By
IN WHOM WE HAVE REDEMPTION THROUGH HIS BLOOD, THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS,
ACCORDING TO THE RICHES OF HIS GRACE.--Ephesians 1:7. HAVING, in the preceding discourses, considered the particulars at
first proposed, which were, that we can obtain forgiveness in no other way
than through the redemption of Christ,--the reason or ground of this mode
of forgiveness,-and the consistency between the complete atonement of
Christ, ind free grace in forgiveness,--the way is prepared for the
following inferences and reflections If the atonement of Christ be a substitute for the punishment of the
sinner according to the divine law, and were designed to support the
authority of that law, equally as the punishment of hell; then we may
infer, that the atonement of Christ does not consist in showing that the
divine law is just. With regard to this, I venture to assert two
things,--that the obedience and death of Christ do not prove that the
divine law is just,--that if they did prove this, still, merely by that
cir. cumstance, they would make no atonement. 1. The obedience and death of Christ do not prove that the divine law
is a just law. The sufferings of Christ no more prove this than the
punishment of the damned proves it. The former are the substitute of the
latter, and were designed, for substance, to prove and exhibit the same
truths, and to answer the same ends. But who will say that the torments of
the damned prove the justice of the divine law? No more is this proved by
the sufferings of Christ. If the justice of the divine law be called in
question, the justice and moral perfection of God is of course equally
called in question. This being the case, whatever he can say, whether by
obedience or suffering to testify the justice of the law, must be
considered as the testimony of a party in his own cause; and also as the
testimony of a being whose integrity is as much disputed as the justice of
the law. It cannot therefore be received as proof in the case. The
testimony of God, whether given in obedience or suffering, so Iona as his
character is disputed, as it will be so long as the justice of his law is
disputed, proves neither that the law is just, in reality, nor that it is
so in his own estimation. A being of a disputed character may be supposed
to testify, both contrary to reality and contrary to his own knowledge.
And as the character of the Deity is disputed by those who dispute the
justice of the divine law, so there is the same foundation to dispute the
character and testimony of the Son of God. Therefore the obedience and
death of Christ do not prove that the divine law is just. 2. If the obedience and death of Christ did prove that the law is just,
still, by this circumstance, they would make no atonement for sin. If it
were a truth that the obedience and death of Christ did prove the divine
law to be just, and merely on that account made atonement, the ground of
this truth would be, that whatever makes it manifest that the law is just,
makes atonement. The essence of the atonement on this hypothesis, is
placed in the manifestation of the justice of the divine law. Therefore
this manifestation, however or by whomsoever it be made, is an atonement.
But as the law is really just, it was doubtless in the power of infinite
wisdom to manifest the justice of it to rational creatures, without either
the obedience or the death of Christ, or of any other person. If it were
not in the power of infinite wisdom to manifest the justice of the divine
law without the death of Christ; then if Christ had not died, but all men
had perished according to the law, it never would have appeared that the
law is just. But bare attention to the law itself, to the reason, ground,
and necessity of it, especially when this ittention is excited, and the
powers of the mind are aided, by even such a divine influence as God does
in fact sometimes give to men of the most depraved characters, is
sufficient to convince of the justice of the law. But there can be no
dispute, whether the sanctifying and savingly illuminating influences of
the spirit of God, without the obedience and death of Christ, would
convince any man of the justice of the law. We have no more reason to
dispute this, than to dispute whether the angels who kept their first
estate did believe the justice of the law before they were informed of the
incarnation and death of Christ. According to this hypothesis, therefore,
all that was necessary to make atonement for mankind was to communicate to
them sanctifying grace, or to lead them to repentance; and as to Christ,
he is dead in vain. Besides; if the obedience and death of Christ did ever so credibly
manifest the justice of the law, what atonement, what satisfaction for sin
would this make? how would this support the authority of the law? how
would this male it appear that the transgressor may expect the most awful
consequences from his transgression? or that transgression is infinitely
abominable in the sight of God? And how would the manifestation of the
justice of the law tend to restrain men from transgressing that law?
Whatever the effect of such manifestation may be on the minds of those
innocent creatures who have regard to justice or moral rectitude; yet, on
the minds of those who are disposed to transgress and have lost the proper
sense of moral rectitude, the manifestation would have no effectual
tendency to restrain them from transgression; therefore would in no degree
answer the ends of the punishment threatened in the law, nor be any
atonement for sin. Perhaps some may suppose that what hath now been asserted, that the
death or atonement of Christ does not prove the justice of God and of his
law, is inconsistent with what hath been repeatedly suggested in the
preceding discourses, that it is in end of the death or atonement of
Christ to manifest how hateful sin is to God. If the death of Christ
manifest God's hatred of sin, it seems that the same event must also
manifest God's love of holiness and justice. In answer to this I observe,
that the death of Christ manifests God's hatred of sin and love of
holiness in the same sense as the damnation of the wicked manifests these,
namely, on the supposition that the divine law is just and holy. If it be
allowed the divine law is just and holy, then every thing done to support
and execute that law, is a declaration in favor of holiness and against
sin; or a declaration of God's love of holiness and of his hatred of
iniquity. Both the punishment of the damned, and the death of Christ
declare God's hatred of all transgressions of his law. And if that law be
holy, to hate the transgression of it, is to hate sin, and at the same
time to love holiness. But if the law be not holy, no such consequence
will follow : it cannot, on that supposition, be inferred from the divine
hatred of transgression, that God either hates sin or loves holiness. Again; we may infer from the preceding doctrine, that the atonement of
Christ does not consist essentially in his active or positive obedience.
By atonement I mean that which, as a substitute for the punishment which
is threatened in the law, supports the authority of that law, and the
dignity of the divine government. But the obedience of Christ, even in the
most trying circumstances, without any tokens of the divine displeasure
against the transgressors of the law, would never support the authority of
the law and the dignity of the divine government. It by no means makes it
appear that it is an evil and bitter thing to violate the law, and that
the violation of it deserves, and may be expected to be followed, with
most awful consequences to him who dares to violate it. A familiar example
may illustrate this matter. It is the rule or law of a certain family,
that a particular child shall steadily attend the school kept in the
neighborhood, and that if he absent himself for a day, without license, he
shall feel the rod. However, after some time the child being weary of
observing this law, does absent himself, and spend the day in play. At
night the father being informed of it, arraigns the child, finds him
guilty, and prepares to inflict the punishment which he had threatened. At
this instant, the brother of the offending child intercedes, acknowledges
the reasonableness of the law which his brother hath transgressed,
confesses that he deserves the penalty, but offers himself to make
satisfaction for his brother's offence. Being interrogated by what means
he expects to make satisfaction, he answers, by going himself to school
the next day. Now can any one suppose that in this way the second child
can make satisfaction for the offence of the first? Or that if the father
were to accept the proposal, he would find the authority of his law, and
the government of his family, supported with dignity? Or that the
offending child, or the other children of the family, would by this means
be effectually deterred from future offences of the like nature? And
however trying the circumstances of going to school may be, if those
circumstances be no token of the father's displeasure at the disobedient
child's transgression; still the going to school of the second child, will
not make the least satisfaction for the offence of the first. I venture to say further, that not only did not the atonement of Christ
consist essentially in his active obedience, but that his active obedience
was no part of his atonement, properly so called, nor essential to it. The
perfect obedience of Christ was doubtless necessary in order to the due
execution of his prophetical and priestly office, in order to his
intercession; and also in order that the salvation of his disciples might
be a reward of his obedience. But that it was necessary to support the
authority of the divine law in the pardon of sinners, does not appear. If
Christ himself could possibly have been a sinner, and had first made
satisfaction for his own sin, it does not appear, but that afterward he
might also satisfy for the sins of his people. If the pretender to the
crown of Great Britain should wage war against king George, in the course
of the war should be taken, should be brought to trial, and be condemned
to the block; will any man say that the king of France, by becoming the
substitute of the pretender, and suffering in his stead, could not make
atonement for the pretender, so as effectually to support the authority of
the British laws and government, and discourage all future groundless
pretensions to the British crown? Yet the king of France could plead no
perfect obedience to the British laws. Even the sinner himself, but upon
the supposition of the infinite evil of sin, could, by his own sufferings,
atone for his sins. Yet he could not exhibit a perfect obedience. Besides; if the bare obedience of Christ have made atonement, why could
not the repentance and perfect obedience of Christ's people themselves
have answered, instead of the obedience of Christ? Doubtless if they had
suffered the penalty of the divine law, it would have answered to support
the authority of the law, and the vigor of the divine government, as
really as the death of Christ. And since the eternal sufferings of the
people of Christ would have answered the same end of supporting the
authority of the law as the sufferings of Christ; why would not the
eternal perfect repentance and obedience of the people of Christ, have
answered the same end, as Its obedience in their behalf? If it would, both
the death and obedience of Christ as our substitute, are entirely in vain.
If the elect had only been converted, and made perfectly and perseveringly
obedient, it would have answered every purpose both of the death and
obedience of Christ. Or if the obedience of Christ in the flesh were at
all necessary, it was not necessary to support the authority of the law
and government of God; but merely as it was most wise that he should obey.
It was necessary in the same sense only, as that the wind should, at this
moment, blow from the north-east, and not from the south-west, or from any
other quarter. If the mere active obedience of Christ have made atonement for sin, it
may be difficult to account for the punishment of any sinners. If
obedience without any demonstration of divine displeasure at sin will
answer every purpose of the divine authority and government, in some
instances, why not in all instances? And if the obedience of sinners
themselves will answer as really as that of Christ, why might not all men
have been led by divine grace to repentance, and perfect subsequent
obedience, and in that way been saved from the curse of the law? Doubtless
they might; nor was there originally, nor is there now, without any
consideration of the atonement of Christ, any other necessity of the
punishment of any of mankind according to the law, than that which results
from mere sovereign wisdom; in which sense, indeed, it was necessary that
Christ should be given to be the Saviour of sinners, that Paul should be
saved, and that every other event should take place, just as it does take
place. From our doctrine we also learn the great gain which accrues to the
universe by the death of Christ. It hath been objected to the idea of
atonement now exhibited, that if the death of Christ be an equivalent to
the curse of the law, which was to have been inflicted on all his people;
then there is on the whole no gain, no advantage to the universe; that all
that punishment from which Christians are saved, hath been suffered by
Christ, and therefore that there is just as much misery and no more
happiness, than there would have been, had Christ not died. To this I
answer, 1. That it is not true that Christ endured an equal quantity of misery
to that which would have been endured by all his people had they suffered
the curse of the law. This was not necessary, on account of the infinite
dignity of his person. If a king were to condemn his son to lose an ear or
a hand, it would doubtless be esteemed, by all his subjects, a proof of
far greater displeasure in the king, than if he should order some mean
criminal to the gallows; and it would tend more effectually to support the
authority of the law, for the violation of which this punishment should be
inflicted on the prince. 2. That if it were true that Christ endured the very same quantity of
misery which was due to all his people; still, by his death, an infinite
gain accrues to the universe. For though the misery, on this supposition,
is in both cases the same, and balances itself; yet the positive happiness
obtained by the death of Christ, infinitely exceeds that which was lost by
Christ. As the eternal Logos was capable of neither enduring misery, nor
losing happiness, all the happiness lost by the substitution of Christ,
was barely that of the man Christ Jesus, during only thirty-three years,
or rather during the three last years of his life: because it does not
appear, but that during the rest of his life he was as happy as men in
general, and enjoyed as much or more good than he suffered evil. But the
happiness gained by the substitution of Christ, is that of a great
multitude, which no man can number, of all nations, kindreds, and people,
and tongues. Rev. 7: 9. Now if the happiness of one man for three years,
or at most for thirty-three years, be equal to that of an innumerable
multitude throughout eternity, with the addition of the greater happiness
which Christ himself must enjoy now that he has brought so many sons to
glory, beyond what he would have enjoyed, if all these had been plunged in
inconceivable and endless misery; then it may be justly said, on the
present hypothesis, that by the substitution of Christ no advantage is
gained to the universe. But if the latter infinitely exceed the former,
the gain to the universe, even on the supposition that the sufferings of
Christ were equal to those to which all his people were exposed, is
infinite. I may also hence take occasion to oppose an opinion which appears to me
erroneous; which is, that the perfect obedience of Christ was in a great
measure designed to show us, that the divine law may be obeyed by men. It
shows, indeed, that it may be obeyed by a man in personal union with the
divine nature. But how does this, show that it may be obeyed by a mere
man? If we should also allow that it shows, that a man born into the world
in perfect innocence, and who is not a fallen creature, may obey the law;
yet how does this prove that it may be obeyed by a fallen creature, dead
in trespasses and sins? It is an undoubted truth, that there is no
inability In men to obey the law, except that which is of a moral nature,
consisting in the disinclination or disaffection of their own hearts,
which does not in the least excuse them in their disobedience. But this is
manifest by other considerations than the per. fect obedience of Christ;
if it were not, it would not be manifest at all. Another remark which naturally offers itself in discoursing on this
subject is, that Christ's obedience to the precepts of the law, without
submitting to the curse, would by no means prove the justice of that
curse. This is the idea of some: that God sent his Son into the world, to
obey the precepts of the law, and that his mere obedience of these proves
the justice both of the precepts and of the penalty of the law. I have
already given the reasons by which I am made to believe, that the
obedience of Christ does not prove the precepts of the law to be just. But
if it did prove the precepts to be just, it would not therefore prove the
penalty too to be just. As the precepts of any law may be just and
reasonable, yet may be enforced by a penalty which is unjust and cruel; so
the proof that the precept is just, does not at all prove but that the
penalty may be unjust and cruel. Indeed as the penalty of any law is
designed to support and enforce the precept of that law, so to prove the
justice of the penalty-, proves the justice of the precept; because not
the slightest penalty can be just, when applied to enforce an unjust
precept. But this rule when inverted, doth not hold good. To prove the
justice of a precept, does by no means prove the justice of the penalty by
which that precept is enforced. So that if Christ have proved the precepts
of the divine law to be just, this by no means infers the justice of its
penalty. On the other hand, if Christ came to prove the justice of the
law, and all that he has done to this effect have an immediate reference
to the precepts only; and if he have done nothing to establish the justice
of the penal part, considered by itself; the aspect of the whole will be,
that the penal part is unjustifiable, and that for this reason he did not
pretend to justify it. The subject which hath been under our consideration also shows us, in
what sense the sufferings of Christ were agreeable to God. It has been
said, that it is incredible that mere pain should be agreeable to a God of
infinite goodness; that therefore the sufferings of Christ were agreeable
to God only as a proof of the strength of the 'virtue of Christ, or of his
disposition to obey the divine law. If by mere pain be meant pain
abstracted from the obedience of Christ, I cannot see why it may not be
agreeable to God. It certainly is in the damned; and for the same reason
might have been, and doubtless was, in the case of our Lord. The Father
was pleased with the pains of his Son, as they were necessary to support
the authority of his law and government, in the salvation of sinners. Another reflection naturally suggested by this subject is, that in
punishing some sinners according to the curse of the law, and in requiring
an adequate atonement in order to the salvation of others, God acts,
notfrom any contracted, selfish motives, but from the most noble
benevolence and regard to the public good. It hath often and long since
been made a matter of objection to the doctrines of the future punishment
of the wicked, and of the atonement of Christ, that they represent the
Deity as having regard merely to his own honor and dignity, and not to the
good of his creatures, and therefore represent him as deficient in
goodness. But can it be pretended to be a proof of goodness in God, to
suffer his own law, which is the perfect rule of virtue, to fall into
contempt? However it might afford relief to some individuals, if God were
to suffer his moral kingdom to be dissolved; can it be for the general
good of the system of his creatures? Is it not manifestly necessary to the
general good of the created system, that God's moral kingdom be upholden?
and that therefore the authority of the divine law, and vigor of the
divine govermment be maintained? If so, then it is also necessary to the
general good that punishments be inflicted on the disobedient and lawless;
or that they be pardoned in consequence only of a proper satisfaction or
atonement. So that those very doctrines which of all others are made matter of the
most objection to the divine goodness or benevolence, are clear proofs of
goodness, and are absolutely necessary to it. If a prince should either
make no laws for the government of his subjects, or should never execute
them, but should suffer all crimes to pass with impunity, you would by no
means esteem him a good prince, aiming at the good of his subjects; you
would not hesitate to pronounce him either very weak or very wicked. In reflecting on this subject, we may notice the reason why so many who
profess to be advocates for the doctrine of atonement, yet place the
atonement in that in which it does by no means consist. The principal
reason seems to be, that they have conceived that the idea of Christ's
having suffered an equivalent to the punishment to which all his people
were exposed, is inconsistent with grace in their pardon. But if I have
been so happy as properly to state the ideas of justice and grace, it
appears that there is as much grace in the pardon of sinners on account of
such an atonement as that just mentioned, as there would be on account of
an atonement consisting in mere obedience; or as there would be in pardon
without any atonement at all. Hence also we see, that the death of Christ in our stead, is nor
useless or in vain. The opposers of Christ's substitution and atonement
assert, that no good end is answered by the sufferings of an innocent,
amiable, and virtuous person, in the stead of the guilty. But surely to
support the authority of the law and of the moral government of God, is
not a vain or unimportant end. It was not in vain that Zaleucus, having
made a law that all adulterers should have both their eyes put out, and
his own son being the first who transgressed, put out one of his own eyes
and one of his son's. Hereby he spared his son in part, and yet as
effectually supported the authority of his law, as if it had been
literally executed. Nor was it in vain that, during the late war, a
soldier in the American army, of a robust constitution, pitying his
fellow-soldier of a slender constitution, who was condemned to receive a
certain number of stripes, petitioned to be put in the place of the
criminal, and actually received the stripes. For the authority of the
martial law was effectually supported, and perhaps by this means, the life
or future health and service of the criminal were preserved, which would
otherwise have been lost. Neither was the death of Christ, in the stead of sinners, any injury
done to an innocent person. As well may we say that Zaleucus, or the
soldier just mentioned, were injured; or that a man is injured when
another man receives the money of him, which he voluntarily tenders in
payment of the debt of a third person; or that a man is injured by the
surgeon, who takes off his leg to preserve his life, the man himself
consenting, and desiring him so to do. Again; we may observe in what sense justice and the divine law are
satisfied by the death of Christ; and in what sense the atonement of
Christ is properly called a satisfaction. It is only the third kind of
justice before mentioned, that is satisfied by the death of Christ. No
man, for the reasons already given, will pretend that commutative justice
is satisfied by Christ; for the controversy between God and the sinner is
not concerning property. Nor is distributive justice satisfied. If it
were, there would indeed be no more grace in the discharge of the sinner,
than there is in the discharge of a criminal, when he hath endured the
full punishment to which, according to law, he hath been condemned. If
distributive justice were satisfied, it would have no further claim on the
sinner. And to punish him, when this kind of justice has no claim on him,
is to treat him more unfavorably or severely than his personal character
deserves. If so, the penitent believer, considered in his own person,
deserves, even according to the strictness of the divine law, no
punishment; and that merely because he repents and believes: and if so,
repentance and faith satisfy the law, or are the curse of it, as I have
already, shown. If distributive justice be satisfied, it admits of no
further punishment, and to punish him further, would be as positively
unjust, as to continue a man's punishment, after he hath endured the full
penalty of any law. If distributive justice be satisfied by Christ, in the
behalf of sinners, then the rule of distributive justice is not the
personal character of a man, but the character of his friend, his
advocate, or representative; any man has a right, on the footing of
distributive justice, to be treated according to the character of his
friend or representative. Therefore if a subject rebel against his
sovereign, and procure a man of a most unexceptionable and amiable
character, to represent him and plead his cause before his severeign, he
has a right, on the footing of distributive justice, to be treated
according to the character of his representative; and if he be not thus
treated, he suffers an injury; he is abused. On this principle, no prince
or magistrate will have a right to punish, for any crime, a subject who
can procure a man of a virtuous life to represent him and plead his
cause. But perhaps it will be said, that distributive justice is satisfied by
the death of Christ, because he placed himself in our stead, and suffered
in our room; and that whenever a person thus substitutes himself for
another, and suffers the punishment due to that other, that other hath a
right to a discharge, as distributive justice is then satisfied. Now,
according to this objection, the true idea of distributive justice is, to
treat a man either according to his own sufferings, or according to the
sufferings of his representative. And if according to the sufferings of
his representative, why not according to the obedience of his
representative? And this brings us just where we were; that every man may,
in justice, demand to be treated according to the character of his
representative; which is absurd. Distributive justice, therefore, is not at all satisfied by the death
of Christ. But general justice to the Deity and to the universe is
satisfied. That is done by the death of Christ which supports the
authority of the law, and renders it consistent with the glory of God and
the good of the whole system, to pardon the sinner. In the same sense the law of God is satisfied by the death of Christ; I
mean as the divine glory and the general good, which are the great ends of
the law, are secured. In this sense only is the atonement of Christ
properly, called a satisfaction; God is satisfied, as by it his glory and
the good of his system are secured and promoted. Objection. But is not distributive justice displayed in the death of
Christ? Answer. The question is ambiguous; if the meaning be, is not
distributive justice satisfied? I answer, for the reasons already given,
in the negative. If the meaning be, is there not an exhibition made in the
death and sufferings of Christ, of the punishment to which the sinner is
justly liable? I answer in the affirmative: distributive justice is, in
this sense, displayed in the death of Christ. But it is no more displayed,
than the punishment of the sinner is displayed in the death of Christ. It may be proper here to notice the sense in which justice admits of
the salvation of sinners. It hath been said, that justice admits of
several things which it does not demand; that it admits of the salvation
of Paul, but does not demand it. And it would admit also of the damnation
of Paul, but does not demand that. But in these instances the word justice
is used in two very different senses, which ought to be carefully
distinguished. When it is said justice admits of the salvation of Paul,
the third kind of justice before described must be intended. The general
good admits it; neither the glory of God, nor the good of the system,
opposes it. But distributive justice, which requires every man to be treated
according to his personal character, does not admit that Paul should be
saved; so far as this kind of justice says any thing concerning this
matter, it demands that Paul be punished according to law: and if this
justice be made the rule of proceeding in the case, Paul will inevitably
be cast off This kind of justice no more admits of the salvation of Paul
than it admits of the salvation of Judas. But it is said, that "justice
admits of the salvation of Paul, but does not demand it." Justice to the
universe does demand it, as fully as admit of it, and the universe would
suffer an injury, if he were not to be saved; but justice to the universe
neither demands nor admits of the salvation of Judas. Whereas distributive
justice to Paul personally, as much demands that be be not saved, as that
Judas be not saved. But if we will make a distinction between what justice admits and what
it demands, the true and only distinction seems to be this: justice admits
of any thing which is not positively unjust; of any favor however great or
manifold; but it demands nothing but barely what is just, without the
least favor, and which, being refused, positive injustice would be done.
Distributive justice, then, admits of the salvation of Judas or of any
other sinner, as surely no injustice would be done Judas in his salvation;
but it demands not this, as it is a mere favor, or something beyond the
bounds of mere justice; or it is no injury to Judas, that he is not saved.
Neither does distributive justice demand the salvation of Paul. But public
justice both admits and demands both the salvation of Paul and the
damnation of Judas. On the other hand, it neither admits nor demands the
damnation of Paul, nor the salvation of Judas. But distributive justice,
according to the present distinction between the meaning of the words
admit and demand, though it admits both of the salvation and damnation of
both Paul and Judas, yet demands neither the salvation nor damnation of
the one or the other; or, to express the same thing in other words, no
injustice would be done either to Paul or Judas personally, if they were
both saved or both damned. Distributive justice never demands the
punishment of any criminal, in any instance; because no injury would be
done him, if he were graciously pardoned. It demands only that a man be
not punished being innocent; or be not punished beyond his demerit; and
that he be rewarded according to his positive merit. These observations may help us to understand a distinction, which to
many hath appeared groundless or perplexing; I mean the distinction of the
merit of conclignity and merit of congruity. Merit of both these kinds
refers to rewards only, and has no reference to punishments; and that is
deserved by a merit of condignity which cannot be withholden without
positive injury. That is deserved by a merit of congruity which is a
proper expression of the sense which the person rewarding has, of the
moral excellency of the person rewarded; which, however, may be withholden
without positive injury. Of the former kind is the merit, which every good
and faithful citizen has, of protection in his person, liberty, and
property, and the merit of a laborer who has earned his wages. These
cannot be withholden without positive injury. Of the latter kind is the
merit, which some eminently wise arid virtuous citizens have, of
distinguishing honors or marks of esteem. If these be withholden, the
proper objects of them may, indeed, be said to be neglected, but not
positively injured. This subject teaches, also, in what sense God was under obligation to
accept, on the behalf of the sinner, the mediation and atonement of
Christ. It hath been said, that when Christ offered to make atonement for
sinners, God was under the same obligation to accept the offer, as a
creditor is to accept the proposal of any man who offers to pay the debt
of another. This is not true; because, in matters of property, all that
the creditor hath a right to is his property. This being offered him, by
whomsoever the offer be made, he has the offer of his right; and if he
demand more, he exceeds his right; and he has no more right to refuse to
give up the obligation, on the offer of a third person to pay the debt,
than to refuse the same when the same offer is made by the debtor himself
All will own, that if a creditor were to refuse to receive payment and
give up the obligation when the debtor offers payment, it would be abusive
and unjust; and let any man assign a reason why it is not equally abusive
and unjust, not to receive the payment and to give up the obligation when
payment is offered by a third person. But it is quite otherwise in atoning for crimes in which distributive,
not commutative justice, is concerned. As the rule of distributive justice
is the personal character of the person to be rewarded or punished, and
not property; if a magistrate refuse to accept any substitute, and insist
on punishing the criminal himself, he treats him no otherwise than
according to his personal character, and the criminal suffers no injustice
or abuse. Nor is the magistrate under any obligation of distributive
justice, or justice to the criminal himself, to accept a substitute. It is true, that the circumstances of the case may be such that it may
be most conducive to the public good that the offered substitute be
accepted; in this case wisdom and goodness or public justice will require
that it be accepted, and the criminal discharged. This leads me to observe that it hath also been said, that when Christ
offered to become a substitute and to make atonement for sinners, God was
under no obligation to accept the proposal. This, I conceive, is as wide
of the truth, as that he was under the same obligation to accept the
proposal, as a creditor is to accept the proposal of a third person to pay
the debt of his friend. The truth is, the glory of God and the greatest
good of the moral system did require that Christ should become a
substitute for sinners, and that his offered substitution should be
accepted by God. This was dictated and recommended by both wisdom and
goodness. So far, therefore, as wisdom and goodness could infer an
obligation on the Father to accept the substitution of his Son, he was
under obligation to accept it. But this obligation was only that of the
third kind of justice before explained, a regard to the general good. This subject further teaches us, that that constitution which requires
an atonement in order to the pardon of the sinner is nothing arbitrary.
That divine constitution which is wise and good, as being necessary to the
good of the moral system, is not arbitrary. But if an atonement was
necessary, in order to support the authority of the divine law, and the
honor, vigor, and even existence of the divine moral government, while
sinners are pardoned, undoubtedly that constitution which requires an
atonement in order to the pardon of the sinner, is the dictate of wisdom
and goodness, and by no means of an arbitrary spirit. Hence we also learn in what sense the death of Christ renders God
propitious to sinners. It does so only as it supports the authority of his
law and government, and renders the pardon of sinners consistent with the
good of the system and the glory of God. Finally; this subject teaches the groundlessness of that objection to
the doctrine of atonement, that it represents the Deity as inexorable. If
to refuse to pardon sinners unless it be in a way which is consistent with
the good of the moral system, is to be inexorable; then that God will not
pardon sinners without atonement, or in a way which is consistent with the
authority of his law, and with the authority and even existence of his
moral government, is indeed a proof that God is inexorable. But unless it
be an instance of inexorability that God will not pardon sinners, unless
it be in a way which is consistent with the good of the moral system,
there is no ground to object to the doctrine of atonement, that it
represents the Deity as inexorable. On the other hand, that God requires
an atonement in order to pardon, is an instance and proof of truly divine
goodness; and if he were to pardon without an atonement, it would prove
that he is destitute of goodness, and regardless not only of his own
glory, but of the true happiness of the system of moral
creatures.