it be pretended to be a proof of goodness in God, to suffer his own law, which is the perfect rule of virtue, to fall into contempt? However it might afford relief to some individuals, if God were to suffer his moral kingdom to be dissolved; can it be for the general good of the system of his creatures? Is it not manifestly necessary to the general good of the created system, that God's moral kingdom be upholden? and that therefore the authority of the divine law, and vigor of the divine govermment be maintained? If so, then it is also necessary to the general good that punishments be inflicted on the disobedient and lawless; or that they be pardoned in consequence only of a proper satisfaction or atonement.

So that those very doctrines which of all others are made matter of the most objection to the divine goodness or benevolence, are clear proofs of goodness, and are absolutely necessary to it. If a prince should either make no laws for the government of his subjects, or should never execute them, but should suffer all crimes to pass with impunity, you would by no means esteem him a good prince, aiming at the good of his subjects; you would not hesitate to pronounce him either very weak or very wicked.

In reflecting on this subject, we may notice the reason why so many who profess to be advocates for the doctrine of atonement, yet place the atonement in that in which it does by no means consist. The principal reason seems to be, that they have conceived that the idea of Christ's having suffered an equivalent to the punishment to which all his people were exposed, is inconsistent with grace in their pardon. But if I have been so happy as properly to state the ideas of justice and grace, it appears that there is as much grace in the pardon of sinners on account of such an atonement as that just mentioned, as there would be on account of an atonement consisting in mere obedience; or as there would be in pardon without any atonement at all.

Hence also we see, that the death of Christ in our stead, is nor useless or in vain. The opposers of Christ's substitution and atonement assert, that no good end is answered by the sufferings of an innocent, amiable, and virtuous person, in the stead of the guilty. But surely to support the authority of the law and of the moral government of God, is not a vain or unimportant end. It was not in vain that Zaleucus, having made a law that all adulterers should have both their eyes put out, and his own son being the first who transgressed, put out one of his own eyes and one of his son's. Hereby he spared his son in part, and yet as effectually supported the authority of his law, as if it had been literally executed. Nor was it in vain that, during the late war, a soldier in the American army, of a robust constitution, pitying his fellow-soldier of a slender constitution, who was condemned to receive a certain number of stripes, petitioned to be put in the place of the criminal, and actually received the stripes. For the authority of the martial law was effectually supported, and perhaps by this means, the life or future health and service of the criminal were preserved, which would otherwise have been lost.

Neither was the death of Christ, in the stead of sinners, any injury done to an innocent person. As well may we say that Zaleucus, or the soldier just mentioned, were injured; or that a man is injured when another man receives the money of him, which he voluntarily tenders in payment of the debt of a third person; or that a man is injured by the surgeon, who takes off his leg to preserve his life, the man himself consenting, and desiring him so to do.

Again; we may observe in what sense justice and the divine law are satisfied by the death of Christ; and in what sense the atonement of Christ is properly called a satisfaction. It is only the third kind of justice before mentioned, that is satisfied by the death of Christ. No man, for the reasons already given, will pretend that commutative justice is satisfied by Christ; for the controversy between God and the sinner is not concerning property. Nor is distributive justice satisfied. If it were, there would indeed be no more grace in the discharge of the sinner, than there is in the discharge of a criminal, when he hath endured the full punishment to which, according to law, he hath been condemned. If distributive justice were satisfied, it would have no further claim on the sinner. And to punish him, when this kind of justice has no claim on him, is to treat him more unfavorably or severely than his personal character deserves. If so, the penitent believer, considered in his own person, deserves, even according to the strictness of the divine law, no punishment; and that merely because he repents and believes: and if so, repentance and faith satisfy the law, or are the curse of it, as I have already, shown. If distributive justice be satisfied, it admits of no further punishment, and to punish him further, would be as positively unjust, as to continue a man's punishment, after he hath endured the full penalty of any law. If distributive justice be satisfied by Christ, in the behalf of sinners, then the rule of distributive justice is not the personal character of a man, but the character of his friend, his advocate, or representative; any man has a right, on the footing of distributive justice, to be treated according to the character of his friend or representative. Therefore if a subject rebel against his sovereign, and procure a man of a most unexceptionable and amiable character, to represent him and plead his cause before his severeign, he has a right, on the footing of distributive justice, to be treated according to the character of his representative; and if he be not thus treated, he suffers an injury; he is abused. On this principle, no prince or magistrate will have a right to punish, for any crime, a subject who can procure a man of a virtuous life to represent him and plead his cause.

But perhaps it will be said, that distributive justice is satisfied by the death of Christ, because he placed himself in our stead, and suffered in our room; and that whenever a person thus substitutes himself for another, and suffers the punishment due to that other, that other hath a right to a discharge, as distributive justice is then satisfied. Now, according to this objection, the true idea of distributive justice is, to treat a man either according to his own sufferings, or according to the sufferings of his representative. And if according to the sufferings of his representative, why not according to the obedience of his representative? And this brings us just where we were; that every man may, in justice, demand to be treated according to the character of his representative; which is absurd.

Distributive justice, therefore, is not at all satisfied by the death of Christ. But general justice to the Deity and to the universe is satisfied. That is done by the death of Christ which supports the authority of the law, and renders it consistent with the glory of God and the good of the whole system, to pardon the sinner.

In the same sense the law of God is satisfied by the death of Christ; I mean as the divine glory and the general good, which are the great ends of the law, are secured. In this sense only is the atonement of Christ properly, called a satisfaction; God is satisfied, as by it his glory and the good of his system are secured and promoted.

Objection. But is not distributive justice displayed in the death of Christ? Answer. The question is ambiguous; if the meaning be, is not distributive justice satisfied? I answer, for the reasons already given, in the negative. If the meaning be, is there not an exhibition made in the death and sufferings of Christ, of the punishment to which the sinner is justly liable? I answer in the affirmative: distributive justice is, in this sense, displayed in the death of Christ. But it is no more displayed, than the punishment of the sinner is displayed in the death of Christ.

It may be proper here to notice the sense in which justice admits of the salvation of sinners. It hath been said, that justice admits of several things which it does not demand; that it admits of the salvation of Paul, but does not demand it. And it would admit also of the damnation of Paul, but does not demand that. But in these instances the word justice is used in two very different senses, which ought to be carefully distinguished. When it is said justice admits of the salvation of Paul, the third kind of justice before described must be intended. The general good admits it; neither the glory of God, nor the good of the system, opposes it.

But distributive justice, which requires every man to be treated according to his personal character, does not admit that Paul should be saved; so far as this kind of justice says any thing concerning this matter, it demands that Paul be punished according to law: and if this justice be made the rule of proceeding in the case, Paul will inevitably be cast off This kind of justice no more admits of the salvation of Paul than it admits of the salvation of Judas. But it is said, that "justice admits of the salvation of Paul, but does not demand it." Justice to the universe does demand it, as fully as admit of it, and the universe would suffer an injury, if he were not to be saved; but justice to the universe neither demands nor admits of the salvation of Judas. Whereas distributive justice to Paul personally, as much demands that be be not saved, as that Judas be not saved.

But if we will make a distinction between what justice admits and what it demands, the true and only distinction seems to be this: justice admits of any thing which is not positively unjust; of any favor however great or manifold; but it demands nothing but barely what is just, without the least favor, and which, being refused, positive injustice would be done. Distributive justice, then, admits of the salvation of Judas or of any other sinner, as surely no injustice would be done Judas in his salvation; but it demands not this, as it is a mere favor, or something beyond the bounds of mere justice; or it is no injury to Judas, that he is not saved. Neither does distributive justice demand the salvation of Paul. But public justice both admits and demands both the salvation of Paul and the damnation of Judas. On the other hand, it neither admits nor demands the damnation of Paul, nor the salvation of Judas. But distributive justice, according to the present distinction between the meaning of the words admit and demand, though it admits both of the salvation and damnation of both Paul and Judas, yet demands neither the salvation nor damnation of the one or the other; or, to express the same thing in other words, no injustice would be done either to Paul or Judas personally, if they were both saved or both damned. Distributive justice never demands the punishment of any criminal, in any instance; because no injury would be done him, if he were graciously pardoned. It demands only that a man be not punished being innocent; or be not punished beyond his demerit; and that he be rewarded according to his positive merit.

These observations may help us to understand a distinction, which to many hath appeared groundless or perplexing; I mean the distinction of the merit of conclignity and merit of congruity. Merit of both these kinds refers to rewards only, and has no reference to punishments; and that is deserved by a merit of condignity which cannot be withholden without positive injury. That is deserved by a merit of congruity which is a proper expression of the sense which the person rewarding has, of the moral excellency of the person rewarded; which, however, may be withholden without positive injury. Of the former kind is the merit, which every good and faithful citizen has, of protection in his person, liberty, and property, and the merit of a laborer who has earned his wages. These cannot be withholden without positive injury. Of the latter kind is the merit, which some eminently wise arid virtuous citizens have, of distinguishing honors or marks of esteem. If these be withholden, the proper objects of them may, indeed, be said to be neglected, but not positively injured.

This subject teaches, also, in what sense God was under obligation to accept, on the behalf of the sinner, the mediation and atonement of Christ. It hath been said, that when Christ offered to make atonement for sinners, God was under the same obligation to accept the offer, as a creditor is to accept the proposal of any man who offers to pay the debt of another. This is not true; because, in matters of property, all that the creditor hath a right to is his property. This being offered him, by whomsoever the offer be made, he has the offer of his right; and if he demand more, he exceeds his right; and he has no more right to refuse to give up the obligation, on the offer of a third person to pay the debt, than to refuse the same when the same offer is made by the debtor himself All will own, that if a creditor were to refuse to receive payment and give up the obligation when the debtor offers payment, it would be abusive and unjust; and let any man assign a reason why it is not equally abusive and unjust, not to receive the payment and to give up the obligation when payment is offered by a third person.

But it is quite otherwise in atoning for crimes in which distributive, not commutative justice, is concerned. As the rule of distributive justice is the personal character of the person to be rewarded or punished, and not property; if a magistrate refuse to accept any substitute, and insist on punishing the criminal himself, he treats him no otherwise than according to his personal character, and the criminal suffers no injustice or abuse. Nor is the magistrate under any obligation of distributive justice, or justice to the criminal himself, to accept a substitute.

It is true, that the circumstances of the case may be such that it may be most conducive to the public good that the offered substitute be accepted; in this case wisdom and goodness or public justice will require that it be accepted, and the criminal discharged.

This leads me to observe that it hath also been said, that when Christ offered to become a substitute and to make atonement for sinners, God was under no obligation to accept the proposal. This, I conceive, is as wide of the truth, as that he was under the same obligation to accept the proposal, as a creditor is to accept the proposal of a third person to pay the debt of his friend. The truth is, the glory of God and the greatest good of the moral system did require that Christ should become a substitute for sinners, and that his offered substitution should be accepted by God. This was dictated and recommended by both wisdom and goodness. So far, therefore, as wisdom and goodness could infer an obligation on the Father to accept the substitution of his Son, he was under obligation to accept it. But this obligation was only that of the third kind of justice before explained, a regard to the general good.

This subject further teaches us, that that constitution which requires an atonement in order to the pardon of the sinner is nothing arbitrary. That divine constitution which is wise and good, as being necessary to the good of the moral system, is not arbitrary. But if an atonement was necessary, in order to support the authority of the divine law, and the honor, vigor, and even existence of the divine moral government, while sinners are pardoned, undoubtedly that constitution which requires an atonement in order to the pardon of the sinner, is the dictate of wisdom and goodness, and by no means of an arbitrary spirit.

Hence we also learn in what sense the death of Christ renders God propitious to sinners. It does so only as it supports the authority of his law and government, and renders the pardon of sinners consistent with the good of the system and the glory of God.

Finally; this subject teaches the groundlessness of that objection to the doctrine of atonement, that it represents the Deity as inexorable. If to refuse to pardon sinners unless it be in a way which is consistent with the good of the moral system, is to be inexorable; then that God will not pardon sinners without atonement, or in a way which is consistent with the authority of his law, and with the authority and even existence of his moral government, is indeed a proof that God is inexorable. But unless it be an instance of inexorability that God will not pardon sinners, unless it be in a way which is consistent with the good of the moral system, there is no ground to object to the doctrine of atonement, that it represents the Deity as inexorable. On the other hand, that God requires an atonement in order to pardon, is an instance and proof of truly divine goodness; and if he were to pardon without an atonement, it would prove that he is destitute of goodness, and regardless not only of his own glory, but of the true happiness of the system of moral creatures.