SERMON I.
THE NECESSITY OF ATONEMENT.
IN WHOM WE HAVE REDEMPTION THROUGH HIS BLOOD, THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS,
ACCORDING TO THE RICHES OF HIS GRACE.--Ephesians 1:11.
THE doctrine of the forgiveness of sins is a capital doctrine of the
gospel, and is much insisted on by the writers of the New Testament; above
all, by the author of this epistle. In our text he asserts that we are
forgiven according to the riches of grace; not merely in the exercise of
grace, as the very term forgiveness implies; but in the exercise of the
riches of grace; importing that forgiveness is an act of the most free and
abundant grace. Yet he also asserts that this gratuitous forgiveness is in
consequence of a redemption by the blood of Christ. But how are these two
parts of the proposition consistent? If we be, in the literal sense,
forgiven in consequence of a redemption, we are forgiven on account of the
price of redemption previously paid. How then can we he truly said to be
forgiven; a word which implies the exercise of grace? and especially how
can we be said to be forgiven according to the riches of grace? This is,
at least, a seeming inconsistence. If our forgiveness be purchased, and
the price of it be already paid, it seems to be a matter of debt, and not
of grace. This difficulty hath occasioned some to reject the doctrine of
Christ's redemption, satisfaction, or atonement. Others, who have not been
driven to that extremity by this difficulty, yet have been exceedingly
perplexed and embarrassed. Of these last, I freely confess myself to have
been one. Having from my youth devoted myself to the study of theoretic
and practical theology, this has to me been one of the gordian knots in
that science. How far what shall now be offered towards a solution, ought
to afford satisfaction, is submitted to the judgment of my candid
auditors.
Our text naturally suggests these three inquiries;
Are sinners forgiven through the redemption or atonement of Jesus
Christ only? What is the reason or ground of this mode of forgiveness? Is
this mode of forgiveness consistent with grace, or according to the riches
of grace? Let us consider these in their order.
I. Are we forgiven through the redemption or atonement of Jesus Christ
only? I say redemption or atonement, because, in my view, they mutually
imply each other. That we are forgiven through the atonement of Christ,
and can be forgiven in no other way, the Scriptures very clearly teach.
For evidence as to the first of these particulars, I appeal to the
following passages of Scripture, which are indeed but a few of the many
which exhibit the same truth. First, our text itself: "In whom we have
redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the
riches of his grace." Rom. 3: 24; "Being justified freely by his grace,
through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." Acts 20: 28; "To feed the
church of God, which be hath purchased with his own blood." Heb. 9: 12;
"By his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained
eternal redemption for us." 1 Pet. 1: 18; "Forasmuch as ye know, that ye
were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, but with
the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without
spot." Ibid. chap. 2: 24; "Who his ownself bare our sins in his own body
on the tree, that we, being dead to sin, should live unto righteousness:
by whose stripes ye were healed." Is. 53: 4, 5, 6; "He hath borne our
griefs, and carried our sorrows; he was wounded for our transgressions, he
was bruised for our iniquities, the chastisement of our peace was upon
him, and with his stripes we are healed. The Lord hath laid on him the
iniquity of us all." Ibid. 10, 11, 12; "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise
him; he hath put him to grief; when thou shalt make his soul an offering
for sin, he shall see his seed,--he shall bear their iniquities,--and he
bare the sins of many."
The Scriptures also teach the absolute necessity of the atonement of
Christ, and that we can obtain forgiveness and salvation through that
only. The sacrifices appointed to be made by the ancient Israelites, seem
evidently to point to Christ; and to show the necessity of the vicarious
sacrifice of him, who is therefore said to be "our passover sacrificed for
us;" and to have "given himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to
God, for a sweet-smelling savor;" and "now once in the end of the world to
have appeared, to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." 1 Cor. 5: 7.
Eph. 5: 2. Heb. 9: 26. As the ancient Israelites could obtain pardon in no
other way than by those sacrifices, this teaches us that we can obtain it
only by the sacrifice of Christ.
The positive declarations of the New Testament teach the same truth
still more directly, as Luke 24: 25, 26; "O fools, and slow of heart to
believe all that the prophets have spoken! Ought not Christ to have
suffered these things, and to enter into his glory?" verse 46; "Thus it
behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day." Rom.
3: 25, 26; "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in
his blood, to declare his righteousness,--that he might be just, and the
justifier of him which believeth in Jesus." It seems that God could not
have been just in justifying the believer, had not Christ been made a
propitiation. John 3: 14, 15; "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the
wilderness, so must the Son of man be lifted up." Heb. 9: 22; "Without
shedding of blood is no remission." 1 Cor. 3: 11; "Other foundation can no
man lay, than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ." Acts 4: 12; "Neither
is there salvation in any other: for there is no other name under heaven,
given among men, whereby we must be saved."
The necessity of the death and atonement of Christ sufficiently appears
by the bare event of his death. If his death were not necessary, he died
in vain. But we cannot suppose that either be or his Father would have
consented to his death, had it not been absolutely necessary. Even a man
of common wisdom and goodness, would not consent either to his own death
or that of his son, but in a case of necessity, and in order to some
important and valuable end. Much less can we suppose, that either Christ
Jesus the Son would have consented to his own death, or that the
infinitely wise and good Father would have consented to the death of his
only begotten and dearly beloved Son, in whom his soul was well pleased,
and who was full of grace and truth, the brightness of his own glory, and
the express image of his person, the chiefest among ten thousand, and
altogether lovely, if there had not been the most urgent necessity.
Especially as this most excellent Son so earnestly prayed to the Father to
except him from death, Matt. 20: 39; "0 my father, if it be possible, let
this cup pass from me ! Nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt."
The Son himself hath told us, John 11 : 42, "That the Father heareth him
always:" and therefore we may be sure, that if the condition of his
pathetic petition had taken place, if it had been possible that the
designs of God in the salvation of sinners should be accomplished without
the death of Christ, Christ's prayer, in this instance, would have been
an. swered, and he would have been exempted from death. And since he was
not exempted, we have clear evidence that his death was a matter of
absolute necessity.
The necessity of the atonement of Christ is clearly taught also by the
apostle, Gal. 2: 21; "If righteousness come by the law, then Christ is
dead in vain." It is to no purpose to pretend that the law, in this
passage, means the ceremonial law, because he tells us, chap. 3, 21, "That
if there had been a law given, which could have given life, verily
righteousness should have been by the law." But the moral law was a law
which had been given; and since no law which had been given could give
life, it follows, that forgiveness and life could not be by the moral law,
any more than by the ceremonial, and that if they could, Christ is dead in
vain.
II. Our next inquiry is, what is the reason or ground of this mode of
forgiveness? or why is an atonement necessary in order to the pardon of
the sinner? I answer, it is necessary on the same ground, and for the same
reasons, as punishment would have been necessary, if there had been no
atonement made. The ground of both is the same. The question then comes to
this: Why would it have been necessary, if no atonement had been made,
that punishment should be inflicted on the transgressors of the divine
law? This, I suppose, would have been necessary, to maintain the authority
of the divine law. If that be not maintained, but the law fall into
contempt, the contempt will fall equally on the legislator himself; his
authority will be despised and his government weakened.
And as the contempt shall increase, which may be expected to increase,
in proportion to the neglect of executing the law, the divine government
will approach nearer and nearer to a dissolution, till at length it will
be totally annihilated.
But when moral creatures are brought into existence, there must be a
moral government. It cannot be reconciled with the wisdom and goodness of
God, to make intelligent creatures and leave them at random without moral
law and government. This is the dictate of reason from the nature of
things. Besides the nature of things, we have in the present instance
fact, to assist our reasoning. God hath in fact given a moral law and
established a moral government over his intelligent creatures. So that we
have clear proof, that inflnite wisdom and goodness judged it to be
necessary to put intelligent creatures under moral law and government. But
in order to a moral law, there must be a penalty; otherwise it would be
mere advice, but no law. In order to support the authority and vigor of
this law, the penalty must be inflicted on transgressors. If a penalty be
denounced, indeed, but never inflicted, the law becomes no law, as really
as if no penalty had been annexed to it. As well might no law have been
made or published, as that a law be published, with an the most awful
penalties, and these never be inflicted. Nay, in some respects it would be
much better and more reconcilable with the divine perfections. It would be
more consistent, and show that the legislator was not ignorant, either of
his own want of power to carry a law into effect, or of the rights of his
subjects, or of the boundaries between right and wrong. But to enact a law
and not execute it, implies a weakness of some kind or other; either an
error of judgment, or a consciousness of a depraved design in making the
law, or a want of power to carry it into effect, or some other defect.
Therefore such a proceeding as this is dishonorable and contemptible; and
by it both the law and legislator not only appear in a contemptible light,
but really are contemptible.
Hence, to execute the threatening of the divine law, is necessary to
preserve the dignity and authority of the law, and of the author of it,
and to the very existence of the divine moral government. It is no
impeachment of the divine power and wisdom to say, that it is impossible
for God himself to uphold his moral government over intelligent creatures,
when once his law hath fallen into contempt. He may indeed govern them by
irresistible force, as he governs the material world; but he cannot govern
them by law, by rewards and punishments.
If God maintain the authority of his law, by the infliction of the
penalty, it will appear that he acts consistently in the legislative and
executive parts of his government. But if he were not to inflict the
penalty, he would act, and appear to act, an inconsistent part; or to be
inconsistent with himself. If the authority of the divine law be supported
by the punishment of transgressors, it will most powerfully tend to
restrain all intelligent creatures from sin. But if the authority of the
law be not supported, it will rather encourage and invite to sin, than
restrain from it.
For these reasons, which are indeed all implied in supporting the
dignity and authority of the divine law, it would have been necessary, had
no atonement for sin been made, that the penalty of the law be inflicted
on transgressors.
If in this view of the matter it should be said, though for the reasons
before mentioned it is necessary that the penalty of the law, in many
instances, or in most instances, be inflicted, yet why is it necessary
that it should be inflicted in every instance? Why could not the Deity, in
a sovereign way, without any atonement, have forgiven at least some
sinners? Why could not the authority of the law have been sufficiently
supported, without the punishment of every individual transgressor? We
find that such strictness is not necessary or even subservient to the
public good, in human governments; and why is it necessary in the divine?
To these inquiries I answer by other inquiries. Why, on the supposition of
no atonement, would it have been necessary that the penalty of the law
should be inflicted in any instance? Why could not the Deity, in a
sovereign way, without any atonement, have pardoned all mankind? I presume
it will be granted, for the reasons before assigned, that such a
proceeding as this would be inconsistent with the dignity and authority of
the divine law and government. And the same consequence, in a degree,
follows from every instance of pardon in this mode. It is true the ends of
human governments are tolerably answered, though in some instances the
guilty are suffered to pass with impunity. But as imperfection attends all
human affairs, so it attends human governments in this very particular,
that there are reasons of state which require, or the public good
requires, that gross criminals, in some instances, be dismissed with
impunity, and without atonement. Thus, because the government of David was
weak, and the sons of Zeruiah were too hard for him, Joab, a most
atrocious murderer, could not, during the life of David, be brought to
justice. In other instances, atrocious criminals are pardoned, in order to
obtain information against others still more atrocious and dangerous to
the community. In many instances the principals only, in certain high
crimes, are punished; the rest being led away by artifice and
misrepresentation, are not supposed to deserve punishment. And it is
presumed that, in every instance wherein it is really for the good of the
community to pardon a criminal, without proper satisfaction for his crime,
it is because of either some weakness in the particular state of the
government, under which the pardon is granted; or some imperfection in the
laws of that state, not being adapted to the particular case; or some
imperfection attending all human affairs. But as not any one of these is
supposable in the divine government, there is no arguing conclusively,
from pardons in human governments, to pardons in the divine.
It may be added, that in every instance in human governments in which
just laws are not strictly executed, the government is so far weakened,
and the character of the rulers, either legislative or executive, suffers,
either in point of ability or in point of integrity. If it be granted that
the law is just, and condemns sin to no greater punishment than it
deserves, and if God were to pardon it without atonement, it would seem,
that he did not hate sin in every instance, nor treat it as being what it
really is, infinitely vile.
For these reasons, it appears that it would have been necessary-,
provided no atonement had been made, that the penalty of the law should
have been inflicted, even in every instance of disobedience: and for the
same reasons doubtless was it necessary, that if any sinners were to he
pardoned, they should be pardoned only in consequence of an adequate
atonement. The atonement is the substitute for the punishment threatened
in the law; and was designed to answer the same ends of supporting the
authority of the law, the dignity of the divine moral government, and the
consistency of the divine conduct in legislation and execution. By the
atonement it appears that God is determined that his law shall be
supported; that it shall not be despised or transgressed with impunity;
and that it is an evil and a bitter thing to sin against God.
The very idea of an atonement or satisfaction for sin, is something
which, to the purposes of supporting the authority of the divine law, and
the dignity and consistency of the divine government, is equivalent to the
punishment of the sinner, according to the literal threatening of the law.
That which answers these purposes being done, whatever it be, atonement is
made, and the way is prepared for the dispensation of pardon. In any such
case, God can be just and yet the justifier of the sinner. And that which
is sufficient to answer these purposes has been done for us, according to
the gospel plan, I presume none can deny, who believe that the eternal
word was made flesh and dwelt among us, and that he, the only begotten and
well beloved Son of God, John 1: 14, bare our sins in his own body on the
tree, 1 Peter 2: 24, and gave himself a sacrifice to God for us, Eph. 5:
2.
But perhaps some who may readily grant that what Christ hath done and
suffered is undoubtedly sufficient to atone for the sins of his people,
may also suppose, that if God had seen fit so to order it, we might have
made a sufficient atonement for our own sins. Or whether they believe in
the reality and sufficiency of the atonement of Christ or not, they may
suppose that we might have atoned, or even now may atone, for our own
sins. This hypothesis therefore demands our attention.
If we could have atoned, by any means, for our own sins, it must have
been either by our repentance and reformation, or by enduring a
punishment, less in degree or duration, than that which is threatened in
the law as the wages of sin. No other way for us to atone for our own sins
appears to be conceivable. But if we attend to the subject, we shall find
that we can make no proper atonement in either of these ways.
1. We could not make atonement for our sins by repentance and
reformation. Repentance and reformation are a mere return to our duty,
which we ought never to have forsaken or intermitted. Suppose a soldier
deserts the service into which he is enlisted, and at the most critical
period not only forsakes his general and the cause of his country, but
joins the enemy and exerts himself to his utmost in his cause, and in
direct opposition to that of his country; yet, after twelve months spent
in this manner, he repents and returns to his duty and his former service
: will this repentance and reformation atone for his desertion and
rebellion? will his repentance and return, without punishment, support the
authority of the law against desertion and rebellion, and deter others
from the Eke conduct equally as the punishment of the delinquent according
to law? It cannot be pretended. Such a treatment of the soldier would
express no indignation or displeasure of the general at the conduct of the
soldier; it would by no means convince the army or the world, that it was
a most heinous crime to desert ind join the standard of the enemy. Just so
in the case under consideration. The language of forgiving sinners barely
on their repentance is) that he who sins shall repent; that the curse of
the law is repentance; that he who repents shall suffer, and that he
deserves, no further punishment. But this would be so far from an
effectual tendency to discourage and restrain from sin, that it would
greatly encourage to the commission and indulgence of it; as all that
sinners would have to fear, on this supposition, would be not the wrath of
God, nor any thing terrible, but the greatest blessing to which any man in
this life can attain, repentance. If this were the condition of forgiving
sinners, not only no measures would be taken to support the divine law,
but none to vindicate the character of God himself, or to show that he
acts a consistent part, and agreeably to his own law; or that he is a
friend to virtue and an enemy to vice. On the other hand, he would rather
appear as a friend to sin and vice, or indifferent concerning them. What
would you think of a prince who should make a law against murder, and
should threaten it with a punishment properly severe, yet should declare
that none who should be guilty of that crime and should repent, should be
punished? or if he did not positively declare this, yet should in fact
suffer all murderers, who repented of their murders, to pass with
impunity? Undoubtedly you would conclude that he was either a very weak or
a very wicked prince; either that he was unable to protect his subjects,
or that he had no real regard to their lives or safety, whether in their
individual or collective capacity.
2. Neither could we make atonement by any sufferings short of the full
punishment of sin. Because the very idea of atonement is something done,
which, to the purpose of supporting the authority of the law, the dignity
and consistency of divine government and conduct, is fully equivalent to
the curse of the law, and on the round of which, the sinner may be saved
from that curse. But no sufferings endured by the sinner himself, short of
the curse of the law, can be to these purposes equivalent to that curse;
any more than a less number or quantity can be equal to a greater. Indeed
a less degree or duration of suffering endured by Christ the Son of God,
may, on account of the infinite dignity and glory of his person, be an
equivalent to the curse of the law endured by the sinner; as it would be a
far more striking demonstration of a king's displeasure, to inflict, in an
igmominious manner, on the body of his own son, forty stripes save one,
than to punish some obscure subject with death. But when the person is the
same, it is absurd to suppose that a less degree or duration of pain can
be equal to a greater, or can equally strike terror into the minds of
spectators, and make them fear and no more do any such wickedness. Deut.
13: 11.
Besides; if a less degree or duration of punishment, inflicted on the
sinner, would answer all the purposes of supporting the authority of the
divine law, &c., equally as that punishment which is threatened in the
law; it follows that the punishment which is threatened in the law is too
great, is unjust, is cruel and oppressive; which cannot be as long as God
is a just being.
Thus it clearly appears, that we could never have atoned for our own
sins. If therefore atonement be made at all, it must be made by some other
person: and since, as we before argued, Christ the Son of God hath been
appointed to this work-, we may be sure that it could be done by no other
person of inferior dignity.
It may be inquired of those who deny the necessity of the atonement of
Christ, whether the mission, work, and death of Christ were at all
necessary in order to the salvation of sinners. If they grant that they
were necessary, as they exhibit the strongest motives to repentance, I ask
further, could not God by any revelation or motives otherwise, whether
externally or internally exhibited, lead sinners to repentance? We find he
did in fact, without the mission, work, and death of Christ, lead the
saints of the Old Testament to repentance. And doubtless in the same way,
he might have produced the same effect, on men of modern times. Why then
doth the Scripture say, "Other foundation can no man lay, than that is
laid, which is Jesus Christ:" and, "neither is there salvation in any
other?" If it be said that these texts are true, as God hath seen fit to
adopt and establish this mode of salvation, it occurs at once, that then
it may with equal truth be said, concerning those who were converted by
the preaching of Paul, other foundation could no man lay, for their
salvation, than the apostle Paul. In this sense, too, every event which
ever takes place, is equally necessary as the mission and death of Christ:
and it was in no other sense necessary, that Christ should be sent and
die, than that a sparrow should fall, or not fall, to the ground. In
short, to say that the mission and death of Christ were necessary, because
God had made this constitution, is to resolve all into the sovereignty of
God, and to confess that no reason of Christ's mission and death is
assignable.
Besides, if the mission, death, and resurrection of Christ, and the
knowledge of them, he, by divine constitution, made necessary to the
salvation of sinners, this will seem to be wholly inconsistent with the
fundamental principle of the system of those who deny the atonement of
Christ; I mean the principle, that it is not reconcilable with the
perfections of God to refuse a pardon to any who repent. If bare
repentance and reformation be the ground of pardon, doubtless all who
repent, though ever so ignorant of Christ, his death and resurrection, and
of the motives to repentance therein exhibited, are entitled to pardon;
and if so, in what sense will the Socinians say, the mission and death of
Christ are necessary to pardon? Not, surely, as purchasing salvation, for
even those who are ignorant of them; this is abhorrent to their whole
system. Not as exhibiting the strongest motives to repentance; because, in
the case now supposed, these motives are perfectly unknown. And they will
not say, it is impossible for any to repent who are ignorant of
Christ.
Again, how is it more consistent with the divine perfections to confine
pardon and salvation to the narrow limits of those who know and are
influenced by the motives to repentance, implied in the death and
resurrection of Christ, than to the limits of those who repent and depend
on the atonement of Christ?
It may be further inquired of those gentlemen mentioned above, whether
the pardon of the penitent be according to the divine law, or according to
the gospel. If it be a constitution of the law, that every penitent be
pardoned, what then is the gospel? And wherein does the grace of the
latter, exceed that of the former? Besides, is it not strange to suppose
that bare law knows any thing of repentance and of the promise of pardon
on repentance? Surely such a law must be a very gracious law; and a very
gracious law, and a very gracious gospel, seem to be very nearly one and
the same thing. It has been commonly understood that the divine law is the
rule of justice. If so, and it be a provision of the law that every
penitent be acquitted from punishment; then surely there is no grace at
all in the acquittal of the penitent, as the gentlemen, to whom I now
refer, pretend there is none on the supposition of the satisfaction of
Christ. Again, if the law secure impunity to all penitents, then all the
terror or punishment which the law threatens, is either repentance itself,
or that wise and wholesome discipline which is necessary to lead to
repentance; these are the true and utmost curse of the law. But neither of
these is any curse at all; they are at least among the greatest blessings
which can be bestowed on those who need them. But if it be granted that
the bare law of God does not secure pardon to the penitent, but admits of
his punishment, it will follow that the punishment of the penitent would
be nothing opposed to justice. Surely God hath not made an unjust law. It
also follows, that to punish the penitent would be not at all inconsistent
with the divine perfections; unless God hath made a law which cannot, in
any instance, be executed consistently with his own perfections. And if
the punishment of the penitent, provided no atonement had been made, would
not be inconsistent with justice, or with the perfections of God, who will
say, that the pardon of the penitent, on the sole footing of an atonement,
is inconsistent with either?
If neither strict justice, nor the divine law founded on justice, nor
the divine perfections, without an atonement, secure pardon to all who
repent, what will become of the boasted argument of the Socinians, against
the atonement, that God will certainly pardon and save, and that it is
absurd and impious to suppose, that he will not pardon and save all who
repent? Are the Socinians themselves certain, that God will not do that
which eternal justice, his own law, and his own perfections, allow him to
do? The dilemma is this:--eternal justice either requires that every
penitent be pardoned in consequence of his repentance merely, or it does
not. If it do require this, it follows, that pardon is an act of justice
and not of grace; therefore let the Socinians be forever silent on this
head. It also follows, that repentance answers, satisfies, fulfils, the
divine law, so that, in consequence of it, the law has no further demand
on the sinner. It is therefore either the complete righteousness of the
law, or the complete curse of the law; for cursed is every one that
continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them. It
also follows, that sin is no moral evil. Doubtless that which deserves no
punishment, or token of the divine displeasure, is no moral evil. But the
utmost that justice, on this hypothesis, requires of the sinner, is
repentance, which is no token of the divine displeasure, but an
inestimable blessing. It also follows, that as eternal justice is no other
than the eternal law of God, grace and truth, life and immortality came
and were brought to light by Moses, since the law came by him; that the
law contains exceeding great and precious promises, which promises
however, exceeding great and precious as they are, are no more than
assurances, that we shall not be injured. It follows, in the last place,
that justice and grace, law and gospel, are perfectly synonymous
terms.
Or if the other part of the dilemma be taken, that eternal justice does
not require that every penitent be pardoned; who knows but that God may
see fit to suffer justice, in some instances, to take place? who will say
that the other divine perfections are utterly inconsistent with justice?
or that wisdom, goodness, and justice cannot co-exist in the same
character? or that the law of God is such that it cannot be executed in
any instance, consistently with the divine character? These would be bold
assertions indeed; let him who avows them, at the same time prove them.
Indeed he must either prove these assertions, or own that justice requires
the pardon of every penitent, and abide the consequences; or renounce the
doctrine, that the divine perfections require that every penitent be
pardoned, without an atonement. |